

Ref: FO 371/215488

87273

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1955

FROM Sir R. Stevenson,
Cairo.

No. 176

Dated 3/2

Received in 3/2
Registry

V
LEVANT DEPARTMENT
CENTRAL

V1073/147

Turco-Iraqi Pact

Pers is still opposed to pact and meeting between Nuri and Colonel Nasser in Beirut. Tensions Egyptian will withdraw from Arab League Collective Security Pact if Iraq insists on signing pact with Turkey.

References to former relevant papers

MINUTES

The Egyptian attitude may improve if the report in England telm No 86 that Salah Salem has been brought round to the Iraqi point of view proves authentic, which I fear is unlikely.

K. Russell-Jones

- B 712 4/2

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

(Index)

1955/2 p. 45

References to later relevant papers

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-----|----------------------|-------|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | cms | PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE | Ins | 1 | 1 | 2 |
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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Re Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 176
February 3, 1955.

D. 11.22 a.m. February 3, 1955.
R. 11.52 a.m. February 3, 1955.

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 176 of February 3.
Repeated for information to Ankara

Bagdad
and Saving to Beirut Amman
B.M.E.O. Benghazi
Damascus Jeddah
Paris Tripoli
Tel Aviv Washington

1073/47

Turco-Iraqi Pact.

Cairo press reports today that "authoritative sources" had announced on February 2 that Egypt would withdraw from the Arab Collective Security Pact if Iraq insisted on signing a pact with Turkey. In this event Egypt would call for a new Security Pact (apparently directed against Israel) comprising those Arab States which opposed foreign alliances.

2. "A responsible personality" is also reported to have announced that no useful purpose would be served by the meeting suggested by the Lebanese President in Beirut between Nuri and Colonel Nasser.

3. Editorialists continue their violent attacks on the Turco-Iraqi Pact and stress Egypt's determination to withdraw from the Arab Security Pact if it should be concluded.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Paris, Washington, Tel Aviv, Benghazi and Tripoli as my telegrams Nos. 32, 29, 25, 26 and 26 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Paris, Washington, Tel Aviv, Benghazi and Tripoli].

RECORDED



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CONFIDENTIAL

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Enter

OUTWARD TELEGRAM FROM COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

TO: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN CANADA
 U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN AUSTRALIA
 U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN NEW ZEALAND
 U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN SOUTH AFRICA
 U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN PAKISTAN
 U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND

RPTD: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN INDIA } (BY AIR MAIL)
 U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN CEYLON }

(Sent 22.45 hours 1st February, 1955)

CYPHER

W. No. 28 CONFIDENTIAL

1073/148

Repeated Air Mail to U.K. High Commissioners in Delhi and Colombo.

My telegram W. No. 14.

MIDDLE EAST DEFENCE

Prime Ministers of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan and Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia assembled in Cairo on 22nd January to attend Arab League meeting convened by Egyptian Government to discuss situation created by Iraq Government's decision to conclude a Treaty with Turkey. Nuri Said had informed Egyptian Government that his health would not permit him to attend meeting. Although grounds of health on which Nuri based his refusal to go to Cairo were genuine, despite accusations to contrary in Egyptian Press, he was also greatly incensed at way Egyptian Government had treated him. They had ignored his request to postpone meeting (shortage of notice given he regarded as further evidence of Egyptian Government's hostility), had refused his offer that Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo or an Iraqi Cabinet Minister should attend in his place, and had done nothing to stop campaign of abuse directed at him by Egyptian Press.

2. Conference of Prime Ministers therefore opened without an Iraqi representative present. They sent a message to Nuri Said to effect that they were prepared to wait a few days, during which time they hoped that his health would have improved sufficiently to enable him to come to Cairo. Nuri Said, decided however to stick to his decision not to go to Cairo (it was also a fact that his health had not improved sufficiently for him to travel) and instead sent Dr. Jamali, Acting Foreign Minister, to attend conference in his place.

3. During conference aim of Egyptian Government, according to Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo, was to persuade other Arab countries that Iraq was pursuing a wrong policy. Other Arab countries with the exception of Saudi Arabia are privately in favour of Iraq, thanks to the tour of the Levant capitals made by Jamali, and to the interventions of Her Majesty's representatives but they were intimidated by Egyptian attitude and, with surprising exception of Syria, finally said at the end of the conference that they would not join a Turco-Iraqi Treaty. Egyptian Prime Minister then announced that if Iraq persisted in her intention, Egypt would

/withdraw

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RECORDED IN G.B.

- 3rd Feb 1958

-2-

withdraw from Arab Collective Security Pact and would thereaft...
consider her position in Arab League. This apparently had had
a profound effect on other Arab Prime Ministers.

3/2
 4. On 28th January Prime Ministers decided to set up a sub-committee to prepare draft of a joint communique but on 30th January sub-committee announced that they could not reach agreement since the Levant States would not join Egypt in a condemnation of the Iraqi initiative. The conference thereupon decided to send a delegation, consisting of Lebanese Prime Minister, Syrian and Jordan Foreign Ministers and Egyptian Minister of National Guidance to Bagdad. Its task was to try to reach agreement with Iraqi Government on co-operation between all Arab States and West in a way that would take into account Iraq's special needs, and thus to make the Turco-Iraqi Pact unnecessary. It arrived in Bagdad on 31st January and meanwhile conference has adjourned until 3rd February.

