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The Foreign Secretary agreed that

there would be trouble in the Assembly over this question. Mr. Menon was anxious to raise it ^{but} ~~in~~ the Secretary-General was a restraining influence. We had a counter claim in the base materials left behind in the Canal Zone which the Egyptian Government had seized and which were valued at some £40 million.

Sir I. Kirkpatrick suggested that

we might use Colonel Nasser's ^{own} valuation ^{of} ~~these stores~~ of £300 million against him. We should also put it about that if the Assembly tried to pass resolutions requiring us to pay we should be forced to exact our judgment debt from the Albanians. In the same way, ^{to} The Indians might be threatened with ^{being made liable for the} ~~liability for the~~ damage in Kashmir.

M. Pineau said that he thought it

was important that there should be a joint survey so that we should agree on estimates of the damage done ^{and both say the same thing.}

Sir I. Kirkpatrick said that we should both look at the question and then exchange ideas.

The Minister of Defence mentioned the inflated Egyptian estimates of casualties and the Secretary of State said that he feared that after we had gone the Egyptians would unearth large quantities/

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in an attempt to produce a second
quantities of bodies, ~~as had happened~~

at Katyn.

M. Pineau suggested that we might
^{announce} say that we proposed to leave the Canal
soon but before we went the United Nations
must send a commission to agree the
damage and the casualties suffered. Any
findings made after we ^{had} left would not be
accepted. If we had sufficient confidence
in our estimate of not more than 300 killed
there would be advantage in asking for an
international enquiry.

The Secretary of State wondered if ^{such an}
~~this~~ ^{enquiry} would be ^{instituted} ~~done~~ by resolution of the
Assembly.

M. Pineau thought that a request
addressed to the Secretary-General would
suffice.

Sir I. Kirkpatrick suggested that
Sir Pierson Dixon should be instructed to
concert with his French colleague an
approach to the Secretary-General asking
for an enquiry. The Secretary of State
emphasised that we must be careful not,
by this action, to accept responsibility.

It was agreed that instructions should
be sent accordingly and that the sooner the
enquiry could be ^{instituted} ~~made~~ the better. It
would be better for the enquiry to confine
itself to casualties since it would be
more difficult/

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The members leaving however were such that it appeared that the movement was general.

more difficult for the Egyptians to fabricate the destruction of buildings after our departure and we had already careful records and photographs.

Finally M. Pineau suggested that it might be wise to make a complaint to the United Nations about ~~any~~ Egyptian treatment of our nationals. // The Secretary of State referred to his letter to the Secretary-General of November 27 but M. Pineau felt that that was not enough. He pointed out that the

Egyptians claimed that there was no expulsion order, ^(there might indeed be) ~~but~~ police action ^{of the police} ~~is~~ ^{was} such that they have ^(there was) ~~no alternative~~ but to leave. The results ~~is~~ the same.

Sir I. Kirkpatrick suggested that Sir H. Trevelyan's advice should be sought but M. Pineau objected to this on the grounds that the problem was political.

The Foreign Secretary asked for time to reflect on M. Pineau's proposal.

The meeting then adjourned.

put with record of Min. meetings on Nov 30. *DDG 5/12*

which in their view still represent the best solution

JE 1073/25 A/A

African Dept

JAE

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12) Les gouvernements français et anglais constatent du fait que :

a) une force internationale efficace arrive en Egypte chargée des missions qui lui sont confiées par les résolutions de 1^{re} Assemblée Générale des Nations-Unies des 2, 5 et 7 Novembre.

b) le Secrétaire Général accepte la responsabilité de procéder au dégagement du Canal de Suez aussi rapidement que possible.

c) conformément à la résolution de 1^{re} Assemblée Générale des Nations-Unies N^o la liberté et la sécurité de la navigation dans le Canal seront rétablies aussitôt après le dégagement de celui-ci.

d) le Secrétaire Général engagera aussi rapidement que possible, conformément à la résolution N^o de 1^{re} Assemblée Générale des négociations sur le régime futur du Canal sur la base des six principes posés par la résolution N^o du Conseil de Sécurité en date du octobre compte tenu du fait que les deux Gouvernements considèrent toujours que la résolution des 18 puissances constitué le meilleur moyen d'assurer un règlement de la question du Canal de Suez, compte tenu également des conversations qui ont eu lieu entre les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères d' Egypte, de France et de Grande-Bretagne, de la

.....

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lettre du Secrétaire Général des Nations-Unies au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d' Egypte en date du 24 Octobre et de la réponse que celui-ci y a donnée.

2) Les gouvernements français et britannique confirment leur décision de poursuivre sans retard le retrait de leurs forces de la zone de Port Saïd.

3) Ils ont en conséquence donné instruction au Général Keightley, commandant des Forces Alliées, de rechercher l'accord du Général Burns, Commandant de la force des Nations-Unies, sur un calendrier comportant le retrait complet de leurs forces compte tenu des nécessités pratiques et des conditions militaires. Ce calendrier sera communiqué aussi rapidement que possible au Secrétaire Général des Nations-Unies.

4) En préparant ce calendrier, le Commandant des Forces Alliées tiendra compte des nécessités suivantes :

a) les opérations d'embarquement du personnel et du matériel devront s'effectuer de façon méthodique et ordonnée;

b) des mesures seront prises pour veiller au maintien de l'ordre public dans la zone actuellement sous contrôle allié;

c) le commandant de la Force Internationale prendra la responsabilité de la sécurité de tous les éléments français et bri-

3.-

tanniques chargés du dégagement du canal qui seront laissés à la disposition de l'organisme compétent des Nations-Unies.

5) Toutefois, en communiquant ces conclusions, les deux gouvernements rappellent les fermes représentations qu'ils ont faites au sujet du traitement de leurs nationaux en Egypte. Ils soulignent que, sur leurs propres territoires, ils ont eux-même appliqué aux ressortissants égyptiens des mesures humaines et libérales. Ils s'estiment ^{donc} en droit d'exiger que la situation de leurs nationaux en Egypte soit assurée d'une complète garantie.

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JE 1013/17

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Record of Conversation - August 24, 1956.

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Present: Secretary of State
Sir Gladwyn Jebb
Mr. Ross
Mr. Logan

M. Pineau
M. Chauvel
M. Jox
M. Henri Roux.

Record of a Conversation

ALGERIA

M. Pineau was asked by the Secretary of State how he saw the situation in Algeria developing during the next four weeks. He replied that the French Government had been in favour of a cease-fire followed by elections but had come to the conclusion that this might take too long. ~~The French Government~~ were working out a new plan based on federalism which would be announced before the opening of the French Parliament, on the first Tuesday in October.

SUEZ CANAL


2. The Secretary of State suggested that two aspects of this problem should be discussed:

- a) what economic and financial measures should be taken against Egypt if she rejected the statement of the 18 countries.
- b) how to prepare world opinion for the most serious measures which might /have to be

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Exchequer



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have to be taken.

3. Possible economic and financial measures

The Secretary of State said that these seemed to fall under three headings:

(a.) Payment of Canal dues into a blocked account. The German ^{Foreign Minister} had said that they could persuade their owners to do this. He thought the Dutch could do the same. Other Governments would probably fall into line if the U.S. Government would give a lead.

(b.) Cessation of commercial transactions with Egypt by the countries supporting the majority ^{proposals} ~~statement~~ at the Suez Conference.

(c.) Cessation of the supply of wheat from North America.

In discussion the following points were made:-

(i) M. Pineau said that after the conversation with Mr. Dulles ^{on the previous day,} ~~yesterday,~~ he thought there should not be much difficulty about applying economic and financial measures. It was clear that many of the measures which could be taken would have unwelcome consequences for Britain and France. France was prepared for this. Naturally, measures which harmed us greatly and Nasser very little would not be taken. He thought that the United States

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States Government would not raise difficulty about the application of economic and financial measures against Egypt* Mr. Dulles had already indicated that some of these measures would benefit U.S. trade.

(ii) M. Pineau pointed out that countries with social poverty could resist economic sanctions for longer than richer countries.

(iii) The Secretary of State said that the routing of ships round the Cape would cause more harm to us than to Egypt. There seemed no advantage in a boycott of the Canal.

(iv) M. Pineau emphasised that the foreign employees would ^{not} be expected to stay ^{much} longer in the Canal Zone. He thought that they would leave within 15 days. The Secretary of State said that this ^{might be} ~~was~~ no bad thing, but the British and French Governments should be able to ~~say that they~~ ^{now it must clear that they have not ordered and} ~~had always~~ ^{had} that the employees would stay on. M. Pineau had suggested that the ^{five} countries appointed to establish contact with Nasser should appeal to the foreign employees to stay. This should show that the French and British Governments had not encouraged the employees to leave. Nevertheless he did not think they would all stay. M. Pineau said that his

no underlining

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suggestion to the five governments had been made in order to make the French Government's position clear.

