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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

Sir R. Makins

VR 1076/365

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

No: 2742
November 11, 1955

D. 6.13 p.m. November 11, 1955
R. 6.30 p.m. November 11, 1955

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.2742 of November 11.
Repeated for information to Codel Geneva,

And saving to Cairo,	Damascus,
Tel Aviv,	Ankara,
Bagdad,	Beirut
Amman,	P.O.M.E.F.
Jedda,	Paris.

Prime Minister's speech of November 9: American Press Comment.

The Prime Minister's speech of November 9 has commanded very close attention, described as "unusually forceful". The tone of the speech has attracted comment on the lines of "in a mood of rare anger Eden assails Soviet actions" and as Jacobs (Baltimore Sun) said "for Eden this was tough talk; his twenty-year polish as a diplomat has seldom permitted him such an open rebuke to a nation not at war".

2. Although the New York Times saw "no new policy involved" in the Prime Minister's and President Eisenhower's "portentous" statements of November 9 the timing is regarded as being no accident, "the two countries and their respective leaders took the initiative which was characteristic of each". Said the New York Herald Tribune "in London Mr. Eden was applying his own unique and highly developed talent to the crisis". Both papers welcomed evidence that "The United States and Britain are working together and with firmness and a willingness to act".

3. Ronan (New York Times from London) said with other correspondents "Britain's offer of mediation represents a major step forward in British policy and reflects the intense anxiety that Britain feels about the possibility of a full-scale war in the Middle East".

/4.

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Washington telegram No. 2742 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

4. A number of papers quoted Mr. Sharett, who arrived at New York on November 10 as saying "The (Prime Minister's) suggestion didn't strike me as constructive or helpful to the cause of peace". Mr. Sharett is reported to have welcomed Her Majesty's Government's "offer of mediation" but to have said that "Britain's preconceived attitude on the crucial question of territorial claims was not conducive to her acceptance as a disinterested mediator".

Please pass to Codel Geneva and Saving to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Bagdad, Amman, Damascus, Ankara, Beirut, Jedda, P.O.M.E.F. and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 37, 38, 46, 27, 28, 25, 42, 27, 27, 78 and 527 respectively.

[Repeated to Codel Geneva and Saving to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Bagdad, Amman, Damascus, Ankara, Beirut, Jedda, P.O.M.E.F. and Paris].

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Private Secretary
Sir H. Caccia
Mr. Shuckburgh
Head Levant Department
Resident Clerk

XXXXX

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

VR1076/346

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Makins
No. 2747
November 11, 1955

D. 8.50 p.m. November 11, 1955
R. 12.28 a.m. November 12, 1955

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2747 of November 11
Repeated for information to Cairo

Damascus
Tel Aviv
Amman
Bagdad
Beirut
Jerusalem

Your telegram No. 5310: Palestine.

Today's New York Times reports that on arrival in New York yesterday Mr. Sharett, commenting on Prime Minister's suggestion that Britain should mediate on Palestine, said he was "disconcerted by the reference to the need for a compromise" on the territorial phase of the dispute. Israel was under "no moral or political compulsion to concede any territorial sovereignty". He said "The Eden suggestion didn't strike me as constructive or helpful to the cause of peace". He deeply deplored the suggestion of compromise because it would excite the appetites of the Arabs and encourage them in their illusions instead of breeding a realistic spirit and acceptance of the facts. He welcomed Prime Minister's offer, but Britain's preconceived attitude on crucial question of territorial claims was not conducive to her acceptance as a "disinterested mediator".

2. His nation had no desire for more territory. At the end of hostilities in Palestine Jordan gained territory, Egypt got the Gaza Strip, Syria and Lebanon lost nothing. It was as fantastic to suggest that Israel should buy peace at the price of her territorial integrity as to suggest that Egypt or Syria or Lebanon should give up territory.

3. He said he did not wish to convey the idea of absolute rigidity in territorial lines: minor adjustments were possible in the mutual interests of the parties.

NOV 1955
12 4 11 PM '55
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Washington telegram No. 2747 to Foreign Office

-2-

4. His nation's chief concern was problem of security; need for defensive weapons was most compelling and he hoped United States would respond to Israel's appeal. He welcomed that part of President Eisenhower's statement that said the United States would consider requests for arms for "legitimate" self defence. If Israel were driven into tight corner she would seek arms from any source, but he denied knowledge of any Soviet offer of arms to Israel.

5. United States role in Middle East, he said, should be "to see to it that two things are not upset: present territorial status and existing balance of military power". He also suggested economic aid "not merely to Israel, but also to other needy nations in Middle East".

6. New York Times repeats the story, denied by State Department on November 8, that United States Government had announced its willingness to sell "significant quantities" of arms to Israel.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Bagdad, Damascus, Beirut and Jerusalem as my telegrams Nos. 97, 49, 26, 67, 25, 26 and 10 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Bagdad, Damascus, Beirut and Jerusalem]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Private Secretary

Sir H. Gaccia

Mr. Shuckburgh

Head of Levant Department

bbbbb

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

R1076/347

Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 1699
November 11, 1955

D. 8.10 p.m. November 11, 1955
R. 8.51 p.m. November 11, 1955

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1699 of November 11
Repeated for information saying to:

Tel Aviv	Jedda
Beirut	Tripoli
Bagdad	Benghazi
Damascus	Ankara
Washington	Jerusalem
Paris	P.O.M.E.F.
U.K. Del. New York	Moscow

Your telegram No. 2595: Prime Minister's Speech.

All papers today report Prime Minister's speech of November 9. Gomhouria and Ahran seized on statement that the United Nations resolutions of 1947 should not be ignored and slur over the idea of a compromise solution between these and the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Akhar alone of the Arabic language papers brings out adequately these points.

2. Only editorial comment so far appeared in semi official Gomhouria under the headline "Eden's assurances are of no use" and made following points

(a) Eden had said that Egyptian-Czech arms deal was political matter, not commercial as Nasser asserted. Facts and logic had proved Nasser right.

(b) Eden had blamed Russia for sending arms to Egypt and Arab Powers and not sending them to Israel, thereby creating threat to peace by arming one side only. British Prime Minister should reconsider this remark considering that

(i) Official documents revealed by Nasser proved that France, Britain and America had sent quantities of weapons to Israel.

(ii) Official American bodies had announced that they had supplied, were supplying and would supply arms to Israel, also that they would not supply arms to Egypt. British Prime Minister should realise that /Israel had

NOV 11 1955

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Cairo telegram No. 1692 to Foreign Office

-2-

Israel had been armed while the Arabs had not and no-one had described this as a threat to peace, though it was in fact. Eden had said nothing until Egypt in despair had turned to the Eastern Powers for arms.

(c) Eden had said that Britain and United States were ready to give official assurances for preserving peace in the Middle East if Arab States and Israel reached agreement. Author did not understand what official assurances these Powers could put forward which would be better in any way than United Nations' decisions which Israel scorned. Statesmen of East and West who wanted peace and stability in Middle East should ask Israel to carry out United Nations' resolutions.

(d) British Prime Minister's speech was part of artificial uproar recently raised by Western Statesmen because of their wrath at Arab States completely independent policy.

3. Gemhouria also published reported attack by Tass on Prime Minister's speech in which Tass alleged that Prime Minister was trying to terrorise the Arab countries which followed a policy independent of the West.

4. Ahran reported that Israeli Embassy in London had announced that Israel would not agree to negotiate on basis of 1947 resolutions.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, U.K. Del. New York, Tripoli, Benghazi, Ankara and Moscow as my telegram 133, 186, 232, 81, 89, 80, 68 and 45 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, U.K. Del. New York, Tripoli, Benghazi, Ankara and Moscow]

bbbb

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

R1076/28

Sir M. Wright

No. 887

D:2.01 p.m. November 12, 1955

November 12, 1955

R:2.24 p.m. November 12, 1955

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 887 of
November 12

Repeated for information to: Codal Geneva
Cairo
Washington
Tel Aviv
Your telegram No. 1550: Israel.



I have spoken to Nuri in the sense of your message. He was gratified by reference to the Pact in the Prime Minister's speech on November 9. He asked me to assure you that Iraq will give full support to a search for an expeditious solution and secondly that he will most certainly not (repeat not) exploit against Nasser any move which the latter makes in this direction. On the contrary he will give him any help he can. He would be glad that Nasser should be assured of this. (I assume we can avoid any risk of Nasser trying to discredit Nuri by saying to the others that Iraq is pressing him to betray the Arab interests).

2. Nuri added that he understood all were examining the speech with interest.

3. I must add Nuri is clearly thinking, at least at this stage, of support behind the scenes. I doubt whether he could afford to make any public statement when he is already under fire from Egypt and Saudi Arabia on other issues.

Foreign Office pass Priority to Codal Geneva, Cairo and Washington as my telegrams 8, 119 and 125 respectively.

[Repeated to Codal Geneva, Cairo and Washington]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Sir H. Canvia
Mr. Shuckburgh

Private Secretary
Head of Levant Department
Resident Clerk

2222

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FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir M. Wright

No. 889

D:3.05 p.m. November 13, 1955

November 12, 1955

R:3.47 p.m. November 13, 1955

MANDATE

R1076/349

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 889 of
November 12

Repeated for information saying to: Cairo Amman
Damascus Beirut
Tel Aviv Ankara

The Prime Minister's reference in Mansion House speech to the need for compromise in the Arab/Israeli dispute has provoked the customary reaction in the Bagdad Press.

2. Al Hawadith denies that the Arabs will ever agree to a settlement which leaves Israel in possession of part of the Arab homeland. The declared aim of the Zionists, is to establish an Empire from Nile to Euphrates. The war of annihilation between the Arab and the Jews is therefore sooner or later inevitable.
3. Al Hurriyah says that Britain and America, by objecting to the efforts of the Arabs to arm themselves, have shown their partiality for Israel. This is, therefore, no time to resuscitate the Dulles proposals.
4. Al Bidad attributes the deterioration in the Middle-East situation during the past year to the Western policy of favouring Israel with arms and money while pretending to maintain an equilibrium. In appealing for a compromise Sir Anthony Eden was clearly thinking of the interests of Israel which is an Anglo-American creation.
5. Al Akhbar says that if the Arabs now agreed to relinquish their stand on the United Nations Resolution of 1947 no one could have any further confidence in international organisation. Britain has too many interests in the Middle-East to be acceptable as mediator in this dispute.

222222



SECRET

VR1076
350

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET (CABINET)
DISTRIBUTION

R1076/350

Sir H. Trevelyan

No. 1708

November 12, 1955

D. 10.29 p.m. November 12, 1955

R. 11.52 p.m. November 12, 1955



PRIORITY

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1708 of November 12.

Repeated for information to Washington Bagdad P.O.M.E.F.

Codel Geneva Tel Aviv

My telegram No. 1693: Palestine.

VR1076/338G

I spoke to Nasser today, on the lines of your telegrams Nos. 2587 and 740 to Amman. He replied as follows.

2. He welcomed the Prime Minister's speech, which was the first constructive declaration from the British side since the end of the Palestine war. He had made a statement on these lines to Barber of the News Chronicle. He had told the Egyptian Press to comment favourably on the speech, and in particular to stress the reports of Israeli objections to it. The Israelis were now adopting Russian tactics of smiling and talking about peace, and he had to do the same, but he sincerely wanted peace.

3. He had spoken in favour of the Prime Minister's remarks to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, the Syrian Prime Minister and the Lebanese Foreign Minister, but it was always possible that Nuri would attack him for favouring a settlement. The Syrian paper, Nas, edited by Mohsin el Barazi (?), which was paid for by Nuri and expressed Nuri's point of view, had in the last few days attacked him for favouring a settlement with Israel. He did not worry, but many of his people did. I asked him whether he would like us to get from Nuri an assurance that Nuri would not attack him for any steps which he took in cooperation with us towards a settlement with Israel. I thought that we could get such an assurance, and we should not, of course, put it to Nuri as a request from him. He said that it would be useful for him to have this.

4. We then

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SECRET

Cairo telegram No. 1708 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

4. We then discussed methods of procedure. At first he said that we should discuss this matter simultaneously with the other Arab States. Otherwise Egypt might find herself in an awkward position with them. I told him that his Minister for Foreign Affairs had advised me that we should discuss it at first with the Egyptians alone. He said that he would have to discuss this with his Minister. It might be advisable for us to discuss it with them alone in the initial stages, in view of the probability of leaks if simultaneous discussions were going on in all the Arab capitals. In Syria particularly, no secret was ever kept. He quite agreed that my American colleague and I should take the discussion further with the Minister for Foreign Affairs at dinner on the 16th, and that the Minister should be kept in on this. He clearly contemplated, however, that I and my American colleague should take the discussions further with him personally, preferably separately in a way which would not attract attention. He thought that it would be better to make no further public references to discussions being held on this question, as there were plenty of people who would take every opportunity to sabotage them. He could not discuss the matter directly with the Israelis.

