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SECRET

V21016  
488

SECRETARY OF STATE

A certain amount of what I believe to be authentic information has percolated through to me from various quarters, though I have made no effort to seek it, as to the attitude to the present Arab-Israel situation of the Zionist element in the Jewish community. Such importance as it may have is derived from the fact that it normally reflects very closely the thinking of the Israel Government. Some of it may therefore be of interest to you in handling the immediate problem.

2. The resignation of Sir Winston Churchill, upon whose long-standing and often proclaimed Zionist sympathies they always felt able to count in the last resort, filled them with a certain degree of apprehension. They did not know exactly where the present Prime Minister stood on this question and they were waiting for some indication of his views. The mere fact that the uncertainty existed was in itself a source of disquiet to them. Their first emotional reaction to the Prime Minister's Guildhall speech was accordingly one of severe shock. They felt, without pausing to analyse the exact terms of the speech, that he had largely thrown his weight into the Arab scale and that their latent fears for the future had been fully justified. Carried away, as they are only too apt to be, by these first impressions, they continued to put the blackest construction upon the whole speech until they had worked themselves up to the point of regarding it as a death-warrant for the State of Israel.

3. They are now beginning to pull themselves together and take a more objective view and some of them have even arrived at the stage of grasping the profound need for a settlement, even at some sacrifice. But they are still deeply suspicious and their anxieties will be intensified by the Israel Ambassador's speech, reported in today's "Times", in which he alleges that Israel is being used by the Great Powers simply as a pawn in the international game. He seems so far to have shewn considerable wisdom and restraint and his outburst at this moment is all the more to be deplored since the Prime Minister's explanatory statements in the House of Commons on November 24 had gone some way towards assuaging their worst fears.

4. Even though a calmer atmosphere may gradually prevail, the Israelis and their supporters here find two things in the Prime Minister's speech very disturbing:

(i) the reference to the 1947 United Nations resolutions; and

(ii) the omission to make any reference to the armed attack by the Arabs on Israel in 1948.

Perhaps, if the question is to be debated shortly in the House, it might be possible to bear these two points in mind. Although the outcome of the fighting in 1948 may jar on Egyptian susceptibilities, the fact that it took place can hardly be denied. I do not imagine that the Israelis are looking for more than a recognition that their present frontiers emerged from a war and that the war was not of their seeking.

5. The problem of the refugees is not regarded as a major obstacle to agreement. The Government of Israel could hardly take all the 900,000 back, but it is very doubtful whether a large number would opt for repatriation to Israel in preference to compensation and resettlement in an Arab country. (In this connection it may be worth remembering that nearly 100,000 Jews left Iraq for Israel; presumably they could be replaced by Arab refugees). What the Israel Government could not offer is to re-establish returning Arabs in their former villages or farms. Many of the villages were destroyed in the fighting; others have been pulled down and Israel settlements built on the site. The small Arab holdings of land have also been broken up and are for the most part cultivated on a cooperative basis. Once they grasp that, if they return, it cannot be to their former homes, an additional number of Arabs will in all probability choose not to go back at all, more especially in view of the danger of being submerged by nearly two million Israelis and reverting to what was largely their position in the days of the mandate of "hewers of wood and drawers of water" except for the limited Effendi class.

6. The real tussle, if the parties ever draw near enough to engage in it, will come over territory. The Israelis would probably not jib at minor rectifications of the existing frontier

/designed

designed to remove obvious anomalies. But they are most unlikely even to discuss the surrender of any appreciable part of the Negev, however much they may desire a settlement. The Negev has become for them a symbol, first, because they acquired it by conquest and, secondly, because it exemplifies their greatest success in reclaiming the desert and thus helps to keep alive the pioneering spirit which is so precious to them but does not notably animate the more recent types of immigrant from, for instance, Morocco or the Yemen. They might possibly be persuaded to give up their plans for the creation of a port at Elath, a very costly undertaking and a quite unprofitable one as long as entry and exit can be controlled by hostile Egyptian guns. But they had looked on Elath as their potential emergency exit if Haifa were closed to them and also as the point of departure for their trade with the East, and to abandon the project will be hard to swallow, particularly as the result will be complete encirclement by Arab states except for the Mediterranean sea-board, a very alarming strategic outlook.

7. It would perhaps be less difficult to ease the Israelis out of Elath if they could be offered some piece of territory in exchange. The so-called "Gaza strip" was part of Palestine under the Mandate. It would not give the Israelis their back-door but it might psychologically have a good effect in making them feel that they had not been compelled to lose territory without any compensatory gain. It can surely only have a nuisance value from the Egyptian point of view. Its occupation greatly extends their communications without obvious corresponding advantage. On the other hand it would relieve the Israelis of a constant threat if it were in their hands.


8. The Israelis continue to express their readiness to sit around a table with the Arabs and discuss terms. But they are perfectly well aware that such a meeting has no chance of taking place and their reiteration of their goodwill in this respect is designed for purposes of propaganda. They understand thoroughly that any negotiations will have to be carried out through intermediaries. But their present view is that the United Kingdom has shewn itself too partisan to qualify for a position in which neutrality is a pre-requisite.

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/Israeli

9. I have put all these points before you not in order to urge them upon you but in order to acquaint you with what I believe to be the prevalent/attitude in case it has not already been presented to you. For no settlement is likely to be permanent unless it has been arrived at with the common assent of both sides.

10. I ought perhaps to mention another remote but perhaps not wholly fanciful and very alarming possibility. The Israel Government uphold the principle that no Jew must be refused permission to enter Israel. There are some two million Jews still in Russia, mostly in a distant area called Birobaijan. Ways and means are always being considered in Israel of inducing the Russians to let them come to Israel. If the tide turns against the Russians in the Arab countries, their views on consistency of policy would not deter them from switching around and currying favour with Israel by releasing at any rate a very large number of Jews. The result would be the incursion of a horde of Communists into the heart of the Middle East and probably the extinction of the State of Israel under the economic weight of these new arrivals, whom she would be quite unable to absorb. The Israelis assert that, once out of Russia, the immigrants would cease to be Communists, but since the great majority of them will have been born and brought up in post-1917 Russia, this is a large assumption. The prospect is not an attractive one and though it may never even begin to materialize, the fact that there are people working towards it cannot be entirely ignored.



November 29, 1955.

Minutes. *Entire*  
VR1076/G

Mr. Maitland.

The Secretary of State would be grateful if you would tell Lord Reading that he has read the attached minute with great interest.

The Secretary of State asks whether Lord Reading would see any objection to its being shown to Sir I. Kirkpatrick and Mr. Shuckburgh. If Lord Reading would rather keep it personal to the Secretary of State, of course this is all right.

*PJK*

November 29, 1955.

*With Lord Reading's agreement I have sent copies to Sir I. Kirkpatrick and Mr. Shuckburgh.*

*J. Maitland*  
29  
11

*Private Secretary Thompson*  
Dec 30  
11

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO. ✓

December 2, 1955.

CONFIDENTIAL

1072/316/55

VR1076/489

Dear Department,

We enclose a translation of an article by Fikry Abaza, editor of Al Mussawar, which appeared in that paper on December 1 about the Prime Minister's Guildhall speech. It may appear rather depressing to you, but it should be recalled that it was published shortly after, as Nasser told the Ambassador, he was caused acute embarrassment by Khairat Said's statements in New York, and its uncompromising nature should perhaps not be taken too seriously. In any case, even in the embarrassing circumstances in which it was found necessary to write this sort of stuff, Fikry Abaza goes some way towards indicating that there might be a possibility of compromise on the points which he surveys.

2. We are sending copies of this letter, with enclosure, to the Chanceries at Washington and Tel Aviv.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

African Department,  
Foreign Office.

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MUSSAWAR: 1st December.

THE COMPROMISE

Had it not been for . . .

Had it not been for the Czech Arms blow, world consciousness would not have awakened, nor would Sir Anthony Eden's memory have recollected and raised up the U.N. resolutions passed in 1947, nor would humanity have taken notice of the Palestinian refugees' afflictions, nor would terror have caught peace-lovers, nor would Sharett have sent his cries throughout the world involving charity from everywhere, nor would London and Washington have raised a dust about the threatened peace in the Middle East area.

I believed - after all this - that the blow we dealt - in Cairo - rendered us unequalled services. It also served as propaganda which excelled all propaganda campaigns abroad on which we have squandered thousands of pounds. I also believed that "might" is logic, "reason" and justice, and is alone the problem-solver.

