



Mr. G. G. G.

Rush 6/12 p.w. G + resident

AIR BAG
TOP SECRET ALPHA
1042/581/55G

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
December 3, 1955

VR1076/463

RECEIVED
DEC 3 1955

Dear Hadow,

Will you please refer to the "Memorandum of Conversation" recording the meeting between Mr. Dulles and Mr. Sharett on November 22, a copy of which was enclosed with Bailey's letter to Rose of November 23 (1042/545/55G)? VR1076/463

2. State Department have now given us a copy of the version approved by Mr. Dulles. The changes are not important but for the record you may wish to know that the final version of the altered passages reads as follows:-

1st paragraph - ... But we must know that there is flexibility if we are ...

5th paragraph - ... in reliance upon Soviet promises. That is a rather good rule to follow in most international negotiations. He does not expect to give up something of value in advance of getting an adequate return. He is not naive and recognises that there are many risks in this situation and that there could be some duplicity. But we do believe that, ...

7th paragraph - The Secretary said that in Korea and Formosa there were governments, faced by massed power, that felt the only way out was in world war, wherever the U.S. would defeat their enemies. He said he assumed that Israel would not want to get into that situation vis-a-vis the Arabs. ...

... that one cannot be blind to the fact that the scales are more heavily weighted against peace than at any time in history. The sacrifices that are called for to save peace are greater. ...

3. I am sending copies of this letter to Garvey in Cairo and to Westlake in Tel Aviv.

*Yours ever,
W. Morris*

W. Morris

R.M. Hadow, Esq.,
Levant Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W. 1

<p>18000 (292)</p>	<p>LEVANT DEPARTMENT ISRAEL</p>	<p>VR1076/404 G</p>
<p>FROM Sir G. Jebb Dario TOP SECRET No. 468 Sar Dated Nov 29 Received in Registry— NW 30.</p>	<p><u>Mansion House speech, 9 ALPHA</u> Contains summary of aide memoire giving the French Government's views on the proposals.</p>	
<p>References to former relevant papers 4516</p>	<p>A) Paris (As Bill to Mr. Rose) of Nov 29. ^{MINUTES} We have now received a copy of the Aide-Memoire (see Mr. Beith's letter of Nov. 29 to Mr. Rose). 2. It is a typical French production. Logical, negative, unhelpful. It is however not quite so foolish as para 2(b) of the telegram suggests. 3. It makes clear that the French are wedded to the Israeli position of "minor further rectifications." 4. It adds few explanations of the P.M.'s views. I am sure we should regret giving the French anything in writing. I attach dft. reply to Mr. Beith on lines on which I spoke to M. de la Chevallerie of the French Embassy who called yesterday to enquire what we thought.</p>	
<p>(Print)</p>		
<p>(How disposed of) Off. Paris (Bill) Dec 7 Ind. Wash. (As Watson) Dec 3</p>	<p>I agree. The Aide-Memoire is unhelpful & unjust - the impatient. P. L. Rose 3/12</p>	
<p>(Action completed) D 8/12</p>	<p>(Index) [Signature]</p>	
<p>References to later relevant papers 1495 4512 G</p>	<p>47524 Copy Mr. Rose's letter to Washington [Signature] 12/12</p>	

70/wk

M.F.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

REFERENCE COPY

En Clair and
By Bag

FROM PARIS TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir G. Jebb
No. 468 Saving
November 29, 1955

R1076/464

CB
V R1076
464

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 468 Saving of November 29.

Repeated for information to:

Washington	No. 363) SAVING
Cairo	" 34	
Tel Aviv	" 29	
Damascus	" 23	
Amman	" 30	
Ankara	" 30	
Bagdad	" 21	
Beirut	" 23	
Jedda	" 21	
Jerusalem	" 5	
POMEF	" 13	

R1076/451E

Beith's letter to Rose of November 22: Palestine.

We have now received the French Government's comments on the Prime Minister's statement on Palestine of November 9. These are embodied in an aide memoire summarised below. The full text follows to Foreign Office and Washington

2. (a) The French Government have never spared their efforts to promote peace in the Middle East in the spirit of the 1950 tripartite declaration and in close cooperation with the British and American Governments. They accordingly welcome all attempts to bring about a peaceful settlement, particularly at the present time of increased tension.
- (b) Nevertheless such attempts, if they are to have any chance of success, must make sufficient initial appeal to both sides to create an atmosphere of compromise. In the present case the favourable reaction of some Arab countries has unfortunately been counter-balanced by the strong opposition of Israel, which has been alarmed by the recent Soviet arms deliveries within the region.
- (c) Moreover it is arguable that, in view of the present tension in the area, a settlement involving "important territorial modifications" would be attended with more difficulties than advantages.



/(a)

1	2	oms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

Outward telegram No 468 Saving

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

- (d) Minor frontier rectifications are another matter. The French Government would be fully disposed to intervene to bring these about if they seemed likely to lead to a peaceful settlement.
- (e) In any case the French Government would, if possible, be glad to know more precisely what the Prime Minister has in mind, in order to contribute usefully to the work of pacification.
- (f) They suggest that any future approaches should be made with the greatest discretion in order to avoid violent public reactions in the countries concerned, which might destroy all chances of success.

CONFIDENTIAL



M. Beith
BRITISH EMBASSY

Paris.

November 29, 1955.

Enter on pass VR1076/444

VR1076/G
464

A
See dft
refly

Dear Michael,

VR1076/464

We are sending you today by saving telegram, repeated to the other posts concerned, a summary of the Quai d'Orsay's aide-mémoire replying to our enquiries as to French views on the passage in the Prime Minister's Guildhall speech concerning the Middle East.

2. I now enclose a copy of the full text of the French aide-mémoire, to which there is little to add since I called on Maillard to discuss other things and he merely took the opportunity to communicate the French paper with apologies for its delay. After reading it through I told Maillard that I was struck at first sight by the statement at the bottom of the second page to the effect that the French Government did not think that a solution involving important territorial changes should be attempted at present. I was glad that immediately afterwards the aide-mémoire added that the possibility of minor frontier rectifications should not be excluded. I explained that Her Majesty's Government undoubtedly wished to regain the initiative in pressing both sides towards a settlement and that, as had been made abundantly clear in later comment from London, there had been no intention of suggesting that the concessions should be strictly unilateral. There would have to be give and take on both sides. I promised to send Maillard the piece from yesterday's "Times", which he had not read, indicating that the Israelis were taking a more sober and sensible view of the Prime Minister's intentions.

3. We had a rather embarrassing couple of minutes on the last paragraph of the French paper. Maillard said that he had really meant to indicate in it that the French Government ought to be brought more into our counsels on this matter. They could not very well comment usefully unless they knew the details of what was in our minds. I said that this was a very logical reaction. Our main object must surely be to get the two sides to negotiate between themselves, possibly with some outside help. Any discussion of what the Powers might consider a suitable settlement immediately became highly secret. M. Maillard took the point. He said that of course on the French side knowledge of such matters could be limited to a very small group indeed.

4. I did not encourage Maillard on all this and indeed rather emphasised the difficulties: but of course this French reaction is reasonable enough a priori, if it were not for considerations of security on the most secret matters.

5. I am sending a copy of this letter to the Chancery at Washington.

Yours ever

John Beith

(J. G. S. Beith)

E. M. Rose, Esq., C.M.G.,
Levant Department
Foreign Office.



COPY
MINISTÈRE
DES
AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

PARIS, le 26 Novembre 1955

AIDE-MEMOIRE

Par son Aide-Mémoire en date du 10 Novembre 1955, l'Ambassade de Grande-Bretagne à Paris a bien voulu communiquer au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères le texte du discours prononcé au Guild Hall par Sir Anthony Eden et par lequel celui-ci a formulé certaines propositions en ce qui concerne le règlement possible du conflit israélo-arabe sur la base d'une solution de compromis s'inspirant en partie de la résolution des Nations Unies de 1947.

L'Ambassade de Grande-Bretagne a d'autre part formulé à cette occasion le voeu que le gouvernement français voudrait bien appuyer ses suggestions auprès des divers pays intéressés.

Ainsi que le sait le Gouvernement britannique, le gouvernement français a toujours été conscient de la nécessité de promouvoir dès que possible un règlement de nature à ramener la paix en cette région et il n'a jamais lui-même ménagé ses efforts pour y parvenir, dans l'esprit de la déclaration tripartite du 25 Mai 1950 et en étroite coopération avec les gouvernements anglais et américain. Il ne peut donc que saluer avec sympathie toutes les tentatives qui sont faites dans ce sens particulièrement à un moment où l'accroissement de la tension au Proche-Orient rend plus nécessaire que jamais la recherche d'une solution pacifique et constructive. C'est dans cet esprit qu'il avait accueilli au mois de septembre dernier les suggestions faites sur le même sujet par le Secrétaire d'Etat américain, M. Foster Dulles.

Le Gouvernement français estime cependant que, pour présenter quelques chances de succès, tout projet de solution suggéré par l'une ou l'autre des puissances occidentales, devrait au préalable être susceptible de trouver chez les intéressés des dispositions telles qu'elles ne risquent pas d'affecter gravement la poursuite d'un règlement qui, comme l'a souligné fort justement Sir Anthony Eden, doit revêtir le caractère d'un compromis. Or, si à l'heure actuelle, certains pays arabes paraissent enclins à accueillir favorablement les suggestions du Premier Ministre Britannique, il n'en va pas malheureusement de même d'Israël dont le Parlement s'est prononcé à l'unanimité pour le rejet inconditionnel de celles-ci. Il est à craindre, dans ces conditions, qu'un tel projet n'ait guère de chances de succès et ne puisse apporter, dans une région où les récentes livraisons d'armes soviétiques ont provoqué chez les dirigeants d'Israël les inquiétudes les plus vives, l'apaisement souhaité.

De plus, il est permis de se demander si, précisément en raison de la tension qui règne actuellement dans cette région, la mise en oeuvre d'un tel règlement comportant des modifications territoriales importantes, ne présenterait pas plus d'inconvénients que d'avantages.

/Il en irait

*between what
& what?*



-2-

Il en irait autrement s'il ne devait s'agir que de rectifications de frontières mineures pour l'adoption desquelles le gouvernement français serait alors tout disposé à intervenir s'il y voyait le moyen d'aboutir à un règlement pacifique du conflit israélo-arabe.

En tout état de cause, le gouvernement français serait heureux de connaître, si possible, d'une façon plus précise les vues de Sir Anthony Eden afin de pouvoir, le cas échéant, contribuer utilement à l'oeuvre de pacification entreprise dans cette région.

Il estime au surplus que dans l'avenir, il conviendrait de garder aux suggestions qui pourraient être présentées à cet égard, ainsi qu'aux sondages qui viendraient à être effectués auprès de l'un ou l'autre des partenaires éventuels, une discrétion aussi marquée que possible afin d'éviter les réactions trop vives auxquelles pourrait être conduite l'opinion publique dans ces pays, réactions susceptibles de compromettre aussitôt toutes les chances de réalisation des projets envisagés./.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

(VR 1076/4648)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

December 7, 1955.

TOP SECRET

Thank you for your letter of November 29 enclosing a French Aide Memoire on the Middle East section of the Prime Minister's Guildhall speech. It is not a very helpful document.

2. We would rather not give the French anything further in writing on this subject. As you know, we and the Americans have worked out some fairly definite ideas on the nature of a Palestine settlement, but we cannot reveal these to the French at present, and we must be careful not to allow them to suspect that an Anglo-American plan for a settlement exists. We should therefore be grateful if you would give the Quai d'Orsay an oral reply to their Aide Memoire on the following lines.

3. We agree with the French that the ideal announcement on Palestine would be one which would appeal to both sides. But we are sure that they will realise that such a thing is beyond achievement, if only because one side will always attack what the other applauds. As the Prime Minister put it in the House of Commons on November 15 (Hansard col. 203) "I did not expect that what I said would please everybody. If I had thought it would please everybody, it would not have been worth while saying it."

4. In his Guildhall speech the Prime Minister defined the positions of both sides; the Arabs taking their stand on the United Nations Resolutions, and the Israelis on the Armistice Agreements and the present situation. He went on to say that a settlement could only be found in a compromise between these positions. This does not mean, as the Israelis have alleged, that either side must make concessions before negotiations can begin, but simply that each side must recognise the other's starting point and show some willingness in principle to move from its own in negotiations. Her Majesty's Government are convinced that there is no other way to a settlement.

5. It is true that the Prime Minister's proposal implies that Israel will have to give up some territory if she wants a settlement. We do not suggest that such cessions would necessarily have to be very substantial; but equally we do not think that they could fairly be described as "minor frontier rectifications" to which the French Aide Memoire refers. All indications are that the Arabs simply would not make a settlement on that basis. The Prime Minister pointed out that the United Nations Resolutions cannot be put into operation as they stand; and we do not think that these resolutions would necessarily bear much relation to any settlement that is now possible or desirable. Their importance is that they are the Arab starting point, and this is a plain statement of fact.

/6. The same thing

J.G.S. Beith, Esq.,
Paris.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records leaflet							

6. The same thing applies to the problem of the refugees. The United Nations resolutions of 1948 give them the option of repatriation or compensation. It is however clear that Israel cannot take all, or even most of them back. But it is equally clear that in order to get a settlement she will have to offer to take some back, if they want to go. As in the case of a territorial settlement, it is not for us to say where the compromise might be found. That is a matter for negotiation; but if there is no willingness to compromise, there will be no negotiation.

7. These are the kind of ideas that were in the Prime Minister's mind when he spoke in the Guildhall. Although they were expressed rather differently, we believe that they are similar in implication to the ideas which Mr. Dulles put forward in his statement of August 26. We must now allow them to sink in. Although the Prime Minister's speech has incurred the hostility of the Israelis, it has enabled the Arabs to speak openly for the first time of a settlement by which Israel's existence would be recognised. Surely that is a step forward; and we hope that the Israelis will in time come to see that a settlement is so urgently necessary for them that any sacrifice they might make would be worth while.

8. A member of the Department has spoken on the above lines to a member of the French Embassy, who called in search of a more precise explanation of the Prime Minister's views.

(E.M. Ross)

(289)
 LEVANT
 NR1076 / G
 456

FROM Lt H. Trevelyan
 CAIRO.
 TOP SECRET
 No. 1813.
 Dated Nov 28
 Received in Registry—
 Low

ALPHA - Conversation with Nasser on Palestine. He agreed with Trevelyan's views, except that he thought refugees should be given the choice of repatriation or resettlement. He is annoyed with Khairat Sa'id for his recent indiscretions at the New York Press Conference & was censoring any reference to them in the Egyptian Press. He may make a statement refuting that of Khairat.

References to former relevant papers
 NR1076 / 391G

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 4/12.
 (Index) [Signature]

References to later relevant papers

MINUTES

Para 1. I can understand Nasser's fears. That is just what the refugees, and a good many other Arabs, will say. It is difficult at the moment to see how this point "will be solved in negotiations". Perhaps the best way is first to negotiate with Israel an upper limit to the repatriation commitment, keep this secret (if we can) and then negotiate a yearly quota. When the refugees see the conditions of return and at the same time have the prospect of compensation and resettlement, few will probably choose to go back. But it is all going to be very difficult: we can only wait until we get started in negotiations.

Para 2. Nasser did make a statement. It was a confusing one which harped a good deal on UN resolutions and Arab rights but did not actually disown Khairat Sa'id. It was evidently designed to shake off the embarrassment without binding Nasser to anything in particular.


Para 3. But Nasser does not live up to this apparent carelessness.

Para 1. in - [Signature]
 P.R. [Signature] 29/xi
 MR 30/xi

Ref: FO 371/115884 86395

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet

A) L.O. Minute by Arthur of B. Harbo



A series of horizontal dotted lines on the right side of the page, intended for writing notes.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

VR1076/456G

VR1076 ^{Minutes} GA Secret.

I do not think we ought to read too much into Nasser's reference, in para 2 of Cairo telegram no. 1813, to "the Egyptian desire for peace, a word which the Arabs liked, rather than explicitly to a settlement."

2. What I think Nasser means is not peace with Israel with all its implications, but peace as a vague general term. In the latter sense it may sound to Arab ears less final and, so to speak, less contractual than a "settlement." But when we begin to be precise about what is meant, we shall find that Nasser wants what we mean by a settlement rather than what we mean by peace.

L.P. Curran
30/xi

Mr. Shackleton. I expect you are right. But let's use the words he likes if possible!
C/M/12.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

SECRET

Cairo telegram No.1813 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

I said that I hoped that he would say as little as possible, and not commit himself to anything which would make it more difficult to move towards a settlement. (Dr. Fawzi told me later that Nasser might not make any statement. If he did, it would be in terms such as I had suggested).

3. Nasser then discussed in general terms his relations with the Communists. He said that they did not like his Government as it was a military dictatorship, and they did not like him personally. They wanted to prevent a Palestine settlement, as they fed on instability. They had attacked him consistently up till six months ago; then they had stopped, but were now starting again in the Lebanon.

4. I mentioned Nuri's assurances and said that even if he did not trust Nuri he must have confidence in Nuri's assurances made explicitly to our Ambassador and confirmed to you. He said that he would trust all assurances from Nuri made personally to you.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Tel Aviv, Bagdad, Beirut and Saving to Paris as my telegrams Nos.231, 181, 169, 183 and 243 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Tel Aviv, Bagdad, Beirut and Saving to Paris]

DISTRIBUTED TO:

Levant Department
African Department

ADVANCE COPIES:

Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Private Secretary
Mr. Shuckburgh
Head of Levant Dept.

V
 LEVANT DEPARTMENT

VR 1076/457

ISRAEL

FROM Mr. Nicholls
 Tel Aviv

Mansion House speech
 Reports speech by Ben Gurion, in which he said that he thought Britain wanted the Negev to be given to Jordan, and suspected the United States of supporting this idea. He also said that too narrow an interpretation should not be placed on his own statements regarding frontier rectifications

No. H 97
 Dated NW 28
 Received in Registry— NW 29.

References to former relevant papers

MINUTES

A) Mr. Nicholls, Tel Aviv H 97 NW 28.
 This is indeed interesting; so is (b). Now that Mr. Dulles has spoken the Israeli tone is a little less confident. But it is not quite so encouraging in full as in the summary Mr. Nicholls gives. I attach the New York Times article, from which you will see that the two paragraphs succeeding (c) make it clear that exchange, not concession of territory, and no strips in the Negev, is what is in Mr. Ben Gurion's mind.

P. C. 29/11

M 2/11

B) Extract 'New York Times' November 26.

C) Washington (communicated) December 2
 1042/578/55

P 12

(Action completed)

(Index)

7/12

1031/106

References to later relevant papers

FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En clair

VR1076/457 FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Nicholls

No. 497

November 28, 1955.

D: 2.49 p.m. November 28, 1955.

R: 3.22 p.m. November 28, 1955.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 497 of November 28.
Repeated for information Saving to Washington.

Press today publishes a brief account of an interview given by Mr. Ben-Gurion and published in the New York Times on November 26. Full text of which is no doubt available to you. Mr. Ben-Gurion is alleged to have said:-

- (a) that he thought Britain wanted the Negev to be given to Jordan in order to provide a large secure base for the British Middle East Forces;
- (b) that he even suspects the United States of having lent some support to this design;
- (c) that too narrow an interpretation should not be put on his own statements regarding the possibility of frontier rectification.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington as my telegram No. 95.

[Repeated Saving to Washington].

LLLLL



Ref: FO 371/115884

86395

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet

BEN-GURION SAYS NEW EDEN OFFER BENEFITS ARABS

Israel Asked to Cede Land,
Admit Refugees for Mere
Recognition, He Asserts

By HARRY GILROY

JERUSALEM, Nov. 25—Premier David Ben-Gurion said today that as he understood the new suggestions by Sir Anthony Eden for an Arab-Israeli settlement, "the essential point of inequality remains."

Israel is being asked "to cede territory and to let the refugees in," Mr. Ben-Gurion said, "while the Arabs in return would recognize the state of Israel." He said substantial sacrifices were wanted of Israel, but the Arabs were expected to make only one so-called sacrifice.

Mr. Ben-Gurion said in an interview that he had seen only newspaper accounts of the British Prime Minister's talk yesterday in the House of Commons. But he added "the Prime Minister does not seem to have amplified much on his speech of Nov. 8" when Sir Anthony originally proposed to mediate between Israel and the Arabs.

The Israeli Premier directed attention to "carefully chosen words" in his own speech ten days ago about Sir Anthony's offer. At that time he spoke of willingness to meet any Arab rulers "to achieve a mutual settlement." He said the meetings should be "without any prior conditions."

He added that there was "room for local frontier rectification, agreeable and beneficial for both sides, carried out as a result of mutual agreement." However, Israel would not negotiate on the basis of the British Prime Minister's proposals "for the truncation" of Israel, Mr. Ben-Gurion asserted.

In his latest statement, Mr. Ben-Gurion said he had seen only newspaper accounts of the British Prime Minister's offer. He said he did not think the suggestion was the right one at which to be more specific.

He said there might be some cases of ground that Israel had no particular use for and that it would be willing to trade for another piece that Egypt was willing to give up. But he said if Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser were sitting in the chair occupied by the reporter, there would be the time to deal with such subjects in detail.

Mr. Ben-Gurion made it clear that he was not entertaining any thought of yielding the Negev or of trading any strip of territory that would cut across Israel at the Negev or any other part of his country.

Any such cession, he said, would make the country unable to maintain its existence.

As he talked, Mr. Ben-Gurion was transformed from a rather tired man, suffering from influenza, sitting in a blue bathrobe in a hotel room, to one of his nation's greatest visionaries.

"We are going to enter the

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

INDEXED

NEW YORK TIMES

14572

Ben-Gurion Says New Proposals Of Eden Favor the Arab Nations

Continued From Page 1

period of solar power," he said. "We have an endless supply in the Negev. We will desalt water and pump it over the Negev, and it will become something far different from the desert of today."

This plan is menaced, he indicated, by the concealed desire of the British Foreign Office. It wants the Negev to be given to Jordan, he said. He felt that the motive was to find a large, secure base for the British Middle East forces.

Premier Ben-Gurion indicated that he even suspected the United States of some support for this supposed design.

That was revealed, he suggested, in words used last summer by Secretary of State Dulles. Mr. Ben-Gurion cited a quotation to the effect that Israel might be a barren area of no sentimental value.

The Israeli Premier said Arab leaders had drawn the same conclusion as he had from Sir Anthony's original mediation offer. The Premier said they welcomed Sir Anthony's talk because they visualized Israel's being cut in pieces by a return to the 1947 partition plan.

Britain seems to feel that apart from getting a Middle East base in the Negev, it can win the Arabs by reference to 1947, Mr. Ben-Gurion said. He indicated he thought this showed lack of understanding of the Arabs.

Britain is not liked by the Arab people, Mr. Ben-Gurion believes. They would be glad if the Soviet Union were to defeat Britain, "not realizing the intentions and reasons of Russia behind her support of the Arabs," he said.

Even if Britain could deliver to the Arabs a slice of Israel, the Premier said, it would soon be forgotten by the Arabs. What would a part of Israel only 8,000 square miles in all mean to countries with sixty-three times that area? he asked.

"But to Israel," he said solemnly, "it would mean destruction."

Unconvinced on Choice

Mr. Ben-Gurion reiterated that territorial concessions from Israel were the obvious intent of Sir Anthony's original proposal.

It was suggested that both the Arabs and Western powers seemed to regard the question of refugees as the crucial issue.

Mr. Ben-Gurion said he realized that situation of the refugees was a continuing human tragedy. But he wondered what Israel could do on that score without making, in this as in the case of territory, its ability to exist.

The Israeli Premier was asked about a report by Henry R. Labouisse, director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. Mr. Labouisse feels that if the refugees were given their choice



The New York Times
Premier David Ben-Gurion

of returning with conditions as changed as they are from the country they knew or resettlement and compensation, most would choose the latter course.

The idea is that some would come back, Mr. Ben-Gurion said, but what would become of all the rest? The answer was that they would be helped to start new lives in good surroundings in Arab countries with the help of capital from Israel and from other members of the United Nations.

Mr. Ben-Gurion remained unconvinced that it was important for refugees to have such choice if only some could conceivably come back.

"Israel is ready to help in resettlement of the refugees in the Arab countries," he said, "and we will do our utmost to contribute from our experience in that respect."

Express Doubt on Nasser

The Israeli Premier said the impression conveyed to him by persons who had met the Egyptian Premier was that Colonel Nasser was honest and that he wanted to do something for his people.

"But why then," asked Mr. Ben-Gurion, "has he sent these murderous fedayeen (self-sacrificers) into Israel to kill civilians and to blow up houses as was done last week?"

Mr. Ben-Gurion waved aside suggestion that the Egyptians might be driven by fear of the Israeli Army and the desire for revenge for losses incurred by their own forces. If Colonel Nasser wanted peace, why was the blockade and boycott maintained and why did Egyptian posts shoot at Israeli patrols? Mr. Ben-Gurion asked.

NEW YORK TIMES, November 26, 1955

NEW YORK, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1955.



George Rowen for The New York Times
 Menon of India talks with Dr. Ir. Kriahna Menon introduced a return to General Assembly.

BEN-GURION SAYS NEW EDEN OFFER BENEFITS ARABS

Israel Asked to Cede Land, Admit Refugees for Mere Recognition, He Asserts

By HARRY GILROY

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Nov. 25—Premier David Ben-Gurion said today that as he understood the new suggestions by Sir Anthony Eden for an Arab-Israeli settlement, "the essential point of inequality remains."

Israel is being asked "to cede territory and to let the refugees in," Mr. Ben-Gurion said, "while the Arabs in return would recognize the state of Israel." He said substantial sacrifices were wanted of Israel, but the Arabs were expected to make only one so-called sacrifice.