5. I assured him that we and the Americans were at one on this question, but he suggested that Zionist influence was affecting American policy. For instance, our spokesman had blamed the Israelis for the Sabha attack, whereas the Americans had blamed both sides. He showed that he was at last beginning to understand the dangers of an arms race resulting from his latest arms deal. He seemed to fear that the Israelis would succeed in buying substantial quantities of arms from the United States. He would then have to buy more arms, which he could not afford, tensions would mount, and there would be an explosion. I said that I would not go into the past, but that the only sure way to prevent an explosion was to settle the Israeli question.

6. I said that I was glad to be able to communicate to you his positive reaction to the Prime Minister's statement and your message.

7. I hope that I may now have instructions to open discussions here on the nature of a settlement, and that it can be left to the discretion of my American colleague and myself how we carry on the discussions here.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Codel Geneva, Bagdad and Tel Aviv as my telegrams Nos. 213, 4, 156, 165 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Codel Geneva, Bagdad and Tel Aviv.]

T T T

SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO GENEVA (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS)

CYPHER/OTP

RESTRICTED DELEGATION DISTRIBUTION

Codel No 444

R. 8.30. a.m. November 13, 1955.

November 13, 1955

SECRET

VR1076/SSO

action already taken on the B. Ad tel about A to Geneva? SAC 8/11

1. SIR IVONE KIRKPATRICK
2. Mr. [unclear]
3. [unclear]
4. [unclear]
- 5.

Following received from Cairo

Begins:

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1693, 700 31 November 1955

Repeated for information to: Washington
 Codel Geneva
 Bagdad
 Tel Aviv
 POMEF

I have repeated to Geneva. 8/11 15

My telegram No. 1693: Palestine (Foreign Office to Codel 414) xi

I spoke to Nasser today on the lines of your telegrams Nos 2587 (Foreign Office to Codel 341) and 740 (Foreign Office to Codel 340) to Amman.

He replied as follows.

2. He welcomed the Prime Minister's speech, which was the first constructive declaration from the British side since the end of the Palestine war. He had made a statement on these lines to Barber of the News Chronicle. He had told the Egyptian Press to comment favourably on the speech, and, in particular, to stress the reports of Israeli objections to it. The Israelis were now adopting Russian tactics of smiling and talking about peace and he had to do the same, but he sincerely wanted peace.

3. He had spoken in favour of the Prime Minister's remarks to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, the Syrian Prime Minister and the Lebanese Foreign Minister, but it was always possible that Nuri would attack him for favouring a settlement. The Syrian paper, was edited by Mohsin El Barazi (?), which was paid for by Nuri and expressed Nuri's point of view, had in the last few days attacked him for favouring a settlement with Israel. He did not worry, but many of his people did. I asked him whether he would like us to get from Nuri an assurance that Nuri would not attack him for any steps which he took in co-operation with us towards a settlement with Israel. I thought that we could get such an assurance, and we should not, of course, put it to Nuri as a request from him. He said that it would be useful for him to have this.

4. We then discussed methods of procedure. At first, he said that we should discuss this matter simultaneously with the other Arab States. Otherwise Egypt might find herself in an awkward position with them. I told him that his Minister for Foreign Affairs had advised me that we should discuss it at first with the Egyptians alone. He said he would have to discuss this with his Minister. It might be advisable for us to discuss it with them alone in the initial stages, in view of the probability of leaks if simultaneous

/discussions...

SECRET

- 2 -

From Foreign Office telegram No. 444 to Geneva

Discussions were going on in all the Arab capitals. In Syria, particularly, no secret was ever kept. He quite agreed that my American colleague and I should take the discussion further with the Minister for Foreign Affairs at dinner on the 16th, and that the Minister should be kept in on this. He clearly contemplated, however, that I and my American colleague should take the discussions further with him personally, preferably separately, in a way which would not attract attention. He thought that it would be better to make no further public reference to discussions being held on this question, as there were plenty of people who would take every opportunity to sabotage them. He could not discuss the matter directly with the Israelis.

5. I assured him that we and the Americans were as one on this question, but he suggested that Zionist influence was affecting American policy. For instance, our spokesman had blamed the Israelis for the Sabha attack, whereas the Americans had blamed both sides. He showed that he was at last beginning to understand the dangers of an arms race resulting from his latest arms deal. He seemed to fear that the Israelis would succeed in buying substantial quantities of arms from the U.S. He would then have to buy more arms, which he could not afford, tension would mount, and there would be an explosion. I said that I would not go into the past, but that the only sure way to prevent an explosion was to settle the Israelis question.

6. I said that I was glad to be able to communicate to you his positive reaction to the Prime Minister's statement and your message.

7. I hope that I may now have instructions to open discussions here on the nature of a settlement, and that it can be left to the discretion of my American colleague and myself how we carry on the discussions here.

Foreign Office pass to Codel Geneva as my telegram No. 4.

*There are no instructions
to a settlement here
A. R. B.
What action is proposed?
BR*

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

21076/351

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan

No: 1709
November 12, 1955.

D. 11.59 p.m. November 12, 1955.

R. 5.12 a.m. November 13, 1955.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1709 of
November 12.

Repeated for information Saving to Tel Aviv, U.K. Del New York
Beirut,
Bagdad,
Damascus,
Washington,
Paris,
U.K. Del. New York
Jedda,
Tripoli,
Benghazi,
Jerusalem,
P.O.M.E.F.



✓ 21076/347

My telegram No. 1699.

All papers today commented on Prime Minister's speech. Akhbar El Yom described the anger of Israel and her supporters at reference to 1947 Resolutions which Israel had always scorned. Manchester Guardian, Spectator and Jewish Chronicle were quoted as expressing Israel's consternation. Reaction in Tel Aviv should make Western statesmen realise that Israel was not a legal State, but a gang of armed thieves for whose capture householders must be armed. Another Akhbar El Yom article thanked the Prime Minister for compelling Israel to reveal its true colours.

2. Ahram welcomed reference to 1947 Resolutions as indicating that British policy had taken step towards accurate gauging of Middle Eastern situation. The Prime Minister ought, however, to have depicted his appeal to United Nations instead of calling for direct Arab-Israel negotiations which he knew /Arabs could

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Cairo telegram No: 1709 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

Arabs could only refuse. Israel had quickly opposed the proposals on ground that 1947 Resolutions conflicted with present borders. She would not have dared to adopt this attitude in face of resolute General Assembly determined to execute its resolutions. United States had so far kept silent. Her position clearly remained as it was when Dulles made proposals of August 26, without referring to 1947 resolutions. Israel had said that she would not concede any territory nor did she covet any. However, only territory she possessed had been usurped from rightful Arab owners.

3. Gemhouria sought to explain Israeli opposition. 1947 partition proposals had been opposed by Arabs. Israel had ignored them and gone far beyond boundaries laid down therein. United Nations had been expected to prevent this, but had not done so. This state of affairs had lasted until Dulles' proposals, of which the best that could be said was that they provided a means for Israel to justify her breach of United Nations resolutions. America had also spoilt Israel and encouraged her in disobedience. This was why Sharett disapproved Eden's call to respect partition resolutions.

4. Press reported Foreign Office announcement expressing regret at uncompromising Israeli attitude.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, U.K. Del New York, Tripoli, Benghazi and Ankara as my telegrams Nos. 134, 187, 233, 82, 90, 81 and 69 respectively.

[Repeated to Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, U.K. Del New York, Tripoli, Benghazi, and Ankara.]

X X X X

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM TEHRAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cyphar/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE AND

Mr. Tichener

R1076/393

WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

No. 845
November 12, 1955

D. 3.05 p.m. November 12, 1955
R. 3.25 p.m. November 12, 1955

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 845 of November 12.
Repeated for information to Bagdad

	Amman
Cairo	Jedda
Damascus	Tripoli
Tel Aviv	
and Saving to Ankara	Paris.

Your telegram No. 1640 to Ankara, Palestine.

Jordanian Minister here who spoke enthusiastically about the Prime Minister's Mansion House speech said to me today that it was imperative that British initiative should not be jeopardised by delay in following it up. He suggested that Her Majesty's Government should make an immediate approach to the Iraqi Prime Minister, pressing him to come out publicly and at once in support of a settlement on the lines suggested by Sir Anthony Eden. A lead of this kind from Nuri Said could, he believed, have a profound effect on all other Arab countries and might well pave the way to negotiations.

2. An alternative to the Iraqi Prime Minister was King Hussein who, Mr. Essaid suggested, had both the necessary wisdom and the courage to give such a lead.

Foreign Office pass to Bagdad, Amman, Cairo, Jedda, Damascus, Tripoli and Tel Aviv as my telegrams Nos. 110, 10, 23, 11, 8, 1 and 3 and Saving to Ankara and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 23 and 11.

[Repeated to Bagdad, Amman, Cairo, Jedda, Damascus, Tripoli and Tel Aviv and Saving to Ankara and Paris]

ADVANCE COPIES

Sir H. Gaccia
Private Secretary
Mr. Shackburgh
Head of Levant Department
Resident Clerk

14 NOV 1955

FFFF

1955

V
 LEVANT DEPARTMENT

VR 1076/354

FROM Mr. Titchener
 Tehran

No. 846
 Dated Nov 12
 Received in Registry— NW 14

Mansion House speech.

Iranian Prime Minister has asked how his government can support the proposals. He has agreed to issue a public declaration, and to see the Arab representatives in Tehran.

1076

References to former relevant papers

MINUTES

1. I don't think we need answer this. What Tehran were asked to do was to urge Persian Govt. to use their influence with parties to dispute in favour of a settlement on the basis proposed by the P.M. on November 9.

(Print)

2. There is something to be said both for and against a public statement by the Persians. For - that a Muslim country should advocate a settlement with Israel. Against - that we don't want to give the enemies of the Baghdad Pact a handle against it.

(How disposed of)

3. On balance I would favour behind the scenes activity - especially for Turkey. Persia is less important; and I don't believe the Persians will make a statement anyhow. So let's not worry.

S. L. Curzon

(Action completed)

9/11/55

(Index)

10/31/56

References to later relevant papers

MR 16/xi

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM TEHRAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

VR1076/324

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Tichenor

No. 846

November 12, 1955

D. 4.55 p.m. November 12, 1955

R. 5.12 p.m. November 12, 1955

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 846 of November 12.
Repeated for information to Ankara, Paris
And Saving to Washington Codel Geneva

Your telegram 1640 to Ankara: Palestine.

I saw the Prime Minister this morning. He asked how his government could support the lead which Sir A. Eden's speech has given. I said that a public declaration of endorsement could not serve anything but a useful purpose; he agreed and added that he would also send for the representatives of the Arab countries here.

2. Iranian influence could unfortunately hardly be at a lower ebb than at present with Arab governments because of their needling tactics over Bahrain. However if Iranian public endorsement makes little impression on Arabs it will at least serve as a useful guide to local Press.

Foreign Office pass to Ankara and Paris as my telegrams 68 and 5 and Saving to Codel Geneva as my telegrams 87 and 1.

[Repeated to Ankara and Paris and Saving to Codel Geneva]

XXXX



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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Nicholls

No. 459

November 11, 1955.

D. 5.13 p.m. November 11, 1955.

R. 6.30 p.m. November 11, 1955.

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 459 of
November 11

Repeated for information Saving to: Washington.
Cairo.
Bagdad.
Amman.
Beirut.
Damascus.
UKDEL New York.
Paris.

Your telegram No. 471: Prime Minister's Speech.

I spoke accordingly to the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He expressed regret that Mr. Ben Gurion had been unable to see me, as he was resting in Sde Boker and that Mrs. Myerson, as acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, was not available.

2. When I had finished Doctor Eytan said that the speech would no doubt be considered by the Cabinet next Sunday and that Mrs. Myerson would wish to see me thereafter. Meanwhile, he would like to put a few considerations to me.

