

Fo 371/118978

117595

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OUT

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOWEn clair  
& by bag.DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

JK 1197/218

No. 956

D. 7.50 p.m. June 14, 1956.

June 14, 1956

Addressed to Moscow telegram No. 956 of June 14.And to Washington No. 2899.Repeated for information to POMEF Beirut  
Bagdad Amman  
and Saving to Damascus No. 361  
Jedda No. 212Cairo telegram No. 985 [of June 9] National  
Day Celebrations.

No Minister will be attending.

2. Sir Brian Robertson has been personally invited  
by Colonel Nasser and has accepted.DISTRIBUTED TO:African Department  
Northern Department

FS 371/118978

SECRET

JE 1197 25

FROM MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir W. Hayter  
No. 737  
June 11, 1956

D: 1.05 p.m. June 11, 1956  
R: 2.11 p.m. June 11, 1956

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

RECEIVED IN C.B.  
11 JUN 1956  
SENT TO DEPT.  
11/6

Your telegram No. 927. *JE 1197/226*  
Following for Prime Minister.

I was very much in two minds about the right course on this. It seemed to me highly unlikely that the Soviet Government would cancel Shepilev's visit, particularly as it has now been publicly announced. Also I thought it quite likely that if I spoke to Bulganin about it he would tell the Egyptians I had done so. Finally there was the secondary consideration that it might make my future relations with Shepilev awkward if, before I had even been able to pay my first official call on him, I had gone behind his back to Bulganin on a matter in which he was so intimately concerned.

2. On the other hand it seemed possible that even if we could not induce Shepilev to give up his journey a hint to Bulganin might ensure that he behaved discreetly in Cairo.

*JE 1197/216*

3. Just as I was due <sup>to write</sup> to leave for the Kremlin to deliver your message to Bulganin about Palestine (see my immediately preceding telegram) I saw a repetition of Cairo telegram No. 985 which suggested that even Nasser was anxious to avoid embarrassments in connexion with Shepilev's new inevitable visit. This seemed to make it even less desirable for me to weigh in too strongly here, particularly as if the Russians told the Egyptians we had done so this might diminish Nasser's willingness not to embarrass us.

4. Accordingly at the end of our conversation about Palestine I said to Bulganin that I was sorry it had not been possible for me to see Shepilev before he left for Cairo

/ as

FO 371 118978 117595

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1	2	3	4	5	6



1. A. D. Johnson 12/6  
2. R. G. ... 12/6  
3. L. ... 5

118978

10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall,

June 10, 1956.

Dear Palliser, 11/6

On Saturday the Prime Minister agreed a draft telegram to Moscow about the Canal Zone evacuation celebrations, prepared by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick. This was sent to the Resident Clerk at the Foreign Office for despatch, but its despatch was held because in the meantime telegram No. 985 and later 988 from Cairo had arrived. The Prime Minister is not disposed to agree that Mr. Nutting should go to Egypt, but he thinks it would be well to modify the telegram to Moscow to the extent of authorising Sir William Hayter to take this action only if he thought right. The main purpose of the telegram would be to secure Sir William Hayter's views on the desirability of making this approach. He is anxious that Sir William Hayter's views should be available in time for the matter to be discussed if necessary at Cabinet on Tuesday.

J Green  
11/6/56

J. H. O. ...

This letter is to confirm the conversation which I had with the Resident Clerk this afternoon. I asked him if he would put the Prime Minister's views to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick and if he agreed, to despatch the modified telegram to Moscow accordingly.

This was done.  
See FO file  
to  
11/6

Yours sincerely,  
No. 11/6/56

A.M. Palliser, Esq.,  
Foreign Office.

11/6/56

37/118978

SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL  
DISTRIBUTION

No. 927- *25 1197/27* D. 4.55 p.m., June 10, 1956.  
June 10, 1956.

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

Following from Prime Minister.

I am afraid that it may be regarded as almost provocative of the new Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs to elect that his first visit abroad should be paid to Egypt at the time of the celebration of the evacuation of the canal zone.

2. I am aware that Russia enjoys friendly relations with Egypt and that the Minister for Foreign Affairs is within his rights in paying the visit. But the evacuation of the base is the result of a freely negotiated agreement and not a victory for Nasser, as Egyptian propaganda seeks to depict. What I fear is that the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, by his presence, will be associated with a dishonest anti-British manifestation. This I should deplore in the present state of our improved Anglo-Soviet relations.

3. You may consider that to represent these considerations to Marshal Bulganin might be construed and resented as an attempt to interfere in the conduct of Soviet foreign relations. I would like you to consider urgently the value of such representations. If you think they would do good, please speak to Marshal Bulganin accordingly, emphasising that you are making friendly representations and that what preoccupies me is the impact of the proposed visit on Anglo-Soviet relations. The presence of Soviet Ambassador would not have a prejudicial effect. But the appearance of the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs on his first visit abroad is what would worry me. If however you think it would serve no useful purpose to speak on these lines, please report to me urgently. If you decide to act, I would like you to report the result of your representations by 10 a.m. G.M.T. Tuesday.

[Copies sent to No. 10 Downing Street]

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African Department

SSSSS

60 371 118978

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SECRETARY OF STATE

*has seen - Mr. Bone*

JUN 7 11 18 AM '56

You asked me to remind you to take up with the Jordanians the question of Ali Abu Nuwar's visit to Egypt for the 19th of June celebrations. You said that you were beginning to think that they should be told that there was an end to our patience and that it had just about been reached with this visit.

I am sending a copy of this to the Department and asking them to submit on it.

*JAN Green*

June 4, 1956.

Copy to:

Mr. Shuckburgh

Levant Dent.

*Discussed with S. J. S. I wrote a long memo to Mr. P.M. A few days ago submitting separately a P.L. on 4/11/56. to Com. Mr. Riv. Sec.*

P0371/118978

CONFIDENTIAL

J E 1197/20

JUNE 19 CELEBRATIONS IN CAIRO

The Secretary of State has minuted to the Prime Minister that he would make further enquiries of the Ambassador in Cairo about the likelihood of the Evacuation Celebrations in Cairo being conducted without anti-British speeches. The Prime Minister is especially concerned because of the invitation to General Ali Abu Nuwwar of Jordan to attend.

2. Sir H. Trevelyan suggested (Flag A) that we might send him instructions in due course. I think he should clearly go. This is an Anglo-Egyptian occasion and the Egyptians have carried out their side of the bargain.
3. I submit a draft telegram to Cairo.
4. Levant Department agree.