5. Meanwhile Iraqi Cabinet and elder statesmen have given unanimous support to Nuri Said, have reaffirmed Iraq's right to make such treaties as she considers necessary for protection of her interests and integrity, and have endorsed his policy of maintaining firm and resolute attitude in face of Egyptian pressure. This policy has full support of United Kingdom Government, who consider that nothing should be done to endanger projected Turco-Iraqi Treaty, which is in the best interests of West. They have therefore refused to urge Nuri Said to make any such concession to Egyptian Government as acceptance of six months' delay in carrying out of Treaty and have advised him to stand firm in the face of Egyptian pressure. They are anxious not to disappoint the confidence of the Turkish Government or to allow Egyptian Government the delay they are obviously seeking in order to undermine projected Treaty.

(Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, Capetown, Salisbury)

6. Please inform Commonwealth/Federal authorities. High Commissioners in London informed.

(Karachi only)

7. You may at your discretion inform Pakistan authorities.

Copy to:-

D.II.

C.R.O.

Mr. Rogers

Foreign Office

Mr. Keeble

M/Defence

Mr. Brewis

(C.O.S. Committee)

Mr. Powell-Jones

Accra, Governor's Office

The Secretary

Colonial Office

Mr. F.E. Cumming-Bruce

African Registry

H.M. Ambassador for U.K. in Dublin

U.K. Embassy Washington Mr. D.J.C. Crawley

U.K. Delegation to the

U.N., New York Mr. M.E. Allen

U.K. High Commissioner in Delhi (7)

U.K. High Commissioner in Colombo (3)

Copies sent to High Commissioners for Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Federal High Commissioner in London, omitting paragraphs 6 and 7

SOUTH ASIA AND MIDDLE EAST DEPT.
SA. 215/9

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

1073/149

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir E. Chapman Andrews

No. 101

February 3, 1955.

D. 1.01 p.m. February 3, 1955.

R. 1.37 p.m. February 3, 1955.

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 101 of February 3

Repeated for information to:- Ankara Cairo

Bagdad Damascus

Amman

and Saving to:- B.M.E.O. Paris

Washington

V1073/153
Your telegram No. 141: Turkish-Iraqi Pact.

President Chamoun himself sent for me this morning to keep me informed of developments. He knew that Jordan was wavering badly and that his own Prime Minister had weakened. He had instructed the latter while in Bagdad, to propose that Nuri and Nasser should meet in Beirut. Nuri had accepted but the latest indication was that Nasser would refuse. If he did, the President would make no further attempt at mediation. I spoke to him very strongly on the lines of your instructions and I think I convinced him about the so-called delaying tactics. He said he would instruct the Lebanese Prime Minister by telegram in Cairo (he was unfortunately flying direct and not via Beirut), not in the circumstances, to join in any vote at all critical [? group emitted] Iraq. He would also consider means of trying to stiffen the Prime Minister's attitude generally.

2. As I [?group emitted] leaving the President repeated the points he has made to me before, that it would be easier for him to press an independent national line upon the Lebanese Government if Britain and America would do something for Lebanese trade and arms requirements.

Foreign Office pass to Cairo as my telegram No. 27 and Saving to Washington and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 5 and 4.

[Repeated to Cairo and Saving to Washington and Paris].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Sir I. Kirkpatrick Head of African Department
 Private Secretary FEB 4th Head of Southern Department
 Mr. Ward 1st Head of Levant Department



Ref: FO 371/215488

87273

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RESTRICTED

V1073/150

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAMFROM ANKARA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir J. Bowker

No. 6 Saving

February 1, 1955

R: February 4, 1955

RESTRICTEDAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 6 Saving of
February 1

Repeated for information Saving to:

| | |
|------------|----------|
| Baigdad | Cairo |
| Beirut | Damascus |
| Amman | Tel Aviv |
| Jedda | R.M.E.O. |
| Washington | Paris |

My telegram No. 4 Saving: Turkish press comment on the Turco-Iraqi agreement.

Turkish press comments on Egyptian opposition to the agreement followed the moderate tone of the Turkish Prime Minister's statement of January 21 (my telegram No. 43). Indications of further resistance to Egyptian dictation and of Iraqi firmness led the press to hope that common sense would prevail. The Arab League is regarded as undergoing a crisis which may break it up.

2. In a series of editorials the Government organ ZAFER underlined the need for common defence plans to meet the Soviet threat to Middle East oilfields and communications. Moscow's denunciation of the agreement should indicate the right course for the Arab States, and there was no room for rivalry in the establishment of Middle East security. Nasser's allegation that, the pact was dangerous for the Arabs and not beneficial to Iraq did not make sense. The danger lay, not in cooperation with Turkey, but in a policy of isolation. It was logical for Turkey and Iraq, each of whom already had a defence treaty with Britain, to plan collective defence, and both were independent states. Defence based solely on the Arab League was unrealistic and ineffectual. The bomb thrown into the Turkish Embassy at Baigdad should warn the Egyptians of the Communist danger and show the need for measures to stabilise the Middle East. Turkey, who devoted half her budget to defence, would be a shield for / Egypt.

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| Ref: FO 371/215488 | | | | 87273 | | |
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RESTRICTED

Aukra telegram No. 6 Saving to Foreign Office

- 2 -

Egypt, who spent only 3% for this purpose, and Turkey's strength had enabled Egypt to devote more expenditure to other fields. Ambition for leadership, which even Britain had abandoned in the Middle East after the war, now only existed behind the Iron Curtain. It was satisfactory that the other Arab States were showing independence and leaving Egypt alone in her adventure of neglecting Middle East security.