Sir Anthony Eden has shown activity recently in an attempt to find a practical solution of the chronic case. He made the 1947 U.N. resolutions to be the centre of gravity, and Egyptian Premier Abdel Nasser hastened to note [lit: record against him] the first official recognition of these resolutions issued by one of the Great Powers. A world row arose about Eden's statement, which was supported by some and opposed by others. Pro-Israel papers in America and Israel bitterly attacked him, and some Pro-Zionist MPs rose against him, foremost of whom were the British Labour MPs, unfortunately.

This serious declaration has resulted in the following:

1. The drawing up of a plain British policy which took the form of a pledge binding on the present British Government.
2. Sir Anthony Eden declared in the House of Commons that America supports him in this declared policy, regardless of the terms of expression and the wording used.
3. The Arabs have won this Anglo-American recognition, which has become a foundation . . . after that comes what the speaker called a compromise. What is this compromise then, and how can it be ?

ma ) The first resolution lays down a partition which gives the Negeb or the important part of it to the Arabs, or the owners of Palestine. There is no sign of a compromise on this decision; Israel has tampered with it and occupied that part, so as to break contact between the Arab States and plunge herself among them. In this way she thought she had severed all military, economic and social relations between the Arabs.

Is it reasonable that the Arabs should accept a compromise on this important issue, the results of which would endanger their existence, present and future ? If this cannot be imagined, there would be no compromise on the first decision.

/ The

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- 2 -

The second decision is the worst point in the Palestinian case. It is the worst stain on the forehead of the civilized world; i.e. the calamity of the Palestinian refugees. Where is the way for a compromise on this sensitive subject?

They, about a million people, have a home, property and rights as against the aggressive state.

In what stage of history did the occupiers expel and banish the sons of the occupied country in masses to the deserts? This is unparalleled in the history of occupation since olden times.

How can a compromise expel those people from their land and home? Justice and logic say that they must return and be compensated. Is there any other solution?

No solution, unless some of them refuse to return to a world of injustice and voluntarily choose to settle in other countries after being paid the necessary compensation, and on condition that these new countries accept them.

Has Sir Anthony Eden any other compromise? The question is not one of talk, promises, exploitation of time and getting out of a difficult position. It is a matter of conscience, justice and right. The courageous is one who faces facts as they are, but does not invent words and terms which cannot prove serious.

<sup>Deaf</sup> ~~Wailing~~ people said that Israel cannot - in practice - contain this large number. This is very strange. It means that the criminal can be told "you have killed, shed blood, plundered and occupied land . . . you can then enjoy your spoils because you cannot endure that the victims should return to their country."

The criminal should bear the consequences of his crime, and must make good what he spoilt at his own expense and not at the expense of the owners of the country.

Then comes the third decision: namely the internationalization of Jerusalem. This is not the case of the Arabs, nor is it the case of the Jews or the Christians. It is the case of all, because Jerusalem is for all. Arab defence for its internationalization is an international world defence which aims at the opening of this city for all religions. Not one religion is to monopolize it, nor to exploit its sanctity for the realization of political objectives and racial ambitions.

How can compromise come into this sensitive question?

The conclusion is that the compromise suggested by Sir Anthony Eden is impracticable. God knows what is behind it.

If it is meant to serve as an opiate, the new Arab consciousness cannot be drugged. If it is meant to cause a split among the Arab countries, a split is probable over any issue except this, because the Arab States represented in their Governments have been anxious not to make it a subject of

/ difference.



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- 3 -

differences. Even if the worst comes to the worst, there, behind the Arab States and Governments, are peoples who are the source of all powers, and no Government can dare stand for a minute against the tide of Arab popular feeling.

If Sir Anthony Eden imagines that power can be exercised, we think that he realizes that today is different from yesterday, and that we have prepared and imported power at a dear price, and it is ready to do its duty when necessary.

We do not want to be suspicious, but we know that Sir Anthony Eden is confronting strong enemies, and unless he is armed with courage and determination and unless he insists on the implementation of those resolutions in full, without a compromise, he will be wasting his time, breaking his head against a wall, and will expose himself to "moral defeat" which is the capital of every important diplomat.

Fikry Abaza.



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SECRET

Washington telegram No. 2991 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

4. Mr. Sharett said he was impelled to use the analogy of Munich. Any show of conciliation on Nasser's part was mere playing for time until he could absorb and bring into effective use his Communist arms, and get his lean for the Aswan Dam. The crux of what he, Mr. Sharett, had to tell Mr. Dulles was that there could be no question of Israel ceding territory. He had never been reckoned an extremist, but he had never been so sure of a position as this. No Israel Government or Parliament would accept anything else.

5. He then talked at some length about the Prime Minister's speech which he described as "not only a blunder, but a disaster", since it had encouraged the Arabs to make totally unjustifiable demands.

6. He argued that Israel's attitude, as shown by the memorandum he had handed to Mr. Dulles, was constructive and demonstrated her readiness to negotiate. Nevertheless, it was not a good time for Israel to negotiate. She had no promise of arms to counterbalance the Communist arms given to Egypt, she was under pressure not to exercise her right to use the port of Elath, and she was under pressure to cede territory in the Negev. He said it would be well to wait for two months to see whether Nasser made good his promise to get Syria and Jordan to accept the Johnston Plan. On the question of Elath, he said that Israel could not renounce her right to use her port for normal trade. The request that they should not press this issue was a suggestion that they should submit to Egyptian force.

7. In his reply, Mr. Dulles said that so far as optimism was concerned, he had stated his personal attitude at his press conference that morning when he said: "the gains to come out of a settlement for both sides are immense. We continue to hope that both sides will see the possibilities of such gains in the situation. I would not say there were any concrete developments which could be adduced as proof that they had been so convinced as yet. But the possibilities, in our opinion, still exist."

8. On the subject of territorial changes, Mr. Dulles made the point that the Armistice lines were agreed upon without prejudice to a settlement and were therefore not intended to be

/ final.

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SECRET

Washington telegram No. 2991 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

final. The Israelis, he said, always explained at great length the difficulties involved in making territorial concessions. He thought there were ways of meeting these difficulties and still providing land communication between Egypt and Jordan. The offer of rights of transit was not enough.

9. A settlement was probably possible only with mediation. The United States was not going to impose herself as mediator but was ready to help. The next two months were far too valuable to waste in waiting. The Egyptians had refused to negotiate from a position of weakness, but their acquisition of Czech arms made them feel that their strength was increasing. At the same time, Israel still had military superiority. There was thus a sort of temporary equilibrium during which an all out effort to reach a settlement should be made. Of the Israel memorandum, he said he had only glanced at it but his first impression was that it was not adequately responsive, though it did show a welcome readiness to negotiate.

10. Mr. Sharett asked whether, in fact, it was suggested that Israel should make drastic territorial concessions. Mr. Dulles at this point said that Mr. Russell had been working on this problem and had come to the conclusion that it would be possible to devise a scheme which would be fair to both sides. (On Mr. Dulles' suggestion, the Israel Minister afterwards had a further discussion with Mr. Russell who argued that there were various possibilities, such as corridors, triangles or a Condominium. There was no desire to impose any scheme on Israel: all that was asked was that she should not start from the position that territorial concessions in the Negev could not be the subject of negotiation). Mr. Sharett said that it was one thing to negotiate, another to be presented with a prejudged plan.

11. Mr. Sharett said finally that he was not leaving the United States until December 13. It was most important that he should be able to take home some word about arms. Mr. Dulles said that the Defence Department were still considering the list submitted by the Israel Ambassador and it was impossible to say anything before they had reported on it.

/ Foreign Office

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Washington telegram No. 2991 to Foreign Office

- 4 -

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus and P.O.M.E.F. as my telegrams Nos. 51, 44, 34, 33, 37, 34 and 91 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus, P.O.M.E.F.].

ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary

Sir I. Kirkpatrick

Mr. Shuekburgh

Head of Levant Department

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Encls: G.

121076 491.

TOP SECRET

SIR I. KIRKPATRICK

The determination of Mr. Dulles to continue pressure on the Israelis while Mr. Sharett is in the United States is to be welcomed, and I do not think we need complain at being confronted once again with rather a sudden move in this matter. It is, however, important that Mr. Russell should not get into a false position vis-à-vis the Egyptians. I also think that it would be much better, having regard to Israeli reactions to the Prime Minister's speech and to their rejection of H.M.G. as a mediating power, if Mr. Russell did not reveal that his ideas result from consultation with us.

2. I attach a draft telegram which ought to go off immediately.

*C. S. Lumsden*

December 8, 1955.

*J. Kirkpatrick*  
S. xii

seen by Lts.