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
June 5, 1956

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
5/6

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
5.6.

Tel., as amended by Minister of State,  
sent for despatch.

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
7/6.



P 0371/118978

This was discussed at Cabinet  
this morning. It was agreed that  
Mr Ambassador at Cairo not have  
to attend the celebrations. This matter  
is not now required.

PM/56/116

PRIME MINISTER

Jordan

JE 1197/18/13 7/6

Sh...  
- J...  
S...  
8/6

You suggested that we might take up with the  
Jordanians the question of Ali Abu Nuwar's visit to  
Egypt for the celebrations on June 18 (Amman tel. no.  
819).

2. I agree that this is an unpleasant business.  
The Egyptians have been told that if they use the  
occasion to gloat, it will have a very bad effect here.  
Fawzi reacted well and suggested that we should have  
nothing to complain about. There has been some  
evidence that they may be preparing a "new look" policy  
for that occasion.

3. It seems to me that our Ambassador will have to go  
to the celebrations if asked. After all, we claimed  
at the time that the Agreement was in our own interests.  
I do not think we ought to appear to be assuming in  
advance that it is going to be an anti-British occasion.

4. I am making further enquiries. Meanwhile I do  
not think we should say anything to the Jordanians.  
Nuwar is going to Bagdad shortly and we are urging  
the Iraqis to try to get their claws into him.

June 6, 1956

6371/118978

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

VJ12011/15

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Duke  
No. 834  
June 6, 1956.

D. 5.06 p.m. June 6, 1956.  
R. 6.25 p.m. June 6, 1956.

PRIORITY  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 834 of June 6.

Repeated for information to Bagdad

Cairo

Beirut

Damascus

and Saving to P.O.M.E.F. Paris

Washington Jedda.

Ali Abu Nuwar, Chief of the General Staff, Arab Legion, told me this morning that he was not (repeat not) going to Cairo for the forthcoming celebrations though he had been invited. He said he had been once and that was enough. Anyway he had too much to do. He was shortly going to Bagdad where military talks must take place before Nuri left on June 17 and he was also expecting a visit shortly from Syrian Chief of Staff to arrange practical implementation of Jordan's recent military agreement with Syria.

Foreign Office pass Bagdad 277, Cairo 245, Beirut 213, Damascus 138 and Saving to P.O.M.E.F. 77, Washington 132, Paris 166 and Jedda 43.

[Repeated to Bagdad, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus and Saving to P.O.M.E.F., Washington, Paris and Jedda.

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- Levant Department
- African Department
- Eastern Department

mmmm



Registry No. JET 1197/20

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Date and time (C.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s).....

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IMMEDIATE  
PRIORITY  
ROUTINE  
with priority  
without  
DEFERRED

(Date) .....  
Despatched.....

Draft.  
Telegram to:

CAIRO

No. 1560

(Date) 7/6

And to:—

[Security classification] Confidential  
—if any

[Codeword—if any] ~~Secret~~

Addressed to..... Cairo

telegram No..... (date)

repeated for information to.....

Repeat to:— Flag A

Your letter of May 10 to Watson  
June 18 Celebrations

This question has been considered by ministers, who agree that for you to be the only absentee would be a mistake. If, however, any allied Arab Ambassador should refuse the invitation, we would like to reconsider the matter. Otherwise you should, if invited, attend.

2. I have noted Fawzi's assurance that the occasion would be handled correctly (your telegram No. 881) and Nasser's evasion of the suggestion that a helpful statement might be made (your telegram No. 908). We need hardly point out the particular importance of the proprieties being observed, and I would hope that you might find a suitable occasion to rub into the Egyptians that it can only further damage relations if the celebrations turn into an anti-British demonstration.

EMERGENCY  
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Cypher

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Flag B

Copies to:— Flag C

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Dictated  
by Minister  
of State.

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Asst. Secy.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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45371 F.O.P. (4)

6371/118978

TOP SECRET

TE  
1197  
21  
G

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan  
No. 985  
June 9, 1956

D: 10.15 a.m. June 9, 1956  
R: 12.02 p.m. June 9, 1956

IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 985 of June 9.

Repeated for information to Moscow Washington  
P.O.M.E.F. Bagdad  
and Saving to Amman Beirut  
Damascus Jodda

RECEIVED IN C.B.  
11 JUN 1956  
SENT TO DEPT.  
N/C

NS 1021/44 (copy below)

My telegram No. 982: Evacuation Celebrations.

Hassansin Heykal, the journalist-confidant of Nasser, told the Oriental Counsellor last night that the Egyptians had assumed that there was no longer any question of Shepilev coming here: he had been invited a considerable time ago as the editor of Pravda. On enquiry they had discovered he intended to come in spite of his change of status. Heykal described this development as a "disaster".

2. Emphasizing that it was his own idea, he enquired whether there was any chance of the Minister of State or the Secretary of State for War, as the persons who had signed the heads of agreement and the agreement respectively, accepting an invitation to attend and thus neutralizing the effect of Shepilev's presence. Heykal added that care would be taken of our susceptibilities in the speeches on the occasion and that even some friendly reference would be included. The arrangements for the celebrations had been quickly altered in order not to give Shepilev the place of honour.

3. The Oriental Counsellor pointed out that time was extremely short and that it would not be easy for a Minister of the Crown to accept an invitation after the prolonged Egyptian propaganda attacks on us. Heykal, however,

/ telephoned

TOP SECRETCairo telegram No. 985 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

telephoned later saying that he had discussed his idea with Nasser. The latter had approved it and was prepared to invite Mr. Nutting, who had signed the agreement and whom he knew better than Mr. Head. The Oriental Counsellor asked him not to raise false hopes.

4. Hoykal has also stated that he had, on June 7, discussed with Nasser the question of Shell exploration licenses and was sure that the matter would be satisfactorily settled after the plebiscite on June 23; meanwhile it was important that this possibility should not be mentioned to the companies.

Foreign Office please pass to Moscow, Washington and Bagdad as my telegrams Nos. 8, 106 and 107 respectively:

[Repeated to Moscow, Bagdad and Saving to Washington].

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African Department  
Northern Department  
Levant Department

ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary  
Minister of State  
Sir I. Kirkpatrick  
Mr. Shuckburgh  
Head of African Department  
Resident Clerk

4444

P. 6371/118978

Mr. Wilton

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan

No. 881

May 22, 1956

D.5.26 p.m. May 23, 1956

R.8. 4 p.m. May 23, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 881 of May 22

Repeated for information Saving to:- Washington

P.O.M.E.F.

