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JE 1058/117

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

INDEXED

En Clair

DEPARTMENTAL

DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan

No. 1027
August 14, 1955

D. 3.07 f.m. August 14, 1955
S* 4.58 p.m. August 14, 1955

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1027 of August 14.
Repeated for information (immediate) to U.K.T.C. Khartoum
and Savin I© B.M.E.O.

My telegram No. 1021 of August 15. 10/10/56

Akhbar editorial today strongly supported Salah Salem's proposal to refer the question of the Commission to the Sudanese Parliament. Britain aimed at entrusting supervision of self determination process to present Sudanese Government under Azhari, but opposed this as disregarding provisions of the Agreement with which Egypt has determined to comply.

2. Press also prominently reported meeting of NUP General Assembly (at which 198 members out of 236 were present) on August 13 at Nureddin's house (not attended by Nureddin) which decided unanimously

- (i) to expel Azhari, Hamad, Fadli, Mardi, Andzarrouk from the Party,
- (ii) to annul expulsion of T Oddim and Kheir, to confirm them in their offices and to charge them with the offices of the Acting President and Acting Secretary-General respectively until the Assembly decide on new party organisation,
- (iii) to aim at establishing in the Sudan independent, democratic sovereign republic in union with Egypt and the setting up of Supreme Council for matters of joint interest (defence, foreign and economic policy) with special tench committee to look after interests of the South,
- (iv) that the peoples of Egypt and the Sudan, as distinct from the Governments, should have the right to annul or amend union,
- (v) to take legal steps to occupy all party property.

/3. Press,

Cairo telegram No. 1027 to Foreign Office

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3* , quoting A.N.A. stated that Sayed AM tllrgbaai had issued declaration suggesting national plebiscite to decide on the Sudan's future instead of election of Constituent Assembly as stipulated in the Sudan Agreement* This would avoid dangerous strife which characterises electoral feattlcs« Co-Domini were requested to adopt this proposal and facilitate matters by introducing the necessary amendment.

4. Press also reported meeting of all Sudanese parties to discuss procedure to be adopted during session of August 20 in which question of evacuation of foreign troops would be dealt with.

5* Press of August 13 published disclosures referred to in paragraph I of my telegram No. 167 Saving of August 12, Azhari had deliberately impeded Egyptian offers to help the South by creating medico-educational centres at cost of £750,000 annually. The centres would have been non-political. Sudanese Government would have the right to appoint all responsible officials and the southerners would have had priority.

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J

AFRICAN DEPARTMENT
EGYPT AND SUDAN

10/5
JE1058/119

FROM
Sir H. Trevelyan
Cairo

No. 1043
Dated Aug. 15
Received in Registry— Aug. 16

Anglo - Egyptian - Sudanese Relations.

Reports his discussion with the Egyptian Prime Minister about Egyptian interference in facts Sudan.

REFERENCES

JE1077/101

MINUTES

I.P.D. have spoken to the Head of the Arabic Service of the B.B.C. about broadcasts on the Sudan. It appears that Gordon Watfield has only recently returned from Egypt where he had a talk with Salah Salem during the course of which their question of broadcasts about Nurgib was discussed. The truth is that the B.B.C. have made no broadcasts in support of Nurgib since soon after he was deposed. B.B.C. were grateful for the compliment Nurgib paid them about their "effective indirect propaganda."

J. W. R. H.
16/8.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

PC) Mr. Tompkins, Sudan Agency 16/8

(Action completed)

8/1/24/8

(Index)

19/1/28

Paragraph 2 of the telegram refers. The broadcast seems to have been made after Nurgib was deposed, so there may be some grounds for Colonel Manner's having taken umbrage. But this is very much past history. In any case we must not do what
(control)

Control the BBC, though the Egyptians probably think we do.
D. B. Shepherd
17/8.

But do the Arabic Services
"Adviser Sudanese independence"?
Can we give Cairo ammunition to refute the charge?
D.B. 18/8

Mr. Ridd
I doubt it. What is more likely is that the B.B.C. will have reported the movement towards independence with some objective comment, which will naturally be taken by the Egyptians as propaganda in support of independence.
Mr. Goodison may have something further to say about this.

J.W.F. Ridd.
18/8

I.P.D. (Mr. Goodison).