3. Other papers echoed these sentiments and resented Nasser's unexpected discourtesy in refusing to meet the Turkish Prime Minister. Egyptian opposition was attributed to unjustified jealousy at the desire of Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon for closer relations with Turkey. The Moslem Brotherhood and Islam were helping to weaken outposts in the Middle East like Persia and Egypt. The Turco-Iraqi agreement was in accordance with Article II of the Arab League constitution and Egypt had already concluded an agreement with Britain, accepting a British base on Egyptian soil if Turkey were attacked, and thus already tying Egypt to Turkey. Nasser's fears that, if a pact were signed with Turkey and war followed, Turkey would involve the Arab nations in trouble, was a poor augury for the political maturity of the Revolutionary Council. Turkey had offered friendship to Egypt with the best intentions, but if the Egyptian leaders were not ready to discuss their security with other nations it was understandable that Turkey should discuss mutual defence with neighbours whose leaders had better foresight.

4. General tone of the press was further that the Cairo conference was a life or death meeting for the Arab League. If the other Arab States followed the Egyptian course, Arab unity would be in danger; but there was evidence of more moderate elements in the League. Egypt apparently wished to exploit the Arab League for her own interests. The League, originally established with British help, had been transformed into an organisation opposing Britain, the Western Powers and Israel. It had been thought that, with the Canal base settlement, this policy would change, but recent events suggested otherwise. If the League survived the present crisis, for which the Egyptians were entirely responsible, it would have to follow a different policy. It might even be better if it did not survive. Several Arab States had realised that the agreement did not conflict

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| Ref: FO 371/215488 | | | | 87273 | | | |
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~~RESTRICTED~~

~~from telegram No. 6 Saying to Foreign Office~~

- 3 -

with Arab interests, and there was even the possibility that Italy might join the defence arrangement. At the Cairo conference it was believed that only Saudi Arabia had supported Egypt. An alternative Arab security pact, intended to substitute the Turco-Iraqi pact, would be no advance on the existing unrealistic Arab security system. Moreover there would be no American aid for countries which did not cooperate with the West.

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FROM ANKARA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir J. Bowker

V1073/15

No. 78

D:11.20 p.m. February 3, 1955

February 3, 1955

R:11.50 p.m. February 3, 1955

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 78 of February 3

| | | |
|------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
| Repeated for information to: | Cairo | Bagdad |
| and Saving to : | Beirut | |
| | Damascus | |
| | B.M.E.O. | Aman |
| | Jedda | Tehran |
| | Tel Aviv | Washington |
| | Paris | New York (U.K.DEL.) |

Turco-Iraqi Agreement.


Karachi

On February 2 a Turkish Government spokesman made the following statement to the semi-official Anatolian Agency.

2. It is known that there have been attempts in the last two weeks to prevent the completion of the agreement which Turkey and Iraq have decided to sign with the object of ensuring their common security against attacks which might come from within or outside the Middle East, an agreement open to all the Arab countries, as to other countries capable of contributing to the same end.

3. The fact that Egypt has not supported the accomplishment of this agreement has distressed us. The clause in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement providing for the return of British occupation forces to the Suez Canal base in the case of an attack directed against Turkey, and the declaration of the Egyptian Prime Minister that any attack against Turkey would equally threaten Egypt, had led us to hope that Egypt had taken the first step towards recognising the needs of security in our area. After all these hopes it is difficult for us to understand the recent attitude of Egypt, and we hope that she, and the countries which think like her, will modify their conduct to join with us.

/4. The



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Ankara telegram No. 78 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

4. The attempts aimed at sabotaging or delaying the completion of the Turco-Iraqi Agreement are, in our view, of such a kind as to damage the interests of peace and the democratic front, and particularly those of the Arab countries, above all Egypt. Turkey and Iraq are firmly resolved to carry out their decision which, they are convinced, is useful both for them and for the whole peace front and all our Arab brothers. Turkey is grateful to the eminent Arab statesmen, and particularly to those of Syria, who have assisted her in her common cause with Iraq. Whatever propaganda may be directed against her, Turkey will always take her place at the side of Iraq and of the Arab countries who work for this cause, and will do everything possible to ensure the security and safety of those countries beginning with the completion of this agreement without delay".

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Damascus, Beirut, B.M.E.O., Amman, Jeddah, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, UKDEL, New York and Karachi as my telegrams Nos. 12, 8, 5, 9, 9, 4, 10, 13, 10 5 and 3 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Damascus, Beirut, B.M.E.O., Amman, Jeddah, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, UKDEL, New York, Copy passed to C.R.O. for Saving repetition to Karachi].

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FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP,

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir M. Wright
No: 86
February 3, 1955.

D: 2.40 p.m. February 3, 1955.
R: 2.55 p.m. February 3, 1955.

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 86 of February 3
Repeated for information to:

| | |
|----------------------------------|-----------|
| Amman. | Ankara. |
| Beirut. | B.M.E.C.. |
| Cairo. | Damascus. |
| Jedda. | Paris. |
| Washington. | |
| and Saving to: Tel Aviv. Tehran. | |
| U.K. Del. New York. | |

My telegram No: 84. ✓1073|145

I saw the Prime Minister this morning. I informed him of your views and again assured him of our sympathy and support in what he is trying to achieve.

2. He tells me he made it plain throughout the talks in Bagdad, which ended last night, that Iraq would proceed with the proposed pact with Turkey (and any others). He had firmly declined all suggestions for postponement. He had said that he was willing to attend a meeting in Beirut with Colonel Nasser if his own health permitted, but had been careful to make this qualification clear. He had explained that Iraq was taking this line not only in her own interest but that of the other Arab countries who ought to support and indeed join her. Iraq and her neighbours ought to act responsibly in the light of the world situation. If there were further assassinations in Persia, Iraq might find Communism on her doorstep. The situation in the Far East was tense. The Arab Governments owed it to their peoples to provide for their safety by linking hands with the West against Communism.

