CAIRO BROADCASTS TO SUDAN

The late Secretary of State has drawn our attention to an article in "The Scotsman" of April 4 (attached behind), saying that Egypt is trying to convince the Sudan that union with Egypt will enable the Sudan to expand her frontiers and that eventually they can together conquer Africa. The article refers to two Cairo broadcasts to the Sudan, one on February 26 and the other on March 19. Sir Anthony Eden thought that these might justify a protest to the Egyptian Government.

2. The broadcast of February 26, the first of a series of talks on provinces in the Sudan, says that the Sudan formerly included Eritrea, British and French Somaliland, Harer in Ethiopia, Uganda and part of the Belgian Congo. It says that Sudan lost more than a fifth of its land before its frontiers were fixed by the 1899 condominium agreement. It attributes this state of affairs to:

(1) the weakness of the Government set up in Omdurman after the Mahdi's rebellion and the Egyptian evacuation and

(2) the greed of the Imperialist powers, which took advantage of this weakness.

3. The broadcast of March 19 talks about pacts being made between the Imperialist powers in Africa ("the hangmen of the peoples"), to suppress the voices of freedom, and says that the unity of the two peoples of the Nile Valley can carry the flame of freedom to the whole of the African continent. It again takes up a theme which the Egyptians were using in November and about which we protested, namely that British administrators in the south of the Sudan, especially those who were in the frontier areas and were known for their political activities, have been transferred to Kenya and Uganda. It also says that the neighbours of the
Sudan are the peoples of the territories concerned and not the British, French and Belgians whose past, present and future are pages in the bloodstained annals of Africa.

4. There was a further broadcast on March 30 which again referred to the idea of an African defence pact and said that the political reply to such pacts can be expressed in a movement towards an African conference to represent all African peoples to discuss Imperialist moves, draw up plans and proclaim the union of the African peoples. It went on to say that Egypt worked for the liberation of the Sudan and offered Sudanese support. When the Sudanese people were called upon to determine their future they would choose union with Egypt. From this free and equal union the strongest state in Africa would emerge and it would be capable of helping the sister countries. We have made many previous protests about broadcasts. The above shows that objectionable broadcasts still continue. But it may be said at least that they are very much less frequent than was the case in the past. I suggest that I might write in the present instance to Mr. Murray at Cairo to tell him [our late Secretary of State] had expressed concern about these broadcasts. I would give him the gist of the objectionable parts and ask that the Embassy should take them up with the Egyptian authorities. There remains the perennial question whether we should give publicity to our protests. I doubt whether it would be advantageous for us to do so in the present instance. Whatever we do it is unlikely that they can be stopped and these are spasmodic instances spread over some five weeks. In view of the recent history of Middle Eastern affairs, I doubt whether a public wrangle would help things along at all though we would no doubt have to say we had made protests if later on a Parliamentary question were asked.

5. We may have much more trouble in broadcasts later in the
year when arrangements for self-determination in the Sudan are set in motion. It may at that time be necessary to make a real drive about broadcasts and to say publicly that we are doing so.

It may be worth adding that the Egyptian Counsellor yesterday referred to the Nairobi and Dakar conferences, and asked whether the defence pact for Africa south of the Sahara was being contemplated - and whether the Americans were pressing for it. I replied that the two conferences mentioned were purely technical and that the Americans were not pressing for anything of the sort.

April 7, 1955

I agree

Murray

13/4
During recent weeks we have noticed in monitoring reports, certain objectionable passages in the Sudan programme from Cairo radio. These occurred in talks given by Dr. Mohi al-Din Sabir.

2. On February 26 in the first of a series of talks on provinces in the Sudan the broadcaster said that the Sudan formerly included Eritrea, British and French Somaliland, Harar in Ethiopia, Uganda and part of the Belgian Congo. The Sudan lost more than a fifth of its land before its frontiers were fixed by the 1899 Condominium Agreement. This state of affairs was due first to the weakness of the government set up in Omdurman after the Mahdi's rebellion and the Egyptian evacuation and secondly to the greed of the imperialist powers which took advantage of this weakness.

3. In a further broadcast on March 19 on political questions on the Sudan's frontiers, the broadcaster referred to the affliction which the Sudan suffered by the presence of three European powers on its frontiers. There was evidence which caused anxiety about political developments on the Sudan's frontiers in the near future. Imperialism which had collapsed in Asia had gathered its disordered remnants and fortified itself in Africa, its last stronghold. The hangmen of the peoples, feeling themselves united by a common danger, had made pacts with each other and had begun to co-ordinate their efforts in Africa. The broadcast went on to say that the interest of the imperialist powers was to keep the Sudan under foreign influence because the liberation of the Sudan clearly meant the liberation of the neighbouring African peoples and eventually of the whole African continent. It ended "we are confident that we shall find in the unity of the two peoples of the Nile Valley real strength not only to safeguard our freedom but also to carry its flame to the whole of the African continent." The broadcast also contained another reference to the fact that when the Sudanese ministers visited this country last autumn they conferred with British officials about the transfer of former British officials in the Sudan to neighbouring territories. It remarked that the former British administrators in the south of the Sudan, especially those who had administered frontier areas and were known for their political activities, had been transferred to Kenya and Uganda where some administrative posts were specially established for them on the frontiers. They could now return at any time to the Sudan to make what contacts they liked in regions where they lived for many years.