The Secretary of State remarked that the Foreign Office News Department would probably be asked at noon that day about the position of the employees. He suggested that the Foreign Office spokesman might say that the two Governments had made great efforts to arrive at a peaceful settlement and had exerted no sort of pressure on the employees to leave. In fact they hoped that they would continue at their posts. But the choice was theirs; they were in a very difficult position and the two Governments sympathised greatly with them. He would discuss the advisability of making such a statement with his colleagues that morning. M. Pineau agreed generally with this line. (It was

4. Development of favourable world opinion for necessary measures.

The Secretary of State said that he thought that sooner or later Nasser would try to prevent a British or French ship from passing through the Canal. He thought that the right thing to do in those circumstances would be to send a /warship

Resume
main
paragraph

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later decided not
to make ~~the~~
statement)

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warship ahead of ~~it~~ and British warships would be available for that purpose in the Eastern Mediterranean. If the Egyptians then stopped the escorted vessel or shot at it or the warship, we ~~must~~ should take over by force operation of the Canal.

It might, however, be desirable at some early stage for Britain and France to go to the Security Council under Article 35 of the Charter. We could bring the matter forward as a "situation". We would aim at a short debate in which we would explain that in accordance with our desire to support the principles of the United Nations we were informing the Council of what had happened; we would not ask for a resolution but would say that in the circumstances existing and with the risk of danger to British and French nationals and ships it had been necessary for us to take certain precautionary measures. The advantages of such an approach were that it would make a strong appeal to parliamentary and public opinion in Britain and France and would put the British and French Governments' actions in a better light in other countries. If the necessity /for forceful

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for forceful action arose, Britain and France would be able to say that ~~they had been to the United Nations.~~ The disadvantage was that once action in the United Nations ^{had been} started, it was difficult to know where or when it would stop. We had, however, always to face the possibility that Egypt might take us to the Security Council.

M. Pineau agreed that it would be better for Britain and France to take the initiative in going to the Security Council. // ^{N.P.} There followed a discussion of timing. It would be possible to announce now that if Nasser said "no" to the approach of the five countries, Britain and France would then take the question to the Security Council. It was thought that this would lead Nasser to say that he would not reply until the matter had been considered in the Security Council. If Nasser replied "no" that would be a good time to go to the Council, but his reply might be "no - but". The representatives of the five nations might be relied upon to get a definite reply out of Nasser soon. Another course might be to go to the Security Council towards the end of the first week in September whether Nasser had replied or not. A

/further

at the London Conference they had sought a solution as ^{in the Security Council} they were agreed to do by Article 33 of the Charter and plan had gone to the United Nations under Article 35.

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further ^{course} alternative would be to go to the Council immediately after assuming control of the Canal.

In discussion the following points were made:-

(i) M. Pineau thought that tension in the Canal Zone would increase within 10 days either from the position of the pilots or from the stopping of ships.

(ii) If there had been recourse to the United Nations before ^{an incident} ~~this~~ occurred, it might be difficult to act when ^{one arose} ~~the incident~~ occurred if the matter was still before the United Nations.

(iii) If we took forceful action in the Canal Zone, Egypt would almost certainly take us to the United Nations.

(iv) There might in any case be a complaint by Egypt to the Security Council, or a counter-complaint, against threats of the use of force by Britain and France. H.M.G. would have to requisition some passenger ships within the next few days which might provoke Egypt to do this.

(v) We should be able to count on a minority in the Security Council which would enable us to block any resolution that we did not like, ^{including} or a Security Council ^{majority in favour of action under the United Nations} ~~majority~~ ^{procedure.}

(vi) If both Britain and France were associated with the approach to the Security

/Council,

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Council, both would lose their veto in the event of a vote on a "dispute". It was thought, however, that in order to satisfy public opinion in both countries it was necessary to face this possibility.

(vii) If a resolution satisfactory to the Western powers were vetoed by the Russians, Britain and France would be in a much better position to use force subsequently. For this reason it might be worthwhile to ask the Security Council to pass a resolution accepting the statement of the 13 countries at the London Suez Canal Conference.

(viii) The Russians might propose that Arab states, all states signatory to the 1888 Convention ^{and} ~~or~~ the successor states to some of those signatories should attend the Security Council. It should be possible to secure a majority against this.

(ix) M. Pineau suggested that in view of the risks being run by British and French nationals in the Canal Zone, the British and French Governments might ^{each} send a warship to each end of the Canal in accordance with the Convention of 1888 in order that their nationals should have some place of refuge if necessary. The Secretary of State

~~Lloyd~~ said he thought he had seen a report that Nasser ^{had} said he would welcome the /arrival

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arrival of warships for this purpose.

Perhaps if they did go the Egyptians might deny them supplies e.g. water. M. Pineau thought they could be supplied from another vessel.

s ~~2~~. Finally, M. Pineau said he wished to refer to two other problems. He felt that it would be worthwhile to make some reply to Israel to encourage her not to take advantage of the situation. He thought the two Governments should examine what could or could not be promised. The Secretary of State recalled that M. Pineau had ^{said} ~~told us~~ that Israel "officially" had 24 Mystères. M. Pineau added that it was not his affair if they had more than that number. The Secretary of State said that H.M.G. had told the Israeli Government that they were prepared to let them have certain ~~other~~ items of military equipment. It was agreed that discussion of this matter should be pursued in Paris.

The second point that M. Pineau wished to raise concerned Ethiopia. He had heard that the Ethiopian Foreign Minister had been greatly upset by a talk he had had about Somaliland with Lord Lloyd during his visit to London. The Secretary of State said he would be seeing the Ethiopian Foreign Minister that afternoon and would reassure him.

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Minutes

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(J)
B

President Eisenhower's Message to

Mr. Ben Gurion.

Page A -
JE 1073/27G

On page 4 of the attached draft record of the meeting with M. Pinson held at W. 10 on Friday afternoon, November 30 it is said that M. Pinson read out extracts from a message which, according to the minutes, President Eisenhower had sent Mr. Ben Gurion by hand of Senator (elect) Javits. The message is said to have contained a passage to the effect that the US Govt. were not anxious to see Israel withdraw in any hurry behind her borders.

Page B -

President Eisenhower's message, the text of which is enclosed in Tel Aviv Chanery letter of November 30 at VR 10345/4, contained no such passage. Mr. Javits may have said something to

Minutes.

the effect orally — compare the report at page C — but that would have been entirely on his own initiative and responsibility. It was unwise of him to have done so, and even more unwise of the speaker to have taken him to be speaking on the President's behalf.

R. L. Lawrence

10/12

Pres. H. H. ...

10/12

[Handwritten signature]

15/12

Separate minute to

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
Admiral

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TOP SECRET


 J
 BRITISH EMBASSY,
 PARIS.

November 20, 1956.

My dear Ivone,

I enclose a note of a conversation I had yesterday with Joxe and Crouy-Chanel about the Middle East. As you know, I had invited them to luncheon for a 'tour d'horizon' of the area.

2. I hope you will think that this exchange of views was useful. The luncheon meeting is a useful formula in these days when everyone is so pressed for time. Joxe had to leave shortly before the end of our discussion but he seemed pleased by the amount of ground which we had been able to cover.

3. The French were not unnaturally more worried about Syria than anything else. That is not to say that they underestimated the difficulty of the Suez situation but rather perhaps that, with Foreign Ministers away at New York, the initiative in respect of Suez matters has largely shifted from the Quai to Monsieur Pineau and the delegation at New York. Joxe said that the Quai were carefully studying the Syrian situation and that they feared that decisions might be needed in the very near future. Though I did not of course raise this matter myself, you will see from the record that he mentioned the French willingness to see Syria absorbed by Iraq of which we have lately been informed by both Pineau and Gazier. I did not comment and Joxe did not mention it again. Meanwhile Crouy-Chanel spoke at some length about the delicacy of the situation in Syria and the danger of our appearing to intervene (a) because of Syria's special position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and (b) because of our present unpopularity in the Arab world.

/4. You will

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.



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[Signature]

4. You will see that I mentioned, as a purely personal suggestion, the idea that a detachment of the United Nations force might take over the Gaza strip and operate a standing patrol between there and Aqaba. I recognise that in our view the main task of the international force must be in the Suez Canal zone but I think that the above idea might have certain attractions for both Arabs and Israelis.