*[Signature]*

*[Signature]*

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

VR1076  
491

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND  
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Mskins

No. 2991  
December 7, 1955.

D. 1.40 a.m. December 8, 1955.  
R. 3.41 a.m. December 8, 1955.

IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2991 of December 7.  
Repeated for information to Cairo

Tel Aviv. 48. 490 G

My telegrams Nos. 2983 and 2991: Palestine.

Mr. Russell told Her Majesty's Minister this afternoon that Mr. Dulles and he, in discussing yesterday's meeting with Mr. Sharett, had been struck by the following factors in the present situation:-

- (a) some significance could be attached to the facts
  - (I) that in stating the Israel Government's objections to submitting to Egyptian pressure over Elath, Mr. Sharett had said that they would not, of course, force this issue if there were real hopes of serious negotiations, and
  - (II) that in stating Israel's refusal to contemplate territorial concessions in advance, he had drawn a distinction between these and mutual exchanges of territory by negotiation, the final result of which might even be a net loss to Israel.
- (b) It will not be possible to delay much longer a reply to the Israel request for arms which cannot be completely negative. This will adversely affect the possibilities of a settlement.
- (c) At the same time, Nasser, with assistance for the Aswan Dam within sight, has strong material reasons for wanting a settlement now.
- (d) It is generally agreed that there is not much hope of further progress with Egypt until we have some indication of a willingness to move on the Israel side.

/(e) Mr. Sharett's

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TOP SECRET

Washington telegram No. 2994 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

(e) Mr. Sharett's presence here for another few days present an opportunity for a follow-up of Mr. Dulles' earlier conversation which would carry much more weight than any action in Tel Aviv.

(f) The Israelis are now aware that Mr. Russell has been working for some months on ideas for a settlement.

2. Taking all these factors together, Mr. Dulles has come to the conclusion that this situation presents an opportunity which must not be missed, and has instructed Mr. Russell to see Mr. Shiloah, the Israel Minister, tomorrow and give him some indication of the broad lines of the Alpha proposals, in the hopes that some real progress can be made with Sharett before he leaves.

3. Mr. Russell said that he had wanted to inform us at once of these developments and make certain that we did not at first sight see any strong objection.

4. Her Majesty's Minister said he saw the force of the arguments Mr. Russell had stated in favour of this course, but that he could not of course commit you on them.

5. The meeting with Shiloah is being arranged for 1500 G.M.T. tomorrow. May I please have any comments you wish to make to the Americans before then?

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo and Tel Aviv as my telegrams Nos. 137 and 67 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo and Tel Aviv].

ADVANCE COPIES:-

Private Secretary  
Sir I. Kirkpatrick  
Mr. Shuckburgh  
Head of Levant Department  
Resident Clerk.

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Registry No. VR 1076

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**CYPHER**

Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s).....

(Date).....  
 Despatched..... 2 25 pm

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Draft.

Telegram to:

WASHINGTON

No. 5828

(Date) 8 Dec

And to:

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 TO DEPT.

Repeat to:—

CAIRO 2972  
 TEL AVIV 889  
 (PRIORITY ONLY)

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~~SECRET~~  
 Cypher

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 —if any

[Codeword—if any].....

Addressed to... WASHINGTON

telegram No. 5828 (date) 8/12

repeated for information to... CAIRO, TEL AVIV

VR 1076/4916

Your telegram 2994. Palestine.

I do not wish to raise any objection to Mr. Russell acting as proposed. But please give him the following comments.

2. He will of course bear in mind the danger of getting into a position where the Israelis can claim to have accepted a proposition suggested to them by the U.S. Government which, however, is not acceptable to Egypt. We have no evidence that Nasser would accept any triangle solution for the Negev. On the contrary we understand he gave the impression to Mr. Byroade earlier in the year that no such solution would be acceptable. It seems to us, therefore, that the utmost Mr. Russell should do is to indicate that the principle of triangles might be one of the possible ways of reconciling the incompatible claims of the two sides and thus of unlocking the door to a negotiation with Egypt. It would be as well that he should discuss other possibilities also,

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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so as to show that we have no firm position.  
I hope he will not give the Israelis any reason to think that any particular triangle solution is considered adequate by the U.S. Government.

3. I would prefer that at this stage Mr. Russell should not (repeat not) suggest that the ideas he puts forward are based on prior discussion with H.M.G. Pressure on the Israelis to come forward with a concession will in their present mood (see your telegram No. 2991, 1490C paragraph 5) be more effective if we are not associated with it. Moreover proposals put forward in the name of two Governments would look more like the "prejudged plan" to which Mr. Sharett objects.

4. I take it that the objective which Mr. Russell will have in view is to obtain Israeli admission that the problem of the Negev may form a part of negotiations for a settlement, and that the Egyptians may be informed accordingly. This is the minimum we require from them at this stage <sup>to get the negotiation going</sup> ~~and their request for arms seems to~~ U.S. Government offer a convenient means of ~~showing how seriously they intend to press for~~ a settlement.

HM  
8/12

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

TOP SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

Cypher/OTP

JR1076/491<sup>c</sup>  
No. 5828

December 8, 1955.

D. 2.25 p.m. December 8, 1955.

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET  
AND WHITEHALL SECRET  
DISTRIBUTION

EMERGENCY

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 5828 of December 8  
Repeated for information to: Cairo (Priority)  
Tel Aviv. (Priority).

Your telegram No. 2994. Palestine.

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND  
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Makins  
No. 2999  
December 8, 1955.

D. 10.10 p.m. December 8, 1955.  
R. 11.11 p.m. December 8, 1955.

IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2999 of December 8.

Repeated for information to Cairo

Tel Aviv

RECEIVED IN O.R.  
1955  
OFFICE OF DEPT.  
9/11

Alpha.

JR1076/491G

Your telegram No. 5828 arrived after the meeting had started, but State Department have taken note of your comments for any further meetings.

2. As you will see from the account of the conversation in my immediately following telegram Mr. Russell met all your points except that in paragraph 4. State Department agree that our objective is to be able to tell the Egyptians that the Negev is a subject of negotiation, but think that we must first get them to admit it to us.

Please pass to Cairo and Tel Aviv as my telegrams Nos. 138 and 68 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo and Tel Aviv].

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Private Secretary  
Sir I. Kirkpatrick  
Mr. Shuckburgh  
Head of Levant Department

12

VR1076  
492

SECRET

SIR I. KIRKPATRICK

Please see attached a copy of a letter from the Prime Minister's Private Secretary to the Commonwealth Relations Office about Nehru's reactions to Sir A. Eden's speech on Palestine.

2. No. 10 have been agitating about this today and the Commonwealth Relations Office have rightly pointed out that only we can draft a reply. The attached draft by Mr. Arthur is I think the sort of thing the Prime Minister would like to say to Nehru. My own feeling is that it is a little over-enthusiastic, but perhaps this does no harm.

3. We certainly cannot say any more about Arab/Israeli reactions. It would be wrong to reveal that Nasser has told us secretly he is prepared to negotiate if he gets an offer from the Israelis; and it would be wrong to tell Nehru of the pressure which Mr. Dulles is now putting on the Israelis to make such an offer.

*C. Z. Linnich*

December 5, 1955.

*I Kirkpatrick*  
5. dec

*Send to Arthur  
to inform  
a new  
HM  
5/12*

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RECEIVED  
PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE  
3/12/55  
371

Row 1-50

41  
A  
10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall,

VR1076/492

December 2, 1955.

Dear Smedley,

On paragraph 16 of Delhi telegram No. 172 Saving on November 29, the Prime Minister has minuted:-

"I think we should give Macdonald more information on my purpose and of Arab and Israeli reactions. He might even say something helpful during next week. A.E."

Perhaps you could let me know what can be done to put the High Commissioner more in the picture. The Prime Minister hoped that it would be possible to send him a telegram on December 3.

Against paragraph 5 of the same telegram the Prime Minister commented that Saudi Arabia is the most reactionary country in the whole Middle East and that the King is Mr. Nehru's guest at the moment. His first thought was that perhaps Mr. Macdonald might have made this point but on reflection concluded that it was probably wiser to say nothing. Accordingly I am not telling you of this comment of the Prime Minister's with any idea that you should pass it on to the High Commissioner.

Yours sincerely,

P. DE ZULUETA

H. Smedley, Esq., M.B.E.,  
Commonwealth Relations Office.

- 11073/1359

ie  
Nehru

Registry No.

Top Secret.
<u>Secret.</u>
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

G  
G  
A  
5/12

Draft.

Telegram to :—

NEW DELHI

No. ....