3. Nuri went on to say that the Egyptians had been extremely difficult; "they gave me hell" he said "but I

gave them....



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CONFIDENTIALEnclosed telegram No: 86 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

gave them double hell". Having been patient as long as he could he had indulged in a calculated explosion yesterday afternoon, and had said to Major Salem that it was effrontery for Egyptian leaders who had been revolutionaries for two years to presume to lecture him who had been an Arab revolutionary for 40 years; or for a régime far from firmly based to try and dictate to a country with a Parliament and solid institutions. Iraq would accept no veto on her actions by shaky neighbours who had far less grasp of the situation.

4. The effect of this had been that Major Salem came to him this morning, embraced him, and said that Egypt now understood for the first time Iraq's attitude and motives. He had hopes that he could persuade Nasser to modify his position.

5. Nuri told me that he expected to hear within a day or two whether there was anything in this or not. He believed the Egyptians wanted Western support, and particularly arms. He had told them they must only expect Western help in proportion to the degree of responsibility they were willing to assume. No responsibility, no help. But if the United Kingdom and United States were willing to make it plain to Egypt that if she were prepared to assume defence responsibilities with the West they would be ready to give her some further aid, he believed there was a chance of bringing her along. At least he himself had done his best. He had constantly assured the Egyptians that he wanted to work with them, and that he had no thoughts of any combination with Turkey to their detriment. He hoped we and the Americans might be willing to follow this up once again in Cairo in whatever terms we judged wisest. His object throughout, and which he understood was also ours, was to bring all the Arab countries to make defence arrangements interlocking with the West, and he repeated that he hoped we could now give this further impulsion in Cairo. Iraq would conform with Turkey in any case.

6. Nuri confirmed that Syria had been steady and helpful, and the Lebanese weak. The Jordanian Foreign Minister had played a contemptible part. He himself had been driven to ask him before all the others whether Iraq was not the only Arab country which had given Jordan a substantial defence contribution. He had advised him to go home and stay there, and the Iraqi delegates had ended by refusing to speak to him.

Foreign Office.....

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CONFIDENTIAL

1073/874

TURCO-IRAQI AGREEMENT

Flags A,B

-/-/135

Cairo telegrams Nos. 157 and 158 reporting the view of the Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo that Iraq should play for time in an attempt to carry the other Arab States with her in support of the Turco-Iraqi Agreement.

2. The Secretary of State has expressed the wish that a stiffener should be sent to Cairo. His view is that ^{who} Iraq _/ is our friend is being bullied and he would not mind if Egypt should carry out her threat to leave the Arab Collective Security Pact. At a meeting in the Minister of State's office this morning the lines of a further telegram to Cairo were agreed. I submit a draft.

3. It was also decided

(a) to inform the American Embassy in London of the Secretary of State's most recent instructions to Cairo and Bagdad, and

(b) to consult the U.S. and Turkey about Nuri's ideas for the early conclusion of an agreement between Iraq, Turkey, the U.K. and U.S. as outlined in Bagdad telegram No. 6.

4. As regards (a) I am arranging to see Mr. Evan Wilson of the American Embassy this afternoon. As regards (b) I will submit a draft telegram as soon as possible.

Flag E
(HIS)

E. M. Rose

(E. M. Rose)
Levant Department
February 1, 1955.

Permanent UnderSecretary J. K. Tizard
F. 2. 1/2

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V

LEVANT DEPARTMENT

1955

VIC73/156

FROM Mr Nicolls,
Tel Aviv

No. 19 (1077/15/TT)

Dated 1/2

Received in 3/2
Registry

References to former relevant papers

-149

-101

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

(Index)

References to later relevant papers

SECRET

Treaty - Iraqi Agreement.

Report on Israeli reaction (which are still mixed) to the prospective conclusion of the agreement.

107

MINUTES

The French appear to overlook the important consideration that their security would gain from closer western association with the Arab states in defence, with its corollary of the latter's attention being given to an anti-Soviet rather than anti-Israel direction.

This dispatch crossed with one in -101 regarding Mr. Buttinger as having told Mr. Slaten that he did not think Israel had cause for genuine anxiety.

Frinell-Paine

5/2

Two points mentioned to 1/2
me by members of the French Embassy
are:-

47013

/ a)

Ref: FO 371/215488

87273

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- a) The danger of the Paris bringing Iraqi-Syrian union nearer (see para 5) and the reaction this would provoke not only in Paris but also in Israel and Jerusalem;
- b) Israeli fears that Western accession to the Paris will mean more areas for the Hizbollah.
- The French have been very busy sounding the Israeli Govt. for their reactions. I suspect they may be toying with the idea of ~~Han elion~~ fixing up a considerably defensible agreement with Israel, although I do not suggest this is a serious intention at present.

JJ Brewis
.. 7/2

We still have our chance of sounding French intentions to the end of the month.

P. L. R

A useful despatch

(SAC)
SPZ.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(1077/55/55)

No. 19



BRITISH EMBASSY,

TEL AVIV.

February 1, 1955.

Sir,

In my telegram No. 1 Saving, I reported that reactions in Israel to the prospective conclusion of a defence agreement between Iraq and Turkey were mixed. They remain so after a fortnight of analysis and debate.