Anglo-Egyptian Relations.

The Foreign Minister this morning himself raised the question of the state of Anglo-Egyptian relations, making it clear that he wanted something to be done to improve them. He repeated my previous argument to him that there were in fact no specifically Anglo-Egyptian questions of importance on which we were at odds with each other, and that we should strengthen our economic relations as far as we could and try and resolve any other points at issue. He hoped for instance that the question of compensation for dismissed British officials would shortly be at last settled. He claimed that the Egyptian Government were not hostile to our interests and, in particular, were fully in agreement that Western economic interests in oil should be preserved. He said that they realised that the oil supporting the Western European economy was vitally important and that it would be foolish for them to overlook this. He went on to say that there were no problems of real importance in British relations with other Arab States. He was glad to see that our relations with Saudi Arabia were improving, even if all questions between us were not yet regulated, and he felt that our differences with the Yemen could be solved. They would be glad to do what they could to help in this. He said that he thought that it was time for me to have another conversation with Colonel Nasser to go over the ground that I had discussed with him (Fawzi) recently and that, if I would make a request for such an interview, he would arrange it.

/2...

P0371/118978

CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 881 to Foreign Office

-2-

2. I said that as he knew, we wanted good relations. The main trouble was that what came out in the Egyptian press and broadcasts was quite inconsistent with their declarations that they were not opposed to our interests. How could they expect their declarations to me to carry conviction outside Egypt if at the same time they registered public horror that Aden might remain in the British Commonwealth and exhorted the oil-producing countries to get rid of Imperialist exploitation of their oil? I developed this theme at some length and the Minister made no very serious reply, but he asked me whether the broadcasts had not improved lately. I said that on the whole they were better, though there was still some objectionable material appearing, much of it being extracts from leading articles in the Egyptian press. He said that he would make further attempts to improve this situation, making excuses to the effect that by no means everything in the press was directed by the Government and referring to the forthcoming removal of press control.

3. On the Yemen I said that it was open to the Yemeni Government to raise matters with us at any time. They had not replied to our request, which had been outstanding for months, that they should say what they wanted to discuss. They would not receive a British Minister at Taiz and they kept our Chargé d'Affaires at arms length. I gave him no encouragement to believe that we wanted Egyptian mediation and said that any discussions between us and the Yemen must clearly be direct, to which he agreed.

4. I then referred to the forthcoming celebrations of the evacuation on June 18, 19 and 20 and said that the way in which these functions were handled would be of importance. If the opportunity was taken for a certain type of rhetoric, then the situation would obviously deteriorate further. There was, however, an opportunity to use this occasion constructively and to emphasize that the agreement between our two countries had been carried out meticulously and smoothly and that our relations should now be founded on the words of the preamble to this agreement. I added that, if there were to be any  
/celebrations...



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CONFIDENTIALCairo telegram No. 881 to Foreign Office

-3-

celebrations to which the diplomatic corps were invited, I trusted that I should not be subjected to any embarrassment. The Minister replied that they would handle the matter most correctly and that both he and I might speak to Colonel Nasser on these lines.

5. I have asked for an interview with Colonel Nasser in view of the Foreign Minister's initiative. I shall emphasize that I am doing it on my own account and have had no recent instructions to speak to him.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington as my telegram No. 201.

[Repeated Saving to Washington]

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African Department  
Economic Relations Department  
Eastern Department  
News Department

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60371/118978

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AMENDED DISTRIBUTION - May 28, 1956.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP.

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND  
WHITEHALL SECRET  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan  
No: 908  
May 27, 1956.

D: 8.12 p.m. May 27, 1956.  
R: 10.12 p.m. May 27, 1956.

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 908 of May 27

Repeated for information Saving to: Washington  
P.O.M.E.F.

My two immediately preceding telegrams: Anglo Egyptian relations.

Following is a continuation of Nasser's points.

2. Nasser denied that the Egyptians had made any suggestion that the recent Egyptian-Saudi-Yemeni pact was directed against the United Kingdom. I replied that, while I admitted that there was no official statement made to suggest this, it was the tenour of Egyptian propaganda that this was a diplomatic defeat for the British and that he should realise the effect created in London by this propaganda. He said that the accusations made against him about Aden and Bahrain were totally without foundation, implying that he was taking no action against us there. He then repeated, as applying to his own position, the story of the man who had been sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for murder. On his release from gaol, he met the man whom he was supposed to have murdered, took out his revolver and shot him. I said that it might be that he was believed to have done things which he had not done; but that that was the result of his propaganda, he would have seen a report in the Times from Amman that Egypt had, in the opinion of the correspondent, probably much less to do with Glubb's dismissal than had been originally thought. But it was perfectly natural for people to suspect that it had been entirely engineered by Egypt, in view of the concentrated attack on Glubb by the Voice of the Arabs 10 days before the event. He replied that this, as he had told me, was the result of the evidence which he had received of Glubb's anti-Egyptian speeches in the Legion. He then complained that you had apparently believed that he knew all about Glubb's dismissal on your first evening's conversation on March 1. This was not true. He had not known until after the conversation.

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SECRET

Cairo telegram No. 908 to Foreign Office

-2-

3. Apart from saying that he had read the debates on the Suez Canal and the High Dam, he had no comments on these questions. He said little on the Bagdad Pact except that his offer to stop propaganda against it in return for an understanding that it would be "frozen" was quite genuine. He repeated that he did not want to deprive us of the oil which we needed. He also again took the line that in general he had no policy. He agreed that there were no specifically Anglo Egyptian questions outstanding but said that they could not treat Egypt as being something completely apart and could not ignore the area around Egypt. His approach to the problems of the area was strategic and he thought about it as a soldier. I asked him to elucidate and he gave as an example his opposition to the Bagdad Pact, saying that he regarded it as designed progressively to isolate Egypt.

4. As another irritation to him he quoted the Foreign Office spokesman's statement that the British Government had no intention of inviting him to England, and referred to the remark by the Secretary of State for War on his visit in March that he should visit England sometime. He said that he had been asked by Thompson (his English publicity agent) whether he would object to visiting the United Kingdom. He had naturally replied that he would not without intending it to be assumed that he was angling for an invitation. The Daily Sketch had then distorted this and the Foreign Office spokesman had made the comment quoted above. I said that the Foreign Office spokesman could hardly have said less without some correspondent interpreting it as indicating that the British Government were about to issue an invitation. He did not pursue the point.