4. There was another broadcast on March 50 in which Dr. Sabir again talked about the idea of an African defence pact. Such pacts should be resisted by the peoples of Africa.

F.R.H. Murray, Esq., C.M.G.,
Cairo.

13th April, 1955.
Africa by means of an African conference representative of all African peoples which could discuss imperialist moves, draw up common plans and proclaim the union of the African peoples. The unity between the two peoples of the Nile Valley should be an example. When the Sudanese people are called upon to determine their future they will choose union with Egypt. From this free and equal union the strongest state in Africa will emerge and it will be capable of helping our sister countries. The sons of the Nile Valley, have a political duty towards the African people. Let us all work for a free African union."

5. The Prime Minister saw a reference to these broadcasts in "The Bootsean" and expressed his concern about them. We should accordingly be grateful if you would bring them to the attention of the Egyptian authorities and once more protest to them their unfriendly nature which cannot be reconciled with the efforts which we are making and which the Egyptians should be making to bring about a better relationship between our two countries. The reference in the third broadcast to "unity with Egypt" is particularly objectionable and entirely at variance with the Egyptian thesis that they agree with us that the Sudanese should not be influenced in their choice.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter to Adams at Khartoum.

(T.E. Bromley)
Egypt and the Sudan

Egypt is trying to convince the Sudan that union with Egypt will enable her to expand her frontiers and that eventually they can together conquer Africa. These points are made in Cairo broadcasts to the Sudan, the texts of which have reached London.

A broadcast on February 26 claims that the Sudan formerly included Eritrea, British and French Somaliland, Harrar in Ethiopia, Uganda, part of French Equatorial Africa, and part of the Belgian Congo.

The broadcast admits that "no one today calls for the recovery of the Sudan's lost provinces." Yet another of March 19 states that "the liberation of the Sudan clearly means the liberation of the neighbouring African peoples; it means the liberation of the Congo, Uganda, Kenya, and eventually the whole of the African Continent."

These broadcasts are being investigated in Whitehall. They appear to be an attempt to encourage expansionist tendencies in the Sudan of the worst kind.
On March 31 the Parliamentary Party of the N.U.P. declared for the independence and sovereignty of the Sudan. The statement called for the establishment of an independent republic with its own President, Government and Parliament and representation abroad.

2. The Parliamentary Party also set up a Select Committee to consider what the Party's policy should be with regard to future relations with Egypt. The Committee has now reported to the Parliamentary Party and its recommendations have been accepted. These are set out in U.K.T.C. telegram No. 76. Although the Executive Committee of the Party has to make the final decision, it is unlikely to differ from the proposals of the Parliamentary Party.

3. In the statement, economic and cultural relations are left to the post-self-Determination government to decide. An Advisory Council is to be formed to exchange views with the Egyptians on defence matters when circumstances so demand. On foreign policy the Sudan will aim at understanding and co-operation with the Arab League countries, or any other country or organisation with which they have links or particular interests. The Sudan is to have its own currency.

4. The main feature of the statement is that union with Egypt now means co-operation between equal partners on subjects of vital mutual interest, with nothing more specific than an Advisory Council on defence and treaties on Nile Waters.

5. The statement on defence would seem to be reasonable. The Sudan defence force may need help to expand from 5,000 to 20,000 as planned, and since the Sudan, from the defence point of view, must have some co-ordination with Egypt, an Advisory Council would seem to be the sensible way of resolving defence problems. What we do not want, however, is that the Sudan should become too bound up with Arab League defence and politics.
politics. From this point of view it is more important than ever that the Sudanese should keep their defence plans in balance and that accordingly they should grant us adequate over-flying rights. We should, however, be prepared for the possibility that the Advisory Council, through Egyptian influence, may make difficulties.

6. The foreign affairs statement is vague. Although we would not welcome the Sudan's entry into the Arab League, it is almost inevitable that they will have some connexion with the League, and the statement goes no further than to say that this connexion would be one of understanding and co-operation. This policy is not likely to attract the south. The emphasis on the Sudan's 'interest' would show that the N.U.P. want the Sudan to stand internationally on its own feet. The statement does not exclude understanding and co-operation with us.