2. The more intelligent Israeli makes up the balance-sheet of benefits and dangers to Israel likely to flow from the pact more or less as follows. On the credit side he sees a chance that the pact will split the Arab League, drive Egypt and Iraq apart, and so diminish the combined political and military strength of Israel's enemies. He hopes, but without much conviction, that Turkey, hitherto positively sympathetic to Israel, may be able gradually to influence Iraq, and through Iraq some at least of the other Arab States, to adopt a constructive policy towards Israel.

3. On the debit side Israeli imaginations see a throng of spectres. Instead of Turkey influencing Iraq, Turkey may herself agree, as the price of Iraqi cooperation, to abandon her sympathy for Israel. Israelis have been quick to seize on the references in the communique issued by the two Prime Ministers in Bagdad on January 13, to aggression from within the region, as well as from outside it, and to United Nations "decisions" - which in this country means the United Nations resolution on the partitioning of Palestine. The Prime Minister, in a statement about the pact in the Knesset, referred to these references as elements "which cannot but cause Israel concern".

4. Some Israelis fear that even if the Arab League splits Israel will not benefit; they argue that Egypt will seek support in the Arab States by stepping up her hostility towards Israel, and that Iraq - always more intransigent than Egypt on this issue - will be obliged to compete. Alternatively, they think that Egypt, rather than split the Arab League, will in the end try to climb on the Turkish band-wagon, while stipulating for face-saving purposes that the pact should be made more openly hostile to Israel.

5. Another nightmare is that Iraq, strengthened by her pact with Turkey, will proceed to realize her dream of a Greater Syria, which would bring Iraq right up to Israel's frontier. Israel has always been exceptionally sensitive to this prospect and even moderate Israelis, recalling that Iraq has no peace treaty with Israel, argue that, rather than accept a union between Iraq and Syria, Israel should if the need arises renew hostilities. Immoderate Israelis boast openly that the day such a union was proclaimed the Israeli flag would fly in Damascus.

/6.

Sir Anthony Eden, K.G., M.C., M.P.,
 etc., etc., etc.,
 Foreign Office,
 LONDON, S.W.1.

Ref: FO 371/115488

87273

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6. These disagreeable possibilities are all remote, and they would not weigh so heavily on the Israelis but for their gnawing preoccupation with Israel's isolation. As it is, the prospect of Israel's most bitter enemy forming an alliance with one of her few active supporters is on balance regarded here more with alarm than with gratification.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Paris, Cairo, Bagdad, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Jeddah and Tehran, to the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Karachi, and to the Head of the British Middle East Office, Cyprus.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

Jack Widdowson

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM ISTANBUL TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL

V1073/159

Her Majesty's Consul General

No. 12

D. 6.50 p.m. February 4, 1955

February 4, 1955

R. 7.28 p.m. February 4, 1955

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 19 of February 4

Repeated for information to Ankara

Beirut

Bagdad

Amman

Cairo

Damascus

Washington

Jedda

and Saving to Tel Aviv

Paris

Tehran

B.M.E.O.

UKDEL New York

Following from Her Majesty's Ambassador,

Your telegram No. 145 to Ankara.

The Turkish Prime Minister told me this morning of the following developments over the Turco-Iraqi pact.

2. (i) He had today sent a message to the Iraqi Prime Minister suggesting that they should meet again at once either in Turkey, or, if for any reason Nuri could not come here, then in Bagdad. He hoped to have a reply this evening and would keep me informed.

(ii) The Lebanese President had informed the Turkish Minister in Beirut that, while remaining sympathetic to the proposed Turco-Iraqi pact, he wished it to come about with general agreement. He had, therefore, invited the Egyptian and Iraqi Prime Ministers to meet him in Beirut to try to reconcile their views. He hoped that Turkey and Iraq would agree to delay action meanwhile. The Turkish Minister [grp. undec.] had been instructed to point out that the Turkish Government wholly disapproved of the President's proposal, which could only do harm, and to urge him, if he could not support the Turco-Iraqi initiative, to keep quiet. The Prime Minister asked if Her Majesty's Government would speak in Beirut on similar lines. He understood that, in fact, the Egyptian Prime Minister had /refused the

FEB 4 AM
6 4 PM
MURKIN

Ref: FO 371/215488

87273

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CONFIDENTIALIstanbul telegram No. 19 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

refused the invitation and he doubted very much whether the Iraqi Prime Minister would consider accepting. Nevertheless, he thought it would be useful if Her Majesty's Government were to urge both the Lebanese and the Jordan Governments, if they could not actively support, to keep quiet.

(iii) The Egyptian Military Attaché in Ankara had spoken to Vali of Ankara, (he is in close touch with the Prime Minister), of his desire to help to repair the damage recently done to the Turco-Iraqi relations. The Prime Minister had sent him a message that, while he remained ready in principle to discuss things with the Egyptian Prime Minister, any decision to fix a meeting must now take into account the recent change in circumstances caused by Egypt's attitude over the last fortnight. The Military Attaché had expressed sympathy with the Turkish Prime Minister's attitude and said he intended to leave for Cairo to see what he could do. Please see my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office please pass to Bagdad as my telegram No. 2, Cairo 2, Washington 1, Beirut 1, Amman 1, Damascus 1, Jeddah 1 and Saving to Tel Aviv 2, Tehran 1, UKDEL New York 1, Paris and B.M.E.O., Nicosia 2.

[Repeated to Bagdad, Cairo, Washington, Beirut, Amman, Damascus, Jeddah and Saving to Tel Aviv, Tehran, UKDEL New York, Paris and B.M.E.O.]

