Para. 2. H.M.O.'s POLICY TOWARDS EGYPT AND THE SUDAN.

I personally had some doubts about the wisdom of a public announcement at this stage. After talking to Azhari, Fadisa El Fadil, Seid Siddik and Mohd. Halif's Sheriff, it was clear that both Government and Opposition are agreed on the desirability of short-cutting the self-determination process and of avoiding a plebiscite or any election in connection with it. They all agree that a plebiscite or election would be impracticable in the South (at least in Equatoria) in the near future. Both sides are thinking in terms of a resolution (or series of resolutions) in Parliament asking for revision of the Agreement to provide for the simplification of the self-determination process, on the lines given in our telegram No. 207. I sounded Siddik and M.K.S. about a public announcement by H.M.O., and neither of them liked the idea on the grounds that it would give ill-disposed persons, such as the Egyptians and the F.A.C., a chance to make mischief and to impute ulterior motives to H.M.O. As M.K.S. put it, the strength of the British position over the past two years has been our strict adherence to the Agreement; if at this late stage, H.M.O. take the initiative in proposing a breach or alteration of the Agreement, people are bound to start looking for hidden reasons.

In the light of all this, I was on the point of recommending to H.E. that we should advise H.M.O. not to make any public announcement when P.O. telegram 396 arrived. This was a great relief to me and was accepted quite happily by H.E. when I explained the results of my conversations. I think we can safely say now that H.E., the Ambassador and the F.O. are agreed on the following points:-

(a) no plebiscite or election to be held;

(b) Parliament should pass a resolution requesting the Co-dominium to amend the Agreement either to empower the present Parliament to carry out all the duties of the Constituent Assembly, or to recognise that the Sudan shall become completely independent and to empower the present Parliament to draw up the new constitution and electoral law;

(c) that the Condominium must be liquidated by the joint action of both Co-dominium, and not by unilateral action, to ensure that the independent Sudan starts life on a valid legal basis.

As regards the second half of paragraph 2(a) of your letter we have been clearing our ideas on the process of liquidating the Condominium and the result is in H.E.'s letter 59/7.8.2 of 13th October to Shackburgh. You will see that in our view there should be no election before H.E. hands over to the new Head of State and the Condominium is wound up.

Will you please pass on the information in this paragraph to Tom Bromley so that he will know that we are in full accord with the withdrawal from the position taken up in 388.

/Para. 5 ....
Para. 5. POLITICAL SITUATION.

There is a good deal of talk among Sudanese about a National or coalition Government (by "National" they appear to mean a Government of all parties including the N.U.P., and by "coalition", a Government of all parties excluding the N.U.P.). The Independence Front maintained up till recently that they did not want to undertake any part in the responsibility of government during the transitional period. But both Siddik and Mahgoub have told me that it is now definitely their policy to form a National Government as soon as possible before irreparable harm is done by the incompetence of the present Government. Mirghani Hamza and the Southern Liberals feel the same way. They wish to see this to be brought about by mutual agreement between all parties, but so far the N.U.P. show no inclination to agree. The Umma say that if necessary they will try to defeat the Government on a vote of confidence when Parliament meets, and they believe that the N.U.P. no longer have a majority - a coalition Government would then be formed, though two or three of the N.U.P. might be invited to join it.

As regards the balance in Parliament, there are about sixteen Southerners against the Government, but the unknown quantity is the extent to which Mirghani Hamza will be able to attract Azhari's supporters to himself - and here again much will depend on S.A.M., whose attitude is, as usual, wrapped in obscurity. Siddik says that Mirghani is now claiming twenty-five supporters in the House of Representatives, but it is impossible to tell how the land really lies until Parliament meets, which is now to be 3rd November.

In any case, the difficulties of forming and maintaining a National or Coalition Government in a country like this are tremendous, with all its political and sectarian rivalries and the Southern business, and I shall believe it when it happens. I have no doubt that a Government of all the "talents" would be in the interests of the country at this stage, as I have no faith whatever in the ability of the present Cabinet to deal adequately with the problems in front of it. There is the additional attraction that it would make it easier for Egypt to accept a short-cut to independence. But we can only wait and see.