(Date) .....

And to :—

Repeat to :—

WASHINGTON  
(Saving)

~~Ex:Ghar.~~  
~~Godaxxx~~  
Cypher

Distribution :—

Copies to :—

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GPO: 1954 O 371/115886 86395

\* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s).....

EMERGENCY
<u>IMMEDIATE</u>
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with priority
without
DEFERRED

(Date) .....

*Not for despatch*

Despatched .....

[Security classification]..... SECRET  
—if any

[Codeword—if any] .....

Addressed to..... NEW DELHI

telegram No..... (date).....

Saving  
repeated for information/to..... WASHINGTON

Your telegram No. 172 Saving /of November 24/7,  
para. 16: Arab/Israel dispute.

Following from Prime Minister.

Please thank Mr. Nehru for his remarks.

I am greatly encouraged by his belief that my Guildhall speech has been helpful. I hoped that it would enable the Arabs to speak openly of the possibility of a Palestine settlement. Our greatest difficulty in the past has been the absolute refusal of the Arab states to negotiate a settlement involving the recognition of Israel. I am convinced that the only way to get peace in the Middle East is for each of the parties to this dispute to accept the other's starting point and seek a compromise between the two.

2. My hopes have not been entirely disappointed. The Arabs have loosened up considerably, and several of their leaders, notably Colonel Nasser and the Iraqi Foreign Minister, have spoken publicly of making peace

/with Israel.

with Israel. The idea of a settlement of some kind is gaining currency with the Arabs though their terms are still often unrealistic. This is an important advance.

3. Our main difficulty at the next stage is with the Israelis, who ~~have naturally attacked my speech and~~ are mobilising their forces everywhere to resist a settlement for which they would have to make some sacrifices. We and our American friends are trying to show them that a settlement, which we are prepared to guarantee, would be so valuable to them that ~~any~~ <sup>reasonable</sup> sacrifices they ~~may make~~ would be worthwhile.

4. In general I believe that the atmosphere in the Middle East is now more propitious than it has ever been. We must try to take advantage of it. Please explain my views to Mr. Nehru as soon as possible and urge him to help us in this important work. If he could make a statement endorsing my Guildhall speech the effect on both Arabs and Israelis would be most valuable. It would maintain the impetus of our efforts for peace in the Middle East.

from the point of view of a Palestine Settlement

*Jm*  
5/11/48

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.



25



Ref 2PL 1) Mr. Turton  
 2) Private Secretary  
 2/11

Secretary of State  
 10, Downing Street,  
 Whitehall.

R10764939

December 2, 1955.

attach the letter in question.

Dear Angus

copy attached

Thank you for your letter of December 1 about Mr. Elath's letter to the Times of November 30.

The Prime Minister notes that there are precedents for contentious letters to the press by foreign representatives. But is it not a most improper proceeding for an Ambassador to make what amounts to a public attack on a speech by the Prime Minister of the country to which he is accredited? Surely the Israelis would be incensed if Nicholls made an attack on a speech by Ben-Gurion.

The Prime Minister thinks that, subject to the Foreign Secretary's views, it might perhaps be a good thing if Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick were to send for Mr. Elath and point this out in appropriate terms.

Yours ever

Smy Millard

C.R.A. Rae, Esq.,  
 Foreign Office.

Str I K  
 I sh. h against him.  
 What do you say?  
 H.M.  
 3/12

Ref: FO 371/115886

86395

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## ISRAEL'S POLICY

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—The latest dispatches from your Jerusalem (Israel) Correspondent, and especially that of yesterday's date under the heading "Israel: Note of Reality—Eden Speech Re-examined," may, I am afraid, create the false impression that there is likely to be some change in my Government's attitude towards the proposals made in Sir Anthony Eden's Guildhall speech. May I therefore be permitted to re-state Israel's position in this matter, as originally set out by my Prime Minister, Mr. David Ben-Gurion, in his speech in the Knesset on November 15, and reaffirmed by him and by my Foreign Minister, Mr. Moshe Sharett, on several occasions since?

It is precisely because of the strong "note of reality" in Israel's policy in this matter that there has hardly ever been an issue on which Israeli public opinion has been so united behind the Government as it is in rejecting the clear implications of Sir Anthony Eden's speech. Knesset and Press have been unanimous and emphatic in their stand on this issue. They are moved by no reluctance to reach a peaceful settlement with their neighbours. On the contrary, the present Government of Israel, like all its predecessors, has repeatedly put forward proposals for negotiations with all or any of the Arab States—negotiations in which each side will be at liberty to present its views and grievances in a sincere effort to reach, through reasonable "give-and-take" on either side, a just and lasting settlement.

What Israel does object to is any proposal involving *a priori*, one-sided concessions on her part. This is not only because we consider such procedure incapable of producing free negotiations on a basis of equality, but also because we recognize no legal or moral right on the part of the Arab States to base any claims on the 1947 United Nations resolutions, after they have first rejected them *in toto*, and later attempted to overthrow them by force of arms, in what the Security Council has branded as a "war of aggression."

It is no less relevant, from the practical standpoint, that, in the areas now held by Israel beyond those allotted to her in 1947, much previously derelict land has been reclaimed and made fertile, and many new settlements have been established, providing livelihood for many new immigrants (a large number of them refugees from Arab countries), and new development schemes put in hand, on which depend the future of Israel as a whole, and her vital social, economic, and strategic interests.

There is a further reason why my Government—backed by a united public opinion—is unable to read Sir Anthony Eden's proposals in any very favourable light. We cannot but see them against the background of her Majesty's Government's past attitudes and actions in relation to a number of matters vitally affecting Israel's interests—matters such as arms supplies, the Arab economic boycott, Egypt's denial of free passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, &c.

Most important, of course, is the security aspect: the treatment accorded to Israel's requests to be allowed to purchase in Britain the arms for "legitimate self-defence" promised under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, to which Great Britain is a signatory. After signing her treaty with Egypt, Britain lifted the embargo on arms supplies to that country. When Iraq joined the Baghdad pact, arms supplies to Iraq, too, were further increased. But Israel, when she sought leave to buy additional arms to prevent the balance being tilted against her by these supplies to her enemies, saw the greater part of her list of requirements struck out. In particular, she was refused Centurion tanks, of which 32 are reported to have been already supplied to Egypt.

And although the new arms race arising from the Czech-Egyptian so-called "business transaction" is none of Britain's making, this fact in no wise releases Britain from her obligation under the Tripartite Declaration to supply Israel with arms for her "legitimate self-defence" in face of the increasingly grave dangers which threaten her. Yet, at the recent meeting in Baghdad, Mr. Macmillan is reported to have said that Britain will not try "to balance the deliveries (of arms) by increasing the supply to Israel." Israel can hardly be expected to ignore such attitudes in her reading of Sir Anthony Eden's Guildhall speech, whose extreme vagueness on the territorial side must be an additional source of doubt and serious concern.

My Government sincerely appreciates the interest felt by Britain in the peace and stability of the Middle East. Israel is always ready to cooperate with H.M. Government in any effort to contribute thereto. But co-operation can exist only on a basis of complete impartiality and equal treatment for and from all parties concerned.

I am, Sir, yours obediently,

ELIAHU ELATH

Embassy of Israel, 1, Palace Green, W.8,  
Nov. 29.

*M. J. [unclear]  
Loyalty [unclear]  
Enter VR1076. ✓*

**VR1076/1194**

SECRETARY OF STATE

493

I think this is a marginal case. If an ambassador wrote a letter to the newspapers really attacking the Prime Minister for a speech by the Prime Minister, I think we should protest.

2. But I do not think that this speech can be fairly described as "a public attack on a speech by the Prime Minister" as Mr. Millard alleges. I have read the letter carefully, and it seems more accurate to describe it as a letter explaining that the Israeli Government's first unfavourable reaction to the speech is maintained and has not been modified. If any of us were to see the Israeli Ambassador in the next day or two, I think it would be appropriate to tell him in a friendly way that he had been sailing rather close to the wind. But I should not advocate summoning him to the Foreign Office in order to administer a rebuke.

*J. Philpott*

December 5, 1955

*I agree. I shall do nothing unless P.M. writes to him re: this.*

*[Handwritten initials and notes]*

*HM  
5/xii  
[unclear]  
[unclear]  
[unclear]*

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✓ R1076/495 ✓

The Arab-Israel Dispute

THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR referred yesterday to the recent French note on this subject and said that the French Government could at the moment go no further without knowing more exactly what was in our mind. He pressed me to tell him what territorial arrangement we had in view, how we proposed that the refugee problem should be settled and so on. I replied that we had been extremely careful not to commit ourselves on these points at this stage. The French Ambassador then said that unless and until we took the French Government completely into our confidence we could not really expect them to support our efforts.