Mr. Ben-Gurion said in an interview that he had seen only newspaper accounts of the British Prime Minister's talk yesterday in the House of Commons. But he added "the Prime Minister does not seem to have amplified much" on his speech of Nov. 9, when Sir Anthony originally proposed to mediate between Israel and the Arabs.

The Israeli Premier directed attention to "carefully chosen words" in his own speech ten days ago about Sir Anthony's offer. At that time he spoke of willingness to meet any Arab rulers "to achieve a mutual settlement." He said the meetings should be "without any prior conditions."

"Truncation" Barred

He added that there was "room for local frontier rectification, agreeable and beneficial for both sides, carried out as a result of mutual agreement." However Israel would not negotiate on the basis of the British Prime Minister's proposals "for the truncation" of Israel, Mr. Ben-Gurion asserted.

In his latest statement, Mr. Ben-Gurion indicated that it was erroneous to place too narrow an interpretation on his mention of "rectifications." However, he said he did not think the occasion was the right one at which to be more specific.

He said there might be some piece of ground that Israel had no particular use for and that she would be willing to trade for another piece that Egypt was willing to give up. But he said if Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser were sitting in the chair occupied by the renegade

U. S. GROWS SURE OF MIDEAST PEACE

Officials Think Neither Side Will Risk a Total War, Yet Feel Mediation Will Fail

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 25—State Department quarters are growing more confident that neither Israel nor the Arab States will start a major war for the present.

Serious as the repercussions of the Soviet bloc's arms deal with Egypt have proved, the best informed sources in the United States Government doubt that any of the parties will risk open war and the massing of world public opinion against the aggressor.

At the same time, the men who are conducting United States affairs in the Middle East have virtually no hope that current efforts at mediation will succeed.

All mediatory efforts, including what are regarded here as well-intentioned endeavors by the British

Continued other side

1055

V
LEVANT DEPARTMENT

VR 1076/458

ISRAEL

FROM
Washington
(comm d)

No. 1042/540/55
Dated NW 22

Received in
Registry— NW 28.

Mansion House speech

Text of Mr. Sharet's speech at
the National Press Club, Washington
on November 21.

1076

References to former relevant papers
451
423

MINUTES

A typical Israeli production. If I were an Arab I should think it worth while taking the offer at the bottom of p. 7 in its literal sense... "peace with Israel as it is, both as to its population and its area" That is, no more mass immigration. (Of course Sharet meant without repatriation of refugees; but he leaves a loophole).

ES 29
xi

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Mr. Lawrence
29/11

(Action completed)	(Index)
30/11	31/11

References to later relevant papers

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

An Address by Mr. Moshe Sharett,
Foreign Minister of Israel at the
National Press Club, Washington,
D. C., on Monday, November 21,
1955.

When I had the privilege of speaking under these distinguished auspices some two and half years ago, I attempted to sketch a general outline of Israel's position and progress. Since then much new ground has been broken by Israel's growth and development which, as before, was generously assisted by the Government of the United States and its Jewish Community, while on the other hand further difficulties and ordeals have fallen to its lot. It is on some of the specific problems now confronting Israel that I propose to concentrate in my present survey.

The world was shaken seven weeks ago by the disclosure of the arms deal concluded between Egypt and Czechoslovakia under the obvious sponsorship of the Soviet Union. To the Western democracies this startling departure signified a discordant intrusion of Soviet military and political power into the Middle East. From their standpoint it was the source of the arms' supply that chiefly mattered. To Israel what was decisive was the massive access of military strength to Egypt. Even before the Czech deal Egypt had enjoyed a definite superiority over Israel in all classes of heavy arms, on land, at sea and in the air. This was largely due to her ability to buy from Great

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

2.

Britain certain types of weapons which the British deemed it inadvisable to sell to Israel. The original disparity became overwhelming when large quantities of Soviet arms in categories vastly superior to anything which Israel possessed came within Egypt's reach.

Whatever the motives of the Soviet leaders in embarking upon this nefarious course, which was bound to start a new and ruinous arms race in the Middle East, they could not be unaware of the fact that they were helping to arm a country which had long forfeited all title to rank as peace-loving. Egypt had obstinately refused to advance from armistice to peace with Israel, as enjoined by the Armistice Agreement itself and by the Security Council of the United Nations. She went on record before the Security Council by declaring herself to be at war with Israel. She has maintained that position despite its repudiation by the Council as illegitimate. She has defied the Council's resolution by maintaining a blockade against Israel's shipping in the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Aqaba. She has systematically violated the Armistice Agreement by armed incursions into Israel. Through the mouthpiece of her State-controlled press and radio and in official pronouncements she has affirmed her absolute refusal ever to negotiate peace with Israel and has proclaimed her resolve to seek Israel's annihilation. It is reasonable to suppose that arms obtained by a State which openly professes to be at war with its neighbor are intended for the prosecution of that war. The world has yet to hear an explanation of how the Soviet Union, or, for that matter, Czechoslovakia, propose to reconcile

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

3.

the supply of offensive weapons to such a country with their declared policy of striving to achieve a relaxation on international tension and of promoting world peace.

For Israel this momentous change in the balance of military strength spells a threat to her very existence. My Government felt impelled to draw the urgent attention of the Great Powers assembled in Geneva last month to this menace to the security of Israel and to the inner stability of the Middle Eastern region. I should like to take this opportunity of expressing my government's deep appreciation of the service rendered to the cause of peace and of Israel's preservation by the United States press, radio and television in bringing to the knowledge of the American and world public the warnings which we were constrained to utter. Israel owes her restoration to independence within her historic patrimony in no small measure to the awakening of world conscience. In the struggle against the dangers and difficulties which still beset her path Israel is vitally concerned to retain and to deepen international understanding of the circumstances of her life. Her people derive great encouragement from every manifestation of sympathy and support which reaches them from outside. Yet moral solidarity alone cannot be adequate to meet the grave issues with which Israel is today confronted. As a State surrounded on all its land borders by hostile resources, Israel's primary preoccupation must be her security. In the face of the new emergency she must seek practical and direct measures for strengthening her defences.

4.

Israel's first and paramount need is additional arms. If universally observed, the avoidance of an arms race is a laudable principle. Once the balance has been so drastically upset as in the present case, an inflexible adherence to this principle is liable to increase, rather than lessen, the danger to peace. It leaves the would-be aggressor in undisturbed enjoyment of his armed superiority and renders the potential victim defenceless. The policy of deterring aggression by building up positions of strength has been vindicated on the international scene and there is no reason why events in the Middle East should follow a different logic. We have therefore been reassured by the declared readiness of the United States Government to give sympathetic consideration to our requests for the acquisition of arms for legitimate self-defense and hope that they will be met.

There can be no adequate substitute for the matching of arms of aggression by arms of defense, if not in the same quantity then at least in corresponding quality. This we believe to be true both for their deterrent effect and for their actual performance in the event of a supreme test. But a most important supplementary role, again both as a deterrent and as a defensive measure, can be played by a security guarantee couched in the form of a treaty.

The idea of a security guarantee is not of Israel's making. It originated with the three Western Great Powers who, in their joint Declaration of May 1950, undertook to preserve, as between Israel and the Arab States, the present territorial status quo, based on the armistice lines, and the

No.
Duty to
oppose attempts
to admit by force

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884			86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

5.

existing balance of armed strength. The Government of Israel has heartily endorsed these two principles but it has failed to perceive either in the Declaration per se or in its actual text any effective guarantee of their implementation.

The advocates of a security treaty between Israel and the United States do no more than pursue to its logical conclusion the obligation enshrined in the Three-Power Declaration to prevent any attempt to alter by force the existing borders between Israel and her neighbors. What they say is that if the purpose of the Declaration is to convince all concerned that this obligation is meant to be acted upon, then it cannot be left in its present form. To begin with, the need for consultation between the three guarantees is liable to delay action. Secondly, the efficacy of the intervention proposed does not emerge clearly and convincingly from the rather obscure wording of the Declaration. Thirdly, the fact that the obligation is of a unilateral character and has not assumed a contractual form is derogatory to the sovereign dignity of the State or States whose integrity it proposed to guarantee. For the same reason it cannot be considered as irrevocably binding as it would be if undertaken vis-a-vis a definite party.

The Secretary of State, speaking with the authority of President Eisenhower, has announced the readiness of the United States Government to enter into such a security treaty, or a series of security treaties. At the same time he stressed the desirability of predicating their conclusion inter alia, upon a prior revision of the existing boundaries. Quite apart

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

6.

from the fact that the chances of any such agreed revision are today extremely problematical, this approach might be ~~continued~~^{CONSTRUED} as a departure from the principle of the Tri-partite Declaration. That document purported to guarantee against violent encroachment the borders fixed in the Armistice Agreement. It is this guarantee that now stands urgently in need of an unequivocal and emphatic reaffirmation by means of a security treaty.

Additional arms and a security guarantee are both sought by Israel as bulwarks against aggression in the absence of a peace settlement. Let me make it clear that the absence of peace is due to no real conflict of interests between Israel and her neighbors which cannot be resolved by free negotiation, but to the vindictive and barren refusal of their governments to accept the existence of Israel as an immutable reality. The buttressing of Israel's security would not only meet the present emergency but would, by discouraging counsels of aggression, pave the way for lasting peace.

In the meantime there are pressing issues which can be singled out for special treatment. Their early solution would be of practical import and might help to prepare the ground for a more comprehensive settlement. One such issue is the payment of compensation for the lands abandoned by the Arabs who fled from Israel. My Government has agreed, subject to certain reservations, to explore with the Government of the United States and other competent authorities the solution envisaged for that

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

7.

problem in Mr. Dulles' address of August last. The Government of Israel has likewise shown the greatest readiness to cooperate with Ambassador Johnston in his mission to produce a coordinated scheme for the distribution of the waters of the Jordan and the Yarmuk Rivers. Unfortunately, while Israel from the outset declared its acceptance of the principle of an inter-State settlement of the water rights involved, at the end of two years of negotiations on the technical details of the scheme it has become clear that the agreement of the Arab States on the point of principle is still lacking. Let us hope that the final Arab word on the fate of this scheme has not yet been spoken and that the skilful and tenacious efforts of Mr. Johnston have not been in vain. At the same time it should be clear that Israel cannot indefinitely postpone the irrigation and power projects vital for her economic development.

While ever ready to offer constructive contributions towards a peace settlement, and to conduct direct peace negotiations in a spirit of give and take, Israel must resist any attempt to debit her account alone with the cost of attaining a settlement and to exact from her, as a price of peace, unilateral concessions at the expense of her sovereignty and territorial integrity. It has been said before, but it bears repeating: peace with Israel means peace with Israel as it is, both as to its population and as to its area.

There has been much talk of late in various quarters about the need

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395		
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

8.

for mutual concessions for the sake of peace. These assertions fail to convince Israel that the proposed concessions are really meant to be mutual. No one has yet heard of any intention to urge any of the Arab States to give up a part of its territory in order that it be added to Israel. Conversely, there should be no attempt to prevail upon Israel to cede territory in order to satisfy the ambition of any Arab State. The only practical and fair basis for a peace settlement as far as territory is concerned, is the maintenance of the status quo - with or without certain agreed adjustments of the line for the mutual benefit of both sides.

A suggestion has recently been made that since the Arabs urge reversion to the boundaries defined in the partition plan of 1947, while Israel insists on the boundaries of the 1949 Armistice Agreement, some golden mean should be found between the two. This proposal, which has the semblance of impartiality and equal justice, is in effect logically fallacious, legally incongruous and morally untenable.

The apparent equality of sacrifice is a mere fiction. All the Arabs are invited to give up is a part of a claim which they have staked out as a bargaining counter. Israel, on the other hand, is expected to cede a physical possession - an area over which its sovereignty extends today with full United Nations sanction as expressed in the official Security Council endorsement of the Armistice Agreement; an area for the sake of which its sons shed their blood and laid down their lives; an area in the develop-

*This is
logically fallacious*

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

9.

ment of which it has already invested funds and labour and in all corners of which new settlements have been established.

And to whom is this area to be ceded? To Egypt, or Syria, or Lebanon, or Jordan? By what right can any of them claim territory which was never theirs and which was not assigned to them even in the dispensation of 1947? As things stand, Jordan has annexed a good part of Western Palestine which was not hers before. Egypt still holds sway over the Gaza strip. Between them, these two Arab States, have occupied and are at present occupying 2,000 square miles of former Mandatory Palestine, which formed no part of their original territories and which they show no intention of giving up. Indeed, they are not asked to do so by those who urge concession. Why then should they be given more? The ratio between the area of Israel and the combined territories of the Arab States is 1:300. The idea that Israel must accept a shrinkage in order that the Arab States should expand is singular indeed.

The invocation of the 1947 resolution as a basis for a settlement in 1955 or 1956 is an attempt to turn the wheel of history backwards. In general, a recommendation of the General Assembly of the United Nations must be related to the circumstances prevailing at the time of its adoption. Its fate always depends on the readiness of the parties concerned to cooperate in its execution. In this case only one party - the Jewish people in Palestine - declared itself ready to accept the plan and to play its part in giving it effect.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

10.

The British Government refused to cooperate - although it was at the formal request of the United Kingdom that the General Assembly was seized of the question. The Arabs - both inside and outside Palestine - took up arms in order to subvert the resolution by force. It is one of the paradoxes of history that it is the Arab States which should now be clamouring for the revival of the 1947 plan - a plan which they themselves did their utmost to kill - and that it is Great Britain, with its record of non-cooperation, which should now advocate that plan as one of the starting points in the quest for a new solution.

Actually the United Nations itself has superseded the territorial division of 1947 by urging the parties in 1948 to negotiate their own frontiers and by sanctioning in 1949 the Armistice Agreements which confirmed Israel in possession of her present territory and laid it down as an immutable condition that the boundary lines fixed in them can be altered only by mutual consent.

Peace is a lofty ideal and a vital necessity. The quest for it should be at once practical and just. May I conclude my remarks with the expression of Israel's confident hope that in dedicating itself to the cause of peace in the Middle East, enlightened American opinion will reject illusory shortcuts to peace proposed at the expense of both practicability and justice, and will be guided by the consideration of what is both realistic and fair.



M. H. ... 26

BRITISH EMBASSY
ANKARA

(1063/101/55)
CONFIDENTIAL

R1076/459

November 22, 1955

Mr. Jean Rose,

R1076/417

The Israeli Minister, Fischer, called on me on November 21 at his request to discuss Menderes' statement (reported in Ankara telegram N. 860) on the Prime Minister's speech on November 9 on the Arab-Israel conflict.

2. He wished to know what interpretation I could give to Menderes' statement and, in particular, why I thought Menderes had chosen this moment to make a declaration which was so patently hostile to Israel.

3. I said that the Embassy had had no forewarning that Menderes was going to make a statement, nor what was going to be in it. We had, however, some days ago asked the Turkish Government, in common with other governments directly concerned with the peace of the Middle East, to use their influence with the parties to the dispute in favour of a settlement on the basis proposed by Sir Anthony Eden. I read Fischer the greater part of the aide memoire which I handed to the Secretary General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 19 when transmitting to him a summary of the Prime Minister's speech (of my letter of November 14). I added that Menderes' statement was, of course, heavily weighted in favour of the Arab countries and I could not think it would help matters much. I asked Fischer whether the Turkish Government had supported Sir Anthony Eden's proposals with the Israeli Government. He said that they had not to his knowledge.

4. The same evening Mehmet Dikerdem, the acting Head of Second Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told me that so far as he knew neither the Secretary General nor any other official at the Ministry had any hand in drafting Menderes' statement. It must have been either Zorlu's or Menderes' work. He agreed that it was unlikely to help to settle the dispute; and I do not think Menderes intended that it should.

5. I said that we had heard that the Secretary of State thought the Palestine dispute could usefully be discussed this week in Bagdad, but I did not suppose Mr. Macmillan would derive much satisfaction from the Turkish statement.

6. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Tel Aviv, Bagdad, Tehran, Karachi, Washington and POMEF.

John ...
Michael Stewart
(Michael Stewart)

E. M. Rose, Esq. C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
LONDON. S.W. 1

<h1>V</h1> <p>LEVANT DEPARTMENT</p> <hr/> <p>ISRAEL</p>		VRI076/460
<p>FROM <u>S. J. Gardener</u> Damascus to Mr. Rose</p> <p>No. 10601/289/55 Dated Nov 23 Received in Registry— Nov 28.</p>	<p><u>Munsion House speech</u></p> <p>Syrian Prime Minister has said that Syria and Lebanon are pressing for a meeting of the Arab League, and that he regards the proposals favourably. Iraq has suggested holding the meeting in Cairo, but Syria is opposed to this.</p>	
<p>References to former relevant papers</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">MINUTES</p> <p>I share Sir J. Gardener's suspicion. Anyhow Nasser, according to Nuri, is against a meeting of the Arab League. He may be forced into it. But if he can escape it so much the better. If on the other hand there is to be a meeting Cairo is the best place for it.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">G. Amis 29/xi</p> <p style="text-align: right; font-size: 1.5em;">WR 29/xi</p>	
<p>(Print)</p>		
<p>(How disposed of)</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>		
<p>(Action completed)</p> <p><i>[Signature]</i> 30/11</p>	<p>(Index)</p> <p>394/510</p>	
<p>References to later relevant papers</p>		



CONFIDENTIAL
(10601/289/55)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
DAMASCUS.

November 23, 1955.

VR1076/460

*Answer to Rose
said was*

Dear Rose,

The Prime Minister (Said Ghazzi) told a reliable friend of mine that Syria and the Lebanon were pressing for an early meeting of the Arab League to discuss the Prime Minister's Mansion House speech which they regarded as encouraging. So far the only reply received had been from Iraq which had suggested Cairo as the place of meeting. Syria was against this because Gamal Abdul Nasser would exert an overpowering influence and would much prefer Damascus or Beirut. Another difficulty was the probable Saudi delegate, Shaikh Yusuf Yasin. Yasin was an obstinate, unreasonable man who always fell foul of his colleagues. At the last meeting of the Arab League (? Buraimi) it had taken the joint efforts of Abdul Nasser and himself to calm him. Syria was manoeuvring to have Amir Faisal appointed as Saudi delegate in place of Yusuf Yasin.

I am sorry to say that I regard the Prime Minister's statement with some suspicion. While I am sure he spoke as I have reported, I should like to think he was speaking sincerely. However his line is worth reporting to you and to Jedda, Cairo, Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Paris and Washington.

Yours ever,

P. H. Keenan

for H.M. Ambassador.

E. M. Rose, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

Entire VR 1076G
Sec 1

Minutes.

TOP SECRET

VR 1076

461.

ALPHA

Compensation and Resettlement of Refugees.

At the Alpha meetings held in London at the end of April the Americans and ourselves agreed to consult our financial representatives in the Middle East about the prevention of inflation and other problems in connection with the payment of compensation to the Arab refugees.

2. The Treasury eventually wrote a letter (drafted by Mr. Simpson) to Mr. Milner on June 8 (VR 1076/99/G), and we sent a copy to Sir John Sterndale Bennett. We received lengthy replies from Sir J.S. Bennett (VR 1076/126/G) and Mr. Milner (VR 1076/146/G) in July.

3. We had hoped to discuss this question with Mr. Milner whilst he was on leave during August and September. However, the Treasury, who were busy discussing Malta and other more urgent matters, failed to arrange a meeting, and we must do the best we can with the letters. I am sorry to have held these up for so long, but I do not think anything has been lost.

4. The Americans made similar enquiries of their financial representatives in the Middle East, but we do not know what replies they got.

5. It cannot be said that the lengthy advice which we have received from Mr. Milner and Sir J.S. Bennett has helped us very much. However, we only consulted them in the first place at the instance of the Treasury, who have spent a lot of time on this matter trying to avoid the responsibility of finding solutions to questions which they themselves have asked, yet suspect to be unanswerable. What follows is a list of the main questions which we asked, the kind of answers we were given to each of them and the main conclusions we may perhaps be permitted to draw.

6. Can Israel pay?

Mr. Milner (paragraph 4) thinks that it would be difficult for Israel and world Jewry to find £30 million; and impossible for Israel to pay £100 million "except on the cynical assumption that she would default, as soon as possible, on the foreign loans."

There is no way to show whether Mr. Milner is right or wrong, although I think "impossible" is an unwise word to use of Israel. But his remarks about defaulting will greatly upset the Treasury, who have long suspected that we shall have seen the last of whatever we loan to Israel.

17.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Flag A
Flag B
Flag C

Minutes.

7. Could Israel pay part of the Compensation in Kind?

Both Mr. Milner (paragraph 5) and Sir J.S. Bennett (paragraph 8) point out the difficulties. Israel would like to do it, but the Arabs would almost certainly reject it, for it would lead to direct trade and the Israeli economic penetration which the Arabs fear (and which, incidentally, might not be in our interests). Apart from that, there will be formidable administrative difficulties: there would have to be a marketing agency in the countries where the refugees are; and the whole idea would greatly add to the difficulties of the distribution of compensation.

I am convinced that we must abandon this idea once and for all. I do not think there is a chance that the Arabs would accept it.

8. How to avoid inflation?

The Treasury made a great song and dance about this, and Sir J. Sterndale-Bennett (paragraph 9) has put them in their place. As both he and Mr. Milner (paragraphs 3 and 6) say, the real problem is how to arrange matters so that compensation solves the refugee problem. The payment of compensation must be linked to resettlement; otherwise the Palestine problem is not being solved. And given resettlement (some of which must be in Arab countries which do not at present contain the majority of refugees), Mr. Milner thinks that "£100 million spread over 10 years and a number of countries does not present a very alarming picture." There is however a certain inconsistency in the arguments both of Mr. Milner and Sir J. S. Bennett; for though both insist that payment of compensation should only be made as and when opportunities for resettlement arise, both argue that 10 years is too long a spread (paragraph 6 of Sir J.S. Bennett's letter and paragraph 9 (i) of Mr. Milner's letter).

We knew most of this before. We always recognised that compensation had both a political and an economic function; and that the two are often incompatible. The most important fact that these letters bring out is that the refugee problem is insoluble without the co-operation of Syria and Iraq; and that since the distribution of compensation will require the help of the host governments and have a considerable effect on their economies, we shall have wasted our time if we discuss it in any detail without the association of these governments. What is

/needed

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

needed. is a thorough study of the question by people who know, that is to say UNRWA and the local people. This study cannot possibly be made until the payment of compensation becomes a real issue.

9. Would £100 be enough to enable a family of five to move from Refugee Camps to secure employment?

Neither letter answers this question directly. Both Sir J.S. Bennett (paragraph 12) and Mr. Milner (paragraph 7) point out that any such payment would be squandered unless it were only made on condition that the refugee either (a) produced evidence that he was moving to a proper job, or (b) took part in an approved resettlement scheme.

This is obviously right and is the sort of think we had always in mind.

10. Is £2,000 enough for a Smallholding or a small business?

Mr. Milner, (paragraph 7) says yes. Sir J.S. Bennett (paragraph 17) points out the difficulty of bringing resettlement schemes to fruition at the right time and ensuring the proper distribution of the refugees between the various trades and places where they might practise these trades.

Development Bank.

10.A. Neither Sir J.S. Bennett nor Mr. Milner object to the idea that sums over a certain figure should be invested in some kind of development bank; but neither supported it enthusiastically. Sir J.S. Bennett (paragraph 13) points out that such investment would be unlikely to succeed if it were voluntary.

This is indubitable. Investment in development will have to be made compulsory or it will not happen.

11. Can refugees be required to hand over part of their compensation to UNRWA if they are or have been resettled by UNRWA?

Sir J.S. Bennett (paragraph 18) says not, since:-

- (a) the refugees would vigorously oppose this;
- (b) it would almost certainly be unworkable;
- (c) it is against the principles of UNRWA, which has often stated specifically that resettlement schemes do not prejudice refugee rights to compensation or repatriation.

Mr. Milner, however, (paragraph 8) sees the difficulties, but thinks that we must somehow get round them without

/worrying

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

worrying over much whether our methods are logical. I think he is right. If distinction has to be made between refugees already resettled and those to be resettled in future, that is just too bad. We must remember that the best we can hope for in this transaction is collective justice for the refugees in general: there will be, and there can be, no guarantee of justice for the individual.

12. What agency should distribute the compensation?

I accept Sir J.S. Bennett's argument (paragraph 19) that this should be a United Nations agency, but not UNRWA.

13. Both Sir J.S. Bennett (paragraph 7) and Mr. Milner (paragraph 11) are unhappy about our proposals for washing out all claims other than those by Arab individuals for unmovable property. They point out that there is a distinction between refugees in Jordan (where they are Jordanian citizens) and in other countries (where they are stateless).

This is going to be a complicated legal question which we shall need to study carefully. We have got to find some way of washing out claims and barring those which are washed out. Again, this will need the co-operation of the Arab governments.

14. The Ingrand Plan.

In paragraph 21 of his letter Sir J.S. Bennett suggests that distribution of compensation should be effected by a variant of the Ingrand plan. A copy of the full text of M. Ingrand's report will be found at EE 1825/61 of 1953. Sir J.S. Bennett rightly dismisses the idea of basing a solution of the compensation question on the guarantee by Israel of a provisional sum. In a comprehensive settlement we must obviously aim at a final global figure. With this reservation, there is much to be said for the Ingrand idea, which is, roughly speaking, that an international body of trustees should invest and administer the compensation and issue bonds to entitled individuals. These bonds could only be encashed when a refugee left UNRWA's ration rolls or could show that he was investing his money in suitable land or business. This scheme does not necessarily entirely fulfil the ideal function of that part of the compensation which will be paid to large claimants; but it seems that it could be combined with the development bank idea and then produce the best answer we are likely to get from the economic point of view. But it is no good expecting this compensation to appeal to the refugees, and we should need the strongest support and co-operation of the Arab governments to make it work.

