Sir Humphrey Trevelyan is shortly to see Colonel Nasser to discuss the next steps to be taken in the Sudan. The Sudanese Parliament has asked the co-dominium to agree to a plebiscite, to decide between union and independence. No reply has yet been sent.

2. It has been rumoured in Khartoum and Cairo that the Egyptian Government might be preparing to make a unilateral declaration of independence for the Sudan. Present indications are, however, that Colonel Nasser may not be willing to take this step or even to agree to a plebiscite, but may rather insist that we keep to the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. The Governor-General has now recommended that:

(a) we and the Egyptians should declare that the Sudan will be independent;
(b) the Sudanese Parliament should be made responsible for drawing up the constitution and a new electoral law, and,
(c) an international commission should supervise (b).

Argument

3. We cannot proceed very far without carrying the Egyptians with us, so that our policy must depend to some extent on what Colonel Nasser is prepared to do. If he agrees to a declaration of independence, the Secretary of State has already agreed that we should explore this with him. The following arguments suggest that such a declaration would be the best way of deciding the Sudan's future. If would be difficult to hold a satisfactory plebiscite in the Sudan, particularly since the recent disturbances in the South. Already the main Sudanese parties are known to be sounding the Egyptians about a declaration, as they did before the plebiscite resolution was formulated. The possibility of the Sudanese taking matters into their own hands, especially after the British and Egyptian troops have all been withdrawn in November, is not entirely out of the question. Moreover, the Governor-General feels that
in his position he is powerless and that it would be better from all points of view if the constitutional processes could be as short and simple as possible. Sovereignty would be held in suspense until the constitution had been drawn up and a permanent Sudanese Parliament elected under it. We should like the constitution to make satisfactory provisions for the South and we should hope that talks would be held between the North and South before independence would be granted.

4. On the other hand Colonel Nasser may not agree to this line. He may either wish to hold a plebiscite, followed by the election of a Constituent Assembly (which the Egyptians could try to buy off) or he might wish to keep strictly to the processes laid down in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. In this event there might be considerable advantage if we were to take the initiative and put to him the Governor-General's proposals. If Colonel Nasser were to turn them down flatly we could then discreetly talk about both co-domini stood in the matter.

5. Egyptian policy towards the Sudan is largely influenced by the need for a solution of the Nile Waters problem to enable work to start on the Aswan High Dam. Nasser may be reluctant to acquiesce in the independence of the Sudan before that problem is finally settled. We have independently come to the conclusion that tripartite talks at the technical level offer the best hope of breaking the present deadlock in negotiations between the Sudan and Egypt. There might now be advantage in proposing such talks to Colonel Nasser. We cannot, however, link Nile Waters with the offer of independence but it might be an idea to mention both proposals to Colonel Nasser at the same interview. Whatever the outcome of the discussions of self-determination we could still go ahead with tripartite talks.

A despatch has been prepared and if the above policy is approved a telegram summarising the contents of the despatch would be sent to Khartoum and Cairo.

6. Recommendations

That:
(a) If Colonel Nasser is thinking on the lines of a declaration of independence Sir H. Trevelyan could be instructed to agree and work out the terms of a joint communication to the Sudanese Government;
(b) If Colonel Nasser does not agree to (a) Sir H. Trevelyan should put forward the Governor-General's proposals;
(c) We should propose tripartite talks on Nile Waters to the Egyptians.

Draft telegram attached dealing with (a) and (b).
A telegram covering (c) will be sent to Cairo and Khartoum if the policy is approved.

[Signature]
September 15, 1955.
SECRET
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OTP and By Bag.

September 16, 1955.

D: 12 Noon September 16, 1955.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Cairo telegram No: 1988 of September 16
Repeated for information to:
and saving to:
B.M.E.O. No: 785.

Your telegram No: 1265 [of September 15]: Sudan,

I quite understand your position. It is of course unwise, if we are to do business on many issues in the future with Nasser to put him in an embarrassing position. We have no desire to do this. Nevertheless, in life the cards must be played as they fall. We have had to carry a good deal of obsequy in the past and we do not see why we should carry it in the future. I suggest that you should say to Nasser that, since both of us have publicly let it be known that we accept the idea of a plebiscite on the independence question, there is no going back on this, either for him or for us. The question then arises whether it is really in the interest of the Sudan to go through this long and laborious process if it can be quickened up. It will not help any of us to prolong the uncertainty. Moreover, as practical people, we must accept the fact that recent troubles in the South increase the difficulties of an effective plebiscite. You could therefore suggest to him that the co-domini should now jointly gain credit for themselves instead of being further involved in dispute and discussion. The way to do this is for us both to say that we accept the principle of an independent Sudan. This will give him credit and no discredit to us. Let us do it together and share the advantages that may accrue to us both. The practical way to do this would surely be to allow the present Parliament to act about the job of constitution making. When it has done this satisfactorily a day will be appointed and the new state will come formally into being.

2. The.....
SECRET

Foreign Office telegram No: 1986 to Cairo

- 2 -

2. The question arises, what part if any the international Supervisory Commission should play. If there is to be no plebiscite and no election for a constituent assembly, the main element in the original purpose disappears. On the other hand, the Sudanese Government may feel that they will gain in public reputation by finding some use for this instrument. If it has nothing to do with the elections and is only to "supervise the making of the constitution" it is a much more limited field and the gentlemen appointed would no doubt be chosen with this in view.

3. If, however, Nasser does not seem attracted by this approach, you should remind him that we at any rate, cannot go back on our publicly declared support of the plebiscite. You might even hint to him that it would be very embarrassing for him if our new proposals become known. However we should much prefer to act in loyal partnership with him in the future in the matter of the Sudan. It would be best for us all in the long run.