- 1. We cannot prove that we have not done something; we can only deny the charge and ask the Egyptians to specify the date and time of programmes which they hold give grounds for complaint.
- 2. I have no doubt that the BBC have said, for example, that a majority of the Sudanese Cabinet, of the N.U.P., or of the Sudanese people, favour independence. As Mr Ridd says, we may regard this as impartial while the Egyptians condemn it as tendentious.
- 3. I can find no earlier pp about Egyptian complaints against the BBC except PB1049/7 (1954) attached, which makes it clear that they usually deal direct with the BBC resident repres representative in Cairo. It is a curious coincidence that this is a complaint that the BBC had

Flag A

attached

Minutes.

General Neguib.

Flag B -

Flag C.

4. No written directive has been sent to the BBC on the tone they should adopt on the Sudan, though that sent to the UKTC (PG 468/14 G (1954)) states clearly that our publicity should favour independence discreetly. The tone of Mr Maxwell's letter to the BBC (at PB1041/28G (1954)) of July 26 1954 might be held to imply the same.

W. Addison
19/8

It would seem best for us to wait for the Egyptians to quote us chapter and verse. In any case the B.B.C. would be reluctant to provide us with a batch of translations from the Arabic of things they have recently said.

J. W. R. Ed.
11/8.

Salah Salem has said that he will send us the offensive paragraphs in the BBC Arabic Service (Cairo tel us 1051) and I think we must now await them. He also complained about the Middle East Broadcasting Service - he may mean Shark.

D. Shepherd
20/8.

Right
D. W. S.
22/8

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL
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Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 1043
August 15, 1955

B. 8.59 p.m. August 15, 1955
R. 11.53 p.m. August 15, 1955

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED
JE 1058/119

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1043 of August 15

Repeated for information to: Governor General Khartoum
U.K.T.C. Khartoum
B.M.E.O.

JE 1071/101
My telegram No. 1040: Sudan.

After the discussion recorded in my telegram under reference, I told Nasser that I had a further message from you about the Sudan to five MB, and suggested that I might do this tomorrow. However, he suggested that I should continue the discussion then and there, and I therefore carried out the instructions in your telegram No. 1645. — JE 1071/101

2. In reply Nasser developed the following arguments. He said that the trouble was that there was no free and neutral atmosphere inside the Sudan, and Azhari was ensuring by his control of the Radio and suppression of Opposition newspapers that only an anti-Egyptian point of view should be put forward there. By allowing this, the Governor-General was failing in his duties. It was natural, therefore, that the Egyptian Press and Radio should have put the Egyptian point of view which, he admitted, was unity between Egypt and the Sudan, though they had tried to moderate publicity on the matter in the last ten days. (There has in fact been no change in this period, and I shall take an opportunity to tell him so). He then suggested that we were not adopting a neutral attitude, on the evidence of articles in the Times and broadcasts from the B.B.C Arabic service favouring Sudanese independence. He said that the B.B.C. had been making effective indirect propaganda in their services directed to the Sudan, particularly by remarks in favour of General Neguib. Supposing he decided to send Neguib to the Sudan? In that case Neguib would make trouble there for everybody.

3. I said



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Cairo telegram No.1043 to Foreign Office

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3. I said that I was not yet sufficiently aware of the facts about radio and newspapers in the Sudan, but I was quite sure that the Governor-General was carrying out his duties with complete impartiality. It was certainly for the Co-dominion to ensure in every way possible that there was a free and neutral atmosphere in the Sudan, and complaints such as he had made could be put by us to the Governor-General for his comments. I was not aware of the contents of recent B.B.C. Arabic broadcasts, but Her Majesty's Government had certainly not been carrying out propaganda by this means, and we could not base this charge upon recent comments by the Times, which, incidentally, was an independent newspaper. Would he really like Her Majesty's Government to start intensive propaganda in favour of one outcome in the Sudan accompanied by large promises of financial aid? The responsibility of the Co-dominion was to try and ensure a free and neutral atmosphere in the Sudan and to refrain from propaganda on the issue in their own countries.

4. Nasser implied that we were conducting propaganda just as much as they were, but doing it in a rather more intelligent and subtle way, but he reiterated the intention of the Egyptian Government to carry out the agreement. I then again urged him to stop the propaganda in the Egyptian Press, emphasizing that you were anxious to help the Egyptian Government in a number of directions, but that they were making it difficult for you to do so, owing to the reactions in the United Kingdom caused by Egyptian Press statements. Nasser said that he was anxious to have a full talk with me about the Sudan, and it was arranged that we should meet again tomorrow morning with Salah Salem.

5. Please see my immediately following telegram

Foreign Office pass to Governor-General Khartoum and U.K.T.C. Khartoum as my telegrams 112 and 113 respectively.

[Repeated to Governor-General via U.K.T.C. Khartoum].