7. As regards currency. In order to remain sovereign and free from Egyptian interference and intrigue, a separate currency would be essential. The proposal raises the problem of funding. This is something on which we might approach the Treasury, and on which Sir Knox Helm is almost certain to support an application by the Sudanese.

8. The effect of the statement will have on Sudanese politics is difficult to assess. The Government and Opposition Parties now agree that the Sudan should be independent, and elections for the Constituent Assembly will probably be fought on the issues raised by this second statement. The Opposition Parties are in favour of not defining relations with Egypt until after self-determination has been achieved.

9. All in all this is not unsatisfactory and it shows that the N.U.P. have moved a long way. It is combined, after self-determination, with independent sovereignty, that may well offer the best hope of a peaceful future for the Sudan.

April 12, 1955.

[Signature]

[Number]
FROM
Mr Zaimal Kharbon

No. 15 (1039/26/5)
Dated 24.13
Received in Registry 4.12.20.

References to former relevant papers
27
26
25

References to later relevant papers

MINUTES

National Unionist Party Policy

Reports on the final stage through which the N.U.P. passed in the formulation of its policy on the relationship of the Sudan with Egypt.

Para 3: Once the issue of Self-Determination is over, it looks as though we shall see the emergence of normal political controversy in the Sudan. We may, in fact, witness a realignment of parties with the likely emergence of an effective Southern Party opposing the claims of the South. Already the Southerners are more interested (that is by Southern politicians) in development and "Sudanisation" of parts than in Self-Determination itself.

Para 5: If agreement is reached between the Parties on the proposal in the first sentence, we shall have to think very carefully what our attitude should be. Besides the principles laid down by the Agreement have many errors and we must always be very careful of internal strife and insecurity about which the Egyptian Government is already worried.
Sir,

I have had the honour to report, in the series of communications ending with my telegram no. 78 of April 12, on the final stages through which the National Unionist Party, which forms the Government of the Sudan, passed in the formulation and publication of its policy on the relationship of this country with Egypt.

2. The party had long been under pressure to declare its hand, and it became increasingly evident during the second half of 1954 that its leaders could not ignore the tide of public opinion, running ever more strongly in favour of independence and full sovereignty for the Sudan. But it was difficult for them to turn away from Egyptian friends, who had given them moral and financial support for many years before they came to power, and in whose friendship they still saw the best assurance that the British would keep their word and hand over the reins of government to the Sudanese. As the British rule was withdrawn, the development of pro-independence sentiments grew within the N.U.P., and this growth was accelerated by Egypt's heavy-handed attempts to control Sudanese affairs. N.U.P. suspicions that the British would try to reimpose their rule in the Sudan were further allayed by Sir Robert Howe's expressions of sympathy towards Sudanese aspirations which were publicly and apparently sincerely recognised by the Sudanese Prime Minister and his colleagues at the time of his recent departure on retirement.

3. The N.U.P. now stands squarely for an independent and sovereign Sudanese republic, in close relations with Egypt; and the old Egyptian cry for "Unity of the Nile Valley" in the sense of a single political entity no longer finds any echo here. The party, encouraged by its moderate elements represented by Sayed Mubarak Zarrouq, is now turning its attention to the formulation of a domestic policy based, according to its sponsors, upon the principles of "democratic socialism" and incorporating provisions for limited association or consultation with Egypt on certain specific points on the lines of those recommended by the special committee appointed for the purpose and reported in my telegram no. 78 of April 7. The various party organs are now to proceed with discussion of a draft "manifesto".

4. The Opposition parties, particularly the Umma, have found that some of the wind has been taken out of their sails by these developments. Nevertheless, the "Independence Front" were swift to extend a formal welcome

The Right Honourable
Harold MacMillan, P.C., M.P.,
etc. etc. etc.,
Foreign Office.
to the declaration of the N.U.P. for complete independence. Their official communiqué however, reported in my telegram No. 77 of April 8, and in which can be detected the hand of Sayed Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub, independent leader of the Opposition, included the suggestion that the next step should be the conclusion by both sides in Parliament of a "national charter to secure complete independence and full sovereignty for the Sudan .... to work through constitutional means and through Parliament to eliminate self-determination ....". This has been echoed by Sayed Mubarak Zarroug (but not yet officially accepted by the N.U.P.), and also by the Independence Republican Party led by Sayed Mirghani Hamza.