Flag D

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

15. Identification and Valuation of Refugee property.

In paragraph 22 of his letter Sir. J. S. Bennett suggests that this should be speeded up. This is being done; Mr. Berncastle has been seconded to the P.C.C. for this purpose.

16. Although the Treasury insisted on consulting financial representatives in the Middle East and sent the letter as from themselves, I do not think that it is any good expecting them to take any further initiative in this difficult matter. Nor would I expect them to be very constructive about it, until it is clear that negotiations for a Palestine settlement are really going to make some progress. I think the best thing to do now is to summarise our conclusions as briefly as possible and invite the State Department to comment. I attach a draft to Washington which, if you agree, we must first clear with the Treasury.

G.G. Arthur

G.G. Arthur
(November 29, 1955)

I agree entirely

[Signature]
2/12

Now see dfr to Treasury.

B.U. Dec 20.

[Signature]
12.

Spoken to Col. Russell Edmunds. If no reply B.U. 11/56.

[Signature]
21
12

Col. R.-E. has promised to do his best to clear this letter before I go to Washington

[Signature]
2
1

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395		
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

December 7, 1955.

(VR 1076/4610)

TOP SECRET

Dear Russell

It is some time since we received replies from Milner and Sterndale Bennett to your letter No. IF.592/236/04 of June 8 about the distribution compensation to Arab refugees. We have not heard what kind of replies the American representatives sent to the State Department.

2. It does not look as though we shall have an early opportunity of discussing this difficult problem either with Milner or with the Americans. We have therefore thought it best to summarise in a letter to Washington the conclusions which we have reached after a study of the advice we have received from Sterndale Bennett and Milner. By this means we hope to agree some general principles with the Americans.

3. I enclose a draft of such a letter and would be glad to know whether you agree with it.

Yours ever,
Geoffrey Arthur
(G.G. Arthur)

Colonel W. Russell-Edmonds, O.B.E., T.D.,
Treasury.

In draft form to the Planning B

Registry No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft. *Page E*

R.W. Bailey,
Esq.,
Washington

from:
G.G. Arthur

copy to:
Colonel
Russell
Edmunds,
Treasury.

Mr. Simpson 2/12
Mr. Rose Spoken.
Pl. sec minutes.

[N.B. not to be sent until cleared with the Treasury]

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

TOP SECRET

You will remember, from correspondence resting with your letter No. 1042/147/55 G of June 10, that the Americans and ourselves sent letters to our financial experts in the Middle East to seek their advice on the prevention of inflation and other problems connected with the payment of compensation to Arab refugees.

2. Some months ago we received lengthy replies to our letter from ~~M.~~ Milner, the Treasury representative in the Middle East, and ~~Sir John~~ Sterndale Bennett, then head of the British Middle East Office. We do not propose to burden you with copies of these replies; and I summarise below the conclusions which we have reached on certain points in the light of the advice which ~~Sir J. B.~~ ^{Sterndale} (Bennett and ~~M.~~ Milner gave us. We shall be glad to know in due course whether the State Department, after considering the replies they received to their letter, agree with our views.

3. It is evident that the crux of the matter is to find some way of making compensation contribute to resettlement. If the two are not linked, the refugee problem will not be solved and the economies of the Middle Eastern states will be adversely affected by an operation which is essential to any settlement of the Palestine affair. The unattainable ideal is that the distribution of compensation should be effected in such a way that the money performs the same function for the /refugees

refugees as a whole as did the capital assets which they left behind in what is now Israel. At the other end of the scale the minimum that we must achieve is to ensure that the money is not being squandered in such a way as to cause inflation in the countries which are hosts to the refugees, in particular Jordan.

4. This means that we must try to reconcile the political and economic functions of compensation. The two are to some extent incompatible. Politically the ideal is the immediate payment of all individual claims in full. From this point of view both Milner and ^{Stendale} ~~Sir J.S.~~ Bennett deplore the proposal that the payments should be spread over 10 years. But both of them ^{see} ~~say~~ that economically speaking compensation and resettlement must go hand in hand and that cash payments will have to coincide with availability of definite opportunities for resettlement. The alternative is waste and inflation, leaving the bulk of the refugees on the hands of the international community.

5. One proposal, which was designed to limit the inflationary effects and which has the merit of easing Israel's burden, is that Israel should pay part of the compensation in kind. We believe that this idea must be dismissed, for the following reasons:-

(a) It would be unacceptable to the refugees themselves

(b) it would be rejected by the

/Arab

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Arab States in general, for they would regard it as the beginning the of/Israeli commercial exploitation which they fear.

(b) It would be administratively extremely difficult, if not impracticable. It would presumably require a marketing agency which would sell the goods in Arab countries and apply the proceeds to compensation for the refugees. Such an agency would be surrounded by suspicion and would find great difficulty in attracting buyers at reasonable prices.

6. So we come back to monetary payments. Let us first consider the wealthy claimants. Here the problem is to prevent the flight of capital from the Levant and to try to see that it is invested in productive enterprises for the benefit of the refugees as a whole. We can find no alternative to the compulsory investment of all payments above a certain sum (e.g. £2,000) in a development bank of some kind, or in approved projects or land on which other refugees who have no claims might settle. As the Arabs are not inclined to philanthropy, or even thrift, such investment would have to be obligatory; and it would be ^{unpopular} impossible, for nobody would expect profits. It is indeed doubtful whether the countries in which most of the refugees now live could provide enough productive enterprises for investment.

7. Milner agrees that £2,000 would be enough to set a refugee family up on a smallholding or ⁱⁿ a small business. But he points out the difficulty of ensuring that opportunities for resettlement are open at the right time and that too many refugees should not rush into the same kind of business in the same place. As regards ^{claimants} ~~claims~~ to less than £2,000 and those without property, to whom it was proposed to pay £100 so that they could move from camps to find employment, both Milner and Sterndale Bennett remark that the money would be squandered unless the payment were made subject to one of the following conditions:-

- (a) that the refugee produced evidence that he was moving to a settled ^{job} ~~business~~,
- (b) that the refugee was moving as part of an approved resettlement scheme.

This is obviously right, and it is the sort of thing we had in mind.

8. In order to meet the economic difficulties involved in the distribution of compensation, ~~now~~ Sterndale Bennett suggests that we should use a variant of the Ingrand plan of 1953. (I ^{enclose} ~~do not know~~ whether you have a copy of that plan, but which the State Department will have received ~~one~~.) Sterndale Bennett dismisses Ingrand's idea of basing a solution of the compensation question on the guarantee by Israel of a provisional sum without prejudice to the final assessment; and in this we think he is right. But with that reservation there /is

1479111 WT.11300275 05.000 5/29 A&E.W.L.P. GP.665

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

WT 661124/161 of 1953
[Handwritten notes and stamps]

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

is much to be said for the plan, which is, roughly speaking, that an international body of trustees should invest and administer the compensation and issue bonds to entitled individuals. There might then be an arrangement (in Sterndale Bennett's own words) "under which refugees on U.N.R.W.A.'s ration rolls would normally have their bonds encashed when, and only when, they were removed from those ration rolls on resettlement or reintegration (this would presumably have to apply retroactively to refugees already resettled or reintegrated); but that if they so requested, they should be able to encash their bonds at an earlier date for the purpose of investing their money either in land or in a business which, to the satisfaction of the trustees, after due examination of the scheme, was likely to make them self-supporting."

9. The body of trustees might take the place of the development bank discussed in paragraph 6 above, if a level could be fixed above which payments would only be made to wealthy claimants if the trustees were satisfied that such payments would be invested in a scheme resulting in the employment of other refugees, and ~~these~~ ^{thus} contributing to a solution of the general problem of resettlement. But the combination of this idea with the one set out in the previous paragraph could not be expected to appeal to the refugees themselves; and we should need the strongest support and /co-operation

co-operation of the Arab governments to make it work.

10. We asked Sterndale-Bennett and Milner whether the refugees could be required to hand over part of their compensation to UNRWA if they are or have been resettled by UNRWA. Sterndale Bennett is against this on the following grounds:-

- (a) the refugees would vigorously oppose it;
- (b) it would almost certainly be unworkable;
- (c) it is against the principles of UNRWA, which has often stated specifically that resettlement schemes shall not prejudice the rights of refugees to compensation or resettlement.

Milner sees these difficulties, but he thinks that we must find some way round them, whether our system is logical and consistent or not.

We think this is right. If compensation is to be linked to resettlement, it does not seem reasonable that refugees should have their compensation and free resettlement paid for by the international community.

11. Finally, there are two subsidiary points on which we accept the advice of Sterndale Bennett and Milner, namely:-

- (a) Some agency of the United Nations would no doubt be appropriate to handle the distribution of compensation and UNRWA could ^{physically make} ~~actually hand over~~ payments to the refugees in its care. But ~~UNRWA~~ is not a suitable agency for

/the

We cannot get see any such way round, but

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

the examination and adjudication of claims, and it should not be hampered in its work of relief and resettlement by the onus which would attach to it as a body engaged in the critical examination and scaling down of the claims of the refugees. *Again* a great many claimants, and particularly those with the biggest claims, are not in fact within its orbit.

On the other hand it would be suitable for UNRWA, as the body with the greatest experience of the refugee problem, to be associated with a technical study of the best methods of distributing compensation.

- (b) Assuming that the total figure for compensation is fixed in agreement between governments, it will be essential to extinguish the claims of individuals on both sides which had been ignored, offset or written down for the purpose of inter-governmental agreement. This is a ~~complicated~~ ^{difficult} question which will need close study and the co-operation of Arab governments. It is complicated by the fact that there is a distinction between refugees in Jordan (where they are Jordanian citizens) and in other Arab countries (where they are stateless).

12. One thing stands out from this analysis. Any method of distributing compensation which is not to be economically disastrous will be unpopular with the refugees; and there can

/be

be no proper distribution at all, and ^{Certainly} no
resettlement, without the full co-operation
of the Arab governments, including Iraq.
It would ~~therefore~~ be idle to work out a
complete scheme without the association of
these governments, who will have to provide
opportunities for resettlement and bar any
claims which are washed out, and on whose
economy the payment of compensation is bound
to have a considerable effect. We suggest
therefore that the Americans and we should
limit ourselves for the present to agreement
on certain general principles such as those
discussed in this letter; and that if and
when agreement on the payment of compensation
seems likely to be reached, we should seek the
co-operation of UNRWA experts, together with
~~the~~ representatives of the Arab governments
concerned and the refugees themselves, in working
out plans for the ^{Simultaneous} distribution of compensation
and the resettlement of refugees.

47911 W-41548/275 58000 2/53 A.B.R.W.L.T.O. 67:685

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

V
 LEVANT DEPARTMENT

ISRAEL

VR1076/462 ✓

FROM Sir H. Trendyan
 Cairo

No. 1820
 Dated NW 29
 Received in Registry— NW 30.

Mansion House speech.
 Contains report of press conference given by Nasser about the proposals. Khawand Said has denied saying that Egypt is ready to accept third party mediation.

References to former relevant papers
 371.

MINUTES

Nasser's statement that the matter does not require mediation or negotiation is an unfortunate one. But everybody is forced into making unfortunate statements in this business.

88 30
 21

A) Sir H. Trendyan Cairo 29 + Saw NW 30.

89 3
 12

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

(Index)

2/12

3/4/56

References to later relevant papers

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

R1076/462

Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 1820
November 29, 1955.

D. 3.27 p.m. November 29, 1955.
R. 5.08 p.m. November 29, 1955.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1820 of November 29

Repeated for information to:-
and Saving to:-



Washington	Tel Aviv
U.K. Del. New York	Tripoli
Beirut	Benghazi
Damascus	P.O.M.E.F.
Amman	Paris
Bagdad	Ankara
Jedda	Jerusalem

R1076/371

My telegram No. 229 Saving (not to Amman).

Today's press published details of press conference held by Nasser yesterday.

2. In reply to question about position of Egyptian Government vis-à-vis British Prime Minister's proposals, Nasser said that Eden had not put forward any proposals for Egypt to support. He had simply referred for the first time since 1947 to long neglected United Nations Resolutions. This could be considered as acknowledgment of rights of Palestine Arab people. Arabs had vainly endeavoured to revive these Resolutions in the United Nations. They subsequently succeeded at Bandung in obtaining unanimous Resolution calling for the execution of the United Nations Resolutions, but United Nations and the big Powers continued to neglect this. Eden's reference to 1947 Resolutions indicated that rights of Palestinian Arabs had not been abandoned as some big Powers imagined. Time had come for their revival.

3. Asked whether Arab League Political Committee would meet to consider Eden's proposals, Nasser said that some had suggested this. Egypt, however, held that no specific proposals had been put forward for Arab League Political Committee to study.

4. Asked whether news agency report from New York, that Khairat Said, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, had said Egypt was ready to accept third party mediation for negotiations with Israel, was true, Nasser said Egyptian Government had not received any official text of statement. Egyptian policy, however, was that Palestine problem concerned all Arab States. No Arab State had the right to deal with it alone. Egypt adhered to rights of Palestinian Arabs. The matter did not require negotiation in view of Resolutions passed by United Nations which should be carried out. United Nations and big Powers should realize that to pretend to forget or to neglect United Nations Resolutions and to abandon rights of Palestinian Arabs would never help in establishing that peace which they hoped to get at the expense of Palestine and the rights of her Arab people.

/5. Full

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

Cairo telegram No. 1820 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

5. Full text by bag.

6. Akhbar reported that in answer to telephone enquiry Khairat Said flatly denied making any declaration of the kind attributed to him. Akhbar commented that supporters of imperialism were using this alleged declaration in their efforts to wreck Arab unity.

Foreign Office pass Washington and Saving to U.K. Del. New York, Paris and Ankara as my telegrams Nos. 234, 93, 244 and 74 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and Saving to U.K. Del. New York, Paris and Ankara].

70/whaha

SAVING TELEGRAM

ADD. THE COPY

EN CLAIR BY BAG

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

CR

Sir Humphrey Trevelyan

VR 1076/402 A

No.254 Saving
November 30, 1955.

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.254 Saving of November 30, repeated for information Saving to:

- | | |
|------------------|--------|
| Washington | No.205 |
| Tel Aviv | No.143 |
| U.K.Del.New York | No. 95 |
| Beirut | No.231 |
| Damascus | No.172 |
| Amman | No.186 |
| Bagdad | No.126 |
| Jedda | No.222 |
| Tripoli | No. 96 |
| Benghazi | No. 88 |
| POMEH | No.425 |
| Paris | No.245 |
| Ankara | No. 75 |
| Jerusalem | No. 26 |

VR 1076/402

My telegram No.1820 /of November 29/ paragraph 5.

The first question directed at the Prime Minister was: "There have been several comments in some foreign newspapers about Egypt's acceptance of Eden's proposals on Palestine. What is the real position of the Egyptian Government in regard to these proposals?" He replied: "Eden has not put forward any proposals for Egypt to support. All that has happened is that for the first time since 1947 the British Prime Minister has referred to the resolutions adopted by the United Nations in 1947 which had been neglected and to which no reference had ever been made in the last eight years. The reference made to these resolutions by the British Prime Minister is considered as an acknowledgment of the right of the Palestinian Arab people whose country was usurped when it was under the British Mandate. The Arabs attempted in the United Nations to revive the resolutions passed in 1947 in support of the right of the Palestinian people, but there was no response from the United Nations. The Arabs then succeeded in obtaining a unanimous resolution at the Bandung Conference providing for the support of the Afro-Asian Conference for the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and calling for the application of the resolutions of the United Nations concerning Palestine. But, in spite of this, the United Nations and the Big Powers in it neglected this resolution and did not consider raising any subject connected with the rights of the Palestinian Arab people which were disregarded in 1948. In spite of the fact that Britain was the Mandatory Power in 1948 she abandoned the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and left Palestine and the Palestinian people at the mercy of armed Zionist gangs. She had not even attempted to

DEC 1 1955

/remember...

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

- 2 -

remember that resolutions had been passed by the United Nations concerning these rights. The reference made by the British Prime Minister to these neglected resolutions indicates that the rights of the Arabs of Palestine have not been abandoned as some of the big powers imagined, but that the time has come for their revival."

2. The second question was: "Will the Arab League Political Committee meet to consider Sir Anthony Eden's proposals?". The Prime Minister replied: "It was suggested by some that the Arab League Political Committee should be convened to consider Sir Anthony Eden's proposals. Egypt's opinion was that Eden had not put forward proposals for the Arab League Political Committee to meet to study. All there is, is that Sir Anthony Eden referred to the 1947 United Nations resolutions which the Arabs demand should be executed, and which Israel insists are not binding on her."

3. The third question was about the report of a certain news agency from New York that Ahmed Khairat Said, Egypt's Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that Egypt was prepared to accept the mediation of a third party for negotiations with Israel, and whether this declaration represented the Egyptian Government's policy. The Prime Minister said: "The Egyptian Government has not received any official text of the statement made by Egypt's Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs at the meeting of the United Nations Correspondents Association in New York. But Egypt's policy is absolutely clear, namely, that the Palestine problem concerns all the Arab States and no Arab State has the right to deal with it alone. Egypt firmly adheres to the rights of the Palestinian Arab people. The matter does not require negotiation, since the United Nations passed a resolution in 1947 concerning Palestine and another in 1949 concerning the rights of the Palestinian people. It is up to the United Nations, in order to maintain its prestige and self-respect, to see that its resolutions, which have remained ink on paper since 1947, are carried out. The Arab States have attempted at the various sessions of the United Nations in the last eight years to raise these resolutions, but the United Nations has ignored its resolutions and neglected the right of the Palestinian Arab people, who were driven from their homes and whose property was usurped, in the belief that by so doing it can avoid problems. It is now time for the United Nations and the big powers dominating it to realise that to feign to forget, or to neglect these resolutions and to abandon the rights of the Palestinian Arab people, will never help the establishment of that peace which they wish to achieve at the expense of Palestine and the rights of the Palestinian Arab people".

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref.: FO 371/115884			86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

*Abu... V.R. 74
662A*

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 254 Saving
November 30, 1955

R. December 2, 1955

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 254 Saving of
November 30

Repeated for information Saving to:-

Washington	Jedda
Tel Aviv	Tripoli
UKDEL New York	Benghazi
Beirut	P.O.M.E.F.
Damascus	Paris
Amman	Ankara
Bagdad	Jerusalem

My telegram No. 1820 [of November 29] paragraph 5.

The first question directed at the Prime Minister was: "There have been several comments in some foreign newspapers about Egypt's acceptance of Eden's proposals on Palestine. What is the real position of the Egyptian Government in regard to these proposals?" He replied: "Eden has not put forward any proposals for Egypt to support. All that has happened is that for the first time since 1947 the British Prime Minister has referred to the resolutions adopted by the United Nations in 1947 which had been neglected and to which no reference had ever been made in the last eight years. The reference made to these resolutions by the British Prime Minister is considered as an acknowledgment of the right of the Palestinian Arab people whose country was usurped when it was under the British Mandate. The Arabs attempted in the United Nations to revive the resolutions passed in 1947 in support of the right of the Palestinian people, but there was no response from the United Nations. The Arabs then succeeded in obtaining a unanimous resolution at the Bandung Conference providing for the support of the Afro-Asian Conference for the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and calling for the application of the resolutions
/of the...

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884			86395				
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

Cairo telegram No. 254 Saying to Foreign Office

-2-

of the United Nations concerning Palestine. But, in spite of this, the United Nations and the Big Powers in it neglected this resolution and did not consider raising any subject connected with the rights of the Palestinian Arab people which were disregarded in 1948. In spite of the fact that Britain was the Mandatory Power in 1948 she abandoned the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and left Palestine and the Palestinian people at the mercy of armed Zionist gangs. She had not even attempted to remember that resolutions had been passed by the United Nations concerning these rights. The reference made by the British Prime Minister to these neglected resolutions indicates that the rights of the Arabs of Palestine have not been abandoned as some of the big powers imagined, but that the time has come for their revival".

2. The second question was: "Will the Arab League Political Committee meet to consider Sir Anthony Eden's proposals?". The Prime Minister replied: "It was suggested by some that the Arab League Political Committee should be convened to consider Sir Anthony Eden's proposals. Egypt's opinion was that Eden had not put forward proposals for the Arab League Political Committee to meet to study. All there is, is that Sir Anthony Eden referred to the 1947 United Nations resolutions which the Arabs demand should be executed, and which Israel insists are not binding on her."

3. The third question was about the report of a certain news agency from New York that Ahmed Khairat Said, Egypt's Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that Egypt was prepared to accept the mediation of a third party for negotiations with Israel, and whether this declaration represented the Egyptian Government's policy. The Prime Minister said: "The Egyptian Government has not received any official text of the statement made by Egypt's Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs at the meeting of the United Nations Correspondents Association in New York. But Egypt's policy is absolutely clear, namely, that the Palestine problem concerns all the Arab States and no Arab State has the right to deal with it alone. Egypt firmly adheres to the rights of the Palestinian Arab people. The matter does not require negotiation, since the United Nations passed a resolution in 1947 concerning Palestine and another in /1949...

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref. FO 371/115884				86395		
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

Cairo telegram No. 251. Saving to Foreign Office

-3-

1949 concerning the rights of the Palestinian people. It is up to the United Nations, in order to maintain its prestige and self-respect, to see that its resolutions, which have remained ink on paper since 1947, are carried out. The Arab States have attempted at the various sessions of the United Nations in the last eight years to raise these resolutions, but the United Nations has ignored its resolutions and neglected the right of the Palestinian Arab people, who were driven from their homes and whose property was usurped, in the belief that by so doing it can avoid problems. It is now time for the United Nations and the big powers dominating it to realise that to feign to forget, or to neglect these resolutions and to abandon the rights of the Palestinian Arab people, will never help the establishment of that peace which they wish to achieve at the expense of Palestine and the rights of the Palestinian Arab people".

VR1076/1G
 463

(891)
 FROM Washington
 (Mr. Bailey to Mr. Rose)
 No. 1042/5265/55G
 Dated Mar 23
 Received in Registry - Apr 30

ALPHA - Encloses memorandum of conversation recording the meeting between Mr. Dulles and Mr. Sharrett on November 21.

References to former relevant papers

VR1076/421G

MINUTES

This record makes clear two points which were not made in the brief report contained in Washington tel. no. 2389:

(a) Mr. Dulles asked for an answer to his memorandum in the "next few days." And Mr. Sharrett (see the last sentence) seems to have accepted this

(b) Mr. Dulles gave Mr. Sharrett the impression that if concessions were forthcoming we might be able to 'push things along' with Egypt. The Israelis will be able to deduce that we know something of Egypt's position.

These points are important in a consideration of tactics: see minute on p. 455.

D. A. Allen 30/xi

A) Washington (Mr. Lewis to Mr. Hodges) of Dec (1042/581/55G)

12

(Action completed) (Index)
 [Signatures]

References to later relevant papers

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884			86395				
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

COPY

TOP SECRET - ALPHA



Memorandum of
 Conversation between Mr. Dulles and the Israel Prime Minister
 in State Department on November 21

Participants:	<u>Department</u>	<u>Israel Government</u>
	The Secretary	Foreign Minister Sharett
	The Under Secretary	Ambassador Eban
	Mr. Allen	
	Mr. Russell	

See Amendment

The Secretary opened the discussion by saying that although he realised Mr. Sharett had requested an appointment in order to make a courtesy call, he wished to take advantage of the occasion to speak of a matter of the greatest importance. The Secretary said he believes there is a possibility of moving toward a settlement along the lines of his August 26th speech. Two things are necessary, however, if further progress is to be made. First, there must be self-control and restraint on both sides so that there will not be a build up to an explosive border situation. There must not be any effort to compel a settlement of specific issues by force, in the Gulf of Aqaba for instance. Secondly, the Israel Government must be prepared to make some concession in the Negev which would make possible an area of contact between Egypt and the other Arab states. Such an area would not necessarily be large nor of great value. And the compensation to Israel from effecting a settlement would outweigh any loss of territory. The position of rigidly standing on the present armistice lines is not tenable. If there is to be a settlement, a lot of people will have to make contributions. The United States has indicated the contributions that it is prepared to make. The Arabs will have to retreat some from their position. So will the Israel Government. The Secretary said that he can understand that the Israel Government would not want the Arabs to know what concessions it would be prepared to make for a settlement until negotiations were well underway. But we must know if we are going to be in a position to push things along. The Secretary said he could assure Mr. Sharett that we are presenting our views on the other side as well although Mr. Sharett, of course, only sees one side of it. There are indications, the Secretary said, that Egypt is worried about the long-term consequences of its action in making a deal with the Soviet bloc and that it is beginning to have second thoughts.

The Secretary handed an aide-memoire to Mr. Sharett. Mr. Sharett said that with respect to the first point, the necessity of maintaining calm along the borders, there had recently been a series of provocations along the Jordan border. Israel had made no reaction up to the present time and Mr. Sharett said he hoped it could continue to refrain from taking action, but he had to say there was a possibility that things would burst out of bounds.

Of graver concern was the Secretary's second point, Mr. Sharett said. The Secretary had mentioned several times the need for concessions from both sides. But the Arabs are only asked to give up things they talk about, not anything they possess. Israel, however, is expected to give up territory it already possesses. If Egypt is to be given contiguity with Jordan, it can be done only in one of two ways; (1) by giving up the port of Elat and shrinking northwards; or, (2) by cutting a belt of land out of the Negev, in other words by cutting Israel in two. This is not fair and the Israel Government should not be asked to do it. The contiguity which Egypt now seeks never existed before. The present situation existed under the British Mandate. There is nothing vital in that contiguity. There are no roads that go through that part of the country, no railroads, and no traffic. There is nothing that would start moving through it. It is only a national slogan and for that Israel is expected to cut itself in two.