Yours ever
Cladys Jell

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Record of a Meeting held at No. 10 Downing Street at 3 p.m. on Friday, November 30

PRESENT:

The Lord Privy Seal	Monsieur Pineau
The Foreign Secretary	The French Ambassador
The Minister of Defence	Monsieur Joxe
Sir. I. Kirkpatrick	Monsieur Crouy-Channel
Sir G. Jebb	Monsieur Gros
Mr. Beeley	Baron de Juniac
Mr. Watson	

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ME (Secret) & Cabinet distribution.

Pate

The Secretary of State began by saying that the alternatives before us were to leave Port Said; or to go on down the Canal and occupy Egypt, which was impracticable. We were therefore committed to a phased withdrawal. We should still retain the right to decide the terms and circumstances of this withdrawal. He had just asked Mr. Menderes' view, as the Turks had been our staunchest supporters in the Moslem Middle East. The Turkish view was that the quicker we went the better: it would not damage but enhance our prestige if we made it clear that we were now turning over to the U.N. force of our own free will, ourselves fixing the circumstances. This was also the Secretary of State's own feeling.

Added: Before we withdraw, certain requirements would have to be met:

- (1) The first thing was to fix a time ourselves. This was the "phasing"

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- (ii) The United Nations must put into Port Said reliable troops so that our withdrawal would not be accompanied by insult or humiliation;
- (iii) The Secretary General must give an undertaking that the United Nations will press on with clearance of the Canal as expeditiously as possible, the speed limited only by technical factors;
- (iv) We must deal with the question of negotiations about the future régime of the Canal. This was perhaps the most important. Monsieur Pineau had not liked the draft passage in the Secretary of State's draft speech shown to him the day before.

There should be no condition about a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem. We should not link our withdrawal from Port Said with the Israeli withdrawal.

Monsieur Pineau said it was too late to go on down the Canal. He did not want to fix a date for withdrawal, for internal political reasons. We should not abandon the control of events to Egypt. We had received nothing from Egypt so far.

He therefore proposed that there should be agreement between the two Commanders-in-Chief, General Keightley and General Burns, on the date; or we should say that the date would be fixed "after discussion between the two Commanders". This would not only be politically easier in France, but the

/evacuation

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evacuation would be gradual and orderly. And, by not committing ourselves to a final date, we should avoid Wasser refusing to do anything in the meantime. Did our military experts know how long it would take to get out?

The Secretary of State said that General Keightley considered that the Anglo-French force could be out in 15 days. Our instructions to him authorised him to make arrangements accordingly. He agreed with Monsieur Pineau about an orderly withdrawal which would not leave equipment behind.

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick said that if we set things in motion at once we would gain three days. Much depended upon our convincing the U.S., the U.N. and others that we would be out in a fortnight or so. We could announce that General Keightley had "received instructions to withdraw as soon as militarily practicable". Monsieur Pineau said that such a formula would bring down the French Government in a week. We must subtract all the political element from the decision. The announcement about withdrawal should make it depend strictly on military factors. These would be:-

- (i) Evacuation should be orderly and not precipitate;
- (ii) The U.N. force should be capable of assuming police functions in Port Said;

/(iii) The

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(iii) The Egyptians would not be allowed to seize our Canal clearance equipment left behind. (The Secretary General had given no assurances about this);;

(iv) There should be no Egyptian entry into Port Said with ^{flaps} drums and bands;

(v) We should agree among ourselves to keep a military force near Egypt.

← Monsieur Pineau agreed that we could not make it a condition that the U.N. should first undertake ^{to} the work out a future system for Palestine. But we must have an assurance about the Canal régime. In the meantime we must have free passage, including Israeli ships.

The Secretary of State agreed that British and French ships must be sure of free passage. But he wondered whether we could demand the same for Israel.

Monsieur Pineau then read out extracts from a message which, according to the Israelis, President Eisenhower had sent to Mr. Ben Gurion by the hand of Senator Javits. . . This document said that the U.S. Government were not anxious to see the Israelis withdraw in any hurry behind their borders, even though the U.S. Government might press them in public to do so: on the contrary occupation ^{of} Israel ^{of} Sinai for a period would facilitate working out a final settlement.

The Lord Privy Seal commented that such a message would amount to collusion and U.S. conspiracy to defy U.N. resolutions they

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themselves had drafted.

Monsieur Pineau said that we should show goodwill about evacuation but keep our hands open as long as possible. In practice withdrawal would begin at once. Should we tell the Americans before the announcement?

~~NP.~~
The Secretary of State said he had sent a message to H.M. Ambassador at Washington explaining our ideas and saying it was important for the Americans to say certain things at once:

- (i) They approved our plan for withdrawal;
- (ii) ~~That~~ They would put the whole weight of the U.S. behind the U.N. force;
- (iii) They would do what they could to get the Canal cleared effectively and quickly;
- (iv) They would do what they could to secure a satisfactory future régime for the Canal.

Moreover the Americans were on the point of making a satisfactory statement about oil.

As for the military programme for withdrawal could we agree that evacuation should begin at once, with a time-table to be fixed by the Commanders-in-Chief, the time-table to be communicated to the Secretary-General?

Monsieur Pineau said that discussions between the military commanders should continue, settling one stage at a time, avoiding a definite time-table.

The Lord Privy Seal asked whether Monsieur Pineau would impose any political conditions for agreeing to such talks between /the

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the military commanders. When Monsieur Pineau said no, the Lord Privy Seal asked how he would refer to the clearance and future régime of the Canal. ^{NS.} Monsieur Pineau said that we were in a strong position with regard to clearance and passage, which were specifically enjoined by U.N. resolutions, but not on a future régime for the Canal.

There must be two understandings;

- (i) No discrimination against our ships;
- (ii) That the United Nations would clear the Canal as expeditiously as possible and that our salvage equipment would be a U.N. responsibility. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Moreover, the last military condition about keeping British and French troops near at hand, on Cyprus, need not be announced, though it would do no harm if the Egyptians knew that the troops were there.

The Secretary of State said that it was important to see that ^{General} Burns was left to assume progressive responsibility, so that it would be his fault, not ours, if incidents took place.

Monsieur Pineau said we should ask the U.N. to keep troops in the Canal until there was a settlement.

The Secretary of State said that we ought not to lose the advantage of our act of faith. It came to much the same thing if we announced that we would be out in 15 days or left it to others to fix this date.

On the future régime for the Canal, the Secretary of State said that Monsieur Pineau did not like his proposed reference to the

/Secretary-General's

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Secretary-General's letter to Fawzi of October 24. The system outlined in this letter was not good, but it was not bad. He thought it represented the best political basis that negotiations could now achieve. The future of the Canal would probably not be decided so much on political grounds as we had all thought. Nasser had done the Canal great damage and he was apparently attracted by the World Bank coming in to rescue him from the resulting financial liabilities. This would be a useful development. Therefore we should take Hammarskjold's letter as a basis for negotiations, recognising that the arrangements for financing reconstruction and development will make it more international than that. If we tried to stipulate political conditions we should meet in deadlock. Why did Monsieur Pineau really object to a reference of this document?

Monsieur Pineau said that a basis for negotiations meant you could not go beyond. He wanted to go beyond the document.

The Secretary of State said that we might take the six agreed principles in the U.N. resolution of October 13 as a basis, and take note of our conversations with Fawzi, the Secretary-General's letter and the Egyptian acceptance thereof as "the minimum we can accept." We might add this to the understandings on which we ~~have~~ given instructions to our Commander-in-Chief.

/Meanwhile,

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Meanwhile, negotiations might begin as soon as possible. We should ask the Secretary-General to promote these as soon as he could.

Monsieur Pineau said that the U.S. draft resolution on this subject was on ice at present. ~~The Indians had suggested a committee under this resolution;~~ ^{was suggested} ~~that~~ ^{of} the U.K., France and Egypt, one other power nominated by each side, and the Secretary-General.

The U.S. regarded this as not balanced and preferred six powers with the Secretary-General.

^{The S. G. said} We must avoid having Mr. Menon on this committee. ^{He} Monsieur Pineau agreed. But we did not know whether the U.S. would bring this resolution ^{forward}.

Hammarskjold wanted two more powers in the room when we discussed with Fawzi, to cover him. ~~The Secretary of State said that Mr. Menon was being unhelpful and was saying that the six principles were already out of date.~~

M. Pineau has suggested but I think the idea that it should be composed

On presentation Monsieur Pineau said that the U.S. and the Secretary-General already knew the position. The Secretary of State said that we might present our withdrawal to the world by saying that on certain understandings we are prepared to order our Commander-in-Chief to agree with General Burns. These ^{could} understandings cover free transit; clearance (including seizure of equipment); and the Secretary-General's undertaking to promote negotiations on a future régime.