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WINTERHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

V (073) 163

No. 187

D:7.28 p.m. February 4, 1955

February 4, 1955

R:8.13 p.m. February 4, 1955

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 187 of February 4.

| | | |
|------------------------------|----------|------------|
| Repeated for information to: | Ankara | Bagdad |
| | Beirut | Amman |
| | Damascus | |
| and Saving to: | Benghazi | B.M.E.O. |
| | Jedda | Tripoli |
| | Paris | Washington |
| | Tel Aviv | |

NO 73/162
My telegram No. 185: Arab Prime Ministers' Conference.

The conference was adjourned to enable the Lebanese to consult Nuri on the following two points arising from their proposal that Nuri and Nasser should meet at Beirut:

(a) would Nuri be prepared to discuss with Nasser the basic question whether a member of the Arab Security Pact is free to conclude treaties with non-member States?

(b) In the event of the meeting taking place and no agreement being reached, would Nuri be prepared to submit the issue to representatives of the Arab States, (Egypt and Iraq excepted), and to accept a majority decision?

2. Point (b) was the result of an informal suggestion by Major Salem on which Colonel Nasser reserved his position until Sunday. Nuri has been asked to give a reply by noon on Sunday and the conference will meet again that evening, when the delegations will be expected to define their attitude.

3. The Lebanese are still speaking in terms of neutrality as between Iraq and Egypt but are much concerned about future developments. My Oriental Counsellor spoke strongly to the Lebanese Charge d'Affaires, (who provided the above information),

FEB 8/ saying that



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CONFIDENTIAL

Qairo telegram No. 187 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

saying that only by standing out firmly against the Egyptians on this issue could they and the other Arabs avoid what they feared.

Foreign Office pass Priority to Ankara, Bagdad, Beirut, Amman and Damascus and Saving to Benghazi, Jeddah, Tripoli, Paris, Washington and Tel Aviv as my telegrams Nos. 30, 38, 31, 12, 10, 30, 38, 29, 34, 31 and 27 respectively.

[Repeated to Ankara, Bagdad, Beirut, Amman, Damascus and Saving to Benghazi, Jeddah, Tripoli, Paris, Washington and Tel Aviv]

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TOP SECRET

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

V1073 165

Cypher/OTP.

DEPARTMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir M. Wright.

No. 93

February 6, 1955.

D: 8.48 a.m. February 6, 1955

R: 8.55 a.m. February 6, 1955

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

V1073/1656

RECEIVED IN C.B.
Your telegram No. 162.

- 7 FEB 1955
Following is text.

SENT TO DEPT.

1/1 (Title) Treaty of Mutual Cooperation between Iraq and Turkey (Title ends).

Whereas the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey are in constant progress, and in order to complement the contents of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness concluded between His Majesty The King of Iraq and His Excellency The President of the Turkish Republic signed in Ankara on March 29, 1946, which recognized the fact that the peace and security of all the nations of the world and in particular the nations of the Middle East, and that it is the basis for their foreign policies.

Having realized the great responsibilities borne by them in their capacity as members of the United Nations concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region which necessitate taking the required measures in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Whereas agreement concluded between Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government has considered that any armed attack on Turkey or any other member State of the Arab League should necessitate taking defensive measures to preserve peace and security in this region.

They have been fully convinced of the necessity of concluding a Treaty fulfilling these aims and for that purpose have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty King Faisal II, King of Iraq (space for signature)

/His Excellency

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TOP SECRET

Bagdad telegram No.93 to Foreign Office

-2-

His Excellency Mr. Jalal Bayar President of the Turkish Republic (space for signature).

who having communicated their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1.

Consultations and discussions shall be held between the respective competent military authorities of the two high contracting parties for the purpose of obtaining reciprocal information regarding security measures and defence plans in countries of the high contracting parties. Exchange of views and information shall also be carried out for the sake of benefiting from the technical experience and progress achieved by any of the two high contracting parties in the field of defensive armament.

Article 2.

The high contracting parties undertake to furnish all facilities and assistance for the passage of arms, military equipment, supplies and other materials used for defensive purposes pertaining to their respective armies, through the territory of the other party without being subject to customs or any other duties.

Article 3.

This Treaty shall be open for accession to any member State of the Arab League or any other State concerned with security and peace in this region. Accession shall come into force from date on which the instruments of accession are deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of (blank).

Article 4.

This Treaty remains in force for a period of five years renewable for another period of five years unless one of the high contracting parties notifies the other party of their desire to terminate it six months before the date of its expiration.

/Article 5.

Ref: FO 371/215488

87273

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Bagdad telegram No.93 to Foreign Office~~

-3-

Article 5.

This Treaty shall be ratified by the two high contracting parties and ratifications shall be exchanged at (blank) as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

Done at (blank) in (blank) languages of which (blank) shall be regarded as the authoritative version in case of divergency.

Ends.

Please see my immediately following telegram,

DISTRIBUTED TO:-

Levant Department.
Southern Department.

ADVANCE COPIES:-

Private Secretary.
Sir I. Kirkpatrick.
Sir H. Caccia.
Mr. Shuekburgh.
Head Levant Department.
Mr. Ward.
Head Southern Department.
Resident Clerk.

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SECRET

V

FROM ISTANBUL TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

V 1073/167 FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Her Majesty's Consul General
No. 25
February 5, 1955.

D: 8.36 a.m. February 6, 1955
R: 9.10 a.m. February 6, 1955

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 25 of February 5.

| | | |
|-----------------------------|------------|----------|
| Repeated for information to | Ankara | Tel Aviv |
| | Washington | Jedda |
| | Bagdad | B.M.E.O. |
| | Damascus | Cairo |
| | Beirut | Amman |
| And Saving to | Paris | Karachi. |
| | Tehran | |



Following from Ambassador.

