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FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En clair 1073/1151 FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Gallagher D: 5.13 p.m. October 22, 1955.
No. 411 R: 6.13 p.m. October 22, 1955.
October 22, 1955.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 411 of October 22.
Repeated for information to Ankara Cairo Bagdad
Tel Aviv
and Saving to Amman Beirut Jeddah
Paris Washington P.O.M.E.F.

My telegram No. 409. Syrian-Egyptian Agreement.

Following is summary of communiqué broadcast by Damascus radio this afternoon.

A mutual defence pact between Syria and Egypt was signed on October 20. This pact will shortly be submitted to Parliament and the text will then be published. Versions which have appeared in the Press are substantially correct, although they do not correspond exactly with the final text. In general the pact provides for a unified army under a single command and the construction of military installations. It is not inconsistent with the Collective Security Pact and will be followed by other similar agreements.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Jeddah, Paris and Washington as my Saving telegrams Nos. 91, 141 and 152 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Jeddah, Paris and Washington].

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SECRET

FROM ANKARA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

1073

152 FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION



Sir J. Bowker
No. 754
October 22, 1955.

D. 1.41 p. m. October 22, 1955.
R. 2.45 p. m. October 22, 1955.

PRIORITY
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 754 of October 22

Repeated for information to

Amman Bagdad Beirut Cairo Damascus Karachi
Tehran Washington Tripoli
And Saving to
P. O. M. E. F.

Your telegram No. 1502: Jordan and the Bagdad Pact.

I explained your views to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening referring also to the conclusions of your talks with Mr. Dulles in Washington on how to meet Egypt's arms deal with Czechoslovakia (as summarized in the memorandum given to me by Mr. Ward dated October 14).

2. M. Zorlu disputed strongly the view that Nasser had acted under pressure from his army supporters. He maintained that Nasser was fully responsible for his policy and was not in any way to be trusted, and that he was also no doubt responsible for Libya's decision to open diplomatic relations with Russia taken without any previous intimation to the Western Powers to whom she owed her existence. In the Turkish Government's view the Western Powers should take promptly all possible action to diminish the prestige Nasser had acquired by his recent move. Jordan's accession to the Bagdad Pact would be most effective in that sense. The Turkish Government's impression was that the Jordan Government would not now if they were quite convinced that Her Majesty's Government wanted them to do so.

3. I said that M. Zorlu would see that there was a divergence of views between him and you both in diagnosing Nasser's recent move and as regards Jordan's present accession to the Bagdad Pact. On the latter issue I summarized your view as being that you were unwilling to exert pressure on Jordan at a moment when you thought it would be both unavailing and inopportune, though you thought it could only do good if the Turkish President and he himself when at Amman, spoke in favour of Jordan's accession, and on the lines indicated in paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference. I also gave him the estimation of the possibility of the Lebanon joining the pact as given in paragraph 1 of Beirut telegram No. 771.

4. M. Zorlu said that these questions were of vital importance to the Western position in the Middle East and required much closer co-ordination of policy between Britain, America and Turkey. He will no doubt wish to discuss all this with you in Paris, and I think it would be useful if you could give him an opportunity of doing so.

/ Foreign Office please



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Ankara telegram No. 754 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

Foreign Office please pass to Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Karachi, Tehran, Washington and Tripoli as my telegrams Nos. 27, 99, 41, 53, 33, 39, 37, 61 and 1 respectively and Saving to P. O. M. E. F. as my Saving telegram No. 88.

[Repeated to Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Tehran, Washington and Tripoli and Saving to P. O. M. E. F.]

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section C. R. O. for repetition to Karachi]

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FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

1073/1153

Mr. Gallagher

No. 415

October 22, 1955

D. 5.52 p.m. October 22, 1955

R. 6.26 p.m. October 22, 1955

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 415 of October 22

Repeated for information to Ankara Bagdad
Cairo Tel Aviv
and Saving to Amman Paris
Beirut Washington
Jedda P.O.M.E.F.

Damascus 414
My immediately preceding telegram.