5. The proposal, which amounts to the suppression of the provisions of Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February 12, has been canvassed before. By its adoption the Opposition would hope to thwart any Egyptian plans which there might be to manipulate the election or the decisions of the Constituent Assembly; and there is the further consideration that it would enable the risk of defeat at elections of Sayed Abdel-Rahman's adherents to be avoided. Such a defeat might so fan the flames of sectarian strife, which are never quite extinguished, as to bring about a serious threat to security and the stability of the new Sudanese state. Sayed Ismail el-Azhari is unlikely to be moved by considerations of the feelings of Sayed Abdel-Rahman and the Umma politicians in this; but he realizes in his own mind in effective control of the country, together with memories of the riot on March 1, 1954 and possible fears of another and more serious Ansar demonstration, might incline him eventually to support a programme which would reduce this risk. Up to date, however, he has stood firmly for the execution of all provisions of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement; and I should myself expect him to hold to this line.

6. The N.U.P. evidently feel themselves the stronger for having taken the plunge, and their leaders are being careful to keep on the right side of Sayed Ali Mirghani, who is assumed to welcome it. There is a marked wave of anti-Egyptian feeling in the party, of which evidence is provided by the action taken to suppress the Egyptian-sponsored paper "El-Telegraph" and to arrange for the censorship of Egyptian plays and sketches performed here. If any further indication of Egyptian motives and heavy-handedness in the Sudan had been required to clinch opinion against them, it was provided by the manner in which the Egypto-Sudanese talks on the Nile waters were broken off in Cairo, and by the insults to which a Sudanese minister was then treated.

7. But it should not be supposed that the Egyptians will take their latest defeat in the Sudan lying down. There are persistent rumours that they are still trying to launch a new pro-Unity party, and indications that they are once more trying to inflame Southern opinion by spreading tales of British intrigues. Sayed Buth Diu and other opposition Southerners have already published a statement calling for a constitutional link with Egypt, which would, they hope, bring Egyptian finance for the development of the South. But the greatest setback to Egyptian ambitions in the Sudan was the removal of General Neguib from power. However desirable this may have been for internal Egyptian reasons it has entirely, and probably irrevocably, altered the attitude of most Sudanese to the
present Egyptian régime. With Sayed el-Azhari and the N.U.P. now publicly committed to a pro-independence line the Egyptians will need greater subtlety than they have yet shown here if their cause is to make headway.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Washington, to the Head of the British Middle East Office and to the Secretariat at Entebbe.

I have the honour to be
with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

[Signature]
The attached record by Sir Knox Helm of his discussions with Egyptian leaders in Cairo is interesting. As usual, however, I think we must treat Salah Salem’s words (in paragraph 2) with considerable circumspection. This is especially true when one compares what he said to Sir Knox Helm with recent Cairo broadcasts to the Sudan, some of them made by Salah Hilal, Salah Salem's mouthpiece.

2. Salah Salem told Sir Knox Helm that the Sudan was very far from being one country and that there was no sense of unity in it. Cairo radio has recently been saying quite the opposite and that because the Sudan was one country, that was why the Egyptians insisted on the use of the phrase "one integral whole" in Article 12 of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement.

3. Salah Salem expatiated also on acute animosity which still existed between the Ansar and Khattia. On March 23 Cairo radio broadcast an article published in El Telegraff, an E.P. newspaper backed by the Egyptians, in which it was alleged that the Ansar were training on Abo Island a large body of armed supporters and were enrolling others throughout the Sudan. They were armed with Tommy-guns and ready to carry out any orders; blacklists of people to be dealt with were now being prepared. In a commentary the following day Salah Hilal referred to this report at length and said that "the secret of the Umma Party’s demand for immediate evacuation of foreign troops from the Sudan has now been revealed. They want evacuation while the security forces are not yet ready, so that they can declare war and fight their battles without opposition, spreading anarchy and chaos." It would seem from this broadcast that the reason why Salah Salem is worried about strife between the Ansar and the Khattia is the fact that his own propaganda is intended precisely to stir up trouble between the two sects.

4. The one theme which runs throughout this record is the paramount importance in Sudanese-Egyptian affairs of the development of the Nile Valley and in particular the importance to Egypt of the construction of the High Aswan Dam. It would seem that the Egyptians were only interested in the Sudan from the point of view of Egypt’s water requirements.

5. In paragraph 3 of the record Salah Salem is alleged to have said that Egypt does not want union with the Sudan. This is a little difficult to believe in the light of Cairo radio's persistent propaganda on the subject but perhaps a recent broadcast excerpt from a leader in El Telegraff gives the explanation. The excerpt said "but how could Egypt rule the Sudan? It could only do so if our campaign was not for union, but for unity. If union..."
Minutes.

were effected, it would be a freely agreed union between the two governments."

J.W.G. Ridd.

(J.W.G. Ridd)
April 15, 1955.

Member of Shalbourn
would wish to send a brief line of thanks to
Sir Ken Hale.

D81 submitted July 1295.
GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
KHARTOUM.


