FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

Mr. Murray
No. 905
July 18, 1955

D: 11.20 p.m. July 18, 1955
R: 12.23 a.m. July 19, 1955

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 905 of July 18

Repeated for information to:
Governor General Khartoum
U.K.T.C. Khartoum

and saving to: B.M.E.O.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Salah Salem said that the Prime Minister wished to speak to me about the present situation in the Sudan and to make a formal proposal for action by the Co-Domin. He then gave me an outline of what was in their minds.

2. The Sudanese Government, he said, were not fostering a free and neutral atmosphere in the Sudan. On the contrary Ahmed had not merely turned his coat as a party leader but was applying the whole weight of the administration and the facilities of government machinery to influencing the Sudanese against unity with Egypt in advance of the self-determination process. In support of this he asserted:

(a) Ahmed had used government machinery to publicise speeches which he made in a recent tour in [Group under ? Darfur];

(b) he had made these speeches, which were opposed to the link with Egypt, as Head of the Government and not as a party leader, and had called together provincial Governors and local authorities on whom he had impressed his thesis as that which it was their duty to support;

(c) the Omdurman radio, which was entirely government-controlled, was being used exclusively for attacks upon the link with Egypt.
(d) these newspapers which supported the policy of union with Egypt had been suppressed by the Sudanese Government, including "el Alam" (which obviously rankled particularly);

(e) applications for licences to start newspapers in support of a link with Egypt were all refused.

3. The Sudanese administration, he remarked, was working more vigorously against Egypt's interests than ever the British had.

4. In the view of the Egyptian Government the Co-Dominion had responsibilities to supervise the situation in the Sudan with particular reference to the free and neutral atmosphere throughout the transitional period. On their view it behoved the Co-Dominion now to agree instructions to the Governor-General to call the Sudanese Government to order over the question of the use of government machinery for electoral ends in advance of the existence of the International Commission. Indeed (though the Minister here was a little confused) he appeared at one point to suggest that the Egyptian Government might oppose the introduction of the International Commission until such agreed instructions had been drawn up and despatched.

5. In reply, I pointed out that in our draft terms of reference for the International Commission we had included a paragraph designed precisely to give the Commission powers to prevent the application of government machinery for electoral ends but the Egyptian delegation had objected to it. It seemed to me that one solution to the anxieties which he had recounted would be to proceed to constitute the International Commission as quickly as possible and to re-insert this clause.

6. I said that I was, of course, at the Prime Minister's disposition but that there seemed to me to be some danger that he might put to me a proposal that might constitute a revision of the 1953 Agreement. There was no provision in that agreement for holding up the constitution of the International Commission as the Minister had appeared to suggest. While I was confident that Her Majesty's Government would always be ready to consult with the Egyptian Government over questions arising out of the agreement, in this case I thought the constitution of the International Commission was the proper solution.
CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 905 to Foreign Office

7. Towards the end of our meeting, however, Salah Salem confirmed that he would try to arrange a meeting with Nasser in the next few days. On the face of it, leaving aside the effrontery of the Egyptian complaint in the light of their own interference with the free and neutral atmosphere, it would seem that there may at least be something of a case to answer if Ashari is using governmental machinery for the dissemination of what might be considered party political exhortations. I should be grateful for the urgent comments of the Governor-General and for your instructions as to how I might treat Nasser’s formal proposal if and when it comes.

8. I of course did not let pass the occasion which this Egyptian initiative presented for pointing to their own interference in the Sudan and remarking that I took leave to doubt whether, supposing Ashari had exerted governmental machinery in their favour, they would have been so keen to protest or to entertain a protest from us. Our meeting reached at moments the usual emotional heights of any meeting with Salah Salem but ended on a reasonable note.

9. I took the opportunity to register a protest against an outrageous “Sudan Corner” broadcast of July 14. I pointed out that attacks of this kind were entirely incompatible with the relations which should obtain between us concerning the Sudan. Salah Salem attributed the speaker’s bile to the fact that he was one of the victims of Ashari’s closure of newspapers but agreed that the broadcast should never have taken place and promised that no similar ones should follow it.

10. See my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Governor-General Khartoum and U.K.T.C. Khartoum as my telegrams 75 and 65 respectively.

[Repeated to Governor-General and U.K.T.C. Khartoum].

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Mr. Shuckburgh

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Head of African Department
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Murray
No. 906
July 18, 1955


PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 906 of July 18.

Repeated for information to Khartoum (Governor General) Khartoum (U.K.T.C.) and S.A.E.B.O.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Sudan.

At the close of our meeting I mentioned that I had seen news agency reports of plans disclosed by Mohamed Noreddin to caucus of N.U.P. pro-unionist fraction, for federal union of an "independent Sudanese republic" with Egypt under a "supreme federal council", with sweeping powers in foreign, economic and social affairs, besides obvious fields of common interest.

2. Salah Salem did not conceal that these plans reflected Egyptian Government's present thinking. We must recognize that "union" was a matter which concerned Egypt as nearly as it did the Sudan. If union came about, fundamental constitutional changes would be required here too. Indeed the Egyptian Government did not propose to promulgate the new Egyptian constitution until self-determination had taken place in the Sudan. It was clearly necessary in these circumstances that Egypt should maintain close touch with Sudanese proponents of a link between the two countries.

3. I observed that, as I had already said at our last meeting (see my letter 10223/8/55 of July 14) and (Bromley) Egyptian Government seemed still to be contemplating only one outcome of the option. They would do well to face the alternative possibility and to have plans ready for managing their common interests in the context of a normal treaty relationship between friendly independent States. In contrast to what he had told me on the last occasion, Salah Salem replied that Egyptian Government were now preparing plans for both eventualities.

/This
CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram no. 906 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

This perhaps represents some progress.

Foreign Office please pass Priority to Governor General Khartoum and U.K.T.C. Khartoum as my telegrams 76 and 66 respectively.

[Repeated to Governor General Khartoum and U.K.T.C. Khartoum]

DISTRIBUTED TO:

African Department
INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By Bag

Mr. Murray:

No: 147 Saving
July 21, 1955
R. July 23, 1955

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 147 Saving of July 21,
Repeated for information Saving to: Governor General Khartoum
U.K.T.C. Khartoum
B.E.H.O.
Addis Ababa.

My telegram No. 141 Saving.

The Egyptian press has continued to devote considerable space to Sudanese affairs.

2. A statement demanding the unity of the Nile Valley issued by the "Supreme Committee of Sudanese Organisations in Egypt" (said to comprise ten different Sudanese organisations) was published on July 16. On July 19 both the Ismailia Sudanese Club and the Khatmia General Union of Alexandria, the latter in association with all Sudanese and Nubian bodies in the city, were reported to have passed pro-unity resolutions. The press of July 17 further announced that two hundred Sudanese students at Al Ashar had, before returning to the Sudan for the holidays, submitted a statement to Major Salem in which they renewed their allegiance to the Army Revolution and their pledge to work with it to ensure unity.

3. Egyptian comment on developments in the Sudan consisted of a series of editorials in Rose el Youssef by Ihsan Abdel Kaddous (paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 130 Saving) and in Al Tahrir by Sami Daoud. On July 4 Kaddous answered readers' letters, one of which said that Ashari had changed his attitude because, after the British had withdrawn from the public field in Khartoum, the Egyptians had begun to interfere openly through the former Irrigation Inspector and senior Egyptian officials, thereby rousing Sudanese resentment. Kaddous declared that this implied that the Egyptians should follow British methods and not secretly instead of openly. Egypt, however, was proud of her open and practical interference, which had led to the creation of the National
Cairo telegram No. 147 Saving to Foreign Office

National Unionist Party, the Sudan Agreement and the freedom of the elections. Kaddous also countered the allegation that Ashari had not altered his principles because he had never defined them, by recalling that Ashari had once stated that Egypt and the Sudan should have the same Head of State, currency, army and foreign policy.

1. On July 11, Kaddous answered Mubarak Zarruk's statement that the call for unity had been made to secure Egyptian help in abolishing imperialism and obtaining Sudanese independence, by asking whether Zarruk implied that Ashari had double-crossed Egypt.

5. On July 18 he said that Egypt had committed a grave error in insisting that the Sudanese should choose between "unity" and "independence" because the mistaken idea had thus arisen that the two were incompatible, and that the Sudan by choosing unity would lose its independence. These innocent terms had been exploited by the separatists and the British. Kaddous finally asked why Salah Salem's offer to divide the Nile waters between the two countries had not been made public in the Sudan. In all three editorials he suggested that American and British interference was responsible for Ashari's change of mind.

6. Sami Daoud attacked Ashari more directly on July 12 and 19, and said that Ashari had been given to understand that were he to renounce his unionist principles he would become the undisputed ruler of the Sudan for life. The imperialist powers' interests were:

(i) They wanted a new defence tier passing through Africa, including the Sudan, Libya, Aden the Buraimi Oasis area and the Persian Gulf Protectorates;

(ii) They feared the extension of the Revolution mentality to the Sudan;

(iii) They feared that a Sudanese-Egyptian union might become instrumental in liberating African colonies.