A. If you think that Nasser is hesitating about early independence primarily because he fears he will not get a satisfactory agreement on Nile Waters you should add that we fully understand his pre-occupation with this problem. If you think it useful, you may tell him we should be ready to take part in further talks if this would help. (Separate telegram on this subject follows). But you should warn him that in our experience, which is quite considerable, of giving free constitutions to countries long under tutelary control, you are much more likely to get what you want if you treat them generously and show confidence in them. In any case, we think it would be a mistake from Egypt’s point of view to link settlement of the Waters with the future constitutional position of the Sudan. That will only lead to perpetual friction.
Sudan Independence - Appreciation of the Governor-General's latest proposals.

We are considering proposals to shorten the process of Self-Determination in the Sudan. The Governor-General has recommended that:

(a) we and the Egyptians should declare that the Sudan will be independent;
(b) the Sudan Parliament should be made responsible for making the Constitution and new electoral law;
(c) an International Commission should supervise (b).

2. The Egyptian position is not known. We thought they were in favour of (a) but, since the departure of Salah Salem, we are not sure. Salah Salem agreed in advance to accept a Sudanese request for a decision by plebiscite but Nasser is hedging. He may be going to try to stick on the 1953 agreement (possibly in order not to lose the measure of control Egypt still has through the Condominium before getting an understanding on Nile waters and other questions of common interest). He may, however, be ready to agree to drastic measures to shorten Self-Determination.

U.K. Position

3. We cannot proceed far in any direction without taking the Egyptians with us. If they are willing to go, we could adopt a positive attitude to the Governor-General's proposals. The reasons he gives for a short cut are generally acceptable. We have decided to leave the Sudan and the longer we remain there...
there the longer the coat we shall trail.
And the possibilities for embarrassment are nearly 2
unlimited. The main Parliamentary Groups, two
strong and many other religious sects, and two
racial groups, all with sub-divisions, all
intertwined, are \textit{willing} for support wherever
they can find it. For the present - magical
moment they seem to be agreed on one thing -
Independence.

4. The mechanics for a quick solution are
discussed below (para. 7). If we adopt them
with the Egyptians willing, or persuade the
Egyptians to accept them, we shall not evade our
inevitable legacy of being held to blame for
whatever happens by anyone who wants a convenient
scapegoat. It is pretty certain that, whatever
we do, the 3 provinces which comprise the South
Sudan, will blame us for something. But we agreed
in 1953 that they were part of the Sudan and there is
really nothing we can do to help them, consistent
with that decision, except back the Governor-
General and our future representatives in the
Sudan in urging the Government to adopt a moderate
and progressive policy towards the South.

\textbf{Egyptian Position:}

5. The methods adopted by Salah Salem to
move the Sudan into the Egyptian camp have failed.
Nasser has taken over and his ideas are not yet
known. We thought he intended to make friends
with El Ashari and the Sudan Government and
rely on goodwill to achieve Egyptian aims. There
is a possibility, however, that he may want to
postpone Self-Determination, e.g. by sticking on the
1953 Agreement in order to gain time and a whip.

\textit{Hand}
hand for settling the Nile waters agreement.

6. Our attitude on the last question could be to try to persuade the Egyptians that any attempt to coerce the Sudanese would be met by intransigence and might result in the Sudanese taking their future into their own hands as soon as British and Egyptian troops have left in November. Much better to try to bring the Sudanese, Egyptians and ourselves together in primarily technical talks, as equals, with a view to a future agreement.

Mechanics

7. The Sudanese Parliament has formally on independence with Egypt resolved to ask for a plebiscite. The Egyptians (i.e. Salem) publicly said in advance that they would accept and we followed suit. Practically, a plebiscite, particularly in the South, would not be easy nor very conclusive but would appear to the world to be a "fair" solution. The Egyptians, having proclaimed their support, would be very rash now to oppose it. But it may be superseded if the idea of a quicker solution gains support.

8. There has been talk in Cairo and Khartoum of a declaration by the Egyptians and ourselves, giving independence to the Sudan. This, which the Governor-General advocates, raises the following issues:

(a) what date would independence be effective?
(b) who would legally inherit? Presumably the present Government and Parliament;
(c) who would draw up the Constitution? If we accept the Governor-General’s arguments against trying to hold elections, we are
left with the present Parliament or some commission they may nominate;

(d) do we need an International Commission? The Sudanese have formally asked for one. The Commission could do a valuable job in relation to constitution-making but their powers would probably not be great and would be less if independence became effective before the constitution-making were completed. At best, in these circumstances, their presence would act as a check against extremism and give a measure of international backing to the new Constitution.

9. If we go for a solution on these lines, and the Egyptians are willing, the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953 will be no more than a technical process.
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/UTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 1361
October 1, 1955

D: 12.15 a.m. October 2, 1955
R: 2.23 a.m. October 2, 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.1360 of October 1.
Repeated for information to Governor General Khartoum
U.K.T.C. Khartoum
2.N.R.O.

My telegram No.1289: Sudan.

At the end of the interview reported in my telegram No.1361,
I spoke to Nasser for a few minutes on the Sudan.

2. Nasser said that they would agree to the plebiscite,
but could not agree to declare Sudanese independence for two
reasons. First, although he believed that the prospects of
unity were over and that the Sudan would vote for independence,
he could not take the initiative in declaring independence,
since this would mean the public abandonment of those Sudanese
who were still in favour of the link with Egypt. Secondly, and
he seemed to attach more importance to this, it would make his
own internal position very difficult if he should take the
initiative in abandoning what had been an important aid of the
revolution.