I have thought it worth while recording the substance of the talks which I had in Cairo with Colonel Nasser, Major Salah Salem and Dr. Pawzi.

I don't think there is anything very new in this record, but you may like to have the enclosed copy of it for what it is worth.

I am sending copies of the record also to Ralph Stevenson, Jack Sterndale Bennett and Adams.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

C.A.S. Shuckburgh, Esq., CMG.
The Foreign Office,
LONDON, S. W. 1.

JRS
It is a measure of the failure of Egyptian (and notably of Salah Salem's) policy in the Sudan that the Sudanese party which won the election on a pro-Egyptian ticket should have moved completely away from the policy of union with Egypt, and should now be advocating Sudanese independence on almost exactly the lines we ourselves favour. One hears a lot from British ex-Sudan officials and others of the immaturity of the Sudanese and their inability to stand on their own feet, but my impression is that Ahmed and his friends have shown a remarkable skill and good sense. The programme they now advocate, including as it does closer relations with Egypt on matters of common concern (notably the Nile waters) is most sensible and encouraging.

[Handwritten note]

Sir, 

Ministry of External Affairs, 8th April

We understand that you may soon be in Khartoum, 

It is encouraging news; and you might mention it to the M.P.E.C. if there is a meeting. 

Chadwick

[Handwritten signature]

FM. 11/4

[Handwritten note]

1106-13 Jan by 14/11, 14/11, 14/11

[Handwritten note]

Dr. G. J. Garrow
On my way through Cairo I dined, on March 23rd., with Major Salah Salem, the Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, and was received on March 24th by Colonel Nasser, the Prime Minister-President, and Dr. Fawzi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. From Alexandria to Aswan the Egyptian authorities were obviously at great pains to facilitate our journey and showed us every attention.

The dinner with Major Salah Salem took place at the Officers' Club. We dined at small tables of four, the other two at the host's table being the Indonesian Ambassador, and a Secretary of the Indian Embassy (the Ambassador was visiting Khartoum). Before dinner Major Salah Salem and I had half an hour's conversation à deux. After various complimentary remarks during which he expressed satisfaction at what I had said to the press correspondents at Alexandria, he said that the decisive moment as regards the Sudan was immediately ahead. He seemed much concerned about public order. The Sudan Defence Force was very weak - it consisted of only some five thousand men who for all practical purposes were without arms or equipment; and they would be alone on the withdrawal of the British and Egyptian forces. I mentioned the police. He said that the police were better, but that they also were quite inadequate for such a large area. Moreover the fact was that the Sudan was very far from being one country. It consisted of many races and peoples, and there was no sense of unity. The North and the South were entirely different. Not only so, but differences were everywhere, i.e.-between East and West as well as between North and South. At the very best it would require fifty years to weld the Sudan into a nation; and even then that would only be possible if the control at the top were right. Major Salah Salem went on to enlarge on the acute animosity between the Ansar and the Khatmias. If either were to form a government the other would refuse to recognise it and would go to extreme lengths to defeat it.

Major Salah Salem said that this matter of control was the real problem confronting us in the Sudan. The problem was not whether the Sudan should have independence or some kind of union with Egypt. The acute internal differences would operate in either event. As regards union with Egypt he said that Egypt did not want union. Nor did any Egyptian want union in the sense of one state, one government, one administration, or one army. Egypt had her own difficulties, and could not think of adding to these the problems of a poor divided Sudan.

Having said this, Major Salah Salem continued that though Egypt did not want union, common interests must be co-ordinated. The principal of these was the matter of the Nile Waters (see below). The second was defence. There was no question of a common or joint army (the relative numbers, 170,000 and 5,000, put that out of the question anyway), but that did not rule out
the co-ordination of defence interests. Egypt had, for
instance, made co-ordinating arrangements with some of
the Arab States. Yet these states were completely
independent, and their independence had not been weakened
thereby. The third common interest was Foreign Affairs.
In this field he seemed to claim that considerable progress
had already been made in the direction of co-ordination.
I forebore from asking him to develop this point.

It was about this stage that we went into
dinner, when the talk was, of course, more general, with
the Indian Secretary going in for compliments and such-like,
which I personally found quite revolting. So far as this
minute is concerned, the only subject worth mentioning
was that of the Nile Waters, regarding which Major Salah
Salem expatiated at great length with much talk about the
necessity for the High Aswan dam. He quoted many figures,
some of which did not sound to me very convincing, but the
burden of his remarks was that the Nile Waters question
was vital, and that the High Aswan dam must go on. (When
at Aswan I was taken to the Irrigation Department offices
- which I had known in 1918 when I was defending the dam
from zeppelin attack! - and there saw an office full of
plans, etc., devoted to the High Dam. Mr. Duncan, who
accompanied me, was surprised at the evidence this gave
of advanced preparations).