Most Damascus papers continue to welcome Syrian-Egyptian pact, although some regret that it is to be a purely military alliance. The Left-wing press expresses the hope that it will be a step towards the Tripartite Pact which would mean a greater degree of Arab unity. Only one paper, N.A.S. (pro-Western) attacks the pact on the grounds that, like the Tripartite Pact, it divides the Arab States instead of contributing to their unity. All papers report without comment Iraqi opposition to the pact.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Jedda, Paris and Washington as my telegrams 92, 142 and 153 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Jedda, Paris and Washington]

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24 OCT 1955

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CONFIDENTIAL

MIDDLE EAST POLICY.

Mr. Mak of the American Embassy told me today that the advice of all American representatives in the Middle East (including Mr. Byroade in Cairo) had been that, in order to offset Russian penetration and to win back the position in the Middle East the United States should adhere to the Bagdad Pact. Speaking personally Mr. Mak said he thought this made sense and assumed that we should welcome such a move.

2. I said that I was sure we would but we had always understood that such a step was out of the question in view of the reaction to be expected from Israel and the Jewish lobby in the States ^{who would press} for a security guarantee for Israel. Any good that would be done by U.S. adherence would be spoilt by a security guarantee to Israel. Mr. Mak said that such had been the case, but that American public opinion felt so strongly about Russian moves that he thought it might be possible to join the Pact without a guarantee to Israel - this was of course really outside his province.

*James
C.S.*

A. - 3. I showed him Washington Saving telegram No. 609 and said that at least Persian accession had received a very good press. After reading this Mr. Mak said that the most significant thing was that the "New York Times" had welcomed this and had even foreseen United States adherence. The only bias that the "New York Times" ever showed was a pro-Jewish one and it was all the more surprising that this paper should now have spoken in this way.

*Mr. Tanton
Ref
2/74*

*C.S.
19/10*

R. M. Hadow

(R. M. Hadow)
October 18, 1955.

R. M. Hadow

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

1073/1163

Mr. Whitteridge

No. 821
October 25, 1955.

D. 9.26 a.m. October 25, 1955.
R. 9.55 a.m. October 25, 1955.

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 821 of October 25.

Repeated for information to Washington Amman
Ankara Beirut
Cairo Damascus
and Saving to Karachi Tehran
P.O.M.E.F. Paris.

V 1073/1142

Your telegram No. 1851 to Washington.

1141

I have not received Amman telegram No. 122, but the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who state that agreement has now been signed, have given me the following details obtained by the Iraqi Minister, Damascus. These are based on a preliminary draft, but Iraqis believe there are no major differences in the final text.

2. Following are main points:
- (i) Any aggression against one contracting party to be regarded by the other as aggression against itself. Both parties to take all necessary measures to defend each other's independence and security in the event of aggression.
 - (ii) [grp. undec. ? Contracting parties] in agreement to honour parties' obligations under United Nations Charter or Arab League Collective Security Pact. The United Nations and Arab League to be informed of any action which may be taken under (i) above.
 - (iii) Unified command of forces in peace and war. Both parties to place all their [grp. undec. ? effective]s, including those serving on the borders of Palestine, at the disposal of the Joint Command.
 - (iv) Defence expenses to be shared 65 (Egypt) - 35 (Syria).
 - (v) Duration of 5 years. To be renewed automatically if neither party gives notice of termination during last year.

/(vi) So

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Bagdad telegram No. 821 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

(vi) So far as Iraqis are aware, there is no provision for accession by other States, but they believe the Egyptians intend to propose similar bilateral pact to Saudi Arabia. There are Press reports that the Syrians are going to offer to make a bilateral military pact with the Iraqis.

3. So far there has been surprisingly little comment here though the Iraqis are inclined to be sceptical of assurances that the Pact is not directed against them.

Foreign Office pass Washington, Ankara, Cairo and Savig to Karachi, Tehran and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 112, 119, 130, 6, 94 and 73 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Ankara, Cairo and Savig to Tehran and Paris.

Copy sent to Telegraph Section C.R.O. for repetition to Karachi].

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE



Cypher/OTP

1073/1165

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Duke

No. 429
 October 25, 1955

D. 5.10 p.m. October 25, 1955
 R. 4.00 p.m. October 25, 1955

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 429 of October 25.
 Repeated for information to Ankara Bagdad
 Beirut Cairo
 Damascus Washington
 and Saving to Karachi Tehran
 1073/1142 Paris P.O.M.E.F.

Your telegram No. 655. Syrian Egyptian Agreement.