You will have seen a good deal in the press about renewed attempts to reconcile the two Sayeds. Dardiri Mohd. Osman is taking the leading part in this, and I suspect that his real aim is to get the support of both Sayeds for his candidature to be First President of the Sudan, which I am sure is his great ambition. But the negotiations are running into the usual heavy weather and I haven't met a Sudanese yet who thinks that anything will come of them.

Azhari met S.A.M. on 12th, and I understand that the question of self-determination was one of the things discussed. I am having breakfast to-morrow with S.A.M., and will no doubt hear all about it then. I do not myself believe that the Sudanese politicians will want to take the law into their own hands over self-determination. I think they realise the importance of achieving independence with the agreement of both Co-dominis, and they don't want to start life with a hostile Egypt, if they can avoid it. So I think they will do all they can to achieve the short-cut to independence by seeking the necessary amendments to the Agreement. Only if Egypt proved absolutely adamant might they consider something more drastic.

Anyway, the first thing is to get the resolutions passed as soon as possible.
ABUH: 17TH OCTOBER

ENGLAND AND THE SUDAN

Mr. Luce, Political Counsellor to the Governor-General of the Sudan, made a declaration published by the newspaper "Al Umrah" in its October 13 issue and announced by A.H.A. in which it was said that Britain's policy was to respect the Sudanese wishes, to maintain their friendship, to consider their feelings as far as possible and that Britain would not henceforth stand in the way of any development, aim or national attitude which the Sudanese wanted, and that it was possible for this policy to be set out in writing and officially if the Sudanese so desired.

He who ponders this statement which a responsible Briton in the Sudan government made, will be astonished at Mr. Luce's talk of respecting the Sudanese wishes and maintaining their friendship.

Since when did the English respect the wishes of the people she dominates and what friendship did Britain present to people who remained chained in the shackles of her imperialism more than half a century? What new bait has British policy used after long waiting, wishing to trick the Sudanese people on the threshold of their self-determination with it?

Does Mr. Luce offer the friendship of Britain and watchfulness over the fulfilling of the wishes of the Sudanese people, without anything in exchange?

And what does Mr. Luce aim at when he says "We will not stand any more as an obstacle in the path of any development, aim or national attitude which the Sudanese want? Does he mean to say that England in the past opposed the aims and wishes of the Sudanese, and that to-day she regrets her position which lost her the love of the Sudanese, and therefore is affirming that her new policy is respect for the Sudanese wishes and preservation of their friendship?

Does Mr. Luce consider that his support for the announcement of Sudanese independence, by way of the Sudanese Parliament, and England's recognition of that independence in the press will gain for her the sympathy and friendship of the Sudanese people?

No, Mr. Luce! A thousand times No, England! The Sudanese people have realized the fact of the imperialist policy which you and your supporters, Mr. Luce, are working for. They have realized it fully and tasted its bitterness. No new trick which you and your Government put forward under the guise of friendship and watchfulness over fulfilment of the Sudanese people's wishes will deceive them.

Friendship in England's conception, is imperialism in her own interest, and at the expense of the people whose friendship she claims...

These elastic promises will not find a listening ear.

The South Sudan will not forget that England has prime responsibility for the backwardness and neglect it is now suffering. It will not forget the seeds of division and hatred which British imperialism planted in the young by way of missionary activities.

The Northerners will not forget the tragedies of British imperialism in the Sudan, and if Mr. Luce considers that they have forgotten these tragedies let him read the Black Book which Ashari and Yehia Fadli issued in 1946, in which they recorded some of these...
these tragedies entitled "tragedies of the English in the Sudan".