Major Salah Salem was going to a meeting of
the Revolutionary Council, so I took leave immediately
dinner was over. As he took me downstairs to my car he
repeated very earnestly that the question of control was
all important. Anglo-Egyptian relations were now on an
excellent footing, and it was necessary that the Sudan
should have good relations with both countries. If only
the United Kingdom and Egypt would get together all would
be well. I gently pointed out to him that this was a
matter for the two Governments, and rather outside my
sphere. He agreed that this was so, but to my mind there
was no doubt about his concern in regard to the future
of the Sudan.

Next morning I was with Colonel Nasser for
half an hour. He was most friendly, and though I took
the opportunity of thanking him for my appointment, he
made no attempt to discuss Sudan affairs. For the most
part he talked about Egypt's ambitious development
programmes, particularly in the direction of education,
public health and so on, but carefully avoided any
mention of the Nile Waters question. He did, however,
speak enthusiastically of the improvement in Anglo-
Egyptian relations and of the way in which the Suez Canal
Base agreement was being carried out. He said that the
Egyptian Government had been encouraging the British
contractors not to confine their interest to the Suez
Canal area, but to have a look at other parts of Egypt
as well.

Dr. Fawzi had been at Major Salah Salem's
dinner party, but I had been given no opportunity for
more than an exchange of compliments with him. When I
called on him, he, like the other two, was extremely
friendly. He also spoke most warmly about developments
in the Canal area. He then turned to the Sudan and said
that in his view there were two questions of real
importance. The first was the necessity for what he
called the atmosphere and the mechanics of the elections
being right. He thought that if the United Kingdom and
Egyptian Governments could ensure this, the outcome
would be reasonably happy. The other question, and obviously
the one to which he attached the greater importance, was
that of the Nile Waters. Like Major Salah Salem, he said
that it was vital for Egypt. He went on to say, however,
and later to repeat it, that Egypt would not be unreasonable
in this question. It was no good Egypt or the Sudan setting
out to impose a solution on the other. But agreement was
urgent, and the question must be tackled in a practical
way and in a spirit of mutual accommodation. If this
were done he had no doubt that an agreement could be
reached which would be satisfactory to both parties. It
seemed to me that his language was something of an appeal
that either I myself should try to induce the Sudanese to
moderate their demands, or that I should suggest to H.M.G.
that they should do so. As with the others, however, I
confined myself to the role of listener.

In general my reception was extremely friendly,
and the three Ministers were unanimous in either expressing
or hinting at their desire to work closely with H.M.G.
At the same time there was, as I have stated, no doubt
about Major Salah Salem's personal concern.

In Cairo I informed Her Majesty's Ambassador
and Sir John Sterndale-Bennett of the substance of the
foregoing.

Governor-General's Office,
Khartoum.
29th March, 1955.
GG/9781.

JRS.
FOREIGN OFFICE, W.1.

April 27, 1955.

(CO 1058/35)

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Knox,

Many thanks for the account in your letter CO.97.B.I. of March 31 of your short stay in Cairo, which I was very glad to have and which the Minister of State has also read with interest.

We were particularly interested in Salah Salem's remark that Egypt does not want union with the Sudan. Some recent Egyptian broadcasts to the Sudan, about which we have asked Cairo to protest, have been advocating a contrary view. They have been claiming that a united Sudan and Egypt would be able to carry the flame of freedom and independence to the colonised territories in the rest of Africa.

The Egyptians keep on bringing up the question of internal differences in the Sudan and expressing their concern about the possibility of strife. In this they may not be entirely disinterested. We know of course that there is not complete harmony between Southerners and Northerners in the Sudan and that sectarian differences remain, but we do not have the impression that these problems are particularly acute at the present time.

The question of the division of Nile waters in the context of the High Aswan Dam project is a knotty one. The idea of arbitration is in many people's minds and Adams has written to me about it. We are looking into the possibilities now; the trouble is that even if we can find an impartial body willing to take on this ungrateful task it may take a long time to carry out, since it would, I presume, involve a survey of Nile waters and have to take into account the interests of our East African territories and possibly of Ethiopia.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Ralph Stevenson, Sterndale Bennett, and Adams.

Yours ever,

(O.A.B. Shuckburgh)

Sir Alexander Knox Holm, O.B.E., K.C.M.G.,
Khartoum.
My dear Evelyn,

The necessity of turning aside to Beirut in connexion with the problem of tuberculosis among the Arab refugees has prevented me from writing to you earlier about my recent visit to the Sudan.