/The Secretary

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

TOP SECRET - ALPHA



- 2 -

The Secretary said he wished to emphasise that we are talking about something of the greatest seriousness, namely, the threat to Israel and the grave threat of the relation of the Middle East to the free world as a whole. The West has great stakes in the Middle East. Israel is one of them. The United States does not intend to allow any of its other extremely important stakes in the area to threaten the existence of Israel. By the same token, we do not think that in the present international situation the Israel Government should allow the contribution which it can make to a settlement and which would not violate Israel's vital interests, to stand in the way of a settlement. The extent and nature of the contribution should and must be a matter for discussion and development. But the Israel Government should not take the position of saying that it will not consider a solution that might be worked out.

Mr. Sharett said that Israel, by its geographic position, is the hub of the area and this imposes an obligation on it to be a good neighbour which it intends to be if the Arab states would only be good neighbours. Israel has offered to provide communication facilities for the Arabs across Israel territory, following a settlement, but giving up its sovereignty over present Israel territory to meet a whim of Nasir's is another matter. Who can tell what Nasir would then go on to request? It would be the beginning of a slippery slope.

See amendments
The Secretary said we are not talking about a whim. We are talking about the continued existence of Israel. All we are asking is for the Israel Government to tell us what it would be prepared to do. That would not be the beginning of a slippery slope. The Secretary said that he had a rule in dealing with the Soviet group not to agree to a change in his position in reliance upon Soviet promises. He is not naive. But we do believe that, as a result of a combination of pressures and inducement, there is a chance for a settlement, whether 50-50 or 1 in 10, no one could say. It cannot, however, be explored without knowing what Israel's position is going to be. If Israel says no then the possibility of a settlement is off and we shall all have to face the consequences. We believe that there is an appreciable chance for a settlement. It would give Israel peace. It would reverse the process of Soviet penetration in the Middle East. The Secretary said that he did not make this statement lightly. He was not engaging in mere wishful thinking. But any further attempts towards a settlement have to be based upon our knowledge that Israel will cooperate. We have not advanced far enough so that we are asking Israel to state its willingness to make concessions publicly but we must know whether Israel would be willing to make concessions or not. If "no" is the last word, then Israel is putting us all in great peril. If we have to make a choice of sticking to Israel in the face of all that the Middle East is to the safety and continued existence of the free world, Israel will be forcing us to make a very grave choice. If the present opportunities for a settlement are to be seized, it will be necessary for us to have Israel's position in the next few days. We cannot go any further in developing the possibilities of a settlement with the Arabs until we know Israel's position.

Mr. Sharett said that he saw no certainty that Egypt, if it knew Israel would agree to a settlement, would itself agree. There was no certainty, if Israel agreed, that such a concession would close the breach in the wall against Soviet penetration in the area. Israel leaders sat with Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax at the beginning of World War II and heard them say that the clouds were gathering, that the Allies must gather the Arabs to them, and that on those grounds they were forced to repudiate the 1939 White Paper. War broke out but the Arabs did not rally to the Allies. The only thing that brought the Arabs to the Allied side was the Allied victory. Mr. Sharett said that he did not dispute the purity of the Secretary's intentions but it is results and not intentions that count. He said he did not see Israel capable of making the concession that the Secretary asked.

/The Secretary

TOP SECRET - ALPHA



- 3 -

[]
See amendments

The Secretary said that in Korea and Formosa there were governments, faced by Communist ambitions, that felt the only way out was in world war. He said he assumed that Israel would not want to get into that situation, that it would not want to go down a road where there would be no solution short of general war. The Secretary said he was against peace at any price as much as anyone but that one cannot be blind to the fact that the scales are more heavily weighted against peace in the Middle East today than at any time since World War II. The sacrifices that are called for are greater. No one is suggesting that Israel do anything that would cripple it. But it is necessary for us to know whether there is flexibility in Israel's immediate answer and he hoped that he would not give him a negative answer. The consequences to everyone concerned would be most serious.

The Secretary said he wished to say that the views of the United States and the United Kingdom are very close. He had not seen Sir Anthony Eden's speech until a few hours before it was given. He would not have put things in just the way that Sir Anthony Eden did but he did not want Mr. Sharett to think that there is any sharp divergence that could be exploited to advantage. Mr. Sharett said that it was not a question of exploiting a difference, it was a question of whether the United States concurred in Sir Anthony Eden's idea of a compromise. The Secretary said that we are not engaged in an intellectual dialectic. We are faced with a very practical situation and that it was a matter of importance for him to know whether, to make possible a settlement that could be of infinite value to Israel, Israel would be willing to give up something of comparatively little value. Mr. Sharett said that if it was a question of give and take, of exchanging territory on a small scale on the principle of mutuality, it could be discussed but that Israel could not give up vital points, such as Elat, nor could it agree to something that would result in cutting Israel in two.

The Secretary said that he would like to have the Israel Government's answer in writing. Mr. Sharett said that it would take two or three days.

CONFIDENTIAL

R1076/LS3

PALESTINE - PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THE GUILDHALL SPEECH

In view of the forthcoming debate on Middle Eastern affairs the Prime Minister has asked for details of any foreign public statements in reaction to that part of his Guildhall speech which dealt with the Arab-Israel dispute.

2. Except for those states which are parties to the dispute, public statements have been made in the following three countries only:-

(a) Canada. In a recent press interview in Ottawa Mr. Pearson, referring to the Palestine passage in the Prime Minister's speech, said:-

"I think that if the rest of us rally round and support that kind of project we may be able to find a solution."

(b) New Zealand. Mr. Holland issued a statement on November 11 to welcome "the clarity and candour of Sir Anthony Eden's statement." The full text of Mr. Holland's statement is attached.

(c) Turkey. Before he left Istanbul for Bagdad on November 19 the Turkish Prime Minister made an announcement in support of Sir A. Eden's speech. A copy of the text of this announcement is attached: it is unfortunately marred by an unconcealed partiality for the Arab case.

3. The three governments of the new Commonwealth countries have expressed their approval privately as follows:-

(a) India. In a letter to the High Commissioner the Indian Foreign Secretary wrote:-

/ "We

Flag A
-1336

Flag B
-1417

"We welcome this broad approach for a compromise settlement to end the deadlock and open up the possibility of negotiations."

The letter ended:-

"As you know, while we have no ill feeling against Israel, the general sentiment in India is strongly in favour of the Arab cause".

- (b) Ceylon. The Government of Ceylon have told the High Commissioner that they have themselves been "rather concerned" at developments in the Middle East and were very glad to see the initiative taken by Sir Anthony Eden to end the deadlock.
- (c) Pakistan. The Prime Minister of Pakistan told the High Commissioner on November 11 that although he did not feel the time was ripe for the Arabs to think in terms of reaching an agreement with Israel, he was prepared to commend Sir A. Eden's new approach to the Arab countries.

We have not sought the permission of these three Commonwealth Governments to make their communications public. Nevertheless the Prime Minister may wish to tell the House in general terms that his Guildhall speech met with their approval.

4. In conversation with the Prime Minister on November 16 Mr. Kardelj expressed his "complete agreement with the Prime Minister's recent statement of policy on the Arab-Israel dispute".
5. The United States. Whilst the United States Government have shown their support of the Prime Minister's speech in private they have not found it possible to say so specifically in public. Their attitude is the subject of a separate minute.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

-3-

6. The Prime Minister's speech has been received very well in the Arab States. The Press and Radio have generally given it a fair wind, and the following public statements have been made by Arab Governments:-

(a) Egypt. In an interview with the "News Chronicle" special correspondent on November 12, Colonel Nasser said that in his personal view the Prime Minister's speech showed that he was trying to be fair and was taking a constructive attitude towards a problem that had too long been neglected. It was good to hear a Western leader at last mentioning the 1947 Resolutions. To accept them, however, would be a sacrifice on the part of the Arabs, which some Arabs might even refuse to accept.

(b) The Lebanon. On November 18 the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies that the Arab countries had given a favourable welcome to Sir A. Eden's proposals. The Minister went on to misconstrue these proposals in a manner favourable to the Arab case.

(c) The Arab League. In its report on the meeting of the Arab League Political Committee on November 16, the Egyptian newspaper "Al Ahram" reported that "it is known officially that the Arab Governments welcome the contents of Eden's statement and support all President Nasser said about it."

7. Israel. The Prime Minister's speech has been severely criticised by the Israel Government and Press. Israel leaders have attacked it publicly on the following occasions:-

/(a)

- (a) Mr. Ben Gurion in his speech to the Knesset on November 15.
- (b) Mr. Sharett in New York on November 10 and again in Washington on November 21.

E. M. Rose

(E.M. Rose)
November 24, 1955

Ch. Stuchlik
25/11

J. Patrick
25.11.

CONFIDENTIAL

1077/857/55

V R1076/454

BRITISH EMBASSY

Paris.

November 22, 1955.

See dfr. 92
Could we have a word with the French about the Middle East? I think we should try to get the French to do the work for us. I would like to see the French in the lead. I would like to see the French in the lead. I would like to see the French in the lead.
Dear Michael,

Please refer to my letter of November 16 (1077/823/55) about the Quai d'Orsay's reaction to our request for their support for the suggestions about the Middle East made by the Prime Minister in his Guildhall speech.

When Patrick Reilly was seeing Henri Roux on another matter yesterday, he asked him whether the Quai d'Orsay had now been able to take any decision on this subject. Roux's reply made it clear that the Quai d'Orsay had not sent any instructions to their Representatives in the capitals concerned to support the Prime Minister's suggestions and that at present they had no intention of doing so. As he did when Reilly first spoke to him in accordance with the instructions in your telegram to Ankara No. 1640 of November 9, Roux said in general and rather woolly terms that the French Government entirely agreed that it was most important to try to find some solution for the Arab/Israel dispute and that they were in favour of the suggestions made by the Prime Minister. In view however of the Israeli reaction, they feared that no useful purpose would be served by any intervention which they might make with the Governments concerned. In these circumstances they did not think that it would be wise for them to intervene.

Reilly expressed disappointment at this. Basing himself on paragraph 3 (c) of Tel Aviv telegram No. 473 of November 16 Reilly said that we had indications that we need not entirely exclude the possibility that the Israelis might be prepared to make some concessions. If they saw that our proposals had the strong support of both the American and French Governments, might not this have a considerable influence on them? Roux replied by asking whether the American Government had in fact made clear their support to all the Governments concerned. Reilly said that surely there was no doubt about this and quoted the action taken by the United States Ambassador at Damascus as reported in Damascus telegram No. 470 of November 15 as an example of the United States Government's support. Roux seemed impressed by this. After some further rather inconclusive discussion, Roux said that he would consider the matter further and let us know whether the Quai d'Orsay felt able to take any action in support of the Prime Minister's suggestion. He agreed to do this however without any enthusiasm and Reilly did not get the impression that the Quai d'Orsay are likely to do anything useful and certainly not unless we go on pressing them very hard.

In the light of the above it would be helpful for us to know just how much importance you do attach to French support. If you want us to go on pressing the Quai d'Orsay, we will of course do so. If however you really do not mind

/very much

E. M. Rose, Esq., C.M.G.,
Levant Department,
Foreign Office.

V R1076/372

V R1076/381

V R1076/335

V R1076/404

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							



-2-

very much one way or the other, then there does not seem to be much point in our making a nuisance of ourselves at the Quai about this. In any case, if you do attach importance to getting the French to support us, would it not be worth while asking the State Department to make it quite clear to the Quai d'Orsay that they do support the Prime Minister's suggestions, that they are recommending them to the Governments concerned and that they hope that the French Government will do the same?

I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Washington, Cairo, Tel Aviv and Damascus.

Yours ever
John Beith
(J. G. S. Beith)

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

(VR 1076/454/G)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

TOP SECRET

November 29, 1955.

Many thanks for your letter 1077/857/55 of November 22 about the French attitude to the Prime Minister's Guildhall speech.

2. Had it been prompt and forthright, French support would have been useful to us, if only for Parliamentary reasons here. But since the Quai d'Orsay are playing shy, we are not inclined to run after them. Their support is not of overriding importance to us at this stage, and to judge from what you say, it would at best be equivocal.

3. Paradoxically enough, the French reluctance is not without advantage to us. It will be easier to justify the exclusion of the French from the Alpha operation (in which we are still hoping to make some progress) if we can point to their lack of interest in the Prime Minister's initiative.

4. We do not therefore wish you to put any strong pressure on the Quai d'Orsay. We should however like to have your views on the motives of the present French policy towards Israel in general and towards the Prime Minister's speech in particular. Considering the importance which they attach to their position in Syria and Lebanon, one might have expected the French to jump at the chance of a little cheap popularity in those countries and in the Arab world at large. But far from that, we hear that their attitude in the Lebanon has been "carping and critical" towards the Guildhall speech. Is it that they hope that by diplomatic adroitness they can keep in with both sides, whilst Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government take the rap? Or is there an important Jewish lobby in France?

5. I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of yours.

(E.M. Kose)

J.G.S. Beith, Esq.,
Paris.

(288) G
VR1076/455

FROM R. R. Malins
 WASHINGTON
 TOP SECRET
 No. 2896
 Dated NOV 28
 Received in Registry NOV 29

ALPHA. Mr. Russell considers it dangerous to go beyond what Mr. Dulles said to Mr. Sharet in hinting to the Israelis Egyptian readiness to talk. Suggests we should concentrate on getting Maxey to ~~agree~~ agree with what we regard as a basis for a settlement & then put the maximum pressure on the Israelis to accept it.

References to former relevant papers
 VR1076/447²
 (Print)
 (How disposed of)

MINUTES
 In view of the new impression derived from the record of Mr. Dulles's conversation with Mr. Sharet (p. 463) and Tel Aviv tel. no. 501 (w.p. 447), I agree that no further approach to the Israelis is immediately necessary. Before deciding what to do next, I think we must see what the Israeli reply to Mr. Dulles's memorandum says.
 2. I am not very happy about the "telescoping" but again we must await the Israeli reply. The American Embassy think Mr. Sharet will communicate it to Mr. Dulles on December 6.
 3. Mr. Russell is right about the High Aswan Dam, but we shall have to be extremely careful how we handle that question.
 4. ? Await result of Mr. Russell's talk with Mr. Dulles and then reply to Washington, if necessary, as above.

(Action completed) 10/12
 (Index) *Wp*

E. S. Curran
 I agree.
 So do I. The hurry of State may cause some (C. L. R. - 'xii')
 47468-2
 Now see on p. 482. *R29*

References to later relevant papers
 -1482



Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

Re: Stuchburgh.

Alpha seems to have
got stuck. The Sec. of
State wd. like us to make
another push.

JK
Z-tic

Private Secretary

The attached paper - with
minutes - gives the latest position.
I think we must really commit
Mr

Mr Shonett's response to
Mr Dulles' memorandum;
it is expected on Dec. 6th

[Signature]
2/12

1075 to see.

[Signature]
3 dii

all right, wait till
Dec 7th + then contact
me again.

[Signature]
2/12

See now p. 482 889
12

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

TOP SECRET

VR1076 / G
455

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Makins

No. 2896
November 28, 1955

D. 8.45 p.m. (L.T.) November 28, 1955
R. 4.00 a.m. November 29, 1955

IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2896 of November 28.

Repeated for information to: Cairo

RECEIVED IN C.B.
29 NOV 1955
SENT TO DEPT.
29/11

Tel Aviv.
VR1076/447G

Your telegram No. 5621: Alpha.

Your views were conveyed today to Mr. Francis Russell who said he would be discussing the whole subject with Mr. Dulles tomorrow.

2. His own view was that it would be dangerous to go beyond what Mr. Dulles had said in his conversation with Mr. Sharett in hinting to the Israelis Egyptian readiness to talk. The Israelis regarded the present time as very unfavourable from their point of view for negotiating a settlement and might be unable to resist the temptation deliberately to sabotage the whole operation by revealing the Egyptian position and forcing Nasser to disavow it. (See paragraph 4 of Bailey's letter of November 23 to Rose). — VR1076/463/k.

3. He thought our aim should now be to bring the operation to a successful conclusion in the limited period before some shipment of arms, which would have to be allowed to Israel (and of which the Israelis would almost certainly exaggerate the importance) spoiled the present favourable atmosphere amongst the Arabs. For this reason the Alpha procedure as originally conceived might have to be telescoped. It might be best to concentrate, for the time being, on getting Nasser to cover the not very great distance between his present position and what we regard as a basis for a settlement, and then put the maximum pressure on the Israel Government to accept it.

4.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884			86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

TOP SECRET

Washington telegram No: 2896 to Foreign Office.

- 2 -

4. Mr. Russell mentioned the importance, in connexion with Alpha, of showing the readiness of the West to build the Aswan Dam. It was clear that Egypt could not afford both the Dam and an arms race, and this would have to be brought out, though he admitted it might be fatal to suggest to Nasser that acceptance of a settlement were a condition of Western assistance for the Dam. JEM 23/82

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo and Tel Aviv as my telegrams Nos. 124 and 63 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo and Tel Aviv]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Private Secretary
Mr. Shuckburgh
Head Levant Department

XXXXXXXX

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884			86395				
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

TOP SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

Cypher/OTP.

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET
DISTRIBUTION

✓ IN 1076/467 e

No: 5621

November 26, 1955.

D: 9.50 p.m. November 26, 1955.

IMMEDIATE.

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Washington telegram No: 5621 of November 26

Repeated for information to: Tel Aviv. Cairo.

Your telegram No: 2839 [of November 21] Alpha.

The conversation between Mr. Dulles and Mr. Sharett has fulfilled part of the purpose of the approach to Israel proposed in my telegram No: 5810 [of November 19]. The Israelis have not however yet been told that the Egyptians might be willing to take the lead in negotiations on certain conditions.

2. I agree that we must first check with Nasser that he is behind what Fawzi told our Ambassadors. I understand that the State Department have instructed Mr. Byrads to do this. When we have received Nasser's assurance I suggest that we should inform the Israelis of the Egyptian attitude towards negotiations and urge them to accept a list of topics for discussion as proposed in my telegram under reference.

3. I am sure that the State Department will agree that it would be best if the United States Ambassador in Tel Aviv made the next approach to the Israelis. It is important that the Israelis, who have received the Prime Minister's Guildhall speech badly, should be made to realize that there is no difference between our two governments on substance; and it would in any case seem more natural if the United States Ambassador followed up Mr. Dulles' conversation with Mr. Sharett.

4. I am impressed by the arguments put forward in Tel Aviv telegram No: 487 [of November 21] against the inclusion in our proposed agenda of an item entitled "the problem of the Negev". Mr. Dulles has made it admirably clear to the Israelis that they will have to consider concessions in the Negev. But we do not want to give them the impression that we are ready to back an Egyptian claim to the whole Negev. I suggest therefore that we should amend the relevant....

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395		
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

TOP SECRET

Foreign Office telegram No: 5621 to Washington

- 2 -

relevant item to read "The Arab claim for an area joining Egypt with the rest of the Arab world". This expression has the additional advantage of being taken from the memorandum which Mr. Dulles handed to Mr. Sharett (your telegram No: 2810).

5. Please discuss with State Department urgently and let me have their views.

JJJJ

TOP SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

V/1076
647

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 1802
November 27, 1955.

D. 4.36 p.m. November 27, 1955.
R. 4.57 p.m. November 27, 1955.

IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1802 of November 27.

Repeated for information to Washington

Tel Aviv

V/1076/467

Your telegram No. 5621 to Washington, paragraph 2: Alpha.

Nasser has confirmed to my American colleague what Fawzi told us. His only variation was that the refugees should be given an opportunity to opt for repatriation or for resettlement and compensation.

2. I shall report further tomorrow.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington (Immediate) and to Tel Aviv as my telegrams Nos. 227 and 180 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and Tel Aviv].

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Private Secretary
Mr. Shuckburgh
Head of Levant Department
Resident Clerk

SECRET

V/21076/G
447

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Nicholls
No. 501
November 29, 1955

D. 10.00 a.m. November 29, 1955
R. 10. 7 a.m. November 29, 1955

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

27 NOV 1955
NO TO SEPT.
29/6

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 501 of November 29
Repeated for information to:- Washington Cairo

Your telegram No. 5621 to Washington: Palestine.

The Prime Minister who has been sick for the last ten days, returned to work yesterday. A special Cabinet meeting is to held today and according to the Press will be devoted to Foreign Affairs.

2. In the middle of last week Ehud Avriel who is known as one of Mr. Ben Gurion's most trusted lieutenants, left at short notice for the United States presumably to see Mr. Sharett.

3. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs when I questioned her last night about Mr. Sharett's return, said she had hoped that he would fly back from Canada direct, but that she was afraid he would now have to visit Washington again. Officials have, however, put it round that he may go to New York in connexion with the refugee debate.

4. These items taken together suggest the Israeli Government's response to Mr. Dulles' request for a considered reply to his oral communication of November 21 may be imminent.

5. You may think that in the absence of my United States colleague on leave the action proposed in your telegram under reference would be better taken in Washington than here.

Foreign Office pass Washington (Immediate) and Cairo as my telegrams Nos. 130 and 181.

[Repeated to Washington and Cairo]

ADVANCE COPIES:-

Private Secretary Mr. Shuckburgh
Sir I. Kirkpatrick Head of Levant

Department

<p>(280)</p>	<p>SECRET</p>	<p>VR1076/448 G</p>
<p>FROM <i>L. H. Trevelyan</i> <i>Case</i> TOP SECRET No. 1793 Dated <i>Nov 20</i> Received in Registry— <i>Nov 28</i></p>	<p><u>ALPHA.</u> Has been told in strict confidence by Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs that they have decided that a secret meeting between Chasser & Ben Gurion would not be advisable.</p>	
<p>References to former relevant papers</p> <p><i>VR1076/391^c</i></p> <p>(Print)</p> <p>(How disposed of)</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	<p>MINUTES</p> <p>More confirmation that "the ball is in the Israeli court." I think if we can once get past the Neger we may find that we can go further than we once thought.</p> <p><i>P. Amis 28/xi</i></p> <p><i>MR 28/xi</i></p>	
<p>(Action completed) <i>29/11</i></p>	<p>(Index) <i>44</i></p>	
<p>References to later relevant papers</p>		

SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

V R1076

448

Cypher/OTP.

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan
No: 1793
November 26, 1955.

D: 10.05 a.m. November 26, 1955.
R: 10.40 a.m. November 26, 1955.

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 1793 of
November 26

Repeated for information to: Washington,
Tel Aviv.

My telegram No: 1745: Palestine.

At a party on November 24, Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me in strict confidence that they had decided that a secret meeting between Nasser and Ben Gurion would not be advisable, owing to the considerable risks of spoiling the prospects for a settlement which would be entailed. He would not commit himself on the possibility of working up to such a meeting at a later stage, though the fact that he mentioned this seems to show that they may not altogether rule it out at a later period, if we can tell them that a deal on the Negev looks possible.

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that it would be a mistake to be too precipitate during the next few weeks, though everyone realized that "the iron was now red hot". The next thing was for them to feel that they had a firm basis for going further.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Tel Aviv as my telegrams Nos: 226 and 177.

[Repeated to Washington and Tel Aviv]

JJJJJ



V
 LEVANT DEPARTMENT
 ISRAEL

VR 1076/449 ✓

FROM Sir R. Mahon
 Washington
 No. 672 Sav
 Dated NW 25
 Received in Registry NW 28.

P. M.'s statement of Nov 22.
 Reports American press comment on
 his statement clarifying the Manassah House
 speech. It is commonly stated that this
 move in the Middle East has split the
 Commons, and some papers refer to the
 proposals as "another Munich".

References to former relevant papers

MINUTES

The Israelis are plugging comparisons with Munich, and they will be made in the House of Commons sooner or later. It is not an easy line to rebut without implicitly adopting the Arab arguments that Israel has no right to her present frontiers or that Israel herself is an example of aggression.

2. I suggest that if faced with this comparison we should simply say that the P.M.'s speech bears no relation to Munich: one important difference is that in this case the British and American Governments are prepared to guarantee the frontiers reached as a result of a settlement. And that in any case Israel's frontiers are defined in Armistice Agreements which specifically provide that these frontiers are without prejudice to an ultimate settlement. Czechoslovakia's borders were fixed by peace treaty to which Germany among others subscribed.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

(Index)

6/2

4/4/50

References to later relevant papers

47524

News Dept. to see

S. Allen 28/xi

MR 29/xi

H. Hanbury 2/2

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

CB
 R1076/449 VR1076/429

BY BAG

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

D. 9.00 a.m. November 26, 1955.

No. 672 Saving of November 25, 1955.

ADVANCE COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram
 No. 672 Saving of November 25
 Repeated for information/Saving to:
 Cairo No.42 Jeddah No.35
 Tel Aviv No.49 Damascus No.32
 Bagdad No.32 P.O.M.E.F. No.86
 Beirut No.35 Paris No.563
 Amman No.33 Moscow No.355
 Ankara No.50

My telegram No.2866 /of November 23/.

PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT OF
 NOVEMBER 24:

AMERICAN PRESS COMMENT

The Prime Minister's statement of November 24 on the Middle East was given fairly wide attention by most East Coast dailies. It was described by the New York Herald Tribune as a "clarification of Sir Anthony's November 9 policy address". Special attention was paid to the Prime Minister's remarks that Her Majesty's Government "are very ready" to help negotiate a Palestine settlement, and to his "denial" that his November 9 speech "implied 'very substantial concessions' of territory" by Israel.

2. Several papers reported that the Prime Minister "was pressed hard by Labour members". And the Associated Press, from London, said that "the Labour Party's move signalled at least a temporary lapse in the foreign policy bipartisanship which is traditional with Britain's main political parties". The Washington Post headlined its report: "Commons Near Rupture Over Eden's Peace Move".

3. Mowrer in the Philadelphia Inquirer reflected the strangely misinformed view that a few papers and columnists are still taking of the Prime Minister's speech on November 9: "it seems strange that Sir Anthony Eden, who strongly opposed the Munich sellout, should now advocate an Israeli sellout to Egypt. There is now, British democracy asked another democracy to yield to the threats of a dictatorship."