And now Mr. Luce would it not be better to give up misleading and substitute action for honeyed words - action by which to prove England's goodwill towards the Sudanese people - if such friendship was genuine - action, for example as to hasten the invitation of the Int. Commission for Self-determination or to specify a time for the departure of the Governor-General and the handing over of the Sovereignty of the Sudan to the Sudanese?

But you don't do that and don't ask for it, but only continue in misleading and endeavouring to entice the Sudanese with you by this deception!

Mr. Luce and his Government fully realize that the Sudan Agreement provides for respect for the wishes of the Sudanese. Has Britain tried to adopt positive steps to carry out this agreement? Has she fulfilled anything of it to prove her goodwill towards the Sudanese people?

Britain signed this agreement reluctantly and wanted to prolong the period of her imperialism in the Sudan as much as possible. Behold to-day she is trying to escape from this agreement by one way or another. Mr. Luce's declaration is nothing but a new attempt on the part of Britain to smash the agreement so that he and his Government in England can benefit - that Government which drafted a long-term policy to remain in the Sudan, as mentioned by Lloyd George in 1921. If Mr. Luce has forgotten let us remind him. Lloyd George said exactly as follows:-

"Egypt is one thing, the Sudan another, and we, except for securing our communications through it, do not want to interfere in its affairs. We want a real alliance to bind us together. But we cannot leave the Sudan or renounce our position in it in the way in which we are renouncing our position in Egypt."

He also said that dangerous conspiracies and troubles may arise in the Sudan, that we may have to send troops to suppress them and that the transport of those troops had to be carried out via Egypt.

The days pass and history recorded numerous developments which ended by Britain signing the agreement of February 12, 1953. She then tried to destroy it in realisation of her planned policy. She created the troubles in the South and tried to spread disunity among the leaders of the North in execution of this policy - divide and rule - but the complete vigilance in the North of the Sudan destroyed the hopes of Britain, and the sorrowful pains endured by imperialism united Sudanese hearts and together they cooperated to get rid of this hateful imperialism.

The statement of Mr. Luce is nothing but a new endeavour by Britain to destroy the agreement and to realise this policy he states that the policy of Britain is respect for the desires of the Sudanese and that it is possible for this policy to be set out officially in writing if the Sudanese so desire?

We ask: Why should the Sudanese ask that from the Government of Britain? Does she still consider herself guardian over them and do the English politicians in whose name Mr. Luce is speaking believe that the Sudanese are still in need of this guardianship which the Sudan Agreement was intended to remove?

Mr. Luce, the era of guardianship has ended and there are outstanding qualifications in the Sudan which can rule without your guardianship and directions. Leave aside this guardianship which
you want to impose on the Sudanese and leave them to take out the

You, Mr. Luce should give up your roundabout policy and

say frankly that it is hard for Britain to leave the Sudan to determine

its fate in a free and neutral atmosphere. It is hard for her when

she knows her inevitable fate. She sent you to present to the

Sudanese a written document as a deposit to buy their friendship and

this deposit will undoubtedly develop into an understanding, then

into negotiations, then into pacts and finally into imperialism.

Say it frankly, Mr. Luce, England wishes to free herself

from the Agreement and wishes to avoid the platissite which the

Sudanese have asked for and which was blessed by the two great

leaders.

Say it frankly, Britain wishes to avoid the constitutional

measures which result in the departure of the Governor-General and in

delivering Sudanese sovereignty to the Sudanese.

Say it, Mr. Luce, and stop beating about the bush. Your

manoeuvres are revealed before Sudanese and world public opinion.

India has suffered so bitterly at the hands of Britain's

imperialist policy that when Nehru met Askeri at the Bandung

Conference, he advised him that the Sudanese should stand firm on

the Agreement and not give the British any chance to fiddle with its

implementation. The fear of the great Indian leader are being

realised, and your statement, Mr. Luce, reveals the truth about

British policy in the Sudan.

The road before our Sudanese brethren is long. But with

their faith and unity they will realise much for the Sudan without

the guardianship of Britain.
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 1529
October 25, 1955

IMMEDIATE:

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1529 of October 25.
Repeated for information to: Governor General Khartoum
and Saving to P.O.M.E.P.

