

SECRET

VR1076/320

V

PALESTINE SETTLEMENT

During a discussion about the Egyptian ^{arms} demands dealing with H.M. Chargé d'Affaires on October 3,

Flag A. (Beirut telegram No. 731) the Lebanese President suggested that the West should make a spectacular move on Palestine if they wished to recover the initiative. He added that it would be necessary to go back for a basis to the 1949 Lausanne proposals which had been accepted by both Jews and Arabs.

Flag B. 2. I attach a Note on the Lausanne negotiations. The only proposal which was "accepted by both Jews and Arabs" was the Protocol on which the discussions were based. (Paragraphs 4 to 6 of the attached note). The Lebanese President's advice is therefore tantamount to saying that both sides should accept the UN. Partition Resolution as a starting point for negotiating a Palestine Settlement.

3. The Iraqi Prime Minister commonly takes the same position. It is, however, extremely unlikely that we could induce the Israelis to agree. They accepted the 1949 Protocol with reservations; and in the subsequent negotiations they behaved as though they had not accepted it. Since 1949 Israel has become more firmly established and the U.N. Resolutions on Palestine more distant. The Israelis would not repeat their opening performance at Lausanne. In any case, the proposals that we have worked out ^{are not} ~~had been~~ derived from the 1947 Resolution.

Flag C. 4. I attach a draft letter to Beirut.

An our present dilemma any Arab suggestion seemed worth examining. But this one is obviously not even a states.

G. G. Arthur
(G. G. Arthur)
October 5, 1955.

Russell
5/10

VR 1076/320

THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL
AT LAUSANNE, IN 1949.

A. U.N. Resolution number 194 (III) of December 11, 1948.

For a proper understanding of the Lausanne Negotiations, we must recall U.N. Resolution number 194 (III) of December 11, 1948. Its main provisions were as follows:-

- (a) The establishment of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. (P. C. C.)
- (b) The instruction to the P.C.C. to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all outstanding questions.
- (c) The re-affirmation of the proposal that Jerusalem should be placed under a permanent international regime.
- (d) An endorsement of the right of refugees to return to their homes if they wished, or to compensation if they did not.

B. THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS ^{AND} OF THE P.C.C.

2. The Armistice Agreements between Israel and her Arab neighbours were signed during the first half of 1949. Meanwhile, the P.C.C. held conversations with the Arab and Israel Governments and finally invited them to send delegations to Lausanne to co-operate with the Commission in the work of conciliation. Israel and her four neighbours accepted the invitation: Iraq and Saudi Arabia did not. The Lausanne meetings opened on April 27 and continued, with a break from July 1 to July 18, until September 15, 1949.

3. The Israelis ^{sought} ~~set~~ separate and direct discussions with each of the Arab states. The Arabs insisted on dealing with the Commission as a bloc. In these circumstances, direct negotiations were not possible, and views were exchanged through the P.C.C.

C. THE PROTOCOL OF MAY 12, 1949.

4. In order to provide a basis for the discussions, the P.C.C. induced all the parties to sign a Protocol which proposed "that the working document attached hereto be taken as a basis for discussions with the Commission". The Protocol continued:- "The interested delegations have accepted this proposal with the understanding that the exchanges of views which will be carried on by the Commission with the two parties will bear upon the territorial adjustments necessary to the above-indicated objectives."

5. The working document annexed to the Protocol was a map showing the boundaries as defined in the U.N. Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947.

6. When signing the Protocol, the Israel representative reserved his Government's position on the matters at issue. By this he confirmed that he meant that the Israel delegation reserved its right "to reject parts of the boundaries set out in the partition plan and to propose others, but that the partition plan would be adhered to as a point from which to work."

D. THE LAUSANNE NEGOTIATIONS

JERUSALEM.

7. On this question the P.C.C. was bound by a specific directive in Resolution number 194 (III). The position of the parties to the dispute, may be summed up in the following extracts from the P.C.C. report on the negotiations:-

(a) The Arabs

"The Arab delegations showed themselves, in general, prepared to accept the principle of an international régime for the Jerusalem area, on condition that the United Nations should be in a position to offer the necessary guarantees regarding the stability and permanence of such a régime".

(b) The Israelis

"From the beginning, however, the Government of Israel, while recognizing that the Commission was bound by General Assembly resolution 194 (III), declared itself unable to accept the establishment of an international régime for the city of Jerusalem; it did, however, accept without reservation an international régime for, or the international control of, the Holy Places in the City."

REFUGEES.

8. The Arabs opened by insisting that Israel should accept the repatriation principle set forth in Resolution 194 (III). The Israelis refused to accept this principle.

9. The Israelis and the Arabs themselves put forward the two following proposals for refugees:-

(a) The Israeli Proposal.

The Israelis declared that if the Gaza area were incorporated in Israel, the Government of Israel would be prepared to accept, as citizens of Israel, the entire Arab population of the area, both inhabitants and refugees, provided that they received such international aid as would be available for refugee resettlement in general.

(b) The Arab Proposal.

The Arabs proposed the immediate return of the refugees whose homes were in the territories under Israel authority which had formed part of the Arab State according to the U.N. Partition Resolution.

10. Neither of the above proposals was accepted by the other side.

11. In the second phase of the negotiations, the Israelis said that their Government would be prepared to accept the return to Israel, in its present limits, ~~all~~ 100,000 refugees, provided that:-

- (a) This ^{offer} ~~offer~~ formed part of a comprehensive plan for the settlement of the entire refugee problem, and
- (b) that the repatriation would be put into effect only as a integral part of a general and final peace settlement;
- (c) that the Government of Israel reserved the right to resettle the repatriated refugees in specific areas.

12. The P.C.C. itself decided that this proposal was unsatisfactory, and communicated it to the Arabs unofficially only. The Arabs accepted it solely on the understanding that it applied exclusively to those refugees who originated in areas allocated to Israel by the U.N. Partition Resolution; and even then they demanded territorial compensation, over and above the Resolution in question, for those refugees of that particular class who did not return to Israel.

13. In subsequent exchanges the Arabs said they would be ready to study the resettlement of those refugees who did not return to the territory allocated to Israel in the U.N. Partition Resolution; and Jordan and Syria said that they would receive refugees originating from those territories who did not return to their homes. The Israelis maintained that the "solution of the refugee problem was to be sought primarily in resettlement in Arab territories."

TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS

14. The Arabs began by demanding the return of all territories controlled by Israel which had been allocated to the Arabs in the U.N. Partition Resolution. The Israelis, notwithstanding their signature of the Protocol, rejected this proposal as unrealistic.

15. The Israelis then proposed that the boundaries between Israel and Egypt and Lebanon should be the same as the Mandatory boundaries: i.e., that Gaza should be ceded to them (paragraph 9 above). The boundary between Israel and Jordan should be the Armistice line "subject to certain modifications in the interests of both parties". Their first proposal for the boundary with Syria is not clear.

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16. The Arabs retorted by claiming all territories allotted to them under the U.N. Partition Resolution, plus the Negev and Eastern Galilee.

17. The Israelis then claimed that all areas falling within their control under the terms of the Armistice Agreement should formally be recognized as Israeli territory. The P.C.C. replied that ~~in~~ reference to the Armistice Agreements in connection with a final settlement, was out of court, since those agreements specifically provided for ~~that~~ the rights etc. of the parties were not prejudiced.

18. The P.C.C. finally informed both Arabs and Israelis that "their proposals exceed the limit of what might be considered 'adjustments' of the map attached to the Protocol". (See C above).

19. The Arabs replied that they still adhered to the terms of the Protocol and that it was up to the P.C.C. to state the extent to which it considered Arab territorial demands excessive. They urged the Commission to present its own proposals.

20. The Israeli reply was completely rigid. In a letter of October 27, 1949, to the P.C.C. the Israeli delegation stated that "The Government of Israel now asserts its title to the territory over which its authority is actually recognized... Although some of the invading Arab armies still stand on the soil of Palestine, Israel is not advancing any further territorial claims. But of the territory now constituting the State of Israel, there can be no cession."

J. A. ...

4. 10. 55.

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~~320~~

P/W

Mr. Graham telephoned last night to say that the Prime Minister had asked about the "1949 Lausanne Proposals" mentioned in paragraph 2 of Beirut telegram No. 731 of October 3 (copy attached at flag A). V1192/433.

I attach a draft to No. 10.

P. H. Laurence

(P.H. Laurence)

October 6, 1955.

Private Secretary first.

Rubb
6/16

Pl type in Private Office

J. H. C.
6/16

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FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OPP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Scott

No. 731
October 3, 1955

D. 8.16 p.m. October 3, 1955
R. 8.58 p.m. October 3, 1955

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 731 of October 3.

Repeated for information to	Amman	Damascus
	Cairo	Tel Aviv
	Benghazi	Bagdad
	Jedda	Tripoli
	Ankara	Tehran
	Karachi	B.M.E.O.
	U.K.T.C. Khartoum	
and Saving to	Paris	Moscow
	Washington	New York (U.K. Del.)
	Bahrain	

My telegram No. 728.

I sought interview with the President this morning and spoke as instructed. The President said that he entirely agreed with Her Majesty's Government's views, but was anxious to know what we were going to do next.

2. He speculated on the situation as follows: The Egyptian deal should be seen in the context of the Arab-Israel dispute. It was up to the West to make a "spectacular move" if they wished to recover the initiative. It would not be enough to take negative action such as cutting off aid, military and economic, to Egypt; that would only make things worse. The Dulles proposals were all right as far as they went, but did not catch public imagination. It would be necessary to go back for a basis to the 1949 Lausanne proposals which had been accepted by both Jews and Arabs. Starting from there, it was by no means hopeless to achieve a settlement not [sic] a peace which would give reasonable satisfaction to Arabs on compensation, boundaries, repatriation and the rest. These problems should be handled together and not one by one.

3. He thought that even if this approach was successful, normal relations would not be established between the Arab States and Israel; but a state of affairs would be reached which

/w/ald

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Beirut telegram No. 731 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

would be far better than the present one. It would however still be necessary for the Arab States to build up their defences to "normal levels". In the case of The Lebanon, this would mean one division, with all the necessary arms and armaments that that implied; in the case of Syria three divisions; and an appropriately balanced force for Egypt.

4. The President then ranged wider afield and said that he wished Iraq were able to reach some kind of accommodation with Syria. He said that he knew French policy was against this, and he knew what our policy was. But Iraq would do nothing unless urged to act. He asked whether we could find some means of stopping Saudi Arabia from spending so much money in Syria; in that case the Syrians themselves would turn towards Iraq. Saudi Arabia was, for its own selfish and very short-sighted purposes and also because of fear of the Hashemites (stronger than their fear of possible Russian penetration), spending large sums of money in Arab countries and buying over a substantial fraction of opinion.

5. The President remarked that it looked as if Syria also might do an arms deal with Russia. The Syrians, like the Egyptians, were dissatisfied with the West both because they had not received sufficient arms from them, and because they could not find satisfactory markets for their exports.

6. I asked the President whether his Minister for Foreign Affairs was correctly reported in today's press as saying that The Lebanon also would accept Russian arms if offered. The President denied this. The Russians had made no offer and if they did The Lebanese answer was ready - there was no money with which to buy Russian arms. At the same time the President complained that the only markets for the increasing Lebanese production of fruit lay behind the Iron Curtain.

Foreign Office pass Priority to Cairo and Routine to Benghazi, Jedda, Tripoli, Ankara, Tehran, Karachi, B.M.E.O. and U.K.T.C. Khartoum as my telegrams Nos. 152, 8, 26, 7, 37, 54, 8, 172, and 12 and Saving to Paris, Moscow, Washington, New York (U.K.Del.), and Bahrain as my telegrams Nos. 30, 3, 34, 14, and 7 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo, Benghazi, Jedda, Tripoli, Ankara, Tehran, B.M.E.O., U.K.T.C. Khartoum and Saving to Paris, Moscow Washington, New York UKDEL and Bahrain].

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section C.R.O. for repetition to Karachi].

ADVANCE COPIES:

FFFFF

Sir H. Caccia
Mr. Shuckburgh

Private Secretary
Head of Levant Department

ON HER MAJESTY'S SECRET SERVICE

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Outline

VR 1078/~~320~~

October 6, 1955.

You said that the Prime Minister wanted to know what the "1949 Proposals" were which were mentioned in paragraph 2 of Beirut telegram no. 731 of October 3, in which Mr. Scott reported a conversation with the Lebanese President.