MAKINS

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Makins
No. 672 Saving
November 25, 1955.

D. November 27, 1955.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 672 Saving of
November 25.

Repeated for information Saving to:

Cairo	
Tel Aviv	Jedda
Bagdad	Damascus
Beirut	P.O.M.E.F.
Amman	Paris
Ankara	Moscow

My telegram No. 2866 [of November 23].

PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 24

AMERICAN PRESS COMMENT

The Prime Minister's statement of November 24 on the Middle East was given fairly wide attention by most East Coast dailies. It was described by the New York Herald Tribune as a "clarification of Sir Anthony's November 9 policy address". Special attention was paid to the Prime Minister's remarks that Her Majesty's Government "are very ready" to help negotiate a Palestine settlement, and to his "denial" that his November 9 speech "implied 'very substantial concessions' of territory" by Israel.

2. Several papers reported that the Prime Minister "was pressed hard by Labour members". And the Associated Press, from London, said that "the Labour Party's move signalled at least a temporary lapse in the foreign policy bipartisanship which is traditional with Britain's main political parties". The Washington Post headlined its report: "Commons Near Rupture Over Eden's Peace Move".

3. Mowrer in the Philadelphia Inquirer reflected the strangely misinformed view that a few papers and columnists are still taking of the Prime Minister's speech on November 9: "it seems strange that Sir Anthony Eden, who strongly opposed the Munich sellout, should now advocate an Israeli sellout to Egypt. Then, as now, British democracy asked another democracy to yield to the threats of a dictatorship".



VR 1076/451

White
 BRITISH EMBASSY,
 WASHINGTON, D.C.
 November 23, 1955
 VR1076

AIR BAG
 CONFIDENTIAL
 1042/542/55

Dear Hadow,

In our telegram No. 2839 we said that the questions addressed to the Israel Prime Minister at the National Press Club meeting in Washington were "mostly barbed and hostile."

2. I attended the lunch. The turn out was, I am told, unusually large, and Mr. Sharett was well but not enthusiastically applauded. The surprising point was that the questions all seemed to be of a kind: some were rather rude and crude, and others were sharply-pointed newspapermen's questions, but all seemed to be hostile. Mr. Sharett took them pretty well. He showed some resentment only at the question: "Why are the Arabs and Jews not more Christian to one another?", and his only serious slip was in answering two questions on the theme "Why should the United States incur the hostility of forty million Arabs in order to please one and a half million Jews (in the case of one questioner) and four million Jews (in the other case)?" In answering this, he failed to clear up the confusion about Israel's population, and then, in reply to a supplementary question, he said that there were 1,600,000 Jews and 200,000 Arabs "who were Israeli citizens, and he hoped loyal ones." He added, jokingly, that four million was "a definite prospect." One of his party saw the danger of this, and Mr. Sharett later explained that he had not said whether the prospect was a near or a distant one. But no doubt the Arabs will pick up his remark.

3. Mr. Sharett probably went too far in omitting any mention of refugees from his address. He was asked what the difference was between the expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs and the Nazi and Soviet expulsions of populations. He gave the usual reply: there was, he said, a pamphlet available which showed, by quotations from Arab sources, that the refugees had left voluntarily; the Israel Government had pleaded with them to stay; there was no case in history where a refugee population had been allowed to return; Israel's offer of compensation was unprecedented in the history of refugee problems, and the Israel Government were determined to meet any obligations they undertook to pay compensation.

*Really!
 Is it the creation
 of Israel*

4. He did not do too well with a cleverly worded question which asked whether "in the event of further Arab aggressions, Israel would be prepared to withdraw from any additional Arab territory she occupied;" and when asked if the Israel Government would object to Mr. Dulles selling United States bonds in Israel, he could only answer "no," and go on to compare the need for capital in Israel's present state of development with that of the United States fifty years ago.

5. In answer to another question, he said that if the Israel Government's requests to the United States Government were turned down, the Israel Government would not appeal over their heads to American public opinion, since the Israel Government could only deal with the United States Government. This answer would, however, have carried more conviction if the peroration of his address had not been an appeal to enlightened American public opinion to "reject illusory shortcuts to peace proposed at the expense of practicability and justice."

6. I am sending copies of this letter to Garvey in Cairo and Westlake in Tel Aviv.

R.M. Hadow, Esq.,
 Levant Department,
 Foreign Office,
 LONDON, S.W. 1

*Yours ever,
 Willie Morris*
 W. Morris

VR1076/452

Leadb.

Parliamentary Question

* 57 Mr. Zilliacus: To ask the Prime Minister, whether he will give an assurance that Her Majesty's Government's services as a mediator are at the disposal of Israel and Egypt only on the basis of strict respect for the obligations of Article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the United Nations Charter.

La

Wickham

24-11-55

F.O. ARE ASKED TO ADVISE by 4pm today
if possible, by 11 AM on beats 23
at latest

LA Northfield

LA Gorton

LA Easington

FOREIGN OFFICE

DRAFT REPLY:

Thursday
Nov. 24

I will with permission answer this Question and Nos ... and ... together.

I did not consult either the Israeli or the Arab Governments concerned before I made my speech at the Guildhall on the 9th of November.

I took this opportunity of advising both sides that if they want peace, they must make some compromise between the positions they have taken up. It is not for me to say where and how that compromise should be found.

All I have done is to give the assurance that if our services are required in the negotiations, both Her Majesty's Government and I personally are very ready to offer them in the cause of peace. It goes without saying that Her Majesty's

Government /

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884			86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

Government as a member of the United Nations will at all times have due regard to the provisions of the Charter.

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES

(1) If it is alleged that the Guildhall speech implied that Israel would have to give up some of the territory she now occupies:

Of course compromise implies sacrifices by both sides. Without such sacrifices it is difficult to see how there can be a settlement. I am convinced that a settlement would be so valuable to both sides that they would find that any concessions they made would be worth while.

(2) If it is alleged that Egypt, by maintaining a blockade and state of war against Israel has shown that she is not willing to abide by the Charter, and that Her Majesty's Government should not offer mediation in such circumstances:

The Charter of the United Nations in no way precludes an offer of mediation whatever the circumstances of the dispute.

(3) /

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref.: FO 371/115884			86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

(3) Under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, Her Majesty's Government are bound to oppose any attempt to change the present frontiers between Israel and the Arab States by force. But that is not to say that these frontiers could not be changed as the result of a settlement. The Armistice Agreements of 1949 specifically provide for such a possibility.

N.B. It would be unwise to give a specific assurance in the terms which Mr Zilliacus requests. Such an assurance might be held to bind us either to mediation only on condition that Egypt abandoned her blockade and state of belligerency with Israel before negotiations could begin, or to the exclusive use of United Nations machinery in seeking a Palestine settlement.

V
LEVANT DEPARTMENT

VR1076/446

ISRAEL

FROM S. Mr Wright
Bagdad

No. 964
Dated NW 25
Received in Registry— NW 26.

Mansion House speech.

Nuri has followed up his message to Nasser by sending Tawfik Suwaidi to Cairo, Nasser has said he does not favour discussion of his proposals by the Arab League, Nuri fears that the Russians are working on Arab extremism to prevent any compromise solution.

References to former relevant papers
370

MINUTES

There is no reason to suspect Nasser's sincerity in trying to avoid Arab League discussion of the P.M.'s speech. The Egyptians successfully resisted such discussion of Mr. Dulles's statement of August 26 and found that it paid them well. It is an excellent idea, if you are anxious to move towards peace with Israel. Indeed it could be argued that this message to Nuri is the best evidence we have had so far that Nasser is sincere.

2. Para 4 is for African Dept.

P. Culver
28/xi

is being done only by too rapidly by aunts.

African Dept to see

P. L. Rose

28/xi

(Action completed)

(Index)

29/11

13/12/66

References to later relevant papers

481

All three of the ^{Egyptian} persons named in paragraph 4 are unstable and extremist & they may be easily influenced by the Russians. Gamal has just been reported to have said that Egypt will choose between the Russians & the West over the

the High Dam & that whichever side she chooses, the other will have no reason to complain.

W. B. Shepherd
28/11

MR 28/xi

Vertical line on the right side of the page, with horizontal dotted lines extending from it, forming a column for notes or a checklist. Two diagonal lines are drawn on the right side of the page, one above and one below the dotted lines.

1	2	CMS	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

SECRET

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OIP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

21076/446

Sir M. Wright

No. 961

November 25, 1955

D. 5.36 p.m. November 25, 1955

R. 6.36 p.m. November 25, 1955

PRIORITY

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 961 of November 25

Repeated for information to Amman	Jedda
Ankara	Tel Aviv
Beirut	Washington
Cairo	P.O.M.E.F.
Damascus	

Nuri told me this morning that he had followed up the friendly message he had sent to Nasser through us (please see my telegram No. 917) assuring Nasser of his support in action to follow up the Prime Minister's Mansion House speech about Palestine, both by sending Taufiq Suwaidi to Cairo to speak on the same lines and also through the Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo, whom Nasser had now agreed to see for the first time for many weeks. He was still awaiting Taufiq's return with a report.

2. Meanwhile Nasser had sent a message to him to say that he would prefer that there should not (repeat not) be a meeting of the Arab League to discuss Sir A. Eden's speech (Iraq had said that she would be willing to attend such a meeting in Cairo or Beirut but not in Damascus). Nasser gave as his reason that he did not wish to find his hands tied by some resolution of the Arab League of an intransigent character. Nuri commented that this would have been a real risk, adding that the Arab League was only a propaganda talking shop anyway.

3. Nuri went on to say that Nasser's message might be interpreted in two ways. If, as Nuri hoped and was fully disposed to believe, Nasser was sincere in what he said it was good and encouraging. But if he was not being sincere, some manoeuvre as yet unrevealed might lie behind it.

4. Nuri then said that he was somewhat disturbed by a statement made by the Secretary General (or Assistant Secretary General) of the Arab League to the effect that the Soviet

/Ambassador, Cairo

v/21076/370

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884				86395		
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

SECRET

Bagdad telegram No. 964 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

Ambassador, Cairo had been to see him and had spoken of the injustice done [grp. undec.] the Arabs by the West in their creation and support of Israel. Nuri believed he had even spoken of the injustice of the existence of Israel. He suspected that the Soviet Government were trying to play on Arab extremism to defeat any chance of a compromise on the lines of Sir A. Eden's speech, and to detach the Arab world wholly from the West. Here were at least three persons around Nasser whom he believed to have Communist sympathies or at least to be extremely susceptible to Communist influence, namely: Anwar El-Sadat, Gamal Salem, and Fathi Radwan. He was nervous of the part they might play and hoped that Nasser was acting in good faith with us and would continue to do so. But he thought we ought to be prepared for the possibility that the Soviets would attempt some further machination to follow up the arms deal, and might meet with some success.

5. He repeated that he earnestly hoped that Nasser would work for a settlement and that any fears to the contrary would prove unfounded.

Foreign Office please pass priority to Cairo and routine to Ankara, Jeddah, Washington and P.O.M.E.F. as my telegrams Nos. 157, 179, 59, 131 and 307 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo, Ankara, Jeddah, Washington and P.O.M.E.F.].

666666

RECEIVED
 28 NOV 1951

(285) V R1076 / 447 / G

FROM H. O. Minelle
 to Mr. Rose.
 No. 107
 Dated Nov 24.
 Received in Registry Nov 28.

ALPHA.
 Note for Secretary of State's discussion with the American Ambassador.

References to former relevant papers

- A) H. O. Minelle to Rose of ^{MINUTES} Nov 25.
 B) Li. H. Trevelyan, Cairo No 1802 Nov 27.

I don't like the "variation" at all. The right of option would mean an open-ended commitment which the Israelis could not be expected to accept. The only way of going about this will be to set a number for repatriation fixed first, and then fill the number by giving option (at least in theory).
 2. Let us await the promised next report.
 P. Lunn 28/11
 MR 28/11

(Print)

(How disposed of)
 Tel) Washington Nov 29
Nov 29
 Mpt) Tel Cairo 28/11
Cairo 28/11

- C) Mr. Nicholas, Tel Cairo, No 501 of Nov 29.

(Action completed) 9/12 (Index) by J.

- D) Mr. Nicholas, Tel Cairo, No 506 of Dec 2
 W.S. 12

References to later relevant papers
 / 455 C

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115884			86395				
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

74

Enter G.

TOP SECRET

ALPHA

VR1076 447.

The Secretary of State has asked for a note on the present state of the Alpha operation for discussion with the American Ambassador at lunch tomorrow.

Talks with Egypt and Israel

2. At a dinner party in Cairo on November 16, the Egyptian Foreign Minister gave the British and U.S. Ambassadors an account of the Egyptian position and suggested that we should next take soundings in Tel Aviv.

3. We suggested to the State Department that the Egyptian attitude was sufficiently encouraging to justify an approach to Israel, to the effect that we had reason to believe that the Egyptians would be ready to take the lead towards a settlement, provided the Israelis were prepared to make some concession in the Negev. We should ask the Israelis to accept an agenda on which the problem of the Negev appeared as one of the topics for discussion.

4. The Americans have not replied directly to our proposals; but on November 21 Mr. Dulles handed to Mr. Sharett a memorandum to say, among other things, that "the territorial adjustments referred to in Secretary Dulles' August 26 speech may have to include concessions in the Negev to provide an Arab area joining Egypt with the rest of the Arab world".

5. The Americans believe that the Israel response to Mr. Dulles' memorandum may provide our next stepping stone. Mr. Dulles' conversation with Mr. Sharett has thus to some extent taken the place of the approach which we proposed should be made in Tel Aviv.

28/11

-2-

6. The Israelis have however not yet been told that we have reason to believe that the Egyptians might negotiate on certain conditions. The Americans believe that it is not safe to tell the Israelis this until we have assured ourselves that Colonel Nasser is behind what Fawzi said to our Ambassadors. Past experience shows that they are right to be cautious; on several occasions in the past Dr. Fawzi has said things to us about Palestine which Colonel Nasser has subsequently disowned.

7. The next steps therefore seem to be:-

- (a) to check that Fawzi spoke with Nasser's authority. The State Department have already instructed Mr. Byroade to do this;
- (b) to follow up Mr. Dulles' talk to Mr. Sharett by informing the Israelis of the Egyptian attitude to negotiations and urging them to accept an agenda for discussions.

Action on these lines is being proposed in a separate submission.

U.S. attitude to the Prime Minister's Guildhall Speech

8. The U.S. Government have made their support of the Prime Minister's speech clear in private. They have instructed their representatives to express their approval of it to Middle Eastern Governments; and Mr. Dulles has spoken very firmly to Mr. Sharett (see paragraph 4 above). The Americans are however unwilling to endorse the Prime Minister's ideas specifically in public. We shall have to accept this position.

E. M. Rose
(E. M. Rose)
November 24, 1955
J. Philipatich
24/11

92

3

VR1076 467
A1

TOP SECRET

ALPHA

Flag A
VR1076/391G

In our telegram No. 5480 of November 19 to Washington we suggested that the next step should be to tell the Israelis about our soundings in Egypt and try to get them to accept an agenda for discussion which would include an item on the Negev.

Flag B
-1419G

2. In reply Mr. Dulles suggested that we must first check that Fawzi had been speaking to us with Nasser's authority (Washington telegram No. 2829 of November 20); and the U.S. Embassy have shown us a telegram instructing Mr. Byroade to do this. Apart from that Mr. Dulles did not give a direct answer to our proposals. Instead he decided to speak to Mr. Sharett in Washington.

Flags
C and D
-1421G
-1422G

3. On November 21 Mr. Dulles (see Washington telegrams Nos. 2839 and 2840 of November 21) handed Mr. Sharett a memorandum saying, among other things, that "the territorial adjustments referred to in Secretary Dulles' August 26 speech may have to include concessions in the Negev to provide an Arab area joining Egypt with the rest of the Arab world. These concessions need not, as we see it, involve loss of any appreciably populated land or land of any substantial economic value."

4. Part of the purpose of the approach we suggested in Tel Aviv has therefore been accomplished. The Israelis have however not yet been made aware of the Egyptian attitude.

5. When we have Nasser's authority, therefore, the next step seems to be for the U.S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv, following up Mr. Dulles' conversation with Mr. Sharett, to inform the Israelis of the Egyptian attitude towards negotiations and press them to accept an agenda.



6. Meanwhile Mr. Nicholls, in Tel Aviv telegram No. 487 of November 21, has argued that we should drop the reference to "the question of the Negev" from our proposed agenda, and substitute some phrase such as "the Egyptian claim for land communication with Jordan". This suggestion has lost some, but not all, force as a result of Mr. Dulles' plain speaking. The Israelis now know that we think they will have to give up part of the Negev, but it would still be wise to reassure them that we are not thinking of the whole Negev. Mr. Dulles' memorandum made that fairly clear, but the original item on our agenda might arouse the Israelis' suspicions and give them the impression of intolerable pressure. Again, it is one thing for Mr. Dulles to tell the Israelis that they must consider concessions in the Negev: it is quite another to press them to accept the point in a document which will then be shown to the Egyptians. Now that Mr. Dulles has told the Israelis clearly what we have in mind, it might be better to proceed rather gently with them for the time being. I suggest therefore that we should accept Mr. Nicholls' idea.

7. I attach a draft telegram to Washington.

Flag E
-14206

E. M. Rose

(E. M. Rose)
November 25, 1955.

I agree *ATZ*

J. Patrick

Seen by Secretary of State - tel despatched

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

- 2 -

both sides more intransigent. There is no case for a return to the boundaries in the 1947 resolution which the Arabs themselves rejected, and which were only part of a larger, probably unworkable, scheme. That scheme has been eclipsed by history, and especially by the Arab attack against Israel. The result of the Israel victory was the gain of some Palestinian territory not originally voted by the United Nations, whilst Egypt and Jordan annexed territory which never belonged to them. If it is suggested that Israel should now return any territory, to whom will it be given? to countries to whom it never belonged?

On the other hand there are certain aspects of the frontier problem which must be solved. For that reason I hope that Mr. Ben Gurion was only speaking figuratively when he said that Israel would not budge an inch. In the first place there is the practical problem of tidying up the frontiers and the removal of anomalies resulting from drawing arbitrary lines on a map. No man in his senses could wish for a frontier to continue which separated villages from the land belonging to them, or for that matter would not welcome some alteration in the boundaries of the ridiculous Latrun salient. These are all matters which sensible men who are prepared to negotiate could settle easily. A second boundary problem is more difficult; Egypt and Jordan have asked for a land passage across the Southern Negev. The Israel Government has already indicated its readiness to give this matter sympathetic consideration and I hope that willingness may be re-affirmed on a suitable occasion.

The other crucial problem is the future of the Palestinian Arab refugees; a matter in which the Anglo-Jewish Association is deeply interested. I am aware that Israel has already made valuable and generous gestures for the compensation of the refugees; it must not be forgotten either that very many of them fled on the advice of the Arab leaders and were not ejected by the Israelis, and that since 1948 their former place has been filled by new immigrants into Israel, most of them refugees from Arab countries. It remains a fact that the continued misery of these people is a blot on twentieth century civilisation; I know that people of good will all the world over recognise this and are ready to co-operate in removing this blot.

(contd.....)

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

- 3 -

The problem is especially difficult since the majority of these unfortunate people cannot adequately be compensated by grants of money. They are largely poor peasant tenant farmers who have lost their homes and their livelihoods and only resettlement will help them. I hope Israel will do everything in its power to help these people who have suffered, but without active Arab co-operation there simply cannot be a solution. The British Government can do much to remove this unnecessary festering sore which continues to inflame the situation.

Apart from Israel's offer to recompense the refugees and to consider a Negev corridor, she has also invited Jordan to use the port of Haifa and expressed her desire to solve the Jordan frontier position. What like offers have been made by the Arab nations? Without legal basis they continue a blockade which is strangling Israel's economy.

I am quite sure that rational, intelligent men on both sides want a settlement so that expenditure on arms can be cut and the countries concerned can continue to improve their standards of living. I was therefore amazed at the statement made by the Foreign Secretary Mr. Macmillan in Baghdad. He is reported as saying that he could not blame Egypt for seeking arms where she could find them and that Britain would not try to balance deliveries by increasing the supply of arms to Israel. If Egypt is not to be blamed then surely other countries will be encouraged to do likewise and an arms race will be upon us. The Communist arms to be supplied to Egypt are destined as everyone knows for use against Israel and for no other purpose and I trust that the Government will reconsider its attitude to this part of the problem.

The Anglo-Jewish Association has never been an apologist for Israel but it desires the closest links between that country and Great Britain. With the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt and the difficulties in Cyprus we believe indeed that an alliance could be to the greatest advantage of this country. The great historical ties between the two countries, stemming from Britain's traditional sympathy for Jewish causes and her initiative in adopting the Balfour Declaration, lead one to hope that she is deeply concerned over the future of Israel which is the only modern democratic

P.T.O.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885				86395		
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

- 4 -

country in the Middle East. It would be a tragedy for the free world if the attitude of this country strengthened the hand of those elements in Israel which would like to see her in the neutralist camp.

I call on the British Government to give new thought to this complex problem before it gets completely out of hand. With its present policy Britain could not escape blame should open warfare break out in the Middle East, whatever country fired the first shot.

*Levings Dept.
Entire VR 1076*

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

December 1, 1955. ✓

Mr Turton has asked me to thank you and the President of the Anglo-Jewish Association for your courtesy in sending him an advance copy of the statement on the situation in the Middle East which Mr Carvalho is issuing to the press to-morrow.

C. R. A. RAE

(C. R. A. Rae)
Private Secretary to
Mr Turton

Charles S. Spencer, Esq.

Mr Turton

Mr Carvalho's statement about the Haganah seems very bold. I do not think I like it. I don't think his remarks about the Dept.'s alleged attitude.

Not too bad: considering its origin, good. What he means for the News is a corridor, as is later made clear. What I dislike is the last sentence, which is advance justification for Israeli aggression.

*Prez
12*

MR

1000
(298)

DEPARTMENT
ISRAEL

VR1076 / G
485

FROM Sir R. Malins
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
No. 2983.
Dated Dec 6
Received in Registry— Dec

ALPHA.

Results of a meeting between Mr. Dulles & Mr. Shovett, when the latter reaffirmed Israel's decision not to make any surrender of territory.

References to former relevant papers

MINUTES

VR1076/482 G

For more complete account see p. 490. The only perceptible changes in the Amman, and those very tiny, are:-

- (a) first sentence of para 3. At least this does not exclude concession in negotiations
- (b) penultimate sentence of para 3. This is perhaps first time that Israel has accepted idea of negotiation through a mediator.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Egg
12

(Action completed)

(Index)

References to later relevant papers

/490 G

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885			86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

TOP SECRET

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET

AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Makins
No. 2983
December 6, 1955.

D. 4.57 a.m. December 7, 1955.
R. 5.59 a.m. December 7, 1955.

PRIORITY
TOP SECRET

Val 1076 485

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2983 of December 6.

RECEIVED IN O.R.
1955
NO. TO DEPT.

Repeated for information to:- Tel Aviv
Cairo

My telegram No. 2959: Palestine. UR1076/4826

Mr. Dulles gave me an account this evening of a long talk which he had had this afternoon with the Israeli Foreign Minister.

2. Mr. Sharrett had sounded very intransigent. He had used language to the effect that Israel had taken an irrevocable decision not to make any surrender of territory. However, Mr. Dulles thought he perceived some chinks in the armour.

3. Mr. Sharrett had said that Israel would never commit itself in advance to any territorial concession. Mr. Dulles replied that nobody was asking them to do so before coming to the conference table. Mr. Sharrett had complained that the United States and the United Kingdom had changed their position under blackmail. Mr. Dulles said that there had been no change from the position which had been taken up by the two Governments in August. Mr. Sharrett had said that he did not want to do anything further for the moment. He would like to wait two or three months to see whether the Egyptians lived up to their promises in connexion with the Johnston plan for the Jordan Waters. Mr. Dulles had said that it would be folly for the Israelis to waste two months. Now was the time to move when there was still an equilibrium between the two sides and before it could be upset by additional supplies of arms to the other side. Finally Mr. Sharrett had said that Israel was prepared to negotiate either direct or through a mediator though he had indicated that Israel would not, in view of the Mansion House speech, be willing to avail themselves of the Prime Minister's offer. Mr. Sharrett had left a long side-memoire with Mr. Dulles which the latter had not yet had time to study.

4. I asked Mr. Dulles whether he had yet considered the next step and he said he had not. He added that while it was certainly possible to put an unfavourable construction on what Mr. Sharrett had said he was not wholly despondent.

/5. Mr. Dulles

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885					86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

TOP SECRET

Washington telegram No. 2983 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

5. Mr. Dulles remarked that he had been much disappointed that Mr. Sharrett was not adhering to his decision to leave the United States tomorrow, but was intending to stay on for at least another week here. Indeed Mr. Sharrett said that he would wait a day or two longer if it was necessary in order to receive a reply to the Israel request for arms. Mr. Dulles said he had been stalling this request, but would have to take a decision within the next few days. He thought they would have to let the Israelis have something.

6. More detailed account of the conversation and text of the aide-memoire will follow by bag.

7. Mr. Russell hopes to discuss present position of Alpha in London on December 14.

Foreign Office please pass to Tel Aviv and Cairo as my telegrams Nos. 66 and 134 respectively.

[Repeated to Tel Aviv and Cairo].

Minutes:

VR1076/486

THE TIMES

Cutting dated 30 Nov '55, 195

ISRAEL'S POLICY

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—The latest dispatches from your Jerusalem (Israel) Correspondent, and especially that of yesterday's date under the heading "Israel Note of Reality—Eden Speech Re-examined," may, I am afraid, create the false impression that there is likely to be some change in my Government's attitude towards the proposals made in Sir Anthony Eden's Guildhall speech. May I therefore be permitted to re-state Israel's position in this matter, as originally set out by my Prime Minister, Mr. David Ben-Gurion, in his speech in the Knesset on November 15, and reaffirmed by him and by my Foreign Minister, Mr. Moshe Sharett, on several occasions since?