Every effort was therefore being made to separate the Sudan from Egypt, and Ethiopia had been induced to join in the plan. There were rumours that if the plebiscite favoured union, Al Mahdi would resort to armed opposition.
Caire telegram No. 147 Saving to Foreign Office

7. Daoud accused Ashari of selling out to Britain and the United States. He had resorted to terrorism, suppressed unionist papers, allowed the Sudanese press and radio to attack Egypt and had violated the Sudan Agreement by issuing Sudanese currency, negotiating with Ethiopia and using the administrative machinery to advocate separatist principles. He should be stopped before he succeeded in rigging the coming elections. Egypt would know how to protect the Sudanese people against his activities.

8. Publicity has also been given to the possible meeting of the General Assembly of the National Unionist Party. All papers on July 16 published a statement made by Nureddin in which he condemned the violation by Cabinet Ministers of the free and neutral atmosphere. On July 17 the press announced that "a large number of N.U.P. Assembly members" had met in Khartoum on July 15 under Nureddin's chairmanship and had decided that:

(i) unity with Egypt was the basic principle of the N.U.P. and that an independent Sudanese Republic united with Egypt should be established;

(ii) a Supreme Federal Council should be set up to supervise joint interests;

(iii) the Government should be called on to maintain the free and neutral atmosphere which it had violated;

(iv) the Secretary-General of the N.U.P. should be asked to call a meeting of the General Assembly. If he refused, the Assembly would meet automatically.

9. The press of July 18 reported that Ashari had called a meeting of the Executive Committee to arrange the meeting of the General Assembly a move of which Nureddin strongly disapproved, expressing the view that the N.U.P. Secretariat (in the person of Khidr Hamad, acting Secretary-General) was trying to obstruct the General Assembly meeting. The Ministers of Finance, Education and Agriculture had called on El Mirghani to resolve the difficulty and he had requested both sides to postpone all meetings until after the festivities of July 23.
Cairo telegram No. 167 Saving to Foreign Office

10. On July 20 the press reported a statement made by Nureddin to A.N.A. in Khartoum to the effect that had the General Assembly met on July 18 it would have expelled Ashari and others from the party for failing to abide by its constitutions and principles.

XXXXXXXX
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP
Governor General's Office
No: 173
July 20, 1955

DEPARTMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION

D. 10.00 a.m. July 21, 1955
R. 12.47 p.m. July 21, 1955

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 173 of July 20.
Repeated for information to: Cairo
B.M.E.O.
Cairo telegram No. 905 to you: International Commission.

Following from Luce.

The implication of Articles 1 and 8 of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement is that free and neutral atmosphere is to be provided by the removal of foreigners from the Central Government (i.e. "full self government") and from the influential posts in the Civil Service. There appears to be nothing in the agreement which precludes the Sudanese whether members of the Government or not, from disseminating their views on the future of their country. This has certainly always been our understanding. The first draft terms of reference for the International Commission included a reference to the right of Ministers to campaign in support of their views. This, with the rest of paragraph 1 (a) (ii), was subsequently dropped not, I understand, because this right was questioned, but because reference to non-use of Government machinery might prevent political broadcasts by Ministers or others from the Government controlled Omdurman Radio.

2. Taking the point in paragraph 2 of telegram under reference,

(a) Radio Omdurman and the newspaper of the Sudanese office of National Guidance naturally publish any speech made by Azhari whether as Head of Government or as leader of the N.U.P. They are news. If there is no objection to his making speeches expressing his views on the future of the Sudan (vide paragraph 1 above), there can presumably be no objection to reporting them in the
normal way just as the speeches by Salah Salem about the future of the Sudan are reported in "Sudan Corner" of the E.S.B. and in the Government controlled Egyptian newspaper

(b) I can recall no instance when such speeches have been made by Azhari specifically as head of the Government. In any case, if the argument in paragraph 1 above is valid, there would be nothing to prevent him doing so. For practical purposes, it makes little difference whether he speaks as Prime Minister or leader of the N.U.P. I have no information which lends support to the allegation in the second part of this sub-paragraph. There has been no meeting of provincial Governors since last February.

(e) It is true that statements about the future of the Sudan broadcast from Omdurman Radio are now all opposed to union with Egypt. One can only suppose that this reflects the view of the Sudanese generally and is the answer to broadcasts from the Government controlled E.S.B. which invariably support union. In the earlier days of the N.U.P. Government, the Omdurman Radio was used exclusively for the support of union with Egypt and this was the subject of bitter protests from the pro-independence Sudanese. Egypt did not then protest that this was an infringement of free and neutral atmosphere. If the International Commission considers the Omdurman Radio or the E.S.B. is being used in a manner prejudicial to impartial elections or free and neutral atmosphere it will no doubt take the necessary action.

(d) This presumably refers to "El Telegraf", "Ittihad" and "El Alam". The first, which was reputedly financed by Egypt, was licensed last year on six months probation of good behaviour on the part of the Editor, who is a well-known disreputable character. The paper proved to be highly inaccurate and malicious, and the licence was not confirmed at the end of the probationary period. The second, which was the organ of the N.U.P., was voluntarily suspended last month by the Party management.
CONFIDENTIAL

Khartoum telegram No. 173 to Foreign Office

and its Editor was transferred to "El Alam", which has not in fact been suppressed and which still publishes daily. "El Alam" was financed by Egypt on behalf of the N.U.P. and when its previous strongly pro-Union Editor began attacking Ashari and the other N.U.P. leaders, they decided to remove him.

(a) I have no information about this. All applications for newspapers licences are considered by the Press Board and certain conditions have to be fulfilled before a licence is recommended.

3. The basic fact in all this, which Egypt cannot of course admit, is that Ashari has changed his policy because from his contacts with the Sudanese during his tour all over the country, he has realised that public opinion generally demands independence. The picture of a minority in power trying to force their views by illegitimate means on an unwilling populace could not be further from the truth.

4. I need hardly add that any action by Her Majesty's Government, in deference to the Egyptians, to curb the Sudanese, Ministers or otherwise, in dissemination of their views on the future of their country would make the worst possible impression here after two and a half years of unrestrained interference from the Egyptian Government. If any brake is to be applied it should be done impartially by the International Commission.

5. With reference to paragraph 6 of [grp undes. # Cairo] telegram, could not the Egyptians be reminded that they have undertaken, in Article 9 of the agreement, to bring the transitional period to an end as soon as possible?

6. Please inform the Governor General.

Foreign Office pass Priority to Cairo and B.M.E.O. as my telegrams 93 and 26.

[Repeated to Cairo and B.M.E.O.]

DISTRIBUTED TO:
African Department

XXXXXX
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

Governor General's Office
No. 174
July 22, 1955

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 174 of July 22.
Repeated for information to Cairo
B.M.R.O.

Following from Luce.

The Sudanese Prime Minister, accompanied by seven Ministers, is leaving for Cairo this evening.

2. In a long conversation with Azhari last night, the following main points emerged:

(a) While ostensibly in response to an Egyptian invitation to the July 23 celebrations, the real object of the visit is to make a final effort to persuade the Egyptians to be reasonable about the Sudan. The main line of approach will be that the whole of the Sudan wants independence but equally the Sudanese want to be friendly with Egypt. They see nothing incompatible about these two things and are ready to safeguard Egypt's legitimate interests in the Sudan.

(b) Azhari will tell the Egyptians that he is convinced that no Sudanese who stood for anything but independence in the elections for the Constituent Assembly would have a hope of being elected (he told me that he believed that this applied even to Nur el Din in his own constituency, which Azhari has just visited). He will say that in these circumstances there is no point in making the Sudan go through all the business of elections and that it would be far simpler and quicker to decide the self-determination issue by a plebiscite. If he can persuade the Egyptians to agree to this, a formal request for the necessary amendment of the agreement would be made to the co-domain probably through the Sudanese Parliament next month. If not, the idea will be dropped and the full process laid down by the agreement will be followed.

(c) Azhari will
CONFIDENTIAL

Khartoum telegram No. 17A to Foreign Office

(c) Aghazi will stand firm on his letter to the Governor General about the composition of the International Commission. This was a decision of the Council of Ministers and it will not be altered whatever the Egyptians may say to him. He will do his best to persuade them to accept a completely neutral commission.

(d) He expects to be attacked by the Egyptians for alleged breach of free and neutral atmosphere. Apart from the obvious answer, he will point out that the N.U.T. did not object when the Umma Ministers campaigned for independence in the 1953 elections. It would be absurd to expect him and the other Ministers to remain silent on the future of the Sudan. He flatly denied that any observations on the subject have been issued to Provincial Governors or local authorities (see paragraph 2 (b) of Khartoum telegram No. 173).

(e) If the atmosphere is favourable, the questions of the Nile Waters and the Sudan currency will be discussed in Cairo. Aghazi was very much impressed on his recent tour by the strength of feeling against the Asouan High Dam amongst the people of Wadi Halfa, and their appeal against being flooded out from their homes has obviously attracted his warm sympathy.