I spoke as instructed to Under Secretary at Ministry for Foreign Affairs today in the absence of the Jordan Prime Minister on account of sickness. I had however spoken briefly on similar lines to the Prime Minister when I met him socially yesterday.

2. The Under Secretary of State told me that he saw no reason to anticipate that the Jordan Government contemplated joining this new pact. Their attitude, of which they made no secret, was that they were already in effect committed to the Bagdad Pact in virtue of their treaties with Great Britain and Iraq and they saw no advantage in changing their position. They wished to be friends with all Arab States. Formally to join either of the pacts would be likely to create difficulties for them both internally and with their foreign relations.

3. I asked the Under Secretary if this meant there was no prospect of Jordan Government adhering to the Bagdad Pact and reminded him that although Her Majesty's Government had always recognized that it was for the Jordan Government to choose its own time, the adherence of Jordan to the Bagdad Pact would be welcomed in London and would keep the possibility of revision of Anglo Jordan treaty by making it possible to convert it into a special agreement under the Pact. The Under Secretary undertook to tell the Prime Minister all that I had said and added that although he thought it would create too many difficulties for the Jordan Government to join the Bagdad Pact at this stage,

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Amman telegram No. 429 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

he anticipated that they would join it eventually and thought that they might wish to start thinking in the meantime of the lines on which they would like a special agreement to be drawn up to replace the existing treaty.

Foreign Office please pass Ankara 24 Cairo 96 Washington 25 Saving to Karachi 6 Tehran 13 Paris 57.

[Repeated to Ankara, Cairo and Washington and Saving to Tehran & Paris]

[Copy sent to C.R.O. for repetition Saving to Karachi]

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V
 LEVANT DEPARTMENT

1955

V1073/1168 ✓

FROM *Sir H. Trevelyan*
 Cairo

No. *204 Savoy*
 Dated *24/10*
 Received in Registry— *26/10*

Text of Syria - Egyptian Pact.
 Transmitt. set which was published in *Al Gumbhira* of October 24 and was described as full text.

References to former relevant papers
1149

A - Cairo 1559 ²⁸/₁₀ MINUTES
 The important points of the agreement seem to be:-
 (a) The provision for each country to come to the aid of the other in the event of an attack (Article 2);
 (b) The establishment of a joint command, and the fact that all "striking units" will come under its command (Articles 8 and 9(i)).
 (c) The financial arrangements under Article 10.
 There is nothing very specific about arms, but Article 7 appears to provide a basis for any mutual arrangements on this subject.

D. J. Spears
 27/10.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

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|--------------------|-----------------|
| (Action completed) | (Index) |
| <i>SL 15/12</i> | <i>127/1/26</i> |

References to later relevant papers
-11335
VJ 10389/17/58

17/10/58 29/10
P.O.S. Dept. 21/10
1. P. D. 21/10

The Bagdad Pact is a very innocuous document providing for cooperation for defence and is useful to those concerned to interfere with the internal affairs of the parties.

This pact on the other hand is highly spontaneous and voluntary.

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and goes very far in tying the parties together. For publicity in the M.E. I suggest the name should be the loss of independence by the Syrian army.

Librarian (Mr. Taylor) ^{sent 24/4/1956}

B. Richards
17/4

- Please ask Cairo, on behalf of Librarian,
- ① - whether the instruments of ratification have yet been exchanged, bringing this agreement into force (under Article 13), and if so on what date?
 - ② - Also who actually signed the Agreement
 - ③ - on behalf of Egypt and of Syria? - And was
 - ④ - it signed at Cairo on October 20?

G.W. Sich,
25/4.

- ① - apparently in Cairo on November 8
- ② (V1073/1252 - flag A)
- ③ - apparently Rashad Barkada (Syrian Minister of Defence) and Mahmud Riad (Egyptian Ambassador to Syria) (V1073/1335 - flag B)
- ④ - Damascus, October 20 (V1073/1184) flag

Mr. Sich
Librarian
Thank you:
G.W.S.
5/5/56

B. Richards
4/5

x B.R. 8/5

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INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM 66

ADVANCE COPY

SAVING TELEGRAM

En Clair.
By Bag.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir Humphrey Trevelyan.
No. 204 Saving.
October 24, 1955.