5. He said that it would be difficult for him to make any statement indicating friendship to the United Kingdom without somebody saying that this was his response to pressure and that it paid to be tough with Nasser. He referred to the cries for a gun-boat policy in the British Press. This, he said, was a suitable policy for Farouk but not for him who had no throne, no hereditary position and no property. Moreover, he could not go on describing his views since when he did so he was regarded as being double faced and tricky. He would, therefore, give no further interviews to British Press representatives for publication.

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SECRETCairo telegram No. 908 to Foreign Office

-3-

6. He now felt that British policy was hostile to him and cited

- (a) the Prime Minister's statement of March 7;
- (b) the Foreign Office spokesman's statement of March 25;
- (c) the campaign in the British Press;
- (d) his report of the Prime Minister's suggestions to Bulganin about arms for Egypt;
- (e) the statement by Mr. Horne (sic) of the British Embassy Washington in a speech to some public institute in which he described Colonel Nasser as Public Enemy No. 1 (I interjected that it was ridiculous for him to deduce Her Majesty's Government's policy from an alleged statement of a member of a British Embassy abroad at some function of no importance) He would not submit to pressure and was not afraid of a tough policy.

7. I answered all these points on the lines of my immediately preceding telegram and ended by saying that I hoped we could continue the discussion at a dinner on the lines of our previous dinners, at the house of the Oriental Counsellor before he went on leave. He said that he had no objection.

Pass to Washington as my telegram No. 210 Saving.

[Repeated Saving to Washington].

SECRET

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J

FROM POLITICAL OFFICE WITH THE MIDDLE EAST FORCES (NICOSIA) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Shattock  
No. 131  
February 29, 1956

D: 10.10 a.m. February 29, 1956  
R: 10.39 a.m. February 29, 1956

PRIORITY  
SECRET

JE 1194  
JK

Your telegram No. 358: Evacuation from British Bases in the Middle East. JE 1197/126

I discussed this with Commanders-in-Chief at B.D.C.C.(M.E.) meeting yesterday. They made following observations and suggestions on publicity.

(a) Egypt.

29/2 Last fighting units will be leaving Egypt in the first week of April; not mid-March as mentioned in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 324 to Bagdad. It would be desirable in publicity to make no differentiation between fighting units and garrison forces, but simply stick to numbers.

(b) Iraq.

In case anything now unforeseen causes R.A.F. units to remain longer than is intended, Her Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad and other posts might defer any publicity until the day the withdrawal begins. At the moment this is planned for "before the end of April".

2. As regards the movement of Army or Air Force units to Jordan (paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 324 to Bagdad) none are planned to coincide with the withdrawal of Her Majesty's forces from Egypt.

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- African Department
- Levant Department
- Eastern Department
- Information Policy Department
- Regional Advisers
- P.U.S.D.
- News Department

4444

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BRITISH EMBASSY, CAIRO

INFORMATION OFFICE

*For Immediate Release*

I.

A MORE DETAILED REVIEW OF THE  
STAGES IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF  
BRITISH FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT

In the Summer of 1954 the British Forces stationed in the Canal Base totalled 88,000. Four Garrison areas flanked the Suez Canal, with a fifth at Tel El Kebir, while Royal Air Force airfields were in use at Shallufa, Kabrit, Kasfareet, Fayid, Deversoir, Ismailia and Abu Sueir. By the end of the first four month phase in the withdrawal of British Servicemen - one year ago - more than the agreed 22% of these forces had left for home or for other stations throughout the Middle East. By January of 1955 Shallufa Airfield and the British Army's Jerrican Factory at Fanara had passed to the Egyptian authorities.

In the ensuing months withdrawal has proceeded steadily. The spring saw all British Troops out of Suez and by mid-April all the major installations south of Geneifa had passed to the Egyptian Forces, or had been sold by private tender under the terms of the Agreement.

As the second phase ended on 18th June 1955, civilian technicians of the Suez Contracting Companies were actively preparing for the take-over of the major installations they were to control. Discussions with the Egyptian Army Eastern Command on such subjects as security, labour laws and the recruitment of local employees were well advanced, while the withdrawal of British Servicemen and families continued ahead of schedule. The 9th June saw the last big ceremonial parade held by British Troops in Egypt when the Trooping the Colour ceremony marked the Official Birthday of H.M. the Queen.

Following a period of close cooperation with the Army, the Suez Contractors took over their first installation on September 29, 1955, when the Engineer Base Group at Fanara passed to the Suez Contractors. On the following day an impressive ceremony marked the hand-over of 2 Base Workshops at Tel El Kebir by the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. By the beginning of this year all the installations scheduled to be operated by British civilian technicians had been handed over. In addition the Egyptian Air Force had taken over the big fighter bases at Deversoir and Kabrit.

By last Christmas all British Service families had left the Garrisons of Fayid and Tel El Kebir; the Garrisons themselves closed in January as the last British Troops left the area. Air trooping switched to Abu Sueir when Fayid Airfield closed to air traffic on December 3, 1955.

More than 270 separate embarkations had taken place from Port Said and Adabiya between the signing of the Agreement and the beginning of 1956. Of the forces stationed in the Base on the date of signature, General Headquarters, Middle East Land Forces, two Infantry Divisions, and numerous administrative units have re-deployed by sea and air. Similarly Headquarters, Middle East Air Force, has departed, together with more than three quarters of the squadrons and ancillary units of the Royal Air Force.

Now with only four months of the withdrawal schedule to run, remaining British Army units are located at Moascar, El Ballah and Port Said. The Royal Air Force occupy only three installations.



BRITISH EMBASSY, CAIRO

INFORMATION OFFICE

For Immediate Release

II.

HISTORICAL NOTE ON THE FACTORS  
LEADING TO THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN  
AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 19, 1954

(1882 to 1954)

The end on June 18 of the fifth and final 4-month period of withdrawal of British forces from Egypt, in accordance with the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of October 19, 1954 will close an era which opened in September 1882, when, with the agreement of the Egyptian Government, British troops landed at Ismailia on the Suez Canal to reassert the Government's authority which had been challenged by Orabi Pasha. Although always regarded as temporary, the time taken to help the Egyptian Government to reform the administration and set their finances in order, coupled with new and unforeseen threats to this strategically vital area, prolonged the first military occupation until the conclusion of the 1936 Treaty with the Government of Nahas Pasha. At the beginning Egypt was bankrupt and heavily indebted to foreign bond-holders, the countryside was exhausted, the army disorganised and the Sudanese provinces in a state of revolt. By 1904 the foreign bond-holders' control of Egyptian revenue, dating from 1876 could be abolished. Overhaul of the Delta Barrages and the basin irrigation by British engineers increased the area under crop from 4.7 million to 7 million feddans by 1899 and construction of further dams brought it to 8.3 million feddans by 1937. The mileage of the State railways, bringing prosperity to the villages was doubled during the period of the occupation and the population of Egypt, with a sudden spurt, doubled between 1882 and 1917. In 1899 the Sudan was reconquered. By the unilateral British Declaration of Policy of 1922 the British Protectorate ended and Egypt became a constitutional monarchy.