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Head of African Department

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

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Sir I* Trevelyan
No. 1044
August 15, 1955.

D: 7.11 p.m. August 15, 1955.
R: 8.50 p.m. August 15, 1955.

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JE1058/120

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1044 of August 15.
Repeated for information to Governor-General Khartoum,
U.K.T.C. Khartoum
B.M.E.O. JE1058/119

My immediately preceding telegram. Sudan.

Nasser was cordial and completely equable throughout our conversation on the Sudan. He did not appear in the least to mind our accusation that the Egyptians were not carrying out the agreement. His line was in effect that we were supporting Ashari in suppressing pre-unity opinion in the Sudan, and that it was natural for the Egyptian Government to take counter-measures. At tomorrow's interview I should be able to deal with his charges more fully.

Foreign Office please pass Governor-General and U.K.T.C. Khartoum as my telegrams Its. 113 and 114 respectively.

[Repeated to Governor-General and U.K.T.C. Khartoum].

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OTP and By Bag

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No. 1645

August 13, 1955.

D.8. 3 p.m. August 13, 1955.

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL -

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 1645 of August 11
Repeated for information to Governor General Khartoum

U.K.T.C. Khartoum

And Saving to B.M.E.O. No. 674

Your telegram No. 999 [of 10: Sudan].

It is clear from your telegrams Nos. 161 and 162 Saving [of August 8] and other evidence, that Egyptians are now making every effort to intervene in the Sudan to discredit Sudanese Prime Minister and to ensure that Sudanese choose as Egypt wishes. I am disturbed by the state of hysteria into which Egyptians are working themselves and I would like you to speak about this to the Egyptian Prime Minister when you see him.

2. You should say to him that I have noticed with disquiet the campaign being openly waged by Egypt to bring pressure to bear upon the Sudanese. I perfectly understand the concern of the Egyptian Government that Egypt's vital interests should not be endangered as the result of Self-Determination in the Sudan but find it hard to reconcile present Egyptian behaviour with the Agreement on the Sudan which we have both signed.

3. You should go on to ask Egyptian Prime Minister whether he thinks that Egypt is acting in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. If he tries to claim that it is, you should ask him whether you can report to your Government that he would not object if they were to enter the lists, proclaim what the Sudanese should do and turn on the full force of their propaganda hacked up by a lavish expenditure of money.

4. You

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office telegram No.1645 to Cairo

- 2 -

4. Toa should impress 01 Nasser that we intend to keep to the spirit of our Agreement; we expect the Egyptians to do the and not to invoke the Agreement only when it happens to suit them. We are perfectly ready to discuss any problems concerning the Sudan with them and still wish to do so, but the way the Egyptians are at present behaving forngtirs III for future Sudanese-Egyptian relations ant gives us little cause for confidence in their intentions.

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JE1058/124

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan

D. 9.40 p.m. August 16, 1955.

No. 1051

R. 10.45 p.m. August 16, 1955.

August 16, 1955

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1051
of August 16.

Repeated for information to Khartoum (Governor General)
Khartoum (U.K.T.C.)
and Saving to New York (UKDEL)
B.M.E.O.
JE11913/21

My telegram No. 1045 paragraph 4: Sudan.

I and Murray talked for an hour on August 16 with Egyptian Prime Minister and Salah Salem. I first remonstrated with the Prime Minister about the publication of the Egyptian Note to the Governor General. I said that yesterday I had urged that we should not conduct our affairs in public debate, while communicating to him your agreement to the Egyptian proposal. Immediately after this the Egyptian Government had published this Note giving the Egyptian version of our previous confidential negotiations. I told them we have a number of points to discuss in executing the agreement and it would be much better if we could do it privately. Salah Salem made the ridiculous excuse that they had had no option but to publish this Note since we had given information on the negotiations to the Sudan Government which had passed it on to the Sudan press. I said that we were doing our best to avoid polemics, and I thought it would be much better if the Egyptian Government did the same.

2. I then took up the question of the recent attitude of the Egyptian press. It soon appeared that the Prime Minister had intended to convey to me at our last meeting that the Egyptian press had had practically nothing about the Sudan until 10 days ago, but that they had then started publicity on the Sudanese question on the alleged ground that Ashari had prevented any expression of opinion in the Sudan in favour of union. X said that according to our information, some Sudanese newspapers in favour of union were being published.