1073/1168

26 OCT 1955
 A R T I C L E
 M I N I S T E R I A L

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F.O.W.H

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 204 Saving of October 24 repeated for information Saving to:-

- Amman No. 158 (S)
- Baghdad No. 102 (S)
- Damascus No. 149 (S)
- Beirut No. 183 (S)
- Jedda No. 182 (S)
- Washington No. 152 (S)
- Tripoli No. 83 (S)
- Taiz No. 18 (S)
- Tel Aviv No. 119 (S)
- Benghazi No. 74 (S)
- Paris No. 208 (S)
- P.O.M.E.F. No. 342 (S)
- Ankara No. 61 (S)

My telegram No. 1504 (not to Taiz).

Text of Egyptian-Syrian Pact.

The Semi-Official Al Gumhuria of October 24 published what it described as the full text of the Egyptian-Syrian pact. The text reads as follows:-

Article 1: The two contracting countries affirm their keen desire for lasting security and peace and their determination to settle all their international differences by peaceful methods.

Article 2: The two contracting countries consider any armed attack on the territory of forces of one of them as an attack on them both. Consequently, and in exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defence, they undertake to extend speedy assistance to the attacked country and to take immediately all measures and use all means at their disposal, including armed force, to repel the attack and restore security and peace.

In accordance with Article 6 of the Arab League Charter and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the League Council and the Security Council shall be immediately informed of the attack and the measures taken to deal with it.

The two contracting countries pledge that neither of them shall conclude a unilateral peace settlement or any kind of agreement with the aggressor without the consent of the other country.

Article 3: The two contracting countries shall, at the request of either, consult with each other whenever serious tensions develop in international relations in a manner affecting the security of the

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Arab area in the Middle East, or the territorial integrity or independence or security ~~of any~~ of either country. In the event of an imminent threat of war or a sudden international emergency of a menacing nature, the two contracting countries shall immediately take the preventive and defensive measures required by the situation.

Article 4: In the event of a sudden attack on the borders or the forces of either of the contracting countries, they shall immediately determine the measures putting the provisions of this agreement into effect in addition to the military measures taken to meet such an attack.

Article 5: For the fulfilment of the purposes of this agreement, the two contracting countries have agreed to establish the following organizational machinery: a Supreme Council, a War Council and a Joint Command.

Article 6:

- (a) The Supreme Council shall be composed of the Foreign and War Ministers of the two contracting countries.
- (b) It shall be the official authority from which the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Command shall receive all directives relating to military policy. It shall have the power to appoint or dismiss the Commander-in-Chief.
- (c) At the invitation of the War Council, it shall organize the Joint Command, define its terms of reference and its duties and make any amendments therein upon the recommendation of the War Council. The Supreme Council shall have the right to set up any committees, or subsidiary or provisional councils, whenever such a step is deemed necessary.
- (d) The Council shall be empowered to examine the recommendations and decisions of the War Council on matters outside the jurisdiction of the Chiefs of Staff.
- (e) The Council shall issue rules of procedure for its meetings and for the functions of the War Council.

Article 7:

- (a) The War Council shall be composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the two contracting countries.
- (b) It shall serve as the Supreme Council's Advisory Body. It shall submit recommendations and directives in connection with military planning and all the duties assigned to the Joint Command.
- (c) The War Council shall make recommendations on war industries and on communications facilities required for military purposes, including their coordination for the benefit of the Armed Forces in the two contracting countries.
- (d) It shall prepare statistical and other data on the military, natural, industrial, agricultural and other resources and potentialities of the two contracting countries and on everything relating to their joint war effort. It shall submit to the Supreme Council proposals for the exploitation of these resources and potentialities for the benefit of the war effort.
- (e) The War Council shall study the programmes drawn up by the Joint Command for training, organizing, arming and equipping the

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forces at its disposal. It shall also study the possibilities of applying them to the armies of the two contracting powers and shall take the necessary steps to carry them out. It shall submit its findings to the Supreme Council for endorsement.

(f) This Council shall have a permanent military body to make all preparatory studies on the questions coming up before it. The Council shall organize the functions of this body by drawing up procedural rules for this purpose. It shall also draw up its budget.

Article 8:

(1) The Joint Command shall consist of: The Commander-in-Chief, The General Staff, the units detached for the security of the Joint Command and the conduct of its activities.