/Monsieur Pineau

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Monsieur Pineau thought the protection of British and French subjects in Egypt was most important. Mr. Hammarskjold had been talking to Fawzi about this.

The Minister of Defence said that General Keightley was satisfied that he ^{could} carry out an ^{only} ordinary tactical withdrawal in 15 days. ^{delegated} If we ~~communicated~~ this decision to Burns and Keightley, Would not the speed depend upon what General Burns suggested? He saw no military objection to this.

He presumed that the command would remain as before so that there would only be one Allied commander. Monsieur Pineau said that General Keightley would naturally consult his French colleague, but would of course remain Commander-in-Chief.

After some discussion as to how the military practicalities in the instructions to General Keightley should be qualified, the Secretary of State read out a tentative draft formula. It was agreed that the formula should be typed out and then be examined again.

In the discussion, Monsieur Pineau asked how much equipment we should leave behind and what assurance we would have that it would be protected and used. The Lord Privy Seal said that he trusted that General Clay would arrive on the Canal before our troops withdrew. Sir I. Kirkpatrick said that we must be sure to keep reminding General Clay of the speed with which we cleared our sector of the Canal so as to spur him on about his own clearance operation. Monsieur Pineau agreed ^{with} that the Lord Privy Seal that the reference to our understanding about clearance was a political and not a military matter.

[Continued] [Signature]

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~~Record of a meeting held at No. 10 Downing Street at 5 p.m. on Friday, November 30.~~

Present:

The Lord Privy Seal	M. Pineau
The Foreign Secretary	The French Ambassador
The Minister of Defence	M. Joxe
Sir I. Kirkpatrick	M. Crouy-Channel
Sir Gladwyn Jebb	
Mr. Beeley	

~~Part II~~

After the statement to be made by the British and French Governments on December 3 had been remitted to a drafting committee, the Lord Privy Seal asked if there were any other subjects which M. Pineau wished to raise.

M. Pineau said that the French had been working on an idea for the future operation of the Canal. They proposed that 3 bodies should be set up -

- (1) An Egyptian authority which would have control of the daily operation of the Canal and of maintenance.
- (2) A Users' Association which would receive the dues and distribute them
 - (a) to the Egyptian authority for its expenses;
 - (b) to the old company for compensation to shareholders; and
 - (c) to a financial concern as under
- (3) below.

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P. W. G. G. G.

Advance copies (unannounced)

Cdr Noble

Ld Reading

Mr Dodds Parker

Sir I. Kirkpatrick

Mr Beeley

Mr Ross

Lawnt Dept

African Dept

POSD Dept.

P0371/118872

(3) A financial organisation - ~~either~~ the I.B.R.D. or the Bank of International Settlements ^{for account of the} - which would be charged with raising funds for the clearance of the Canal and ^{later,} for its development and improvement.

The three organisations would meet jointly for anything concerning common policy, in particular the choice of contractors to carry out development work.

The French saw three advantages in their proposal -

1. It would satisfy Egyptian nationalist feeling by reason of the fact that the daily operation would be under Egyptian control.
2. Britain, France and the users would be guaranteed their essential requirements ^{since} Egypt would not receive more than a share of the dues and there would be ^a means of pressure upon her should she fail in her obligations.
3. The financial concern would alone be responsible for raising funds and loans would be guaranteed by reason of the existence of the intermediary - the Users' Association. Such an intermediary would be essential since Egypt could never raise sufficient funds on her own credit. The problem of

financing/

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financing the improvement of the Canal would thus not be a burden on France, Britain, the users or Egypt.

The French would like to put this forward as a basis for discussion.

The Foreign Secretary ~~said~~ welcomed this and said that he would like to arrange for it to be discussed between officials. He thought ^{however that} there was a more immediate problem since, if after the clearance of the Canal we were to seek to pay the dues into blocked accounts as previously, Egypt would probably refuse to accept the position. Before October 29 we should in that event have used force. It would now be more difficult to do so. He thought it was important therefore to force ^{on the} negotiations on the future of the Canal. ~~forward.~~

M. Pineau said that he thought there was a new and important factor in our favour. Apart from clearing the Canal it would be necessary to improve and develop it. The Egyptians had destroyed some £10 million worth of equipment belonging to the old company. After recent happenings and Egypt's behaviour it would be impossible to raise money to carry out the necessary work without some ~~financial~~ international guarantee.

The Forei n/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Record of conversation on
the Middle East, November 19

The Ambassador entertained M. Joxe and M. de Crouy-Chanel to luncheon for a 'tour d'horizon'. Mr. Beith was also present. The following were the main subjects discussed.

1. Nasser's prestige

H.E. gave the French representatives the information contained in the enclosures to Sir I. Kirkpatrick's letter of November 16 showing what we have done to discredit Nasser. M. Joxe expressed appreciation and suggested that the following points should also be made by French and British propaganda:-

- (a) it was the Allied Air Forces which in fact knocked out the Egyptian Air Force: this action was entirely separate from the action of the Israeli army;
- (b) Nasser had suffered a resounding defeat and could no longer pose as the natural leader of the Arab group. The Cairo "Caliphate" had no further claims to pre-eminence;
- (c) Nasser had acted throughout as a Soviet puppet;
- (d) Nasser had brought the Soviet Union into the Middle East, that is to say into an area of critical importance to members of the Afro-Asian group and the Bandung Pact;
- (e) Nasser's strategy had been that of a tyrant. He had attempted no adequate defence of Egyptian territory but withdrew such Egyptian forces as he could, like a Praetorian guard, towards the capital in order to protect his person.

In further conversation on this point M. Joxe expressed the view that our propaganda should drop the story that special, new-fangled Soviet weapons had been captured in the Sinai desert. There was no proof of this. M. de Crouy-Chanel said that the Soviet aircraft in Egypt could legitimately be regarded as advance stocks for the Russians. They had certainly not been used to defend Egypt. Only a small percentage, presumably those for whom pilots were available, had left for Saudi-Arabia. Another point indicating Soviet designs was the story of the Stalin tanks. They had been seen by the Israeli forces but they had not stayed to fight. One of the French Attachés had on the night of November 2-3 seen fifty of them being driven at a great pace, obviously by experts, through Cairo. A stock of ammunition only suitable for Stalin tanks had been found near the frontier at Gaza. Evidently these Soviet tanks had been driven by trained Russians who had taken good care not to be captured when the Israelis had launched their preventive attack.

2. Libya

H.E. on instructions expressed the satisfaction of H.M.G. at the French Government's decision to evacuate the Fezzan. He said that he proposed to write a letter to the French Government

/and M. Joxe

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- 2 -

and M. Joxe suggested that M. Gazier, acting M.F.A., would be the proper person to address. M. Joxe explained that the information given by the Quai d'Orsay to the Embassy was more accurate than that of the French Minister at Tripoli (Tripoli telegram No. 467). The French Government had taken a clear decision but the French departure might be delayed for a week or two after November 30 owing to logistical problems.

Entered in
VR1085/13.G

The Gaza strip

H.E. explained that Sir I. Kirkpatrick had suggested to the Israeli Counsellor on November 15 that his Government might "think it prudent to suggest that the Gaza strip should be taken over by the United Nations pending a definitive territorial settlement". He said that the idea had occurred to him personally that, as soon as an adequate international force was available on the Canal, a detachment should be stationed in the Gaza strip with the task of maintaining a standing patrol between there and the Gulf of Aqaba to ensure the demilitarisation of the Israel-Egyptian frontier. The final status of the Gaza strip would not be prejudged. Clearly Israel would not want to give up the strip but she might regard the effective demilitarisation of the Sinai frontier as some compensation; and to this might possibly be added the advantage of interesting the United Nations in the administration of the Gaza refugees.

M. Joxe said that he thought the idea presented difficulties if it meant that Gaza was to become a contested area. Of course if the United Nations could take a decision on the lines suggested by H.E. that might help. It was quite a new idea for the international force to administer an area like Gaza. Elsewhere they were merely arbiters. M. de Crouy pointed out that the Israelis were greatly concerned by the Fedayeen problem and that the presence of an international force on the frontier might therefore be appreciated. H.E. reiterated that the final disposal of Gaza would remain for the peace settlement but that meanwhile Israel might get some solid advantages. M. Joxe concluded that the idea was distinctly interesting and that the Quai d'Orsay would study it further.