3. I then asked him whether he would agree to the co-domini
inviting the Sudanese Parliament to declare on the issue. He
said that this would not help to get over his difficulties
since everyone knew that the present parliament was in favour
of independence.

1. I then said that I would ask for his reactions on a
further possibility, emphasizing that my question was made on a
purely personal basis. If we agreed, in spite of the difficulties,
to have a plebiscite and the result was in favour of independence,
would he then agree, once this issue was out of the way to the
existing parliament being empowered to draft its new constitution
and decide the Sudan an independent State? He did not rule this
out as a possibility, and said that he would have to think over
the idea.

/5. My comments
CONFIDENTIAL

Caire telegram No. 1362 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

5. My comments follow.

Foreign Office please pass to Governor General and
United Kingdom Trade Commissioners Khartoum as my telegrams
Nos. 171 and 182 respectively.

[Repeated to Governor General and
United Kingdom Trade Commissioners
Khartoum]

G G G G
From Cairo to Foreign Office

Sir H. Trevelyan

No. 1366
October 2, 1955.

D. 2.34 p.m. October 2, 1955.
R. 3.15 p.m. October 2, 1955.

The situation foreseen in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 1988 has happily not arisen. Nasser has accepted the plebiscite. He also recognizes the inevitability of Sudanese independence, although, for understandable reasons, he will not take the initiative in declaring it. In the circumstances I recommend that the Co-Dominion now reply to the Sudanese accepting their proposals for a plebiscite and International Commission, and that we and the Egyptians should get to work on the changes necessary in the Sudan Agreement and the commission's terms of reference.

2. Although I do not much like the commission as at present constituted, I do not see how we can get out of having it, though it may be advisable to prevent it having too much power. I shall telegraph proposals.

3. Meanwhile, we can press Nasser to agree to the present parliament, after the conclusion of the plebiscite, being empowered to draw up the constitution and turn itself into the first parliament of the independent State. If he does not agree, then a plebiscite and an election for a Parliament Assembly can presumably be held simultaneously and we can then aim at avoiding a second election.

4. If meanwhile the Sudanese Parliament propose something else, we can consider it.

5. From the point of view of this post, I should see a number of disadvantages in a decision to tell the Sudanese or publish elsewhere that
CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 1366 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

elsewhere that we have made the proposal for a declaration of independence and that Hasser has turned it down. I hope, therefore, that if you consider that there would be advantages in such a course, I may have an opportunity to express my views before the decision is taken.

Foreign Office please pass Priority Governor General and U.K.T.C. Khartoum as my telegrams Nos. 172 and 183 respectively.

[Repeated to Governor General and United Kingdom Trade Commission Khartoum].
Intelligence Brief

No. 1906
August 1, 1955

IMPLICATIONS FOR EGYPTIAN-SUDANESE RELATIONS OF AN INDEPENDENT SUDAN

Present indications are that the Sudanese will choose independence rather than union with Egypt when the time comes early in 1956 for them to decide their future. Although Egypt is still actively promoting union, particularly among southern Sudanese, the Egyptians will probably accept the emergence of an independent Sudan once this becomes explicit. Should the consequent Sudanese Government disintegrate into warring factions -- and this is not beyond the realm of possibility -- any resulting threat to Egypt's share of the Nile waters would be sure to provoke a strong Egyptian reaction which in its extreme might take the form of forcible intervention.

Steps Preliminary to Self-Determination: The basic procedures by which the Sudanese will choose independence or union with Egypt were established in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan of February 1953. This agreement provides that once the Prime Minister has certified the successful completion of the Sudanization of the administration, the Parliament may pass a resolution asking that arrangements for self-determination be put in motion and that the Combined withdraw their troops within three months. The Sudanese Government will then draw up a draft law for the election of a Constituent Assembly subject to the approval of the existing Sudanese Parliament and the Governor General.

Sudanization is now complete and an extraordinary session of the Sudanese Parliament (elected in December 1953) is expected to meet in August to pass the necessary legislation. Although the Egyptian and UK governments have not yet reached final agreement as to precise procedures to be followed, an international commission will then be established to supervise the election of the Constituent Assembly, probably in the winter of 1955 or early 1956. This assembly
will have three functions: (1) to choose independence or some form of link with Egypt, (2) draw up a constitution for the Sudan, and (3) draft an electoral law for the election of a Sudanese Parliament. The responsibilities of the international commission will cease once the Parliament has been elected. Considerable sentiment exists in the Sudan for a direct plebiscite on self-determination, but there are no present indications that the procedures set forth in the UK-Egyptian agreement will be amended.

Probable Outcome of the Vote on Self-Determination. Once the Constituent Assembly is elected, there is every indication that it will choose independence for the Sudan. The membership of the new body is likely to include a majority of the present Parliament, which overwhelmingly favors independence. Although the two major parties—the majority National Union Party (NUP) and the Ummah Party—oppose each other on many issues, they appear to be agreed on the question of independence. A small segment of the NUP under the leadership of the pro-Egyptian former Minister of Public Works Mubarak Dar al-Din, may break away from the party but this will not affect the result. Deputies of the small Republican Independence Party, which split off from the NUP in early 1955, are also committed to independence. Deputies from the largely illiterate southern Sudan are still uncertain.

The Egyptian Position. Egypt, crucially dependent on the uninterrupted flow of the Nile for its livelihood and anxious for an even greater share of the waters in order to realize a development program on which the RCC's political future may hang, has a definite stake in the future of the Sudan. Egypt has long feared the emergence of an independent Sudan because the two countries have competitive economies which could give rise to serious political divergencies. The Nasser regime believes that its interests would best be served by a federation of the two countries under which Egypt would have a controlling voice in policies of common interest.