It is precisely because of the strong "note of reality" in Israel's policy in this matter that there has hardly ever been an issue on which Israel public opinion has been so united behind the Government as it is in rejecting the clear implications of Sir Anthony Eden's speech. Knesset and Press have been unanimous and emphatic in their stand on this issue. They are moved by no reluctance to reach a peaceful settlement with their neighbours. On the contrary, the present Government of Israel, like all its predecessors, has repeatedly put forward proposals for negotiations with all or any of the Arab States—negotiations in which each side will be at liberty to present its views and grievances in a sincere effort to reach, through reasonable "give-and-take" on either side, a just and lasting settlement.

What Israel does object to is any proposal involving, *a priori*, one-sided concessions on her part. This is not only because we consider such procedure incapable of producing free negotiations on a basis of equality; but also because we recognize no legal or moral right on the part of the Arab States to base any claims on the 1947 United Nations resolutions, after they have first rejected them *in toto*, and later attempted to overthrow them by force of arms, in what the Security Council has branded as a "war of aggression."

It is no less relevant, from the practical standpoint, that, in the areas now held by Israel beyond those allotted to her in 1947, much previously derelict land has been reclaimed and made fertile, and many new settlements have been established, providing livelihood for many new immigrants (a large number of them refugees from Arab countries), and new development schemes put in hand on which depend the future of Israel as a whole, and her vital social, economic, and strategic interests.

There is a further reason why my Government—backed by a united public opinion—is unable to read Sir Anthony Eden's proposals in any very favourable light. We cannot but see them against the background of her Majesty's Government's past attitudes and actions in relation to a number of matters vitally affecting Israel's interests—matters such as arms supplies, the Arab economic boycott, Egypt's denial of free passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, &c.

Most important, of course, is the security aspect; the treatment accorded to Israel's requests to be allowed to purchase in Britain the arms for "legitimate self-defence" promised under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, to which Great Britain is a signatory. After signing her treaty with Egypt, Britain lifted the embargo on arms supplies to that country. When Iraq joined the Baghdad pact, arms supplies to Iraq, too, were further increased. But Israel, when she sought leave to buy additional arms to prevent the balance being tilted against her by these supplies to her enemies, saw the greater part of her list of requirements struck out. In particular, she was refused Centurion tanks, of which 32 are reported to have been already supplied to Egypt.

And although the new arms race arising from the Czech-Egyptian so-called "business transaction" is none of Britain's making, this fact in no wise releases Britain from her obligation under the Tripartite Declaration to supply Israel with arms for her "legitimate self-defence" in face of the increasingly grave dangers which threaten her. Yet, at the recent meeting in Baghdad, Mr. Macmillan is reported to have said that Britain will not try "to balance the deliveries [of arms] by increasing the supply to Israel." Israel can hardly be expected to ignore such attitudes in her reading of Sir Anthony Eden's Guildhall speech, whose extreme vagueness on the (Israeli) side may be an additional source of doubt and serious concern.

My Government sincerely appreciates the interest felt by Britain in the peace and stability of the Middle East. Israel is always ready to cooperate with B.M. Government in any effort to contribute thereto. But cooperation can exist only on a basis of complete impartiality and equal treatment for and from all parties concerned.

I am, Sir, yours obediently,
 ELKANAH BLATT
 Embassy of Israel, 2, Park Green, W.1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

F.O.P.

Not true.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885			86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

Leads Dept
in to enter
December 1, 1955.



The Prime Minister asked Mr. Turton in the House last night, with reference to Mr. Blath's letter in yesterday's Times, whether there were any precedents of contentious letters written by Ambassadors to the press of the country to which they are accredited.

H.M. Representatives abroad do not write letters to the local press. Missions in London, usually, and indeed not infrequently, write to the press over the signature of their Press Attachés; the Greek Press Attaché, for example, has often written to the Times. It is rare for a Head of Mission to write personally but Mr. Blath's letter is not unprecedented. The Afghan Ambassador, for example, wrote a very contentious letter to the Times on the "Pakistani" problem as recently as November 8 of this year.

C. R. A. Bae

(C. R. A. Bae)

G. E. Millard, Esq.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

C O P Y

The Editor,
"The Times",
Aldwych House Square,
E.C.4.

December 1, 1955

Dear Sir,

I have read carefully Mr. Elath's letter in your issue of November 30th, and as an eye-witness of the Palestine tragedy and a student of politics in the Middle East, I would like to be allowed to present a few facts and figures in correction of some of Mr. Elath's statements.

- (1) Concerning the Palestine territorial problem and the United Nations decisions of 1947, Mr. Elath reaffirms Mr. Ben Brion's recent declaration that these decisions are for Israel nul and void. They seem to forget that the Israeli State has been created by the very same decisions. The decisions concerning the territorial division of Palestine cannot be taken in part, and disregarded in part, at the Israeli leaders' convenience. These resolutions can be taken only as a whole with the rights and obligations that they impose on both sides. If the 1947 resolutions are nul and void, then neither the creation of Israel, nor its recognition by other States, have any legal basis. States which have given official recognition to Israel, including the U.S.A., have been careful to specify that their recognition applies only to the boundaries of the part of Palestine given to the Jews by the United Nations decisions. Furthermore, the validity of the United Nations decisions is not affected by the refusal of the parties concerned - either by the refusal in 1947 of the Arabs, who, however, later accepted them, or by the refusal of Israel since 1948. Israel acclaimed the decisions in 1947 because they were carving out of Arab Palestine a Jewish State, and as soon as Israel was created, they refused to accept the part of the United Nations decisions concerning Arab rights in Palestine... It is important to stress here that the United Nations decisions like those of the Law Courts are not dependent for their validity on the acceptance of the parties in the case. These decisions constitute a form of judgment by the world's highest authority and, as such, they are morally and legally binding on the parties.
- (2) The Israelis have often stated that Israel in 1948 was invaded by the Arab States. What happened was that Palestinians who were attacked by Israelis in the Arab part of Palestine appealed to Arab Governments to send forces to defend them. Arab countries sent some forces to Palestine for that purpose and to prevent the occupation by Israel of the Arab part of Palestine. The fact that, in flagrant violation of the United Nations decisions, the Israelis have since 1948 been occupying three-fifths of the Arab part of Palestine is enough to demonstrate that the Israelis were the aggressors and that it is not the Arab forces which attacked or invaded Israel. And we cannot doubt the fact that were it not for the intervention of the Arab forces in 1948, Israel would now occupy all the Arab part of Palestine and would have made all the Arab Palestinian inhabitants into refugees.
- (3) Mr. Elath's claims that previously derelict land has been reclaimed and made fertile by Israel. The examination of the following facts do not support that traditional Israeli claim:

The Israelis have occupied the best three-fifths of the Arab part of Palestine, an area of one and three quarter millions acres which includes Western Galilee, the Lydda-Ramleh area, the city of Jaffa, the Majdal-Hebron area and the Beersheeba area. Far from being empty and deserted lands, these areas were among the most densely inhabited by the Arabs and the most intensively cultivated before the Israeli occupation. In fact, the part of Palestine now held by Israel is less cultivated to-day than when it was tilled by Arab farmers before 1948. For example, far from reclaiming desert lands for farming, Israelis have allowed Arab-owned groves to dry up, with the result that last year Israel exported only six million cases of oranges, while in 1948, the

./.. part of Palestine...

- part of Palestine now held by Israel, exported about fifteen million cases of oranges.
- (4) The handing back by the Israelis of the one and three quarter million acres of the Arab part of Palestine which they now unlawfully occupy, will be basic in finding any workable solution to the Arab refugees' problem, because half a million refugees could be repatriated there, and without that there is no solution to the dangerous problem of these Arab refugees.
 - (5) The Israelis refusal to abide by the United Nations decisions in working out a practical and just solution of the Palestine problem seems to indicate that the Israelis may well prefer their present position to any acceptable solution of the problem. Some of them believe that the finality of a solution may result in a great diminution of the huge amount of contributions received by Israel from abroad during the last seven years. And the Israelis are very well aware that they cannot live on their own resources.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Y. Haikal,
Jordan Embassy,
7, Palace Green, W.8.



BRITISH EMBASSY,
BEIRUT. V

November 30, 1955.

1052/53/55
CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Sir,

VR1076/487

① h v l 888
② C v l h m

When, ten days or so ago, I asked Puaux, the Counsellor at the French Embassy here, what the French attitude was to Sir Anthony Eden's Mansion House speech, he said the Embassy had had no indication whatever.

2. It may therefore be of interest to you that last night at dinner he told me that they had very recently received a despatch on the subject. The French Government were prepared to co-operate in the Prime Minister's initiative if reactions in other countries showed that it had some prospect of success. They were, however, very dubious whether it would succeed; and in particular they thought it was unrealistic to expect Israel to make any appreciable territorial concessions. For the time being, therefore, they simply intended to wait and see.

3. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Paris and Damascus.

Yours sincerely,

R. M. Tesh

(R. M. Tesh.)

E. M. Rose, Esq., C.M.G.,
Levant Department,
Foreign Office, S.W. 1.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							




- 3 -

5. Despite uncertainty and confusion on the part of the Press, and inaction on the part of the Government there has been an encouraging advance of private opinion amongst influential people whose homes were formerly in Palestine. This has been accompanied by some widening of the political gap between the West Bank and the rest of Jordan and the growth of something closely akin to separation on the West Bank, a subject on which I shall have the honour of addressing you in the near future.

6. My conclusions are that the Jordan Government is not likely to take any initiative on their own as a result of the Prime Minister's Speech even though they have the most to gain by a settlement and are undoubtedly contributing to internal tension by hanging back. I have repeatedly told the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior and other members of the Government that because a settlement is of vital interest to Jordan, the Government ought to give a lead to public opinion. However, I cannot report they have taken this advice to heart. At present all sections of opinion are asking what Her Majesty's Government intend to do as a next step towards settlement. My answer in an attempt to instil a little realism is that it is not now for Her Majesty's Government to take the next step, but for the Jordanians themselves.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Bagdad, Tel Aviv and to the Political Officer with Middle East Forces at Nicosia.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect, Sir,
Your obedient servant,


(C. E. Duke)

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885				86395		
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

(1052/54/55)



BRITISH EMBASSY,
BEIRUT.

CONFIDENTIAL.

December 1, 1955.

R 1076/480

Dear Department,

One aspect of responsible Lebanese thinking on Sir Anthony Eden's Mansion House speech is a belief that the United States Government does not support the "proposals". This belief is not influenced by British statements that the two Governments are in agreement.

2. Recently a sizeable group of serious-minded and reputable editors and others met to discuss the speech (which they welcomed). They were almost unanimous in believing that the greatest obstacle would be found in the United States. And, as an American journalist expressed it to our Information Section the other day, "the noises coming out of Washington have not so far been reassuring".

3. Muhieddin Nsouli, who was Finance Minister in the last Solh Cabinet but one, and who was a member of the group mentioned above, has published an editorial in his newspaper, "Beirut", which includes an appeal to the British. Referring to the Mansion House speech it says "Britain, after making its positive and just step, should persuade her ally America of the necessity of carrying out justice and equity before persuading the Arabs to accept Sir Anthony Eden's proposals. Otherwise the White House and all active American diplomats will present the Middle East to the Soviet Union on a silver platter".

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

N

Levant Department,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

1955

V
LEVANT DEPARTMENT

VR1076/481 ✓

ISRAEL

FROM S. M. Wright
Bagdad
SECRET
No. 994
Dated Dec 5
Received in Registry— Dec 6.

Mansion House speech

Reports Toubiq's visit to Egypt. Nasser is willing to cooperate with Nuri, and it seems that his approach to a Palestine settlement will be reasonable.

1076

References to former relevant papers
446

MINUTES

Paragraph 3 is almost too good to be true. It must mean that Nasser is hoping that a Palestine settlement would raise his prestige, if it means anything at all. The Israelis, alas, will not fall for that kind of settlement.

C. A. ... 6/12

... 6/12

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

(Index)

7/12

31/12

References to later relevant papers

SECRET

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

VR 1076/481

Sir M. Wright
No. 994
December 5, 1955

D. 9.55 a.m. December 5, 1955
R. 10.38 a.m. December 5, 1955

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 994 of December 5.
Repeated for information to

Cairo	Jedda
Amman	Tel Aviv
Ankara	Washington
Beirut	P. O. M. E. F.
Damascus	

My telegram No. 964.

VR 1076/446

Nuri told me on December 2 that Taufiq Sudwaidi, whom he had sent to Egypt with friendly message to Nasser, had now returned.

2. Taufiq, who like all visitors to Nasser had been impressed by his personality, had received the impression that Nasser wished to respond to Nuri's overtures. Taufiq had impressed upon him that it was a mistake to think that Iraq's present foreign policy was that of Nuri alone. On the contrary, it had the support of the great majority of responsible leaders and opinion. If, for example, he himself were to become Prime Minister again he would follow the same line, and so would almost any other. But far from wishing to see the Arab World divided, Iraq hoped the differences could be reconciled.

3. Nasser had said that the past was past. If some solution could now be found to the Palestine question he would be willing to cooperate with, and perhaps associate himself in some form with, the Bagdad Pact.

4. As regards Palestine, Nasser said that he did not yet know what the United Kingdom Government might have in mind in the form of a compromise. No doubt it would become clearer soon whether any acceptable basis for discussion would open up. Taufiq's impression was that his approach would be reasonable.

5. As regards arms from Czechoslovakia, Nasser said that his intention was not to accept Communist technicians in Egypt but to send Egyptian personnel to be trained (presumably in Czechoslovakia). Meanwhile there was still a good deal of uncertainty as to what type of arms would be received. The Egyptian Government had asked for modern models of MIGs and tanks but were not sure of the response. Taufiq had enquired what would be done about spare parts and replacements. Nasser had replied that this was a difficulty which remained to be solved.

6. I have since had a talk with Taufiq, who confirmed the above. He is far from being always reliable, but on this occasion he struck me as telling the truth. He added that he had appealed to Nasser to put an end to Egyptian press and wireless criticism of Iraq. He gave Nasser assurances

DEC 10 1955
from the

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885				86395		
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

SECRET

Bagdad telegram No. 994 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

from the King and Nuri that Iraq bore no ill feeling towards Egypt for the many attacks during the past year, sharp and ill-judged as they had been, and they took them tolerantly and in good part. But Iraq hoped that the abuse of one Arab country by another would cease. Their wish was to work together, and they would do their best to this end on their side.

Foreign Office pass Cairo, Ankara, Jedda, Washington and P. O. M. E. F. as my telegrams Nos. 161, 186, 60, 134 and 315 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo, Ankara, Jedda, Washington and P. O. M. E. F.]

T T T

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

TOP SECRET

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

VR1076 / 482. G

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

VR1076

Sir R. Makins
No. 2959
December 5, 1955.

D. 10. 3 p.m. December 5, 1955.
R. 11. 59 p.m. December 5, 1955.

PRIORITY
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2959 of December 5
Repeated for information to
Cairo Tel Aviv Bagdad Amman
And Saving to Beirut Damascus

Tel Aviv telegram No. 508; Alpha.

VR1076/4756

Mr. Russell said today that Mr. Sharett had an appointment to see Mr. Dulles tomorrow December 6.

2. The Israel Ambassador has already indicated that the Israel Government's reply to Mr. Dulles' memorandum will say what Israel is prepared to do to achieve a settlement. On the question of communication between the Arab States, it will go into detail on facilities which could be made available, such as Jordanian access to a free port at Haifa, railway communication between Lebanon and Egypt and road communication between Jordan and Egypt, but it will exclude the cession of territory in the Negev.

3. Mr. Russell thinks that Mr. Dulles will use this opportunity to reiterate that Israel must accept that the question of the Negev is subject for negotiation. No decision has yet been taken, however, on what Mr. Dulles will say.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Bagdad, Amman and Saving to Beirut and Damascus as my telegrams Nos. 131, 64, 84, 34, 36 and 33 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Bagdad, Amman and Saving to Beirut and Damascus]

B B B

5. It is hardly our place to supply Syria with UN Docs, and we have no White Paper in Arabic that is easily discernable now. H.M.A. does not make it clear whether he wants us to send these things or not; but I think he himself might find the English versions useful.

6. I attach short draft reply.

P. Allen
7/12
RMB

A) Chumayy Tel Aviv to Hermit Dept
1031/154/55 Dec 12

After consultation with A/Care Buss, I attach dfr reply to Tel Aviv.

P. Allen
21
12

Number of copies	1
Number of copies of each	



Enter VR1076

BRITISH EMBASSY,
DAMASCUS.

CONFIDENTIAL

10601/307/55

November 28, 1955

VR1076/483

My dear Rose.

This morning I found the Prime Minister in one of his rare forthcoming moods and so sounded him on Syrian reactions to the Prime Minister's Mansion House speech.

2 He said that much as he personally found in favour of the Prime Minister's proposal, left-wing opposition here was so strong that no Syrian Government could openly pronounce itself in favour. What was needed was a decision in that sense by the Arab League when Syria could act without fear of leftist opposition. He had therefore called for a meeting of the League but so far only Iraq had responded.

3 I thereupon remarked that as Gamal Abdul Nasser seemed in favour of the idea, perhaps this would help Syria face internal opposition. He then warmly asserted that Gamal Abdul Nasser misunderstood the nature of the Prime Minister's suggestion. In reply to his statement that Gamal thought that the plan was to enforce the 1947 United Nations decisions, I pointed out that the Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister had made a favourable declaration in New York only a few days ago and it seemed to me unlikely that both should have misunderstood the nature of our Prime Minister's proposals.

4 I then urged the Prime Minister to face the issue courageously. Nothing was gained by constantly refusing to recognise an established situation. The Arabs, I said, had refused our 1939 White Paper and later the 1947 United Nations decisions. It seemed to me risky to refuse the present chance. The Syrian Prime Minister then asked me for a copy (in Arabic) of the 1939 White Paper and queerly enough of the 1947 United Nations decisions (with map) saying these documents did not seem to exist in the Syrian archives! I promised to do my best to supply his need. He asked if the 1947 decisions provided for a land connection between Egypt and the Arab world! When I said they did he said that was an essential condition for any settlement.

5 I fear this may sound more promising than I consider it to be. The key of the problem of a Palestine settlement, as far as Syria is concerned is in Cairo. Egyptian cum Saudi influence is paramount here thanks to the Army which is the moving force of Syrian politics. At the moment, Egyptian Army influence is clearly in evidence. Shishakli's never-lived-in Palace lodges the Egyptian military mission headed by General Amer. Incredibly smart Syrian sentries mount guard and brilliant lights shine all round it all night quite overshadowing literally and metaphorically the Syrian Foreign Office lodged in a nearby house. I wonder how long it will be before the Syrians quarrel with the Egyptians or vice versa?

6 Meanwhile, Gamal Abdul Nasser with his enhanced prestige resulting from the Czech arms deal should be able to induce the Syrians to fall in with a Palestine settlement if he wishes.

/Incidentally

E.M. Rose, Esq., C.M.G.,
Levant Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W. 1.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							



-2-

7 Incidentally I was rather shocked today at the bitter anti-Iraqi sentiments voiced by the Syrian Prime Minister. This was not his attitude earlier this year. But I was even more shocked by his final remark that I was not to do confidential business with his Secretary-General because he did not trust him. I wonder what's behind that one? Ibrahim is very pro-West.

8 I am sending copies of this letter to Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Paris, Washington and the Political Office with the Middle East Forces.

Yours ever
John Lawrence

P.S. Since writing the above the Press have reported my visit to the Prime Minister. According to "political circles" I "hinted in my discussions" that the British Government would welcome Yugoslavia or Spain as a third party in discussions between the Arabs and the Jews regarding the solution of the Palestine problem. Only the Prime Minister knew that we touched on Palestine. Therefore he must have put out the idea of Spain or Yugoslavia as a "third party" (which I thought was to be our role) as a sort of straw in the wind. Perhaps he thinks that a "neutral" third party especially a communist one would be more acceptable to Syrian public opinion than ourselves.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

(VR 1076/483)

CONFIDENTIAL

Outfile

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

December 9, 1955.

Dear Ambassador,

Thank you for your letter (10601/307/55) of November 28, giving an account of a discussion with the Syrian Prime Minister on Palestine.

2. We agree with your view that the Syrian attitude to the Palestine question will be determined by Egyptian advice and pressure; Egypt is the key to Arab acceptance of a settlement. Nevertheless, we hope that you will continue to speak on the lines of our telegrams Nos. 740 and 742 to Amman and urge on the Syrians the need for a comprehensive settlement as proposed in the Prime Minister's Guildhall speech.

3. We are amazed that the Syrian archives should contain no copies of the 1939 White Paper and the 1947 United Nations Resolution; and that the Syrian Prime Minister should appear to be unacquainted with the main provisions of these documents. It is hardly our business to fill gaps in Syrian archives, particularly with United Nations documents; and we cannot lay our hands on a copy of the 1939 White Paper in Arabic. I enclose, however,

- (a) the English version of the 1939 White Paper; and
- (b) a short history, prepared by Research Department in 1954, of the United Nations and Arab-Israel relations. This contains the text of the 1947 Resolution and a map showing the boundaries fixed by that Resolution.

4. I think you will find the latter useful if you become involved in any further historical argument about Palestine; and you may of course send the copy of the White Paper to the Prime Minister if you wish.

Yours ever
(Sd) Michael Hadou
for (E. M. Rose)

Sir John Gardener, K.C.M.G., C.B.E.,
Damascus.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1031/154/55)



BRITISH EMBASSY,

TEL AVIV.

R1076/483^A

December 12, 1955.

Dear Department,

We see from Sir John Gardener's letter to Mr. Rose of November 28 (10601/307/55) that he told the Syrian Prime Minister that the 1947 Resolution provided for a land connection between Egypt and the Arab world. Re-reading the Partition Plan, we wonder whether this is in fact so. It is true that paragraph A 5 of the section on boundaries seems to take the frontier from Qabab as far as the Gaza District boundary and then refers to a point of intersection between Yasuv and Batani Sharqi, which suggests that the two main sections of the Arab state would touch at this point. On the other hand, the actual point of contact is not very clearly indicated in the Research Department's map of August 1949, and there seem to be no communications of any sort at this particular point. It may well be that, in view of the provisions elsewhere in the plan for complete freedom of movement, no particular attention was paid at the time to the provision of a land link in the ordinary sense.

2. We wonder whether you could without too much trouble let us know what the actual position was under the partition plan?

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

Levant Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

Registry
 No. VR 1076/483

Top Secret.
~~Secret~~
 Confidential.
~~Restricted~~
 Open

Draft.
 Tel Aviv
 from
 Levant. Dept

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

21/12

70
 Confidential 22/10

Dear Chancesy,

We read the 1947 Partition Plan, to which you refer in your letter no. 681/54/55 of December 12, as providing ^{two} points of contact between the different parts of the Arab and Jewish states, one near Afula and one near Isdud. The map attached to the record of the UN. Resolution makes it clear that the frontiers intersected at those points. The intersections are, as you say, obscured on the Research Dept. map of 1949, but that is a fault of reproduction only. They were not important features of the 1947 Plan, which in any case provided for freedom of movement and economic union.

Yours con
 Levant Dept
 RL 21-12

V

LEVANT DEPARTMENT

VR 1076/484

ISRAEL

FROM Mr. Spencer
 Anglo-Jewish Association
 to Mr. Turton

No. CSS/HM
 Dated NW 30
 Received in Registry— Dec 6.

Palatine settlements
 Text of statement to be issued
 by the President of the Association
 commenting on the Mansion House
 speech and the Middle East situation.

1076

References to former relevant papers

MINUTES

Please see minutes within, on letter of thanks. The piece about Arab frontier villages is really good; but the more I look at the last sentence the less I like it. Apart from the Jewish press I didn't see that this statement received any publicity; but I do not read the Manchester Guardian.

12

(Print)

(How disposed of)

D. H. Mr. Spencer
 from Mr. Turton
 Dec 1.

Mr. Lyndall
 7/12

(Action completed)

(Index)

12 10/11/26

References to later relevant papers

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

ANGLO-JEWISH ASSOCIATION

Founded 1871-5631

WOBURN HOUSE (Fifth Floor) . UPPER WOBURN PLACE . LONDON . W.C.1
 Telegrams: Inland: ANJEWGLO, Kinross, London Overseas: ANJEWGLO, London Telephones: EUSTON 593718

President: R. N. CARVALHO.

Vice-Presidents:

THE VERY REV. THE CHIEF RABBI
 THE HON. EWEN E. S. MONTAGU,
 C.B.E., D.L., Q.C.

THE VERY REV. THE HAHAM
 L. G. MONTEFIORE, O.B.E.

NEVILLE LASKI, Q.C.
 LEONARD STEIN, O.B.E.

Treasurer: HYMAN STONE

Secretary: CHARLES S. SPENCER

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Press Statement - For Release Friday December 2nd.

Mr. R. N. Carvalho, President of the Anglo-Jewish Association who recently discussed the situation in the Middle East with the Rt. Hon. R. H. Turton, M.P., Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, and with the Israel Ambassador in London, has issued the following statement prior to the debate on the Middle East in the House of Commons.

"The Anglo-Jewish Association is greatly concerned over the continuing tension in the Middle East; it is anxious equally about the well-being of the State of Israel and the future role of Great Britain in the area.

I believe that the recent policy of the British Government in the Mediterranean area has been harmful to British prestige. As a result of it the Russian bloc has seized the initiative, with the effect of further exacerbating an already dangerous situation.