Entered in
VY1015/49G

Syria

H.E. gave an account of President Chamoun's fears about the situation in Syria as reported by our Representative. M. Joxe said that he thought the Soviet Union had recently operated one of its lightning "changes of subject" which normally occurred every few months but had this time only taken a fortnight. Russia felt herself vulnerable in Hungary and also to a certain extent in the Middle East. Russian propaganda had piped down about Russian volunteers. The Quai thought President Chamoun had acted in a very sound way. He had at the recent meeting of Arab Heads of States posed the fundamental problem of the Communist menace and the need of the Arab countries to align themselves with the West. The Lebanon remained an open door to the West. As regards Syria there were at present two broad alternatives; either Shishakli would have to be brought back or it would be necessary to effect a Syrio-Iraqi union.

M. de Crouy pointed out that Syria was a key point for the Russians. Any obvious intervention by the Western Powers would be regarded by the Soviet Union as aggressive. The Western Powers could hardly take the initiative to change things in Syria.

/As in regard

As in regard to the Soviet threat of sending volunteers, almost everything depended on the American attitude. M. Joxe agreed that the key to this situation lay in Washington. Meanwhile President Chamoun must be strongly supported. In the last resort the Lebanon might have to proclaim its neutrality on the Swiss model. Such a move ought to have our support. If Shishakli were to stage a 'coup d'état' in Syria this would have to be ostensibly done against the wishes of the West. M. de Crouy mentioned as an alternative to Shishakli the Syrian Military Attaché at Rome, Hussein, who was anti-Communist but also unfortunately anti-Western.

M. de Crouy summed up the Quai d'Orsay view on Syria as follows:-

(i) our two Governments should be ready to stage their counter-attack against Communist influence in Syria as soon as a revolutionary situation developed there. It would however be very unwise at present to take any initiative owing to our present unpopularity with the Arabs;

(ii) we might meanwhile work out with the U.S. a plan to instal a more acceptable régime in Syria (which would imply our taking the initiative) - but only if the United States agreed.

M. Joxe thought that this was about the most important subject for discussion between our two Governments at present. The Quai would study it and consult M. Pineau as soon as he returned on November 23. It might however be necessary to take the matter up with him by telegram because decisions might be urgently required.

Entered on
V R1071
5. Possible subordination of the withdrawal of allied troops to the achievement of some progress towards a Palestine settlement

Neither side had the impression that their Government considered this to be practical politics at present. X

6. U.S. draft Resolution on Suez

M. Joxe said that M. Pineau and M. Alphand had discussed plans over the weekend with Messrs. Hoover and Murphy. The latter were by no means hostile to the idea of amending the U.S. draft to take account of French views. They did not think the French idea of a committee consisting of France, the U.K. and Egypt plus a nominee of each side and the Secretary-General would prove acceptable. But they had gone some way towards drafting an amended text with M. Alphand which would tend to put the committee under the aegis of the Secretary-General. M. Alphand's final draft was not yet ready.

7. American aid for Nasser

H.E. informed M. Joxe of the assurance received by Sir Harold Caccia from Mr. Humphrey to the effect that there was no question of U.S. financial aid for Nasser at the present time.

8. Fort Said

M. Joxe having left the meeting, Mr. Beith explained to

/M. de Crouy

- 4 -

M. de Crouy the proposal to send a company of the U.N. force into Port Said (New York telegram No. 1281). M. de Crouy took note and said that the Quai would have to study the proposal carefully. He was not previously aware of it but would let us know the French view as soon as possible.

As regards the suggestion that we should try and get U.N. observers to come to Port Said again in order to furnish an authoritative account of conditions there (Mr. Beeley's telephone conversation with Mr. Beith) M. de Crouy said that the Quai d'Orsay had some time ago expressed their agreement in principle. They saw no objection to renewing our invitation and thought that the British command ought to do all they could to give the lie to the false accounts which were being spread around.

Entered on
UES 11719.

Oil supplies

M. de Crouy said that the Americans were still unwilling to help because of their fear that the Tap line would be interfered with. They did not wish to deal with the British and the French but they might perhaps deal with O.E.E.C. M. Bauer was seeing the U.S. Embassy today and would ask for some assurance of American aid before undertaking that the European countries would submit to discipline to conserve oil supplies. The European bargaining position was however hardly a strong one, though the Americans would be less willing to punish Europe collectively. The real danger was that, if the Americans delayed much further, the "innocent" Europeans such as Italy and Germany, would come to the conclusion that the collective European approach was useless, and chaos might then result. x

10. Clearance of Port Said and the Northern end of the Canal

M. de Crouy asked whether the Embassy had received a reply from the Foreign Office about the direction of this operation. The questioning of Admiral Champion's authority was, he feared, symptomatic of a difference of approach between the French and British on the spot. The French were holding a meeting tomorrow, the result of which they would bring to our notice, to decide how soon a reasonable channel could be freed in the area held by Allied forces. They hoped that a channel big enough to take a Liberty ship would be freed within about eight days. For their part the British command seemed to attach more importance to cooperating with Salvors and did not seem to think it worth while going far towards the pooling of all Anglo-French resources on the spot because they thought they would all shortly be handed over to the U.N. command.

(J. G. S. Beith)

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JE107/18

EGYPT: JOINT MILITARY PLANNING WITH THE FRENCH

Western Department have received an approach from the French Embassy suggesting consultation or joint planning with us on Civil Affairs for the occupation of Egypt.

- 2. This is in tune with, I understand, the arrangements already arrived at in the field of Operational Military Planning. In principle it is presumably desirable that we should bring the French in pretty soon.
- 3. It opens the door, of course, to French political advice and interference. It also raises the question of how we fit the French into Civil Affairs.
- 4. With regard to their political advice, we are going to suffer that anyway; but it might be of some importance to ensure that we make the appointment of Chief Civil Affairs Officer and get them to accept a French Deputy.
- 5. Whether we can do this will depend to some extent perhaps on whether we are prepared to let them have the Chairmanship of the Military Canal Operating Agency. I understand we may be. Mr. Beeley, whom I have consulted, has broached the subject with the French Minister at the Embassy of their coming into our planning of the Agency and a decision on this question will soon be necessary.
- 6. May I have authority to tell the French Embassy that we welcome their approach on Civil Affairs and, if they agree, will put a Planner of theirs into touch with the appropriate official at the War Office. I would warn Sir Charles Key of this development at the same time.

Ralph Murray
Ralph Murray
August 20, 1956.

Mr. Ross
Sir H. Caccia
Sir I. Kirkpatrick.

This appears to be a necessary evil.

R. Ross
20/8

H. Caccia
21/8

I. Kirkpatrick
21.8.

By the Committee

Approved

F0371/118872

Discussed with Mr Ross

Could a draft be prepared of a short note for the Secretary of State to circulate to the Egypt Committee in preparation for discussion there? Alternatively, if there is very little of substance which can go into a note, please let the Secretary of State have a brief for raising the question orally.

Mr Murray

[Signature]
22/8

Draft note for the Egypt Com attached.

[Signature]
22/8

H. Beeley first

I agree with this draft as amended. But I do not know whether we should suggest to the Secretary of State that he should circulate a paper on matters which are of primary interest to other Departments and involve the appointment of members of their staffs. I suggest that it would be preferable for the Secretary of State to speak from a brief (which could be the present draft with the necessary changes of form).

[Signature]
(H. Beeley)
August 22, 1956.

Private Secretary

This subject is down for the next Committee - probably August 24. Please prepare brief as suggested by Mr Beeley. The Secretary of State will raise the question orally. Presumably other departments are aware and in agreement ready.

brief attached.

[Signature]

R0371/118872

JE1073/18

Smith J

TOP SECRET

(H)

EGYPT: FRENCH ASSOCIATION WITH OCCUPATION PLANNING:
APPOINTMENTS

This subject is to be raised orally by the Secretary of State at the meeting of the Egypt Committee on August 24.

2. The Egypt Committee recently approved a proposal that the French should be put in direct touch with the Admiralty in connexion with planning for a Military Canal Operating Agency.

3. The French have now approached the Foreign Office suggesting that they should participate in Civil Affairs Planning, and enquiring about zones of occupation.

4. If French troops are participating in operations and occupation, we can scarcely decline to admit them to Civil Affairs Planning, and indeed it is politically - and presumably financially - desirable to spread Civil Affairs responsibilities. It is therefore urgent that the French should be brought in on our planning. Their participation in this adds complications, of course, and gives them more title to require their political advice to be heeded, but these are necessary drawbacks. To a Canal Operating Agency they could clearly make a substantial contribution: in Civil Affairs we are entitled, from our experience of administration in Egypt, as well as because of our major rôle in operations, to expect them to play a subsidiary rôle.

5. This raises questions of the senior appointments involved. It would no doubt make it easier for the French to accept subordinate rôles in the Operational Command and in Civil Affairs if they were given the Chairmanship of the Canal Operating Agency.