What the President seems to have meant was that discussion of a Palestine settlement should start from the 1947 United Nations Resolution, which is what the Arabs have been demanding all along. The only proposal accepted by both sides at Lausanne, when the Palestine Conciliation Commission initiated discussions with the Israelis and the Arabs in May, 1949, was a Protocol to which was annexed a "working document". This working document was in fact a map showing the boundaries between the two proposed States in Palestine as defined in the United Nations Resolution of November 29, 1947. The Israeli Representative accepted this document, but at the same time reserved his Government's position on the matters at issue, which meant that he took the United Nations Resolution only as a point of departure. In fact, however, the discussions at Lausanne came to nothing, and in October 1949, the Israeli Delegation formally asserted their Government's title to the territory "over which its authority was actually recognised". He added that "of the territory now constituting the State of Israel, there can be no cession".

G. E. Millard, Esq.

(Ed) J. A. N. [unclear]

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Registry No. V R 1076/320

Top Secret
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Draft

The Chancery
 BEIRUT

From:
 Levant Dept.

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- Damascus,
- Cairo,
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- Washington,
- New York.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RECEIVED IN
 7 OCT 1955
 7/10

Dear Chancery,

We were interested to see from paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 731 of October 3, that the President of the Lebanon advises us to make a spectacular move towards a Palestine Settlement on the basis of the 1949 Lausanne proposals which were "accepted by both Jews and Arabs."

2. As far as we know, the only proposal put forward at Lausanne and accepted by both parties was the Protocol of May 12, 1949, on which the subsequent discussions were supposed to be based. The Protocol proposed "that the working document attached hereto be taken as a basis for discussion with the (Palestine Conciliation Commission)"; and its instrument of acceptance read "The interested delegations have accepted this proposal with the understanding that the exchanges of views which will be carried on by the Commission with the two parties will bear upon the territorial adjustments necessary to the above-indicated objectives."

3. The working document annexed to the Protocol was a map showing the boundaries between the Arab and Jewish States, as defined in the U.N. Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947.

4. The President's advice therefore is tantamount to saying that both ~~states~~ sides should accept the 1947 Resolution as a

/starting

starting point in negotiations for a Palestine Settlement. This theme is a familiar one of the Iraqi Prime Minister. Unfortunately, we see little prospect of inducing the Israelis to repeat their Lausanne performance. Even at that time they subjected their acceptance of the Protocol to certain reservations; and in the subsequent negotiations they behaved as though they had not accepted it at all. Since that time, Israel has become more firmly established and the U.N. Resolutions on Palestine more distant.

It seems to us that the only
5. ~~The best~~ way of approaching negotiations for a settlement now, would be for both Israelis and Arabs to acknowledge that they must make concessions from their respective starting points: the Arabs from the 1947 Resolution, and the Israelis from their claim to their present frontiers.

6. *We are sending copies etc.*
Yours ever,

LEVANT DEPARTMENT.

WJ
9/10

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~~SECRET~~

Put into ME papers in a min
H

~~VR1072/288~~

VR1076/G
321

The Arab / Israel Dispute

If the object of foreign policy is to remove suspicion, the Middle East policy of Her Majesty's Government and the other Great Powers, and above all of the United Nations, has been an outstanding failure.

(2) Fear and suspicion are the driving forces behind the policies of both sides. The Jordanians cannot forget, and expect another, Qibya. The Egyptians still smart under their defeat in the war with Israel and expect a second encounter with the same result. The Israelis, after centuries of persecution see danger lurking behind every boundary stone and pride themselves on the success of their policy of retaliation. These mutual suspicions are grossly exaggerated, partly because fear is an irrational counsellor, and partly to forward the scheming of politicians. But because of them, every proposal for a solution of the dispute, however simple, will meet with opposition, the Governments concerned fearing that acceptance will weaken their bargaining positions either against their enemy or with their friends.

(3) I have become convinced that it is an error to base our policy on the assumption that a package deal will remove suspicion, because no deal is likely to succeed unless the suspicion has first been removed. In other words, any early attempt to make progress on the issues outlined in Mr Dulles' statement of August 26,

would /



would make their several solution less likely.

Furthermore, the present situation over arms supplies makes any approach towards a solution on these lines dangerous as well as impractical.

(4) There are, however, three steps which in the short term, and in isolation, can and should be taken to improve the situation; and any improvement would bring in its train a relaxation of tension.

(a) The Johnston Plan for the Jordan Waters

It is an economic plan, which has few political implications. It benefits both Jordan and Israel (especially the former) and affects Egypt in no particular. If Egypt gave her nod the plan could start to-morrow, but Nasser suspects that if he nodded, Nuri would use the nod to his own advantage, and that after the experience of the Arab Graduates Conference in Jerusalem the Lebanese might be on Nuri's side.

(b) Frontier Policing and Local Commanders' Agreements

Except in the Jerusalem sector there is no contact between opposing Commanders, and nowhere is there (as I should prefer to see) contact between opposing police forces. A large part of the frontier problem arises from banditry, petty thieving and murder gangs instigated by Communist and other influences. No responsible Commander on either side excuses such incidents. It is common sense

that /

that the police forces should co-operate, but as the frontiers are under the command of the military, neither side will delegate control to the police.

I believe that ^{we should press} for more Local Commanders' Agreements ~~we should press for~~, and in addition try to secure co-operation between opposing police forces.

(c) Mount Scopus War Cemetery

This is a very small matter but one in which Parliament has a deep interest. I believe that agreement has now been reached on this, so that the cemetery will shortly be cleared of mines and booby traps and decently cared for. The effect may not be great but it should decrease suspicions in the Jerusalem sector.

(5) In considering a solution in the longer term, I believe that Jordan holds the key position:

- (a) The majority of the refugees are quartered within her frontiers.
- (b) There is less bitterness between the Israeli and Jordan Governments than between Israel and the other Arab States. Equally, Jordan is not greatly involved in the jealousies which divide the Arab League.
- (c) A Local Commanders' Agreement is already operating in one sector of the frontier.
- (d) The British-officered Arab Legion is the soundest and best disciplined force in the Middle East.

(e) /

(e) I found considerable sympathy both in Israel and Egypt with some of Jordan's difficulties.

(6) There are two further facts which must be borne in mind:

(a) The Jordan river seems to me the only defensible frontier. Incidents are inevitable so long as troops face each other on a frontier that is at places unmarked and is throughout indefensible militarily or logically.

(b) The deep cleavage within Jordan between the inhabitants on either side of the river, neither group trusting and both blaming the other: on the east bank they fear the refugee vote and despise the West Jordanian military capacity; on the west bank the rumour has been sedulously fostered that the government on the east purposely mismanaged the discussions on partition and fixed the armistice line to the west's disadvantage.

(7) We should therefore, in my view, work for a demilitarisation of the whole area lying west of the Jordan and entrust the duty of policing it to some international authority, either the United Nations or the parties to the 1950 declaration. The Arab Legion would be withdrawn east of the Jordan and Israel would no longer need to keep forces in the area of the narrow "waist".

(8) A solution on these lines would:

- (a) be in the spirit of the 1947 United Nations Resolution to place Jerusalem and Bethlehem under international administration. Jordan will never accept the Resolution as it stands at present; but she looks forward to increasing revenue from tourists and pilgrims to the Holy Land and has everything to gain from peaceful conditions in that area:
- (b) allow the villages on the Jordan side of the demarcation line to recover land on the other side. From my talks with Sharett and Colonel Herzog (Israeli Commander of the Jerusalem sector) I believe that Israel would be willing to allow this, especially if the Jordanians traded the Latrun salient in return. (The salient, whose value is even now problematical, would after demilitarisation serve no useful purpose at all):
- (c) possibly lead to access by the Jordanians to the port of Haifa, which the Israelis in these circumstances could safely allow.

(9) I realise that such a solution involves great difficulties of "salesmanship" to the United Nations or the three powers, to the Jordanians, and the Israelis. On the other hand

- (a) General Burns' great handicap at present is that he has neither troops nor police under his

command /

command; there is always a risk that an incident may lead to open conflict. The new military obligations of the policing powers would be far smaller than those to which they would be committed in the event of a renewal of Arab/Israeli conflict.

- (b) Without loss of sovereignty, the Jordanians would be relieved of an impossible military commitment; I am confident that the British officers in the Arab Legion would support withdrawal across the Jordan. With a solution of the frontier village problem and access to the Mediterranean, the Jordanian economy would be strengthened. This in its turn would help to solve the refugee problem.
- (c) Although the Israelis would prove stubborn over Jerusalem (about which they are intractable and have extravagant claims) they have nothing to lose except a few fertile fields which their leaders told me they are prepared to surrender. The present continual threat of hostilities will eventually so drain their manpower away from development as to cause a failure of the Zionist experiment. The character and history of these tense and brittle people makes them hard bargainers, but they have no suicidal tendencies where their economic future is at stake.

(10) Whatever the difficulties involved, they will always be less than those involved in selling the Dulles

package /

R.H. Tufan
29.9.55

package. Moreover, progress on the above lines would create an atmosphere in which several issues composing the package could profitably be tackled.

R. H. Turton

R. H. Turton

September 29, 1955.

SECRETARY OF STATE

Copies to: Lord Reading
Sir H. Caccia
Mr. Shuckburgh
Mr. Pink
Levant Dept.
African Dept.



BRITISH EMBASSY
AMMAN

October 6, 1955

1077/87/55G
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VR 1076/322

My dear Rose,

VR 1076/248

Further to Damascus telegram No. 333 of September 1 about the Pakistan Minister's approach to the Syrian Prime Minister, the Pakistan Minister called to see the Ambassador on September 28 in the course of a two-day visit to Amman.

2. He told the Ambassador that he had spoken to the Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as he had not been able to see the Prime Minister at such short notice) about Mr. Dulles' statement. He had taken the line that Pakistan was entirely sympathetic to the Arab cause and wanted to concert with the Arabs a joint reaction to the statement and had said that Pakistan took the view that it would be unwise to give a purely negative response, which would forfeit much international sympathy for the Arabs. The Under-Secretary apparently had been sympathetic to this point of view.

3. In response to the Minister's enquiry, the Ambassador gave his views on the present political situation in Jordan and the attitude of the Jordan Government towards the Johnston Plan. The Ambassador urged him to do anything he could, in conversation with Ministers and other Jordanians, to give them the courage and confidence to accept the Johnston proposals which, as they all realized, would be greatly to Jordan's benefit. It is doubtful, however, whether the Minister was unable to do anything further on this visit as he was leaving early next morning. He hopes to make a longer visit in the near future.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Beirut and Damascus and to the United Kingdom High Commission, Karachi.

Yours sincerely
Harry Dudgeon

(H.A. Dudgeon)

E.M. Rose, Esq., CMG.,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

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(VR 1076/323)

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

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October 20, 1955.

My dear Jack,

In their letter of October 7 to Beirut, Levant Department suggested that there was little prospect of inducing the Israelis to agree to negotiations on the same basis as that which they and the Arabs accepted in the Lausanne Protocol of May 12, 1949.

2. I agree with that view. I do not see how we can expect the Israelis to compromise their position as to agree in effect to take the United Nations resolutions as a starting point in negotiations. It is nevertheless true that they did accept this in 1949, though they paid little enough regard to the Protocol in the negotiations which followed. The Protocol is thus the last example of a common document agreed on by both Arabs and Israelis, and it might be argued that a new start can be made from it which would involve no loss of face. Any device which might make it possible for negotiations to start again is worth trying, and the acceptance of negotiations by the Arabs would be an important gain for the Israelis.

3. I wonder therefore whether you think it might conceivably be possible to induce the Israelis to sign again (if necessary, with full reservations to safeguard their present position) some document like the Lausanne Protocol. I hope you will be able to find an opportunity of sounding the Israeli Government on this point informally without revealing that you have received any instructions or that the Arabs have been thinking over the question.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to Scott in Beirut, with reference to his letter No. 1191/37/55 of October 7 to me (not copied to you).

Yours ever

(Sd) Evelyn Shuckburgh

(C.A.E. Shuckburgh)

J.W. Nicholls, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Tel Aviv.

1955

V
 LEVANT DEPARTMENT

VR1076/324

ISRAEL

FROM Commonwealth
 Relations Office
 (communications)

No. EXT. 58/59/1

Dated October 14

Received in
 Registry— October 20.

Dulles proposals.
 Letter from Mr. Molynaux, Karachi, reporting
 his conversation with Sajjad Hyder. He
 said that according to his information,
 the Arab Foreign Ministers will reject the
 Dulles proposals.

1076

References to former relevant papers

312

MINUTES

There has been nothing yet to show
 what the Arab League Political Committee in Cairo
 have concluded about Mr. Aulter's policy statement,
 or indeed whether they have discussed it at all.