2. My purpose in going to the Sudan was to learn, not to report. The whole visit, after all, lasted only ten days. In the course of it there was a railway strike and, for quite different and technical reasons, all the Dove aircraft which provide the internal services were grounded. My movements were consequently circumscribed. Mostly I was in Khartoum and, although I did manage to get to Barakat and the Sennar Dam and also to Port Sudan, I cannot claim to have had more than a rapid and restricted view. Nevertheless, it may be useful to pass on to you some impressions and reflections.

3. My first and major impression was the emotional approach of the Sudanese towards the question of relations with Egypt and the United Kingdom; and the apparent strength of present feeling against Egypt and the correspondingly favourable attitude towards ourselves. This sounds very nice but has its dangers and, as I shall try to show, is no ground for passive self-satisfaction on our part.

4. I admit that in Khartoum I was inclined to make some allowance for wishful thinking when I was told about this markedly anti-Egyptian trend; and it was chance conversations with non-political Sudanese in the course of my visit to the Gezira which convinced me and clarified to some extent the reasons. In the course of this visit I met Sudanese whose work was connected with the Sennar Dam. I also met two senior Sudanese doctors who explained to me the magnitude and the daily difficulties of the Public Health problems which they had to tackle. Lastly, there was the Gezira scheme itself where the need for continuing British help is most apparent and where the resignations and impending departure of the majority of the British technical personnel have come as a considerable local shock.

5. In what was said to me by Sudanese in the Gezira (with the exception of Mekki Abbas who, though betraying his anxiety, was not so out-spoken) the general theme was the same - their eyes had now been opened as regards Egypt and surely we were not misled by talk but must realise their need for help. I had the thankless task of explaining as gently as I could the practical difficulties at the present time and the primary need for the Sudanese themselves to decide what they wanted their future to be.

6.

C.A.E. Shuckburgh, Esq., C.B., C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
C.W.I.
6. The mood as regards Egypt seemed to be a compound of two elements:

(a) a vague feeling that the Egyptians had led the Sudanese "up the garden path" by spurring them on to cast off the British connexion, with consequences of which they are only just beginning to understand the realities; and

(b) a resentment against Egypt for what they regard as her overbearing and selfish attitude in the matter of the Nile waters.

7. A thing which struck me very forcibly is the ultimate dependence of the economic life of the country, or, at all events, of the heart of it which lies between Atbara, Khartoum, Sennar and Kassala, upon a relatively few competent and conscientious technicians. I cannot of course speak about the railways as I got no chance to go to Atbara. But I am thinking of the men who actually control the flow of the Nile waters, whose canals are kept free of weeds, that the ground is cleared and the old plants are burnt when the crop has been gathered in the cotton fields, or keep the machinery of the ginning factories going. It was clear, for instance, that with the loss of his British field staff and, above all, of his British engineers, Mekki Abbas, on whom the actual management of the Gezira scheme will devolve, was a very worried man. Insufficient trained Sudanese are available to take over, and competent foreign substitutes for the British are going to be very difficult to find and much more expensive. Also politics (not merely Communist manoeuvres but the ordinary Sudanese party politics) threaten increasingly to invade every sphere of the work of the Board - social development and marketing, as well as the management of the whole enterprise as an agricultural concern; and it will be much more difficult for a purely Sudanese management to resist politics than it has been for the British. Altogether I could not help feeling that the future of the Gezira scheme was somewhat precarious; and the question I was bound to ask myself was whether even now we could not fill the need for a few new men to help to keep it going.

8. As regards the Nile waters, there is clearly a rankling sense of injustice. Egypt may have a strong case in theory based on her growing population, her acquired rights, and the limited amount of water which the Sudan could in fact use in 1929 or can in fact use now. But it is hard for the Sudanese to understand why Egyptian needs should come first, or why the White Nile should in effect be reserved for the use of Egypt while the Sudan must be content with the Blue. I listened to a very interesting argument on all this between a British irrigation engineer and a Sudanese agricultural official. It was clear from that that it will take a lot to convince the Sudanese that their interests were not sacrificed in the 1929 Agreement between ourselves and Egypt, and they find it hard to understand that the High Aswan Dam scheme should have gone so far as it has regardless of the Sudanese and yet that the Sudanese cannot proceed with their Roseires Dam on the Blue Nile without first obtaining Egyptian agreement. The Sudan official ended the argument by saying that what the British engineer said about Egyptian rights and international practice might be rational/
rational. But the Roseires Dam had become a national aspiration which the Sudanese were determined to realise. Quite independently of this, the Sudanese engineer who took me over the Sennar Dam, spontaneously remarked that when the Sudan got her independence she would take what Nile waters she liked and the Egyptians would only get what was left over. I am only recording isolated scraps of evidence. But from these and other conversations it was quite clear that those Sudanese who think about Nile waters are looking to us to see that they get what they think is fair play.