3. Aghazi expects a difficult time in Cairo, but he is making a courageous and, I believe, genuine effort to come to an understanding with Egypt, based on the Egyptians' recognition of the situation in the Sudan and forbearance from acts of interference, and on Sudanese recognition, but with friendly relations between the two countries and proper safeguards for Egypt's interests. In this effort he has, on the whole, the support of public opinion in the Sudan, but both he and the Sudanese Press emphasize that this must be the last time.

4. If anything more can be done to persuade the Egyptians to see reason about the Sudan, I suggest that this is the time for it. I do not think the Sudanese will try again.

5. Aghazi leaves Cairo on July 25 for the Belgian Congo to attend the opening of a commercial fair.

6. Please inform Governor General.

Foreign Office pass priority to Cairo and B.M.E.O. as my telegrams Res. 91 and 29 respectively. [Repeated to Cairo and B.M.E.O.]

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6 & 9
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J
AFRICAN DEPARTMENT
EGYPT AND SUDAN

STATE THAT EGYPTIAN PRESS HAS CONTINUED TO DECK CONSIDERABLE
SPACE TO SUDANESE AFFAIRS.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY—JULY 31.

MINUTES

A bitter rivalry is being fought between the Sudanese and Egyptians. Pages 8, 9, and 10. It is difficult to say what the truth of all this is, but if the opinion of the Jeneral Assembly was so violently anti-African, I should have thought that it could compel the Egyptian government to convene an emergency meeting. Solida Sudan has recently invited the American President to the American League of Nations, and he has sought 250 of the 300 members of the Assembly, and I think that is wishful thinking.

J. W. R. II.
23/5.

MIHR BAGIR (1. P. O.)
Thank you. I agree. 26/7.

J. S. 21/1.
En Clair by bag.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. P.R.H. Murray

No. 147 Saving

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 147 Saving of July 21, 1955. Repeated Saving for information to:

Gov. Gen., Khartoum No. 56
U.K.T.O., Khartoum No. 13
B.M.E.O., Khartoum No. 179
Addis Ababa No. 13

My telegram No. 146 Saving...

The Egyptian press has continued to devote considerable space to Sudanese affairs.

2. A statement demanding the unity of the Nile Valley issued by the "Supreme Committee of Sudanese Organisations in Egypt" (said to comprise ten different Sudanese organisations) was published on July 16. On July 19 both the Ismailia Sudanese Club and the Khartoum General Union of Alexandria, the latter in association with all Sudanese and Nubian bodies in the city, were reported to have passed pro-unity resolutions. The press of July 17 further announced that two hundred Sudanese students at Al Azhar had, before returning to the Sudan for the holidays, submitted a statement to Major Salem in which they renewed their allegiance to the Army Revolution and their pledge to work with it to ensure unity.

3. Egyptian comment on developments in the Sudan consisted of a series of editorials in Rose al-Aymar by Ihsan Abdel Kadous (paragraph 9 of my telegram No. 145 SAVING) and in Al Tahrir by Sani Daoud. On July 4 Kadous answered readers' letters, one of which said that Ashari had changed his attitude because, after the British had withdrawn from the public field in Khartoum, the Egyptians had begun to interfere openly through the former Irrigation Inspector and senior Egyptian officials, thereby raising Sudanese resentment. Kadous declared that this implied that the Egyptians should follow British methods and act secretly instead of openly. Egypt, however, was proud of her open and practical interference, which had led to the creation of the National Unionist Party, the Sudan Agreement and the freedom of the elections. Kadous also countered the allegation that Ashari had altered his principles because he had never defined them, by recalling that Ashari had once stated that Egypt and the Sudan should have the same Head of

/State
State, currency, army and foreign policy.

4. On July 11, Kaddous answered Mubarak Zarruk's statement that the call for unity had been made to secure Egyptian help in abolishing imperialism and obtaining Sudanese independence, by asking whether Zarruk implied that Azhari had double-crossed Egypt.

5. On July 18 he said that Egypt had committed a grave error in insisting that the Sudanese should choose between "unity" and "independence" because the mistaken idea had thus arisen that the two were incompatible, and that the Sudan by choosing unity would lose its independence. These innocent terms had been exploited by the separatists and the British. Kaddous finally asked why Salah Salem's offer to divide the Nile waters between the two countries had not been made public in the Sudan. In all three editorials he suggested that American and British interference was responsible for Azhari's change of mind.

6. Sami Daoud attacked Azhari more directly on July 12 and 19, and said that Azhari had been given to understand that were he to renounce his unionist principles he would become the undisputed ruler of the Sudan for life. The imperialist powers' interests were:-

(i) They wanted a new defence tier passing through Africa including the Sudan, Libya, Aden the Buraimi Oasis area and the Persian Gulf Protectorates;

(ii) They feared the extension of the Revolution mentality to the Sudan;

(iii) They feared that a Sudanese-Egyptian union might become instrumental in liberating African colonies.

Every effort was therefore being made to separate the Sudan from Egypt, and Ethiopia had been induced to join in the plan. There were rumours that if the plebiscite favoured union, Al Mehdi would resort to armed opposition.

7. Daoud accused Azhari of selling out to Britain and the U.S.A. He had resorted to terrorism, suppressed unionist papers, allowed the Sudanese press and radio to attack Egypt and had violated the Sudan Agreement by issuing Sudanese currency, negotiating with Ethiopia and using the administrative machinery to advocate separatist principles. He should be stopped before he succeeded in rigging the coming elections - Egypt would know how to protect the Sudanese people against his activities.

8. Publicity has also been given to the possible meeting of the General Assembly of the National Unionist Party. All papers on July 16 published a statement made by Nureddin in which he condemned the violation by Cabinet Ministers of the free and neutral atmosphere. On July 17 the press announced that "a large number of NUP Assembly members" had met in Khartoum on July 15 under Nureddin's chairmanship and had decided that:-

(i) unity with Egypt was the basic principle of the NUP and that an independent Sudanese Republic united with Egypt should be established;

(ii) a Supreme Federal Council should be set up to supervise joint interests;

(iii) the Government should be called on to maintain the free and neutral atmosphere which it had violated;

(iv)
(iv) the Secretary-General of the NUP should be asked to call a meeting of the General Assembly. If he refused, the Assembly would meet automatically.

9. The press of July 18 reported that Ashari had called a meeting of the Executive Committee to arrange the meeting of the General Assembly a move of which Nureddin strongly disapproved, expressing the view that the NUP Secretariat (in the person of Khidir Hamad, acting Secretary-General) was trying to obstruct the General Assembly meeting. The Ministers of Finance, Education and Agriculture had called on El Mirghani to resolve the difficulty and he had requested both sides to postpone all meetings until after the festivities of July 28.

10. On July 20 the press reported a statement made by Nureddin to A.N.A. in Khartoum to the effect that had the General Assembly met on July 18 it would have expelled Ashari and others from the party for failing to abide by its constitutions and principles.
FROM
No. Murray
Cairo
No. 946
Dated July 26
Received at Registry July 27

REFERENCES

(Put in)

Note of action completed

(Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese Relations. Report a talk with the Sudanese Prime Minister on the Sudan.)

MINUTES

Akhani's visit does not seem to have been very successful, but it should have helped considerably to consolidate his plans. I think that our advice is welcome and the way in which he has been feted more efficient in themselves to show Akhani what the Egyptians' intentions are.

J.W. R.
27/7.

1. P. D. (Mr. Johnson)
27/7

3984
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP.

Mr. Murray

No: 946

July 26, 1955.


Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 946 of July 26.
Repeated for information to:

Governor-General Khartoum.
U.K.T.C. Khartoum.
B.M.E.O.

Sudan.

I called on Azhari today. He had had a long session with Salah Salem yesterday and was to have another this evening.

2. He told me that Salem had not wished to discuss International Commission and I therefore agreed we should not attempt to discuss it either. Sudanese Minister of Communications, who joined us, however elicited a general statement of our position from me and Azhari referred to his letter to the Governor-General as expressing definitive Sudanese view. He hoped we would reach agreement soon.

3. Azhari seemed fairly unaffected by Egyptian pressure on him here and maintained that he was trying to get Saleh Salem to understand that Egyptians were damaging their own interests by continued pressure and interference, and that vast majority of opinion in the Sudan was in favour of independence. He implied that he had not made much impression. He was much annoyed because he had yesterday asked Salem to curb press attacks on him, had received some sort of assurance but had found the newspapers full of worse attacks than ever this morning.

4. He had raised the question of separate currency and had encountered Egyptian reluctance on political grounds to give him any undertaking regarding redemption.

5. He enquired what progress had been made regarding co-ordinated withdrawal of Egyptian and British forces and pointed out that it behoved the co-Dominion to be prepared to begin evacuation in little over three weeks from now. I told him the present position and that my Military Attaché was making a fresh approach....
CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 816 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

fresh approach to Commander in Chief's office today.

7[sic]. He told me that Sudanese had now definitely decided
to reject latest Egyptian offer on Nile waters.

Foreign Office pass Governor-General and U.K.T.C. as my
telegrams Nos. 79 and 69 respectively.