My telegram No. 1521.

All papers today referred to news agency reports of Foreign Office statement of October 22 that Britain had sent Note to Egypt suggesting holding of negotiations between co- denominator of Sudan on the understanding that proposals, which might be put forward by Sudanese Parliament at next meeting on November 3, should be taken into consideration. Foreign Office is alleged to have said that Britain favoured the proposal made by Asahi that present Sudanese Parliament should be entrusted with tasks of

(a) deciding future position of the Sudan,
(b) drawing up constitution,
(c) drafting electoral law.

In British view such a proposal would dispense with the need for plebiscite, election for Constituent Assembly and International Commission.

2. Press published comment on this by responsible source at Ministry for Sudan Affairs. Source declared that this British request constituted flagrant violation of agreement and open interference in Sudan's freedom to decide its own destiny. It would affect free and neutral atmosphere. Obligation of neutrality demanded that Britain and her supporters cease...
Cairo telegram No. 1529 to Foreign Office

-2-

cease interfering and abstain from partiality. Spokesman added that this British interference indicated her determination to evade convening of International Commission before evacuation. By this Britain was aiming at placing Governor General in Supreme Command of Sudanese Defence Force. Britain wished to do this free from international control. Spokesman expressed confidence that Sudanese were fully aware of imperialist devices by which British aimed at preventing establishment of this control (according to Ahram he added the phrase "lest it might expose their plots"). Spokesman stated Egyptian view that Supreme Command should be Sudanese. International Commission must meet before evacuation to hand Supreme Command over to them in accordance with Agreement, which Britain was attempting to break every day in order to achieve her own aims, and in order to deliver Supreme Command to British Governor-General. Britain should stop these artifices and respect the Agreement, which was approved by the Sudanese and had an international character since it had been communicated to the United Nations. She should let the Sudanese decide their own destiny in free atmosphere guaranteed by neutral International Commission, whose first duty would be to hand over Supreme Command to the Sudanese and not to British Governor-General, as Britain wanted. Ahram's editorial echoed these comments expressing particular concern at the prospect of British Governor-General retaining Supreme Command after evacuation. Author questioned value of evacuation in such circumstances and reflected bitterly on the continued trickery of British imperialism.

3. Press also published report that Luce had officially denied statement attributed to him by Al Umma of October 13 and that Governor General in urgent letter to Egyptian Government had also denied that such a statement had been made. Only comment was in Gemsauria, which asked critically why it had taken ten days for denial to be issued.

1. Akbar published somewhat obscure denial by Zulficar Sabri of statement attributed to him in Sudanese paper, Ray El Am, of October 21 (not available here) that Egypt had agreed on Sudanese self determination by a method which contradicted plebiscite method officially suggested by Sudanese Government.

/5...
Osiris telegram No. 1529 to Foreign Office

5. Ahrar published lengthy report from its London special correspondent saying that

(a) Britain was urging seven invited member States of International Commission not to decide on Egyptian invitation until Sudanic opinion had crystallised. It was hoped this would take place on November 3;

(b) Britain considered it would be impossible to carry out plebiscite in the South;

(c) responsible British authorities had said that they did not want to enter into controversies with Egypt and hoped agreement would be reached.

6. Ahrar also contained report from Khartoum that Umma Party would only agree to present Sudanic Parliament being vested with functions of Constituent Assembly if a coalition Government were formed. If Ashari rejected this proposal Umma Party would insist on the necessity for convening International Commission which would take over the Supreme Command of the Sudanic army and powers of sovereignty until self-determination elections are concluded and constitution drawn up by Constituent Assembly.

ADVANCE COPIES:
Mr. Shackburgh
Head of African Department
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITMALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan

No. 1545
October 27, 1955

D. 12.08 p.m. October 27, 1955
R. 1.25 p.m. October 27, 1955

PRIORITy

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1545 of
October 27.
Repeated for information to Governor General Khartoum
U.K.T.C. Khartoum
and Saving to P.O.M.E.F.