I do not think this letter should be
 copied for the post concerned.

R. Lawrence.
 21/10

R. A. P.
 21/10

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action
 completed)

24/10

(Index)

31/10

References to later relevant papers

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CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED KINGDOM HIGH COMMISSION

KARACHI

EXT. 58/59/1

14th October, 1958

VR1076/324

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VR1076/312

Would you please refer to Commonwealth Relations Office telegram W.176 SAYING about Palestine.

2. We decided not to pass on the enclosure to the Pakistan authorities but to use the material in it to try and find out whether they had any further information about Arab reactions to the Dulles proposals.

3. I accordingly went to see Sajjad Hyder on October 12th. He confirmed that no Arab country had yet taken up any firm line and thought that the whole question would be discussed at the current meeting in Cairo of the Arab League Foreign Ministers. According to his information the Ministers were likely to reject the proposals. It had always been an open question whether they had ever had any chance of acceptance and he doubted whether the news of the Egyptian arms deal with Czechoslovakia would affect the final decision. The real trouble was that none of the present leaders in the present Arab World had the courage to take a lead. They were therefore likely to seize on the inevitable concessions which the proposals represented to Israel as enough reason to reject them. He fully agreed that all this was very unfortunate.

4. I am copying this letter to the Chancery at British Middle East Office.

(J.A. MOLYNEUX)

M.E.C. Rogers Esq.,
Commonwealth Relations Office,
LONDON S.W.1.

ed/6.



M. Shuckburgh AM 20/10
African Dept
Secretary of State
 BELGRADE. *JBW*

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October 14, 1955. *20X*

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Green

My dear Jack,

Following up my conversations with the Yugoslav authorities based on your telegram No. 69/180, I asked the Acting Secretary of State to-day whether the Yugoslav Government had formed any views about Mr. Dulles' proposals for diminishing tension in the Middle East. I pointed out that the situation had been made much more dangerous by the Czechoslovak and Soviet offer of arms. This was hardly a contribution to a diminution of world tension. Apart from being an extremely irresponsible act in itself, it had naturally caused us to doubt the sincerity of Soviet attachment to what was now called "the Geneva spirit". I hoped that Tito on his visit to Egypt in a month or so would use his influence to support the Dulles proposals and so help to remove one of the greatest dangers to world peace. I had also taken the opportunity when Vice-President Kardelj was dining with me last night to speak to him on similar lines, and the point could usefully be driven home when he visits London next month. Tito still, I imagine, exercises quite a considerable influence on Nasser.

/other

Both Kardelj and Micunovic took the point and agreed that the recent Czech and Soviet initiatives were not helpful. They pointed out however that the Yugoslav Government could hardly take too definite a line on the Dulles proposals before the Arab and Israeli Governments who were directly concerned. They also argued, not unmaturally, that the accession of Iran to the Middle East Defence Pact was an unhelpful development on the side, and refused to accept my argument that this Pact was only the Middle East equivalent to the Balkan Alliance. When I asked Kardelj whether the main difficulty in his view was that a great Power, the United Kingdom, was associated with the Middle East Defence Pact, he replied, "Not at all". This was a positive factor, since our influence would be used in the right direction.

yours ever
Frank Roberts

J.G. Ward, Esq., C.M.G.,
 Foreign Office,
 S.W.1.

1035
 (250)

VR1076/G
 /326

FROM *Amman*
 (No Duke to be Shuckburgh)
 No. 1077/97/853
 Dated Oct 20
 Received in Registry Oct 29

ALPHA
 Conversation with the Jordan Prime Minister during which Mr. Dulles' statement was discussed. Said al Muftri expressed regret that the Western Powers had not made more effort to solve the problem. Mr. Duke feels that we should try to reawaken Arab interest in the Dulles statement.

References to former relevant papers
 (VOL 21/121)
 SE1022/17.
 VE 1824/97

MINUTES
 There have also been hints from him and Lebanon that there should now be some new initiative towards a Palestine settlement (for Lebanon see VE 1824/93) and Mr. Shuckburgh has proposed that Mr. Russell should come soon to London to discuss possible steps in this direction (FO telegram no. 66 to Colonel Goussa, copy B attached). Meanwhile Mr. Duke has reported a Jordanian suggestion that a start should be made with the question of the repatriation of or compensation for refugees (VE 1824/97). This does not seem very hopeful but remains a possibility.
 R/Amman
 1/11

(Print)
 (How disposed of)
 Df) Amman letter
 Shuckburgh to Mr. Duke
 Cpt) Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jeddah, Tel Aviv, Damascus - POMER
 Navic

(Action completed) (Index)
 10/11

References to later relevant papers

I should have thought the chances of reviewing Alpha along its original lines were almost nil. Mr. Simpson has commented on the Jordanian /

(1077/92/55G)

CONFIDENTIAL



M.S. for Paris
British Embassy,

AMMAN, *Alpha*

October 29, 1955

VR1076 326

Levant Dept
VR1076/121
CM
27/6

Dear Evelyn.

As I mentioned in my letter No. 1421/124/55 of today's date to Rose, the conversation which I had on October 18 with Sa'id al Mufti, the Jordan Prime Minister, about the meetings in Cairo on the Johnston proposals for the utilisation of the Jordan waters led on to some discussion of the Dulles statement.

2. Sa'id al Mufti expressed regret that the Western Powers had not made more effort to solve the major problem of Palestine as a whole, of which solution he thought the plans for the utilisation of the Jordan waters should form a part. I naturally drew his attention to Mr. Dulles' statement of last August, and to the lack of Arab response to it. Sa'id al Mufti said that the statement was not even mentioned during the recent meetings of the Arab Foreign Ministers in Cairo. He added that anyway Mr. Dulles' statement had not been addressed to the Arab Governments but was merely contained in a speech delivered to some audience in America. I said that I thought that the Arab Governments were being extremely short-sighted in ignoring the opportunity which Mr. Dulles had given of exploring afresh the possible ways of reaching a settlement. They complained that the statement had been vague and obscure; I said that I was sure that if Mr. Dulles had produced more specific proposals for a solution, the Arab States would have rejected them out of hand, as being a scheme produced by the Americans, and therefore inspired by Zionism, which was to be forced on the Arabs and they would therefore not even have considered it. When on the other hand Mr. Dulles had merely appealed for fresh consideration of the problem and outlined some of his ideas, including some of great significance for the Arabs, they complained that his proposals were indefinite and took no notice of them.

3. There was unfortunately no time to pursue the discussion further on that occasion but I feel strongly that further efforts should now be made to reawaken Arab interest in the Dulles statement and to try and get some definite reactions out of them. I was interested to see the views of the Iraqi Foreign Minister on this point, as reported in paragraph 2 of Cairo telegram No. 1445 of October 14. I can see no other step which we can take to prevent the prospects of a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem from receding again into the indeterminate distance, particularly in view of the Egyptian-Czech arms deal and the implications that flow from it.

4. It seems to me that it will be necessary to bring Mr. Dulles' statement once again directly to the notice of the Arab Governments and to ask each definitely for an expression of its views. They may each say they can

/not

C.A.E. Shuckburgh, Esq., C.B., C.M.G.,
Levant Department,
The Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

74/022/17



-2-

not express a view without reference to the others, but I think in that case pressure should be maintained to try and get without much more delay some definite opinion as to how a solution of the Palestine Problem could best be pursued, or at least an expression of willingness to explore the problem further with the Americans and/or ourselves, or something of that sort. In any case I feel that we should not allow the situation to drift, since the current of affairs in this area is now running against us, particularly since the Johnston proposals must, I fear, be regarded as shelved, at best, for the present any way.

5. I am sending copies of this letter to Her Majesty's Representatives at Bagdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jeddah, Tel Aviv, Washington and to the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces.

Lawrence

Lawrence

(C. B. Duke)

Bag 19/11 Nov. 14
 have
 T.P.C. **OUTFILE**

Registry No. V.1076/326 Q.
 Top Secret. GGA
 Secret.
 Confidential.
 Restricted.
 Open.

You will realise that the last part of the Prime Minister's speech in the Guildhall on November 9 was an attempt, such as you advocated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of your letter No. 1077/92/55G of October 20, to awaken Arab interest in the idea of a Palestine settlement. ^{did}
 2. We do not think that it would be much use pressing the Arab Governments for a definite expression of their views on the Dulles statement of August 26, unless at the same time we gave our approaches a new bite. Otherwise, as their earlier reactions to the Dulles statement showed, the Arab States would simply have waited on Egypt; or, had they been persuaded to act on their own, they would have dared to give unfavourable responses only. We hope, however, that the Prime Minister's frankness and his reference to the United Nations resolutions will ^{now} make it possible for you and H.M. Representatives in other Arab States to pin the Arabs down to a definite move towards negotiations.

Please leave this address to Mr. Duke

To: C. B. Duke, Esq.
 AMMAN.

From: Mr. Blackbrough.

Copy to: E.M.E.R. by AIRMAIL, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, and P.O.M.E.F.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Mr. Simpson fist.
Do you want to add anything? No
11/14
C. B. Duke
11/14

3. ^{I do not think much of} ~~the~~ suggestion, made by certain Jordanian Ministers and reported in your telegram No. 436 of October 27, that the refugees should now be called upon to register formally their preference for compensation or repatriation. ^{in any case} We doubt whether the refugee question is the right starting-point; but even if it proves to be so, we should not get anywhere by inviting the refugees to opt in vacuo. If they were required to give grounds for their claims

/for

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
 14 Nov. 1955
 14/11

for repatriation, as the Jordanian Ministers suggested, they would simply say that they wanted to go home and point to the appropriate U.N. resolution. Whatever the real views of the refugees may be, we fear that their hosts would see to that.

4. ^{I am sending} Copies of this letter are being sent to H.M. Representatives at the receipt of yours

CD
WJ

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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✓ R1076
827.

TOP SECRET.

Hay A
VR1022/2

Mr Shuckburgh has asked whether we should not take up the latter part of paragraph 5 of Tel Aviv telegram No. 381 of October 19 with the Americans with a view to making some correction.

Hay B
VR1076/294G

2. Mr Sharett has no justification for saying that the British Government have explained that "only minor mutual border rectifications" had been implied in Mr Dulles' policy statement of August 26. When the Israel Ambassador called on him on September 15 the Secretary of State told him that we could not possibly guarantee frontiers which everybody regarded as unsatisfactory; at the same time, while the Arabs took their stand on the United Nations resolution of 1947 and the Israelis on their present frontiers as the result of war, we felt that some accommodation must be made and could be made if both sides wanted it. (Foreign Office despatch No. 174 to Tel Aviv). This implies that some compromise between the present frontiers and those envisaged in the United Nations resolution was what we had in mind. This would involve more than minor frontier rectification.

Hay C
VR1076/298G

3. The Americans on the other hand may have given the Israelis more cause for hope of being let off lightly. When Mr Eban called on Mr George Allen on September 6 the latter told him, according to a telegram from the State Department which the United States Embassy showed to Mr Arthur, that the Israelis should not assume that all the necessary adjustments to the frontier would be at their expense. Mr Allen did not, apparently, dissent when Mr Eban said that the Israelis would not give up all or part of the Negev, nor did Mr Lawson react when Mr Sharett told him, on September 8, that the Israeli Government was prepared for mutual adjustment of boundaries

/but not for

but not for cession (Tel Aviv telegram No. 331, paragraph 4).

Hay D
VR 1976/2830



4. On the question of a security treaty also the Americans seem to have given Mr Sharett some ground for speaking as he did. During his conversation with Mr Eban on September 6, Mr Allen said that it was not surprising that the Israelis wanted a guarantee before a settlement; the United States preferred that agreement on a settlement should come first. A preference is different from a condition.

5. Mr Sharett no doubt spoke deliberately, hoping that, if we did not correct him, he would be able to argue later that our silence had implied that his interpretation of our intentions was correct. It seems therefore important to correct him. The question is, how.

6. Three ways occur to me: first, a statement by News Department; second, the inspiration of a Parliamentary Question; third, a communication to the Israel Government by the two Ambassadors.

7. The first would, I think, be too public and might arouse too much interest in the details of our proposals. The second would have the same disadvantage and would also seem too ponderous a procedure. The third seems the best course. We must, however, avoid being drawn into further discussion, for the reasons set out in our telegram No. 4184 to Washington.

Hay E
-12836

8. I submit a draft telegram to Washington.

P. H. Laurence

(P. H. Laurence.)
October 21, 1955.