I accept unreservedly that, as he said last week in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister, in his Guildhall speech, merely wished to get the two parties to initiate direct negotiations and that his reference to the 1947 frontiers was intended only to indicate the starting point from which the Arabs would begin such negotiations. But I regret to have to state that I think that this passage in his speech was, to say the least, unfortunately worded; and that many of the unhappy reactions to the speech might have been expected. The reference to the 1947 United Nations resolution has only succeeded in raising false hopes among the Arabs and of leading Israel to believe that this country has turned against her. Mr. Ben Gurion's reaction was surely to be foreseen. Sir Anthony's statement has only made

(contd....)

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

FOREIGN OFFICE,

LONDON, S.W.1.

December 20, 1955.

TOP SECRET

V21026/475²

I hope you do not think that because we have not replied to it, we have ignored your telegram No. 508 of December 2 about Alpha.

2. The arguments against Mr. Russell's "telescoping" which you put forward in the first paragraph of your telegram have convinced us. In any case, we do not think that Nasser would be prepared to play his part in the shortened version of the negotiations suggested in paragraph 3 of Washington telegram No. 2896 of November 28. Now that the Israeli raid on Syria has given the State Department a pretext for delaying arms deliveries to Israel, there is perhaps less immediate need for haste. We shall have to decide how to proceed with Alpha when we get the Israeli reply to the approach reported in Washington telegram No. 3000 of December 8; and in considering the next step we shall bear in mind what you say.

3. Your other main point (paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference) is that we should give the Israelis some reassurance about Egyptian sincerity and our intentions on the Negev. This we have not felt able to do. We are leaving it to the Americans to make the running with the Israelis for the present, and in that I am sure you will agree that we are right. In deciding whether to speak to the Israelis, therefore, we have to be guided by American advice. Francis Russell, with whom I discussed the question recently in Paris, is anxious that we should not say anything to the Israelis about the Negev at present. He fears that an approach of the kind you suggest would weaken the effect of the American insistence on Israeli concessions in the Negev and he hopes that the Israelis will be the readier to accept these concessions when they find that they are smaller than they had suspected. I think that this is right.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to Roger Makins and Humphrey Trevelyan.

(C.A.E. Shuckburgh)

J.W. Nicholls, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Tel Aviv.

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

BY BAG

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

VR1076/477

Mr. Nicholls

No. 9 Saving

November 30, 1955

R: December 3, 1955

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 9 Saving of November 30

Repeated for information saving to: Amman Bagdad
Beirut Cairo
Damascus Washington

Palestine.

Press today carries statement attributed to Foreign Office spokesman that, following Sir Anthony Eden's speech of November 9, discussions had been held with a number of Middle East countries but that these soundings had not yet reached the stage of formal negotiations. Spokesman allegedly indicated that Israel was among the countries consulted and that the United States had been kept closely informed of developments.

2. In obviously inspired accompanying comment, under the heading "London Working up False Impression", Jerusalem Post states that Foreign Office is trying to give the impression that progress had been made. If this is so, it is confined strictly to the Arab countries; Israel has received no official offers of mediation, there have been no feelers or soundings, and "indication" that Israel was among countries approached is correct only in so far as it refers to my calls on Director-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs "to transmit the text of Sir Anthony Eden's speech" (my telegram No. 459) and on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (my telegram No. 473), to receive the text of the speech to be made by Mr. Ben-Gurion".

3. Impression of State Department support, which Her Majesty's Government are reportedly striving to create, is said to be "no less erroneous".

DISTRIBUTED TO:

Levant Department
News Department
Regional Advisers

African Department
Information Policy Department

2222

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885				86395		
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(VR 1076/4786)

December 5, 1955.

~~TOP SECRET~~

In your letter of December 1 you asked for a description of our proposals for a territorial settlement of the Palestine affair.

The Alpha proposals, which were described in paragraph 7 (e) of C (55)96 of April 6 and in paragraphs 3 - 7 of C.P.(55)35 of June 11, were agreed with the Americans in March and approved in principle by the Cabinet at its meeting on June 16 (C.M. (55) 15th Conclusions, Minute 6). These proposals were marked by red lines on the map enclosed with my letter of November 25.

As you will see from the map, the Alpha proposals provide for the cession by Israel to the Arabs of a double triangle of territory in the extreme south of the Negev. The principle underlying these two triangles was explained in paragraph 3 of C.P. (55)35. We soon began to suspect, however, that the Egyptians would not accept so small a cession of territory in the Negev; and the Secretary of State therefore suggested (paragraph 6 of C.P.(55)35) that it might be necessary to apply the double triangle principle further north, so as to link both Egypt and the Gaza Strip to Jordan and provide a fairly large transfer of territory. The Americans had some reservations about this proposal, though they admitted that the small triangles in the south would probably not be sufficient to tempt the Egyptians to make a settlement. It was therefore agreed that we

/should attempt

W. Colmerous, Esq.,
No. 10, Downing Street.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

should attempt to get the Israelis and the Arabs to accept the double triangle principle as the only means of reconciling their conflicting claims on the Negev. If they accepted the principle, the size and location of the triangles could be negotiated at a later stage.

That is how the matter still stands. We have recently learned, however, that Mr. Dulles is now thinking that Israel might have to give up as much as one third of the Negev (see paragraph 6 of Washington telegram No. 2799 of November 17). This idea was represented by the shaded area on the map which I sent you with my letter of November 25. The Americans have not yet put this proposal to us officially, but from conversations with Mr. Dulles' advisers in Geneva, we understand that the idea is that Israel should retain Elath and have guaranteed rights of access (but not a corridor) to it.

It is in fact probable that the Egyptians will accept nothing less than Mr. Dulles' latest idea. The Egyptian Foreign Minister has told us that they will not agree to an Arab corridor through an Israeli Negev, nor to an Israeli corridor through an Arab Negev. Mr. Dulles' idea has several other advantages over the double triangle principle: it is shorter, produces a far shorter and more easily defensible frontier, and is less open to public mockery. But it will be very difficult for the Israelis to accept it. They could only be brought to do so by severe and sustained American pressure. It is therefore fortunate that the idea should have originated with Mr. Dulles, and we think we should be well advised not to press him on it for the present. If after due consideration he puts it forward officially as a definite proposal, we think that we ought to support it.

John Graham

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885				86395		
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						



DESPATCH NO. 99
(1077/162/550)
Confidential

BRITISH EMBASSY
AMMAN

December 1, 1955

R1076/479

V R1076/437

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my Despatch No. 92 of the 21st of November, 1955 and to summarise the development since that date of opinion in Jordan about the Prime Minister's Speech at the Mansion House of the 9th of November, 1955 on the Palestine problem.

2. The attitude of the Jordan Government towards the Prime Minister's suggestions has continued to be disappointingly feeble, while the reactions of the press, have been confused. Thus, in a session of the Jordan Chamber of Deputies, held on November 29, the Minister of the Interior replying for the Government to a question raised by two West Bank Deputies, stated that the policy of the Government was set out in the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the present session of the Lower House (my despatch No. 95 of the 24th of November) in the assurance that the Palestine question was the cause not of Jordan alone but of the Arabs in general, and that no Arab State would be able to deal with it independently. The Minister went on however to say that the Prime Minister's statement represented a "positive step" towards meeting the claims of the Arabs who had consistently asked for a return to the Partition Plan as a basis for a settlement. He concluded by informing the Chamber that consultations for the holding of a high level meeting among the Arabs were in progress.

.../2

The Right Honourable Harold Macmillan, M.P.,
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
The Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							



* 2 *

3. This so far is the most authoritative comment made by the Jordan Government. Another official pronouncement was, made by the Mufti of Jordan, Sheikh Abdulla Qalqili, in a "fatwa", (religious opinion), refuting a "fatwa" issued by the Professor of Islamic Law at Cairo University, to the effect that peace with Israel would not violate Islamic Law. The Mufti of Jordan stated that the conclusion of any settlement or peace with Israel was forbidden by religion; peace was only permissible if those who fought Islam restored whatever they had usurped from the Moslems. Patriotism also forbade peace with Israel.

4. Jordanian press comment has been obscure and, as usual, critical, both of Her Majesty's Government's efforts and of the Jordan Government's continued inertia. On the 20th of November, the newspaper "Difaa" recalled previous authoritative statements made by Her Majesty's Government and called for pressure on Israel to prevent Sir Anthony Eden's suggestions following the others into oblivion; the Arabs had expressed their willingness to negotiate on the basis of the 1947 Resolutions. The following day Difaa's editorial suggested that the proposals of the Prime Minister be clarified; if Israel would not accept them, then the issue should be taken to the United Nations. On the 22nd of November however, Falastin attacked the Jordan Government for its continued inaction which "cannot be justified because of Jordan's obligations and responsibilities in this matter". Since then however, the Press has veered between criticism of the Prime Minister's Speech because it was not specific enough, and criticism of those Arabs who accorded it a favourable reception. None of this has prevented a bitter attack in "jihad" on the 1947 resolutions themselves, on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of their adoption by the United Nations.

.../3

Pro G.

TOP SECRET

ALPHA

V11076
H1
KTS

Flag A
V11076 H75G

The Prime Minister is concerned about the report in paragraph 2 of Tel Aviv telegram No. 508 of December 2 that Mr. Ben Gurion is convinced that Her Majesty's Government, for their own purposes, wish to deprive the Israelis of the whole of the Negev. He asks what we can do to reassure the Israelis that it is not our intention to press them to surrender the whole territory.

2. There are two main alternatives:-

(a) A public explanation.

I do not recommend this. We have never said anything which suggests that we think the Israelis should lose the whole Negev; and a public reassurance would seem both guilty and defensive. It would, moreover, encourage Zionist pressure in the United Kingdom. Mr. Barnett Janner has recently told his friends that H.M. Government may yet change their policy if British Jews are united at Israel's critical hour. I believe it would be unwise to do anything which would let the Zionists think that their pressure was succeeding.

(b) A confidential approach to the Israelis.

We have always intended to reassure the Israelis on this point when we make our first approach to them. (See, for example, paragraph 4 of Foreign Office telegram No. 5621 of November 26 to Washington.) But it would be a mistake to say anything to the Israelis about the Negev at present. On November 21 Mr. Dulles told Mr. Sharett that the territorial changes necessary for a settlement might have to "include concessions in the Negev to provide an Arab area joining Egypt with the rest of the Arab world". Until the Israelis have replied to Mr. Dulles we should not do anything which they might interpret as a weakening of Mr. Dulles's courageous stand. In any case it would be very difficult to decide just what to say to the Israelis until we have seen their reply.

Flag B
-14476

Flag A

3. It is true that there is a risk of Israeli violence. But that risk, as Mr. Nicholls says in paragraph 3 of his telegram No. 508, is one that we must take if we are trying to get a settlement. Whenever they are subjected to pressure the Israelis begin to talk of "despair" in order to frighten the Western Powers. We shall have to call this "despair" bluff if we are going to get out of Israel the sacrifices necessary for a settlement. It may not be bluff, of course. But if we take it seriously, we shall not be able to do anything that the Israelis dislike.

/s/ Mr.

2/12

4. Mr. Sharett is returning to Washington on December 6 and to Israel on December 12. There is strong evidence that he will present Israel's reply to Mr. Dulles's memorandum of November 21 within the next few days. After that, we shall be able to decide on the next move in consultation with the Americans. Whatever form Mr. Nicholls' next approach to the Israelis takes, reassurance on the Negev would be a part of it.

G. G. Arthur

(G. G. Arthur)
December 5, 1955

Private Secretary

I used more or less these arguments in speaking to Mr Zulueta on Sunday (he had rung me up); so I do not know if it is necessary to send anything more to No. 10. But if it is, the above would serve.

GD
b/12.

Let us drop this, then, unless NO 10 asks us again.

GGA
6 xii

TOP SECRET

FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

VR1076
445

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Nicholls
No. 508
December 2, 1955.

D. 4.05 p.m. December 2, 1955.
R. 4.33 p.m. December 2, 1955.

IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

VR1076

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 508 of December 2.

RECEIVED IN C.S.
- 3 DEC 1955
SENT TO Dept.
3/12.

Repeated for information to Bagdad

Cairo

Washington

Washington telegram No. 2896, paragraph 3: Alpha.

I am very doubtful of the wisdom of the procedure suggested by Mr. Russell. The Israelis will inevitably believe that any basis of settlements we put up to them on Nasser's behalf is no more than an opening for bidding, which they would be able to whittle down in negotiations. If, in fact, it was Nasser's last word, there would be an immediate deadlock. Moreover, I think we cannot afford to leave the Israelis much longer in their present state of alarm and uncertainty.

No. 1
Telecopying
is important
to the
situation
in the
Middle
East
and
we
must
keep
it
open.

2. I have further confirmation that Ben Gurion is convinced that Her Majesty's Government, for their own purposes, wish to deprive the Israelis of the whole of the Negev. He interprets the Guildhall speech as meaning that Her Majesty's Government intend to go back to the Bernadotte plan. So long as this misconception prevails, there is a real risk that an atmosphere will develop in which negotiations will become impossible. Certainly we cannot hope for any progress on the Israeli side until we have disposed of this misconception once and for all. It is almost equally necessary and urgent to convince the Israeli Government that Nasser is genuinely prepared to negotiate. There is an under-current of suspicion that his object is merely to ward off an Israeli "preventive" attack until his own forces are ready.

3. I do not underestimate the risk that Israel might sabotage the whole operation either (as suggested by Mr. Russell) by misconstruing this country's position or (as suggested in my telegram No. 487, paragraph 1) by taking military action. But I think this is a risk we must take if progress is to be made. We can minimize it by:

- 14206

/(a)

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885			86395				
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

TOP SECRET

Tel Aviv telegram No. 508 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

- (a) giving Israel the firmest possible intimation of Nasser's readiness to consider a settlement;
- (b) making it clear to them that, whatever Nasser's terms may turn out to be, it is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government to press Israel to surrender the Negev.

4. I am inclined to think that it ^{139K} would be better tactics not to follow such a communication immediately with the proposal (your telegram No. 5480 to Washington) to work out an agenda. The Israelis would think we were rushing them and would probably take it as evidence that we had already worked out with Nasser not only the agenda, but the terms of a settlement.

5. Instead I suggest, having made the points at 3(a) and (b) above (which should have a calming effect) we should inform the Israelis that we intended to probe Egyptian intentions altogether more closely and that, when we had done so and if we thought that a possible basis for a settlement existed, we would inform them and propose a list of subjects for discussion. A few days later (without necessarily going back to the Egyptians) we could resume the procedure indicated in your telegram No. 5480 to Washington, paragraph 5.

6. This may seem a bit devious but first approach to the Israelis will be crucial and I am sure that we must at all costs avoid scaring them into some act of folly.

Foreign Office pass Cairo and Washington as my telegrams priority Nos. 187 and 132 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo and Washington].

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Private Secretary
Sir G. Harrison
Mr. Shuckburgh
Head of Levant Department
Resident Clerk

SECRET

Despatched by Defe.

Registry No. *V21076/465*

Top Secret.
~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~RESTRICTED~~
~~OPEN~~

Draft. letter to Mr. Nicholas Tel Aviv

Page A.

From: *Fly B.*
 Mr. Shuckburgh

C. L. R.
 19/12/55
 Copies to H.M. Ambassadors at Washington and Cairo

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

I hope you ~~did~~ not think that because we have not replied to it, we have ignored your telegram ^{no.} number 508 of December 2 about Alpha.

2. The arguments ^{against} about Mr. Russell's "telescoping" which you put forward in the first paragraph of your telegram have convinced us. In any case, we do not think that Nasser would be prepared to play his part in the shortened version of the negotiations suggested in paragraph 3 of Washington telegram ^{no.} number 2896 of November 28. Now that the Israeli raid on Syria has given the State Department a pretext for delaying arms deliveries to Israel, there is perhaps less immediate need for haste. We shall have to decide how to proceed with Alpha ~~wh~~ when we get the Israeli reply to the approach report ^{no.} in Washington telegram number 3000 of December 8; and in considering the next step we ~~sh~~ shall bear in mind what you say.

3. Your other main point (paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference) is that we should give the Israelis some reassurance about Egyptian sincerity and our intentions on the Negev. This we have not felt able to do. We are leaving it to the Americans to make the running with the Israelis for the present, and in that I am sure you will agree that we are right. In deciding whether to speak to the Israelis, therefore, we have to be guided by American advice. Francis Russell, with whom I discussed the question recently in Paris, is anxious that we should not say anything to the Israelis about the Negev at present. He fears that an approach of the kind you suggest would weaken the effect of the American insistence on Israeli concessions in the Negev and he hopes that the Israelis will be the readier to accept these

/concessions

concessions when they find that they are smaller than they had suspected. I think that this is right.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to Roger Makins and Humphrey Trevelyan.

copy
20/12

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

**PARLIAMENTARY
QUESTION**



MIDDLE EAST (ISRAEL)

46. Mr. Chapman asked the Prime Minister what territory he has proposed should be ceded by Israel in order to secure peace in the Middle East.

The Prime Minister: I am not prepared to refine the replies I have already given on this subject.

Mr. Chapman: Will the Prime Minister at least make it clear that what he had in mind was probably mutual and slight territorial adjustments rather than the cession of territory by Israel in return simply for recognition by the Arab States?

The Prime Minister: If the hon. Member would glance at *The Times* correspondent's article from Israel yesterday, he may find some comments which may help a little bit in the elucidation of this question.

V
 LEVANT DEPARTMENT

VR1076/474

FROM Mr Nicholls
 Tel Aviv
 No. 509
 Dated Dec 2
 Received in Registry - Dec 3.

Palestine settlement.
 Israelis are much annoyed by 'The Times' assertion that Ben Gurion has moved a step forward but the correspondent maintains that this is true. Gives details of Jerusalem Post's attack on the article and comments on its reference to Gaza.

References to former relevant papers
 457.

MINUTES

There is other evidence that the Israelis are beginning to think of the Gaza strip as a counterpoise to any concessions they make in the Negev. It was mentioned to Lord Reading, I believe; and it has certainly been referred to, though in the vaguest and most non-committal way, by the Jewish press in the U.K.

2. It looks therefore as though we may sometime be faced with an Israeli claim on Gaza. What has made them change their minds about this? Two things, perhaps;

(a) growing realisation that they will have to face concessions in the Negev, & a determination to make such a transfer mutual

(b) a report that the oil-bearing strata (or whatever the things are called) extend not south from Dulaigat (Heletz), where the first discovery was made, but westwards across Gaza to the sea.

(Print)
 (How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
6/12	4/4/56

References to later relevant papers
 531

47524

P. A. Curtis 5/12
 interesting C. L. R. 5/12
 C.B. 5/12

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

R1076/47

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Nicholls

No. 509

D:4.25 p.m. December 2, 1955

December 2, 1955

R:4.48 p.m. December 2, 1955

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 509 of
December 2

Repeated for information saving to:

Cairo Washington

My telegram No. 498; Palestine.

The Times correspondent tells me that Israeli officials were much put out by despatch from him published in the Times of November 28 and pressed him strongly to send a further message "correcting" his statement that Mr. Ben Gurion had moved a step forward. He refused because, as he told me, he was quite satisfied that Mr. Ben Gurion, in the interview given to the New York Times correspondent, had advanced from his previous uncompromising stand.

2. Attacking the Times article, the Jerusalem Post today says, in a signed article, that there is all the difference in the world between "mutual exchanges of territory - which might conceivably involve such areas as the Gaza strip - and one-sided yielding of territory by Israel".

3. I am sure that this reference to Gaza, which was not necessary in the context, would not have been included without official inspiration.

Foreign Office pass to Cairo and Washington as my saving telegrams 46 and 101.

[Repeated saving to Cairo and Washington]

2222



ISRAEL
 VR1076/G
 475

FROM Mr. Nicholls
 Tel Aviv
 TOP SECRET
 No. 508
 Dated Dec 2
 Received in Registry—
 Dec 2

ALPHA - Is doubtful of wisdom of procedure suggested by Mr. Russell. Suggests we calm Israelis by telling them it is not our intention to press for surrender of the whole of the Negev, & then inform them that we intend to probe Egyptian intentions closely, and, if a possible basis for settlement exists, we will propose a list of subjects for discussion.

References to former relevant papers
 VR1076/455 C.

MINUTES
 I have held this telegram until we could see how things were going in Washington.
 2. I find the arguments put forward by Mr. Nicholls against the telescoping of the Alpha procedure entirely convincing. In any case it would be impracticable, for Colonel Nasser simply would not do what Mr. Russell suggested in paragraph 3 of Washington telegram number 2896. There is perhaps less reason for telescoping now, since Israeli attack on Syria has presented the Americans with a ready excuse for delaying shipments of arms to Israel. Before we decide on the next step we must await the final Israeli reply to the approach by Mr. Russell reported in Washington telegram number 3000 of December 8.
 3. The other point which Mr. Nicholls makes is that we should reassure the Israelis about our intentions on the Negev. We have in fact not talked to the Israelis about a settlement since the arguments which immediately followed the Prime Minister's Guildhall speech: we are leaving the approaches, as is right, to the Americans. We should therefore be guided by American advice on this; and when Mr. Shuckburgh discussed it with Mr. Russell in Paris the latter said that he hoped that we would not say anything to the Israelis about the Negev, since any approach by us might weaken the American insistence on concessions there, whilst the Israelis might well be pleased to find that the sacrifices suggested were smaller than they had suspected.
 4. I attach a draft reply to Mr. Nicholls.

(Print)
 (How disposed of)
 1) Tel Aviv Mr. Nicholls
 2) Mr. Shuckburgh/Dec 20
 3) Cairo Dactylin
 Dec 20

(Action completed) 4/1
 (Index) [Signature]

References to later relevant papers

G.G. Arthur
 December 19, 1955.
 [Signature]
 [Signature]
 [Signature]

Ref: FO 371 / 115885 86395

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet

b) Darlington (L. Bailey to L. Middle, Id. (no)) 1042/1625/15^e

Dec 27

Page 2
1

Vertical column of horizontal dotted lines for notes.



Enter VR1076 G.



TOP SECRET

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON D.C.

(1042/541/55G)

November 23, 1955.

interesting in my opinion Mr Dulles has acted very wisely & in complete loyalty

*W. J. ...
A. ...*

My dear Rose,

VR1076/406

In the course of the conversation reported in our telegram No. 2799 of November 19, Francis Russell said he had been startled by the frankness with which Gideon Raphael (who is head of the Arab Affairs section of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs) had spoken of the desperate measures being seriously considered by the Israel Government.

2. One was a plan to send a warship up the Gulf of Aqaba to Elath. When the Egyptian shore batteries opened fire, Israel would regard this as a casus belli, declaring Egypt to have committed an act of aggression. A second was to get rid of Nasser by some means. Raphael had talked of being in touch with certain Egyptian Jews. (Willie Morris tells me he heard a similar story from an American source recently, according to which the Israelis claimed that they were in touch with the Wafd). Eban had also said quite unequivocally in Geneva that it had become a primary objective of Israel policy to push Nasser out.

3. Francis Russell said he had done his best to make Raphael see the folly of these courses. A war, however, successful, would leave Israel further than ever from a settlement. The removal of Nasser, in circumstances which would almost certainly cause it to be attributed to Israel or British or American intrigue, would be a golden opportunity for the Russians and might destroy any hopes of our influencing the Arabs towards a settlement.

4. As you will remember from our telegrams, Russell was explaining the logic by which Mr. Dulles had decided against any specific public endorsement of the Prime Minister's precise words. He has since elaborated the argument in this way. Hitherto, the Israelis, being in possession of what they want and confident of their physical power to hold on to it, have been ready to negotiate, and our chief concern has been to get the Arabs to accept the need for coming to terms. That situation has now been reversed. The Egyptians are no doubt conscious of their improved bargaining position and the Prime Minister's speech seems to have had the valuable effect of breaking down Arab inhibitions about discussing the possibility of a settlement. It is now the Israelis whom we shall have to coax. They are inclined to think that they cannot do business with Nasser, and that they will be negotiating at a disadvantage unless they can restore - or reassert - the balance of armed power. For this reason, when we discussed with him the approach to the Israelis outlined in your telegram No. 5480 of November 19, he thought it better not to reveal too much to the Israelis about the Egyptian Government's readiness to talk. Otherwise the Israelis might be tempted to

I'm glad the Americans see this

we now agree

E.M. Rose, Esq., C.M.G.,
Levant Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W. 1.

/ wreck the

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							



wreck the operation by "blowing" the Egyptian story and forcing the Egyptians to deny it.

5. His main point, however, was that if Mr. Dulles had come out with a specific endorsement of the mention of the 1947 Resolutions as relevant to a settlement, the Israelis might have concluded that a preventive war was their only resource. The implication of this seems to be that the Israelis should continue to think that the United States Government (because Mr. Dulles has not gone beyond his speech of August 26 and publicly used the Prime Minister's blunter language) are more sympathetically disposed than H.M. Government. They will therefore be less ready to feel completely abandoned and look to desperate courses.

6. I think there is something in this reasoning provided Mr. Dulles leaves the Israelis under no illusion that they can have their peace at no price, or that there is any basic difference between the Americans and ourselves. In his present mood Mr. Dulles seems very solid indeed on these points. He has used his speech of August 26 as he said he intended to use it: as a firm statement of United States policy from which the administration is not to be moved by domestic pressures.

7. I am sending copies of this letter to Garvey (Cairo) and to Westlake (Tel Aviv).

Answer
Ronald Bailey
(R. W. Bailey.)

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885			86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

(1074/77/55)



British Embassy,
Jedda.

November 27, 1955. ✓

VR1076/467

Dear Department,

There has still been no official comment here on the Prime Minister's Mansion House speech: as has so often happened in the past, the Saudi reaction is waiting upon the Arab League's.

2. In our telegram No. 321 of November 15 we passed on to you a surprisingly favourable comment made semi-officially on Mecca Radio. As if to redress the balance, the local newspaper "Bilad as Saudiya" has now come out with some sharp criticism of the Prime Minister's speech. The article in which it appears is written by one of the paper's two political commentators and as such purports to be un-official. But since nothing ever appears in the paper which runs counter to the Government's attitude, the article in question can at least be regarded as semi-official.