Under the 1936 Treaty of Alliance which was to last 20 years, with the possibility of revision after ten, Great Britain was authorised (Article 8) to maintain a limited number of British troops in the Suez Canal Zone, "until such time as the... Parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure by its own resources, the liberty and entire security of navigation of the Canal". The highly strategic position of Egypt since the construction of the Canal was, indeed, an overriding factor in the prolongation of the original occupation. As the dark clouds, already apparent in 1936, burst in 1939 into the storm of war, it proved necessary to defend the liberty and entire security of the Canal with more than the limited number of British troops originally stipulated and, in the course of the war, the equivalent of about 41 divisions, 13 of them armoured, in addition to Commonwealth naval units and air forces totalling about 65 squadrons were supported by the Suez Canal Base in the defence not only of the Canal, but of Egypt and the whole Middle East and North Africa.

Within a year of the defeat of the Axis Powers, popular demand rose in Egypt for a revision of the 1936 Treaty. In October 1946 an agreement was reached ad



371/118978

Referendum between Mr. Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary of the time, and Sidky Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Ministers. This would have resulted in a complete evacuation of British forces from Egypt by September 1949, had not insistence on the incorporation of the Sudan in Egypt under a single crown, without prior consultation of Sudanese wishes, led to the resignation of the Sidky Government.

Negotiations were not resumed until the Wafd returned to power in 1950 and broke down again when the Egyptian Government unilaterally abrogated the 1936 Treaty on October 15, 1951. Public security both in the Canal Zone and in the Delta rapidly deteriorated until the fire of Cairo and the riots which accompanied it led to the fall of the Wafd administration.

It was not until the July Revolution and the fall of the monarchy that negotiations could be reopened. The Revolutionary Government, however, wished to dispose first of the Sudan question and it was not therefore until April 1953, one month after the conclusion of the Sudan Agreement, that negotiations on the Canal Base were actually begun.

Unfortunately the strategic considerations still valid at that time continued to make a reconciliation of the viewpoints of the two Governments impossible and the formal negotiations, conducted on the British side with the assistance of General Robertson were adjourned sine die on May 11, though unofficial contacts continued through diplomatic channels until October 1953.

The Agreement

By 1954, however, new factors were affecting the technical aspects of security. Development of the power of nuclear weapons, and their availability to potential aggressors, had necessitated a fresh approach to defence strategy in general. A strategic review carried out by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff and agreed by the British Cabinet had implications for policy in the Middle East. Some indications of the lines of this re-assessment were later to be given in the House of Commons on 29th July 1954 by the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Head.

The advent of the hydrogen bomb, together with other thermo-nuclear weapons, Mr. Head said, "puts a premium on dispersion and is very much against concentration". The ability to equip, train and despatch overseas large numbers of troops would be restricted, and the ability to maintain them at long distances from home would be severely strained. The same considerations would apply to any Power attempting to maintain large forces in a campaign in the Middle East. Russia, for instance, would also be hampered by long lines of communication running through difficult mountainous country peculiarly vulnerable to attack with nuclear weapons. It could be deduced that large-scale land campaigns in the Middle East in any future war were considerably less likely. Further, Turkey's accession to N.A.T.O., the progress made in re-equipping the Turkish army with U.S. help, and Turkey's determination to defend itself, together with the increased difficulty Russia would have in maintaining its lines of communication towards Turkey improved the chances of the successful defence of Turkey. Thus the United Kingdom was more likely to be able to take part in a more forward strategy on Turkey's right flank, an area from which Egypt is relatively remote".

These considerations allowed the United Kingdom to modify its approach to the negotiations and gave a new and more hopeful tone to informal discussions held during the early summer of 1954. Talks started by the British Ambassador, Sir Ralph Stevenson, and Major General Benson were brought to a successful conclusion, in the presence of the British Secretary of State for War, with the initialling of Heads of Agreement with the Egyptian Government on July 27. Intensive work in joint Anglo-Egyptian Committees embodied the principles established by the Heads of Agreement in the final Anglo-Egyptian Agreement signed by Colonel Nasser, General Abdel Hakim Amer and Dr. Fawzi for Egypt and Mr. Nutting, the British Minister of State, Sir Ralph Stevenson and General Benson for the United Kingdom, in Cairo, on October 19, 1954.

The Agreement is an elaborate document of 13 Articles, two Annexes (each of several parts) 16 Exchanges of Notes, one unilateral Note and an Agreed Minute; it was supplemented by a further Exchange of Notes, and Agreed Minute on May 3, 1955. In brief, the main Agreement provided for the withdrawal of British forces from Egypt within 20 months of October 19, 1954, and the conversion of the Base to a new, reduced civilian version, subject to re-activation in the event of an outside armed attack on an Arab League state or Turkey within the duration of the Treaty, set at seven years from its signature.

The 4-monthly phases of withdrawal, the last of which is now opening, were laid down in Part A of the first Annex. It required that 22% of the forces in Egypt on July 27, 1954, should have been withdrawn by February 19, 35% by June 19 and 54% by October 19, 1955, and 75% by February 19, 1956. By each date the British Headquarters have, in practice, been able to announce that the required figure had been surpassed more than a month previously.

Meanwhile, the reorganisation of the Base, under civilian management, (as set out in Parts A to F and Appendices A to D of the second Annex of the Agreement, and 8 Exchanges of Notes) is far advanced. About 600 of the 800 technicians from Britain and their families have already arrived in the Suez Canal Base.

The Contractors have a dual function, to keep in good order certain equipment and material on behalf of the British Government and to operate, for repair work, certain installations, which are being regularly inspected by a small number of British Government-appointed inspectors attached to the British Embassy in Cairo.