3. First, he had been struck by the emphasis placed on territorial changes. In Mr. Dulles statement of August 26, these had been touched on simply as one of several subjects requiring settlement and not even the most important. Subsequent elucidations had still further reduced their importance. The Prime Minister now appeared to have put them right in the foreground, and this could only give rise to great anxiety in Israel.

4. I replied that I thought this was a misreading of the Prime Minister's speech. He had, like Mr. Dulles, mentioned refugees and the Johnston plan; but he evidently felt the real problem was the impossibility of getting negotiations started so long as one party said it would only negotiate on the basis of the United Nations partition scheme, while the other refused in advance to consider any change in the Armistice lines. Unless both sides modified their attitudes, there could be no negotiation and without negotiation there could be no settlement.

5. Doctor Eytan then said that the real obstacle to a settlement was the the Arabs did not want one. The Arabs knew that their professed willingness to settle the dispute

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CONFIDENTIAL

Tel Aviv telegram No. 459 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

on the basis of the 1947 Resolutions would never be put to the test. Had we any reason to think that any Arab leaders would really be willing to negotiate on a realistic basis?

6. I replied that that was precisely what the Prime Minister's speech, and your instructions to my colleagues in neighbouring countries were designed to discover. I could, however, tell him that there were indications that some, at least, of the Arab leaders realized that a settlement had to come, and that their insistence in public statements on the 1947 Resolutions was in part at least, a question of public relations and of Arab League compliance.

7. Eytan said that the Israeli Government had always expressed its readiness to negotiate. But they could not accept a position where as a condition of negotiations taking place they would be expected to concede in advance Arab desiderata on what ought to be the subject of those negotiations. I said that I found that quite reasonable, that if the Israeli Government declared in advance that they would never yield an inch of territory, they were doing in reverse precisely what they objected to the Arabs doing. We were not asking Israel to declare publicly her willingness to make territorial adjustments: but we were asking her not to say that she would only negotiate if such adjustments were excluded from the agenda. At the same time I added that it would not be realistic to suppose that there could be fruitful negotiations without some readiness on Israel's part to make concessions on the question of the frontier. The point was that it was only when negotiations were under way that Israel would be able to judge how extensive those concessions would have to be and whether they would be a fair price to pay for peace.

8. Finally, Dr. Eytan asked me what Her Majesty's Government's intentions were. Were they offering to act as mediators or intermediaries, or did they simply intend to see whether the Prime Minister's speech had the desired effect or not? I said that the Prime Minister had expressed his willingness, and that of Her Majesty's Government to help in any possible way. I was sure that we in association with the Americans, would be at the disposal of either side or both, if they wished to find out whether such concessions as they were prepared to make offered prospects of constructive negotiations. I was sure that if either side did so, we should be ready to respect its confidence and not remove those concessions from the field of negotiation by revealing them to the other side as points already conceded.

9. I ended with an appeal for helpful and constructive guidance to the Press.

Foreign Office pass Washington, Cairo, Bagdad, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, UKDEL New York and Paris as my Saving telegrams Nos. 89, 37, 29, 100, 51, 42, 66 and 121 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Washington, Cairo, Bagdad, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, U.K. Del. New York and Paris].

I.B.

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SECRET

FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Nicholls

No. 463.

November 12, 1955.

D. 10.25 a.m. November 12, 1955.

R. 10.43 a.m. November 12, 1955.

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

R 1076/356

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 463 of November 12.
Repeated for information to Washington.

Your telegram No. 780. *N.R.*

I do not know on what Mr. Sharett based his statement of October 18 about minor frontier changes, though Dr. Eytan yesterday (my telegram No. 459) gave me to understand that the Israel Government had received reassuring explanations in Washington after Mr. Dulles' statement of August 26.

VR 1076 2. Ever since Sir A. Eden's statement in the House of Commons on April 4 (which coincided as you will recall with Salah Salem's claim to the Southern Negev) there has been a tendency here to believe that we intend to press Israel to surrender the whole territory from Elath to Beersheba. The Times correspondent tells me that Ben Gurion is convinced of this.

3. Prevalence of this belief has certain advantages, e.g. Israel would be relieved to find that no such massive sessions of territory were contemplated, that she might be more accommodating about lesser changes. But I fear that the effect on balance is likely to be disadvantageous since it will make it more difficult, and perhaps impossible, to bring the Israel Government to admit the possibility of any frontier changes, however small, in advance of a settlement.

4. I hope, therefore, that News Department, when denying that we have only minor changes in mind, will be careful not to strengthen the impression that we intend to deprive Israel of the whole of the Southern Negev.

Foreign Office pass Washington as my telegram No. 121.

[Repeated to Washington]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Private Secretary
Sir H. Gaccia
Mr. Shuckburgh
Head of Levant Department
News Department
Resident Clerk



REPLACEMENT

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SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO GENEVA (UNITED KINGDOM
DELEGATION TO THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS)

Cypher/OTP

PR I S E C

No. 392

November 11, 1955

D. 2.40 p.m. November 11, 1955

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to Codel Geneva telegram No. 392 of November 11.
Repeated for information to Washington.

Following for Foreign Secretary from Prime Minister.

I asked the United States Ambassador to come to see me this morning and said how glad I was to hear of the President's improved health. This was indeed splendid news for us all. I went on to say that I had observed the statement put out by President Eisenhower on Wednesday with reference to the Middle East and our Tripartite Declaration of 1950. Her Majesty's Government were of course in complete agreement with this and we would make this clear in our Press guidance over the weekend.

The Ambassador said he was glad of this because he knew how much importance the President and the Secretary of State attached to our being completely in agreement about the Middle Eastern situation. I said that there was fortunately no doubt of this and drew his attention to the conversation you had had with Mr. Dulles in Paris after the former's interview with Mr. Sharrett. If I might say so I thought that the points made by Mr. Dulles in that conversation were exactly the ones which needed making.

I had indeed had them in mind in the remarks which I had made at the Guildhall on Wednesday. I had no doubt that Mr. Dulles was right in maintaining with Mr. Sharrett that to reach an agreement with the Arabs, Israel would have to make some concessions. That was why I had used the following words at the Guildhall:-

"The stark truth is that if these nations want to win a peace which is in both their interests they must make some compromise between these two positions."

If the United States Government agreed with this as I felt sure they did, it would be helpful if they too could say something encouraging both sides to compromise. There were two stages in what we had to do: warn both parties that we stood by 1950, and try at the same time to work out some solution. The Ambassador said he felt sure the United States Government would be able to say something helpful on the lines I had suggested, and he would communicate with Washington at once.

[Copies sent to No. 10 Downing Street.]

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VR1076

359

V

FROM GENEVA (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE MEETING OF
FOREIGN MINISTERS) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

VR1076

DEPARTMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Macmillan
No. 173
November 14, 1955.

D.3.32 p.m. November 14, 1955.
R.2.37 p.m. November 14, 1955.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Following for Shuckburgh from Hancock.

Russell tells me that Dulles' views about Cairo dinner party are as follows. Our representatives should not go too far in revealing to the Egyptians details of our thinking under Alpha since:

- (a) Nasser is still pleased with himself and might pitch his claims too high. We should wait until the atmosphere is more propitious;
- (b) it might be a mistake to give details of our thinking to one side only. Such details could be better revealed if the two sides had agreed upon an exchange of views.

2. In view of the foregoing, Dulles thinks that our representatives should confine themselves to the desirability of beginning process of negotiation. They should press for it to be begun as soon as possible and ask who the Egyptian representative would be.

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Private Secretary
Sir H. Caccia
Mr. Shuckburgh
Head of Levant Department

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SECRET

FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Nicholls
No. 466
November 14, 1955



VR1076/360

D. 4.49 p.m. November 14, 1955

R. 5.12 p.m. November 14, 1955

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 466 of November 14
Repeated for information to Washington.

My telegram No. 459. — VR1076/355

The press comment on the Prime Minister's Guildhall speech is increasingly uncompromising and unfriendly. I am telegraphing the above separately.

2. Indignation is directed exclusively at Her Majesty's Government, except in the extreme left-wing paper, which makes no distinction between British and American wickedness.

3. Although I made it clear to the Israel Government, as instructed in your telegram No. 771, that Mr. Dulles was in full agreement with the Prime Minister's speech, I have little doubt that the Israel Government believes that the United States Government are not fully behind it and can be induced by appropriate pressure to avoid public endorsement of it. They will have noted that, whereas Her Majesty's Government publicly supported Mr. Dulles' statement of August 26, there has been [? grp. omitted] corresponding American support either publicly or through diplomatic channels for the Prime Minister's speech.

4. I think it is essential that Mr. Ben Gurion should be convinced, before he makes the statement foreshadowed in my telegram No. 464, that the Americans are with us in this. A public statement would of course be best, but a communication through my United States colleague would serve.

N.R. 5. If anything is to be said to Israel to calm their fears that we contemplate massive territorial concessions, including the surrender of the southern Negev (please see my telegram No. 463), it is very desirable that we and not the Americans should

1356

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SECRET

Tel Aviv telegram No. 166 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

Americans should say it. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has asked to see me on November 16.

Foreign Office pass Washington as my immediate telegram No. 122.

[Repeated to Washington].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary

Sir H. Caccia

Mr. Shuckburgh

Head of Levant Department

Resident Clerk

Enter
VR1076

R1076/363

✓

SECRET

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN ON 3RD NOVEMBER, 1955.

ARAB/ISRAELI DISPUTE

This was raised by the Secretary of State, who sought the Prime Minister's views. The Prime Minister said that the reactions of Arab countries to the Dulles proposals had not been favourable, they felt that the proposals favoured the Israelis. The Prime Minister did not feel that there was any possibility of any Arab country being prepared to enter into a formal agreement with Israel at this moment. At present the strength lay with Israel; she talked of a preventive war, and countries only made such statements if they were talking from strength. In his view the most we could expect would be a continuation of the uneasy truce, perhaps for as much as five years. It should be our aim during this period to prevent any further aggression, however small, by Israel against any of the Arab countries.

The Secretary of State suggested that the best course would be for the Arab countries to give serious consideration to the Dulles proposals; they might require concessions from both sides, but the proposals seemed to contain the only basis for an early solution. The Prime Minister reiterated that he did not think that this was possible at this stage.

The Secretary of State then pointed out that there seemed to be no sanction or any method of holding Israel back if she was bent on continuing her policy other than some formal agreement. The Prime Minister appeared to recognise this, and in fact fell back on the argument that in the last resort America could curb Israel by withholding economic assistance. He recognised, however, that with a Presidential election next year, it would be difficult for the American administration to ignore the Jewish vote.

Copy to:

D. II.

C.R.O.
P.S. to Prime Minister (2)
Foreign Office
" (Levant Dept.)

Mr. Rogers
Mr. Shuckburgh
Mr. Rose
Mr. Arthur (2)

SOUTH ASIA AND MIDDLE EAST DEPT.

STATEMENT BY THE EMBASSY OF ISRAEL

LONDON

NOVEMBER 10, 1955

Since much press and radio comment on Sir Anthony Eden's references to the Middle East at the Guildhall last night refers to the resolutions adopted by the Special General Assembly of the United Nations in November, 1947, for the solution of the Palestine problem, the Israel Embassy feels that it may be useful briefly to recall the facts about those resolutions and the events which followed them.

The resolutions themselves, adopted in an attempt at a peaceful and lasting settlement of the Palestine problem, consisted of four parts, providing respectively for

- 1) the establishment of a Jewish State within part of the former mandated territory of Palestine;
- 2) the establishment of an Arab State within the rest of that area;
- 3) economic union between these two States;
- 4) internationalisation of the City of Jerusalem.

The Jewish representatives at the Assembly accepted this plan, and pledged themselves to fulfil its provisions in the spirit and the letter, so far as they were concerned. The Arab representatives, and their Governments, rejected the plan out of hand, and declared that they did not consider themselves bound by the resolutions. Arab leaders made no secret of their intention to prevent by force the implementation of the plan.

On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel was proclaimed, in accordance with Point 1) of the resolutions referred to above. On that very day, seven Arab States, six of them members of the United Nations, launched simultaneous attacks on Israel's borders.

In the course of the defensive war thus inflicted upon her, Israel succeeded in defending the area allotted to her under the U.N. resolutions. In the course of driving the invading Arab armies from her territory, she extended her borders somewhat beyond those of the original partition plan - though nowhere beyond the original frontiers of the mandated territory of Palestine. She does not hold one single yard of territory formerly belonging to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon or Jordan (her neighbour states). A number of villages on the Lebanon border, over-run in the course of the fighting, were duly returned to Lebanon under the Armistice Agreements.