3. Here is the gist of what it says:

"The most recent proposal for a Palestine settlement was that made by Mr. (sic) Eden in which he was considerate to the Arabs, and referred to the 1947 resolutions of the United Nations: these called for compensation of the refugees and partitioning of Palestine between Jews and Arabs. Eden broadcast his proposals knowing very well that they would be rejected. In fact Israel hastened to do so. Thus the proposals are non-committal since one of the parties has rejected them - and this was the result Eden aimed at.

"He also intended that this action should cover up his Government's recent policies in the south of the Arabian peninsula and in the outlying parts of Saudi Arabia. He made this statement in the knowledge that it was Britain who laid the foundations of Israel in 1917.

"Our reply to all these proposals is to say that the general policy behind them is a negative one. Like every other proposal that has been made, these recent proposals aim to preserve Israel as a state in Palestine. Any proposal of this nature cannot be considered as a positive one that merits further discussion."

Yours ever,

CHANCERY

Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885			86395				
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 150
(1084/58/55)

BRITISH EMBASSY,

TEL AVIV.

The 26th of November, 1956.

Sir,

In my recent telegrams I have reported on the day-to-day developments arising from the Prime Minister's offer of mediation in the Arab-Israel dispute. It may be useful if I now submit a more connected account of the sequence of events and of official and press reactions to Sir Anthony Eden's statement of the 9th of November.

2. On the 10th of November the press published only the briefest account of the speech and there was no editorial comment. In giving the full text to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I asked particularly that their spokesman should be instructed to refrain from comment until I had had an opportunity to expound the Prime Minister's thought to the Israel Government. This, in the absence of Mr. Ben-Gurion at Sde-Boker and of Mr. Sharett in the United States (where he was taking part in a bond-selling campaign) I had arranged to do on the following day through Dr. Eytan, the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry readily acceded to my request and the spokesman refused all requests for comments and guidance from the press. The Ministry had, however, not reckoned with Mr. Sharett who, immediately after his arrival in New York, delivered himself of a forthright condemnation of the Prime Minister's proposals. He deplored the suggestion that a compromise should be sought between the Israel and Arab positions on the ground that it would merely excite the appetites of Arab leaders. He claimed that Israel was under no legal, moral or political compulsion to concede any territory and that the Prime Minister's statement was neither constructive nor helpful to the cause of peace. He nevertheless welcomed, somewhat grudgingly, the Prime Minister's offer of assistance in achieving a settlement of the Arab-Israel problem, but in view of the allegedly preconceived attitude of the United Kingdom on the crucial problem of territorial claims he questioned H.M. Government's suitability as a "disinterested mediator". In the absence of any guidance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the press took their cue from Mr. Sharett and, as I reported in my telegram No. 460 of the 11th of November, the first reactions were accordingly unenthusiastic.

3. When I called on Dr. Eytan on the 11th of November to carry out the instructions in your telegram No. 771 of the 9th of November, I found him disposed to treat the Prime Minister's statement with due seriousness and to seek elucidations rather than pretexts for indignation of the kind expressed by Mr. Sharett. But he stressed the great anxiety that had been caused in Israel by the emphasis placed by Sir Anthony Eden on territorial concessions - an emphasis which was not present in Mr. Dulles' statement of the 26th of August. As reported in my telegram No. 459 of the 11th of November, I sought to

The Right Honourable
Harold Macmillan, M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

/explain to

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885			86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records leaflet						

3.

explain to Dr. Bytan that to achieve any settlement there would have to be negotiations and that negotiations could not be started unless both Israel and the Arab states modified their present rigid attitudes on the question of frontiers. In reply to a question, I informed Dr. Bytan that there were indications that some Arab leaders were now seriously prepared to contemplate the idea of a settlement. Finally, I appealed for helpful and constructive guidance to the press.

4. My appeal was unfortunately disregarded, for comment during the days immediately following my talk with the Director-General became increasingly bitter and critical. When it became apparent that no supporting statement would be immediately forthcoming from the United States Government, the entire weight of condemnation fell upon H.M. Government and, as reports came in of the relatively favourable reception of the speech in the Arab countries, H.M. Government were accused of conducting a policy of appeasement at Israel's expense for their own selfish interests and in order to check Soviet penetration into the Middle East. The word "Munich" appeared repeatedly in editorials and papers of every complexion looked forward to the sharp rejection of all concessions by Mr. Ben-Gurion in a policy statement to the Knesset.

5. In this hostile and unfriendly atmosphere I called on the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, at her request, on the 16th of November. As I reported in my telegram No. 473 of the following day, Mrs. Myerson explained that she wished to inform me of the attitude of the Israel Government towards Sir Anthony Eden's speech before Mr. Ben-Gurion's statement in the Knesset which was scheduled for the same evening. The Israel Government feared that the mere mention of a compromise would encourage the Arab States in their intransigence and that the prospects of a settlement would thereby recede. Israel was prepared to meet the Arab States for peace negotiations at any time, so long as no prior conditions were laid down. But she would not in any circumstances cede territory, and no offer of mediation based on territorial concessions by Israel could possibly be considered.

6. I attempted to convince Mrs. Myerson that Israel could not afford to reject out-of-hand, and without even ascertaining the cost, what might well be the best chance of a settlement since negotiations with King Abdullah were cut short by his assassination. My efforts were, I fear, wasted; for Mr. Ben Gurion's statement to the Knesset later in the evening (the full text of which I enclose) was an outright rejection of any form of compromise and of British mediation. He rejected the idea of the "truncation of the territory of Israel" and declared that it was the considered and determined policy of the Israel Government not to permit anyone "to rob us of a single inch of our land". He repeated his offer to meet any Arab leaders to achieve a mutual settlement. I am told by

/journalists who

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

5.

journalists who were present that the statement, despite its emotional tone and highly-coloured wording, was delivered in a flat voice to an almost apathetic House.

7. As was to be expected, the press next day fully endorsed Mr. Ben-Gurion's remarks which, I have no doubt, enjoyed the firm backing of the great majority of the population. Certainly in unofficial conversations with Israelis, which have happily been free of the rancour expressed in the Press, I have found nothing but support for Mr. Ben-Gurion's views. Nevertheless, had public attention at this stage been distracted from this issue, the hostile atmosphere, which at times reached a near-hysterical level, would, I believe, have been dissipated. Unfortunately, the flames were fed by further pronouncements by Mr. Ben-Gurion - notably in an interview on November 20 with the local correspondent of the London "Observer". He alleged that the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were pursuing like policies in the Middle East, both of which might lead to the destruction of Israel. He was also sharply critical of what he described as the "Arab-British" proposal to revert to the 1947 United Nations resolution on the partition of Palestine. In one breath, therefore, Mr. Ben-Gurion associated B. . . Government with both of Israel's main antagonists and gave a new fillip to the flow of hostile editorial comment. Much tendentious play was also made with Sir Anthony Eden's reply to a supplementary question in the House of Commons on the 22nd of November when he stated that there was nothing about a balance of arms in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. Taken out of its context, this statement was cited as another instance of B. . . Government's hostile attitude towards Israel and signalled as a further retreat from the Tripartite Declaration, which had virtually been rendered invalid by the refusal of B. . . Government to provide Israel with arms to balance the supply of Czech arms to Egypt.

8. Simultaneously with the campaign to impugn British motives and distort British policy, the press has been desperately seeking to satisfy itself and its readers that the U.S. Government does not support the plan for a compromise settlement - at least so far as Israel's boundaries are concerned - and is likely to meet a substantial part of Israel's request for arms. So long as the facts do not belie these comforting beliefs, B.S. Government are likely to remain the villain of the piece. Mr. Dulles' frank discussion with Mr. Sharett in Washington will, however, have helped to remove the illusion, in official circles at least, that there are differences between B.S. Government and the U.S. Government on the steps that must be taken to achieve a settlement, and I think that, perhaps as a result, the anti-British attitude of the press has been somewhat modified in the last few days. It may be, therefore, that the emotions aroused by Sir Anthony Eden's statement are now almost spent and that, in a less highly-charged atmosphere, it may shortly be possible to move towards a more realistic study of the elements of a settlement to which the majority of Israelis aspire.

/I am sending

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

4.

I am sending copies of this despatch (without enclosure) to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Paris, Amman, Cairo, Bagdad, Beirut, Jedda, to the Political Officer, British Middle East Forces, and to the United Kingdom Delegation, New York.

I have the honour to be,

With the highest respect,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

STATE OF ISRAEL
Government Press Office

Translation of a statement by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Mr. David Ben Gurion, in the Knesset (Parliament) in Jerusalem on November 15, 1955, in answer to a question about the proposals of the British Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden.

Question addressed to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence by Mr. Baruch Azania, M.K. (Mapai), on November 14, 1955:

- 1) Has the statement made by the British Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, on November 9th, come to the attention of the Prime Minister?
- 2) Is the Government of Israel prepared to accept the mediation of the British Prime Minister on the basis of the conditions set out in his statement?
- 3) Does the Prime Minister not believe that Sir Anthony Eden's statement is likely to encourage Arab aggression and that the Government of Israel should therefore make an authoritative and precise statement on its position?

Answer by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Mr. David Ben Gurion, as delivered in the Knesset on Tuesday, November 15, 1955:

I have read the statement made by the British Prime Minister on November 9, with the serious attention it deserves and regret that its main contents are in complete contradiction to its declared objective. His proposal to truncate the territory of Israel for the benefit of its neighbours has no legal, moral or logical basis and cannot be considered. Instead of fostering better relations and bringing peace nearer, it is likely to encourage and intensify Arab aggression and to lessen the likelihood of peace in the Middle East.

Sir Anthony Eden has levelled criticism at the Soviet Government, which has decided, as he put it, "to inject into this delicate situation a new element of danger and to deliver weapons of war, tanks, aeroplanes, even submarines to one side only".

He asserted that it is "impossible to reconcile this Soviet action with protestations that they wish to end the cold war in the new spirit of Geneva".

It is astonishing, on the other hand, that the British Prime Minister should defend Egypt's part in this "transaction", the transaction of which Sir Anthony Eden says that "it is fantastic to pretend that this deliberate act of policy was an innocent commercial transaction". It is even more disquieting that Sir Anthony Eden deliberately ignores the grave danger which the supply of weapons of war "to one side only" involves for Israel.

The British Prime Minister contends in his speech that the main responsibility rests on the suppliers and not on the recipients, as if the purchasers of the arms had bought them for decorative purposes only. Does not the British Prime Minister know as well as I do for what purposes these arms are intended in Egypt? Sir Anthony Eden, who places the responsibility on the suppliers, has apparently forgotten that for a long time his government too had been supplying arms "to one side only" -- and there is no indication in his statement that it will not do so again in the future.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885				86395		
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

The British Prime Minister is rightly concerned at the increase of tension in the Middle East, particularly between Egypt and Israel, although he passes over in silence the danger involved for Israel in Egyptian arms superiority, and he points out that "the hostility between Israel and her Arab neighbours is unreconciled. Here time has proved no healer". Sir Anthony Eden did not see fit to point out that Israel, which was the victim of aggression in 1948, harboured no hostility towards her neighbours after the end of the fighting, and stretched out her hand for peace -- and that hand is still outstretched. But the British Prime Minister did single out Israel in his proposals for peace between the two sides: Israel must cede some of its territory to its neighbours, and this proposal is what Sir Anthony Eden calls a "compromise between these two (the Israel and Arab) positions". And why does the British Prime Minister use the word "compromise" to describe the truncation of Israel's territory? Because the Arab states, according to him, take their stand on the United Nations resolution of November 29, 1947 and Sir Anthony Eden declares that "it is not right, I agree, that United Nations resolutions should be ignored". But since Israel takes her stand, according to Sir Anthony on the frontiers set out in the Armistice Agreements of 1949, it is necessary to find a compromise between these two frontiers: to cut off part of the "excess" territory of Israel and hand it over to the neighbouring states.

I believe that Sir Anthony Eden's definition of the "innocent commercial transaction" can be applied with a greater measure of force and truth to this "innocent" compromise.

The British Prime Minister ignore in his so-called compromise proposal a series of basic historical and political facts, of which it is quite inconceivable that he, as a man who has headed the British Foreign Office for many years, could fail to be aware.

1) History does not begin with the United Nations General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947. The Jewish people will always remember and remember in gratitude and esteem -- that thirty years before the United Nations General Assembly, the British Government, under the leadership of Lloyd George and Balfour, and with active cooperation of the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, acknowledged the historical connection between the Jewish people and the land of Israel. And this connection did not come into existence as a result of that declaration; the opposite was the case. This connection was in existence throughout the generations, and we live in our land as of right and not as on sufferance. A State of Israel was in existence in this country in a period when human history knew nothing of the existence of America or Britain. And Jerusalem was the capital of Israel when the world was unaware of the existence of London, Moscow or Paris.

2) The British Government was the only non-Arab state which declared at the United Nations General Assembly as early as September 26, 1947 that she would not implement the United Nations Resolutions on the Palestine problem. The British Government acted according to this declaration, thereby encouraging, directly or indirectly, the armed opposition of the Arab states to these resolutions. It refused to hand over the administration of Palestine during the transition period to the U.N. commission, and abandoned the country to chaos. Only the establishment of the Government of Israel on May 14, 1948, eight hours before the British withdrawal, saved the Jewish community from annihilation and the country as a whole from ruin.

3) The Arab states -- Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan and Saudi Arabia -- which, according to Sir Anthony Eden, take their stand on the U.N. Resolutions of November 29, 1947 -- did not content themselves with public pronouncements about their disagreement with and opposition to the U.N. Resolutions; they invaded the country with their armies immediately after the departure of the Mandatory Government and engaged in a war of annihilation against that State of Israel, the re-establishment of which had been decided upon by more than two-thirds of the members of the United Nations.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

- 3 -

The United Kingdom and the other member states of the United Nations then did not raise a finger to save the young state and its small people (which then numbered only about 650,000 souls). Moreover, British officers, who then headed the Arab Legion, and British arms in Egypt, Iraq and the other Arab countries, played a considerable and predominating part in the shelling of Jerusalem, and would have destroyed it but for the supreme heroism of its Jewish inhabitants and the devotion of our sons and daughters who successfully repelled the attacks of the invaders, though not without the loss of precious and irreplaceable lives.

The invasion of the Arab states has made all the U.N. resolutions on Palestine null and void. They cannot be brought back to life anymore than can the thousands of Jewish defenders who gave their lives for the salvation of their people and the renewal of its freedom.

4) The U.N. General Assembly never decided to do what Sir Anthony Eden now proposes -- to increase the areas of the neighbouring states (Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Syria and Lebanon) at the expense of the land of Israel. This is a fantastic suggestion, which did not enter anybody's mind at the U.N. General Assembly. According to the U.N. resolution not a single inch of Palestine territory was to be handed over to the neighbouring states. Sir Anthony Eden's proposals, in effect, amount to the dismemberment of the State of Israel and the grant of a reward to the Arab aggressors of 1948.

The only state in the Middle East entitled to redress for the criminal attack of the Arab states in 1948 is the State of Israel. Israel was attacked by her neighbours. Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia were the aggressors, and these countries still continue their war against Israel by other means: boycott, blockade and the organization of bands of saboteurs and murderers who are sent from time to time into Israel territory. This fact of aggression against Israel by the Arab states is still fresh in the memory of our generation all over the world.

The fact that is in contradiction to the U.N. resolution is the presence of the Egyptian army in the Gaza strip.

The second fact that is in contradiction to the U.N. resolutions is the annexation by the Trans-Jordan Government of a considerable part of western Palestine -- the Old City of Jerusalem, Hebron, Nablus, etc. The British Government, and I believe only the British Government, recognized this annexation in April 1950, completely ignoring the U.N. resolutions. If Sir Anthony Eden does not consider that the Armistice Agreements of 1949 are binding upon both sides, and if he is correct in his contention that it is not right that U.N. resolutions should be ignored, then Egypt should immediately leave the Gaza strip and Trans-Jordan should evacuate all western Palestine.

When I presented the new Government to the Knesset on November 2nd, a fortnight ago, I announced that "we do not covet a single inch of foreign soil. But as long as we live we will not permit anyone to rob us of a single inch of our land".

This is the considered and determined policy of the Government of Israel. Accordingly we do not see in Sir Anthony Eden's proposal a way for the resolution of the conflict in the Middle East but a factor making for its intensification.

My proposal for a direct meeting with any of the Arab rulers in order to achieve a mutual settlement, without any prior conditions, which I announced a fortnight ago in the Knesset, still stands. There is room for local frontier rectifications agreeable and beneficial for both sides, carried out as a result of mutual agreement. But the British Prime Minister's proposals for the truncation of the territory of Israel, means giving a reward to the aggressors. The Government of Israel will not conduct any negotiations on this basis.

SECRET

FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

VR 1076/409

DEPARTMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Nicholls

No. 503
November 30, 1955

D. 4.06 p.m. November 30, 1955
R. 4.33 p.m. November 30, 1955

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 503 of
November 30.

Repeated for information to Cairo
and Saving to Washington.

My telegram No. 9 Saving paragraph 2: Palestine.

This sort of misrepresentation is annoying, but from the local point of view I see no particular virtue in attempting to correct it or even in reproaching the Israeli Government. If words help to allay nervous tension here that is all to the good. It may also be useful in Cairo as helping to convince Nasser that we are indeed preserving maximum secrecy.

2. Continued pretence that United States Government is not with us will as I suggested in my telegram No. 492 make difficulties for the Israeli Government in the end. But there is some force in State Department's argument reported in Washington telegram No. 2799 and now that the Israeli Government (or at any rate some members of it) know what the State Department's position is I do not think we need worry unduly if, for the present, they go on trying to deceive their own public opinion.

VR 1076/401E

Foreign Office pass Cairo and Saving to Washington as my telegrams Nos. 182 and 100 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo and Saving to Washington]

DISTRIBUTED TO:
Levant Department

F F F F



VR1076
471

TOP SECRET

ALPHA

The United States Embassy have shown me Mr. Byroade's telegram reporting his conversation with Colonel Nasser to which Cairo telegram No. 1802 of November 27 refers.

VR1076/4476

2. Mr. Byroade read to Nasser his account of the conversation between Dr. Fawzi, Sir H. Trevelyan and himself at the dinner party in Cairo on November 15. He did not mention the impression which both Ambassadors derived from the discussion, that the Egyptians might not be entirely unyielding on the question of Israeli access to Elath; but otherwise he read his account of the conversation sentence by sentence. Nasser agreed that it reflected his own views accurately, except on the repatriation of refugees.

3. Nasser agreed that the majority of refugees would not wish to return to their homes in Israel when they realised that they would have to be Israeli citizens and reflected on the condition of the Arab citizens of Israel. He thought however that it would be very difficult for an Arab leader to take up a position which deprived the refugees of their right to return to their homes. The refugees should therefore make their own decision. He wondered whether some agency, for example UNRWA, could not make an impartial enquiry into the wishes of the refugees so as to get both the Arab States and Israel out of their present difficulty in this matter.

4. On this point Mr. Byroade replied that a poll such as Nasser seemed to be suggesting would probably show as wishing to return a large number of refugees who would not in fact desire to do so if they had to make a real choice and stick by it.

G.G. Arthur

G.G. Arthur
(November 28, 1955)

F.L. Rose 28/11
xi

(S)
29/11

Confidential.

VR 1076/472
Minutes.

VR 1076 V

Mr. Arthur Henderson is to ask a question in the House this afternoon about Israeli readiness to enter into negotiations with the Arab States. One of the Supplementary questions may be whether the Arabs are willing to negotiate at all.

2. I suggest that in reply to this Supplementary the Prime Minister might refer to the Reuter report of November 25 from New York, according to which the Deputy Foreign Minister of Egypt had said that Egypt would accept mediation in the Palestine dispute by a third party negotiating separately with the Arabs and Israel.

3. Nasser has now spoken to H.M. Ambassador in Cairo about these remarks of his Deputy Foreign Minister. It appears that the Egyptians are being attacked for their alleged readiness to negotiate, and Nasser is thinking of making a statement to disavow Khairat Said's words.

4. In the circumstances it would clearly be better not to refer to Khairat Said's statement in the House. By doing so we should tempt Nasser to disown him (which we want to avoid if possible) and risk an accusation of folly in that we trusted the word of the Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister.

5. I suggest therefore that the reply to this particular Supplementary should be amended to read as follows:-

A "Their present attitude towards indirect negotiations is more encouraging that it has been in the past. No Arab leader has rejected the idea, and it seems to be gaining ground in the Press."

I should like to add something like this:-

"I do not want to say anything which will hinder these favourable developments."

G. G. Arthur

G.G. Arthur
(November 29, 1955)

Mr. Rose. (I have spoken to Mr. Rose).

* The Times today carries a confused statement by Nasser which is obviously meant to undo some of the damage he regards Khairat Said has having done. For Nasser, the statement is not too bad; but it emphasises the need to avoid making Khairat Said's words the centre of controversy.

Cairo tel 1813.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

I see that this was finally taken as a written question on 29/11.

Mr. Rae

VR 1076/472A
Parliamentary Question

Levant
 ✓

*108 Mr. Arthur Henderson: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, what information is in the possession of Her Majesty's Government indicating the willingness or otherwise of the Government of Israel to enter into direct talks with her Arab neighbours.

LA. Rowley Regis.

Rev. add. P.M.

TRANSF: 29 Nov 1955

ANSWERED NOV 1955
 REPLY ATTACHED

108. Mr. A. Henderson asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what information is in the possession of Her Majesty's Government indicating the willingness or otherwise of the Government of Israel to enter into direct talks with her Arab neighbours.

Mr. Turton: The Government of Israel have often stated publicly that they are willing to enter into direct talks with their Arab neighbours.

(193)

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref. FO 371/115885				86395			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

Levant.

Parliamentary Question

*¹⁰⁸ Mr. Arthur Henderson: To ask the Prime Minister, what information is in the possession of Her Majesty's Government indicating the willingness or otherwise of the Government of Israel to enter into direct talks with her Arab neighbours.

LA. Rowley Regis

29 NOV 1955

F.O. HAVE AGREED TO TAKE


Mr. Henderson must know perfectly well that the Israelis have always stood out for direct negotiations with the Arabs. The latest occasion on which this was solemnly and publicly announced was on November 2, when Mr. Ben Gurion, in a speech to the Knesset, said "I am prepared to meet with the Prime Minister of Egypt and with every other Arab ruler as soon as possible in order to achieve a mutual settlement, without any prior conditions".

2. Mr. Henderson's question must therefore be designed to lead on to a comparison between the Israel acceptance and the Arab refusal of direct negotiations without conditions. The most recent public reaffirmation of the Arab refusal to entertain direct negotiations was made by the Lebanese Foreign Minister in a speech to the


/Foreign

Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies on November 18.

3. I attach a draft reply.



(E.M. Rose)
November 28, 1955.



2/11

DRAFT REPLY TO
PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION
BY MR. ARTHUR HENDERSON
ON NOVEMBER 29, 1955

The Government of Israel have often stated publicly that they are willing to enter into direct talks with their Arab neighbours.

*Ref
28/xi*

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES

1. In reply to a similar question about the Arab States:-

The Arab States say that they are not willing to negotiate directly with Israel in present circumstances.

2. Are the Arab States willing to negotiate at all?

There is some evidence that the Arabs may be willing to discuss a settlement in certain circumstances. According to reports from New York the Deputy Foreign Minister of Egypt has said that his country would be prepared to talk about a settlement through third parties. This is a most encouraging development.

3. If an attempt is made to contrast the Arab and Israel attitudes to direct negotiations:-

Both sides sorely need a settlement of the Palestine affair. Israel in particular needs peace and says she desires peace.

/If

*AM
28/xi*

*Insert A of attached
minutes*

1)	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115885						86395	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

If one side refuses direct negotiations, it is no good simply deploring the fact or hoping to use it to score debating points. It would be better to look for some alternative way of approaching a settlement.

Registry
No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft.
REPLY TO
PARLIAMENTARY
QUESTION
by
MR. CHAPMAN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

I have nothing to add to the replies which I gave to the Right Honourable Member for Easington and the Hon. Member for Gorton on November 24.

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES

If it is alleged that in a compromise settlement the Israelis would be ceding actual territory whilst the Arabs would only be giving up claims: As I told the House before, I ~~said~~ ^{believe} that both sides would have to make concessions. Territory is not the only thing involved. In any settlement now possible many of the Arab refugees would have to give up the hope of returning to their homes.

But it does not help to be legalistic.

A settlement would be of such benefit to Israel that I am sure that any sacrifice she might be prepared to make to get one would be worth while. It would mean that her neighbours accepted her existence and it would bring the end of the Arab blockade and of the crushing burden of armaments, and the beginning of real security and prosperity for her people.

N.P.

25/11

Minutes

V

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN ^{ps}
Cutting dated 26 NOV 195

EGYPT'S READY FOR
NEGOTIATION

"We Are Ready for Negotiation"

New York, Nov. 25.—Egypt's deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Ahmad Khariq Said, intimated today that Egypt would be prepared to accept mediation in the Suez Canal dispute by a third party negotiating separately with the Government of Israel.

Harold, the United Nations Correspondents' Association, said Egypt was interested in securing an honourable peace on the basis of a solution of the main issues. "We are seeking peace," he said, "and I would like to emphasize that we are seeking it from whatever quarter it comes."

Asked whether he envisaged the negotiation of a third party, such as Britain, being conducted separately with Israel and Israel or at a round-table conference, the Minister said that the first alternative might be "more suitable to the present situation." Asked whether he thought the Arab States were sufficiently united to be dealt with collectively by a third party, he replied: "Yes, I am sure of it."—Reuter.