[Repeated to Governor-General Khartoum and
U.K.T.C, Khartoum]

DISTRIBUTED TO:
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Economic Relations Department.
News Department.

JJJJJ
African Department
Egypt and Sudan

Visit of Sudanese Prime Minister.

According to the Sudan Agent the only useful purpose served by the Talks between Azhari and the Egyptians had been that the position of the Sudan Government had been made perfectly clear to the Egyptians. Give information on the Talks.

MINUTES

Page 3: This is most peculiar. The Egyptians have only recently, through Cairo radio, been claiming that Azhari was controlling "press for his own ends.

Page 5: We were a little surprised that Makellawi was not called with Nureddin.

J. E. Hill.

29/7

Mr. Sartorian (1.8.20).

A. 307

P. 591

Action completed: 8/10/34

Index: 39984

FROM
Mr. Murray
Cairo

No. 955
Dated: July 28
Received by: July 29

REFERENCES

(Print)

(How disposed of)

89 Meulanen Sudan Agency

Aug 10
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OIP

DEPARTMENTAL

DESCRIPTION

Mr. Murray

No. 955


CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 955 of July 28.
Repeated for information to U.K.T.C. Khartoum. Governor-General Khartoum


According to Sudanese Agent here, the only useful purpose served by the talks between Ashari and the Egyptians' leaders had been that the position of the Sudanese Government had been made perfectly clear to the Egyptians. It was for that reason that Ashari had brought so many Cabinet Ministers with him.

2. Major Salem had offered to adopt a "passive attitude" i.e. neither encouraging nor discouraging pro-unity elements in the Sudan. Ashari had, however, no confidence that he would do so.

3. In response to an Egyptian suggestion that the Sudanese Government should control the press, Ashari had made it clear that the press in the Sudan was free. If, however, the tone of the Egyptian press became more moderate, journalists in the Sudan would certainly react favourably. He had also proposed that Egyptian and Arab journalists should visit the Sudan to see for themselves.

4. As regards Nile waters, the Egyptians had at last put their offer in writing. It was, however, still vague and would be rejected.

5. The Minister of Mineral Affairs, who was one of those who came with Ashari, would shortly declare himself in favour of unity and resign from the Government.
CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 955 to Foreign Office

6. My immediately following telegram gives text of a statement of Ashari which has been released by the Sudan Agent here. It is not yet known whether the Egyptian censorship will allow its publication in the Cairo press.

Foreign Office please pass to U.K.T.C. Khartoum and Governor-General Khartoum as my telegrams 79 and 80 respectively.

[Repeated to U.K.T.C. Khartoum and Governor General Khartoum].

DISTRIBUTED TO
African Department
Economic Relations Department
News Department
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Murray
No. 957
July 28, 1955

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 957 of July 28
Repeated for information to:- UKTC Khartoum and Saving to E.M.E.O.

My telegram No. 147 Saving: Egypt and the Sudan.

Four-day celebrations of third anniversary of Egyptian revolution were attended by official Sudanese delegation of seven Ministers headed by Ashari. Main attention was, however, focused on rival Unionist Party headed by Nureddin, Tayib Mohamed Kheir and Bullen Ali. Apart from an official dinner on July 24 and two six hour meetings with Salah Salem on July 25 and 26, Ashari and official delegation were pointedly ignored, and at parade on July 23 were seated well down and next to vociferous pro-Unionist Sudanese clique.

2. By contrast Unionist Party has held the limelight. Press of July 24 published Nureddin's statement thanking Egypt for efforts to liberate the Sudan, denying Sudanese defection from Unionist principles, disowning NUP Executive Committee's re-interpretation (April 9, 1955) of Unionist position, and quoting resolutions of majority of NUP General Assembly on July 13 and 15 (my telegram No. 147 Saving paragraph 8). In interview with Abram, Nureddin protested against Sudanese Government's campaign to stifle pro-Unionist press and radio comment, attributing Ashari's volte face to his London visit and suggesting that Sayed Ali Mirghani had saved Government from collapse.

3. Speeches by Nureddin and other Unionists were important feature of public meetings in Alexandria July 26 and Mehalia El Kubra July 27.

4. Speaking immediately after Nassar in Alexandria, Nureddin declared that liberation festival was festival of whole Nile...
Cairo telegram No. 557 to Foreign Office

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Nile valley. Though British were still using their influence in the Sudan, Sudanese people were alert to frustrate these endeavours. Benjamin Louki followed on behalf of the South, asking for Egyptian help to bring about union.

5. At Mehalla Nureddin spoke on similar lines clamouring for union with Egypt. Replying, Salah Salem presented link with Egypt as safeguard of Sudanese independence, emphasizing the danger of exploitation by great Powers of small "independent" States. It was ridiculous to allege that unity of Egypt and the Sudan on equal footing would hinder Sudanese sovereignty and independence. Egypt had secured Sudanese independence before that of Egypt. In three months time there would be no single foreign soldier on Sudanese territory. Fuller report follows saving.

6. Press reports declaration by Ballen Alier, July 27, that the only policy for the South was unity with Egypt. Any link with Britain could only be as between master and servant.

7. Nureddin was applauded at reception given by Salah Salem on July 24 and shouts were heard against the "stooge of imperialism".

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Murray

No. 956

July 28, 1955

Our present visit to Egypt was in response to the kind invitation extended to us by Egypt and to participate in her liberation festivals and cherish the memory of the revolution which has an undeniable credit in reaching an agreement over the Sudan and consequently in the emancipation of the Sudan. It was decided that the delegation should be composed of this big number of my colleagues so that they might express clearly the true position in the Sudan and emphasize the real inclinations of the Sudanese people and their true desire for the realization of the Sudan's independence together with the retention of the connectors of friendship, cordiality and brotherhood with Egypt. This was the subject of the discussions in the three long meetings, the first of which was held in the presence of President General Abdel Naser and some Revolutionary Council members at the Tahra Palace on the night of Sunday 21st instant, the second and the third meetings attended by Sagh Salah Salim, having been subsequently held on the nights of Monday and Tuesday the 25th and 26th July, 1955. We were keen to conduct and continue the negotiations in order to explain the facts and thus fulfill this noble mission in spite of certain incidents and dispositions which should have led us to breaking the discussions and returning immediately to Khartoum since we were convinced of the seriousness of this occasion regarding the future of the two countries and most desirous to undertake this duty for the sake of history and the people of Egypt and the Sudan. At these meetings we were able to listen to everything which was wished to be said about the situation, and also to say everything with complete clarity and frankness about the true position in the Sudan and about the inclination of public opinion there towards independence with the assured and honest desire to retain the best possible form of friendship, cordiality, and brotherhood with sister Egypt. We can say that blemishes...
Cairo telegram No. 956 to Foreign Office

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Connected with the atmosphere of personal relations have now disappeared.

DISTRIBUTED TO:

African Department
Economic Relations Department
News Department
Information Policy Department
Regional Advisers.
SAVING TELEGRAM.

By Eng.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. F.R.H. Murray.
No.150 Saving.

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office Saving telegram No.150 of July 28 repeated for information to U.K.T.O. Khartoum No.73 and Saving to E.M.O. Nicosia No.185.

My telegram No.957.

Speech of Salah Salem at Mehlal El Kubra on July 27 referred to in paragraph 3 of my telegram under reference was of considerable interest. He praised the Sudanese for not weakening in face of imperialist rule and coercion during half a century of struggle, and expressed the hope that the tyranny and conspiracies of today would be equally successfully overcome.

2. He described as deceivers those who urged that it was illogical for anyone to choose to abandon independence. Such men were attacking the unity of Moslem with Moslem and brother with brother. He cited Syria as an example of an Arab country at once independent and aiming at full unity with every part of the Arab world, as the first article in her first constitution proved. He praised Syria for her efforts to achieve Arab unity and strongly criticised the big powers for tearing up an area, once united, into the separate pieces of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine. Palestine had later been handed over to gangs of despots by the same great powers.

3. He stated that history was repeating itself in that the great powers felt uneasy at the very existence of a strong and united people in the Nile Valley. Imperialism was no defender of independence as a glance at colonial Africa readily proved. Some leaders had accused Egypt of being a colonising power but Egypt had never said that she wished to proclaim Nasser as King or President of the Sudan. Salem recalled that he had told Sudanese leaders that Egypt would struggle against Britain to secure the withdrawal of British forces from the Sudan, and announced that Egypt had obtained Sudanese independence before her own. He declared that in three months time all foreign troops would be evacuated, that there would be no ruler, officer or official who would not be Sudanese, and that it was therefore ridiculous to allege that unity with Egypt on a footing of equality would be a hindrance to Sudanese sovereignty and independence.
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(Governor General's Office)

Cypher/OTP

No. 177
July 29, 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 177 of July 29
Repeated for information to:-

Cairo
B.M.E.O.

Following from Luce.