I think this is now
"water over the dam" - as s/s
has urged Sharett to make concessions
X CHD 27/10

P. H. Laurence
21/10

P. H. Laurence

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O. A. E. SHUCKBURGH

VR 1922/2

FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Nicholls

No. 381

October 19, 1955

D. 6.31 p.m. October 19, 1955

R. 7.17 p.m. October 19, 1955

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 381 of October 19

Repeated for information Saving to:

Cairo	Jerusalem
Amman	Washington
Damascus	Paris
Beirut	UKDEL New York
Bagdad	

Mr. Rose
I wonder whether we should take up the later part of para 5 with the Americans with some points correction?

Following is summary of Israel Prime Minister's speech yesterday in the Knesset.

2. Mr. Sharett dealt first with the tension along the Gaza strip in September and the operations of Egyptian commandos inside Israel. The subsequent activities of gangs in the north of Israel were attributed to an Egyptian initiative "we must once more warn Egypt that it will be considered liable for the continuation of such murderous activities, although this warning in no way absolves from responsibility those other Arab countries bound by the Armistice Agreement to prevent penetration of armed forces into Israel from their territory".

3. As regards the El Auja demilitarized zone "if Egypt proposes once more to disregard the obligations it has recently undertaken, we reserve to ourselves the freedom to act in accordance with the requirements of the situation".

4. Over the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba also "we reserve for ourselves full freedom of action at the time and in the manner we shall find suitable" since the new regulations contravene the Armistice Agreement, resolutions of the Security Council and international law in general.

5. Turning to Mr. Dulles' speech of August 26 Mr. Sharett admitted that it evidenced a fuller understanding of Israel's problems, but referred to sections which aroused misgiving and required clarification, especially the part dealing with boundaries. He reasserted in unequivocal terms that Israel was determined to preserve its territorial integrity from Dan to Eilat and that no unilateral concessions on its part were even /conceivable.

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Tel Aviv telegram No. 381 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

conceivable. The United States and British Governments were said to have explained that only "minor mutual border rectifications" had been implied. Discussions with the former had not confirmed that frontier adjustments were regarded as an indispensable condition to a security treaty.

6. Mr. Sharett supported Mr. Johnston's belief that the gap between Israel and the Arab States on the distribution of Jordan waters has been greatly narrowed. "On the other hand we are not prepared to forego indefinitely the realization of vital development projects based upon our own rights. It is our own firm hope that whichever way the (Arab) decision goes, the work in which we are so vitally interested will be renewed in that (coming) work season and carried on without interruption".

7. The remaining two thirds of Mr. Sharett's speech was devoted to "the distressing prospect of the accrual to the strongest State among our adversaries of a far reaching military advantage". This event had "cast a deep shadow on the entire scene of the State's foreign and defence affairs" and might lead to far reaching conclusions, although it also imposed the need for cool judgment.

8. A long opening on this subject dealt with the inconsistency between "peace" and the deliberate arming of Egypt, "what relation does this (Soviet) initiative bear to the policy of reducing international tension, progressive disarmament and a gradual working toward a stable world peace which the U.S.S.R. at present avows", and "both parties attempted to describe the arrangement as a purely commercial deal intended to satisfy defence needs. Neither of the parties ignored Israel or pretended that the arms were not destined to be used against her".

9. In all this "a heavy and primary responsibility rests with the Western Powers, who were the first to try to bribe wavering régimes with military assistance". Unfortunately there is no certainly that the deplorable policy of the past will not continue in the future and lead as before, consciously or unconsciously, to the sacrificing of Israel.

10. Mr. Sharett went on to claim that the military manpower of the Arab States was already double that of Israel, their combined defence budgets greater than Israel's total civil and military budget and that the Egyptian army alone was superior

/in all

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Tel Aviv telegram No. 381 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

in all categories of heavy weapons, used in land, sea or air warfare. Israel's qualitative advantage could never serve as a full substitute for a vast quantitative advantage, and ever since the establishment of the State Israel had been under the threat of a widening gap. That is why their cry had always been no arms race, but faced with the alarming prospect of a decisive increase in the armed power of hostile neighbours, the obtaining of powerful modern arms became for Israel a first essential of existence. We will not hesitate to obtain them from every possible source.

11. The change which had taken place in the last few weeks also invested with an additional urgency Israel's need for a security pact. Such a pact was justified and vital. Nevertheless, just as I have emphasized our need for a security pact in addition to the supply of arms, I must stress, even more emphatically, that no security pact is a substitute for arms.

Foreign Office pass to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Washington, Paris and New York (U.K.Del.) as my Saving telegrams Nos. 32, 31, 32, 37, 21, 11, 69, 104 and 52 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Washington, Paris and New York (U.K.Del.)]

F F F F

(1031/107/55)

CONFIDENTIAL

MR
Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]



BRITISH EMBASSY,
TEL AVIV

VR 1076

October 31, 1955

VR 1076/529

My dear Evelyn

Please refer to your letter VR 1076/323 of October 20 about the Lausanne Protocol of May 12, 1949.

2. I had a long talk on October 28 with Walter Eytan (on which I am reporting separately) in the course of which he said that he would like to tell me the full inside story of the Lausanne Conference one day when I had six or eight hours to spare. This gave me a natural opening to take up the point in your letter; I said that I had recently re-read the text of the Protocol and that I wondered whether it, or something like it, might not come in useful one day as a basis for new talks with one or more of the Arab countries.
3. Eytan replied at once that he did not think so. He said that the Protocol itself was no more than a device to which the Arabs, the Israelis and the Conciliation Commission all lent themselves. The Commission had told the Israelis that the signature of some agreed document was an absolutely necessary prerequisite to the successful continuation of the negotiations; and that, if they could swallow the indirect reference to the United Nations Resolution of 1947, it would not commit them to anything, but would serve to break the log jam. Having confirmed that the Arabs fully understood that this was the intention, the Israelis finally accepted the draft Protocol, though they stipulated that the reference to the map embodying the 1947 partition plan should be amended to make it clear that it would be taken as "a basis", and not as "the basis" for the discussions with the Commission.
4. I said that I was quite prepared to accept that the Protocol was merely designed to save face all round and get discussions started, but that did not seem to me to be a valid reason why it should not be used again for the same purpose. Eytan produced two counter-arguments to this point. First, he said that things had solidified a good deal since 1949 and that he doubted whether any Israel Government would be prepared to accept such a clear reference to the 1947 Resolution, even if there were reservations attached to it. Secondly, he said, he did not believe that any fruitful negotiations could take place with any Arab leader who found it necessary to resort to face-saving devices of this kind. What was needed was rather an Arab leader with sufficient guts to tell his people that, though they all hated the Jews and wished that Israel did not exist, it was time to stop playing the ostrich and come to terms. Such a leader could, he said, perfectly well use the argument that the best way of guaranteeing the Arab States against Israeli expansionism was to pin them down firmly to their present frontiers by means of a treaty which could be guaranteed by the great powers or the United Nations.

/I did

C. A. E. Shuckburgh, Esq., C.B., C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

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2.

5. I did not think it worth pressing Eytan any further, but I ended this part of our talk by saying that even if such a prodigy among Arabs were to arise, it might well be that a suitable reference to the Lausanne Protocol would be a helpful starting point for discussion. Eytan said that this was a bridge we would cross when we came to it.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter to Scott at Beirut.

Yours ever
Jack Liddell.

<p>1555 (252)</p>	<p>LEVANT DEPARTMENT ISRAEL</p>	<p>G VR1076/330</p>
<p>FROM Sir H. Sevelyan Case TOP SECRET No. 1641 Dated Mar 5 Received in Registry— Mar 7</p>	<p><u>ALPHA & Egyptian Policy</u> Expresses the hope that we will not encourage any more Arab States to adhere to the Baghdad Pact, as by doing so, we should be attacking Nasser on his most sensitive point, & would be likely to lose his support. Suggests we should not go further than the "Triangles", and tackle the frontier question first.</p>	
<p>REFERENCES V1023/24 V1023/20 V1025/2 SE 1194/177C</p>	<p>MINUTES It is to be hoped that Nasser will be willing to talk Palestine after the P.M.'s Mansion House speech. But I fear Sir H. Sevelyan may be right in believing that Nasser won't talk if Jordan joins the Pact.</p>	
<p>(Print)</p>	<p>P. Amis 9/11</p>	
<p>(How disposed of)</p>	<p>Reuk 10/61</p>	
<p>(Action completed) [Signature]</p>	<p>(Index) [Signature]</p>	
<p>38111</p>		

TOP SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

VR1076 G
330

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan

VR1076

No. 1641
November 5, 1955.

D. 6.16 p.m. November 5, 1955.
R. 7.22 p.m. November 5, 1955.

PRIORITY
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1641 of November 5.

RECEIVED IN C.B.
- 7 NOV 1955
SENT TO DEPT.
7/11

Repeated for information to Amman Bagdad Beirut
Damascus Tel Aviv
and Saving to Washington Paris

P.O.M.E.F.
11025/2

My telegram No. 1625: Egyptian Policy and Alpha.

I do not doubt the strength of Nasser's feeling on the question of the possible adherence of Syria, the Lebanon or Jordan to the Bagdad Pact. If we sought to enlarge the Pact by the addition of any other Arab countries, we should be attacking Nasser on his most sensitive point. It might well be a turning point in his thinking and I should be much more sceptical thereafter of the prospects of his leaning to our side, which at the moment are still reasonably good.

11023/20

11073/544

2. I do not think that we should establish a direct link between his conduct and our decision on enlarging the Bagdad Pact (see my telegram No. 1609, paragraph 2(g), nor would I suggest that we should again assure Nasser as we did in March (Cairo telegram No. 415), that we should not press for further adherents. But I hope that we shall not encourage any of the States concerned to join for the moment. The Iraqis, in discussing bilateral pacts with Syria and the Lebanon, presumably also have in mind the possibility of moving towards a rapprochement with Egypt. The next step here still seems to be to discuss Palestine seriously with Nasser and, particularly, your ideas on his land connexion with Jordan (New York telegram to me No. 88, paragraph 5). But I think that we must be prepared to go further than the triangies. I do not now think that we can get anywhere by tackling anything except the frontier question first.

TE 1194/776

Foreign Office pass to Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus and Tel Aviv and Saving to Washington and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 91, 151, 164, 69, 157, 176 and 225 respectively.

[Repeated to Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv and Saving to Washington and Paris].

SSSSS

Ents

VR1076
331

TOP SECRET

PALESTINE SETTLEMENT

V1893/89
VR10710/7

We have been told both in Iraq and Jordan that we ought to make another attempt towards a Palestine settlement (see Flag A Amman telegram No. 436 and paragraph 4 of Bagdad telegram No. 838). The importance of getting a settlement needs no emphasis. Soviet intrusion into Middle Eastern affairs has not only increased the danger of war between the Arab States and Israel: it has also exposed the whole weakness of our position in the Middle East. We shall never be safe until the Palestine question has been settled. Without a settlement a policy implicitly based on the division of the Arab world will ultimately fail.

2. At the same time we cannot do anything that will risk losing us our Arab friends, whom we need more than ever now. We must indeed try to restore some of their confidence in us, for there is a general feeling that we have lost the initiative in Middle Eastern affairs. What can we do?

3. Alpha

We could pursue the original Alpha plan where we left off. This would be the least risky thing we could do and in theory it is still the most hopeful way of arriving ultimately at a settlement. But, as always, it depends entirely on the attitude of Colonel Nasser. It is impossible to feel hopeful of securing his co-operation. It is arguable that his recent taste of Israeli power will chasten him to the point at which he might be prepared for peace at the Alpha price. But unhappily this is not likely. A person in his position, where there is no tradition of loyalty to the régime, can rarely afford to negotiate from weakness, if he is to survive. He does not want war with Israel, but

/there

RECEIVED IN C.B.
- 8 1955
SENT TO DEPT.
84

there is a great danger that his insecurity (combined with Israel provocation, on which one can always rely) will drive him to more spectacular adventures until war comes.

4. On the other hand, Nasser has often told us that he is willing to talk confidentially about a Palestine settlement. He said this to H.M. Ambassador just before the news of his arms deal with Czechoslovakia was published (Cairo telegram No. 1286 of September 20); and he has recently repeated it to Mr. Byroade (para. 2(a) of Cairo telegram No. 1609 of November 2). There is much to be said for one last determined effort to interest him in Alpha, however small our chance of success. It would be better to do this through special emissaries rather than through our Ambassadors in Cairo.

V1016/306 G
Flag C
V1023/20
Flag D

5. Alpha without Egypt

We have often discussed the possibility of trying to promote a general or partial settlement on the lines of Alpha through some other Arab country or countries. We have always concluded, I believe rightly, that this would not be possible. No Arab country would "go it alone". Nor would it be to our advantage to try to induce one to do so.