Following is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram.

Begins.

Whereas the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey are in constant progress, and in order to complement the treaty of friendship and good neighbourliness concluded between His Majesty The King of Iraq and His Excellency The President of the Turkish Republic and signed in Ankara on March 29, 1946 which recognizes the fact that peace and security between the two countries is an integral part of the peace and security of all the nations of the world and in particular the nations of the Middle East, which is the basis of their foreign policies, having realized the great responsibilities borne by them in their capacity as members of the United Nations concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region which necessitates taking required measures in accordance with Article 51 of United Nations Charter, fully convinced of the necessity of concluding a treaty fulfilling these aims, have appointed, etc.

/Article 1.

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SECRET

Istanbul telegram No. 25 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

Article 1. The contracting parties undertake to co-operate in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of United Nations in confronting any armed aggression against one of them from inside or outside the Middle East region.

Article 2. In order to ensure effective realization and application of co-operation envisaged in Article 1 above the competent authorities of the contracting parties shall establish military plans and determine the requisite measures immediately after entry into force of the present treaty. These plans and measures shall be operative as soon as they shall have been approved by the Governments of the contracting parties and may moreover be the subject of special agreements.

Article 3. Exchanges of views and information shall be carried out between the respective competent military authorities of the contracting parties for the purpose of benefiting from the technical experience and progress achieved by either of the parties in the field of defensive armament. The contracting parties shall consult and cooperate together in order to satisfy, as far as possible, the needs of each of them in the production of arms and munitions as well as in military training and education.

Article 4. The contracting parties undertake to furnish all facilities and assistance for the passage of arms, military equipment, supplies and other materials used for defensive purposes pertaining to their respective armies, through the territory of the other party without being subject to customs and any other duties.

Article 5. The contracting parties declare that the provisions of the present treaty are not in contradiction with any of the international engagements contracted by either of them with one or several third parties, and could not alter nor be interpreted as altering the said contractual engagement, and they undertake not to conclude any international engagement incompatible with the present treaty.

/Article 6.

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SECRET

Istanbul telegram No. 25 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

Article 6. The present treaty shall be open for accession to any Member State of the Arab League or any other State concerned with the security and peace of this region. Accession shall take place after agreement between the contracting parties and the State applying for accession, and shall come into force from the date on which the instruments of accession are deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Article 7. The present treaty shall remain in force for a period of five years renewable for other five year periods unless one of the contracting parties notifies the other of its desire to terminate it six months before its expiration.

Article 8. This treaty shall be ratified by the contracting parties and ratifications shall be exchanged as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of exchange of ratifications.

Done at etc. etc.

Ends.

Foreign Office pass priority to Washington and Bagdad as my telegram Nos. 3 and 4 and routine to Damascus, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Jeddah, B.M.E.O., Cairo and Amman as my telegrams Nos. 3, 3, 1, 3, 5, 4, 3 and Saving to Paris, Tehran, Karachi, as my telegrams Nos. 3, 3, and 1.

[Repeated to Washington, Bagdad, Damascus, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Jeddah, B.M.E.O., Cairo and Amman and Saving to Paris and Tehran and copies sent to C.R.O. for transmission Saving to Karachi.]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Private Secretary
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Sir H. Caccia
Mr. Shuckburgh
Mr. Ward
Head Levant Department
Head Southern Department
Resident Clerk.
XXXXXX

Ref: FO 371/215488

87273

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V

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 191
February 5, 1955

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
V1073/16 WHITSHALL DISTRIBUTION

D. 12.52 p.m. February 5, 1955
R. 1.24 p.m. February 5, 1955

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 191 of February 5.
Repeated for information to: Beirut Bagdad Ankara Damascus
Amman
and Saving to: Jeddah B. M. E. O. Paris Washington
Tripoli Benghazi

V1073/107 V1073/109

My telegram No. 187 and Beirut telegram No. 101 to you.

Lebanese Prime Minister told a member of my staff this morning that message referred to in Beirut telegram under reference had been received to the effect that he was to be "very prudent".

2. M. Naccache emphasized the serious economic difficulties which Egypt could cause to his country, and with which Nasser had threatened him. Despite an awkward predicament, however, the Lebanese appear to be now in a position where they may well reserve their position if anything approaching a vote on Iraq's action, or a declaration, is called for at the next Arab Prime Ministers' meeting on Sunday evening.

3. He incidentally stated that one of the arguments put forward insistently by the Egyptians had been that none of the Arab States needed to enter into agreement with the West because in the immediate future Egypt would be in a position to supply them with all they needed, including aircraft. He said he realised the absurdity of this claim. It is remarkable, however, that the Egyptians should be so swept away with their own propaganda as seriously to advance such nonsense. (Cf. in this connexion Chancery letter to African Department No. 1196/2/55 of January 19). V1073/119

4. He also stated that, should Egypt withdraw as she threatened from the Arab League Security Pact, she intended to negotiate bilateral defence agreements with as many Arab States as she could.

Foreign Office please pass Beirut, Bagdad, Ankara, Damascus and Amman (PRIORITY) and Saving to Paris, Washington, Tripoli and Benghazi as my telegrams Nos. 32, 39, 31, 11, 14, 35, 32, 30 and 31.