Mubarak Zarroug, Minister of Communications, gave me yesterday an account of the Sudan delegation's visit to Cairo. The main points were as follows:

(a) The delegation had done its best to explain the present situation in the Sudan and to seek an understanding with Egypt on the lines mentioned in paragraph 2(a) of Khartoum telegram No. 174 and Zarroug thought that Salah Salem must have realized the strength of pro-independence feeling in the Sudan, but he was certainly not prepared to admit it. On the contrary, he made it clear Egypt would continue to support unity. He was not prepared to restrain pro-unity propaganda from Cairo radio, and said that the B.B.C. are now openly supporting independence. He did not admit any other form of Egyptian interference.

(b) Salah Salem tried to frighten the delegation by describing the dangers of a Mahdist armed coup in an independent Sudan. He claimed reliable information that the majority recently recruited to expand the Sudan Defence Forces are Mahdists who aim at gaining control of the Force. The Sudanese delegation told him this was nonsense and Zarroug thought that these remarks were intended mainly for Sayed Ali's consumption.

/(c) Salah Salem...
CONFIDENTIAL

Khartoum telegram No. 177 to Foreign Office

-2-

(c) Salah Saleh talked a lot about military alliances and about the dangers of an independent Sudan being drawn into some kind of defence pact with the Western Powers [grp under ? arguing that] this would, in effect, deprive the Sudan of its independence, as, he said, had happened to Turkey and Iraq. He commented that if the Sudan made an alliance with Ethiopia it would, in fact, come under American domination because Ethiopia already has a pact with America. (This is not the first time I have heard of Egyptian apprehension about a future Ethiopian and Sudanese alliance.) Egypt was determined not to be drawn into any such pact and only under her shield could Sudan hope to be free of foreign domination. The Sudanese were little impressed by all this and said that in any case they were not thinking of any military alliance at present.

(d) In the end, Salah Saleh did speak about the International Commission (paragraph 2 of Cairo telegram No. 946 to you). After accusing the British of revealing secret Anglo-Egyptian discussions to the Sudanese, he said that Egypt would not approve a commission which included neither Egyptian, British or Sudanese members, but would not accept a neutral commission which was dominated by the Western Powers (sic). He told the Sudanese, as an example, that he had proposed members from Russia and the Ukraine.

(e) The Sudanese raised the question of the withdrawal of troops, and Salah Saleh said that Egypt would not object to any programme which British liked to propose, provided that British and Egyptian troops withdraw simultaneously. He remarked "if the British suggest withdrawal within twenty four hours, we shall agree".

(f) Zarroug discussed Sudan currency with the Egyptian Minister of Finance and "found him not unsympathetic and ready to pursue discussions at technical level". Zarroug, however, is under no illusion that this question will be determined on technical and not /political.
CONFIDENTIAL

Khartoum telegram No. 177 to Foreign Office

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political considerations.

(g) The long awaited Egyptian memorandum on the Nile waters was given to the Sudan during the visit. It proposes an equal sharing of the present surplus calculated at the High Aswan Dam, i.e. after allowing for evaporation. The Sudanese Minister of Irrigation undertook to have this examined by his experts, but Zarroug implied that the Sudanese were very unlikely to accept it.

(h) The question of a plebiscite was not, after all, mentioned (paragraph 2 (b) of Khartoum telegram No. 174), as Zarroug had persuaded Azhari to drop it on the grounds that there was no hope of the Egyptians agreeing.

(i) As expected, the Egyptians attacked Azhari and his Government's breach of free and neutral atmosphere, but the Sudanese gave no ground and denied they were doing anything contrary to the agreement. The Egyptians objected particularly to a recent edict by the three dominant Provincial Governors in Southern Sudan that all foreigners living in the South and not employed by the Sudan Government, must at once apply for closed district permits if they have not already got them. This includes the Egyptians and their [grp undecl consular] staff. The Sudanese replied that if anyone considered he was being treated unlawfully he could seek a remedy in court. (Please see my immediately following telegram).

(j) On the only occasion on which Gamal Abdel Nasser was present (July 24) he took virtually no part in the discussion. Almost all the talking on the Egyptian side was done throughout the visit by Salah Salem.

2. Generally speaking, while the Egyptians will, in his opinion, undoubtedly continue to support unity by every possible means, Zarroug got the impression that they will not force a show down on either the Internation Commission [grp undecl] on the

/withdrawal...
CONFIDENTIAL

Khartoum telegram No. 177 to Foreign Office

withdrawal of troops.

3. Although the Sudanese delegation had had a very difficult time in Cairo, he thought the visit well worth while as it showed the Sudanese had taken the initiative in seeking to establish friendly relations with Egypt. The fact that Azhari and his Ministers had stood firm against Egyptian pressure would also strengthen the Government's position in the Sudan.

4. According to Zarroug, the N.U.P. will take firm action against Nur al Din immediately after Azhari's return from the Belgium Congo on July 31. He will almost certainly be expelled from the party.

5. Please inform the Governor General.

Foreign Office pass Cairo and BMDO as my telegrams Nos. 95 and 30.

[Repeated to Cairo and BMDO]

DISTRIBUTED TO:

African Department
STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY SAYED ISMAIL EL AZHARI
PRIME MINISTER OF THE SUDAN ON HIS RETURN
TO KHARTOUM ON THE OCCASION OF THE
ANNIVERSARY FESTIVALS OF THE
REVOLUTION IN CAIRO

Sayed Ismail El Azhari, the Prime Minister of
the Sudan on his return to Khartoum on July 26th from
Cairo, where he had led the official government
delegation on the occasion of anniversary festivals
of the Revolution issued a statement to the press
to the following effect:-

"Our visit to Egypt was in response to her
invitation, which we accepted because we realise
that the Revolution undoubtedly contributed to the
conclusion of the Sudan Agreement. It was decided
that the delegation should include a large number
of my colleagues so that they could take the
opportunity to confirm the present trend of public
opinion in the Sudan for complete independence, while
at the same time, maintaining cordial and friendly
relations with Egypt. This was the subject of the
discussions which took place during three long
meetings between July 24th - 26th. At the first
meeting Colonel Nasser was present, while the two
subsequent meetings were attended by Major Salah
Salem.

In spite of certain incidents which gave us
adequate reasons to keep off these talks and return
immediately to Khartoum, we decided not to do so,
because we were convinced of the vital importance
for the future of both countries that we should
explain fully to the Egyptians the true facts
in the political situation in the Sudan at the
present time and so fulfil our duty for the sake of
history and for the welfare of both the Sudanese and
Egyptian peoples.

At these meetings we were able to listen
to all the Egyptians had to say on this subject and
to convey to them very plainly and frankly our
views on the present political situation in the Sudan
and to confirm to them that public opinion there was
tending more and more to complete independence
while at the same time it was the ardent desire of
the Sudanese to maintain the most cordial and
friendly relations with Egypt."


DNJ.
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

Mr. Murray
No. 980
August 4, 1955

D. 8.55 p.m. August 4, 1955
R. 9.59 p.m. August 4, 1955

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 980 of August 4
Repeated for information to Governor General Khartoum
U.K.T.C. Khartoum
and SAVING to B.M.E.O.
Addis Ababa

Sudan.

I called today on Minister for Foreign Affairs whom I had not seen since his return, and whose nose I did not want to put out of joint by my forthcoming interview with the Prime Minister. We went over the ground generally but by mutual consent did not attempt to go any further in the question of the International Commission.

2. I exhorted him to steady up Salah Salem particularly with reference to

(a) his ideas of including eastern bloc members in the International Commission;

(b) his threats of disrupting Anglo-Egyptian relations over the Sudan;

(c) the dangers of envisaging only the one solution to Egypto-Sudanese relations in the future.

3. Fawzi was very smooth over all three points. He said he thought Cairo and London ought to work towards solutions in the best interests of the Sudanese and have some informal discussions. We should be careful not to do things behind the backs of the Sudanese: indeed we should be careful to keep their confidence: but we were entitled to talk things over.

4. In particular he said he thought we ought to discuss soon informally the question of the Nile waters.
CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 380 to Foreign Office

-2-

5. I said that I was sure you would always be willing to ventilate problems concerning the Sudan. It was far better to bring them out into the open than to allow fancied grievances to grow between us. As for "solutions" however I must warn him that he must not expect us to discuss any revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement: he hastily and emphatically reassured me that he did not mean to suggest any such thing.

6. He then warned me that the Prime Minister would have some remonstrances to make to me about interference in the Sudan by "London, Washington and Addis Ababa". I said I was not aware of any interference from London and did not (repeat not) believe there had been any; as for Washington I had heard a silly story about Mr. Beach being supposed to be supporting Aghari, but he must not believe every wild allegation put forward by penny-a-liner intelligence sources; I knew nothing about Ethiopian interference. Fawzi stuck to his dark thoughts and remarked that the Ethiopian Ambassador had been very unhappy at what the Egyptians had said to him about it.

7. I should be grateful for any comments on what supposed British interference the Egyptians may have in mind, though it may be no more than a complaint at Mr. Luce's calculated indiscretions to Azmiri about the International Commission.

8. I should be grateful also for any instructions you may have for me with regard to Egyptian desires for discussions particularly with regard to the Nile waters. (My letter unnumbered of July 29 to Mr. Shuckburgh refers). Prime Minister may be expected to follow this up. My interview with him may be on Saturday.