6. Pressure on Arab Governments to respond favourably to Mr. Dulles' Statement

There is not in fact much difference between this proposal and the one set out in paragraph 3 above. The Arab States would wait for Egypt. The reactions to Mr. Dulles' statement confirm this view.

7. Publish Alpha

We considered this during the summer and we were prepared to face it, though with much misgiving. But the situation has since changed: tension has risen, not

/only

-3-

only on the frontiers with Israel, but throughout the Middle East. Recent Soviet moves have made it even more important to avoid administering severe shocks to the Arabs and to steer clear of anything that raises the temperature. Such risks could only be taken if there was a good chance that they would contribute towards an early settlement. But this is the last thing that the publication of Alpha would do in the present circumstances.

8. United Nations action

The Palestine Conciliation Commission would not even be able to get started. If we wished to achieve a general settlement, we should have to raise the whole Palestine question in the General Assembly. We know that the Arabs are bitterly opposed to this, since they fear that the adoption of new resolutions would undermine their stand on the old. We should only take the risk of alienating them seriously if we were fairly certain of a favourable outcome. But once the question came before the General Assembly heaven knows where it would end. The record of the Assembly on this matter is not very inspiring, and the Russians would be presented with a fine opportunity to exploit the whole business.

9. A new approach

There remains the possibility that we might make a new approach to the parties, or another public statement, in the hope of getting the contestants, and particularly the Arabs, to think in terms of a settlement, or at least negotiations, rather than of war. If we do this, it will be necessary to show our hand more than Mr. Dulles did in his statement of August 26, for mere repetition would be a bankrupt idea. But as I have suggested above, the hand

/that

-4-

that we show cannot be the details of Alpha. We need something that will make it possible for our Arab friends to support us and difficult for our Arab enemies to attack. I can only see one possibility: that we should move towards some acknowledgment of the validity of the United Nations resolutions on Palestine.

10. I do not suggest that we should publicly advocate negotiations on the basis of those resolutions. This, although easily defensible, would be entirely unacceptable to the Israelis and it would be in effect a complete capitulation to the Arab case. It would frighten the Americans, frighten Parliament, drive the Israelis to despair and perhaps precipitate the war that we must avoid. It would be seen as a triumph for Colonel Nasser's policy of blackmail.

11. It might however be possible for us to recognise the United Nations resolutions as one of the factors which must be taken into account in negotiating a settlement. I have in mind some kind of approach or public statement which would refer to, and appear to derive from, Mr. Dulles' speech of August 26, invite the parties to respond to that initiative, and go on to say something like the following.

"The Arabs base their case on the 1947 and other United Nations resolutions, the Israelis on the present situation. Both of these are perfectly tenable positions from which to start a negotiation. It is not right that U.N. resolutions should be ignored; but equally it is not possible to maintain that in present circumstances the U.N. resolutions on Palestine could be put into operation in every respect. Both sides must realise that if they

/want

-5-

want peace they will have to negotiate a compromise between these two positions.

12. A statement of this kind would be a blow to the Israelis. But we must face the fact that if we are ever to bring about a Palestine settlement we shall have to be nasty to the Israelis at some stage. As they themselves put it, they are to be asked to sacrifice something of what they have whilst the Arabs only give up claims. This was implicit in the Alpha proposals (though I often wonder whether the Americans really faced it), but the evil day was to be postponed until we had secured Arab agreement. There is something to be said for advancing it to an early stage of the operation. By doing so we should give ourselves a better chance of getting the Arabs to talk seriously, and with luck we might get them down to something very like Alpha. The general idea would be to trade Western Galilee for Israel concessions in the Negev, and to advance the Jordanian frontier a little nearer to the 1947 partition lines. The ultimate task of putting a settlement of this kind across to the Israelis, would not be much more difficult than it would have been under the original Alpha procedure.

13. The timing of any public move on these lines would need very careful consideration: the situation on the frontier would have to be less tense than it is today. But if we can induce the U.S. Government to take part in this new approach (which they will be very reluctant to do), the Secretary of State might perhaps discuss it as one of the possibilities when he sees Nuri in Bagdad. If we decide to proceed on these lines we should have to seek the views of our Missions in the Middle East and give the parties to the dispute warning of any public move, as we did before.

14.
G-G Anthony
11.11.57

-6-

14. Recommendations

I believe therefore that there are two courses which we should consider:-

- (a) another approach to Nasser, and
- (b) a fresh start which would include recognition of the United Nations resolutions on Palestine.

G. G. Arthur

(G. G. Arthur)
November 4, 1955

Obs
7/11

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TOP SECRET

FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

VR1076
839

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Nicholls

No. 455

D:9.10 a.m. November 11, 1955

November 11, 1955

R:9.52 a.m. November 11, 1955

VR1076

PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 455 of November 11

11/4

Repeated for information to: Cairo Washington

Cairo telegram No. 1641: Alpha.

When proposals were first mooted, I gave it as my opinion that the Negev triangles represented the furthest points to which the Israelis could possibly be brought, and that even that was doubtful. Since then, opposition to territorial concessions in the Negev has hardened and the discovery of oil in the region will no doubt make the Israelis even less inclined to cede territory there.

2. I fear, therefore, that it would be quite unrealistic to go further than the triangle proposal in discussions with the Egyptians.

Foreign Office pass to Cairo and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 159 and 118 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo and Washington]

2222



VR 1076/33B

- 1. Mr. Shutehampton
- 2. Sir W. ... seen.

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

November 6, 1955.

W. ...
My dear Andrew,

The Prime Minister instructed me to tell you that the only interesting point which emerged from his lunch with General Burns on Saturday was that the General took the view that the refugee question was more important than the frontier question. The Prime Minister notes, however, that this appears to be directly contrary to Sir Humphrey Trevelyan's view as expressed in Cairo telegram no. 1641.

your ever,
Philip

A.A.S. Stark, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

11/7/55/35006

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VR1076
334
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V

I have been considering with the Department the implications of the passage on the Middle East which I have submitted for the Prime Minister's Mansion House speech on Wednesday. I understand a copy has already gone to the Prime Minister.

2. The kernel of the statement is in the penultimate paragraph where the Prime Minister would be stating openly for the first time that a solution for the Palestine problem must be found as a compromise between the present status quo and the 1947 Resolutions. Although this is well-known to be the fact, it will be a painful thing for the Jews to hear it stated by one of the Great Powers.

3. It is, I think, essential that this paragraph in the Prime Minister's speech should be shown to Mr. Dulles beforehand. Not to do so would be very near a breach of faith, having regard to the history of our Alpha discussions. Furthermore it would be very dangerous, since there can be no Palestine settlement without American participation, both diplomatic and financial.

4. The question is whether it is right to present Mr. Dulles with a choice of this kind at twenty-four hours notice. One cannot be sure quite how much stir will be caused by a statement of this kind; and whether Mr. Dulles would regard it as little more than a plain statement of what was already implicit in Alpha, or whether he will think it a new policy move on which he should have been given more time to comment. One solution might be, if he does not like the statement, to suggest the omission of the two sentences beginning "It is not right that" and ending "put into operation as they stand". These are perfectly good sentences in my opinion, but they do constitute a more explicit recognition of the validity of the U.N.

Resolutions on Palestine than we have been prepared to make

11/11

so far. If they were cut out from this text it might be possible to make use of them in Parliament later.

5. Another important point on which the Prime Minister's view ought to be known is whether he would intend this statement to be followed up by a further attempt to get an Alpha settlement. If so, our publicity and our approaches to the States concerned must be arranged accordingly and there is very little time for this.

6. Would it be possible to have a talk with the Secretary of State ^{& Minister of State} about this today?

A. S. Cunningham

November 7, 1955.

Sir H. Caccia

*Discussed with Sir H. Caccia,
also and with S/S.*

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Mr. Rove

SECTION
IN MIDDLE EAST
FOR PRIME
MINISTER'S
MANGLION HOUSE
SPEECH

But what must we think of the actions of the Soviet Government in the Middle East? Here is an area of dangerous tension where we have been trying for the last seven years to prevent a competition in armaments and to bring about some sort of settlement. We have not been entirely unsuccessful. For despite frontier incidents from time to time, some more serious than others, there has been no open outbreak of fighting since 1948. The level of arms in the area, and especially of the most modern types, has been kept relatively low. There has been a sort of balance, though naturally each side thought itself less favoured than the other. Many people were beginning to see that a solution must somehow be found and the reception given to Mr. Dulles' proposal last August was by no means discouraging.

Into this delicate situation the Soviets have now decided to pour weapons of war, tanks, aeroplanes, even submarines, to one side only. Could anything be more irresponsible, less consistent with the duty of a world power seeking peace and reduction of tension? At first we were told that it was a purely commercial transaction. It was simply a matter, Mr. Molotov said, of the armament manufacturers of Czechoslovakia supplying a legitimate demand. He was quite shocked that we should question this pure and /innocent ..

innocent business transaction. Later, however, the Russians have taken the line - for I can assure you that we have not failed to remonstrate with them - that it is not a commercial matter at all. It is not even primarily a Czechoslovak matter. It has to do, we are told, with such things as the Bagdad Pact. It is part of the Soviet response to our attempts to build up some sort of common security in the Middle East. In fact it is a political move and must be taken in conjunction with other aspects of Soviet intervention in the Middle East, their open appeal to Arab Nationalist sentiment against Israel, their new diplomatic interest in Libya, the Yemen and so on. I am sure we all realise here, and I hope it is realised in the Middle East, that this is a major move towards the spread of Soviet influence and Communism throughout that area. It is a move designed to discredit the Western Powers in the eyes of the Arab World, so that the penetration of Arab society by Communism may be made the easier. Many proud States, some of which have not long enjoyed independence and national identity, will be threatened with submergence in the Communist Empire if they allow themselves to be detached in this way from the other free nations of the world. I can assure them, and all our friends in the Middle East, that we shall do our utmost with their help to prevent the success of this patent manoeuvre.

The immediate effect of the arrival of

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these large quantities of arms has been a sharp increase of tension, with very dangerous possibilities all round the borders of Israel. The Israelis feel their very existence threatened. The Arab States, naturally enough, applaud Egypt's success. Many of them would like to get arms from a source which has no scruple in supplying whatever is asked for. I hardly think we can blame them. It is not the recipients, it is the suppliers who must be held responsible for the consequences.

c The immediate task is to prevent the outbreak of war. We are giving our full support to General Egras, the United Nations Chief of Staff in Palestine, in his efforts to keep the forces of the two sides apart. I should like to pay tribute to his imperturbable patience and determination in this hazardous task. He is urging both sides to withdraw their forces from the El Aqja demilitarized zone and I trust that they will do so.

But obviously the matter lies far deeper than this. The real cause of the trouble is the unreconciled hostility between Israel and her Arab neighbours, which time has shown no signs of healing since the Armistice Agreements of 1949. If it were not for this, the supply of arms would not have half the importance or half the danger that it has today. If it were not for this, the countries of the Middle East could be attending to

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their economic and social problems and for greater progress could have been made in building up a stable, prosperous and safe society in that ancient area of civilisation.

We have been trying for a long time to find common ground on which some kind of settlement might be achieved. We fully supported the proposals which Mr. Dulles outlined in August. I think the time has now come when the acute dangers of the situation forced us to try again. We must somehow attack and eliminate the central cause of the trouble. Our country has a special responsibility in all this, for we have a long history of friendship with the Middle East and we still have an important position there.

I believe it should be possible for us to find common ground between the two positions.

There is, after all, already a common interest in one respect. Neither Israel nor her Arab neighbours want to see their differences turned to advantage by the Communists. None of them wants to see the Middle East reduced to the conditions of Eastern Europe. From that starting point, cannot we all look once again at the proposals put forward by Mr. Dulles and supported by Her Majesty's Government? The essence of these proposals was that if there could be an agreed settlement of the boundaries, the United States and the United Kingdom, and perhaps other powers, would be prepared to give a formal guarantee by treaty with both sides.

/Our

Our two countries would offer substantial help over the tragic problem of the refugees. Can we not move on a ^{little} farther from this?

The position is that the Arabs take their stand on the 1947 and other United Nations Resolutions. They have said that they would be willing to discuss terms with Israel on that basis. The Israelis, on the other hand, base themselves on the Armistice Agreements of 1949 and on the present situation which they occupy. Between these two positions there is of course a wide gap. But is it so wide that no negotiation is possible between them? It is not right that United Nations resolutions should be ignored. But equally it is not possible to maintain that the United Nations resolutions on Palestine can now be put into operation as they stand. I believe we have a duty to tell both sides plainly that if they want peace there will have to be a compromise between these two positions.