Under the Armistice Agreement with Egypt, the Gaza strip, originally allocated by the U.N. resolution to the proposed Arab State, remained in Egyptian hands. On April 24, 1950, the late King Abdullah of Jordan proclaimed the annexation to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of the rest of the territory originally allotted to that State, and still held at that time by Jordanian troops, and on April 27, 1950, the British Government recognised this annexation.

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...2...

The U.N. resolutions regarding an independent Arab State and its economic union with the Jewish State were thus nullified at least as much by the actions of the Egyptian and Jordanian Governments as by Israel's conquest of certain territories in the course of her defensive war.

The Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan established a boundary across Jerusalem, leaving the Old City (with almost all the major Holy Places) in Jordanian hands, and the New City in Israel.

Both in theory and in practice, therefore, the U.N. resolutions of 1947 ceased to be valid on the day when the Arabs, having first formally rejected them, later proceeded by force to try and prevent their implementation.

After their decisive defeat at Israel's hands, some of the Arab States showed a sudden readiness to revert to the very borders proposed by the U.N., which they had previously done their best to overthrow by force. This is a claim for which they have neither legal nor moral grounds. There is equally little legal or moral justification to-day for suggesting that Israel should cede what she has held since the Armistice Agreements of 1948/49. Israel, as the only legal successor to the Mandated Territory and the Jewish National Home, hold her present boundaries not only by right of occupation in the course of a defensive war, but by rights at least as valid as those by which the aggressor States of Jordan and Egypt hold territories not allotted to them by the original U.N. plan, such as former Central Palestine and the Gaza strip.

The Israel Government has repeatedly declared that it will accept the existing Armistice Agreement boundaries, and is equally ready, in the course of general negotiations for a peace settlement, to make such necessary minor adjustments of those boundaries as may be mutually agreed upon in order to facilitate the solution of local problems and to make the "Line" more workable.

At the same time, the present Government of Israel, like all its predecessors, and backed by unanimous public opinion in Israel, has made it clear that it does not admit any claim on the part of the Arabs, whether alone or supported by other Powers, to any of the territory Israel now holds. If the Arab States need anything, it is certainly not land - but rather agricultural and technical knowledge, scientific management, and capital, for developing their vast empty spaces, both to raise the general standard of living of their peoples and to re-settle their refugees. Israel is the only country of the Middle East to have shown herself capable of reclaiming her swamps, irrigating her deserts, and resettling her new citizens on land which would otherwise have remained as derelict in the future as it has been in the past.

Finally, the present policy of the Israel Government remains the often re-stated one of complete readiness to meet Arab representatives, without pre-conditions on either side, for the amicable discussion of a just and lasting peace.

CONFIDENTIAL

VR 1076

Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office

FROM: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN PAKISTAN

RPTD: AMMAN
BEIRUT
BAGDAD
CAIRO
DAMASCUS
JEDDA
TEL AVIV
TRIPOLI
WASHINGTON
ANKARA
POMEF
BENGHAZI

VR 1076/365

(SAVING)

D. Karachi 19.10 hours, 11th November, 1955.
R. 15.09 hours, 11th November, 1955.

CYPHER
PRIORITY

No. 1576 CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed Commonwealth Relations Office No. 1576 repeated PRIORITY to Amman No. 730, Beirut No. 731M, Bagdad No. 732M, Cairo No. 27, Damascus No. 733M, Jedda No. 734M and ROUTINE Tel Aviv No. 735M, Tripoli No. 736M and to Washington No. 113 Saving Ankara No. 28 Saving, POMEF No. 1 Saving, Banghazi No. 1 Saving (Commonwealth Relations Office please pass all PRIORITIES and ROUTINES and SAVING to Washington).

Your telegram No. 1744 and Foreign Office telegram No. 740 to Amman.

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

I have sent Foreign Minister under cover of a letter the text of Sir A. Eden's speech on the above and followed it up with a talk with the Prime Minister this afternoon (11th).

2. The Prime Minister reminded me of the views which he had expressed to you on November 3rd and said again that he did not feel the time was ripe for the Arabs to think in terms of reaching an agreement with Israel. He had commended the Dulles' proposals to the Arab countries but there had been a flat refusal. He said it was scarcely a propitious time with the Bagdad Council meeting in the offing for Pakistan at present to have much influence with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless he was prepared to commend Sir Anthony Eden's new approach to the Arab countries and would hope that his prestige and well-known ability to get people together would have some result.

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Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office

V R 1076/366A

FROM: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN NEW ZEALAND

D: Wellington 13.40 hours, 12th November, 1955
R: 03.40 hours, 12th November, 1955

EN CLAIR

No. 496 PRESSE

Mr. Holland's statement: "I welcome the clarity and candour of Sir Anthony Eden's statement which brings into focus the dangers of the present situation in the Middle East and the extent to which the existing tension between Israel and the Arab States has been intensified by the recent arms deal between Egypt and the Soviet bloc. Recently Mr. Dulles made proposals for the solution of the three basic problems affecting relations between Israel and the Arab States, the frontier questions, the refugee problem and the persistence of fear on both sides. The New Zealand Government at that time supported Mr. Dulles' proposals and I welcome Sir Anthony's reference to them. The immediate issue, however, is the elimination of tension between Israel and Egypt along the existing armistice lines in the demilitarised zone of El Auja. General Burns, United Nations Chief of Staff in Palestine, has proposed that both sides should withdraw from the zone. I am pleased to observe that Sir Anthony Eden supported this proposal which has the approval of the New Zealand Government".

NOTE BY TELEGRAPH SECTION

No punctuation telegraphed.

Copy to:-

D. II.

C.R.O.
P.S. to Prime Minister (2)
Foreign Office
" (Levant Dept.)

Mr. Rogers
Mr. Shuckburgh
Mr. Rose
Mr. Arthur (2)

ALLOTTED TO SOUTH ASIA AND MIDDLE EAST DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Scott

R1076/368

No. 874
November 15, 1955.

D. 11.41 a.m. November 15, 1955.
R. 11.54 a.m. November 15, 1955.

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 874 of November 15.
Repeated for information Saving to Amman



Bagdad	Bagdad
Cairo	Tel Aviv
Damascus	Jodda
Tripoli	Geneva (CODEL)
Benghazi	Ankara
New York (UKDel)	Washington
Paris	Tehran
P.O.M.E.F.	Jerusalem
Karachi.	

My telegram No. 855. VR1076/342

I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and spoke to him in the same way as I had to the Prime Minister. I strongly urged M. Lahoud that the Lebanese Government should, by means of a public declaration, make acknowledgment of the value of proposals in the Prime Minister's Mansion House speech.

2. I said that M. Karame had so far refrained from a discussion in the Cabinet and had not even consulted the President: Her Majesty's Government expected a considered reply from the Lebanese Government and not only M. Karame's personal views.

3. M. Lahoud promised he would do his best to obtain a Cabinet decision which he would try to make as encouraging as possible.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Tripoli, Washington, Paris, Karachi, New York (UKDel), Geneva (CODEL), Benghazi and Ankara as my telegrams Nos. Saving 11, 58, 45, 6, 19, 6, 14 and 36.

[Repeated Saving to Tripoli, Washington, Paris, New York (UKDel) Geneva (CODEL), Benghazi and Ankara].

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section CRO for repetition Saving to Karachi].

ADVANCE COPIES:-

Private Secretary
Sir H. Caccia
Mr. Shackburgh
Head of Levant Department

sssss

Center
VR1076 G.

TOP SECRET.

ALPHA.

VR1076

869

Present Situation.

The first reactions to the Prime Minister's speech of November 9 are, generally speaking, favourable in Arab quarters. Even the Egyptian press is not entirely negative

Flag A. (Cairo telegram No. 1079 of November 12) ; though it is evident from the article in "Akhbar el Yom" that the reference to United Nations resolutions has whetted Arab appetites as the Israelis said it would.

VR1076/351

Flag B. 2. H.M. Ambassador in Cairo has seen both Dr Fawzi (Cairo telegram No. 1693 of November 10) and Colonel Nasser (Cairo telegram No. 1708 of November 12). On this occasion their attitudes are not too far apart ; and we are nearer to loosening Egyptian joints than we have ever been before. There is one point that we should clear up immediately. Nasser would like an assurance that Nuri will not exploit any move he makes.

-1338G

Flag C.
-1350G

Flag D. Nuri has given us such an assurance (Bagdad telegram No. 887 of November 12) and I think that we should authorise H.M. Ambassador in Cairo to convey it to Nasser. I have submitted a draft telegram in this sense. (see VR1076/350G)

-1348

Submitted
to Sir H. Trevelyan
CM
14/11

Procedure.

3. On November 16 Dr Fawzi and Mr Byroade are dining with Sir H. Trevelyan. All three are agreed that this will be a suitable opportunity for informal discussion on this question ; and Sir H. Trevelyan has asked that he and Mr Byroade should have instructions which will enable them to take the matter further, both on procedure and on the boundary question. Colonel Nasser also has agreed to this, though he wants to discuss procedure further with Dr Fawzi. H.M. Ambassador thinks, however, that Nasser would prefer that the discussions /should be with

16/11
should be with him personally ; and that the two Ambassadors should make separate visits in order not to attract attention. Both Nasser and Fawzi have confirmed that they will not negotiate directly with the Israelis ; and that their discussions with us should be known to as few people as possible and not be mentioned publicly.

us
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4. Past experience, as well as Nasser's present attitude, shows that we should be unwise to outrun Nasser or to show our hand too clearly to Fawzi before we are assured that Nasser is with us. The important points should be discussed with Nasser first. But Sir H. Trevelyan's dinner is too good an opportunity to miss, especially since it will give us a chance to show Anglo-American solidarity from the start. This is particularly desirable, since it is clear from paragraph 5 of Cairo telegram No. 1708 that Nasser still harbours suspicions of American policy.

5. I suggest, therefore, that the two Ambassadors should not go too far with Fawzi next Wednesday. It would, however, be very useful if they could clear the ground for serious discussions to start and get across some of our ideas on procedure. The best way of approaching the problem is discussed below.

Presentation.

6. We must remember that it is the Prime Minister's reference to United Nations resolutions that has given us our present impetus. In our early discussions with the Egyptians we shall have to approach the problem with these resolutions in mind, so as not to arouse mistrust. At the same time, we do not want to tie ourselves in knots

/with the

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with the Partition Resolution of 1947. What we need is a bridge from the 1947 resolution to the Alpha proposals.

7. Fortunately, this should not prove too difficult in discussion with the Egyptians. Their interests lie in the Negev, which the Partition Resolution allotted to the Jewish state. It is significant that, for his starting point, Dr Fawzi prefers the Bernadotte proposals of 1948 to the 1947 resolution. The Bernadotte proposals are summarised in Appendix A. Their main territorial provision is that the boundaries as defined in the 1947 resolution should be revised so as to make the Negev Arab territory and Galilee Jewish territory.

8. It would be better not to start from the Bernadotte proposals as such, if we could avoid it. I have not yet been able to trace the exact boundaries which Count Bernadotte proposed, but I think he defined the Negev rather generously, since his report was based on the then military situation, when the Egyptians held the line Isdud-Faluja-Beit Jibrin-Hebron. Even Dr Fawzi's starting point near Beersheba is better than that.

9. We should be as vague as possible about frontiers at the start. Bearing in mind that we shall not be able to restrain the Israelis nor keep them in the dark for long, we should try to get back to the procedure which was agreed at the Alpha meetings held on September 20 and 21. In discussion with Dr Fawzi next week, our Ambassadors might ^mtake the transition as follows :-

(a) We must first get clear what we are talking about.

The 1947 resolution gave Western Galilee to the Arabs, the Negev to the Jews. We have reason to believe, from our conversations with Dr Fawzi and other Arab leaders, that all the Arabs now recognise that this allotment is no longer practicable or even desirable. We suggest, therefore, that the first step should

/be for the

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be for the Egyptians to agree that Western Galilee will remain part of Israel, and that on the matter of frontiers there are only three points to discuss :-

- (i) Arab claims in the Negev ;
- (ii) the allocation of the demilitarised zones between Israel and Syria ;
- (iii) changes in the frontier between Jordan and Israel.

On (iii) we might add the suggestion that the best principle on which to base these changes now would be that the Arab villages on the frontier should recover some of the lands from which they are now cut off by the Armistice Line.

(b) There are other points for discussion, notably repatriation and compensation of the refugees, the status of Jerusalem, and various economic questions. As far as possible, discussion on all of these should proceed concurrently for they are interlocking questions.