*JK.*

December 7, 1955.

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Mr. Shuckburgh

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Draft. Letter

to:

Mr. J.G.S. Beith  
PARIS.

from:

Mr. Rose *Hadow*

Copies to:  
Chanceries at  
WASHINGTON  
BEIRUT  
DAMASCUS

CONFIDENTIAL

You may like to know, with reference to my letter VR.1076/464/G of December 7, that during a recent conversation with Sir I. Kirkpatrick the French Ambassador referred to the Quai d'Orsay aide memoire on the Guildhall speech and said that the French Government could at the moment go no further without knowing more exactly what was in our mind. He pressed for an explanation of what territorial arrangements we had in view, how we proposed that the refugee problem should be settled, and so on.

2. Sir I. Kirkpatrick replied that we had been extremely careful not to commit ourselves on these points at this stage. The Ambassador then said that unless and until we took the French Government completely into our confidence we could not really expect them to support our efforts.

3. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Washington, Beirut (with reference to Tesh's letter No. 1052/53/44 of November 30) and Damascus.

*Ruth.*  
10/12

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G  
VR1076 497

TOP SECRET

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND  
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Makins  
No. 3000  
December 8, 1955.

D: 10.50 p.m. December 8, 1955.  
R: 11.42 p.m. December 8, 1955.

IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET

REGISTERED IN G.S.	9/12
DATE TO DEPT.	

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 3000 of December 8.

Repeated for information to Cairo and Tel Aviv.

My immediately preceding telegram: Alpha.

Mr. Russell made no (repeat no) mention of a joint United States/United Kingdom plan. He said that his suggestions represented the carefully considered views of all sections of the United States Government. They went back to last spring and were not the result of Soviet moves. Soviet actions had, however, made a speedy settlement imperative. At one time, the idea had been to make a piecemeal approach to both sides and work gradually towards a settlement. The time factor was now all important, and it was necessary to move towards an immediate overall settlement. The next two or three weeks might be crucial.

2. Mr. Russell then went over the elements of a settlement, giving Mr. Shiloah the substance of the Alpha proposals. In discussing the Negev, however, he did not elaborate and made no (repeat no) mention of triangles, but he emphasised that a settlement would probably stand or fall on this question. The problem was to find some means of reconciling what Israel regarded as her vital interests with what Egypt regarded as hers. He was convinced that they could be reconciled and it was therefore of the utmost importance that Israel should be prepared to negotiate about the Negev.

3. Mr. Shiloah made it clear that he was not negotiating and could not go into the substance of what he had been told. He asked some questions but did not probe deeply. He took Mr. Russell's exposition very calmly and commented that all the elements seemed to be based on a decent effort to approach the problem from a point of view of equity, with the exception of that concerning the Negev. He seemed to imply that he thought agreement could be reached on everything else. He

/ said

TOP SECRET

Washington telegram No. 3000 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

Said he could not understand why a land link between Egypt and Jordan was vital or why the Western Powers should seek to encourage Egypt's aspirations to area leadership. Mr. Russell said there was no question of encouraging Egyptian aspirations. The reason for insisting on this point was that a settlement with Egypt would be impossible without it.

4. Mr. Shiloah said he would discuss what he had heard with Mr. Sharett and would see Mr. Russell again over the weekend.

5. I am sending by bag a copy of the Note from which Mr. Russell spoke, and certain additional comments he made.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo and Tel Aviv as my telegrams Nos. 139 and 69 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo and Tel Aviv].

ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary

Sir I. Kirkpatrick

Mr. Shuckburgh

Head of Levant Department

4444



1200 G.

URGENT AIR BAG  
IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET ALPHA  
1042/599/55G

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.,  
December 8, 1955.

*My dear Evelyn,*

✓ 1076/497  
✓ 1076/497G

As promised in our telegram No. 3000, I enclose a copy of the note from which Francis Russell spoke to Mr. Shiloah, the Israel Minister in Washington, on December 8.

2. The following are additional points which he made during the conversation:-

- i) Refugees - He explained that efforts would be made to convince as many of the refugees as possible that it would be better for them not to return to Israel.
- ii) Compensation - He said that Israel's counter-claims against the Arabs should be dropped in return for the dropping of Arab claims over and above claims for real property.
- iii) Arab boycott - He explained that it would not be realistic to try for direct trade between Israel and the Arab States at this stage.
- iv) Belligerency - He said it would also be unrealistic to try to get the Arabs to accept a full and formal state of peace at this time.
- v) Territorial changes - As report<sup>ed</sup> in our telegram under reference, Francis Russell did not elaborate on our ideas about a possible arrangement in the Negev, but directed his efforts to establishing that some arrangement was a sine qua non of any settlement.

3. I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Jack Nicholls in Tel Aviv and Humphrey Trevelyan in Cairo.

*J.E. Coulson*

J.E. Coulson.

C.A.E. Shuckburgh, Esq., C.B., C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.





TOP SECRET

ALPHA

ELEMENTS OF AN ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT.

(Note used by Mr. Russell in conversation with Mr. Reuven Shiloah, the Israel Minister in Washington, in the State Department on December 8, 1955).

I. Territorial

Mutual agreement on a definite border in accordance with the following principles:

a. Division of the present "Demilitarized Zones" and "No Man's Lands" created by the armistice agreements.

b. Restoration to Arab border villages of a portion of the adjoining farm lands upon which they are dependent for a livelihood and from which they are cut off by the existing armistice line.

c. Cession to Israel of a portion of the Latrun salient making possible resumption of the use of the direct road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

d. Adjustments in the Negev to provide an Arab area joining Egypt with the rest of the Arab world. The land involved need not be appreciably populated or of any substantial economic value.

II. Refugees

a. Repatriation to Israel of perhaps 75,000 Arab refugees at an agreed annual rate. The refugees repatriated would assume all of the rights and obligations of Israel citizens.

b. Resettlement of the remaining refugees in the Arab states or other areas.

c. Israel to pay compensation for the real property left by refugees who fled from Palestine.

d. A substantial portion of the funds required to pay compensation would be raised by Israel and the international Jewish community. The US and perhaps other countries would assist Israel in meeting the obligation through a long-term low-interest loan.

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TOP SECRET

- 2 -

IV. Boycott

a. The Arab states would cease efforts to enforce a secondary boycott against Israel, defined as attempts to prevent trade between Israel and non-Arab countries, including termination of all pressure on non-Arab firms trading with Israel.

b. The Arab states would remove all restrictions on shipping, including Israel vessels, transiting the Suez Canal or entering the Gulf of Aqaba.

V. Communications Arrangements

a. Israel would offer Jordan free port facilities at Haifa and free access to the port.

b. Other communications arrangements would be worked out; for example, with respect to overflight rights with respect to civil aircraft and telecommunications.

VI. Unified Development of the Jordan Valley

The parties would agree to the plan presented by Ambassador Eric Johnston for the unified development of the Jordan Valley.

VII. Territorial Guarantees

Given a solution of the other related problems mentioned herein, the US and perhaps other countries would join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the definitive boundaries established between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

VIII. Termination of State of Belligerency

Termination of the state of belligerency would be acknowledged in some suitable contractual way.

NEA:NE:WCBurdett:blw  
12/7/55

TOP SECRET



VR1076/499

Parliamentary Question

\* Mr. Zilliacus: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether he will draw the attention of the Arab States concerned to the fact that their maintenance of a state of war with Israel, after their being condemned as aggressors by the Security Council, must be ended unconditionally before British services as a mediator can be offered on terms consistent with the United Nations Charter. [Transferred]

LA. Gordon

Rev. add: P.H.

7 DEC 1955

ANSWERED 7 DEC 1955  
REPLY ATTACHED.

As far as we can discover, the Arabs were never condemned as aggressors by the Security Council. The nearest the Council came to this is as follows :-

(a) The Resolution of July 15, 1948.