Recommendation

That the Secretary of State should seek the approval of the Committee for the following:-

- (i) that the Foreign Office should put the French Embassy in direct contact with the War Office


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with a view to French participation in
Civil Affairs Planning and preparations;

(ii) that French participation in Civil Affairs
administration should be accepted in a
subordinate rôle and the post of Chief
Civil Affairs Officer should be retained
by a British Officer;

(iii) that the post of Chairman of the Canal
Operating Agency should be offered to a
French nominee.



August 23, 1956

TOP SECRET

SIR MARCEL GACCIA

JE 10/15 / 19

M. Joxe took the attached text away for an hour or two and returned it to me saying that the French for their part agreed that it was an accurate record of the conclusions of the secret Anglo-French talks provided it was amended in two small particulars, as follows:-

Towards the end of paragraph 8 ~~instead~~ ~~in the words~~ for the existing phrase "The French Government agree....", substitute:

"The French Government agree that the Pact ought to continue in existence in its present form and they are prepared to take up an objective attitude towards it."

The next sentence but one to be redrafted as follows (It should I think now appear as a new paragraph 9):-

"The position of the French Government is that Morocco and Tunisia - and more generally the Maghreb - should remain within the Western Mediterranean orbit (doivent rester unis à l'ouest Méditerranéen)."

M. Joxe then enquired whether the French and English texts could now be exchanged so as to form an authoritative version of what had passed. I said that if a document was to be formalized to this extent it might give rise to difficulties. It would be much better, I thought, for me and I merely to record our own impression that the record we had now seen was perfectly authentic.

M. Joxe readily agreed to this and said that so far as he was concerned I could certainly say that the record as amended was entirely accurate.

0371/118872

JE 1073/21

EGYPT: FRENCH ASSOCIATION WITH OCCUPATION PLANNING:

TOP SECRET

APPOINTMENTS

This subject is to be raised orally by the Secretary of State at the meeting of the Egypt Committee on August 27.

2. The Egypt Committee recently approved a proposal that the Foreign Office should be authorised to initiate discussions with the French on the basis of a paper prepared by the Suez Canal Sub-Committee for the operation of the Suez Canal by a military agency. Arrangements were made with the French Government for their Naval Attaché to begin detailed discussions with the Admiralty: but these discussions have not started because the Admiralty wanted first to know whether they or the French would provide the Chairman of the operating Agency.

3. The French approached the Foreign Office last week suggesting that they should participate in Civil Affairs Planning, and enquiring about zones of occupation.

4. If French troops are participating in operations and occupation, we can scarcely decline to admit them to Civil Affairs Planning, and indeed it is politically - and presumably financially - desirable to spread Civil Affairs responsibilities. It is therefore urgent that the French should be brought in on our planning. Their participation in this adds complications, of course, and gives them more title to require their political advice to be heeded, but these are necessary drawbacks. To a Canal Operating Agency they could clearly make a substantial contribution: in Civil Affairs we are entitled, from our experience of administration in Egypt, as well as because of our major rôle in operations, to expect them to play a subsidiary rôle.

5. This raises questions of the senior appointments involved. It would no doubt make it easier for the French to accept subordinate rôles in the Operational Command and in Civil

/Affairs

(56)
16th Meeting

urgent 16th 1956
(S. L. S.)

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Affairs if they were given the Chairmanship of the Canal Operating Agency.

Recommendation

6. That the Secretary of State should seek the approval of the Committee for the following:-

- (i) that the Foreign Office should put the French Embassy in direct contact with the War Office with a view to French participation in Civil Affairs Planning and preparations;
- (ii) that French participation in Civil Affairs administration should be accepted in a subordinate rôle and the post of Chief Civil Affairs Officer should be retained by a British Officer;
- (iii) that the post of Chairman of the Canal Operating Agency should be offered to a French nominee;
- (iv) following (iii) that detailed planning of the Operating Agency should be started between the Admiralty and the French Naval Attaché.

Reynolds S.
August 27, 1956.

I told the French Ambassador to-day that we agreed that the post of Chairman of the Canal Operating Agency should be offered to a French nominee and that we suggested that detailed planning should be started now between the Admiralty and the French Naval Attaché. He expressed satisfaction. I then said that we agreed in principle that there should be French participation in civil affairs administration. He said that he was not under instructions to make any representations on this subject. He did not know the views of his Government, but he would make enquiries and communicate later with us.

J. K.
August 28, 1956.

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Minutes
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TOP SECRET

Please see Sir I. Kirkpatrick's minute overleaf.

N/K

X

2. This matter came up for discussion at the Egypt (Official) Committee meeting under Sir Norman Brook yesterday. Sir Norman Brook said that he understood the French had put in a bid for running the whole of the Canal Operating Agency. We agreed that this might be undesirable because the French would be calculated pretty well to re-constitute the Suez Canal Company operating staff and though they might do a good job, they might well prejudice the final solution of the administration of the Canal which we would have to agree with the Egyptians. Sir Norman Brook doubted whether the French would be content with the Chairmanship of a concern predominantly run by the Royal Navy, and wondered therefore whether it was wise to offer them the Chairmanship, more particularly as the military dispositions envisaged at the end of operations will leave the French administering an area of their own and therefore raise no particular problem, as we had feared, of incorporating them into the Civil Affairs hierarchy. However, the French Ambassador has now been told of our willingness to accept a French Chairman, so we shall presumably have to see how an integrated Canal Operating Agency can be worked out.

3. If there is anything you wish me to say on this point at the next meeting of the Egypt (Official) Committee to-morrow at 11 a.m., will you please let me know.

R.M.
Ralph Murray.
August 29, 1956.

Mr. Beesley.

I think it would be useful if you were to get in touch with the Admiralty (Mackay, Ext. 86) before the meeting, and find out from him what happened at to-day's meeting between Admiral Pelly and the French Naval Attaché.

M.K. Murray

H. Beesley 29/8

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

TOP SECRET

EGYPT: FRENCH MILITARY PARTICIPATION

must
Paris on Wednesday
It was discussed
- 14/11
JE 1043
2/11

M. André of the French Embassy came to see me yesterday to discuss French participation in the occupation of Egypt. I told him of our general ideas and have agreed, with the approval of the Egypt (Official) Committee to give him copies of our draft Proclamations establishing military control in areas we may occupy.

2. In the course of this conversation, M. André restated the French claim to operate the whole of the Canal Operating Agency, though he expressed pleasure that we had offered the Chairmanship to them, and told me that their nominee, Admiral Champion, was already in London.

3. He then went on to say that his Government thought that on the whole it might be preferable if the French had little or no responsibilities in Civil Affairs. He said the French recognised that we had long experience of governing Egypt and consequently would willingly resign the execution of Civil Affairs into our hands. Furthermore, he said the French Government wished to suggest to us that so soon as active military operations were complete in Egypt, French forces should be completely withdrawn. He said he recognised that we might wish to preserve the international character of the operation as a whole and might therefore wish to ask for a token force to remain, but he hoped we would recognise the urgent necessity for the French Government to transfer military forces employed in Egypt back to Algeria.

4. I said I was sure that, while H.M.G. fully recognised the difficulties which the French Government had in Algeria, they would certainly wish to preserve the international character of the occupation and I was by no means sure that we could accept a mere token force. We had assumed that the

French /

P0371/118872

French military authorities would be responsible for Civil Affairs in the area occupied or garrisoned by the French forces at the end of operations, which I understood to be the northern half of the Canal.

5. As regards the Canal Operating Agency, I said that we had made certain preparations, which included the earmarking of vessels, expert man-power and, for example, heavy salvage gear. I thought that we had conceived of the Operating Agency as being an integrated military concern run by the two Navies, who would work out an integrated staff and the best use of available personnel of both nationalities.

6. I reported this French initiative at the Egypt (Official) Committee this morning. The Committee held the strong opinion that the French proposal to withdraw altogether was unacceptable and that it should be held that the operations could not be held to be complete until the aim had been achieved of securing an international régime for the Canal. It was suggested that Sir I. Kirkpatrick might wish to speak to the French Ambassador in this sense and that the Secretary of State might wish to take the matter up with M. Pineau when he goes to Paris next week.

7. Sir I. Kirkpatrick may also wish to take the opportunity to deter the French Ambassador from his idea that the French should alone run the Canal Operating Agency. The Egypt (Official) Committee thought it might cause us considerable difficulty in eventual negotiations for the international régime of the Canal, if the French had succeeded, by virtue of running the Canal, in recreating de facto the Suez Canal Company's ~~administration~~ administration of it and getting themselves into a position from which it would be very difficult to

get /

P-371/118872

get them to retreat, as may well be necessary.