BRITISH EMBASSY, CAIRO

INFORMATION OFFICE

*For Immediate Release*

(N.B. EMBARGOED. NOT FOR PUBLICATION BEFORE 1800 HOURS,  
CAIRO TIME, FEBRUARY 18)

WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES FROM EGYPT  
AHEAD OF SCHEDULE AS FINAL PHASE OPENS

10371/118978

Saturday, February 18, 1956, will see the completion of the fourth phase of the withdrawal of British Forces from Egypt under the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of October 19, 1954. Under the terms of this Agreement, 75% of the 88,000 British Forces stationed in the Suez Canal Base in July 1954 were to have been withdrawn by this date. Redeployment has, however, run ahead of schedule, and, instead of the permitted 22,000 troops, less than 15,000 British Servicemen and women remain in Egypt. Withdrawal from the Fayid and Tel el Kebir areas is now complete and all installations to be operated by civilian contractors, under the terms of the Agreement, have been handed over.

Redeployment will continue until the final withdrawal date - June 18, 1956, but the move of Headquarters, British Troops in Egypt, from Moascar to Port Said, three days ago, will be followed within the next month by the departure of all British troops from Moascar garrison and the vicinity of Ismailia; Headquarter No. 205 Group, Royal Air Force is similarly withdrawing from Ismailia and will complete its move to Abu Sueir by March. The bulk of remaining British forces will thereafter be concentrated in Port Said and El Ballah and, in the case of the R.A.F. at Abu Sueir. It is expected that the General Officer Commanding, B.T.E. Lieutenant-General R.A. Hull, KCB, DSO, will leave for the United Kingdom in the first half of April in readiness to assume the appointment of Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff in May. The next appointment, as Commandant of the R.A.F. Staff College Bracknell, of Air Vice Marshal D.H.F. Barnett CB, CBE, Air Officer Commanding No 205 Group, has already been announced and he will leave Egypt for the United Kingdom in early March.

Side by side with the withdrawal of the British Forces, the British Contractors have now taken effective control of all the installations they are to operate in accordance with the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. This process, which began at the end of September 1955, was completed in January 1956. The main installations are situated at Tel el Kebir - former Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers' Workshops and Royal Army Ordnance Corps' Base Depots; Abu Sultan - the Ammunition Depot; and Fanara - former Royal Engineers' Stores Base Depot and Base Workshops. Those three groups of installations, guarded externally by the Egyptian Army and internally by Contractors' security staff are now completely in the hands of the Contractors. From April, when Abu Sueir will be taken over by the Egyptian Air Force, over-flying, landing and servicing facilities for Royal Air Force aircraft will be provided, under the terms of the Agreement, with the help of British civilian technicians. The same facilities will exist for Royal

.. / Air

No. 371/118978

117595

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- 2 -

Air Force flying boats at Fanara on the Great Bitter Lake.

The change from army to contractor administration has been accomplished without any interruption to the work being carried on. The Contractors have brought out their technicians to replace the Army's technical staff and retained several thousand local workers. Some of these continue in their previous jobs; others have been found new employment. This transfer of labour has been accomplished in close collaboration with the Egyptian Directorate of Labour at the Headquarters of Eastern Command, Ismailia, whose assistance in facilitating the transfers has been invaluable. The Egyptian authorities have also been most helpful to the Contractors in other directions. For example experienced police and fire brigade officials have been made available to assist in the training of the Contractors' security and fire services personnel.

By June 18 the final phase of the withdrawal will have been completed. Of the 88,000 British forces in the Canal Base in July 1954, all will have been redeployed to the United Kingdom or to other stations in the Middle East and elsewhere. Some 800 civilian technicians from Britain, with a large number of locally engaged staff, will be sharing responsibility with the Egyptian authorities for the remaining installations in the Base.

#### NOTE TO EDITORS

Attached to this Press Release are

- (a) A more detailed review of the stages in the withdrawal.
- (2) A background note on the historical factors leading up to the Agreement.

British Embassy  
February 18, 1955

N.B. EMBARGO



SECRET

6574/18978

JE 1197/126

OUTWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO BAGDAD

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

By Bagir

No. 81 Saving  
February 17, 1956

PRIORITY  
SECRET

Addressed to Bagdad telegram No. 81 Saving of February 17.

And Saving to: Cairo	No. 133	Tripoli	No. 22
Amman	No. 86	Jedda	No. 59
Damascus	No. 68	Tel Aviv	No. 55
Beirut	No. 166		

Repeated for information Saving to Ankara	No. 136	P.O.M.E.F.
Bahrain	No. 33	No. 188
Khartoum	No. 10	Governor Aden

My telegram No. 324 to Bagdad.

Following are times and themes for publicity about withdrawal of British troops from Middle East.

1. From February 19. (End of 4th withdrawal period prescribed by Angle-Egyptian Agreement). "Fulfilment of Premises." Mainly in Egypt, small notices elsewhere; facts and figures to be supplied to Egyptian press.

2. From end of April, "Withdrawal from Allied Iraq." "Fulfilment of Premises to Iraq," "Fulfilment of Premises to Egypt" (less emphasis, but advance references to June). Avoid suggestion of transfers to Jordan. In Middle East generally: publicity in Egypt as in paragraph 1.

3. Mid-June, "Fulfilment of Angle-Egyptian Agreement." "Contractors installed." In Middle East generally.

4. As occasion offers, Loss of revenue to national exchequers, shopkeepers, working men, etc., by withdrawal of British troops.

DISTRIBUTED TO:

African Department  
Levant Department  
Eastern Department  
Information Policy Department

Regional Advisers  
News Department  
F.U.S.D.

G G G G

60371/118978

Mr Watson  
Can we speak to  
4.30 (today)

TOP SECRET

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL  
DISTRIBUTION

SC 1197/95

Sir M. Wright  
No.130  
January 31, 1956.

D. 8.45 a.m. February 1, 1956.  
R. 9.41 a.m. February 1, 1956.

PRIORITY  
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.130 of January 31,  
Repeated for information to  
Cairo Amman Damascus Beirut Tripoli Jedda  
Tel Aviv Ankara  
And Saving to P.O.M.E. F.

Your telegram No.305 [sic] to Cairo: Publicity for Evacuation of the Canal Zone.

I am naturally not in a position to judge whether we shall be able to persuade the Egyptians to treat this subject inconspicuously or whether they will be willing to handle it as an example of Anglo-Egyptian cooperation. But if not, we should perhaps be well advised to make a virtue of necessity and extract from the occasion what propoganda value we can, on the lines that despite the doubts of those who said we would never leave Egypt, we have kept our pledged word.