This Command shall be permanent, functioning in peace-time and war-time.

(2) The Commander-in-Chief shall command the forces put at his disposal. He shall be responsible to the Supreme Council. His duties shall be:

(a) to draw up and implement the programmes for training, organising, arming and equipping the forces placed at his disposal by the two contracting countries so that they may become a dependable unified force; and to submit these programmes to the War Council for examination or to the Supreme Council for endorsement.

(b) to prepare and carry out joint defence plans to meet all eventualities arising from any possible armed attack on one of the two countries or on their forces. For the preparation of these plans, he shall rely on the decisions and the directives of the Supreme Council.

(c) to deploy the forces put at his disposal by the two contracting countries in peace-time and war-time in accordance with joint defence plans.

(d) to draw up the budget of the Joint Command and to submit it to the War Council for consideration prior to final endorsement by the Supreme Council.

(3) The appointment or dismissal of the Chief Aides of the Commander-in-Chief shall be undertaken by the War Council in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief. As for the rest of the Command Staff, appointments and dismissals shall be undertaken by the Commander-in-Chief in agreement with the Chief of Staff of the Army concerned.

Article 9:

(1) The two contracting parties will place at the disposal of the Joint Command, in peace and war time, all striking units including the troops concentrated on the Palestinian borders. The War Council, in conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief, will fix the number of troops to be ~~placed in each of the two tasks~~, the recommendations of the Council to be considered as final immediately on being approved by the Supreme Council.

(2) The War Council, on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, shall make a precise list of the installations and bases necessary for the carrying out of plans and will be ~~decided on~~ *decide this* priority.

/Article 10...

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Article 10:

(1) A joint fund in which the two contracting parties will participate, shall be established for the achievement of the following objectives:

(a) All expenditure incurred by the Joint Command shall be equally shared by the two contracting parties.

(b) With regard to the expenses for the maintenance of military installations mentioned in Article 9, paragraph 2, they shall be borne in the proportion of 65% by the Egyptian Republic and 35% by the Syrian Republic.

(2) Each of the two contracting states shall pay all salaries and indemnities for the military and civil personnel to be seconded for duty by it with the Joint Command, the War Council and other Committees in conformity with the financial regulations of each of them.

Article 11: None of the provisions of this pact shall in any way affect or be intended to affect the rights and obligations resulting or which may result therefrom or which may accrue in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter or with the responsibilities borne by the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of world peace and security.

Term of Treaty.

Article 12: This treaty shall be for a term of ~~10~~⁵ years automatically renewable for further terms of 5 years. Each of the two contracting parties may terminate the pact by notifying the other party at least one year before the expiry of any of the above terms.

Article 13: This treaty shall be approved in conformity with the constitutional rules in force in each of the two countries, the instruments of ratification to be exchanged at the Syrian Foreign Ministry in Damascus within a period not exceeding 30 days from the date of the signing of the pact which will come into force immediately on the exchange of these documents.

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INVALID SAVING TELEGRAM 66

SAVING TELEGRAM

ADVANCE COPY

En Clair by Bag.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir Humphrey Trevelyan

No.205 Saving
 October 24, 1955.

1073/1169

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UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.205 Saving of October 24, repeated for information Saving to :-

- Damascus No.150
- Beirut No.184
- Amman No.159
- Baghdad No.103
- Ankara No. 62
- Jedda No.183
- Tripoli No. 84
- Benghazi No. 75
- Washington No.153
- Paris No.209
- POMESE No.343



My telegram No.1504 /of October 21/.

All papers of October 23 published an interview given by Nasser to Joubran Hayak, Beirut correspondent of the Egyptian News Agency and editor of Al Jarida.