/But the

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CONFIDENTIALCairo telegram No. 1051 to Foreign Office

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But the Prime Minister insisted that BO expression of views in favour of union was allowed to appear in the Sudan press or to be heard on the Sudan radio and no newspaper licenses were issued to unionists who applied for them. He and Salah Salem then attacked the Governor General on the ground that he was not acting impartially by allowing Azhari to do this, although, at the time Azhari had been unionist, the Governor General had insisted on the independence view being publicly and had reproved Azhari for making unionist statements. Nasser said that "ill a day or two they would be sending a Note to us and " to the Governor General substantiating their allegations. They were thinking of sending it also to the United Nations. Meanwhile he reiterated that they were in favour of union and would continue to publish opinions in the Egyptian press and OB the Egyptian radio in favour of it, so long as there was no opportunity for the expression of these opinions in the Sudan. He said that if he abolished the censorship the Egyptian TOWSSS would express even stronger views on the subject. As soon as there was opportunity for the expression of these views in the Sudan the issue would cease to be ventilated in Egypt.

3. I strongly defended the Governor General saying that I had no doubt at all that he was acting completely impartially and in the spirit of the agreement. I said that we should wait their Note and that it would be much better for us to deal with this matter between ourselves. Salah Salem raised the question of conditions in the south alleging that the Governor General was not carrying out his responsibilities there. I gave the substance of the relevant information contained in Khartoum telegram No. 106 to me, but he maintained that my information came from Sudan Government sources and was untrue. J51058/116

4. Allegations against the British press and the B.B.C. were mentioned, but clearly only as a defence against our accusations about Egyptian propaganda. Salah Salem obviously resented the accusation of bribery contained in the Times leading article of August 11. Nasser said that he would send us the passages in the B.B.C. Arabic Service to which he objected. They also attacked the Middle Eastern Broadcasting Service, which it was well known to be a British organization.

5* Salah Salem whether the proceedings before the Parliament would be carried out in both Houses sitting together. I replied that I had BO ideas on the subject /and that

JE1058/125

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 1052
August 16, 1955

D. 10.48 p.m. August 16, 1955
R. 12.14 a.m. August 17, 1955

IMMEDIATE
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1051 of August 16
Repeated for information to Governor General Khartoum
U.K.T.C. Khartoum
and Saving to U.K. Del. New York
B.M.E.O.

JE1058/124

My immediately preceding telegram: Sudan.

The Egyptians may be expected to a big issue out of the alleged of a free and neutral ftoosphe^ in the Sudan. They will undoubtedly continue their campaign in Egypt and will probably publish the new Note soon after it reaches us. They emphasized that this was a question which they considered affected the future of Egypt as much as the future of the Sudan, and appeared to be totally indifferent to the suggestion, which they as good as admitted, that their conduct could not be reconciled with the ftgTMmct*. We must expect them to taylor and block every development which is not in their favour.

2. At the I can see no useful step to take here except to produce to the Egyptians unassailable evidence that pro-unity views can be publicly express in the Sudan in the Press and on the radio. I suggest that this information should be collected to answer the Egyptian Note and for publication if the Egyptians publish their Note.

3. I should also be glad to know how the composition of the Commission will be put before the Sudan Parliament*. The Egyptians may allege unfair procedure, if they want to veto the parliament's decision.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Governor General Khartoum and U.K.T.C. Khartoum as my telegrams Nos. 118 and 120 respectively.

[Repeated to Governor General and U.K.T.C. Khartoum]

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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JE1058/131
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DEPARTMENTAL
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Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 1098
August 23, 1955.

D. Untimed August 23, 1955.
R. 10.06 p.m. August 23, 1955.

IMMEDIATE
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1098 of August 23
Repeated for information to:- Gov. Gen. Khartoum
U.K.T.C. Khartoum
B.M.E.O.

JE1205

My immediately preceding telegram: Sudan.

On the conference proposal I only went so HUP as to tell Major Salem that in our view it was a question which could be considered by the Sudan Government only after order had been restored. I did not want him to be able to allege that we had already agreed at this stage that such a conference should be held later. He then made it quite plain what he was after in a manner which shows what lies behind paragraph 2 of Khartoum telegram No. 218. He said that they thought that the political conference should not only deal with the position between the North and the South, but should also make a declaration on the future of the Sudan which could then be accepted by the two governments. They had been in touch with Sayid AH el Mirghani recently about this, and thought that he was agreeable.