2. The withdrawal of British forces from Iraq should, I suggest, receive publicity on similar lines, and it might improve the standing of the Bagdad Pact in the Arab world if this were done before publicity in connexion with our evacuation of Egypt. Final evacuation of British bases in Iraq by fighting units of the R.A.F. will be completed by May 1, i.e. a month after the departure of the last major unit from the Canal Zone, but six weeks before the departure of the Commander-in-Chief. If the maximum publicity value is to be derived from both these operations, careful timing is necessary. I suggest therefore that our publicity might follow a timetable roughly as below:-

(a) At the end of April and beginning of May we should concentrate on publicity to show that we have been as good as our word to the Iraqis (and may therefore be expected to deal similarly with the Egyptians)

(b) In mid-June (but not in April when the major units leave) we should turn on the heat to demonstrate that we have been as good as our word to Egypt.

Foreign Office pass Cairo, Tripoli, Jedda and Ankara as my telegrams Nos.25, 1, 4 and 12 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo, Tripoli, Jedda and Ankara]

DISTRIBUTED TO  
African Department  
Levant Department  
Information Policy Department

B E B



P 371/118978

WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM EGYPT

Flag A

JE 11910/6 (45)

At the end of December the B.D.C.C. (M.E.) recommended that our remaining forces in the Canal Base should be withdrawn as inconspicuously as possible. By agreement with the Chiefs of Staff Secretariat we deferred action on the question while Ministers were considering whether the timetable for withdrawal should stand. We have now taken it up with H.M. Representatives in Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut and Bagdad and received their views. Three points arise: method of withdrawal, publicity in the Middle East generally, and corresponding troop movements elsewhere.

3L 1197/46, 56, 76  
86, 96.

2. All except Beirut agree that the withdrawal itself should be unceremonious. Clearly the Egyptians will make a great fuss of our withdrawal and Sir H. Trevelyan points out that we shall have to counter Egyptian propaganda. This is relevant but does not affect the manner in which our withdrawal takes place.

3L 1197/96

3. H.M. Ambassador in Bagdad has made suggestions about publicity, with which I agree, and which I have incorporated in the attached draft letter to the Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Similar publicity can of course be made in the Lebanon (which will go some way to meet Sir E. Chapman-Andrews' point) and elsewhere.

4. H.M. Ambassador at Amman has made a reservation about moving troops into Jordan when moving out of the Canal Zone, with which I also agree and have included in the draft letter to Commodore Lovegrove.

Recommendation

5. That the attached draft letter be sent.

Mr. P. A. 1197-6  
2 Feb.

Mr. S. J. 1197-6  
J.H.A. Watson

(J.H.A. Watson)  
February 2, 1956

118978

Registry No. 25194/116

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Open.

Draft letter

Commodore H. Lovegrove

Cos. Sukarni

in reference

ENCLOSURES  
-175-152  
-176-146  
and -185

From:

Mr. Watson.

Mr. Stewart  
(170)

This We agree.  
4. Second,

RECEIVED IN DIVISION

3 Feb. 1956

3/2  
4/2

EP 31725

Feb 3

Steel + 2 flumes  
and bear copies of each of these things please -  
Dear Commodore Lovegrove,

You will remember that the B.D.C.C. (M.E.)

recommended (telegram MECOS 80) that the withdrawal of our remaining forces in Egypt should be made as inconspicuously as possible; and that you arranged with Bromley, my predecessor, that we should not try to deal with this question until we knew that Ministers had agreed to leave the programme of withdrawal unchanged. Now that Ministers have so agreed, we have consulted out posts in the Middle East, with the following results and enclose their replies.

2. There is general agreement that the withdrawal should be inconspicuous. We agree. The Egyptians will, of course, make a great fuss about our withdrawal, however it is carried out; Sir Humphrey Trevelyan has pointed out that he will have to continue to issue press material to present the withdrawal from the British point of view and counter Egyptian propaganda. This of course does not affect the manner in which the withdrawal takes place.

3. You will see that Two related points of some importance have been raised. First, H.M. Ambassador in Amman does not want any impression to be created that troops are being moved from Egypt into Jordan, and hopes that any necessary reinforcement of Jordan can be timed, <sup>Good</sup> to avoid this. ~~Second~~ Second, H.M. Ambassador in Bagdad has pointed out that the final evacuation of British bases in Iraq by R.A.F. fighting units will be completed by May 1, i.e. a month after the departure of the last major unit from the Canal Zone and seven weeks before the departure of the <sup>Johnson</sup> Commander in Chief. He considers, and <sup>we</sup> agree, that we should make a <sup>virtue</sup>

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Pos 71/118 928

virtue of necessity and extract from these occasions what propaganda value we can. He points out, and I also agree with this, that it might improve the standing of the Bagdad Pact if publicity were given to our withdrawal <sup>from Iraq</sup> before publicity for our evacuation from Egypt. This would mean that at the end of April and the beginning of May we should concentrate on showing that we have been as good as our word to the Iraqis. In mid-June (but not in April when the last major units leave the Canal Base) we should <sup>therefore, in our opinion</sup> concentrate on pointing out that we have been as good as our word to the Egyptians and <sup>make the point</sup> that, in accordance with the Agreement, our contractors have taken over from our troops.

4. In paragraph 7 of MECOS 80 one of the considerations advanced in support of an inconspicuous withdrawal is that the right of re-entry into the Canal Base between April and June should not be forfeited. We are not entirely sure of the legal argument here, and I will let you have our views later. ~~I am not sure whether the point is, in any case, particularly relevant.~~ <sup>in any case</sup> There is no doubt in our minds that any attempt to bring back British forces would raise a major political storm, unless either the Base were being reactivated under Article 4 of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, or we were involved in helping Egypt to resist <sup>an</sup> Israeli attack.

a JUV  
2 Feb

(24) [J. H. AWATSON]

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FO 371 118978

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1	2	3	4	5	6



5E1194  
9  
A.

TOP SECRET

PUBLICITY FOR EVACUATION OF THE CANAL ZONE

In view of the fact that the Egyptians are sure to gloat over our evacuation of the Canal Zone with the maximum publicity, I wonder whether we are considering the possibility of a diversion. I agree that the diversion would have to be a pretty big one to oust the subject of evacuation from the headlines, but the idea might perhaps be worth considering.

*still*

February 1st, 1956

Mr. Dodds-Parker *add*

Copy: Mr. Nutting  
 Sir I. Kirkpatrick  
 African Dept. *AWH*  
 Levant Dept.

*If any diversion  
 offers, we will exaggerate it, but I  
 don't think we can manufacture one.*

*Lord Ashby/Hope*

*still*

*add*



3E1197/8C

upman

371/118978

TOP SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan

No. 174

D. 2.04 p.m. January 28, 1956.

January 28, 1956.