"Taking into consideration that the Provisional Government of Israel has indicated its acceptance in principle of a prolongation of the truce in Palestine ; that the States members of the Arab League have rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator, and of the Security Council in its resolution of July 7, 1948, for the prolongation of the truce in Palestine ; and that there has consequently developed a renewal of hostilities in Palestine, "Determine that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter ; "

(b) Resolution of September 1, 1951, which called upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal, wherever bound, contained the following paragraphs:-

"Considering that since the Armistice régime, which has been in existence for nearly two and a half years, is of a permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence,

"Finds that the maintenance of the practice mentioned in paragraph 4 above /interference with the passage through the Suez Canal / is inconsistent with the objectives of a peaceful settlement between the parties and the establishment of a permanent peace in Palestine set forth in the Armistice Agreement ; "

2. The question could therefore be side-stepped on the grounds that its facts were wrong. But that alone would be a very blunt answer ; and it is after all true that the Arabs maintain a state of belligerency with Israel. It is perhaps therefore better to explain that there is nothing in the United Nations Charter which precludes mediation whatever the circumstances of the dispute.


3. Mr Zilliacus may try to show that the Arabs do not observe the provisions of the Charter in their relations with Israel. It is true that /the Arabs have .....

366/7

the Arabs have sometimes ignored Security Council resolutions including the one referred to in paragraph 1(b) above ; but so have the Israelis, notably the Resolution of November 4, 1948, which called upon both the parties to withdraw those of their forces which had advanced beyond the position held on October 14, 1948. The Israelis never withdrew their forces from the Negev.

9/12

4. I attach a draft reply.



( E.H. Ross . . )  
December 3, 1955.



5/12

**Arab States and Israel**

15. Mr. Ziliacus asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will draw the attention of the Arab States concerned to the fact that their maintenance of a state of war with Israel, after their being condemned as aggressors by the Security Council, must be ended unconditionally before British services as a mediator can be offered on terms consistent with the United Nations Charter.

Mr. H. Macmillan : No, Sir. The Charter of the United Nations does not preclude an offer of mediation whatever the circumstances of the dispute.

Mr. Ziliacus : Is not the Foreign Secretary aware that the United Nations Security Council, on 15th July, 1948, passed a Resolution pointing out that Israel had accepted, and the Arab States had rejected, the proposals of the Security Council to prolong the truce ; that the subsequent renewal of hostilities constituted a threat to peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter ; moreover, that under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter, Member States are not allowed to negotiate under the threat of aggression ; and is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that there is a danger lest, under the guise of mediation, we may be trying to make the State of Israel give up part of her territory in exchange for the Arab States ending the state of war and the blockade which they are maintaining in disregard of the Charter?

Mr. Macmillan : That is a long supplementary question covering a large number of questions. I will content myself by saying that it is unfortunately true

that both parties to this dispute have on different occasions ignored Resolutions of the Security Council, but it does not help to apportion praise or blame between the parties. Our object is to try to get them to settle their differences.

7 DEC 1955

Mr. Macmillan

DRAFT REPLY  
 PARLIAMENTARY  
 QUESTION NO: 60  
 MR ZILLIACUS

? [ ] for Supps.

No Sir.

Answer, as far as I know, the Security Council has never condemned the Arab <sup>States</sup> as aggressors. ~~though it has declared that they cannot reasonably assert that they are active belligerents.~~ In any case <sup>does</sup> ~~in no~~ way preclude an offer of mediation whatever the circumstances of the dispute.

RM  
 6/12

HM

Notes for Supplementaries.

1. It is unfortunately true that both parties to this dispute have on different occasions ignored the resolutions of the Security Council. But it does not help to apportion praise or blame between the two parties. Our object is to try to help them to settle their differences.

2. Effect of Resolution 7 <sup>Sept. 1, 1951</sup> ~~2/11/51~~  
 was to declare that neither party <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ an active belligerent.

1955

V  
LEVANT DEPARTMENT

ISRAEL

✓  
VR1076/500

FROM Sir R. Makins  
Washington

No. 701 Saving  
Dated December 7  
Received in  
Registry— December 9.

Palestine settlement

Mr. Sharet's remarks to Mr. Dulles concerning boundary changes and cession of territory were aimed at discovering what formula State Department have evolved for a settlement. He did not learn anything.

References to former relevant papers  
498

MINUTES

I am sorry to have held up this telegram. Mr. Shuckburgh minuted on the last two sentences "What do you make of this?"

2. We agree, of course, that Arab claims in Galilee are not now a live question, whereas their demands in the Negev are. We did however interpret a compromise settlement such as was advocated in the Guildhall speech as covering a solution whereby the Israelis retained western Galilee whilst making concessions in the Negev. On this point it was perhaps inevitable that the Guildhall speech should be misinterpreted by the general public, though Arab leaders such as Nuri and Nasser, as well as Mr. Ben Gurion, know quite well what was at the back of the Prime Minister's remarks. I think it is no bad thing that the "informants" of the "New York Times" should have spoken as they did. Their description of the 1947 Resolution as obsolete has enabled them to draw attention to the problem of the Negev, without appearing to be too anti-Zionist. And we can always point to the fact that the Prime Minister said that United Nations resolutions on Palestine could not be put into effect as they stand.

3. At some stage we shall need to make a transition from the Guildhall speech to a more precise definition of our views on the territorial settlement. I do not think the time has yet come to do this publicly unless we are specifically tackled on this point. Our approach to the problem is fairly popular with the Arabs, though they are vague about what it implies; and the Israelis have been frightened enough by American references to the Negev without our joining in the chorus. When we do need to explain ourselves more clearly we could do so on the following lines. The Prime Minister's advice was not meant to be translated into precise geographical terms: indeed we do not suggest that any settlement which might now be reached would necessarily bear any close resemblance to the 1947 or any other partition plan. If both sides show a readiness to move from their respective starting

/points

(Action completed)

(Index)

*[Signature]*

*[Signature]*

References to later relevant papers

47524

points there are innumerable ways of reaching a compromise settlement. It is not a question of bisecting the areas between the 1947 partition lines and the armistice lines. There are many rectifications and exchanges that might be made. For example we do not think that the Arabs could now make any serious claim to Western Galilee; but they have claims for land communication across the Negev, which was Jewish in the 1947 partition plan.

*Y. A. A. A.*

December 14

*Amthadon*

14/12

*C. L. R. 16*

I agree.

*xii*

*CM*

17/10



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM  
UNCLASSIFIED

CS  
10/wh.V

BY BAG

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

No. 701 Saving  
of December 7, 1955

D: 11.00 a.m. December 8, 1955

R1076/50R Dec 9

PRIORITY  
UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram  
No. 701 Saving of December 7.

Repeated for information Saving to:  
Cairo No. 45 Amman No. 35  
Tel Aviv No. 52 Damascus No. 35  
Bagdad No. 34 Beirut No. 38

PALESTINE

According to today's New York Times, the Israel Foreign Minister, after his meeting with Mr. Dulles yesterday, said he saw no reason whatever to suppose that prospects for peace in the Middle East had improved. If there were willingness on the Arab side, there could be peace, but on account of the Egypt-Czech arms deal it was more likely that things would get worse. He had told Mr. Dulles that it was the irrevocable stand of Israel that she would not make territorial concessions, though she was willing to discuss minor mutual adjustments.

2. The report goes on to say that "according to diplomatic informants," Mr. Sharett's main purpose was to ascertain what formula State Department had evolved for a settlement. He was unsuccessful because United States policy, though advocating concessions, including territorial ones, has not been spelled out in a formula. According to the same informants, the United States considers the 1947 United Nations resolutions obsolete because they call on Israel to cede territory in Galilee but leave the Negev entirely to Israel. Arab claims in Galilee are not now a live question, whereas Arab demands for a land communication across the Negev are.

MAKINS



(304)

V R 1076 / 501 / G

FROM Mr. O. Brundage  
 Secretary of State  
 No. 17073 101  
 Dated Dec 8  
 Received in Registry Dec 10

ALPHA.  
 Visit paid by Mr. SIEFF, when he gave his impression of Israeli public opinion on a Palestine settlement. He suggested the Israelis would give away more of the Negev if we took some military rights in the Israel part of the Negev.

References to former relevant papers

MINUTES

The views expressed by Mr. Sieff are derived from a moderate and traditional British Zionism and are quite reasonable. It is however unfortunate that those people in Israel from whom he acquired his impressions seem to have little influence on the counsels of the Israeli Government.

(Print)

2. The most interesting suggestion made by Mr. Sieff is that the Israelis would give more of the Negev away in a settlement if we took some military rights in the part of the Negev that remained to Israel. He presumably has the neighbourhood of Beersheba in mind. If Mr. Sieff's belief is justified, his suggestion is worth considering.

(How disposed of)

Df) Selous (behind)

For. Sec. [unclear]

Gen) [unclear]

Brit. [unclear]

Dangerous, POKEE

Dec 1

3. But is it justified? I very much doubt it. The Israelis show no sign of being ready to accept the fact that they will have to make concessions in the Negev; and even if they can be brought to give up some land there, they are unlikely to increase the area of their sacrifice simply for the privilege of harbouring a British base. They know that as part of a settlement they would get a firm security guarantee from the Western Powers, and that this would give them the security they want. What they will not give away for that guarantee, they will not give away for a British base.