(Repeated to Beirut, Bagdad, Ankara, Damascus, Amman and Saving to Paris, Washington, Tripoli and Benghazi)

ADVANCE COPIES:

Sir H. Caccia
Mr. Shuckburgh
Head of African
Department

Private Secretary
Head of Levant Department
Resident Clerk

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Ref: FO 371/215488

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FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Richmond

V1073/170

No. 43

D. 4.28 p.m. [sic] February 5, 1955

February 5, 1955

R. 4.28 p.m. February 5, 1955

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 43 of
February 5.

Repeated for information to Ankara

Bagdad

Cairo

Beirut

Damascus

New York (U.K. Del.)

and Saving to B.M.E.O.

Paris

Tehran

Washington

Jedda

Tel Aviv.

V107
Your telegram No. 97.

I saw the Jordan Prime Minister this morning and gave him the substance of Mr. Nutting's remarks to the Jordan Ambassador in paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of your telegram No. 96.

2. The Prime Minister repeated that his main concern was to preserve Arab unity, or if this proved impossible to ensure that no blame for the break could be imputed to Jordan. His instructions to the Jordan Minister for Foreign Affairs had been twofold:-

(a) To try to prevent irrevocable action by Egypt at least until the Turco-Iraqi pact was signed and its contents announced;

(b) To try to obtain a delay by Iraq which would enable the splits in Arab unity to be papered over.

In his opinion both Iraq and Turkey were determined to go ahead, and in the circumstances Jordan's safest policy was to take a neutral line. He repeated that Jordan had no direct interest in the Turco-Iraqi pact.

3. He admitted that his policy was largely determined by local considerations and referred to the power of the Egyptian Press and radio. He said that I should know that demonstrations had been planned to take place in Jordan against the

/Turco-Iraqi

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CONFIDENTIAL

Amman telegram No. 43 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

Turco-Iraqi pact and that these had been staved off only because of the neutral attitude taken by his Government. (I doubt if this is strictly true, but it is true that numbers of telegrams have been sent to the King and the Government, urging them to prevent a collapse of the Arab League). He repeated that if a split did take place, Jordan would have to side with the majority.

4. I said that Egypt's capacity for influencing the Arab peoples was surely an argument for the speedy conclusion of the Turco-Iraqi pact, since delay would merely give her more time to use her propaganda machine. As for Jordan's need to side with the majority, it seemed to me that Jordan's adhesion to one side or other would ensure this, since, disregarding Libya, the other Arab states appeared equally divided. The Prime Minister denied that Syria and the Lebanon were on the side of Iraq, but assured me that Jordan would adhere to the Iraqi-Syrian-Lebanese side if a split on these lines seemed inevitable. He had sent categorical instructions to Walid Salah to reserve Jordan's position on any proposal Egypt might make for a new defensive pact from which Iraq would be excluded.

5. Although he did not give me any specific assurance that Jordan would refrain from further delaying action, I found his attitude rather more forthcoming than at my previous interview.

6. I have since seen my Turkish colleagues whose general impression accords with mine, that while no positive help from the Jordan Government can be expected, we can hope that they will not hinder further. He had seen the King this morning and found [? grp. omitted] friendly but non-committal.

Foreign Office pass priority Cairo, as my telegram No. 8 and to B.M.E.O., New York (U.K.Del.), Paris, Tehran, Washington and Jeddah as my Saving telegrams Nos. 7, 5, 5, 3, 6, and 4.

[Repeated to Cairo, and Saving to B.M.E.O., New York (U.K.Del.), Paris, Tehran, Washington and Jeddah.]

ADVANCE COPIES

Sir H. Gazzia

Private Secretary

Mr. Shuckburgh

Head of Levant Department

Resident Clerk

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FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

To Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

V1073/172

Sir E. Chapman Andrews

No. 107

February 5, 1955

D. 11.28 a.m. February 5, 1955

R. 12.23 p.m. February 5, 1955

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 107 of February 5
 Repeated for information to Ankara

Cairo

Bagdad

Damascus

Amman

and Saving to B.M.R.O.

Paris

✓ 1073/149

Washington

My telegram No. 101.

This morning press published text of telegram sent from Cairo by Lebanese Prime Minister to President Chamoun reporting that Egyptian Prime Minister has been persuaded to agree to meet Iraqi Prime Minister and other Arab Prime Ministers in Beirut provided

- (1) Iraq will agree to discuss with the other Arab States the principle of the proposed alliance and
- (2) Iraq will accept a majority decision as Egypt is prepared to do. According to the press President Chamoun has communicated this reply to the Iraq Prime Minister and is urging him to accept.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Paris as my Saving telegrams Nos. 7 and 6 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Washington and Paris]

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FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

Sir M. Wright

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

No. 96

February 7, 1955

V 1073/174

D: 9.38 a.m. February 7, 1955

R: 10.00 a.m. February 7, 1955

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 96 of
February 7.

Repeated for information to: Ankara, Cairo,
Amman, Damascus.
Beirut,

And Saving to: B.M.E.O., Tripoli, Tehran,
Jedda, Paris, Tel Aviv,
Benghazi, Washington, U.K. Del New York

✓ 1073
Beirut telegram No. 107: Arab Prime Ministers' Conference.

Iraq Government have refused the two conditions suggested. Deputy Prime Minister stated in the Chamber on February 6 that to accept the two would be a derogation of Iraqi sovereignty. On condition one, the Iraq Government argue that Articles 9 of the Arab League Charter and 111 of the collective Security Pact permit pacts with non-member states. They instance the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, the Saudi-American Agreement and the Anglo-Libya treaty.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Benghazi, Tripoli, Paris, Washington and U.K. Del New York as my telegram Nos. 2, 1, 6, 8 and 29 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Benghazi, Tripoli, Paris, Washington and U.K. Del New York.]

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