I want to say tonight, Ladies and Gentlemen, that Her Majesty's Government and I myself are available to render any service in this cause. We offer our services in an endeavour to find at least a modus vivendi which will enable the peoples concerned to get on with their lives in peace.

NOTES FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

But the picture in the Middle East is not all dark. There are forces working for peace and stability, forces which will, I trust, raise the standard of prosperity and reduce the chronic hatreds which so gravely retard progress.

In all the countries of the area, and especially in Iraq and Egypt, great new projects of development are in hand or being drawn up which raise the standard of living and the prosperity of these peoples. We have already played a large part and hope to participate even more fully in these projects.

The Bagdad Pact is a free association of powers interested in the security of the region, and we support it wholeheartedly. It does not infringe the sovereignty or independence of the Arab States in any way and it is of course purely a defensive arrangement. I do not see that it need create any division of interest or outlook between those who belong and those who do not. But we supported it wholeheartedly and we welcome the wise decision of Iran to accede to it. The Foreign Secretary will attend the first meeting of the Pact Council in Bagdad this month and I hope this will be an occasion for strengthening our ties of friendship with our partners in this Pact.

It is our firm determination to support our friends. We have intervened firmly to protect the rights of the Sultan of Muscat and

/the

the Ruler of Abu Dhabi in the Dursini affair. Nobody regrets more than I that our traditionally cordial relations with Saudi Arabia have been upset. I hope that King Saud will come to realise that he has been badly advised in this matter. We would like to rebuild the friendship between ~~the~~ ^{our} two countries. Why not? Saudi Arabia is ~~by~~ rich and large. She is not threatened in any way by Muscat or Abu Dhabi. She has no shortage of oil resources. Why should she not leave her small neighbours alone?

In the Sudan, too, we are concerned to ensure a peaceful and prosperous future for our friends the Sudanese. We and the Egyptian Government have agreed to the proposal of the Sudan Government that there should be a plebiscite to decide the form which the new State is to take. I hope that the arrangements for this can be put in hand speedily and by agreement. It is not good that there should be much more uncertainty about the future and I can say that it is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to give the Sudanese the earliest possible opportunity to chart their course. We have ~~not~~ ^{no} selfish ambitions there.

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITERALL DISTRIBUTION

No. 740

November 9, 1955.

R. 8.30 p.m. November 9, 1955.

IMMEDIATE
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Addressed to Amman telegram No. 740 of November 9.

And [Immediate] to:- Beirut No. 947
 Bagdad No. 1549
 Cairo No. 2586
 Tel Aviv No. 770
 Damascus No. 567
 Jeddah No. 788
 Tripoli No. 270

Repeated for information to:

[Immediate]	(Codel Geneva	Paris	}	[Immediate]
	Bonghugi [priority]	Tehran		
[Immediate]	(Ankara	P.O.M.E.F.	}	[Immediate]
	U.K. Del. New York	Jerusalem		
	(Washington	Karachi		

In his speech at the Mansion House this evening the Prime Minister will deal with the Arab/League dispute. The text of the relevant passage will be telegraphed to you as soon as possible after delivery.

2. Please approach the Government to which you are accredited as soon as possible tomorrow and do your utmost to prevail upon them to associate themselves with the Prime Minister's remarks and to accept the idea of a compromise on the basis suggested. In urging this course Her Majesty's Representatives in Arab countries should make use of the following points:-

(a) The Prime Minister's remarks are in no way inconsistent with the proposals made by Mr. Dulles in his statement of August 26. They simply make plain what Mr. Dulles implied about frontiers. Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government are of one mind on this question. They are doing their best to help the Arabs make a move towards negotiation..

(b) The Prime Minister has recognised that United Nations resolutions must be taken into account in negotiating a settlement. I hope therefore that in their public /statements

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Foreign Office telegram No. 740 to Amman

- 2 -

statements the Arab Governments will acknowledge how far this goes to meet their position and try to ensure that it is recognised appropriately in the press. Now is the Arabs' chance to show their statesmanship and move towards an honourable settlement.

(c) At the same time, I hope that the Arabs' reaction will be realistic. The present situation must be taken into account no less than the United Nations resolutions, and it is no longer possible to put the resolutions into effect as they stand. I hope therefore that the Arab Governments will make it clear from the start that, although they take their stand on the United Nations resolutions, they are prepared to make concessions from that position in order to reach a settlement.

(d) From the Arab point of view a settlement is more urgent than ever. Without one, there is a growing danger that Communism will feed on continuing conflict and dissension and will spread throughout the Arab world. Do the Arabs want this?

3. I hope that with these and other arguments with which you will be familiar, you will be able to convince the Arab Governments that the basis of negotiation proposed by the Prime Minister is the only one now practicable which takes account of Arab claims and interests. I am sending special supplementary instructions to Bagdad, Cairo and Tel Aviv.

4. You should keep your United States colleague informed. Mr. Dulles has been told of the Prime Minister's intention, which he welcomes.

SECRET

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cyphers/CIT

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
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No. 2387

November 9, 1955

D. 7. 2 p.m. November 9, 1955

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 2387 of November 9
Repeated for information to Washington [Priority]
Codal Geneva [Priority]

My telegram No. 740 to Amman [of November 9. Palestine].

You should remind Colonel Nasser that both Her Majesty's Government and United States Governments have made it clear to him that one of the most important steps which he could take to restore mutual confidence would be to cooperate in the achievement of a Palestine settlement. The Prime Minister has done his best to make this easy for him. He can scarcely complain, as he did after Mr. Dulles' statement (your telegram No. 1136 [of August 27]), that this speech contains nothing of advantage for the Arabs.

2. Colonel Nasser has given us the impression that he wants a settlement with Israel and is opposed to the spread of Communism. Now is the chance for him to prove his sincerity and his statesmanship. He can do so in the following ways:-

(a) By associating himself with the task of seeking a settlement on the basis proposed now by Sir Anthony Eden and earlier by Mr. Dulles.

(b) By seeing that the Prime Minister's speech receives fair treatment by the Egyptian press and radio.

(c) By expressing to you his willingness to discuss soon the nature of a settlement either directly with the Israelis or through British and American intermediaries.

(d) By commending the statements of the Prime Minister and Mr. Dulles to other Arab Governments.

(e) By exercising great restraint on the frontiers and abstaining from all provocation of the Israelis both in speech and action.

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO BAGDAD

Cypher/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
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No. 1550
November 9, 1955

D. 7.03 p.m. November 9, 1955

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Bagdad telegram No. 1550 of November 9
Repeated for information to Codel Geneva
Cairo } Priority
Washington }

My telegram No. 710 [of November 9, Palestine] to Amman.

You will no doubt remind Nuri that he has told us more than once that if the United Nations resolutions were used as a starting point the Arabs would be prepared to make concessions from their position in order to reach a Palestine settlement. The Prime Minister has gone as far as possible to meet that point of view. We hope therefore that Nuri will see that the Mansion House speech receives a favourable reception in Iraq and will find some way of assuring the other Arab leaders, and particularly Colonel Nasser, that the Iraq Government will give their full support to the search for a compromise settlement such as the Prime Minister and Mr. Dulles have proposed. It is important that Colonel Nasser should know that his rivals will not seek to exploit any move he makes.

2. We count on Nuri's help in this.

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

Cypher/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

No. 771

November 9, 1955.

D.7.55 p.m. November 9, 1955.

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Tel Aviv telegram No. 771 of November 9
Repeated for information to Washington [Priority]
Codel Geneva [Priority]

My telegram No. 740 to Amman, [of November 9, Palestine].

I am aware that the Israelis will dislike the reference to United Nations resolutions. They will probably allege that the Mansion House speech represents a change in the policy of Her Majesty's Government to appease the Arabs.

X
2. You should therefore assure the Israel Government that our policy and our views on the nature of a settlement have not changed. The Prime Minister is not repeat not advocating that the United Nations resolutions should be taken as the sole basis for negotiations. He is simply saying that these resolutions are the Arab starting point. This is a plain fact, whether the Israelis like it or not. The existence of the United Nations resolutions can no more be ignored than the realities of the present situation. Any settlement requires concessions from both sides, and the Israelis must realize that they will have to make some sacrifices if they want peace. There is nothing new in that. It has always been Her Majesty's Government's view. It was also implied in Mr. Dulles' statement of August 26, as the Israelis themselves perceived; and Mr. Dulles has told me that he recently made it quite clear to Mr. Sharett in Geneva.

X
3. I do not expect the Israelis to abandon their contention that negotiations should be related to the present situation. But I hope that you will be able to bring them to see that they cannot hope for a settlement, or even for negotiations, if they

/refuse to

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office telegram No.771 to Tel Aviv

- 2 -

refuse to move at all from their starting point. I hope that the Prime Minister's plain speaking will break the deadlock and that both sides will now begin to look for common ground. We are ready to help in the search.

4. You should make it clear to the Israel Government, as suggested in paragraph 2(a) of my telegram under reference, that the Mansion House speech and Mr. Dulles' statement of August 26 are complementary, Her Majesty's Government are still in entire agreement with what Mr. Dulles said, and Mr. Dulles is in agreement with the Prime Minister's speech.

5. Should you judge it necessary in the light of the reaction to your approach, you should leave the Israel Government in no doubt that the use of force in the manner that is now being canvassed in some quarters in Israel would bring tripartite declaration into play against them. We must appeal to the Israelis, as we are appealing to the Arabs, to reflect calmly on the present situation and consider seriously what contribution they are prepared to make towards a settlement.

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO ANKARA

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
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No: 1640

November 9, 1955

D. 6.40 a.m. November 10, 1955

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Addressed to Ankara telegram No. 1640 of November 9.

And to: Tehran No. 731 Paris No. 2132

Repeated for information to:

Washington

Codel Geneva.

My telegram No. 740 to Amman [of November 9]: Palestine].

Please draw the attention of the Government to which you are accredited to the Mansion House speech and urge them to use all their influence with the parties to the dispute in favour of a settlement on the basis proposed by the Prime Minister.

2. With the Soviet intrusion into the Middle East the Palestine conflict has become more serious than ever. It is now a threat not only to the stability of the Middle East, but to East/West relations as a whole. The Prime Minister's plain speaking and his appeal for a compromise settlement is intended to try and end the deadlock and open up the possibility of negotiations.

XXXX

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

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FOREIGN OFFICE AND
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No. 742

November 9, 1955

D. 11.15 p.m. November 9, 1955

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Amman telegram No. 742 of November 9

and to: Beirut No. 949	Jedda No. 789
Bagdad No. 1551	Tripoli No. 271 [All
Cairo No. 2592	Tel Aviv No. 772 Priority]
Damascus No. 570	

Repeated for information to:

Benghazi	Washington [Priority]
Ankara	Tehran
U.K. Del. New York	Jerusalem
	Karachi

and Saving to: Paris No. 3697
P.O.M.E.F. No. 1065

My telegram No. 740 to Amman: [of November 9 Palestine].

In your publicity you should underline the frankness and friendly sincerity of the Prime Minister's speech. It says plainly what all true and disinterested friends of the Middle Eastern peoples believe and desire; that a solution to the Palestine problem should be sought in a compromise between the United Nations resolutions and the present situation between Israel and her neighbours.

2. You should emphasize that the views of Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government on this question are identical. In his speech of August 26 Mr. Dulles was advocating the same kind of compromise settlement as the Prime Minister. No other solution is possible; and no settlement of any kind can be reached without the considerable outside help, both diplomatic and financial, which Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government are alone able to provide.

3. Arab posts should make use of the points contained in paragraph 2 of my telegram under reference, emphasizing in particular the Prime Minister's recognition that the United Nations /resolutions

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Foreign Office telegram No. 742 to Amman

-2-

resolutions cannot be ignored. The Arabs have missed many chances of negotiating a reasonable settlement, and they have always lost by doing so. We hope they will respond constructively to the Prime Minister's offer of help and show their willingness to relax the rigidity of their stand on the United Nations resolutions. They may take this as their starting point, but they cannot expect the Israelis to do so too. Each side must at least acknowledge the other's starting point.

4. In Israel comment should as far as possible be avoided. If necessary, Israeli allegations that our views have changed or ceased to be impartial, should be rebutted on the lines of my telegram No. ~~742~~⁷⁷¹ to Tel Aviv (not to all). The Israelis say they want peace. They must realise that no conflict can be settled peacefully without sacrifices.