My telegram No. 1538: Sudan,

Gamhuria editorial today said that Foreign Office
announcement that it did not want establishment of international
commission or see any need for plebiscite or constituent
assembly, had revealed Britain's imperialist intentions.
Britain was aiming at maintaining her imperialist interest
in the Sudan and at fulfilling what she had been working towards
for more than 50 years, separation of north from south and
addition of three southern provinces to her existing colonies
in Central Africa. Britain imagined that;

(a) it was in her power to confirm the Governor-General in
command of army to facilitate his directing it in Britain's
interest;

(b) Present Sudanese Government and Parliament was anti-
Egyptian which would facilitate task of obtaining treaty or
arrangement whereby Britain could extend her stay in Sudan
or tie it to British imperialism.

2. Recent great failure of Britain's policy in Middle
East was Britain's motive for trying to obtain air bases and
strategic positions.

The Sudanese were aware of all this and were working
hard to prevent fulfillment of British aims. Egypt's policy
was to stand beside Sudanese against any aggression or
imperialist conspiracy. Egypt would spare no effort in
fulfilling any national policy or desire agreed on by the
Sudanese people, and in opposing any party policy promoted by
imperialism.

/3. Ahram
Caire telegram No. 1545 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

3. Ahram published brief report from special correspondent in London dated October 26. Correspondent said he could affirm that Egypt had not agreed to Britain's point of view about supreme command. Agreement had left this matter to be dealt with by international commission before evacuation. Britain was trying to keep Governor-General in his military and civil position during decisive period until completion of constitution and electoral law and meeting of new Parliament. She wanted to use this opportunity to impose military and economic treaty on Sudan not differing in essence from imperialism. Britain's refusal to agree on completing formation of international commission confirmed this view. She did not want Sudan to be under international control which might reveal her intentions towards Sudanese people.
En Clair

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir H. Trevelyan

No. 1526

October 28, 1955

D. 11.11 a.m. October 28, 1955

R. 11.57 a.m. October 28, 1955

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1526 of October 28,
Repeated for information to Governor-General Khartoum,
U.K.T.O. Khartoum

And Saving to P.O.M.B.F.

My telegram No. 1545. Sudan.

Gambouria and Akhbar carried similar brief articles summarising
British and Egyptian points of view about supreme command and
quoting Azhari as saying that having studied Article 11 and
accompanying exchanges of Notes. He found that no complications
need arise.

2. Gambouria also published agency reports from London that
British Ambassador had handed Egyptian Minister of Interior Note
suggesting postponement of further action until meeting of
Sudanese Parliament. Reuter correspondent said that this was
second British Note this week following British protest on Saturday
about Egyptian attempt to establish international commission.

3. Ahram headlined criticism by Sudanese parliamentary opposition
of United Kingdom Trade Commissioner's statement that Britain had
requested postponement of examination of self determination until
November 3 and quoted UMA as suggesting that statements by Luce,
Azhari and new Trade Commissioner indicated collusion.

4. Ahram also reported statement by Mirghani Mamza that for
Sudanese Parliament to call for independence was easy but dangerous
course. Prospect of Governor General retaining supreme command
without international control gave cause for anxiety.

5. Ahram published AFP report from Prague that Czechs had
accepted Egyptian invitation despite British representations that
invitation was premature.
**Sudan: Statement by Mr. Ivere.**

Transmit copies of a letter from the Egyptian Prime Minister of October 17 and the Governor General’s reply about Mr. Ivere’s alleged statement on the Sudan.

### MINUTES

Col. Ivere should subscribe to some reliable newspapers. Nevertheless, I still think that “Al Humra” merely printed, in a more sensational form, what Mr. Ivere probably told other party leaders on the instructions of the Governor General.

*3/11*

It’s all rather unfortunate. If you are right, it shows the impotency and unpreparedness to be suspected. It’s a pity the Palace didn’t issue a prompt denunciation.