Foreign Office please pass Government General and U.K.T.C. Khartoum as my telegrams 88 and 81 respectively.

[Repeated to Governor General and U.K.T.C. Khartoum]
In his letter to you 1037/35/55 of July 14, Terence Garvey referred to a statement issued in Cairo by the "National Society of the White Flag" and asked whether there were any indications of a revival of the Society in the Sudan.

2. I enclose a translation of an article which appeared in the Umma Party organ "El-Umma" on July 18 incorporating a reply to the Cairo statement by Salih Abdel Gader, a founder-member and "general secretary" of the Society. In his "reply" Salih Abdel Gader says that the Society is no longer active and that the principle of the unity of the Nile Valley had not even been thought of at the time of the Society's formation.

3. We ourselves can find no evidence of any activity on the part of the Society in the Sudan, and we are told that Salih Abdel Gader's statement reflects the position fairly accurately. It looks therefore as though the Cairo statement is in fact another Egyptian stunt.

4. I am copying this letter, with enclosure, to Garvey at Cairo and to Peck at the B.M.E.O.

(Yours, etc.,

T. E. Bromley, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.)
"El Umma" July 11, 1955

Salih Abdel Gadir answers Radio Cairo and says: The aim of the White Flag was the complete independence of Egypt and the Sudan, but the Egyptians by yielding to the British destroyed our faith in a combined struggle.

Following the weak statement broadcast by Cairo Radio in the name of the White Flag in which it was said that the surviving members of the White Flag still call for the unity of the Nile Valley, we approached Ustaz Salih Abdel Gader, one of the founders of the White Flag and its general secretary and asked him for his views on the broadcast. He gave us the following statement:

I do not know of any surviving members of the White Flag except Sayed Mohammed El Mahdi El Taaishi whose name was not mentioned in the said statement. I would like to seize this opportunity of assuring the Sudanese that the principle of the White Flag, as stated in its constitution and internal bye-laws, was the complete independence of Egypt and the Sudan. It was not the unity of the Nile Valley, as that was unknown at that time and was therefore not one of the principles of the White Flag. We used to believe in a combined struggle as a means to free our country and we believed also that to get rid of the Egyptians was much easier than getting rid of the British. The result of the Egyptians yielding to the British in Egypt and the Sudan destroyed our faith in the combined struggle and we decided since that time, to shoulder things ourselves. I can say that the survivors of the White Flag with the exception of Mohammed El Mahdi El Taaishi, who sold himself to the Egyptians are the first to fight for the Sudan's complete independence.
INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Murray
No. 152 Saving
August 3, 1955.


Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 152 Saving of August 3
Repeated for information saving to
U.K.T.C. Khartoum

My telegrams Nos. 150 Saving and 957 of July 28.

Press continues to devote considerable space to Sudan affairs.
Rose el Youssef of August 2 published an account of interviews by
Editor Reda with Azhari, Nureddin, Benjamin Louki and Dr. Asshat,Ahmed Asshat,
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

2. Azhari admitted his change of attitude and attributed it to the
fact that Egypt has no Parliament and no constitution. Reda pointed out
that Egypt would soon have a Parliament and that Revolution had played main
part in concluding Sudan Agreement and moulding Unionist Party. Had
Azhari conducted elections or plebiscite to ascertain true will of the
people? Azhari was accused of inclining towards West, of allowing
American influence to dominate Sudan and of planning to conclude a
 pact with Ethiopia. Azhari denied that he was planning to conclude any
 pact and in answer to other questions stated that:

(i) He still had the support of 54 members of the House of Representatives.

(ii) He did not intend to collaborate with the Umma Party because
he believed that there should be some ties between Egypt and the Sudan.

(iii) Postponement of meeting of N.U.P. General Assembly was
due not to Mr. Ghazi's intervention but to the fact that most of its members
were visiting Egypt.

3. Nureddin blamed Britain, United States and other foreign powers
as responsible for Azhari's present attitude. Azhari had been friendly
towards the British to the extent of asking the Party to stage a popular
farewell for Sir Robert Howe "who was responsible for the Khartoum
massacres", and he had concluded a number of agreements with the British
in London although falsely describing his visit as one of courtesy only.
Since returning from London he had undermined the N.U.P. by making
approaches to supporters of independence. Nureddin declared that Unionist
principles would triumph and that Azhari was committing political suicide.
He had hoped to win popular support by agreeing to pay what he himself
called a "courtesy" visit to Egypt but had brought with him the Minister who
printed leaflets against Egypt and Yehia el Fadil who had attacked Egypt
on the radio.

/4. Louki declared
Cairo telegram No. 155 Saving to Foreign Office

4. Louki declared himself impressed by Nasser's popularity and by the strength of the Egyptian Army. The South looked to Egypt to protect her against the North. If unity was not forthcoming the South would demand separation. Dr. Akial also supported the principle of unity on a basis of equality and said that there was no proof that the Sudanese had swerved from their Unionist principles. On all these interviews Reda's only comment was that unity between Egypt and the Sudan would definitely come about.

5. Akbar el Yom's editorial of July 30 described great effect which visit to Egypt had had on Sudanese Delegation. They had been surprised at the amount of freedom in Egypt, at the unity and simple life of the members of the Revolution Council, at the well-fed populace and well-armed forces, at the support given to the Revolution by the workers and at the love shown by the Egyptians for the Sudanese. All these matters had been cast in doubt by false rumours in the Sudan, where it had even been said that Salah Salem was no longer responsible for Sudan affairs - another untruth.

6. Editorials in Gomhouria of August 2, Akbar of July 29, and Mussawar of July 28 continued to warn the Sudanese against the separatists and their imperialist backers declaring that the Sudan's distrust of Egypt is unfounded, Egypt alone had no ambitions in the Sudan. Press also reported that Shireddin's pro-unity statements during his visit to the Canal Zone had been warmly received. Members of the Duweim delegation who attended the celebrations, declared their support for union in a letter to Salah Salem from Abdel Hamid Abdel Balim, a member of the executive committee of the N.U.P. A manifesto was issued in the name of the White Flag Society exhorting the people of the Sudan to stand firm in the cause of union.

7. Radio reports and comment followed similar lines.

BBB
INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By Bag

Mr. Murray
No. 156 Saving
August 4, 1955.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 156 Saving of August 4.
Repeated for information Saving to: - Governor General Khartoum
U.K.T.C. Khartoum
B.M.H.O. Nicosia

My telegram No. 152 Saving of August 3.

Press today carries MENA report from Khartoum that Ashari is to meet Abdullah Khalil, Secretary-General of Umma party, and Mohamed Mahgoub (described as leader of the separatists) to arrange co-operation between Ashari and Umma party. Meeting arranged in accordance with decision adopted yesterday by "Independence Front". Sudanese political circles reported as saying that Ashari seeks Umma and Ansar support because he fears that Unionist elements of Khatmia may not support him. Press recalls occasion when Ashari called on El Mahdi following the March massacres and it was said then that he had reached an understanding with the Umma. More recently El Mahdi had announced that he would "sacrifice his fortune and his sons" for Ashari.

2. Press also reported that Khidr Hamad, Secretary-General of N.U.P. and Minister of Irrigation, announced on August 3 that party's Executive Committee would meet on August 5. Sudanese political circles were surprised and considered this a violation of Mirghani's mediation between Ashari's separatist group and Nureddin's unionist bloc. Moreover many Committee members were still in Cairo. Ahram reported that separatists would try to use this meeting to announce dismissal from the N.U.P. of all unionist leaders. Violent struggle expected to ensue within ranks of party.

3. Sudan Benevolent Union held tea party in Cairo on August 3 in honour of visiting Sudanese delegations with Salah Salem as guest of honour. Nureddin, who claimed to be indisposed, spoke briefly. Dr. Mohieddin Saber said on behalf of "Sudanese /delegations
Cairo telegram No. 156 Saving to Foreign Office

- 2 -

delegations" that difficulty in Sudan was not over choice between union and independence but over the great imperialist conspiracy. Salem declared that welfare of Sudan was part of Egypt's welfare and hoped that Sudanese would close their ranks.

1. Fikri Abaza, in to-day's editorial in Mussawar, said present confusion in Sudan was a result of British and American activities, dissenion within the N.U.P., reorganisation of the Khatmia and undefined activities within the Umma party and in the South. One group wanted complete unity of the Nile Valley; another complete independence; a third the creation of an independent republic in unity with Egypt, (unity to be provided for in the constitutions of the two countries and supervised by a special supreme committee); while a fourth group advocated an undefined, vague and novel "unicaist independence".

5. Abaza reminded Azhari of national convention he signed providing for unified defence, foreign policy, currency etc. and asked what happened to this convention. Abaza also requested clarification of Azhari's obscure attitude. Nureddin's clearly defined position pleased him better, but comparison between the two attitudes indicated a trend towards independence as fundamental to both. Abaza expressed personal belief that unity ought to imply complete merger, adding that he could have understood if discussion had turned around already existing patterns of union such as United States of America, Switzerland and Soviet Union, but systems adumbrated by Sudanese had no precedent. On the whole supporters of independence had cause to rejoice.