2. I made it quite plain that I myself could not (repeat not) accept this. I said that I thought that TO should be able to accept a declaration of this kind in place of a plebiscite if made by the Sudan Parliament, should they make it on their own initiative, but that we could not substitute for a parliament and ill-defined body which could not be easily formed in such a way as to be regarded as fully representative of Sudanese opinion. X said that political opinion in the United Kingdom paid special importance to the workings of parliamentary democracy, and that we could not accept any declaration on the future of the Sudan except from a Parliament which had been elected by the Sudanese people.

/3. Major Salem

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Cairo telegram No. 1098 | Foreign Office

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3. Major Salem then said that in no circumstances could the Egyptian Government accept & decision from the Parliament, since some of the members from the N.U.P. had changed their minds on the question since they had been elected, and were, therefore, no longer representative of their constituencies. I said that in these circumstances we were back to the alternatives of (a) carrying out the agreement, or (b) accepting a demand by the Sudanese Parliament, if they made one, for a plebiscite.

I* Major Salem then asked whether we were to take an initiative and only wait to see what the Sudanese Parliament did. It referred to Section 53 of the Self-Government Statute with the implication that this question might be put to the Parliament by the Governor-General. I replied that the Co-dominion should take no initiative. We had made an agreement which we must carry out unless the Sudanese Parliament should take the initiative and request us to alter the procedure contemplated in it. We were perfectly aware of this issue and, as he knew, the parties had been discussing it.

I, Be then asked whether we were to act only on the initiative of the Sudanese in regard to further procedure. I repeated your views that there would be obvious technical difficulties such as the organisation of the plebiscite, but that it would be up to the Co-dominion to renegotiate the agreement in so far as that was required as a result of any amendment of the procedure if it required by the Co-dominion's acceptance of a proposal made by the Sudanese Parliament. Your provisional view was that a Constituent Assembly would still be needed. It had not yet got beyond that point in consideration of that question.

in
line

6. If you agree with the line I have taken, I do not think that we need give Salah Salem any further answer now. I shall discuss this telegram with Helm and telegraph again after his visit.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Governor General Khartoum and U.K.T.C. Khartoum as my telegrams Nos. 141 and 148 respectively.

[Repeated to Governor General and U.K.T.C. Khartoum].

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Mr. Pink
Head of African Department
Head of News Department
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1955

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AFRICAN DEPARTMENT
EGYPT AND SUDAN

105
JE 1058/132

FROM
Sir H. Trevelyan
Cairo

No. 1106
Dated Aug. 24
Received in Registry — Aug. 25

Anglo - Egyptian - Sudanese Relations.

From Sir K. Helm giving details of his talk with the Egyptian Minister for Sudan Affairs. Subjects discussed included the situation in the South Sudan, the plebiscite, and Azhari's alleged control of broadcasting and the press.

REFERENCES

MINUTES

Salah Salem's opinions are constantly being altered. I have the feeling that minutes are a little too fast for him. It might, therefore, be a good idea if we were to press him hard now to conclude the discussions on the terms of Reference for the International Commission before he has time to sit back and reflect what his next moves will be.

By all means.
We can certainly try. J.W.Ridd.
10/6/58 25/8.

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(How disposed of)

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(Index)

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

J

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL

Sir H. Trevelyan

JE 1058/132

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INDEXED

No. 1106
August 24, 1955

D. 8.20 p.m. August 24, 1955
1 10.25 p.m. August 24, 1955

IMMEDIATE
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1106 of August 24.
Repeated for information to Governor-General Khartoum
U.K.T.C. Khartoum and B.M.E.O.

Following from Sir Knox Helm.

This morning I had ninety minutes talk with Egyptian Minister for Affairs and subsequently called with him on Minister President.

f* Salem discarded Ms dark from the and personified sweet reasonableness throughout. He spoke of Egyptian Government's great concern about Sudan situation but agreed that first essential was that teth@adt" of Government should be restored. He that next steps thereafter would be very important« Hid 1 any idea of form they should take? I replied ttet much would depend on situation I found on arrival and @a position when Government feat re-established its authority* I ted noticed that Azhari ted promised full investigation at the proper time. It would be natural that legitimate grievances should be redressed. But it would today be to say how ttet could best be done.

3. Salem did not mention idea of table conferen.ee and did not for despatch of British and Egyptian troops. He did, however, attach importance to report that some British troops had been sent South* I said I was confident that this was untrue tat in Hi presence requested Her Majesty's Ambassador by telephone to try to get immediate clarification f 3?@a Khartoum. I have since given Ma flat denial and advised him not to give credence to every improbable story he might receive from his agents.