Ralph Murray
Ralph Murray

August 30, 1956.

Mr. Beeley.

Sir I. Kirkpatrick.

Copies to:

Mr. Reilly

Mr. Watson (African Dept.)

Mr. Johnston (Western Dept.)

I agree with Mr. Murray, with the proviso that a distinction should be drawn between the Suez Canal Company's operating staff and its higher administration. We want to hold the former together while avoiding the restoration of the latter. In view of the relations between the Company and M. Mallet's Government I do not think we need assume that the French will be difficult about this. But we ought to keep some control over the policy of the Operating Agency.

J. Kirkpatrick
31.8.56
Beeley 31/8 '56
Yes

P037/118872

Minutes.

Nothing much happened this morning, but the French N.A. is to produce the French Admiral whom they nominate for the job of Chairman tomorrow, & get down to detailed planning with Pelly. Mackay thinks this is not v. desirable but does not know how to get out of it: he is afraid Pelly may find himself committing us to a very large French participation which, for the reasons mentioned overleaf, might be unwelcome to us. He is going to enjoin upon Pelly to go carefully, & will let me or you know developments.

Do you agree with x/overleaf, by the way?

J. Buckley.

R. J. S.
29/8.

Answered on other pp.

eq 8/9.

W.B. 31/8

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

R03 71/118872

M. André of the French Embassy came to see me to-day about the Occupation Planning for Egypt, and raised the question which he said was preoccupying the Quai d'Orsay, namely, that of a provisional civilian Operating Agency which might succeed the military Canal Operating Agency before the establishment of a permanent international régime.

2. I said that I did not think that we ~~could~~ contemplated specifically a provisional civilian Agency: the circumstances in which we should try to begin the process of transferring responsibility from the military Canal Operating Agency to an international body were still very difficult to foresee. There might be a period during which the personnel of the military Canal Operating Agency were increasingly civilianised, but we had not envisaged an actual change of régime, and I did not think we should be prepared to commit ourselves to one.

3. He said he personally agreed, but the Quai d'Orsay had drawn up some ideas on this subject which he would bring round to me or to someone else towards the end of this week.

4. Would Mr. Beeley like to see him or tell me what to say? He is coming to see me in other connexions in any case.

Ralph Murray
Ralph Murray
September 5, 1956.

Mr. Beeley.

Copy to:
African Dept.

I think it would be best if you said you would have to consult the officials concerned before you commented on the Quai d'Orsay's ideas. This would give us time to consult e.g. the Ministry of Transport before we commit ourselves. I should like to see M. André's paper if he brings one, or a note of what he says

Mr. R. Murray

H.B. 5/5

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TOP SECRET

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Perat

EGYPT.
F.O. Secret, WH Secret.

Registry
No.

- Top Secret.
- Secret-
- Confidential.
- Restricted
- Open

HB

Draft.

WV
12

THE SUEZ CANAL CRISIS: ANGLO-FRENCH

DISCUSSIONS

Anglo-French conversations took place at the Quai d'Orsay on August 11 and 13, 1956, on the political implications of armed intervention in Egypt if such intervention should become necessary. The conversations were conducted by Sir *Gladwyn* Jebb with Monsieur Pineau and Monsieur Joxe.

The attached document is a United Kingdom record of the conclusions reached in these conversations. It has been shown to Monsieur Joxe, who has stated that in his opinion it is entirely accurate.

HB - 49

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Amber Soar
JE 1073 / 22

TOP SECRET

M. André of the French Embassy came to see me to-day and raised the question of a possible rupture in diplomatic relations with Egypt. He told me that the Quai d'Orsay had been considering the question tentatively and had gone so far as to approach the Swiss Government whether they would be prepared to accept representation of French interests in Egypt. The Swiss Government had replied in the affirmative, but had asked that the French Government should let them know as quickly as possible whether they really wanted this, since it would involve opening another department in the Département Politique.

2. M. André remarked that we should clearly concert our action about the rupture. I said that this went without saying.

R.M.
Ralph Murray
September 7, 1956.

African Dept.

Your minute below.

The position is not yet clear as between us and the French, but it is fairly clear on our own side. The Egypt (official) Office has supported the views

(a) that the French must play their full part in Canal Affairs;

(b) that the French cannot be allowed to dominate the Canal Operating Agency.

2. On (a) above, so far as we have been able to trace, the S. of S. did not speak to M. Pinson, nor has Sir I. Kirkpatrick spoken to the French Ambassador (para 6 of Mr Murray's minute below). But Mr Murray has spoken to M. André of the French Embassy, who has flown to Paris to expound the problems and to tell them about our Canal Affairs planning (we have given him texts of proclamations, etc.). We have not yet heard of any decision by the French, but M. André has asked whether the War Office could supply a liaison officer with a French Canal Affairs staff if one is established and the French financial expert in their Embassy here has seen me and also Mr Thorley of the Tby about problems of currency etc., so

(M. Chassagnat)

RECORDED IN G

Minutes.

it looks as though they are now thinking along the right lines.

3. On (b) above, the French have been offered and have accepted the Chairmanship of the Canal Operating Agency and have in turn accepted a British Deputy Chairman. He has been appointed (Captain Rodgers R.N.) and was briefed the day before yesterday to dig his toes in and make it clear at the working level that the Agency was not to be a mainly French show. But, again so far as we can trace, the point of principle has not yet been taken up by Sir I. Kirkpatrick with the French Ambassador (para 7 of Mr Murray's minute below).

FF Brumby
11/9

~~Mr Watson~~
Thank you.

Mr Ross
hdmh
12/9

Ad Wilson
11/9
W.H.P.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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1073

Enter file

10 Downing Street
Whitehall

25

TOP SECRET

November 14, 1956.

*Sent a copy to Sir C. Gell with my copy.
Done 15/11*

Dear John,

...
 I enclose two copies of a record of the Prime Minister's meeting with Monsieur Gazier today. Perhaps you would show this to Kirkpatrick. The Prime Minister has not seen it. Subject to the views of the Foreign Office I do not see any reason why a copy should not go to H.M. Ambassador in Paris. He has written to the Prime Minister asking to be kept informed.

Yours ever

Guy Mitchell

J.C. Cloake, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

The Prime Minister saw Monsieur Gazier, the acting French Foreign Minister, today. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick and Commander Noble were also present. The meeting was joined later by the Minister of Defence.

Monsieur Gazier showed the Prime Minister the telegrams which the French Government had recently received from New York. These showed that whereas on November 12 the Secretary-General had been fairly confident of obtaining the agreement of the Egyptian Government to his proposals for the international force, he had received information from Cairo on November 13 which changed the whole picture. Nasser was now claiming the right to decide where the international force should be stationed, and how long it should remain. The position of the Secretary-General seemed to be that he was bound by the terms of the various United Nations resolutions and that if the Egyptians continued to be obdurate he might have to refer the question back to the General Assembly. He seemed to be determined to insist on the participation of NATO countries in the United Nations force. He also appeared to be contemplating that the United Nations force should be stationed west of the Canal, in the neighbourhood of Ismailia.

Monsieur Gazier said that the French Government considered that the location of the force was of fundamental importance. The best solution would be that the force would be stationed the whole length of the Canal, on both sides of it. But the minimum which the French would regard as satisfactory would be that the force should take the place of the Anglo-French forces in their present positions. It

was essential that the United Nations force should take over Port Said.

The Prime Minister said that he thought it would be difficult for the United Nations force to take over the whole Canal. He agreed, however, that it ought to take over Port Said. In his view, the most important consideration was that the force should be effective. From this point of view it was very important that the Canadian battalion should be included. Monsieur Gazier said that he thought that the Secretary-General was more likely to be firm about the inclusion of the Canadians than about the location of the force. If the force did not take over Port Said, it would be impossible for our troops to withdraw. The Prime Minister said that he foresaw difficulties ahead because the Russians would encourage the Egyptians to resist ^{the constitution} consideration of an effective force. In the meantime the advice which we had from New York was to leave matters to Mr. Hammarskjold and not to make difficulties. We should, however, be clear on what we ourselves wanted.

The following points were also discussed:-

Functions of the international force

Monsieur Gazier said that according to French information, the situation in Port Said was unsatisfactory. The population were being incited to passive resistance, and once the Anglo-French forces were withdrawn there was a serious risk of reprisals against Europeans. It was therefore important to know whether the United Nations force would have the task of maintaining order. It could perhaps be argued that if there were massacres or disturbances, the

security of the force would be threatened, and that it should therefore be entitled to restore order.