The Egyptians have been discomfited by the NUP's abrupt abandonment of its pro-Egyptian, unionist policy in April 1955 and by the inconclusiveness of Sudanese-Egyptian talks on the division of the Nile waters. The abortive negotiations held in Cairo during late 1954 and early 1955 ended in mutual recrimination, and subsequent discussions have not yet led to concrete agreement.

From the 1953 Sudanese elections until late 1954, Egyptians under the aegis of Minister of Sudan Affairs Salah Salim were active and free-spending in their efforts to win over Sudanese political leaders. There followed a lull of several months.
in Egyptian activities in the Sudan, concomitant with reports from Cairo that the RCC was apparently gradually accepting the inevitability of an independent Sudan. More recently, and particularly since the breakdown in the Nile waters talks, Egyptians have been reported active in the southern Sudan. On the basis of these reports, it would seem that Egypt may be seeking out the "soft underbelly" of the Sudan in a last-ditch effort to break up the independence movement.

Egyptian persuasiveness, money, and incitement can be expected to generate some support in the southern part of the country, which is culturally separate if not antipathetic to the Arab-oriented north. For the most part, however, southern political leaders distrust the Egyptians even more than they do the northern Sudanese and many of them would prefer the British to either. While the deputies from the largely illiterate southern Sudan are the most venal in Sudan public life, this long-standing distrust of Egypt will militate against any sweeping success for the current Egyptian campaign.

In an apparent effort to improve Egyptian-Sudanese relations, Sudanese Prime Minister al-Azhari attended the anniversary celebration of Egyptian Revolution in Cairo on July 23, where he reportedly intended to urge the Egyptians to recognize and accept the strength of Sudanese sentiment for independence.

Will Egypt Accept an Independent Sudan? The Egyptian regime will probably accept the emergence of an Independent Sudan. Such a development is not likely to damage seriously the Egyptian regime's internal prestige so long as Egypt and the Sudan can arrive at some mutually acceptable agreement on the division of the unallocated Nile waters. Both parties hope for early agreement. Successful conclusion of such an agreement remains of paramount political importance to the Egyptian regime.

Should post-independence developments lead the Egyptian Government to believe that its interests in the Nile waters are threatened, Egypt might attempt to intervene forcefully to protect its interests. It is unlikely that the Egyptians would resort to such intervention for any lesser reason.
Significance for the Area Should Egypt and the Sudan be Unified.

Should, as a remote possibility, the Sudanese choose unity with Egypt, "unity" would probably mean loose ties between the two countries. Real Egyptian control of the Sudan, even if it could be realized, would be very difficult to maintain since large and influential elements of the population would almost certainly be strongly opposed to such a regime. Egypt at present lacks the military force to hold the Sudan against the will of the Sudanese, especially in view of continuing Egyptian reluctance to move effective troops out of Egypt as long as tension with Israel remains high.

Even such limited union, quite aside from Egyptian military occupation, would probably arouse the opposition of Ethiopia and give rise to apprehension among the British in Kenya and Uganda. In the face of a possible coalition of the above forces and unrest within the Sudan itself, it is unlikely that such a hypothetical Egyptian occupation of the Sudan would result in Egyptian expansion beyond the Sudanese borders.
SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET

AND WHITEHALL SECRET

DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan

No. 1326

D. 1.55 a.m. October 7, 1955

R. 2.23 a.m. October 7, 1955

October 6, 1955

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1326 of

October 6.

Repeated for information to Governor General Khartoum,

U.K.T.C. Khartoum,

S.U.E.0., Washington.

Your telegram No. 388 to Khartoum (not to all).

Sudan.

However presented, the course you propose will probably

be seen here as tantamount to abrogation of Anglo-Egyptian agree-

ment on the Sudan, in reprisal for Nasser's arms deal. If we

adopt it we should be prepared for Egyptian retaliatory action

against Base agreement either by administrative obstruction

or by actual abrogation, though latter might be delayed until

our withdrawal is complete.

2. I believe that there is a chance of our achieving some-

thing along the lines of paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 2155,

but that the proposed action on the Sudan will greatly increase

the difficulty of either ourselves or the Americans getting

Nasser to act on these lines; particularly on Palestine.

Foreign Office please pass Governor General Khartoum,

U.K.T.C. Khartoum and Washington (all immediate) as my

telegrams Nos. 174, 185 and 182 respectively.

(Repeated to Governor General Khartoum and U.K.T.C.

Khartoum and Washington).

ADVANCE COPIES:

Mr. Ward,
Private Secretary,
Mr. Shukburgh,
Head of African Department.
THE SUDAN

Confidential

Our latest suggestions for Self-Determination in the Sudan were put to the Egyptian Prime Minister by Sir H. Trevelyan on September 20. Colonel Nasser asked for time to consider them. Fawzi may not yet have been told about them.

2. Briefly, our policy is as follows. When Salah Salem was dealing with Sudanese affairs, the Egyptians publicly committed themselves to agree to the Sudanese Parliament's request that the choice between Union with Egypt and Independence should be decided by means of a plebiscite instead of a Constituent Assembly as provided in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953. Though we have not made any such promise publicly, it is generally known that we also are ready to agree. We are now seeking to convince the Egyptians that we and they cannot go back on this.