25 AUG 1955
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4. In reply to another remark of Ms 1 said that, though I ted power to use British and Egyptian troops actually in Sudan, 1 at present saw no necessity to do so but that if sudden

/emergency

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Cairo telegram No. 1106 to Foreign Office

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emergency arose I not, unless absolutely compelled, use them without prior consultation with Cairo and London. At the very worst I would them and in any case the two would be used together. This seemed to reassure him.

5. We spoke of plebiscite proposal which we recognised Co-dominion would if asked for by Sudanese. tat Salem agreed that plebiscite would not hasten but retard process of self-determination and that it had best be dropped. He agreed that Constituent Assembly would, in any case, be necessary and he affected a pressing desire to get rid of Sudan problem as quickly as possible. He was tired of it.

6. Salem ft* bitterness towards Azhari but complained bitterly of use of broadcasting Mid Press controls so that pro-unity elements had no means of expressing their views. I firmly contested this* He said that because of Khartoum controls he had been obliged to use Egyptian means. If expression could be given in - Sudan campaign from here would be stopped. I remarked that it sounded like the and the egg but promised to bear in mind what he had said.

7. A reference by Salem to the free and neutral atmosphere gave me an opening for saying that opinions must differ about what that was. My powers were limited but such as they were I could use them. If, however, there was anything in some current reports such action by me might not be altogether to Ms liking. What would he think then?

8. Instead of replying Salem skillfully turned conversation to Nile waters, Egypt's life blood. I said that I was not up to date about this but that as the Egyptian proposals had been submitted only a few weeks ago time was required for their examination by experts, of which had been on leave, and recent events must have engaged whole attention of Sudan Government.

9. Salem spoke of growing Communist activities and strength in Sudan and went on to lament jealousies between the two Sayeds with both of whom he said he was in close touch. He seemed to assume that if only the two would sink their differences independence would be carried by large majority.

10. Salem is obviously very closely informed about situation (he clearly has agents everywhere but at another stage said that there were only two Egyptian officials in the South.

/Net

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Cairo telegram No. 1106 It Foreign Office

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Not even by superhuman efforts would two achieve all that was ascribed to them) and showed little interest in my suggestion that I might give the two Governments situation as I thought desirable. I stressed that I only had to Sudan Government information as I had a © sources of my own.

11. Salem claimed that he was anxious to help me in my difficult task. I thanked MA and said that we could only be successful if we all worked together. I would continue to serve my three masters to the best of my ability and I wanted to make & success of what must be my last job. Egyptian interests in the Sudan were very real and much greater than those of United Kingdom, which I could assure him had no so-called Imperialistic designs. But, if he would pardon my giving him fatherly advice, Egypt could perhaps profit from the British example and leave nature to do its work. Economics were much more powerful in the long run, if perhaps less spectacular, than signed documents. And this would be infinitely more true if the signed documents, whatever they contained, were framed in bitterness.

12. Salem took this in good part and we ended on assurances of mutual cooperation. In his mood today it could work but I should be the last to put it higher than that.

Foreign Office pass to Governor General Khartoum and U.K.T.C. Khartoum (both immediate) - as my telegrams Nos. 144 and 151 respectively.

[Repeated to Governor General's Office at U.K.T.C. Khartoum]

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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JE1058/133

INDEXED

Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 1107
August 24, 1955

D: 7.51 p.m. August 24, 1955
R: 9.11 p.m. August 24, 1955

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1107 of August 24.
Repeated for information to Governor General Khartoum
B.M.E.O.

My immediately preceding telegram. — JE1058/132
Following from Sir Knox Helm.

Talk with Minister President added nothing material. He gave impression of viewing situation with more seriousness than Salem. In particular he enlarged on broadcasting and Press control, I spoke as I had done to Salem.

2. Like Salem, Nasser seemed to accept my view that first essential was to restore authority of Sudan Government. I said I counted on his support to that end. He need be in no fear that I did not appreciate importance of Egyptian interests in Sudan. Having had an opening I made point that the United Kingdom also had interests he could be certain that these were in no sense imperialistic and all that Her Majesty's Government desired was that Anglo-Egyptian agreement should be implemented in the spirit as well as in the letter and that this could only be done by the Co-dominion acting together. He agreed, but I thought rather sourly.

3. I leave tonight for Khartoum.

Foreign Office please pass to Governor General Khartoum and United Kingdom Trade Commissioner Khartoum (both immediate) as my telegrams Nos. 145 and 152 respectively.

[Repeated to Governor General's Office and U.K.T.C. Khartoum]

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JE 1058/134

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INDEXED

Sir A Trevelyan
No. 1105
August 24, 1955

D. 5.21 p.m. August 24, 1955
R. 7.20 p.m. August 24, 1955

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1105 of August 24.
Repeated for information O U.K.T.C. Khartoum
and Saving to B.M.E.O.