R. 2.44 p.m. January 28, 1956.

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 174 of January 28.

Repeated for information to P.O.M.E.F.  
and Saving to Bagdad

	Amman
Damascus	Beirut
Tripoli	Jedda
Tel Aviv	Ankara.

Your telegram No. 250: Withdrawal of British Forces.

I agree, though I shall have to continue throughout to issue press material in order to present the withdrawal from the British point of view and counter the expected Egyptian propaganda.

2. I am writing on the legal aspect of re-entry, which is not clear. Whatever our rights, I have no doubt that any attempt to bring back British forces would raise a major political storm here.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Tripoli, Tel Aviv and Ankara as my telegrams Nos. 5, 5 and 5 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Tripoli, Tel Aviv and Ankara].

DISTRIBUTED TO:-

African Department  
Levant Department

SSSSS

① If Egypt attacked Israel, and began to use equipment etc from Syria base, what could we do to stop them?

② What action are we taking to see that Egyptian authorities are preventing the use of base to go on?

See preliminary check used to go on?

add

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

118978

1194  
A

Mr. Dodds-Parker has asked two questions arising out of the withdrawal of British forces. The answers seem to be as follows:

1. (Question) If Egypt attacked Israel, and began to use equipment, etc. from Suez base, what could we do to stop them?

(Answer) If Egypt attacked Israel, the tripartite declaration would come into play, and we should be morally and politically bound to implement it together with the Americans and the French. This would presumably involve sanctions and other actions against Egypt such that the Egyptian Government would, in retaliation, seize the equipment from the Suez Base. This would not, apparently, give us a legal right to reactivate the Base but we could maintain our claim to the supplies taken by Egypt, especially if our actions were taken as a result of a Security Council recommendation. In practice, under present conditions, the Israelis could probably arrive quite quickly at the Canal.

2. (Question) What action are we taking to see that Egyptian authorities are preventing the pilfering which used to go on?

(Answer) In fact the Egyptian authorities have recently been preventing the pilfering of our stores at the Canal Base, at which they previously used to connive. This pilfering has now died down to very small proportions. We expect that the police which the contractors are putting in will be adequate to take care of the problem.

*J.H.A. Watson*  
(J.H.A. Watson)  
January 31, 1956

*Mr. Rae*

*Quantities will be considerably less under all heads.*

*Answer 1 is all right  
under (5) June 1956!  
Can War Office let us know  
what exactly will be kept in the Base?  
Can we get the GSO 1, No 4 along to  
tell rather than write?  
a J.W.  
1. Jan.*



Fg 371 118978

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
Minutes

I have arranged for Herbert Hobart  
 to call on you just before 11.30.  
 On Monday for Mr Dodds Parker  
 to see you and Col. Hobart  
 at 11.30.

W. H. ...  
 1/2

to Watson ...  
 1/2

(pronounced  
 Hubbard.)



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

TOP SECRET

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

JE 1197 H

DEPARTMENTAL  
DISTRIBUTION

Cypher/OTP

Mr. Duke

No. 163

January 26, 1956.

D. 11.16 a.m. January 26, 1956.

R. 11.38 a.m. January 26, 1956.

PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 163 of January 26

Repeated for information to: Cairo  
Bagdad  
Damascus  
Beirut  
and Saving to: Tripoli  
Jedda  
Tel Aviv

Ankara  
P.O.M.E.F.

RECEIVED IN U.S.  
26/1

Your telegram No. 155. JE 1197/3 G

I agree that the final withdrawal of British forces from Egypt should take place as inconspicuously as possible.

2. I also think that if any moves of Army or R.A.F. units into Jordan are planned to coincide with the withdrawal of our forces from Egypt they should be reconsidered. We do not wish to give Egyptian propaganda the opportunity of saying that, having been pushed out of Egypt, British troops are now occupying Jordan.

Foreign Office pass Cairo No. 58 and Saving to Tripoli No. 1, Jedda No. 4, Tel Aviv No. 24, Ankara No. 30, and P.O.M.E.F. No. 18.

[Repeated to Cairo and Saving to Tripoli, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Ankara and P.O.M.E.F.]

DISTRIBUTED TO:

African Department  
Levant Department.

Fo 371 118978

117595

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1	2				

TOP SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

JE 1197

DEPARTMENTAL  
DISTRIBUTION

Cypher/OTP

Sir H. Trevelyan

No. 174

January 28, 1956.

D. 2.04 p.m. January 28, 1956.

R. 2.44 p.m. January 28, 1956.

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 174 of January 28.

Repeated for information to P.O.M.E.F.

and Saving to Bagdad

Amman

Damascus

Beirut

Tripoli

Jedda

Tel Aviv

Ankara.

JE 1197/36

Your telegram No. 250: Withdrawal of British Forces.

I agree, though I shall have to continue throughout to issue press material in order to present the withdrawal from the British point of view and counter the expected Egyptian propaganda.

2. I am writing on the legal aspect of re-entry, which is not clear. Whatever our rights, I have no doubt that any attempt to bring back British forces would raise a major political storm here.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Tripoli, Tel Aviv, and Ankara as my telegrams Nos. 5, 5 and 5 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Tripoli, Tel Aviv and Ankara].

DISTRIBUTED TO:-

African Department

Levant Department

SSSS

RECEIVED G.R.
TO THE DEPT.
20/1

J E 11 97 / 6

J

I do not think that there is much from African Department that requires your special attention between now and the time you sail. We have given P.U.S.D. briefs on the obvious subjects,

2. The points which do need your attention are:

- A. Russian overtures to Libya
- B. The position of Mr. Graham in Libya
- C. Rate of troop withdrawals from the Canal Zone.

A. I attach a separate brief on this question, which has been seen by Sir G. Harrison and which links up with conversations you have had in Washington.

B. Please see attached brief.

C. Ministers raised the question of whether we should slow down the withdrawal of troops from the Canal Zone. In practice this means retaining one battalion for an additional eight weeks, until some time in June. The Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence and the War Office have all advised Ministers against this. In particular, General Poett has stated that it is easier to send reinforcements to the Middle East direct by air from here than to use the few troops remaining in the Canal Zone. However, both the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State still seem to be in two minds about this question, and may still wish to discuss it further. The relevant submission is with the Secretary of State.

3. High Dam

There has been considerable activity; things seem to be going smoothly. As you will presumably have been following events in Washington, I am not submitting to you anything on this. Mr. Black is apparently due in Cairo on January 26.

*Arthur Wilson*  
January 21, 1956

*ADJ*