5. You should not be drawn on concrete examples of what a compromise settlement might look like. The important thing is for both sides to show their readiness to discuss such a settlement. If serious negotiations could be started in a spirit of goodwill, the outlines of a settlement would soon appear.

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Section 1

VR 1076/335

**SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RIGHT HON.
SIR ANTHONY EDEN, K.G., M.C., M.P., AT
THE LORD MAYOR'S BANQUET ON
NOVEMBER 9, 1955**

My late Lord Mayor. My Lord Mayor. Your Graces. Your Excellencies. My Lords, ladies and gentlemen.

It is indeed for me a moving occasion to have this opportunity for the first time to reply on behalf of my colleagues and myself to your more than generous welcome. This important civic occasion stands in a category entirely by itself in our nation's history. To-night we pay tribute once again to the glory and greatness of this City of London, battered in war and gracious in peace.

My Lord Mayor, you referred to the famous speech of William Pitt. If my historical recollections are not at fault, that speech lasted exactly two minutes. In that respect, and in others, it was a model I can hardly hope to equal, but I will try to live up to the advice that an elder statesman gave me in the younger years of my Parliamentary life when he said: "Young man, if you can't contrive to say what you've got to say in twenty minutes, you'd better not try to say it at all."

I think in this company I should say that is still applicable to the House of Commons at this time. My Lord Mayor, you have reminded me that it is traditional that I should speak to you this evening on the subject of foreign affairs, and this I propose to do, just a little bit like going home. But since our foreign policy requires a strong and healthy economy, you will allow me this prelude in the presence and with the agreement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

My Lord Mayor, as a nation we have to keep in check any disturbing rise in costs and prices which can injure us at home and undermine our power to compete abroad. The measures which the Government have introduced are designed to moderate home demands, and to moderate also the distribution of cotton; but the problem of price stability cannot be solved by the

Government alone. There is also need for a restraint on all sides: by employers and shareholders as well as by employees—both in fixing prices and in seeking higher incomes and rewards. Of this, my Lord Mayor, I am certain: if, as a nation, we can practise restraint for a while, we shall find our prosperity more firmly established and our opportunities more encouraging than they have ever been before.

Now, my Lord Mayor, since my famous predecessor spoke to you a year ago, we have seen the three nations of the West happily welded together—the Federal Republic of Germany has joined N.A.T.O. and the Western European Union. It is sad that the first Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Forces, President Eisenhower, should, at this moment, be laid aside by illness. It is indeed an unhappy conjunction of events that at this time two of the world's wisest and bravest statesmen—the President of the United States and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany—should be absent from our counsels through illness. My Lord Mayor, we look forward eagerly to their full recovery.

We in this country are indeed fortunate that, in spite of the lively controversy in our political life, there is profound agreement between us on those matters which affect our country's safety and its place in the world, and in this instinctive unity we are at one with our fellow nations of the Commonwealth. I am happy, as I am sure you are, that it has been possible to arrange a meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London in June next year.

It will be of special help to me to be able to meet together with my colleagues for the first time since I took office as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. It is well known to you all, the main purpose of these meetings is not to lay down policies, or to take formal decisions, but they are none the

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less important for that. Perhaps all the more valuable for that. The counsel and support of the Commonwealth is of constant help to all its members, and not least to us here in Britain. There is nothing to compare with its free consultation in this world to-day.

My Lord Mayor, it has been the hope of us all that at Geneva this autumn the welcoming smiles of summer would be interpreted into solid agreement. That is what our Foreign Secretary has been working hard to do. The news last night was not good. I do not find that altogether surprising, having attended countless conferences between East and West. We all welcomed the easier personal relationship established by the Heads of Government in Geneva, but we have always made it plain that it will be upon the results of these more detailed meetings that judgment will finally be pronounced.

My Lord Mayor, I have only three comments to make on the present state of discussions at Geneva, and I hope I will carry you with me in them all. First; to attempt to keep Germany divided for a further indefinite period ten years after the war is ended adds to the dangers in Europe and is no contribution to peace. Secondly; Germany, like other countries, must be free to make her own decision as to her political future by the free voice of her people. In other words she is entitled to free elections, and it is indefensible to hold that free elections cannot take place because the Communist system in East Germany must be preserved. Thirdly; the Western nations and Soviet Russia cannot but recall the experience of past years. Mutual undertakings should therefore be given and taken against any act of aggression in Europe. This is the most effective assurance we have been able to devise. If it can be improved upon, let other suggestions be made.

My Lord Mayor, as you and this audience know, we in this country, and I who am speaking to you, have had something to do with the authorship of the proposals put forward by the West at Geneva. But of course we do not suggest that they are unalterable. But any alternative, to be of any real value, must take account of the three essential elements I have just described. Meanwhile, my Lord Mayor, as you hinted just now, the discoveries of science underlying the responsibilities of statesmen, may be they may even bring them wisdom, one never can tell. But there is no leader of any one

of the Great Powers of the world who does not know how utterly destructive of all mankind any conflict between them must be. We pray that this knowledge will bring fruits. In a measure it has probably already done so, but it is not enough for the great nations to hold back from the final act which leads to war. They must lead, guide, restrain those whose conflicts may begin on a minor scale, but could yet wrap the whole world in flames. And here, my Lord Mayor, I have to discuss a grave situation with you. Between Israel and Egypt lies an area of dangerous tension.

During the past seven years we have been trying to bring about some kind of settlement, successive Governments in this country and our allies, in that part of the world. And to prevent competition in armaments there. We have not been entirely unsuccessful. Despite frontier incidents from time to time, some more serious than others, there has been no war since 1948. The level of arms has been kept comparatively low, and this applies especially to more modern weapons. There has been some kind of a balance, though naturally each side cries loudly that it is less favoured than the other.

My Lord Mayor, I had hopes, real hopes, that many peoples in these lands were beginning to see that a way to peace must somehow be found, in all their interests. We have been working for a long time past without publicity to promote such a result. In this connection, the reception given to Mr. Dulles' proposals last August was by no means discouraging. It should be followed up, but now, now into this delicate situation the Soviet Government have decided to inject a new element of danger, and to deliver weapons of war, tanks, aeroplanes, even submarines, to one side only. It is fantastic to pretend that this deliberate act of policy was an innocent commercial transaction.

Of course, my Lord Mayor, it is no such thing. It is a move to gain popularity at the expense of the restraint shown by the West, and by this means it is intended to make it easier for communism to penetrate the Arab world. Its consequences should be clear for all to see. Many proud States, some of which have not long enjoyed independence and national identity, will be threatened with submergence in the Communist empire if they fall victims to these tactics.

For our part, sir, we find it impossible to reconcile this Soviet action with protestations that they wish to end the cold war in

the new spirit of Geneva. The authors of these actions must have known well enough in advance what the effect of the sudden arrival of these large quantities of arms must be. It has brought a sharp increase of tension, with very dangerous possibilities, particularly between Egypt and Israel. And yet, when nations face each other in hostility it is not much use just blaming them for getting arms wherever they can. It is not with the recipients, but with the suppliers, that the main responsibility must lie.

Now, my Lord Mayor, what is our immediate task? It is to prevent the outbreak of war. General Burns, United Nations Chief of Staff in Palestine, and a distinguished Canadian soldier, has been tireless in his efforts to keep the forces of the two sides apart. He and his staff have shown patience and courage in a hazardous work, and we should all be most grateful to them. At this moment, General Burns is urging both sides to withdraw their forces from the El Auja demilitarised zone. We are giving him full diplomatic support for his present proposal in the capitals concerned. But let there be no mistake. Were any country to reject counsels of moderation it would forfeit the sympathy of this, and I believe every other peace-loving nation, and once lost that sympathy might be hard to regain.

My Lord Mayor, you were kind enough to refer to my experience at the Foreign Office, and I would just, in that connection, like to say this. I have never known a situation where it was clearer that neither party, neither party has anything whatever to hope for in the long term from any military conflict. It is in the interests of both to put the demilitarised zone between them. I saw General Burns when he was in London three days ago, and he knows that if there is any further help we can give him we shall be glad to do so. It will be a great gain if the risks of frontier incidents can be reduced; it will be a greater gain if the tragic problem of the refugees can be dealt with. I much regret that the hard work which Mr. Johnston of the United States has devoted to preparing irrigation schemes has not yet been accepted by those concerned. It should be, for it is in the interests of all, Israeli and Arab alike, and we are ready to help here also, as we have done with the Arab refugees.

But, my Lord Mayor, beneath the volcanic crust of these smouldering dangers lies a deeper peril still. The hostility between Israel and her Arab neighbours is

unreconciled; here time has proved no healer. There is no progress to record to you since the armistice agreement six years ago. If it were not for these harsh and enduring sentiments, the countries of the Middle East could give all their efforts to their economic and social plans. They could concentrate on building up happy and prosperous societies in their lands. As I said, we have tried for a long time past to find common grounds for some kind of settlement. I think that the time has now come when the acute dangers of the situation command us to try again. We must, somehow, attempt to deal with the root cause of the trouble, and our country has a special responsibility in all this, for we have a long tradition of friendship with the Middle East.

I believe that it should be possible to find a common ground between the two positions. There is, after all, one interest which both parties ought to share: neither Israel nor her Arab neighbours can want to see their differences turned to the advantage of anyone else, and there is somebody else quite ready to receive the advantage. Now, sir, from that starting point, can we not all look once again at the proposals which the United States Government and we ourselves have been advocating?

We have only one desire in this, if our Arab and Israeli friends would but believe us, and it is to help to find a means of living which will enable the peoples concerned to dwell side by side in peace. Let us give one instance. If there could be an accepted arrangement between them, about their boundaries, we, Her Majesty's Government and, I believe, the United States Government, and perhaps other Powers too, would be prepared to give a formal guarantee to both sides, and that might bring real confidence and security at last; and our countries would also offer substantial help, financial and other, over this tragic problem of the refugees. All this we will do, but cannot we perhaps now move even a little further than this, and I think the Guildhall is the right place to make this suggestion?

The position to-day is that the Arabs on the one side take their stand on the 1947 and other United Nations resolutions—that is where they are. They said they would be willing to open discussions with Israel from that basis. The Israelis on the other side, they found themselves on the later armistice agreement of 1949 and on the present territories which they occupy.

Now, my Lord Mayor, between those two positions there is, of course, a wide gap,

4

but is it so wide that no negotiation is possible to bridge it? It is not right, I agree, that United Nations resolutions should be ignored, but equally can it be maintained the United Nations resolutions on Palestine can now be put into operation just as they stand?

The stark truth is that if these nations want to win a peace, which is in both their interests and to which we want to help them, they must make some compromise between these two positions.

My Lord Mayor, I am convinced, I am convinced that it is possible to work this out, and if we could do so it would bring relief and happiness to millions and the sooner the better. If we fail to do so, none can tell what the consequences may be. I want to say to-night, my Lord Mayor, that Her Majesty's Government, and I personally, are available to render any service in this cause; if there is anything, anything that we can do to help, we would gladly do it for the sake of peace.

B

SECRET

V R1076 338 V

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET (CABINET)
DISTRIBUTION

V R1076/338/299

Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 1693
November 10, 1955.

D. 10.15 p.m. November 10, 1955.
R. 10.50 p.m. November 10, 1955.

PRIORITY
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1693 of November 10
Repeated for information to Washington

V R1072/296

Your telegrams Nos. 2586 and 2587: Palestine.

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and put to him the points in your two telegrams under reference. He replied as follows:

(a) He told me confidentially that the Egyptian Government welcomed the statement, and would be prepared to associate themselves with the task of seeking a settlement. He was not prepared to commit himself to saying on what basis this settlement would be, nor would he say that they would necessarily start from the point of the 1947 Resolution. He said that the Bernadette proposals of 1948 for example, might be more acceptable to the Arabs as a start. He reiterated the view, which he had previously expressed, that the Arabs would have to have the Negev, including Beersheba, and that they would not accept either Jewish corridors through an Arab Negev, nor Arab corridors through a Jewish Negev. He expected no difficulties over Jerusalem and probably no serious difficulties over the refugees;

(b) They would do their best to see that reactions to the Prime Minister's speech on the Press and radio were not too critical. He said that we must understand that it would be a tactical mistake for the Egyptian Press and radio publicly to support the speech. Everybody would suspect that there was some conspiracy with the British, and the chances of making progress would be diminished. They would, however, try and taper off public opposition to a Palestine settlement both in Egypt and the other Arab States, and try to create an atmosphere which would help to lead to a settlement. The Egyptian Government would not issue any statement themselves on the speech, since this would be bad tactics at the moment, and would reduce the chances of working towards a settlement.