My mm No. 1095. JE 1058/130

Press today prominently reported

- I. Agreement on programme for withdrawal of condominium forces from the Sudan.
- II. Conditions of surrender put forward by the Southern mutineers.
- III. Arrival in Cairo of the Governor General.

2. Gomhouria article commenting on I., said that no clarification of the announcement would have been required but for the surrounding circumstances of intrigue which aimed at fulfilling imperialist aims by spreading lies about Egypt and disturbing good relations between two parts of the Nile Valley. Egypt was proud of her record in the Sudan, whose interests she had placed even before her own, and would rejoice with the Sudanese when all foreign troops were evacuated. Whether the supporters of the union or of the Aspej^ncs triumphed, Egypt and the Sudan would continue to be united by the strongest tie of friendship and cooperation.

3. The Southern mutineers were reported to have refused to surrender unless the Northern forces were removed and replaced by British and Egyptians. The mutineers also to have requested United Nations commission of enquiry. Akhbar editorial regretted that the South should challenge the Sudanese Government in this way, adding that Egypt had worked hard to foil every British attempt to cut off the South from the North. Sudanese separatists erred in accusing Egypt of trouble-making. Egypt would rather see unity between North and South than unity between the Sudan and Egypt itself. The threat to the integrity of the Sudan was far graver than the question of union with Egypt, or independence. Egypt aimed only at eliminating imperialism from the Nile Valley.

4. The Governor-General's arrival and programme were widely reported. Akher Sa'a editorial criticizes him for disregarding the provisions of the Sudan Agreement, which required that he should not leave the country during the transition period except for urgent reasons and only for very short periods. The Governor-General had arrived in Khartoum, found that he needed relaxation, to a summer resort to East Sudan, where he invited Azhari and presumably there succeeded

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Cairo telegram No. 1105 to Foreign Office

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in to support the British view point on the composition of the International Commission, and then, before completing one month in office, had flown to London on leave. His long stay there gave rise to belief that he was not on holiday, [grp. undec.] simply available for consultations with the Foreign Office. He promised immediate return, but seemed in no great hurry as he had not yet reached Khartoum.

5. Other Press items included

- (i) Report that Britain was believed to have rejected Salah Salem's proposals regarding despatch of condominium forces to the South and holding of Sudanese round-table conference.
- (ii) London U. P. report that Anbari's fall was anticipated.
- (iii) *Ahram* had accepted the Sudan Parliament's decision on the composition of the International Commission and had greeted the inclusion of Czechoslovakia with indifference.

The author pointed out that apart from Russia's part in the discussion of former Italian-African colonies, the West had hitherto succeeded in keeping the Eastern bloc out of African affairs.

- (iv) *Mena* Khartoum report of the mutiny of Mahadi Police. Situation now under control.
- (v) Denial by the Egyptian Inspector General of Irrigation in the Sudan of reports that the Juba authorities had arrested local Egyptian engineer on suspicion of being connected with the incident in the South.

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JE 1058/135

J.

Sip Knox Helm came to see me yesterday when he raised two matters which he said we must decide sooner or later. The first was the question of the Nile waters and currency. The Sudanese had got nowhere in their negotiations with the Egyptians on these two points. Azhari had suggested to the Governor-General that he might have to call us in aid and ask us to take part in a tripartite negotiation as the only means of bringing pressure to bear on the Egyptians to settle. The Governor-General had told Azhari he was against the idea, at any rate until self-determination was through. If after all the Sudan should choose to have some link with Egypt then it would not be for Britain to butt in on negotiations about currency or waters. Sip Knox Helm wanted to know whether this was our view and what view we would take if, as seemed likely, the Sudanese chose total independence and at the time of their choosing had still not settled these problems with Egypt. I said I would think this over and try and get him an answer before he returned. The question was hypothetical for the moment, but that was no reason why we should not form some ideas for His Majesty's guidance if this were possible.

The second point he raised was the question of the withdrawal of the second battalion from the Sudan. The Egyptians had behaved so stupidly that it was by no means impossible they would refuse to withdraw their battalion when the time came. They might for instance manufacture some kind of Hitlerian incident and claim that their troops were needed to protect their nationals and their property. In that event what would we do about our troops? I said that on the face of it I thought our answer must depend on Azhari. If Azhari asked us to keep our troops there it would be difficult to withdraw them. If on the other hand he made no such request then two blacks wouldn't make a white and I felt we should withdraw and leave the Egyptians to have it out with the Sudanese. There was no provision in the Agreement which would enable us to keep our troops there merely because the Egyptians broke their side of the bargain and kept theirs. Sip Knox Helm agreed with this answer. But I said that it was only a preliminary view and I would like to think further on it and see whether I could give him any more considered guidance.