2. Nasser declared that the bilateral pacts, which were now being drawn up between the Arab States and in which the great powers could not interfere, would form both the keystone in the structure of Arab unity and the means whereby the Arab States could ensure their safety without relinquishing their independence, interests, or distinctive character. At Bandoeng Egypt had clearly recognised the right of every State to defend itself either individually or collectively and had stressed that joint defence should be decided by the countries actually concerned. If the great powers participated in any pact they would have the last word. The others would be mere instruments of their policies and would lose their personality. The new bilateral pacts would be a stronghold against the intrigues of the great powers, and would uphold the theory that the defence of any region should emanate entirely from the countries of that region, acting in their own interests. This was the only way of strength for the Arab countries, which had been intended to remain weak and to rely upon others for their own defence. To-day the Arabs felt as one man: if one were exposed to danger, all would support him. A turning point in the history of the Arab nation had been reached. The Arabs had hitherto asked in vain for means of strength. To-day, however, the Arab nation felt that foreign domination and the arms monopoly, which had been used to infringe Arab sovereignty, had been removed. The Arab homeland was now taking its rightful place in international affairs, and all Arabs should hold fast to unity and strengthen themselves to fulfil all their long-advocated but unattained hopes.

1. In referring to the end of foreign domination and of the arms monopoly, Nasser said "We look to the future and wish to see ourselves producing heavy and light arms, and our people armed with principles and high ideals so that full material and moral liberation may be achieved".

4. Akhbar editorial echoed Nasser's remarks, and explained that as the great powers had foiled the true fulfilment of Collective Security Pact, and had used the Turco-Iraqi pact to maintain their influence, the

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Egyptian-Syrian bilateral pact was a great step forward. Anwar Sadat in Gomhouria said Britain was naturally opposed to the new pact because she had not been consulted, would not be allowed to participate, and yet felt she had some kind of trusteeship over the region as a whole. Rose el Youssef's editorial of today ascribed vast political significance to Syrian-Egyptian pact which it warmly welcomed.

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En clair. FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan D. 2.15 p.m. October 26, 1955.
No. 1539 R. 3.18 p.m. October 26, 1955.
October 26, 1955

PRIORITY 1073/1171

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1539 of
October 26.

Repeated for information to Jeddah
and Saving to Damascus Beirut
Amman Bagdad
Ankara Tripoli
Benghazi Washington
Paris P.O.M.E.F.

My telegram No. 205 Saving. - V 1073/1169

Gomhouria today reported that Egyptian-Saudi Military Pact, modelled on recent Egyptian-Syrian Pact, would be signed in Cairo today. Egypt and Saudi Arabia would contribute equal shares to provide necessary funds for joint command.

2. Nasser conferred with Feisal yesterday. Feisal said after meeting that joint statement would be issued within two days. Ahram said joint statement would announce signing of a pact.

3. Gomhouria editorial welcomed the news. Arabs would rejoice, Zionists and Imperialists mourn. It had been thought imperative to conclude new pact without delay to put an end to malevolent rumours designed to create doubts in Arab minds about Tripartite Pact.

4. Anwar Sadat, also in Gomhouria, published article intended to refute argument that Egyptian-Syrian Pact tended to weaken unity of Arab world. Sadat said Arab League passed unanimous decisions, but its members remained basically divided. Arab Collective Security Pact was never more than ink on paper. Bilateral pacts represented real co-ordination.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Ankara, Paris and Washington as my telegrams 63, 211 and 156 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Ankara, Paris and Washington]

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

V 1073/1174

Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 1562
October 28, 1955

D. 9.13 p.m. October 28, 1955
R. 9.50 p.m. October 28, 1955

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1562 of October 28

Repeated for information to Jeddah

P.O.M.E.F.

- and Saving to Amman
- Bagdad
- Beirut
- Damascus
- Washington
- Tripoli
- Taiz
- Tel Aviv
- Benghazi
- Paris
- Ankara

V 1073/1174

My telegram No. 1539 (not to all).

A military pact between Egypt and Saudi Arabia was signed in Cairo on October 27 by Colonel Nasser and Prince Feisal.

2. As published in Press text of Saudi-Egyptian Pact is almost identical with text of Syrian-Egyptian Pact given in my telegram No. 204 Saving.

Following clauses have been omitted.

- Paragraph (d) of Article 6;
- Paragraph (2) of Article 9;
- Paragraph (1) (A) and (B) of Article 10; Article 13.

Main difference is there is no provision for a joint fund.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington, Paris, Tel Aviv and Ankara as my telegrams Nos. 161, 214, 125 and 65 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Washington, Paris, Tel Aviv and Ankara].

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

(1195/744/55)

November 14, 1955.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Chancery,

In your letter 11913/4/55 of November 9 you asked whether it could be inferred that, as there was no provision for a joint fund in the Saudi-Egyptian military pact, Saudi Arabia would foot the whole bill for the Joint Command.