*4/11*
GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
KHARTOUM.

October 19, 1955.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's letter of 17th October, 1955, regarding the alleged statement by Mr. Luce which was published in the Umma newspaper of 15th October.

I hasten to inform Your Excellency that Mr. Luce has made no statement of the nature described, and that none of the remarks attributed to Mr. Luce in that article were, in fact, made by him on any occasion.

I would add that I have hitherto thought it best studiously to refrain from involving myself in public comments on irresponsible press reports of alleged statements and actions of my staff and myself. I did not feel that any departure from this rule was called for in the present instance.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency the assurance of my high consideration.

GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE SUDAN.

His Excellency
Lieutenant-Colonel Genal Abdul Nasser,
The Prime Minister,
CAIRO.

Copies to: Foreign Office, London,
H.M. Ambassador, Cairo.
Governor-General's Office, London.
Sudan Agent, Cairo.
CAIRO, 17.10.1955.

His Excellency,
The Governor-General of the Sudan.

Mr. Luce, your political adviser, has made a statement which was published by the Umma Newspaper in its issue of date 13.10.1955, and was broadcast by the Arab News Agency.

Mr. Luce, who made this statement is your Political Adviser, appointed in accordance with Section 103 of the Sudan Self-Government Statute in order to assist you in the discharge of your responsibilities in the Sudan Government.

If he made this statement in his capacity as your political adviser, then no doubt this statement must have been issued under instructions about which you have not written to the Egyptian Government or sought her views. Such a statement ought to be an explanation of the views of the two Governments on behalf of which you act as representative, especially as the statement is contradictory to the terms of the existing Agreement between the two Governments, which must be respected. But if this statement was made by Mr. Luce in his capacity as a British Government spokesman — despite the fact that it is inconsistent with the text of Section 103 of the Self-Government Statute, then the Egyptian Government wishes to know whether this view represents the official viewpoint of the British Government, since it is contradictory with the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement which both Governments undertook to respect.

I await an explanation from Your Excellency about this statement.

Please accept my best regards.

(Signed) JAMAL ABDUL NAASSER,
President, Council of Ministers.
Britain will be Subservient to the Desire of the Sudanese.

Mr. Luce, the Governor-General's Adviser who has recently returned from Britain declared that Britain's policy is to respect the wishes of the Sudanese, maintain their friendship and respect their feelings whenever possible. She will no longer stand as an obstacle in the way of any development, aim or national tendency which they wish to adopt.

If the Sudan Parliament decided to declare the independence from inside its house, Britain will recognize this independence. Mr. Luce added: this policy may be sent in writing and officially if the Sudanese so desired.
From Cairo to Foreign Office

En Claire

Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 569
October 29, 1955

D. 1.05 p.m. October 29, 1955
R. 2.06 p.m. October 29, 1955

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 569 of October 29.
Repeated for information to: G.O. Khartoum
U.K.T.C. Khartoum

And Saving to: P.O.M.E.F.

My telegram No. 556: Sudan.

Ahram editorial today, in familiar vein, commented on Britain's obstructionist policy and contrasted it with Egypt's endeavours to expedite meeting of international commission. Egypt was honouring agreement, Britain breaking it. Although Britain had signed United Nations Charter, she was fundamentally opposed to self-determination and feared a spread of this principle to rest of Africa.

2. Ahram reported that its correspondent had learnt that a responsible Briton had asked important Sudanese leader to make secret Anglo-Sudanese military and commercial pact. Briton had asked for establishment of Anglo-American war base in Sudan to enable British and Americans to bring pressure to bear on Egypt. In return Britain would support the body of opinion favouring announcement by Sudanese Parliament of independence. Agreement was to be secret lest it caused the failure of the group represented by the Sudanese leader in any future elections which might take place for self-determination. Correspondent asserted, that Sudanese national wakening had become too strong to accept either secret or open imperialist pact.

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