(c) Once our Ambassadors have reached this point, it should not be difficult for them to suggest that the first step should be to agree on an agenda of general headlines^{ings} for discussion. If Fawzi accepts this idea there is no reason why they should not try to work out such an agenda on the spot, for submission to Colonel Nasser and ourselves.

(d) Fawzi might then be told that we must say something to the Israelis soon. The argument might run as follows : There was no hope of getting the Israelis even to consider concessions of any kind in the Negev unless we could accustom them to the idea gradually and, at the same time, convince them that the Egyptians were genuinely willing to discuss a general settlement. The first step seemed to us to be to persuade the Israelis that the Negev is a subject for discussion - a point which they would be very reluctant /to concede.

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to concede. To this end we should like to be able to present them with a full agenda, on which one of the items would be the Negev, and to assure them that Nasser was willing to discuss a general settlement on the basis of that agenda. On that understanding we would be ready to press them to accept the agenda ; and once they had accepted it, Egypt would know that the possibility of Israeli concessions in the Negev was implied; and serious negotiation could begin. Meanwhile, we could continue to discuss with Nasser informally the details of a settlement, entirely without commitment and without passing anything on to the Israelis.

(e) We should, however, have to bring Jordan into our discussions at an early stage : we could not talk about Jordan's interests behind her back. We should be glad to hear Dr Fawzi's ideas on this.

(f) We must envisage at some stage some form of mediation, since the Arabs are not willing to discuss a settlement directly with the Israelis. Would Colonel Nasser be willing to receive British and American emissaries, who might later act as intermediaries, at an early date ?

10. During their discussion with Dr Fawzi, and any other conversations, they may have with Colonel Nasser or him, our Ambassadors should take every opportunity of discouraging, gently at first, Egyptian dreams of possessing the whole Negev.

11. We ourselves, however, in consultation with the Americans, must soon make up our minds exactly how far we are prepared to support Egyptian claims on the Negev ; and in particular whether we are ready to go beyond the triangles.

A very useful paper - on the basis of which we have drafted instructions for Sir H. G. G. (see v. x. 1776/3692) 15/11.

G. G. Arthur
 (G. G. Arthur.)
 November 14, 1955.

APPENDIX A

THE BERNADOTTE PROPOSALS FOR A PALESTINE SETTLEMENT

On 16th September, 1948 the Mediator, Count Bernadotte, submitted a report to the United Nations in which he set out certain conclusions as providing a 'reasonable equitable and workable basis for settlement' of the Palestine question.

2. Bernadotte's recommendations were as follows:-

- (a) Hostilities should be pronounced at an end, and the existing truce be superseded by a formal peace, or, at the minimum, an armistice.
- (b) The frontiers between Arab and Jewish territories, in the absence of agreement between Arabs and Jews, should be delimited by a United Nations technical commission. Certain revisions should be made in the boundaries defined in the Assembly resolution of November 1947; the Negeb should be Arab territory and Galilee Jewish territory.
- (c) The disposition of the Arab territory in Palestine should be left to the Governments of the Arab States in consultation with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, with the recommendation that in view of the historical connection and common interests of Trans Jordan and Palestine, there would be no compelling reasons for merging the Arab territory of Palestine with Trans Jordan.
- (d) The United Nations should provide special assurance that the new frontiers would be respected and maintained.
- (e) Haifa, including the oil refineries and terminals, should become a free port. The interested Arab countries would have access to it, but the port's status would be without prejudice to its inclusion in the sovereign territory of the Jewish State. Lydda should be declared a free airport.
- (f) Jerusalem should be placed under United Nations control with full protection for the Holy Places and a maximum of feasible local autonomy for the Arab and Jewish communities. The right of unimpeded access to Jerusalem should be fully respected by all parties.
- (g) The United Nations should affirm the right of Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date. Their resettlement, and the compensation of those not choosing to return, should be supervised and assisted by the Conciliation Commission [see para (i)].
- (h) The political, economic, social and religious rights of Arab and Jewish minorities should be fully guaranteed and respected. The Conciliation Commission should supervise the observance of this guarantee.
- (i) The United Nations should establish a Palestine Conciliation Commission, charged with using its good offices to ensure the continuation of a peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine.

3. Count Bernadotte was murdered in Jerusalem by Jewish terrorists the day after his report was submitted.

/On

4. On September 22 Mr. Evin announced "the wholehearted and unqualified support" of Her Majesty's Government for Count Bernadotte's recommendations. Mr. Marshall, the United States Secretary of State, announced the support of the United States Government later.

November 14, 1955.

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TOP SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO GENEVA (UNITED KINGDOM
DELEGATION TO THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS)

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET
(CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

VR1076/369C

No. 482

November 14, 1955

D. 9.15 p.m. November 14, 1955

IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Codel Geneva telegram No. 482 of November 14.
Repeated for information to Cairo P. O. M. E. F. Washington
Bagdad Tel Aviv

My immediately preceding telegram. (Not to all).

Following is suggested line of instructions to Sir H. Trevelyan for dinner meeting with Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs on Wednesday.

1. It seems important not to set too fast a pace especially when dealing with Fawzi alone. Objects of the first meeting might be:-

- (i) to agree upon the broad headings under which the problem must be considered;
- (ii) to find out whether the Egyptians agree that something should soon be said to the Israelis by us about Egyptian willingness to consider a negotiation; and if so what;
- (iii) to start the process of probing Egyptian thought as to their minimum demands.

2. The main elements in any arrangement must be the territorial settlement, the question of refugees (repatriation, compensation and re-settlement), the status of Jerusalem, the end of the state of war and of the blockade, and the guarantees to be applied to a settlement itself. It is clear that the two most difficult and at the same time key questions for Egypt are the territorial settlement and the ending of the blockade. These two questions in fact represent the first bargain which must be struck, i. e. territorial concessions by Israel in return for permanent security and peace on her borders.

3. Territorial settlement. We know that the official Arab demand is for a return to the 1947 United Nations frontiers. We also know that the Egyptians and others would be willing to write-off Western Galilee if the Arab world could obtain territory in the Negev (which was not allotted to them by the 1947 Resolution). From the point of view of Egypt, the problem boils down almost exclusively to the Negev. Their present demand for the "Beersheba line" is unrealistic. But it is clear that they will have to have some part of the Negev if they are to agree to any settlement at all. The Ambassadors will naturally try to find out whether behind their maximum demands the Egyptians have in mind any more moderate method of dealing with the Negev problem, including that of the Israeli port of Elath. It

/would not

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TOP SECRET

Foreign Office telegram No. 482 to Geneva (U. K. Del. to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers)

- 2 -

would not be right for the Ambassadors at this stage to produce proposals of their own, except by way of illustration and without commitment of any kind. But they might suggest to Fawzi that it would be a step forward if the Egyptian and Israeli Governments could both agree to an item on "The problem of the Negev" being included in the list of topics for negotiation. This in itself would imply, on the Israeli side, a willingness to consider concessions there and, on the Egyptian, an admission that their extreme demands are negotiable.

4. On the other side of the picture we must, before we go to the Israelis at all, have a clear idea what the Egyptians are offering. If we are to go to the Israelis with suggestions for territorial concessions by them we must be able to show them clear evidence that a genuine negotiation is intended and that a settlement is possible which will give them real security for the future. While we need not insist that the Arabs should agree in advance to contemplate a complete "peace" with Israel, including diplomatic and commercial relations etc., we must be able to assure the Israelis that the settlement sought would be an overall one and would include abandonment of the active blockade and termination of the state of war (the alleged justification for restrictions on Suez Canal traffic).

5. In discussing with Fawzi the nature of any approach we might make to the Israelis, the Ambassadors might suggest that the first requirement is to draw up a list of topics which both sides would agree should be the subject of negotiation. By means of such a list we could show the Israelis that a genuine and complete negotiation is contemplated. The Ambassadors may think that to produce a list at their first discussion with Fawzi would frighten him but they might offer to work one out for later discussion with Nasser. If, on the other hand, Fawzi seems responsive, they might suggest the headings in my immediately following telegram.

6. The Ambassadors might also discuss with Fawzi some of the procedural problems. These include:-

- (a) at what stage to bring in Jordan and the other Arab countries;
- (b) how we can best operate as mediators.

We suggest that until we reach the point at which an agenda is agreed by both the Egyptians and the Israelis there is no need for any special emissaries. After that it may be necessary to find someone who has access to both sides.

T T T

TOP SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO GENEVA (UNITED KINGDOM
DELEGATION TO THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS)

Cypher/OTP
VR 1076/369

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
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No. 483

November 14, 1955

D. 8.50 p. m. November 14, 1955

IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Codel Geneva telegram No. 483 of November 14.
Repeated for information to Cairo Washington P. O. M. E. F.
Tel Aviv Bagdad

My immediately preceding telegram [Palestine].

The following is suggested list of topics for discussion. It is based on a list which was shown to Mr. Russell in London on September 21.

Begins.

1. Refugees

- (a) Repatriation: to what extent feasible and under what conditions
- (b) Compensation: estimation of claims and counter-claims; arrangements for financing; methods of distribution.
- (c) Resettlement: provision of facilities; function of compensation; need for further funds.

2. Frontiers

- (a) Allotment of demilitarised zones between Israel and Syria.
- (b) Changes required on frontier between Jordan and Israel.
- (c) The problem of the Negev.

3. Security

- (a) Form in which a settlement might be embodied.
- (b) Guarantees of the settlement.
- (c) Recognition that the state of war or belligerency has ended.

4. Jerusalem

5. Economic

- (a) Cessation of Arab economic warfare; freedom of passage through Suez Canal and other waters.
- (b) Provision of free ports and transit rights.
- (c) Regulations for overflying.
- (d) Telecommunications facilities.

Ends.

T T T

SECRET

Cypher/OTP

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir M. Wright

VR1076/370

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

No. 917
November 15, 1955

D. 4.32 p.m. November 15, 1955
R. 4.58 p.m. November 15, 1955

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 917 of November 15.

Repeated for information to Cairo	Washington
Cedrel Geneva	Ankara
Beirut	Damascus
Jedda	Tehran
Tel Aviv	P.O.M.E.F.

My telegram No. 887: Palestine.

I had a further talk with Nuri this morning about the Prime Minister's speech and gave him an indication of Nasser's reaction as reported in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Cairo telegram No.1708 to the Foreign Office (not to all addressees).

VR1076/350

2. Nuri repeated the assurance contained in my telegram under reference and again said that he wished Nasser to know that he would help and support him in any constructive steps to follow up the Prime Minister's speech. (Incidentally Nuri said that he was not responsible for the Syrian newspapers to which Nasser referred). Nuri continued that if a settlement could be reached on the lines indicated by the Prime Minister, it would be welcomed by a great majority of responsible opinion in Arab countries, although not of course by the extremists. In his opinion it was important to follow up this initiative. If Nasser wished to make any move jointly with Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq (Saudi Arabia might well be hopeless), or alternatively through the Arab League in support of the Prime Minister, Iraq would associate herself with Nasser whether in private or public. On the other hand, Iraq would not support Nasser in opposition to the Prime Minister's proposal. Meanwhile the Iraqi Government would refrain from public comment.

3. What Nuri thought was required immediately was an endorsement by the United States. Without this Israel would play off the United States against the rest, and we should drift back into a deadlock with all its dangers. He repeated several times that early American support was essential. He added with great earnestness



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SECRET

Bagdad telegram No. 917 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

earnestness that an honourable peace between the Arab countries and Israel was the great need of the Middle East. It must surely be to Israel's interest to substitute for an uneasy armistice, which might be broken at any time, a real peace which would enable her to trade and establish friendly relations with her Arab neighbours. But Israel would have to contribute something to a compromise settlement.

4. Prime Minister's speech had, for the first time, opened a real possibility of reaching such a settlement. By his reference to the United Nations resolution he had unlocked the door. At the same time the speech had at one stroke undone 50% of the damage caused in the Arab world by Egyptian arms deal with the Communist countries. He hoped it would prove a turning point, and we must make it so.

Foreign Office pass immediate to Cairo, Washington, Codel Geneva, and routine to Ankara, Jeddah, Tehran and P.O.M.E.F. as my telegrams Nos. 152, 128, 18, 170, 56, 95 and 298 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo, Washington, Codel Geneva, Ankara, Jeddah, Tehran and P.O.M.E.F.]

ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary

Sir H. Caccia

Mr. Shuckburgh

Head of Levant Department

Resident Clerk

F F F F

ADVANCE COPY
INWARD TELEGRAM

CS
V

SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En clair
By Bag

Sir Humphrey Trevelyan

VR1076/371

20. Whitehall

No. 229 Saving
November 14, 1955.

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office Saving telegram No. 229 of November 14, repeated for information Saving to:-

Tel Aviv	136
Beirut	217
Bagdad	117
Damascus	164
Washington	190
Paris	235
UKDEL New York	84
Jedda	204
Tripoli	91
Benghazi	82
Jerusalem	21
Ankara	70
P.O.M.E.F.	394

VR1076/351

My telegram No. 1709 [of November 12].

Press of November 13 reported Nasser's interview with News Chronicle special correspondent. Nasser had said that in his personal view (although not every Arab might agree with him) the Prime Minister's speech showed he was trying to be fair and was taking a constructive attitude towards a problem that had been too long neglected. It was good to hear a Western leader at last mentioning the 1947 Resolutions. To accept them however would be a sacrifice on the Arabs' part, which some Arabs might even refuse to accept.

2. A Gomhouria editorial echoed Nasser's comment and favourably compared the Prime Minister's speech with the Dulles' proposals. Akhbar remarked on the different attitudes adopted by the United States and Britain.

3. Today's press published reports that the Israeli Cabinet had rejected the Prime Minister's proposals out of hand. Gomhouria commented that these proposals were a heavy blow to Israel. Akhbar said that the proposals were one of the chief factors which had recently brightened general prospects in the Middle East.

4. Press comment in general has been anti-American in tone.



1955

V
LEVANT DEPARTMENT
ISRAEL

VR1076/372

FROM *S. J. Gurdener*
Damascus

No. *470*
Dated *NW 15*
Received in Registry— *NW 16*

Mansion House speech
United States Ambassador has told the Syrian Prime Minister that State Department entirely support the proposals. The Prime Minister is definitely interested, but rather suspicious of reported ~~rectifications~~ rectifications.

1076

References to former relevant papers

MINUTES

There is some deep and quite unnecessary misunderstanding here. What "rectifications"?

2. I suppose we must reply to Damascus and I attach a brief draft. Our instructions seem to have been understood everywhere else.

S. J. Gurdener 16/xi

WR 17/xi

(Print)

(How disposed of)

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Amman 271 SW
Rpta) Baghdad 238 SW
Jedda 308 SW
Tel Aviv 391 SW
Washington 464 SW
Paris 3811 SW

(Action completed)

(Index)

JW 18/11

31456

References to later relevant papers

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

CYPHER/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

VR1076/372

Sir J. Gardner
No. 170
November 15, 1955.

D. 2.42 p.m. November 15, 1955.
R. 3.13 p.m. November 15, 1955.

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 170 of November 15
Repeated for information Saving to:-

Amman	Jedda
Bagdad	Tel Aviv
Beirut	Washington
Cairo	Paris

The United States Ambassador told me that he has today officially informed the Syrian Prime Minister that the State Department entirely support the Prime Minister's declaration of November 9. The United States Ambassador considers that the Syrian Prime Minister is definitely interested (press comment and other sources confirm), but rather suspicious of rectifications which the local press allege were made (and some say given out by Foreign Office spokesman) after an interview between the Prime Minister and United States Ambassador in London. One paper said the proposals were limited to the Al Auja area.

2. I told the United States Ambassador and subsequently the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that I had no news of any rectifications. The latter confirmed that the Prime Minister and others were anxious to know details of the alleged changes. As I think interest has been genuinely aroused, I promised to make telegraphic enquiries. In the meantime I am giving the Secretary General the text of comment by the Diplomatic Correspondent of the Times (November 12, page 5) warning him this is not official.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Tel Aviv, Washington and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 65, 179 and 168 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Tel Aviv, Washington and Paris].



CYPHER

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Open.

EMERGENCY
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
with priority
without priority
~~SECRET~~

Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s) 17/4

(Date) Nov 17/4

Despatched 9:31 AM

Draft.

Telegram to:—
Damascus.
No. 589
(Date) 16. 11. 55

And to:—

[Security classification] Confidential
—if any

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to Damascus
telegram No. 589 (date) 16 Nov.

repeated for information to Amman Bagdad Beirut Cairo Jeddah Tel Aviv Washington Paris

VR1076/372

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

271 SAV
404 SAV
308 SAV
4848 SAV

Repeat to:—
Amman Bagdad 238 SAV
Beirut Cairo 352 SAV
Jeddah Tel Aviv 39 SAV
Washington Paris 39 SAV
En Clair.
Code 3911 SAV
Cypher

Your tel. no. 470 [of Nov. 15]: Palestine. There have been no ~~we do not understand the~~ reference to ~~official~~ "rectifications." Times comment to which you refer explains intention of Prime Minister's speech. It does not change it in any way. You should continue to be guided by my tels no 740 and 742 to Amman.

Distribution:— Syria

F.A.W.H.

Copies to:—
[Signature]
16/11

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17 NOV 1955
SECRETARY

bpr
16/11/55
F.O.P. 4622-1

FROM JEDDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

R1016/373

Mr. Parkes

No. 321

November 15, 1955

D. 3.00 p.m. November 15, 1955

R. 7.25 p.m. November 15, 1955

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 321 of November 15
Repeated for information Saving to Cairo

R1076/335

Beirut
Washington

Your telegram No. 740 to Amman.

There has been no official reaction here. Semi-official commentary on Radio Mecca welcomes Prime Minister's speech as being most constructive statement on Palestine made by any Western statesman and points out that this is the first time in recent years that a proposed solution has mentioned United Nations resolutions. Speech was compared with Dulles' plan, which was said to be an empty offer and provided no solution.

2. Commentator hoped Britain was sincere, but foresaw that America's attitude of support for Israel would be a stumbling block. Buraiki was, of course, mentioned. British conscience in that matter worked in a different way than over Palestine.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Cairo, Beirut and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 17, 21 and 33.

[Repeated Saving to Cairo, Beirut and Washington].

666666

16 NOV 1955

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TOP SECRET

FROM GENEVA (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Macmillan
No. 197
November 16, 1955

D.12.07 p.m. November 16, 1955
R.11.10 a.m. November 16, 1955

EMERGENCY
TOP SECRET

VR 1076 374

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 197 of November 16

RECEIVED
NOV 17 1955
AS TO DEPT

Repeated for information to:-
Cairo Tel Aviv
Bagdad Washington
P.O.M.E.F.

VR 1076/369 G.

Your telegrams Nos. 482 and 483: Cairo Dinner Party.

Following from Secretary of State.

I approve suggested line of instructions to Sir H. Trevelyan though I think he should beware of going too much into detail. Of course, if Fawzi asks questions, some details can be given in reply. But I think it would be a mistake to go very far with him at this stage. We cannot exclude the possibility that it might be his object to draw us out and to use the answers against us.

Foreign Office pass to Cairo, Bagdad, POMEF, Tel Aviv and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 1, 5, 3, 2 and 62 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo, Bagdad, POMEF, Tel Aviv and Washington]

ADVANCE COPIES:-

Sir H. Caccia
Private Secretary
Mr. Shuckburgh
Head of Levant Department
Head of African Department

.....

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GREEN

SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION

VR1076/374
No. 2687

November 16, 1955

D. 5.33 p.m. November 16, 1955

EMERGENCY
SECRET

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 2687 of November 16
Repeated for information to Washington [Immediate] Tel Aviv
Bagdad P.O.M.E.F.

Codel Geneva telegram No. 197 [of November 16].

Please act accordingly.

2. We understand that your United States colleague has been sent instructions on the lines of my immediately following telegram. Since these were sent the Secretary of State has discussed the matter with Mr. Dulles. Latter has telegraphed to Washington saying that in his view instructions already sent by the State Department to Byroade (i.e. presumably those in my immediately following telegram) are sufficient as general indication of the line which Byroade should take. He has indicated however that the State Department (who will since have had copy of your instructions from Mr. Russell may send Byroade some elaboration of his existing instructions in order to enable him to keep in line with you.

3. We can only rely on you and Byroade to work out a common line.

DISTRIBUTED TO:
Levant Department
African Department

bbbb

SECRET

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

V
 F.O. Secret & Whistle
~~Secret~~
 Secret

Cypher/OTP

VR1076/375

Sir R. Makins

No. 2772

November 15, 1955

D. 9.43 p.m. November 15, 1955

R. 4.17 a.m. November 16, 1955

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2772 of November 15
 Repeated for information to Codel Geneva

~~My telegram No. 2766~~ Palestine Statement.

I am now informed that State Department are considering the issue of a statement tomorrow which would re-emphasize the United States Government's belief that both sides in the Palestine dispute should move towards a settlement and that if a settlement is to be achieved, contributions will have to be made by both sides.

2. The occasion for this statement would be a meeting tomorrow between the Israel Ambassador and Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., at which the former is expected to present a list of arms which Israel wishes to buy; but no firm decision has been taken either about issue of statement or its wording.

Foreign Office please pass to Codel Geneva as my telegram No. 46.

[Repeated to Codel Geneva]

bbbbb



Mrs. Baker
 W. S. Stone
 JAC

Registry No.

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 Secret.
 Confidential. GGA
 Restricted.
 Open.

Draft. REPLY TO
 P.O. NO.
 BY MR. GRIMOND

051

ANSWERED 15.11.55
 REPLY ATTACHED.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

A.L. Ru
 11/11

12/11

coll(c6)

P.O.P.

V 15th Nov. V

The position of Her Majesty's Government is that they are only prepared to guarantee Israel's frontiers after a settlement which includes an agreement on what those frontiers are to be. That is also the position of the United States Government, as will be seen from President Eisenhower's statement on November 9. I told the House on April 4, and H.M. Government have repeated this several times since then, that if we could get an arrangement between Israel and the Arab States we should be ready to guarantee it.

ISRAEL (FRONTIERS)

51. Mr. Grimond asked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on his proposal for a guarantee of Israel's frontiers.

The Prime Minister: The position of Her Majesty's Government is that they are prepared to guarantee Israel's frontiers after a settlement which includes an agreement on what those frontiers are to be. That is also the position of the United States Government, as will be seen from President Eisenhower's statement on 9th November. As I told the House on 4th April, and as Her Majesty's Government have repeated several times since, if we can get an arrangement between Israel and the Arab States we should be ready to guarantee it.

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(10601/251/55)



British Embassy,

DAMASCUS.

November 12, 1955.

Dear Department,

Please refer to our telegram No. 462 about reactions to the Prime Minister's speech on the Arab-Israel situation. It may be useful to summarise press comment in Damascus so far.

2. The speech was printed in full or in part as front page news in most of the 23 daily papers and in view of the highly emotional state of the press on the Palestine question comment was milder than had been expected. Although Manar, the extremist Moslem Brotherhood newspaper, described the proposals as favouring the Jews, this comment has been repeated with less conviction since the reported rejection of the proposals by Mr. Sharett.

3. Two Christian papers appearing today, both with left wing tendencies, adopt different attitudes. Jumhour, rejecting the proposals, says the objective of the speech was to prevent the Arabs from receiving arms from Russia. Alef Ba sees an attempt to divert Arab attention from the Buraimi question and adds that Britain is trying to make amends for past and present mistakes in the Middle East.

4. Notwithstanding the low standards of the press here and its susceptibility to Saudi bribes, the usual cries that the Arabs will regain their rights by force and push Israel into the sea have been noticeably absent.

5. We are sending copies of this letter to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jeddah, Tel Aviv, Washington and Paris.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY. *les*

Levant Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

1955

V
 LEVANT DEPARTMENT
 ISRAEL

VR 1076/381

FROM Mr Nicholls
 Tel Aviv
 SECRET
 No. 473
 Dated NW 16
 Received in Registry— Nov 16.

Mansion House speech.
 Reports conversation with Israel Acting Foreign Minister, who explained the deep sense of anxiety in Israel over the proposals, gives his impression of the Israeli attitude
 1076.

References to former relevant papers
 362

MINUTES
 Mr. Nichols again spoke well.
 2. I find the conclusions in para 3 convincing. 3(a) (c) and (d) show that the "Agenda" method of approach is much the most hopeful. It takes for the reluctance of both sides to offer concessions first.
 3. As regards 3(f), I don't blame the Israelis. I myself shall not believe that the Americans are really behind us until I see them willing to press Israel publicly to make concessions.
 P.H. Arthur 17/xi.
 See on VR 1076/400/G.
 P.H. Arthur xi.