2. As far as we can gather, this is not the case. According to the text published in the Cairo press of October 26, no provision is made for the operating expenses of the Joint Command. However, Article 10 of the pact reads:

"Each of the two contracting countries shall pay the salaries and emoluments of the military and civilian personnel attached to the Joint Command, the War Council, and other committees, in accordance with its own financial regulations".

3. From this and from references elsewhere in the pact to "forces placed at the disposal" of the Joint Command by the two contracting parties, we assume that Egypt and Saudi Arabia will be separately responsible for the maintenance of their own personnel. Presumably they will share other expenses equally.

4. We are sending a copy of this letter to African Department, the Chancery at Jeddah and to the Political Office with the Middle East Forces at Nicosia.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

The Chancery,
British Embassy,
AMMAN.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Scott

V1073/1172

No: 810
October 28, 1955

D. 3.27 p.m. October 28, 1955.
R. 4.07 p.m. October 28, 1955.

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 810 of October 28,

Repeated for information Saving to: Amman, Jodda,
Ankara, Jerusalem,
Bagdad, Tel Aviv,
P.O.M.E.F., Washington,
Cairo, Paris,
Damascus, Tripoli.

Lebanese press this morning has headlines to the effect that the Lebanon is going to join Egypt-Syria pact. When I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs today I asked him if there was any truth in these reports. M. Laboud replied that he and the President were against the Lebanon joining and would not agree to it. There was pressure from various directions in favour of the pact and the Prime Minister (as reported in telegram No. 793) was himself in favour. Nevertheless the Lebanon intended to stall until the pact had been debated in the Syrian Parliament where there would be much opposition from pro-Iraqi members. Nothing would be done to discourage the campaign in some papers in favour of the pact, as this was a useful safety valve.

2. I asked M. Laboud to let me know in advance if any serious risk developed of the Lebanon joining. He promised to do so.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Ankara, Washington, Paris and Tripoli as my telegrams Nos. 26, 46, 35 and 7 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Ankara, Washington, Paris and Tripoli].

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Scott
No. 812
October 29, 1955

V1073/1178

D. 11.05 a.m. October 29, 1955
R. 11.16 a.m. October 29, 1955

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 812 of October 29.
Repeated for information to: Damascus,
Cairo,

And Saving to: Bagdad,
Ankara,
Tel Aviv,
Jedda,
Washington,

Benghazi,
Amman,
Paris,
Jerusalem.

My telegram No. 810. V1073/1177



I saw the President last night and asked him also about persistent reports and rumours that the Lebanon might join the Egypt-Syrian pact.

2. The President said that he had just ended a lengthy meeting about this with the Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commander-in-Chief. The last named had pointed out that a military alliance with Syria was nonsense and that he was "100 per cent against it". The Prime Minister was keen to join, but the President had said that he had no intention of helping to bolster up the Syrian Government by giving them, for the forthcoming debate in Syrian Parliament, the support which the Lebanese accession to the Egypt-Syrian Pact would provide. The President went on to say that since 1948 there had been informal discussions between the Lebanese and Syrian army commanders on defence of the Marjayoun-Hasbaniya sector (this lies in Lebanon close to the Israeli frontier and provides a means of access into Syria through the south east corner of the Lebanon). It had always been agreed that if the Israelis attacked in this area the Syrians and the Lebanese would engage in joint operations against them. Such [gp undec] conversations continue and the Commander-in-Chief had said that he was quite /prepared

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CONFIDENTIAL

Beirut telegram No. 812 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

prepared to have further and more detailed talks with the Syrians on defence of this area, but nothing more. I said that this seemed to me a natural and reasonable arrangement but I hoped that there would be no government-to-government agreement or alliance. The President said that he and the Commander-in-Chief were against any such official pact.

2. [sic] I hope that with our encouragement and the support of his Commander-in-Chief the President will be able to resist pressures being brought on him.

Foreign Office pass immediate to Cairo as my telegram No.173 and Saving to Ankara, Washington, Benghazi and Paris as my Saving telegrams Nos. 27, 47, 10 and 36.

[Repeated to Cairo and Saving to Ankara, Washington, Benghazi and Paris].

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Private Secretary
Sir H. Caccia
Mr. Shuckburgh
Head Levant Department

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