Nevertheless, with the growing demand in the Sudan for independence, which Nasser cannot ignore, and because recent disturbances in the south will increase the difficulties of holding an effective plebiscite, we should like to shorten even more the rather laborious process of Self-Determination provided for in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. Our idea is that both co-domin should publicly accept the principle of an independent Sudan, thereby jointly gaining credit for themselves in the eyes of the Sudanese. This would do away with the need for a plebiscite. The process could be further shortened if the Egyptians could agree to place the task of constitution making in the hands of the present Parliament. This would do away altogether with the need for electing a Constituent Assembly. Under this shortened procedure we think it would still be useful to have an International Commission
Commission as provided for in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, but its task would be limited to supervising the drawing up of the Constitution. The Sudanese Parliament on August 22 chose the countries from which the members of the Commission should be drawn.

3. It now seems possible that Nasser will not agree to go so far as we suggest, but we have made it clear that, for our part, we cannot go back on our support for a plebiscite (and we might even be prepared to make our views publicly known so that the Sudanese would realise we were not standing in their way, although we should prefer to work in harmony with the Egyptian Government). We think that one of the main reasons for Nasser's hesitancy about early independence for the Sudan may be that he fears that he will not get a satisfactory agreement on the division of the Nile Waters. We have, therefore, authorised Sir H. Trevelyan to tell Nasser, if he thinks it would be useful, that we should be ready to participate in tripartite talks on Nile Waters and to impress on him that he is much more likely to get what he wants from the Sudanese if he treats them generously. We think it would be a mistake from Egypt's point of view to link a settlement of the Nile Waters question with the future constitutional position of the Sudan, but we think that tripartite talks might appeal to Nasser as a way of breaking the deadlock. Our idea is that the talks should be conducted at the technical level and that it may be possible, without settling everything down to the last detail, to agree on a formula which would enable work on the Aswan High Dam to be started. The tripartite talks would also provide an opportunity to put on record officially, the East African interest in Nile Waters. If Nasser likes our proposal we shall approach the Sudanese who have already hinted that they would welcome our help in solving this problem.

September 23, 1955.
When we were trying to discuss with the Egyptians the composition of the international commission to supervise the process of self-determination in the Sudan they tried to outbid us for Sudanese support by making it known publicly that they would be prepared to let the Sudanese Parliament decide this question. That did not appear to us to be the intention of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan. Though we acquiesced, we thereafter did all we could to persuade the Egyptians to proceed in consultation with ourselves and not again go behind our backs. Some two weeks ago Sir H. Trevelyan asked Colonel Nasser for his view about the Sudanese request that the question of the Sudan's future should be decided by plebiscite instead of through a Constituent Assembly and further suggested to him that the whole process might be shortened by our making a joint declaration of Sudanese independence. Colonel Nasser has just told Sir H. Trevelyan that he would agree to a plebiscite but would not agree to declare Sudanese independence, since that would make his internal position difficult and would mean abandoning the remaining Sudanese supporters of the idea of union.

2. It would seem to follow that we could embarrass Nasser if we were to make it known that, if the Sudanese desire it, we would agree to Sudanese independence without a plebiscite or any electoral process. We should of course thus be doing to the Egyptians what Major Salem had been doing to us and what Colonel Nasser has promised not to do. It might annoy Nasser but it would be favourably received in the Sudan and ought not to arouse particular repercussions in other Arab countries.

3. We could adopt two methods: /(a) to let
7 OCT 1966

(a) to let the fact be known through the press;
(b) to inform the Sudanese Prime Minister privately of our view.

4. If our move is intended to make Nasser's position difficult it would be necessary that publicity should be given to our views. But if we were to do this without informing the Sudanese Prime Minister of our intentions we might catch him off balance. This we must avoid. He may be in a difficult position when the Sudanese Parliament meets later this month when he will be under severe criticism over the mutiny in the South and may find quite a powerful coalition against him. He may also prefer that nothing should be said until the main body of Egyptian troops has left on about October 12.

5. We should therefore inform the Sudanese Prime Minister privately of our intention and give him a chance of commenting before we make our views public. But we should not give him time to warn the Egyptians.

TIT FOR TAT

[Signature]

October 5, 1966
SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO KHARTOUM
(Governor-General)

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET

D. 2,10 a.m. October 6, 1955

October 6, 1955

TIMIDATE REPORT

Addressed to Governor-General, Khartoum, telegram No. 388
of October 6.
Repeated for information to Cairo and Washington.

In view of Egyptian action in concluding an armaments deal
with Czechoslovakia, we need no longer feel obliged to consult
Egyptian susceptibilities so carefully as hitherto over the
Sudan. There is a strong case on merit for speeding up the
process of the Sudanese towards independence. The original plan
under the Anglo-Egyptian agreement would have required elections
for a constituent assembly before self-determination. The next
plan (advocated by the Sudan Parliament) was for a plebiscite.
Both these arrangements would involve international supervision.
There seems no valid reason why the Sudanese should not be
allowed to decide upon independence without going through these
difficult and perhaps dangerous processes. I have also been
impressed by the difficulty of your position in the interim
period, with responsibility but no power, and by your strong
desire to see the whole process speeded up.

2. Subject, therefore, to your views, I propose that you
should inform the Sudanese Prime Minister at an early date
that Her Majesty's Government are ready to recognize the
immediate independence of the Sudan if the Sudanese so desire,
and that an announcement to this effect will shortly be made.
Proposal would be to make the public announcement not more than
twenty-four hours after Aswari had been informed. Thus he would
have an opportunity to protest if he really objected, but
danger of leakage to the Egyptians would be avoided. The
action would not (repeat not) be presented as a "tit for tat"
against Nasser, but rather as something which Her Majesty's
Government believe to be right and in the best interests of
the Sudan. Nasser would be told immediately before publication.

3. I shall be glad to have your comments urgently and
your advice upon methods and timing. In principle, we would
like to take this action as soon as possible, unless you think
it necessary to wait for the departure of the main body of
British and Egyptian troops.
Minutes.