(Print)

(How disposed of) 7/12
 84) Mr. Hodge M.T.G.A.

(Action completed)	(Index)
<i>[Signature]</i> 21/11	<i>[Signature]</i> 23/11/56

References to later relevant papers
 400 G

A] F.O. Minute (Mr. Arthur) November 23.
 P.H. Arthur 28

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Ref: FO 371/15881			86346			
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SECRET

Tel Aviv telegram No. 473 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

2. In the ensuing discussion I made the following points:
 - (a) First reactions from Egypt and Iraq had been distinctly encouraging. It was too early to say whether they would be prepared to negotiate on basis that Israel could accept; but Israel should not underestimate the importance of the fact that for the first time leaders of the two principal Arab States seemed disposed to admit Israel's right to exist and to shift from their stand on the 1947 resolution.
 - (b) It was to say the least, premature to get so excited about cession of territory. We had no cut and dried plans, and it was certainly not to our interests to mislead Arabs as to concessions they might hope to obtain in negotiation. Territorial adjustments were a matter of degree; Israel might be very willing to yield a hundred yards to remove an anomaly and totally unwilling to cede the Negev up to Beersheba, but there were innumerable gradations between, and Israel would have to decide how far she was prepared to go to secure peace.
 - (c) Israel might feel justified in refusing all concessions, but had she considered the alternatives? One was war, which would solve nothing, as Mr. Ben Gurion had recognized. The other was ever increasing tensions and a field for Communist penetration so fertile that Israel might in the end be surrounded not by weak and divided neighbours but by a bloc of Communist-dominated States. In the long run Israel could not hope to maintain herself in the teeth of forty million Arabs. If there was now, as there seemed to be, a chance of a settlement, could Israel afford to reject it in advance without at least finding out first what the price was!
3. Conversation which lasted over an hour, was less orderly than this account suggests and covered a wider field. My impression is that the Israel Government:
 - (a) have little or no confidence in Nasser's sincerity;
 - (b) believe that Her Majesty's Government hope to lure Egypt back into the Western fold by concessions at Israel's expense;
 - (c) would

SECRET

TeleAviv telegram No. 473 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

(e) would go somewhat further than mere frontier rectification but in view of (a) and (b) think that it would be dangerous to tell us so for fear that Nasser would be told and would raise his price;

(d) hope inwardly that we will pursue talks with Nasser, but are not prepared to say or do anything which could be quoted to Nasser as an indication of Israeli readiness to compromise;

(c) are likely to take an uncompromising line in public partly for reasons implicit in (c) and (d) above and partly in the hope of mobilizing world opinion in advance against pressure to which they expect to be subjected;

(f) are still convinced that the Americans are not fully behind us and can be induced to support them in refusing anything but trivial territorial concessions.

4. With regard to (f) Mrs. Myerson said that Mr. Dulles had assured the Israeli Ambassador in Washington after his statement of August 26 that the United States Government had only minor adjustments in mind.

Foreign Office pass Priority to Cairo as my telegram No. 165 and to Beirut, Damascus, Paris, Washington, New York (UKDel) and P.O.M.E.F. as my Saving telegrams Nos. 55, 46, 122, 90, 67 and 101.

[Repeated to Cairo and Saving to Beirut, Damascus, Paris, Washington, New York (UKDel) and P.O.M.E.F.].

ADVANCE COPIES:-

Private Secretary
Sir H. Caccia
Mr. Shuckburgh
Head of Levant Department

63888

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes

VR 1076/381^A

INDEXED
Pl. see Minister of State's minute on
Tel Aviv tel no. 473. VR 1076/381.

2. Mr. Lawson of US Embassy has
given me the following information
(he did not show me any telegams):-

(a) Mr. Lawson had a conversation
with Mr. Ben Furion on Nov. 16. But
this was just before he received his
instructions to say that the U.S. Govt.
thought Sir A. Eden's statement helpful.
So he did not support it.

(b) The U.S. Charge' in Tel Aviv
has since expressed U.S. Govt's support
to the Head of the American Dept of
Israeli F.O. Mr. Lawson seems to have
been away from Tel Aviv recently.

3. This is not very satisfactory. But
before telegraphing Tel Aviv we might
await the result of Mr. Dulles's
lecture to Mr. Sheppott, due to take
place in Washington today. P.S. (mem 20/11)

<h1>1955</h1>	<h1>V</h1> <p>LEVANT DEPARTMENT</p>	<h1>VR1076/382</h1>
	<h1>ISRAEL</h1>	

FROM Mr. Nicholls
Tel Aviv

SECRET

No. 474
Dated NW 16
Received in Registry— NW 17.

Mansion House speech.

Head of Commonwealth Division questioned Mr. Nicholls closely about the nature of 'mediation' we proposed. He was told that the first aim was to try and find common ground for negotiation.

References to former relevant papers
381

MINUTES

If we are to get anywhere we shall have to go very much further than this soon. But it was the right reply for the present.

Ag 18
xi

(Print)

(How disposed of)

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(Action completed)	(Index)
<i>21/11</i>	<i>10/3/4/50</i>

References to later relevant papers

SECRET

FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Nichols

VR 1076/382

No. 474
November 16, 1955.

D. 1.51 p.m. November 16, 1955.
R. 2.37 p.m. November 16, 1955.

PRIORITY

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 474 of November 16.
Repeated for information to Amman

Bagdad
Washington.

My telegram No. 473. —

VR 1076/381

It is perhaps encouraging that the Head of Commonwealth Division, who was present throughout, questioned me closely after Mrs. Myerson's departure about the nature of "mediation" we proposed.

2. I said I thought mediation was too big a word. Our aim was to find out whether a basis for settlement existed. Later if things went well, we might be able to take things a step further; e.g. we might tell one side that their full desiderata were not worth putting to the other side, but that we would transmit a more reasonable proposal. Having done so we could, if desired, put forward a counter proposal. But this stage was a long way off.

Our immediate object was to find out whether enough common ground existed, or could be created, to justify real negotiations either direct or indirect.

Foreign Office pass Cairo and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 165 and 125.

[Repeated to Cairo and Washington].

sssss



FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Nicholls

VR1076/383

No. 475
November 16, 1955.

D. 4. 4 p.m. November 16, 1955.
R. 4.42 p.m. November 16, 1955.

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 475 of November 16.
Repeated for information to Amman

Cairo
Bagdad
and Saving to Beirut Damascus
P.O.M.E.F. Washington
Paris.

My telegram No. 473. — VR1076/383

Following are the main points in the Israel Prime Minister's statement on Sir Anthony Eden's Guildhall speech.

- (a) Sir Anthony Eden's proposal "to truncate the territory of Israel" for the benefit of its neighbours had no legal, moral or logical basis. Government of Israel would not conduct any negotiations on that basis.
- (b) Proposal was likely to intensify Arab aggression and lessen the likelihood of peace. It singled out Israel as the party by whom concessions should be made and was not, therefore, a compromise.
- (c) Proposal amounted to the dismemberment of Israel and the grant of a reward to "the Arab aggressors of 1948".
- (d) The invasion of Israel by the Arab States had made all the United Nations resolutions on Palestine null and void. "They could not be brought back to life".
- (e) Should, however, these United Nations resolutions now be considered as a starting point, the first step would be for Egypt to leave the Gaza strip and Transjordan to evacuate all Western Palestine.
- (f) The considered and determined policy of the Israel Government was not to permit anyone "to rob us of a single inch of our land". Similarly Israel Government coveted no foreign soil. There was, nevertheless, room for local frontier rectification agreeable and beneficial to both sides carried out as a result of mutual agreement.

/(g) Offer

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Tel Aviv telegram No. 475 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

(g) Offer to meet directly with any of Arab rulers in order to achieve a mutual settlement still stood provided there were no prior conditions.

2. In a digression on the Egyptian-Czech arms deal, the Israel Prime Minister accused Her Majesty's Government of supplying arms "to one side only" and added that there was no indication that they would not do so again in the future.

3. As was to be expected the press today supports Mr. Ben Gurion.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Beirut, Damascus, P.O.M.E.F., Washington and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 56, 47, 102, 91 and 123 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Beirut, Damascus, P.O.M.E.F. Washington and Paris].

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The following is the text of Mr. Ben-Gurion's statement in the Knesset (Parliament) on November 15, 1955

I have read the statement made by the British Prime Minister on November 9th with the serious attention it deserves and I regret that its main contents are in complete contradiction to its declared objective. His proposal to truncate the territory of Israel for the benefit of its neighbours has no legal, moral or logical basis and cannot be considered. Instead of fostering better relations and bringing peace nearer, it is likely to encourage and intensify Arab aggression and to lessen the likelihood of peace in the Middle East.

Sir Anthony Eden has levelled criticism at the Soviet Government, which has decided, as he put it, "to inject into this delicate situation a new element of danger and to deliver weapons of war, tanks, aeroplanes, even submarines to one side only". And he asserted that it is impossible to reconcile this Soviet action with protestations that they wish to end the cold war in the new spirit of Geneva". It is astonishing on the other hand, that the British Prime Minister should defend Egypt's part in this 'transaction', the transaction of which Sir Anthony Eden says that "it is fantastic to pretend that this deliberate act of policy was an innocent commercial transaction." It is even more disquieting that Sir Anthony Eden deliberately ignores the grave danger which the supply of weapons of war "to one side only" involves for Israel. The British Prime Minister contends in his speech that the main responsibility rests on the suppliers and not on the recipients, as if the purchasers of the arms had bought them for decorative purposes only. Does not the British Prime Minister know as well as I do for what purposes these arms are intended in Egypt? Sir Anthony Eden, who places the responsibility on the suppliers, has apparently forgotten that for a long time his Government, too, had been supplying arms "to one side only" - and there is no indication in his statement that it will not do so again in the future.

The British Prime Minister is rightly concerned at the increase of tension in the Middle East, particularly between Egypt and Israel, although he passes over in silence the danger involved for Israel in Egyptian arms superiority, and he points out that "the hostility between Israel and her Arab neighbours is unreconciled. Here time has proved no healer." Sir Anthony Eden did not see fit to point out that Israel, which was the victim of aggression in 1948, harboured no hostility towards her neighbours after the end of the fighting, and stretched out her hand for peace - and that hand is still outstretched. But the British Prime Minister did single out Israel in his proposals for peace between the two sides: Israel must cede some of its territory to its neighbours, and this proposal is what Sir Anthony Eden calls a "compromise between these (the Israel and Arab) two positions".

And why does the British Prime Minister use the word "compromise" to describe the truncation of Israel's territory? Because the Arab States, according to him, take their stand on the United Nations Resolution of November 29, 1947, and Sir Anthony Eden declares that "it is not right, I agree that United Nations Resolutions should be ignored." But since Israel takes her stand, according to Sir Anthony, on the frontiers set out in the Armistice Agreements of 1949, it is necessary to find a compromise between these two frontiers: to cut off part of the "excess" territory of Israel and hand it over to the neighbouring States.

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03.2.50

I believe that Sir Anthony Eden's definition of the "innocent commercial transaction" can be applied with a greater measure of force and truth to this "innocent" compromise. The British Prime Minister ignores in his so-called compromise proposal a series of basic historical and political facts, of which it is quite inconceivable that he, as a man who has headed the British Foreign Office for many years, could fail to be aware.

I. History does not begin with the United Nations General Assembly's Resolution of November 29, 1947. The Jewish people will always remember - and remember in gratitude and esteem - that thirty years before that United Nations General Assembly, the British Government, under the leadership of Lloyd George and Balfour, and with active co-operation of the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, acknowledged the historical connection between the Jewish people and the land of Israel. And this connection did not come into existence as a result of that declaration - the opposite was the case. This connection was in existence throughout the generations, and we live in our land as of right and not as on sufferance. A State of Israel was in existence in this country in a period when human history knew nothing of the existence of America or Britain. And Jerusalem was the capital of Israel when the world was unaware of the existence of London, Moscow, or Paris.

II. The British Government was the only non-Arab State which declared at the United Nations General Assembly as early as September 26, 1947, that she would not implement the United Nations Resolution on the Palestine problem. The British Government acted according to this declaration, thereby encouraging, directly or indirectly, the armed opposition of the Arab States to the Resolutions. It refused to hand over the administration of Palestine during the transition period to the U.N. Commission, and abandoned the country to chaos. Only the establishment of the Government of Israel on May 14, 1948, eight hours before the British withdrawal, saved the Jewish community from annihilation and the country as a whole from ruin.