Perhaps/

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Perhaps these two points could be looked into and if time permits discussed with me before I go on holiday.



(Anthony Nutting)
July 27th, 1955

Mr. Shuckburgh

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Mr. Turton

JE1058/135(A)

Minutes white

INDEXED

Sir Knox Helm raised two points in his conversation with Mr. Nutting, of which the record is attached. The first was helping the Sudanese over two questions:

- a. Nile waters
- b. A separate currency

2. The second was what we should do if Egyptian troops did not in fact leave the Sudan within three months of the resolution asking that arrangements for Self-Determination be set in motion.

3. The Sudanese Prime Minister will have discussed both Nile waters and currency with the Egyptians during his recent visit to Cairo. Present indications are that he got nowhere on either of them. It is probable that we shall have to make some démarche with the Egyptians ourselves about Nile waters before long, since we must in some ~~form~~ ^{or} manner, take the claim of our East African territories to have a share in Nile waters, in order that their future requirements do not go by default as the result of some Egyptian-Sudanese arrangement, unlikely though that may at the moment seem. The recently issued report of the Royal Commission on East African territories will provide a convenient hook and it might at the same time give us the opportunity of trying to help break the log jam in the Egyptian-Sudanese negotiations. We have discussed the question with the Colonial Office, Treasury and the Board of Trade (the last two of which have a general interest because of the connection with the Aswan high dam project) and will shortly be putting up a despatch to Cairo taking up an idea of the Cairo embassy's that we might perhaps hold tripartite talks (U.K., Egypt and the Sudan), to see whether progress can be made in the interests of all three countries. The object would be to try and persuade the other two countries that the problem should be dealt with more from a technical than a political point of view. It seems desirable to take some initiative since at present Nile development plans in Egypt and the Sudan are being held up by the dispute and this is one of the factors in making Egypt particularly difficult over the Sudan.

4. As regards a separate Sudanese currency, the position is that the Sudanese Minister of Finance has asked the Egyptians to agree in principle, some basis for the repatriation of Egyptian notes. He has apparently made it clear that the actual introduction of a separate currency, and indeed the final decision for a separate currency, should not take place until after the Sudanese have made the choice about

/their

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

formally

yes / agree we should try this
CM

yes
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29/7

Minutes.

their future. The Egyptians are refusing to negotiate about this - probably because they consider that the whole thing does in fact strongly suggest that the currencies will be separated as a result of a choice for independence. This was one of the questions which we have discussed this morning with Sir John Carmichael and with Treasury officials. What the Sudanese hope from us at the present stage is that if the Egyptians continue to refuse to negotiate at all about the question, we would try to persuade Egypt to do so. We are apparently not being asked at this stage to do more than this - e.g. to persuade the Egyptians to negotiate any particular solution. It may be that we could go as far as suggested if we appealed to by the Sudanese; the Treasury are considering the matter. The trouble is of course that even if the Egyptians do agree to negotiate, they may propose some solution which would be unacceptable to the Sudanese and we shall then be asked by the Sudanese to put pressure on the Egyptians about that. Egypt will probably be unwilling to pay from her free sterling, that part which would have to be paid in sterling in any settlement of the problem.

5. The question of what we should do if the Egyptian battalion does not in fact leave the Sudan at the end of the three month period is a difficult one. I am myself inclined to agree with Sir Knox Helm and Mr. Luce (see correspondence attached at Flag A), that we should stick to the agreement and keep our hands clean, and that we should only stay on if so requested by the Sudanese Government. I am not sure how much trouble the Egyptian battalion could make if left behind; Sir Knox Helm in his letter to Mr. Luce at Flag A, is inclined to doubt whether the Sudanese forces could cope with the battalion. I do not know the answer but I should have thought that if the Sudanese forces remained loyal to the government they would give a pretty good account of themselves. It would obviously be difficult for British troops to return once they had left but the planners are giving some thought to the question.

T.E. Bromley

(T.E. Bromley)

July 29, 1955

On the notes, see my marginal comments.

On the troops, there is a new telegram. I doubt if we can offer to go regardless of the Egyptians. But we might name dates, to shame them. (M/25/1)

26/8
Luce will not be asked

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