(c) They would not be willing to negotiate directly with the Israelis. Any form of negotiation on a multi-lateral basis which brought in the other Arab States would kill all possibilities of a settlement. They would, however,

/be prepared

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SECRET

Cairo telegram No. 1693 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

be prepared to discuss the details of a settlement with ourselves and the Americans, either separately or together, in a way which would not attract notice. As they had said before, the conversations must be extremely confidential and known to those only directly concerned in London, Washington and Cairo;

(d) They would be prepared at the right time to "stick their neck out" more than was prudent for them, as they had in the case of the Jordan Waters. For the present, he would do what he could cautiously to improve the reactions of the other Arab States to the Prime Minister's speech. Incidentally, he wished to tell me, as he had told Mr. Johnston in New York, that they were doing their best to bring the Jordan Waters' scheme to the surface again;

(e) They would exercise the greatest restraint on the borders, and abstain from every kind of provocation.

2. Your instructions arrived just after I had seen Nasser yesterday. He will probably be able to see me on Saturday. I think it better not to press for an earlier interview, particularly as he has to see Mr. Pearson and General Burns tomorrow, and was very tired when I saw him yesterday. Moreover, by Saturday I shall be able to get a more useful reaction from him than if I were to insist on pursuing this with him immediately.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and my American colleague are dining with me in a small party on the 16th, at which no other foreigners will be present. Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees that this will be a suitable opportunity for an informal tripartite discussion. I have discussed this with my American colleague who also agrees. I hope that by that time he and I can have instructions from Washington and London which will enable us to take the matter some way further, both as regards method of procedure and on the boundary question. On this latter question we hope that we can have general instructions, which will enable us to try and move towards something more possible than the Beersheba line, without committing Her Majesty's Government or the United States Government.

4. We both consider that the Minister's reaction was quite encouraging and that our best chance of getting anywhere is to proceed on the lines which the Egyptians propose, by confidential Anglo-American discussions with them. Nasser's views may not be the same, but I have heard of a Scripps Howard report of an interview with him, published in today's American Press, which apparently records him as going surprisingly far.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington as my telegram No. 211.

[Repeated to Washington]

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FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

R1076/33 FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITTHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Gallagher

No. 162

November 10, 1955

D: 6.03 p.m. November 10, 1955

R: 6.30 p.m. November 10, 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 162 of
November 10

Repeated for information to: Amman Bagdad
Beirut Cairo
Jedda Tel Aviv

Your telegram No. 740 to Amman. ^{VR1072}

Two Syrian Ministers with whom I spoke earlier this a.m. had already heard the gist of the Prime Minister's Mansion House speech from Near East broadcasting station. Their attitude was reserved.

Later I spoke as directed to the Acting Prime Minister. He noted points to be stressed and together we made translation of the most important passages of the speech, copy of which I am sending him and others. He seemed interested in the idea and promised to put the matter to the President and Cabinet later this morning. He thought, however, the Syrian Government would be unable to make official announcement favouring the plan until more precise details were available. I thereupon stated you would be happy to answer Syrian queries if feasible, but pointed out the difficulty of being more precise at the present stage.

Foreign Office pass to Cairo and Jedda as my telegrams 135 and 29 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo and Jedda]

2222

NOV 11 1955

1955

V
 LEVANT DEPARTMENT

ISRAEL

VR 1076/340

FROM Mr Graham
 Tripoli
 No. 270
 Dated Nov 11
 Received in
 Registry— Nov 11.

Mansion House speech
 Libyan Prime Minister welcomed
 the speech, and promised that his
 Government would work for a settlement
 by negotiation rather than force.

1076:

References to former relevant papers

MINUTES

We noticed from his reaction to Dulles' speech that
 Libyan P.M. seems to feel very strongly about
 the status of Jerusalem; and to put that question
 much more to the fore than the other Arab
 States. Is this just a personal fad, as
 I suspect; or is there any reason you know of?

P. Amis
 12/xi

African Dept.

I can recall nothing to account for
 Ben Halim's selecting the status of Jerusalem
 for special mention or can only suppose
 that this was a personal fad on his
 part.

J.F.S. Phillips
 15/11

Mr. Rowfden

I agree
CR
 15/11

See
 17
 xi

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
<i>[Signature]</i> 11/11	1076/340

References to later relevant papers

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FROM TRIPOLI TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

VR1076/340

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Graham
No. 270
November 11, 1955

D. 9.58 a.m. November 11, 1955
R. 10.20 a.m. November 11, 1955

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 270 of November 11.
Repeated for information saving to Benghazi.

Your telegram to Amman No. 740. ^{VR1076} Mansion House Speech.

I spoke to the Libyan Prime Minister last night as instructed. He welcomed the speech as constructive and advanced on Mr. Dulles' proposal, because more concrete. He promised that the Libyan Government would work for settlement of the dispute by negotiation rather than force, but warned that it would be difficult to make progress without substantial border rectifications (which would facilitate settlement of refugee problem) and change in the status of Jerusalem.

2. Full text of the speech was broadcast over Tripoli radio last night and appears prominently in to-day's issue of Government controlled Tripoli papers.

T T T

NOV 11 1955
RECEIVED
FOREIGN OFFICE
WHITEHALL

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair
Mr. Scott

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

R1076/344

No: 854
November 11, 1955

D: 10.46 a.m. November 11, 1955
R: 11.29 a.m. November 11, 1955

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 854 of November 11,
Repeated for information Saving to:

Amman,	Tripoli,	Washington,
Bagdad,	Codel Geneva,	Paris,
Cairo,	Benghazi,	Tehran,
Tel Aviv,	Ankara,	P.O.M.E.F.,
Damasous,	U.K. Del New York,	Jerusalem,
Jedda,		Karachi.

Your telegram No.743 to Amman.

Prime Minister's speech has been widely and prominently reported. Because of delivery time the reporting has carried over to today and comment, in two papers only, has been based solely on the first half of the passages on the Middle East. Israelis' reported rejection of the Prime Minister's proposals is well covered this morning.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Amman, Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda, Tripoli, Codel Geneva, Benghazi, Ankara, U.K. Del New York, Washington, Paris, Tehran, Jerusalem and Karachi as my numbers 65, 43, 52, 44, 10, 5, 13, 35, 18, 57, 44, 21, 10 and 5 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Amman, Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda, Tripoli, Codel Geneva, Benghazi, Ankara, U.K. Del New York, Washington, Paris, Tehran, Jerusalem and copies sent to Telegraph Section C.R.O. for repetition Saving to Karachi.]

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FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

R1076/342

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
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Mr. Scott

No: 853

November 11, 1955.

D. 12.04 p.m. November 11, 1955.

R. 12.27 p.m. November 11, 1955.

IMMEDIATE

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 853 of November 11.

Repeated for information Saving to

Amman,	Ankara,
Bagdad,	U.K. Del New York
Cairo,	Washington,
Tel Aviv,	Paris,
Damasous,	Tehran,
Jedda,	P.O.M.E.F.
Tripoli,	Jerusalem
Codel Geneva,	Karachi,
Bonghazi,	

Your telegram No. 740 to Amman. VR21070

In the absence in Cairo of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I saw the Prime Minister (having previously sent him an Arabic translation of extracts from Sir Anthony Eden's speech which was telegraphed here) and spoke accordingly. I was accompanied by Oriental Secretary.

2. M. Karame replied that he had studied text and had come to the conclusion that although this offered "a very small step forward" in that the Prime Minister had recognized that the 1947 resolution of the United Nations must be taken into account, it was impossible for him to accept principle of negotiating away from the letter of these resolutions. Such negotiations would implicitly admit the right of Israel to more than the resolution gave her; and that was not to be contemplated. Secondly, M. Karame said that the Prime Minister had not made any specific proposals for dealing with the refugee problem: financial help without the right of repatriation was no solution. Finally, he said that he could not go in the face of reported adverse decision of the Arab League Council in Cairo and preliminary comment in Lebanese Press, which was hostile. And he was personally not convinced of the value of negotiating at all.

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Beirut telegram No. 853 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

3. In the course of a 40 minute discussion in which I urged him strongly to make a public declaration of the fact that Sir Anthony Eden's proposal offered a basis from which to seek a compromise; and pressed him to take a realistic view of Israel's existence, and necessity therefore for Arabs to move from their rigid position, M. Karame showed himself unyielding. The fact is that he does not wish to find a solution nor does he regard the need for a settlement now as more urgent than before. He, and the great majority of the Lebanese, are completely oblivious of the dangers of Russian penetration in the Middle East because all their attention is concentrated on Israel. M. Karame added that he regarded Britain as a good and well-tryed friend of the Arabs, whereas American policy, with which we tried to keep in step, would be increasingly dominated for next year by Jewish vote in Presidential elections; and thereby distorted in favour of Israel.

4. I am afraid that M. Karame is a small man and a prejudiced one; and I have no hope that a Lebanese Government led by him will take any helpful steps. I pressed him in the end at least to acknowledge the Prime Minister's initiative and to make a further positive contribution himself by stating precisely on what further points he wished clarification before a basis of negotiation could be accepted. I have little hope however that he will do even this. I left him on the promise that he would study the Prime Minister's speech further with his colleagues and let me know the result this week. I have also sent copies of statement to President of the Lebanese Republic with a covering letter emphasizing points in telegram under reference.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Amman, Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda, Tripoli, Codel Geneva, Benghazi, Ankara, U.K. Del New York, Washington, Paris, Tehran, Jerusalem and Karachi as my Saving telegrams 64, 42, 51, 43, 9, 4, 12, 34, 17, 56, 43, 20, 9 and 4 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Amman, Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda, Tripoli, Codel Geneva, Benghazi, Ankara, U.K. Del New York, Washington, Paris, Tehran, Jerusalem.]

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section C.R.O. for repetition Saving to Karachi.]

ADVANCE COPIES

XXXXX Private Secretary
Sir H. Gaccia

Mr. Shuckburgh
Head Levant Department

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FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Nicholls
No. 457
November 11, 1955.

VR1076/34B

3.2 p.m. November 11, 1955.
3.37 p.m. November 11, 1955.

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL
ASIDE

VR1076

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 457 of November 11.
Repeated for information to Washington.

Your telegram No. 771: Prime Minister's Speech.

The Israelis will be favourably impressed by doubts cast on [grp under] of 1947 Resolution rather than unfavourably impressed by statement that the declaration should not be ignored. Publicity directed to Israel need therefore not be defensive in tone on this point.

2. The main positive line should I suggest be:
 - (a) the speech is implicit in recognition of Her Majesty's Government's belief that Israel is here to stay and will, once peace is achieved, be a factor of stability and progress in the Middle East;
 - (b) our immediate object is to get negotiations started.

Israel will retain full freedom of choice and will be able to decide, once talks have started, whether an acceptable basis for a settlement exists or whether she prefers to let the present situation continue with all its uncertainties and increasing dangers.

Foreign Office pass Washington as my telegram No. 119.

[Repeated to Washington].

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Information Policy Department
News Department
Regional Advisers
Levant Department
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FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

VR1076/344

Mr. Nicholls
No. 160
November 11, 1955

D. 6.27 p.m. November 11, 1955
R. 7.00 p.m. November 11, 1955

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 160 of November 11
Repeated for information Saving to Washington Beirut

Amman Cairo
Bagdad Damascus

Your telegram No. 774: Prime Minister's Guildhall Speech.

Early press reception of Prime Minister's speech has been at best unenthusiastic. Summarised reports of the speech appear in most papers and it is quoted at length in Jerusalem Post and Lamerhav.

2. All papers report prominently at the same time comments ascribed to Mr. Sharrett on arrival at New York. He is said by Habaker (General Zionist) to have described Prime Minister's speech as regrettable, fantastic and unconstructive and by other papers to have described the appeal for a compromise on territorial issues as "disconcerting", Davar adds "the Foreign Minister emphasised that it was difficult to consider Britain as an impartial mediator since Eden had made it clear which compromise he aimed at".

3. In such comment as appears (there are normally no editorials today) the Press appear to have taken their cue from Mr. Sharrett. Haaretz (Independent) finds no advance on the United Kingdom's previous attitude of support for the Dulles proposals, and suspects that the speech is intended to serve as an alibi for Britain if the situation deteriorates. Habaker in an editorial suggests that the West plans to appease the Arab States and that the danger facing Israel does not bother the conscience of any Western Power. Lamerhav depicts the speech as hostile to Israel and intended merely to secure Britain's position in the rest of the Middle East.

Foreign Office pass Washington as my telegram No. 120 and to Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Cairo and Damascus as my Saving telegrams 35, 30, 52, 38 and 13 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Washington, Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Cairo and Damascus]

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NOV 11 1955