I suppose that the attached letter be entered for the record.

Mr. Fawcett sent this letter to Mr. Turton while he was in Cairo, but it could not be deciphered until after he had left. Mr. Turton would not in any case have seen him. Mr. Durnall's note, how serious can be considered sufficient acknowledgment.

African Dept.

A.
Mr Reid

I agree. There is one further point.
And Aghorn continued to hold "unmist"
vrnue and had continued to use his written
as P.M. for their impression he would not
have been polluting the free and neutral
datmoshere!

Mr Reid

11/10.
Dear Angus,

We have now deciphered Louis Fanous’ manuscript letter and had copies typed. It might perhaps be as well for you to have a copy and I enclose one herewith. I have not had the enclosures typed as they are very lengthy and do not contribute anything to the main arguments set out in the letter.

Louis Fanous is an aged and very verbose ex-Senator. He now has no official capacity or political influence. This does not however prevent him from taking advantage of every possible opportunity to bombard the Embassy with his views. The trouble is that these always ignore the old proverb that “politics is the art of the possible”.

I have had a two hour session with Fanous in order to enable him to let off steam. No further action is called for.

Yours ever,

John

(J.K.DRINKALL)

C.R.E. Rae, Esq.,
Room 57,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.
COPY

20, Hassan Sabry,
ZAHALAI, Cairo.
24th September, 1955.

To H.E. The Under-Secretary of State (Parliamentary) Mr. Turton,
c/o British Embassy, Cairo.

Sir,

Being an old Egyptian Nationalist and for 22 years member of the
Senate, and having been educated at New College Oxford, under my
beloved old Tutor the late H.A.L. Fisher, and had such good and many
friendships in Britain which made me believe in and appreciate the
"mode of life" of your great people, I have always been, at
great personal cost to my person, to work for a good understanding
between Egypt and Britain.

This is why I am now taking the liberty of addressing this letter
to you, as between two representatives of the people in their
respective countries, and in no way as speaking for our government,
in order to put an immediate stop to the present trend in the Sudan
affairs, which is resulting in an evil situation likely to be
disastrous to both Egypt and the Sudan, and consequently also to the
British.

I need not go into details, which you no doubt know better than I
do - but from all the reliable information I have, it is clear that
the developments, since the Agreement was put in operation, have been
of a nature to reveal the impossibility of letting it work out as
originally planned without the most dire and disastrous consequences
which it may not be possible to retrieve, if allowed to take their full
course.

The two basic conditions of that Agreement, viz. the Unity of the Sudan
North and South, and the provision of an atmosphere of neutrality
and freedom for self-determination, have both now collapsed - and cannot
be restored.

Firstly, The sad developments in the Southern Sudan, which
threaten to become worse, have shown clearly the impossibility of
reconciling the Southerners, with their past memories of the
Northern Arabs' relations with their Folk, to the acceptance of
the Northern Politicians' domination - Parliament or no Parliament -
for that would only mean a facade and a sham.

No peace in the Sudan as a whole could be realised without the
intervention of a third "shise" party between the Northerners
and the Southerners - and peace is fundamentally essential -
not to be trifled with for the sake of a shibboleth, as self-
government much less self-determination, for a mass of tribes
that have no unity among them of any kind and no sense of
nationality at all. To give timelater importance, would be
shameless hypocrisy, and I feel sure, with my knowledge of
British morality, the British Government would not indulge in
such hypocrisy.

Secondly - The primary condition of freedom and neutrality,
it has become clearly evident from the present Sudan Cabinet
of El Azhari, can no longer be pretended to exist, after his open declaration in favour of 'independence' and cooperation with the Umma Party, while he and his colleagues and supporters in Parliament had obtained their seats on the 'unionist' ticket. Everyone knows what a strange supposed 'freedom and neutrality' in a popular election becomes, in fact, when a government in power sets its heart to get a certain result - the one it wants - and we in Egypt know from our experience the reality of this, as does your Embassy, who witnessed the 'freely and unhindered' elections which ostensibly gave them huge majorities against the Wafd, only to be reversed strongly at following elections under freer conditions.

The issue in the self-determination contemplated election is far too important (and vital to Egypt) to be so lightly trifled with and permit its taking place under a declared blatant partisanship as that lately revealed by the Azhari cabinet and his Sudan Government.

To talk of an "International Commission" to supervise the Election and ensure "the free and neutral atmosphere" stipulated as an essential condition in the Agreement, would be worse than a hypocrisy - a crime to truth and reality - which would lead to future disasters.

For one thing, we the Egyptian People, whatever any Government of Egypt of the day may do, cannot and will not accept its results - or rather ostensible and pretended results, that Agreement of 1953 was made and signed by Gen. Neguib, head at the time of the Revolution Government, which itself declared itself to be a transitional government from the Devolution to a Constitutional Regime - I leave it to you to reason out the rest of its implications, legal and diplomatic.

The reasons for this anti-Agreement (1953) attitude on the part of the Egyptian People as a whole are not difficult to see and appreciate - as a sound moral and political attitude to take. I enclose some extracts from the statements made by eminent British Authorities on the fundamental issues at stake, from the Egyptian National vital interests point of view, which I trust will give you the elements necessary for a sound judgment.

To these I need only add the substance of the further extracts confirming Egyptian rights in the Sudan and these resolve themselves into the fact that the Egyptian People were called upon by Lord Cromer, as British Representative, and other British Authorities to make great sacrifices, financial and other, to their great cost in health, that is life and education, to help the people in the Sudan as being their brothers and the Sudan "an integral part of Egypt", and are so vital to their very existence - life itself - and their national well-being. (See Cromer and Milner and Garstin's statements in notes attached).