X X X X X
INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITSHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Murray

No. 158 Saving

August 5, 1955

R. August 8, 1955

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 158 Saving of August 5.

Repeated for information Saving to: Governor General Khartoum

U.K.T.C., Khartoum

B.M.E.O.

My telegram No. 156 Saving.

Sudan affairs take first place in press today.

Full reports are given of press conference held by Southern leaders including Benjamin Louki, Booth Din,

Bullen Alier, Litotombi (Juba Deputy), Pablo Lugali and Ridento

Ongi members of Juba Senate, Atou Atilio, Secretary of

Malakal Branch of Liberal Party, and Ahmed Mourgan,

Secretary of the Juba Branch. Louki declared that present

rule was worse than British rule, that South had not been

consulted like the North about future developments and had

not been represented on Sudanisation Committee. There

was no freedom of opinion and Ashari’s imprisoning of a

Southern Deputy had been followed by fighting between local

people and the Administration.

2. Southern leaders reported to have presented official

Note to Salah Salem complaining of oppressive methods adopted

by Ashari in three Southern Governorates and to have

supported this with two documents:-

(1) Alleged circular from Ashari to administrative

officials in South ordering them to be vigilant and not

listen to childish complaints of South, and permitting

them to maltreat Southerners if necessary. Officials

who disobeyed would be punished.

/(11) A
Cairo telegram No. 158 Saving to Foreign Office

-2-

(ii) A message from Juba Liberal Committee to Louki reporting battle between Zandis and Mangas. Trouble started on July 25. Governor-General had sent whole army to Jumbo secretly without informing police commandant. Four killed, many wounded, Elia Kouay and others jailed. As a result many Zandi men preparing to emigrate to Congo. Louki requested to inform all members of Parliament, and to refuse to participate in present session of parliament. All members asked to return to South. The party said they had put all this before Salah Salem as representing one of the Co-dominis and in the hope that Egypt would intervene to put an end to these oppressive measures.

3. Press also reported meeting of Abdullah Khalil, Secretary-General of Umma, Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub, As hari and Zarouk to agree on principles of collaboration between As hari and Independence Front. After the meeting Khalil and Mahgoub issued statement that talks were cordial and that meetings would continue.

4. Statement by Ali el Mirghani also given prominence consisting of somewhat obscure warning to those who had been attributing opinions and comments to him, warning them not to make improper use of his name and warning the Sudanese people not to believe rumours.

5. Akhbar also carried Khartoum cable saying that Executive Committee members have refused to attend meeting arranged for today as it is a breach of the mediation arrangements made by Mirghani.

6. Press reports that Ashari has received telegrams from Chairman of Gezira Cultivators Association asking for payment of disbursement due and protesting against police action in preventing cultivators expressing disapproval of delay in payment.

7. Akhbar's editorial emphasises the strength of unionist feeling in the Sudan and natural ties between the two countries. Like Akhbar it also described the British as responsible for the idea of separation (called independence by imperialist supporters). Samboukia editorial pointed out that Ashari had been elected on one platform and had now changed. He ought to correct his position vis-à-vis the electorate by holding new elections.
Flag A

Please see the attached telegram from Cairo which gives an account of an interview which Mr. Murray has just had with the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. For the purpose of a forthcoming interview with the Egyptian Prime Minister about the Sudan Mr. Murray asks us if we could elucidate certain references made by Mr. Fawzi to British interference in the Sudan and also whether there is anything he should say about Nile waters - i.e., presumably the dispute on that subject between Egypt and the Sudan.

Argument

3. As regards interference I have little to add to paragraph 6 of Mr. Murray's telegram except possibly that the Egyptians may be aware that we manage to have frequent consultations with the Governor-General and his office. I think that the Egyptian Prime Minister can only be asked to elucidate if he refers to the matter. We have heard little about American interference other than that mentioned in Mr. Murray's paragraph 6. This was to the effect that the American liaison officer in Khartoum (Mr. Beach) was using money to keep the Sudanese Prime Minister and his friends in power. The American Ambassador in Cairo asked Mr. Beach to come down when he heard the tale and of course there was nothing in it whatsoever. We have heard nothing at all about Ethiopian interference - unless it is that the Egyptians have heard some vague rumours about the return of Gambella to Ethiopian administration. We propose to tell the Egyptians about that anyway as soon as the necessary exchange of notes with the Ethiopians is ready for signature. It is not a matter of direct concern to

Egypt
Egypt since it follows from a purely Anglo-Ethiopian agreement made some 50 years ago.

4. While he is about it, it would be well if Mr. Murray were to draw the Egyptian Prime Minister's attention to the remarks made on July 27 by Major Salem as reported in paragraph 5 of Cairo telegram No.957 and somewhat elaborated in Cairo telegram No.150 Saving. Mr. Murray has already asked the Egyptian Foreign Minister to try to do something about Major Salem but he might well speak to the Egyptian Prime Minister, particularly if, as is probable, the latter starts talking about our interference. Mr. Murray then go on to urge, as he has already done, that questions of this kind be discussed between us rather than ventilated publicly before being checked in any way.

5. With regard to Nile waters, the position is as follows here. Some time ago we had considered the question whether we could help to break the deadlock between Egypt and the Sudan over the division of future Nile waters and at the same time stake a claim for our own East African territories on Nile water for the purpose of future development. Beyond an informal mention to the Egyptians and Sudanese of the interest of our East African territories in the question nothing further was done, since it appeared that the Egyptians and Sudanese were going to make a further effort to reach agreement. It appears from accounts of the Sudanese Prime Minister's recent visit to Cairo that no settlement will be reached. We have again discussed the matter with the Colonial Office, the Treasury and Board of Trade (the last two being interested because of the proposal to build a high dam at Aswan). We have agreed that we might usefully take up the suggestion made by Cairo some time ago, and referred to in Mr. Murray's letter mentioned in paragraph 8 of his telegram, that tripartite talks should be held about the problem. Using the recent report of the Royal
Royal Commission on East African Territories as a peg, we could tell the Egyptians and Sudanese that we wished to reserve the right in principle of our East African territories to use water for further development and we would try to get the Egyptian and Sudanese Governments to acknowledge this. We could then go on to say that we were sorry to see the difficulty which had arisen between Egypt and the Sudan over the division of Nile waters. We too, as we had indicated, had an interest in this problem and if it would help, we would like to suggest discussions between the three of us in the hope that progress might be made.

We would try to persuade the other two that the discussions should be, so far as possible, technical rather than political.

As Cairo have not failed to realise, we may get kicks from both the other countries, since each will expect us to support it against the other. But we have a real interest in seeing a solution in that:

(a) it is a major factor in Egyptian interference in the Sudan
(b) a solution is a matter of economic importance
(c) we may have a commercial interest in the building of the Aswan high dam
(d) we want to be sure that the rights of our own territories are safeguarded.

A despatch to Cairo on the subject is going to be submitted shortly but it would not be desirable for Mr. Murray to say much until the policy proposed in the despatch has been approved here and possibly modified a little by Cairo and Khartoum in the light of local circumstances.

Conclusion

6. That a telegram be sent to Cairo on the lines of the attached draft.

S. K. 
M. Bridgeman

P. J.

T. Brunei

August 5, 1946

Mr. Bridges, C. 6/10
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OTP
and By Bag

No. 1591
August 5, 1955.

D. 7.15 p.m. August 5, 1955.

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 1591 of August 5.
Repeated for information to Khartoum (Governor-General), Khartoum (U.K.T.C.)
and Saving to E.M.I.O.(Nicosia) No. 630
Addis Ababa No. 15

Your telegram No. 980 [of August 4: Sudan].

I agree with the line you took.

2. I cannot think of any other possible complaint about our behaviour than that mentioned in paragraph 7 of your telegram unless it be that the Egyptians may realize that we have rather frequent communication with the Governor-General and his office and may without any ground suspect the worst. But our efforts are directed not towards influencing the Sudanese choice but towards trying to ensure that the Egyptians allow them to choose freely and that such arrangements are made that a free and neutral atmosphere will prevail. The Egyptians have hinted at British bribery once or twice and you have already dealt with that firmly. As regards American and Ethiopian interference I have nothing to add to paragraph 6 of your telegram. Both seem highly improbable. On the Ethiopian side there is so far as we know only the Gambella question about which we have recently telegraphed separately.

3. In rebutting firmly any suggestion from the Egyptian Prime Minister of British interference, you should draw his attention to Major Salem's speech as reported in paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 957 and in your telegram No. 150 Saving. You could say that it is hard to conceive of a more open attempt to interfere and to influence the Sudanese choice by a Minister who may be presumed to be speaking with the approval of the Egyptian Government. Such action, besides being completely contrary to the spirit of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan, could not be better calculated to prevent that improvement in Anglo-Egyptian relations which we both desire. Coming on top of the "Anshum" incident and
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Foreign Office telegram No. 1591 to Cairo

- 2 -

incident and Egyptian propaganda efforts about the Oman, etc.,
it frustrates the task of those here who are trying in various
concrete ways to make a reality of a new era in our relations.
You should then once more urge that Major Salem be curbed and
reiterate the point made in the first two sentences of paragraph
5 of your telegram under reference.