(Action completed)

21/2

(Index)

[unclear]

4. But even if Mr. Sieff's belief is justified, I do not think that a British base in the Negev would be a good thing, if it were part of the price of a settlement. I think it is important that Her Majesty's Government should appear to derive no direct or specific advantage from a settlement. If a British base in Israel were to follow immediately upon a settlement, the Arabs, and probably a good many other people, would regard a settlement as an "imperialist" trick to get facilities to replace those in the Canal Zone or to ensure ourselves against events in Cyprus. In any case, the Arabs would object to the

References to later relevant papers

V R 1071 / 108 110  
 of 1956

/idea

M 3442 48211-1

idea, since they would suspect that we were endorsing Israel's role as a bastion of the West in the Middle East. From this point of view, a base under NATO arrangements would be even worse: it would look like an outpost of Europe against Islam.

5. Even if we could be satisfied about the Arab reaction, we should still need to proceed cautiously. Can we, for example, afford another base in the Middle East, particularly one whose primary justification would be political not military? And there is another thing to remember: once we have given them hostage of our friendship, the Israeli embrace would be like that of a boa constrictor.

6. For these reasons I do not advise the pursuit of Mr. Sieff's idea. But it is too interesting to abandon ~~it~~ without consulting H.M. representatives in the Middle East. I submit a draft.

*G.G. Arthur*

(G.G. Arthur)  
(December 15, 1955)

The mention of a naval base, the  
Niger and a land link between Egypt  
and Jordan have all come together  
in another Israeli idea I have  
heard of elsewhere i.e. that ~~there~~  
might be a British base in which  
the Israelis would have rights  
and hence some means of access  
to it.

*4/12*

*Reuben*

*17/12*

*R. R. 17/xii*

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Mr. Shuckburgh

VR1076

501

Enter  
VR1076 G  
Seen

Mr. Sieff called to see me yesterday. He said that three weeks ago, just before he left Tel Aviv, he attended a dinner of the Anglo-Israel Commonwealth Society, which commands the support of a lot of very moderate and good type of citizens in that country. He said that the three things that impressed him in talking with them were:-

- (1) They wanted peace. They were now convinced that they ought to get it. It was in their interest to make a settlement.
- (2) They wanted to keep their ties with the West and Western culture and not to be sunk into an oriental world. Jews now regarded themselves as Westerners, not as orientals, hence of course their dream of coming into the British Commonwealth. This they know is hopeless now but they would like to keep a strong British connexion, for instance a naval base or something of the kind.
- (3) With regard to the Prime Minister's speech, it was of course rather a shock to them but they still would prefer the mediation of Her Majesty's Government to that of the Americans. Could we make some gesture which would restore the balance a little in their eyes ?

Could this be by

- (a) arms deliveries of some kind. He personally realised the difficulty about the Centurion tanks, but something which

/would show

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10/12

would show that we had not gone over to the Arabs altogether.

(b) a statement by us that all aggressive action must cease forthwith.

2. He went on to say that on the refugee problem he believed that a way could be found by means of a token resettlement, and that this token might in fact be quite high in terms of numbers. He suggested the principle that all divided families should be allowed to reunite. He understood there were a lot of people in the refugee camps who had brothers, sisters and other relations living in different parts of Israel. This would mean a good deal of resettlement through a means which would appeal to family sentiment and therefore be much less difficult to put over the Israelis.

3. With regard to frontiers, he thought the word "rectification" was the right one. He believed that moderate Israeli opinion would consider favourably a link between Egypt and Jordan. He thought the free port of Haifa could be developed.

4. With regard to their real ambition to have some connexion with the United Kingdom as part of the whole settlement, could there be a British naval base, however small, at some point, possibly under NATO arrangements or as an outpost of Cyprus? Could there be a British air base in the Negev? He believed they would give more of the Negev away in a settlement if we took some military rights in the Israel part of the Negev.

*Sumner  
whether we  
could do  
this?  
CM*

5. Mr. Sieff did not ask me to answer any of these /questions.

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questions. At the end I merely thanked him.  
6. He was good enough to add that he thought my personal mediation would be acceptable to the Israelis. They had naturally turned rather against the Americans because they had expected so much of them. He did not himself charge this against the Americans. But, when your chief patron does not come up to scratch, there is a chance of deception. (This of course is a very secretive way of saying that they have not been able to bully the State Department as much as they had hoped and is in a sense a tribute to American policy.)

*H.M.*

December 8, 1955

Copied to:

Sir I. Kirkpatrick  
Lord Reading  
Levant Department  
African Department  
Eastern Department

*Mr Arthur*  
*for Mr. Mann.*  
*CM*  
*th*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. R1076/501<sup>Q</sup>

~~SECRET~~  
 Secret.  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

J.W. Nicholls,  
 Esq., C.M.G.,  
 O.B.E.,  
 Tel Aviv.

from:  
 C.A.E. Shuckburgh

Copies to:  
 H.M. Ambassador  
 at:  
 Cairo  
 Amman  
 Beirut  
 Damascus  
 Bagdad  
 and  
 The Political  
 Officer,  
 P.O. W.E.F.

*R. Williams*  
 17/12  
*P.L. Re*  
 17/xii

RECEIVED IN  
 DIVISION  
 20 Dec  
 20/12

E.P. 51-7282

Dec 21  
 25/12  
 +69

During a recent conversation with the Secretary of State Mr. Israel Sieff said that the Israelis now regarded themselves as Westerners, not as Orientals, and that this was the motive of their dream of coming into the British Commonwealth. They realised that this was hopeless now, but they would like to keep a strong British connexion, for instance a naval base or something of that kind. Mr. Sieff went on to suggest that the Israelis would give more of the Negev away in settlement if we took some military rights in that part of the Negev which remained to Israel. Could there be a British naval or air base, however small, at some point in the Negev, possibly under NATO arrangements or as an outpost of Cyprus?

2. We rather doubt whether Mr. Sieff's contention is justified. The Israelis know that as part of a settlement they would get a treaty from Britain and the United States, and we suspect that they realise that such a treaty would be a sufficient guarantee of their security. If that is so, they are not likely to give up for a British or NATO base what they will not give up for the sake of a Western guarantee.

3. If on the other hand Mr. Sieff is right, and a Western military base would enable us to get a settlement that would be otherwise impossible, the idea deserves serious consideration. We fear, however, that the Arabs would not take to it; first because they would see in such a base an /endorsement

endorsement of Israel's role as a bastion of the West in the Middle East, and secondly because the settlement might look like a device to recover what we lost by the evacuation of the Canal Zone, or to reinsure against events in Cyprus. It would be much better if we appeared to derive no direct and specific advantage from a Palestine settlement.

4. Even if our doubts on these points could be satisfied, there would still be many difficulties in the way of establishing a British base in the Negev, for example the expense of it. But before we give any further thought to the matter we should like your opinion whether Mr. Sieff is justified in thinking that the Israelis would give more of the Negev away if we undertook to maintain a base in Israel. I should also be grateful for the comments of Her-Majesty's representatives at Arab posts on likely Arab reactions to the establishment of a British base in Israel after a settlement, but as part of the price for the Israeli concessions which would make a settlement possible.

5. I am sending copies of this letter to H.M. representatives in Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus and Bagdad, and to the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces.

*AM*  
*6/12*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.



**V**  
LEVANT DEPARTMENT  
**ISRAEL**

VR1076/502

FROM Mr Nicholls  
Tel Aviv

No. 520  
Dated Dec 9  
Received in Registry— Dec 12.

Mansion House speech

According to Jerusalem Post,  
Mr. K. Younger has stated that,  
under the Plan, Israel will be asked  
to surrender the southern Negev up  
to Beerseheva.

References to former relevant papers

MINUTES

A) F.O. Minute (Mr Graham) Dec 9.  
Please see Mr. Graham's minute of December 9 and his letter to Mr. Millard of December 12. I regard this as a deliberate Zionist trick. Mr. Younger's efforts to present to the Parliamentary Labour Party some view other than the Israeli must be leaked and misrepresented.

2. I attach a draft letter to Tel Aviv.

(Print)

*G.G. Arthur*  
(G.G. Arthur)  
December 14, 1955.