Besides, there is another reason why the British Government must, in fidelity to itself and its declared policy of acting in the interest of the People of the Sudan, the same as Egypt did in the Treaty of 1936, now revise their position in the 1953 Agreement, namely that it is not in the best interests of the people in the Sudan as a whole, to go along with the policy embodied in that Agreement, which, by the way, seems to have been made in undue hurry and under stress of momentary psychological disequilibrium on the part of both Egyptian and British for, otherwise, no sane man, with knowledge of the facts, can understand how it was made and in that queer form, and the undue haste for its execution - especially as regards the sabotaging of the Sudan Administration in top haste, before an adequate substitute was available.

There can only be one way, and at that the only real solution, and that is for the British Government to honour its pledges to Egypt, so often given in the past, and agree to the restoration of the

/De Jure
do vary regime for the Sudan — a territory legally internationally forming part of the territory of the Egyptian Republic, today, as it did under the Khedivial Regime — as declared by Cromar so repeatedly, so clearly and so emphatically (see Notes on Egyptian Sovereignty over Sudan attached herewith).

This is the only honourable and moral course for the British now to take — not only for respect of their commitments to Egypt and her vital interests, but also in the best real interest of the Sudanese themselves.

For as Mr. Churchill himself on the question of the Unity of the Sudan with Egypt, at the end of his book "The River War", said, after referring to "the intimate and sympathetic connections of Egypt and the Sudan" — that "Egypt does not benefit alone — the advantages of the connection are mutual; for", as he concluded, "if the Sudan is thus naturally and geographically an integral part of Egypt, Egypt is no less essential to the development of the Sudan — adding that their future welfare is inseparably intermingled" and that "they could not improve apart".

(Signed) L.A. PANOUS.
SECRETARY OF STATE

This conflict of opinion between Cairo and Khartoum was inevitable. You will see from Sir Knox Helm's paragraph 5 that we have until Tuesday next to make up our minds finally. Indeed you might prefer to allow yourself a few more days so as to be able if necessary to consult your colleagues again on Thursday. There is no absolute need, I think, for the action to be taken on the very day after the departure of the troops.

2. I am not myself inclined to be put off by Sir H. Trevelyan's warnings. It is true that the Chiefs of Staff attach importance to the Base Agreement and particularly the overflying rights which go with it; so that an abrogation of the Agreement by Egypt would be a serious blow to us. But if Egypt is prepared to go so far as that in retaliation for our offering early independence to a fellow Arab people, I cannot believe that the overflying rights we enjoy under the Base Agreement will be of very great value to us if ever we wanted to make use of them in connexion with the maintenance of our position in the Gulf or Africa. The abrogation of the Base Agreement would be a very considerable further step by Egypt away from co-operation with the West and would have even more dangerous political consequences than the arms deal with Czechoslovakia.

3. As regards Sir H. Trevelyan's second paragraph, I wish he could show us some evidence that there is a chance of Nasser limiting his Iron Curtain arms deal and mitigating its political effects. I doubt whether we increase his respect for us by appearing to accept tamely a defeat of the kind he has administered to us.

4. The overriding considerations seem to me that we want to
get out of the Sudan soon; that a speeding up of the process of self-determination is clearly in the interests of the Sudanese people and in no way damages real Egyptian interests; and that it is a position which we can publicly defend much more easily than Nasser can his.

5. However, there are certain risks and you will want to think the matter over carefully. If there were some evidence next week that Nasser was really trying to be good, we might possibly be wise to delay the operation.

October 7, 1955

* * *

The Chiefs of Staff say that demobilisation of the Peace Agreement would be "a most curious backdown, not only of our relations with Egypt, but of most of our aspirations for the stability of the Middle East as a whole." (COS.(Si)xx3)

P.S.

I am advised to go ahead.

The work I have in hand is on

my mind in the morning;

I have two weeks in

a summer

and

I have to

work;

perhaps a short trip? I

I wish to

I wish to

write

write

write

write

29/10
SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

Sir H. Trevelyon

No. 1395
October 6, 1955

D. 4.07 a.m. October 7, 1955
R. 4.30 a.m. October 7, 1955

PRIORITY
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1395 of October 6.
Repeated for information to Washington

Your telegram No. 2139: Soviet bloc arms for Egypt.

I spoke to the Prime Minister accordingly on October 6. I also said that I hoped that he had fully realised at our last interview the seriousness with which this matter was regarded in London, and clearly understood the dangers to Egypt’s relations with the West, which I had explained to him on your instructions on that occasion.

2. When I told him that he should have discussed the matter with me before concluding the deal, he again referred to his interview with my predecessor. He said that he had told Byroade in June that if he could not get arms from the United States, he would have to turn to Russia. Byroade had told my predecessor, who had next day come to deliver a message from Her Majesty’s Government which was a threat that we would stop all arms supplies if he did so. He had therefore felt that he could not helpfully discuss the matter any further with us. His Q.M.G. had had a similar experience with Mr. Shuckburgh. I said that I had no doubt that both my predecessor and Mr. Shuckburgh had rightly pointed out the dangers of such action. He insisted that he had received only threats which had made it impossible for him to discuss the question further with us.

3. When I said that his speech had given the impression that he had received no cooperation from the United Kingdom, which was not true, he replied that he was talking only about arms and not about other forms of cooperation. I said that that was certainly not the impression which readers of the speech had obtained.