III. The Arab States - Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Transjordan and Saudi Arabia - which, according to Sir Anthony Eden, take their stand on the U.N. Resolutions of November 29, 1947 - did not content themselves with public pronouncements about their disagreement with and opposition to the U.N. Resolutions. They invaded the country with their armies immediately after the departure of the Mandatory Government and engaged in a war of annihilation against that State of Israel, the re-establishment of which had been decided upon by more than two thirds of the members of the United Nations. The United Kingdom and the other member States of the United Nations then did not raise a finger to save the young State and its small people (which then numbered only about 650,000 souls). Moreover, British officers, who then headed the Arab Legion, and British arms in Egypt, Iraq and the other Arab countries, played a considerable and predominating part in the shelling of Jerusalem, and would have destroyed it but for the supreme heroism of its Jewish inhabitants and the devotion of our sons and daughters who successfully repelled the attacks of the invaders, though not without the loss of precious

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and irreplaceable lives. The invasion of the Arab States has made all the U.N. Resolutions of Palestine null and void. They cannot be brought back to life anymore than can the thousands of Jewish defenders who gave their lives for the salvation of their people and the renewal of its freedom.

IV. The U.N. General Assembly never decided to do what Sir Anthony Eden now proposes - to increase the areas of the neighbouring States (Egypt, Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon) at the expenses of the land of Israel. This is a fantastic suggestion, which did not enter anybody's mind at the U.N. General Assembly. According to the U.N. Resolution not a single inch of Palestine territory was to be handed over to the neighbouring States. Sir Anthony Eden's proposals, in effect, amount to the dismemberment of the State of Israel and the grant of a reward to the Arab aggressors of 1948. The only State in the Middle East entitled to redress for the criminal attack of the Arab States in 1948 is the State of Israel. Israel was attacked by her neighbours. Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia were the aggressors, and these countries still continue their war against Israel by other means: boycott, blockade and the organization of bands of saboteurs and murderers who are sent from time to time into Israel territory. This fact of aggression against Israel by the Arab States is still fresh in the memory of our generation all over the world. The fact that is in contradiction to the U.N. resolutions is the presence of the Egyptian army in the Gaza strip. The second fact that is in contradiction to the U.N. Resolutions is the annexation by the Transjordan Government of a considerable part of Western Palestine - the Old City of Jerusalem, Hebron, Nablus, etc. The British Government, and I believe, only the British Government, recognized this annexation in April, 1950, completely ignoring the U.N. Resolutions. If Sir Anthony Eden does not consider that the Armistice Agreements of 1949 are binding upon both sides, and if he is correct in this contention that it is not right that U.N. Resolutions should be ignored, then Egypt should immediately leave the Gaza strip and Transjordan should evacuate all Western Palestine. When I presented the new Government to the Knesset on November 2, a fortnight ago, I announced that "we do not covet a single inch of foreign soil. But as long as we live we will not permit anyone to rob us of a single inch of our land". This is the considered and determined policy of the Government of Israel. Accordingly we do not see in Sir Anthony Eden's proposal a way for the resolution of the conflict in the Middle East, but a factor making for its intensification. My proposal for a direct meeting with any of the Arab rulers in order to achieve a mutual settlement, without any prior conditions, which I announced a fortnight ago in the Knesset, still stands. There is room for local frontiers rectifications, agreeable and beneficial for both sides, carried out as a result of mutual agreement. But the British Prime Minister's proposal for the truncation of the territory of Israel means giving a reward to the aggressors. The Government of Israel will not conduct any negotiation on this basis.

<p>1955</p>	<p>V LEVANT DEPARTMENT</p>	<p>✓ VR1076/384</p>				
<p>FROM Mr Nicholls Tel Aviv SECRET No. 476 Dated NW 16 Received in Registry— Nov 17.</p>	<p>ISRAEL</p> <p><u>Mansion House speech</u> Israelis are worried about omission of any mention of the Tripartite Declaration from the proposals. It has been pointed out to them that the Declaration cannot replace the need for a permanent settlement. 1076</p>					
<p>References to former relevant papers 381</p>	<p>MINUTES</p> <p>It is an interesting thought that the Israelis secretly set some store by the Tripartite Declaration, which they profess to despise.</p> <p>2. But I do not like the idea of letting them be nervous about the Declaration if it means that we have got to compensate them in other ways. After all the Declaration is such a familiar feature of the Middle Eastern landscape that nobody objects to it much any more. But that does not apply to new methods of supporting Israel, each of which saps Arab confidence at a time when we need it.</p> <p>R.S. Aulme 18/xi MR 18/xi</p>					
<p>(Print)</p> <p>(How disposed of)</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>						
<table border="1"> <tr> <td>(Action completed)</td> <td>(Index)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>19/11</td> <td>1031/156</td> </tr> </table>	(Action completed)	(Index)	19/11	1031/156		
(Action completed)	(Index)					
19/11	1031/156					
<p>References to later relevant papers</p>						

SECRET

FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Nicholls

No. 476

November 16, 1955

D. 1.28 p.m. November 16, 1955

R. 2.20 p.m. November 16, 1955

PRIORITY

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 476 of November 16

Repeated for information Saving to:-
Cairo
Paris
Washington

My telegram No. 473. ✓ V R 1076/381

As I knew that the Israelis were much worried by the omission of any mention of the Tripartite Declaration in the Prime Minister's speech, I said deliberately at one point that it should not be regarded as something upon which the Israelis could rely indefinitely as an alternative to a peace settlement.

2. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, as I had expected, asked whether this meant that Her Majesty's Government intended shortly to withdraw from it.

3. I replied I had been speaking of Israel's long term [grp. undec. ?course]. Our policy was based on the Declaration and we would certainly carry out our obligations under it; but it could not in the long run replace the need for a settlement between the parties themselves.

4. The Israelis clearly regard the withdrawal of the Declaration as one of the means of pressure at our disposal. It will do them no harm to be a little nervous about this, so long as we do not give the impression of pulling out all the props from under them and make occasional gesture of support, such as the very welcome decision to release some aircraft.

Foreign Office pass Cairo, Paris and Washington as my Saving telegrams Nos. 10, 124 and 92.

[Repeated Saving to Cairo, Paris and Washington]



1955

V
 LEVANT DEPARTMENT
 ISRAEL

VR 1076/385

FROM Sir R. Makins
 Washington

Mansion House speech.
 Text of statement issued
 by State Department after
 conversation with Israel Ambassador.

No. 2777
 Dated Nov 16
 Received in Registry—NW 16

References to former relevant papers
 375

MINUTES

This does not go very far, and in particular it offers no support for the P.M.'s speech of November 9. But, as far as it goes, it is firm. I suppose that is all we can expect. If the Americans are not keeping up with us, at least their previous pace is not lagging.

Ed. Aulms 17/xi

WR 12/xi

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

(Index)

11/11

11/3/56

References to later relevant papers

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

R1076/385

FOREIGN OFFICE
AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Makins
No. 2777
November 16, 1955

D. Untimed November 16, 1955
R. 11 24 p.m. November 16 1955

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2777 of November 16.
Repeated for information to Cairo Amman Damascus

Tel Aviv Beirut Bagdad
and Saving to Paris

My telegram No. 2772. Palestine.

Following statement was read to Press by State Department spokesman today.

"The Ambassador of Israel called on the Acting Secretary of State today. During the course of the visit a list of military equipment was submitted for purchase under the provisions of the agreement for cash reimbursable military assistance between Israel and the United States. The Israel Ambassador was informed that the request would receive consideration by the various agencies of the United States Government in the light of American policies including the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.

The general discussion which followed included reference to the Secretary's proposals of August 26 and the President's statement of November 9. The Acting Secretary underlined the importance, as expressed by the President and the Secretary, of a solution for existing problems by agreement between the parties. The Acting Secretary asked whether progress had been made towards acceptance of the proposals put forward by General Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization with regard to the El Auja demilitarized zone and re-emphasized our strong support for United Nations efforts".

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad and Saving to Paris as my telegrams Nos. 99, 50, 27, 27, 26, 69 and 536 respectively

[Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad and Saving to Paris.]

ADVANCE COPIES:-

Sir H. Caccia
Private Secretary
Mr. Shuckburgh
Head of Levant Department

T T T

17 NOV 1955
RECEIVED
WHITEHALL

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

2076/386

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Makins
No. 2786
November 16, 1955

D. 11.1 p.m. November 16, 1955
R. 6.47 a.m. November 17, 1955

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2786 of November 16.
Repeated for information to Cairo

	Bagdad	
Tel Aviv	Amman	
and Saving to Damascus	Beirut	P. O. M. E. F.
Ankara	Jedda	Paris

Israel.

The following are significant extracts from a letter from President Eisenhower to Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver; who read the letter to a large rally organized by the major American Jewish organisations and the American Zionist Council at Madison Square Garden, New York City on November 15:

"A threat to peace in the Near East is a threat to world peace. As I said the other day while we continue willing to consider requests for arms needed for legitimate self defence, we do not intend to contribute to an arms competition in the Near East. We will continue to be guided by the policies of the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950. We believe this policy best promotes the interest and security of the peoples of the area". "We believe the true and lasting security in the area must be based upon a just and reasonable settlement, it seems to me that current problems are capable of resolution by peaceful means. There is no reason why a settlement of these problems cannot be found and, when realized, I would be prepared to recommend that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries upon which Israel and its immediate neighbours agree". "The need for a peaceful settlement becomes daily more imperative. The United States will play its full part in working toward such a settlement and will support firmly the United Nations in its efforts to prevent violence in the area by firm friendship towards Israel and all other nations in the Near East. We shall continue to contribute to the peace of the world".

2. The President's letter has attracted considerable attention in the East Coast press. The United Press reported that "officials in Washington had said the President's statement did not alter the United States position that Egypt and Israel should settle their border and refugee disputes in advance of any such treaty".

3. Text follows by bag.

Please pass to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Bagdad, Amman and Saving to Damascus, Ankara, Beirut, Jedda, P. O. M. E. F. and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 100, 51, 70, 28, 28, 45, 30, 30, 81 and 537 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Bagdad, Amman and Saving to Damascus, Ankara, Beirut, Jedda, P. O. M. E. F. Paris.]



T T T

BY AIR FREIGHT
UNCLASSIFIED
15/20/8/55

VR1076/386A



INDEXED VR1076/386

Reference our telegram No. 2786 of
November 16.

Forwarded with the Compliments

of the British Embassy,

Washington, D.C.

November 18, 1955.

American Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

1570 / 8 / 55

For Release at 8:30 P.M., EST

November 15, 1955

James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

HOTEL GETTYSBURG
GETTYSBURG, PA.

The White House today made public the following exchange of correspondence between the President and Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver

The President's message is as follows:

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver
Commodore Hotel
New York, N. Y.

I am glad to comply with your request to send a message to the meeting which you are addressing this evening, as I know of your great concern about the recent developments in the Near East which disturb all of us.

A threat to peace in the Near East is a threat to world peace. As I said the other day, while we continue willing to consider requests for arms needed for legitimate self-defense, we do not intend to contribute to an arms competition in the Near East. We will continue to be guided by the policies of the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950. We believe this policy best promotes the interest and security of the peoples of the area.

We believe the true and lasting security in the area must be based upon a just and reasonable settlement. It seems to me that current problems are capable of resolution by peaceful means. There is no reason why a settlement of these problems cannot be found, and when realized I would be prepared to recommend that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries upon which Israel and its immediate neighbors agree.

The need for a peaceful settlement becomes daily more imperative. The United States will play its full part in working toward such a settlement and will support firmly the United Nations in its efforts to prevent violence in the area. By firm friendship towards Israel and all other Nations in the Near East, we shall continue to contribute to the peace of the world.

D.
Dwight D. Eisenhower

Rabbi Silver's letter to the President is as follows:

My dear Mr. President:

I have been profoundly disturbed by the recent events in the Near East which have aroused deep apprehension in Israel and among peace-loving people everywhere. I am to address on November 15th a mass rally at Madison Square Garden in the City of New York in which many civic, religious and labor organizations will participate to express the vital concern over the situation. I know that they would welcome a word from you as coming not only from the Chief Executive of our beloved country but as the foremost spokesman of international justice, freedom and peace in the world today. Personally I would greatly appreciate such a message.

With warmest regards and with all good wishes for your complete recovery and well being,

/s/ Abba Hillel Silver

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