(How disposed of)

Dft Mr. Millard  
Not Obene) 12/12  
from Mr. Graham

250. Chancery  
Tel Aviv 12/12  
from Levant Dept  
Washington (Mr)  
P. Lewis (Mr)

*Print*  
14/12

(Action completed)

(Index)

*[Signature]* 12/12      *[Signature]* 13/12/56

References to later relevant papers

VR1071/15(3)

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FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

VR1076/502

DEPARTMENTAL  
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Nicholls  
No. 520  
December 9, 1955.

D. 3. 35 p.m. December 9, 1955.  
R. 4. 20 p.m. December 9, 1955.

Under heading (Eden Plan would give Arabs entire Negev) London correspondent of the Jerusalem Post has reported an alleged statement by Mr. K. Younger at a private meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party on December 7 to the effect that the Egyptian Government has been given to understand that under the (tentative Eden Plan) Israel would be invited to surrender the Southern Negev up to Beersheba.

DISTRIBUTED TO

African Department  
Levant Department  
News Department

B B B

Minutes

V R 1076/502 'A'

by Israel  
Mr. Kenneth Younger telephoned to me this afternoon with a somewhat rambling story. It seems that the Daily Telegraph of yesterday quoted him as having made certain statements in a Labour Party Meeting which suggested that H.M.G. were proposing to the Egyptian Government the surrender of a large piece of the Negev/as the price for a Palestine settlement. Mr. Younger was alleged to have attributed his knowledge to an official Egyptian source.

2. Mr. Younger says that in any case this report was garbled, but it was true that he had seen the Egyptian Ambassador to discuss the settlement of the Arab-Israel problem and that in the course of that conversation the Egyptian Ambassador had put forward as his own view of what would be necessary, amongst other things, the surrender by Israel to Egypt of a piece of the Negev. The Egyptian Ambassador was very worried that the Daily Telegraph report would make it appear to us that he, the Egyptian Ambassador, was leaking what he had been told in confidence by us. He had therefore asked Mr. Younger to put this right and to make it clear that:-

(a) he had been misreported,  
and

(b) the Egyptian Ambassador was only speaking for himself and was not reporting the views of his government or of H.M.G. as he knew them.

Mr. Younger + I agree with him, thought that the Ambassador was unduly worked up.

J. A. N. GRAHAM

December 9, 1955.

African Dept.

Copied to Levant Dept.

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*Levant*

December 12, 1955

... At the Foreign Secretary's request I enclose a copy of Tel Aviv telegram no. 520.

Mr. Kenneth Younger rang me up on Friday about this report. He said that it was true that at a private meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party he had spoken about possible terms for an Arab-Israeli settlement. He had based himself, when speaking of the Arab terms, upon a conversation which he had had with the Egyptian Ambassador. It was not true that he had said that the Egyptian Government had received the impression that Her Majesty's Government were proposing that the Southern Negev should be surrendered to Israel, and the Egyptian Ambassador had himself been worried by the report that this might be the impression given by it. The Egyptian Ambassador had been speaking personally and Mr. Younger was merely reporting his views.

The report appeared in the Daily Telegraph of September 8.  
December

G. B. Millard, Esq.

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**OUTFILE**

(VR 1076/502)

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

December 15, 1955.

Dear Chancery,

The report referred to in your telegram No. 520 of December 9 was of course a misrepresentation.

2. Before we received your telegram Mr. Younger had telephoned the Private Secretary about this story, which appeared in the "Daily Telegraph" of December 8. He said that it was true that at a private meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party he had spoken about possible terms for an Arab-Israeli settlement. He had based himself when speaking of the Arab terms on a conversation which he had had with the Egyptian Ambassador. It was not true that he had said that the Egyptian Government had received the impression that Her Majesty's Government were proposing that the southern Negev should be surrendered to Israel. The Egyptian Ambassador telephoned Mr. Younger to say that he had himself been worried by the report that this construction was being put upon what he had said. The Egyptian Ambassador had been speaking personally and Mr. Younger was simply reporting his views to the Parliamentary Labour Party.

3. We believe that the leakage and misrepresentation of Mr. Younger's words were deliberately arranged by the Zionists. It is not often that the Parliamentary Labour Party hears anything other than Israeli views; and on this occasion the Zionists have found a way of embarrassing one of the few persons who is likely to be ready and able to put forward objectively the point of view of the other side.

4. We are sending a copy of this letter, together with copies of your telegram under reference, to Paris and Washington.

Yours ever,

LEVANT DEPARTMENT

The Chancery,  
British Embassy,  
Tel Aviv.

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**SECRET**

VR1076/492<sup>e</sup>

Enter VR1076 Q  
December 6, 1955.

On December 2 you wrote to Smedley to pass on some comments of the Prime Minister's on Delhi telegram No. 172 SAVING of November 29. You asked if anything could be done to put the High Commissioner more in the picture about the Arab-Israel problem. Smedley passed a copy of this letter to us and I accordingly enclose a draft telegram which would give Mr. Macdonald something from which to speak.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosures to Smedley.

P.F. de Zulusta, Esq.

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM  
UNCLASSIFIED

A. [redacted]

VR 1076/503

CB

BY BAG

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

No. 709 Saving  
of December 8, 1955

D: 11.00 a.m. December 9, 1955

R. Dec. 10

Fol/Wh

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram  
No. 709 Saving of December 8, 1955  
Repeated for information Saving to -  
Tel Aviv No. 53 P.O.M.E.F. No. 92  
Cairo No. 47

MIDDLE EAST: AMERICAN PRESS COMMENT

Following are extracts from a report by  
Tait in today's New York Herald Tribune:

"The United States has expressed its displeasure to Israel over that country's 'rigid' attitude in the Palestine dispute, informed officials disclosed today.

"While careful to avoid taking sides in the Arab-Israeli feud, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles has told Israel that the cause of Middle East peace could best be served if the Tel Aviv government would show willingness to 'negotiate' and come forward with 'contributions' toward a settlement, officials said.

"It is understood that Secretary Dulles made clear this American position in his conference yesterday with Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett.

"American officials emphasized today that while this government is prodding Israel, it is not absolving Egypt and other Arab states of blame for the present atmosphere of distrust and hatred in the Middle East. But, they pointed out, Egypt has indicated a willingness to accept mediation while Israel has consistently declined to negotiate on the basis of territorial concessions.

"It is the American view that Israel must display a greater flexibility in its approach to the crisis.

"The United States, however, does not go so far as Great Britain, which has urged the opposing parties to find a compromise between the 1947 United Nations partition resolution and the 1949 armistice lines."

12 DEC 1955

MAKINS

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Ref: 1076/5010)

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

December 21, 1955.

During a recent conversation with the Secretary of State Mr. Israel Sieff said that the Israelis now regarded themselves as Westerners, not as Orientals, and that this was the motive of their dream of coming into the British Commonwealth. They realised that this was hopeless now, but they would like to keep a strong British connexion, for instance a naval base or something of that kind. Mr. Sieff went on to suggest that the Israelis would give more of the Negev away in settlement if we took some military rights in that part of the Negev which remained to Israel. Could there be a British naval or air base, however small, at some point in the Negev, possibly under NATO arrangements or as an outpost of Cyprus?

2. We rather doubt whether Mr. Sieff's contention is justified. The Israelis know that as part of a settlement they would get a treaty from Britain and the United States, and we suspect that they realise that such a treaty would be a sufficient guarantee of their security. If that is so, they are not likely to give up for a British or NATO base what they will not give up for the sake of a Western guarantee.

3. If on the other hand Mr. Sieff is right, and a Western military base would enable us to get a settlement that would be otherwise impossible, the idea deserves serious consideration. We fear, however, that the Arabs would not take to it; first because they would see in such a base an endorsement of Israel's role as a bastion of the West in the Middle East, and secondly because the settlement might look like a device to recover what we lost by the evacuation of the Canal Zone, or to reinsure against events in Cyprus. It would be much better if we appeared to derive no direct and specific advantage from a Palestine settlement.

4. Even if our doubts on these points could be satisfied, there would still be many difficulties in the way of establishing a British base in the Negev, for example the expense of it. But before we give any further thought to the matter we should like your opinion whether Mr. Sieff is justified in thinking that the Israelis would give more of the Negev away if we undertook to maintain a base in Israel. I should also be grateful for the comments of Her Majesty's representatives at Arab posts on likely Arab reactions to the establishment of a British base in Israel after a settlement, but as part of the price for the Israeli concessions which would make a settlement possible.

5. I am sending copies of this letter to Her Majesty's representatives in Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus and Bagdad, and to the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces.

(G.A.S. Snuckburgh)

J.W. Nicholls, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,  
Tel Aviv.