4. He did not contest my figures of our deliveries of arms to Egypt and Israel. He showed that he understood my point about what would be the effect of their publication, but said /that,
that, contrary to my view, he was quite sure that Israel was able to get considerable quantities of arms from other sources. He said that I argued that we had kept the balance, but both my predecessor and my United States colleague, in urging on him restraint on the Gaza border, had repeatedly told him that the Israeli forces were stronger, and would beat the Egyptian forces if there were a serious clash. I said that they had no doubt urged restraint on him, but could not have suggested that the Israelis were far stronger in arms, since we had carried out the policy of the Tripartite Declaration. He again referred to British Press reports that the Israelis were far stronger. I replied that I had already told him that you understood the feelings of his army at hearing Israeli boasts, and that he did not surely regard statements of this sort in the Press as a serious military estimate.

5. I then referred to the French paper concerning British deliveries to Israel, which he had used in his speech. I reminded him that I had already told him that the Sherman tanks were not a British export to Israel, and gave him enough comments upon some of the remaining items to show him that the list was unreliable. He said that it was an official French publication. I said that I understood it to be only an unofficial news-letter circulated to the French Press, but he repeated that it was put out before publication in "Le Monde" by the French Government as propaganda directed to the Arab countries. He then referred to the French deals. He said that the French had agreed to sell the Israelis MX tanks, Mysteres and 155 MM guns. The first four tanks had arrived in Israel before the parade there in April, and deliveries were going on. In April or May he had made a deal with the French that in consideration of certain changes in their policy and propaganda on North Africa, the French would supply him with similar armaments. Delivery of the aircraft (Mystere IIs), however, [? grp. omitted] not going to start for 12 months, and they had still been negotiating on this when the French cancelled the deliveries under the contract, which had not yet begun. The French deliveries to Israel had not been cancelled. He neither produced nor mentioned the British military intelligence document (my telegram No. 1372).
SECRET
Cairo telegram No. 1395 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

6. The Prime Minister then repeated his thesis that all he wanted was security. Up till Gaza attack in February, he had concentrated his resources on development. He did not want to spend his money on arms, but had been forced to after that date.

7. I had an opportunity to refer in passing to the Johnston plan. He said that he was waiting for the views of the other Arab States, and I did not pursue the matter.

8. I have no doubt that the Prime Minister fully understands the seriousness with which you regard his action.

Foreign Office please pass Priority to Washington as my telegram No. 181.

[Repeated to Washington]
SECRET
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO KHARTOUM
(Governor General)

Cypher/CFP
& by bag.

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND WHITEHALL
SECRET DISTRIBUTION

No.396
D. 1,45 a.m. October 12, 1955.
October 12, 1955
IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Khartoum telegraph No.396 of October 11.
Repeated for information to Cairo [Immediate]
Washington
and Sending to P.O.W.E.F. No.920.

By telegram No.2177 to Cairo [of October 7]:

Sudan,

I have now reconsidered this question. I think that since Her Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo has so strongly insisted with Colonel Nasser that the Egyptian practice of trying to force our hand by press releases should cease and Nasser has since complied with this, it would be a mistake for us to revert to such a method. At the same time I am sure that in the interests of the Sudan itself it would be very much better to avoid the difficulties inherent in holding a plebiscite and also to shorten the period in which you are left with authority but little power to enforce it.

2. The best method of achieving this end, whilst adhering to the procedure agreed with Nasser, would be to arrange for the initiative to be taken by the Sudanese Government. Please, therefore, unless you see serious objection, put to the Sudanese Prime Minister the arguments in favour of the Sudanese Parliament itself making the choice about the Sudan's future status and urge him to request the Government forthwith to fall in with that proposal. You should add in confidence that if he does so Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to urge Colonel Nasser to agree.

3. If Colonel Nasser, on further reflection accepts the idea, we shall have achieved our main objective. If he still proves recalcitrant it will then be open to us to tell him that we shall have to let our views be known.

A. I realise
SECRET

Foreign Office telegram No. 596 to Khartoum (Governor General)

1. I realise that if Colonel Harner agrees, we have to decide how the Constitution shall be drawn up and put into effect, but hope that in that case he would also be willing to entrust this to the Sudanese Parliament.

5. If Harner declines to make the request, I shall have to reconsider the matter. But one conclusion we should probably have to draw is that we cannot necessarily rely on him to support any unilateral action we might take to bring about a short cut to independence.
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

[Signature]

Sir H. Trevelyan

No. 1471

October 18, 1955

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1471 of October 18.

Repeated for information to Governor General Khartoum

U.K.T.C. Khartoum

P.O. M.E.F.

Editorial in Alhram yesterday commented on statement by Luce published on October 13 in the Khartoum Almanac in which Luce affirmed that Britain's policy was to respect Sudanese wishes and hence forward not to stand in the way of any development desired by them. This could be set out officially in writing if they so desired,

2. Article warned Sudanese against underlying implications of this seemingly kind message and then asked whether Luce "considers his support for a declaration of Sudanese independence by the Sudanese Parliament and Britain's recognition of that independence in the Press will gain for her the sympathy and friendship of the Sudanese people?" - (This appears to refer to further remark by Luce carried by Alhram on October 13, but not quoted by Alhram, that if Sudanese Parliament decided on independence Britain would support its decisions.

3. British policy still aimed at prolonging British domination. Britain had been trying for a long time to undermine Anglo-Egyptian Agreement and avoid carrying out its provisions. She went so far as to cause the disturbances in the south in hope of creating a situation under which the Agreement would be amended.

4. Luce's statement revealed that Britain wanted to avoid the plebiscite which had been advocated by the Sudanese and blessed by Lingg and the Mahdi. Indeed she wanted to avoid all the constitutional steps provided for in the Agreement which if carried out would ensure the Sudan's sovereignty and the end of British influence.

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T T T