4. I am considering your suggestions about the Nile waters.
Meanwhile if the Egyptian Prime Minister raises the subject you
may say that Her Majesty's Government are themselves interested
and will certainly give consideration to Egyptian views.

DISTRIBUTED TO:-

African Department
Sir H. Trevelyan
Cairo

No. 161 (s)

Dated Aug 8

Received in Registry Aug 10

FROM

Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese Relations.

Reports a second press conference held by Southern Sudanese leaders on August 5 and gives press extract about Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese relations.

REFERENCES

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MINUTES

Most of the prominent Southern politicians have been caution, responding at least, to the Egyptian view. It is true that many have received some Egyptian money, but only some. For example, (one for kin-seizing) and not Egyptian to Egypt is that assumption.

Temperature

It seems they probably attach much importance, if not more, to getting Egyptian support for greater autonomy in the new Constitution.

M. Swakem

The South is anti-West. They were pro-we when the North were anti us. They are now pro-Egyptian when the North is pro-independence.
SAVING TELEGRAM

Sir Humphrey Trevelyan

No. 161. Saving

August 8, 1955.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegraph No. 159. Saving of August 8.

repeated for information Saving to:-

G.O. Khartoum No. 42
U.K.T.O. Khartoum No. 25
B.M.O. Khartoum No. 29
B.M.O. Nicosia No. 202

My telegram No. 159 Saving of August 5.

Sudan affairs are still taking first place in the press. Southern leaders held second press conference on August 5 at which Luel stated that Southern Sudanese had asked Egyptians to put an end to Ashari's terrorist methods in the South. Asked whether South intended to ask Britain as the other co-dominus to intervene Luel said there was no objection to this. He reiterated complaints made in previous press conference and stated that Southerners, if they united their ranks which they were now trying to do, would have considerable strength in Parliament. Luel indicated that the South was demanding some kind of self rule.

2. Booth Dju elaborated this point saying that prevalent feeling in South was that there should be some kind of federal union between North and South. He said that Southerners did not know whether Egypt would support this, adding that Southern deputies who had joined Ashari in the past had begun to realize their mistakes. (As one of those deputies, Ridanto Ondzi Kama, Senator for Equitoria, indicated that he had decided to stop supporting Ashari). Dju pointed out that if Ashari's Government was popular it would not have called on the army to fight the Southerners. He stated that the Southern Delegation did not come to complain but simply to bring to light all the facts and inform the Co-Dominus that elections held under present conditions could not be free and that in present circumstances Sudan could not enter battle of self-determination.

3. In response to questions Dju indicated:-

(i) that he was not aware of any American activity in the South although it might exist in the North

(ii) that he saw no reason why Russia and Ukraine should not be represented on International Commission. (He also stated that the Co-Dominus should be represented).

(iii) that only 25 of the hundreds of tribal chiefs invited had been able to come to Egypt because of administrative pressure.

4. Press of August 6 also carried report from Khartoum that separatist members of N.U.P. had decided to refrain from discussing controversial matters at Party's Executive Committee meeting on August 5. Khidir Hamad, Secretary-General of the Party, said that discussion would be limited to organizational matters. It was nevertheless, reported that Ashari...
had received a cable from Nureddin stating that the meeting was a violation of a promise made to Khairany and that Azhari would have to bear the consequences. A further meeting of the Independence Front was also reported.

5. **Ahbar al Yur's** political correspondent published a long article saying that serious studies were being conducted in Cairo with a view to protecting the Sudan Agreement and to ensuring that the Sudanese would be able to decide on self-determination in freedom. These studies were based on documents proving that Azhari had almost broken the Agreement. In these circumstances self-determination in a free and neutral atmosphere was impossible. This, however, did definitely not mean that Egypt wanted to hinder evacuation of foreign troops from the Sudan. She did, however, hold a serious view of Azhari Government's attitude especially vis-a-vis the three Southern provinces, and pointed that Egypt had refused to allow self-determination to take place under British rule because of British bias and it would therefore be unreasonable to permit self-determination under present arbitrary conditions. Author added that Britain's true position and Azhari's relations with the British would be unveiled. **Goribouria** editorials of August 6 and 7 simply declared that Azhari had definitely sold himself to imperialism which had exploited weak elements among the nationalist ranks to its own ends. **Goribouria** noted that B.B.C. had persistently defended Azhari and had described Egyptian press campaign as destructive weapon which might cause his downfall. The B.B.C. did not, however, defend independence in Arab regions of Buraimi and Aden. **Ahbar** editorial of August 7 said that present terrorism in Sudan might serve Britain's interests but added that Egypt and Britain ought to interfere to put an end to the arbitrary actions of Sudanese Government. If Britain would not do so, Egypt's responsibilities were doubled.

6. On August 7 press published **MENA** cable from Khartoum stating that **MENA** Office had received telegram from Omar Abu Azza, Sudanese Senator, complaining of harsh methods used by customs officers at Port Sudan and of being dogged by numerous spies, and expressing the fear that Azhari might deprive him of his nationality. **Goribouria** and **Ahbar** declared that this was evidence that Azhari's terrorist methods had extended to North Sudan.

7. In an interview in Cairo with Husni Khalifa, Managing Director of **MENA** which appeared in all the Arabic press of August 7, Loud said that Southerners task was to get rid of Azhari's terrorist rule. He expressed profound gratitude for Egyptian hospitality and compared it with old days when Egypt concerned herself only with the North. Loud appealed for active Egyptian intervention.

8. **Ahbar** and **Goribouria** also reported on August 7 that talks between Azhari, Zarouk, Mahgoub and Khalil of Umm Party had been suspended in face of strong opposition from unionist bloc within N.U.P. Nureddin's remarks about N.U.P. split, made on his return to Khartoum, were also reported. He reiterated his previous statement that if Azhari had enjoyed majority support he himself would have formed new party but that this was not the case.

9. Organisations and individuals continued to express support for principle of unity. Maitre Omar Hamza, Under Secretary of State for Stores and Equipment, declared that such union was 'natural', while a conference of Sudanese and Suban Organisations of Ismailia, Port Said and Suez called on Sudanese to unite and struggle to achieve it.
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/UDP

Sir H. Trevelyan

No. 1000

August 10, 1955

Repeat for information to:

Governor-General, Khartoum
United Kingdom Trade Commissioner, Khartoum
E.M.E.O.

My telegram No. 993, Sudan.

My paragraph 1. Salah Salem's allegations regarding the state of affairs in the Sudan included the following:

(a) Alarming state of unrest in the south in general. Southern opinion solidly opposed to northern domination and policy and resenting despatch of troops here from Khartoum.

(b) In particular Sudanese Government had arrested local police and Defence Force members whom they regarded as unreliable and were keeping them in detention together with other southern officials.

(c) Recent incident at Yambio had been much more serious than represented and had resulted in fifteen deaths and many wounded, most of whom had escaped.

(d) Egyptian Government had proof that circular from Azhari to administrative officials in south reported in paragraph 2(i) of Mr. Murray's telegram No. 158 saying was true.

(e) Azhari and Caucus of the N.U.P. had already decided on how to rig the elections to the Constituent Assembly, had chosen candidates and were issuing instructions to senior government officials on how the results of the elections were to be determined.

(f) The same allegation as that reported in Khartoum telegram No. 177 to you, paragraph 1(b).

(g) Azhari and a small group of men around him did not represent Sudanese opinion nor even opinion of the N.U.P., 81% of which was in favour of union with Egypt.
CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 1000 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

2. Egyptians are likely to produce this sort of stuff during the next few rounds with them. Most of it is scarcely worth arguing about. I should be grateful, however, for any comments which Khartoum may be able to make on specific allegations.

Foreign Office please pass to Governor General and United Kingdom Trade Commissioner Khartoum as my telegrams 95 and 96.

[Repeated to Governor General and United Kingdom Trade Commissioner Khartoum]

DISTRIBUTED TO:
African Department

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Yesterday I paid a belated Bairam call on Sayed Ali Mirdhani. I took the opportunity to introduce Mr. Roberts.

The conversation was almost entirely non-political. But when I asked what news he had had from the Sudanese who had been to Cairo for the Egyptian celebrations he replied that he had seen Ashari and the other ministers and had had a full account from them. Otherwise he really had very little idea who had gone or what they had done there; their visit was no concern of his. I am not sure how seriously we were expected to take this, but I notice that he has put out a press statement to the effect that "certain persons" had been speaking in his name: this was entirely unauthorised and must cease. The offender is assumed locally to be Nureddin, in Egypt.

Before taking leave of the Sayed I expressed the hope that the Sudan would pass safely and swiftly through the critical days ahead. He said that he was sure all would be well and (putting his hands together) that all Sudanese would work together; the ship had not yet reached the shore, but the coast was not far off and would soon be reached.

(P. O. D. Adams)
August 5, 1955.

Copies to:
Mr. Bromley, African Dept.
Mr. Garvey, Cairo.
Mr. Lucas, Palace.