The Minister of Defence confirmed that the attitude of the population in Port Said was less satisfactory. This was no doubt partly because the Governor was apprehensive about his own position when our forces were withdrawn.

Russian Consul at Port Said

The Minister of Defence said that the attitude of the Governor of Port Said ^{has been} was stiffened by the visit he had received from the Russian Consul. There were also indications reported in the Times today that he was conducting propaganda among the population. It was desirable that action should be taken to ensure that he confined himself to his consular duties.

It was agreed that the first step was to find out more about the Consul's activities. The Minister of Defence undertook to send a telegram to General Keightley about this.

Clearance of the Canal

Monsieur Gazier said that according to a telegram which had been received from Admiral Barjot, the British authorities in Port Said were not carrying out agreed Anglo-French decisions about salvage operations. The French view was that the Anglo-French naval salvage team should be used to clear Port Said as rapidly as possible and that meanwhile the Salvor organization should operate further south along the Canal, in Egyptian held territory.

The Prime Minister said that he was quite sure that

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salvage operations at Port Said were being pushed ahead as rapidly as possible. He did not, however, think that we could clear the wrecks in Egyptian held territory. The United Nations would have to secure agreement for this from the Egyptians. We should, however, make it clear to the United Nations that we alone could do the job and offer to place all our resources at their disposal.

The Minister of Defence undertook to send a telegram to General Keightley to confirm his instructions to go ahead as rapidly as possible with the clearance of Port Said and of the sector of the Canal under the control of the Anglo-French troops.

Gaza

Monsieur Gazier raised the question of the Gaza Strip. He said that whereas the Israelis would be prepared to withdraw elsewhere to the armistice line, the Gaza Strip was a special case. It was not regarded as part of Egypt and this view was held by the United States Government. If the United Nations confirmed that view the French saw no reason why the Israelis should not continue to hold the Strip. It was vital for Israel.

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick said that whatever view the United Nations might take, from our point of view it was essential not to inflame Arab feeling any further. There was a serious risk of a boycott by the oil-producing countries even including Kuwait. If we were seen to be supporting the Israeli claim to Gaza, this risk would become much more serious. He therefore saw great difficulties in Monsieur Gazier's proposal.

Gulf of Aqaba

Monsieur Gazier then raised the question of the two islands in the Gulf of Aqaba and said that according to French information, the Israelis did not intend to remain in occupation of them. They would be content with their demilitarisation. If that was so, he assumed that we should agree.

Iraq, Syria, and Jordan

Finally Monsieur Gazier said that the French Government were in the process of re-examining their whole Middle Eastern policy. The present situation and the risk of Syria becoming a Soviet satellite suggested that it might now be desirable to allow the Government of Iraq to take over Syria as they had long wanted to do. If this happened, it might be necessary to offer Israel some compensation for the emergence of a new and powerful Arab State. Jordan might have to disappear, in order that Israel could be rewarded with part of the West Bank territory. The French Government wanted us to know that they did not exclude such a solution, although it was only one of those which they were considering. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick pointed out the disastrous effects on Arab opinion of compensating Israel with Arab territory. While it was interesting that the French were thinking of withdrawing their objections to the Fertile Crescent idea, such a solution would hardly be possible until passions in the area had considerably cooled.

November 14, 1956

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TOP SECRET

In confirmation of what I told you this afternoon, Monsieur André of the French Embassy came to see me to-day with instructions to make the following communication.

2. The French, Monsieur André said, felt that there would be advantage in having an Anglo-French working group to consider certain problems which would arise on the assumption that British and French forces occupied Egyptian territory. As examples of such questions he quoted the following.

(1) Civil Affairs

- a) Would we and the French be responsible for administering the zones which we respectively occupied, or how would this be arranged?
- b) What would be the legal and judicial situation? For example, if there were incidents involving our own and Egyptian nationals, what law would have to be applied? It would perhaps be simplest if we each applied our own military code, - but should this be done by zones of occupation, or according to the nationality of the British or French nationals involved?

(2) Operation of the Canal

- a) Should this be done by the military authorities or by the old Suez Canal Company?
- b) If it was to be done by the military authorities should the man in charge be British or French? The French had been inclined to think that, as we were taking the lead in this exercise, the top man in the running of the Canal should be a British admiral. In talks at the Admiralty this morning however French naval representatives had got the impression that we would be happy to see a French admiral take the job on.

3. Monsieur André said that if we agreed with the idea of a working group to study these problems, he himself would be at our disposal to meet whoever we were prepared to nominate from the Foreign Office; he suggested that military and expert advisers should be called in on both sides as required.

4. I told Monsieur André that I was a bit out of my depth in this but that I would make enquiries and give him an answer within the next two days.

C. H. Johnston

(C. H. Johnston)
August 20, 1956.

Mr. R. Murray

J. Johnston - This has led to a Sytt'one. I will let you know as soon as we get a decision.
29. 2/3.

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THE SUEZ CANAL CRISIS

Conclusions reached at the Anglo-French talks held at the Quai d'Orsay on August 11 and 13, on the political aspects of possible intervention in Egypt

1. The London Conference would be a sincere and serious attempt to settle the Suez Canal problem by peaceful means. If, however, the Conference failed to arrive at suitable recommendations for the internationalisation of the Canal, or if the Egyptian Government rejected such recommendations, military operations in Egypt might prove necessary.
 2. As many other countries as possible (in particular Australia and New Zealand) should be associated with these operations.
 3. An international organisation for the control of the Canal should be in existence before operations were launched, or alternatively set up immediately afterwards, if necessary of a temporary character. Payment of dues to the Company should cease. Pending a final solution, which would include adequate compensation to the Company, Canal dues could be paid into a blocked account.
 4. The object of operations would be to secure free passage through the Canal for all users, until an acceptable final settlement could be agreed with an Egyptian Government.
 5. Operations should be restricted in time and place to the minimum compatible with this.
- /object

object and the protection of other essential Anglo-French interests. Any part of Egypt brought under occupation should be evacuated as soon as these aims were assured.

6. If the present Egyptian régime should fall, and should be replaced by a democratic, non-militarist government, ready to provide satisfactory guarantees in regard to the future of the Canal, it should be an aim of French and British policy to strengthen the position of this government.

7. Every effort should be made to separate the Arab-Israel dispute from the Canal dispute. In particular:

- (a) Israel should be discouraged by all possible means from taking the opportunity to launch an attack on any of her neighbours;
- (b) Arms supplies to Israel and her neighbours should be regulated on the same principles as before the Canal crisis;
- (c) A lift of the blockade on Israeli ships passing through the Canal should be shown to proceed from general principles and not appear as a mark of favour to Israel;
- (d) In the view of the French Government in order to achieve (a), it would probably be necessary at an appropriate moment, to let it be known to Israel that, as soon as possible after a new Egyptian Government had come to power, an attempt would be

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made to settle the Arab-Israel dispute on the basis of Israel's existing frontiers or of an exchange of territory acceptable to Israel.

Her Majesty's Government for their part would be reluctant to handicap a new Egyptian Government with such a problem at once.

Moreover, in their view a permanent settlement of Israel's frontiers would probably be impossible without at least a token cession of territory on her part.

8. If operations in Egypt become necessary, it should be made clear to world opinion that they were not inspired by general hostility to the Arab world, or symptomatic of a return to former "imperialist" methods. Relations between Western and Middle Eastern countries should continue to develop on a basis of equality. At the same time Middle Eastern countries would continue to need Western assistance to develop their economies and to resist internal or external Soviet penetration. Her Majesty's Government regard the Bagdad Pact as a model for relations between the West and the Middle East.

The French Government agree that the Pact ought to continue in existence ^{in its present form and they} ~~and are prepared to establish~~ ^{to take up an objective attitude towards it.} ~~a modus vivendi with it.~~ But they consider that

very great prudence should be exercised in seeking to extend its membership.

~~The position of the French in particular they think~~

/Government

/it

Government is that Morocco and Tunisia - and more generally the Maghreb - should remain within the Western Mediterranean orbit (doivent rester unis à l'ouest Méditerranéen). ~~it important not to attempt to associate the North African countries (which in their view should be orientated towards the Mediterranean rather than the Middle East) with the Pact.~~

9. The Lebanon should be encouraged to preserve its equilibrium as a mixed Christian-Moslem community facing the Mediterranean as much as the Arab world. In Syria the advent of a Government in friendly relations with the West and Iraq would be welcome and might well come about as a result of the fall of Nasser. Iraq should be encouraged to improve its relations with France. The French Government for their part think that care should be taken not to replace an Egyptian "Khalif" by any Iraqi pretender to that title. In present circumstances there might be an opportunity to encourage Saudi Arabia to move away from Egypt.