9. You will see now why I said earlier that the present favourable attitude towards ourselves has its dangers. However ardently the Sudanese may want self-determination, they are no more ready than other people in this part of the world to stand entirely on their own feet, and they still look to us to help them in spite of themselves. The story that we have made some sort of bargain with the Egyptians by which in exchange for the continuation of the Suez Canal Base we are giving the Egyptians a free hand in the Sudan, dies hard. We can hardly avoid some of the stigma attaching to the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement. Furthermore, though the resignation of so many officials and technicians who are not being Sudanised is understandable enough to us who realise all the factors involved, the Sudanese look at the matter subjectively.

10. The upshot of all this is that the present friendly feelings might easily turn to bitterness and resentment. The question is whether we mind about this. Personally I think we ought to. I do not believe that we can afford to wash our hands of the Sudan. It is too big a slice of Africa; its stability touches too nearly that of our own dependent territories further south. We have a considerable commercial interest; and, bearing in mind the importance of Africa in the defence of the Middle East, we cannot afford to ignore the strategic value of the Sudan as a reinforcement corridor and supply line, and therefore the importance of centres like Khartoum, Asaba and Port Sudan.

11. What most concerns me therefore is the obvious danger that the thread of our influence may be broken during the period which must yet elapse before the régime resulting from self-determination is set on the rails. This "interregnum" will be critical for our future connexion with the country. Even assuming a transition without violent upsets, a considerable period may elapse between the withdrawal of our troops and the completion of the various constitutional stages before the Condominium is finally dissolved. During that period the direct connexion, at least in the Sudan itself, between our military authorities and the Sudan Defence Force will completely disappear and other influences may get a strong foothold. The R.A.F. staging and overflying rights will hang on a precarious thread (I will write separately on this point) and even the position of the Governor-General as Commander-in-Chief may apparently not be maintained. Most of the British element in the Administration and the nationalised undertakings will have gone. Apart from the small remainder, our links will be reduced to the Governor-General himself and his minute personal staff, the very small and restricted United Kingdom Trade Commission, and the British commercial community. During this time it is fair to suppose/
suppose that, even if the Egyptians have given up the idea of union, they will use every means, including money, to maintain their influence and bring into being a régime favourable to their interest and amenable to their control. It is certain also that the Communists will feel no compunction in exploiting all the difficulties of this formative period and it is of particular interest that the Czechoslovak Government should have applied at this precise moment to establish a Czech Liaison mission in Khartoum. This should be noted in relation to the recent Czech Trade Mission to the Sudan, the Czech industrial exhibition in Cairo, and the proposal for a visit by Sudanese Defence Force officers to armament factories in Czechoslovakia among other countries.

12. During this period the task of maintaining British prestige will be no easy one but it is, I suggest, important that every effort be made to maintain it against the time when, as we hope, Sudanese independence is achieved and we are free to work back into the position which, to my mind, our long-term interests demand. It will of course have to be a new position built up primarily in the cultural and commercial spheres and not directly in those of politics and strategy. But even in the cultural and commercial spheres we may then find that we have been left behind in the race by the influx of various other foreign influences in official and technical capacities during the "interregnum". What we can then do may depend on what technical and financial assistance we can provide; and I do not think we should be dismayed by the dilemma which Her Majesty's Government may find in providing such assistance. It may be a question of giving the necessary impetus and encouragement to British financial houses and consultants.

13. The immediate question is how best we can guard against the thread of our influence being broken, and how best we can prepare the ground during the "interregnum" for an eventual "come back" if independence is achieved.

14. It seems to me that in the next eighteen months or so we shall have to be prepared to give such help as we can to the Sudan in the peculiar special circumstances, principally in the matter of seeing fair play over the Nile waters, but not ruling out the possibility of helping to find new technicians. I am not suggesting that we shall win ourselves any special gratitude for any help that we may be able to give, I would rather put it that failure to give reasonable help may produce positive ill-will for the future; and in regard to the Nile waters I would suggest that it is not at this stage, at all events, a question so much of advising the Sudanese to work for good and close co-operation with Egypt, as of inducing the Egyptians to put forward the sort of propositions which the Sudanese can be reasonably expected to accept.

15. But while we should be prepared to help where we can, it seems to me that our primary objective during this difficult eighteen months should be to maintain and build up the maximum friendship and goodwill between ourselves and the Sudanese in the Sudan.

16. There is one matter on which we may easily start off on the wrong foot. It relates to the disposal of
land, installations, equipment and stores when the military and R.A.F. contingents withdraw. I am not going into details in this letter but I do hope that we shall not get ourselves bogged down in one of those hopeless haggles over pounds, shillings and pence. I know that this may seem from the Treasury angle a very dry and lofty attitude to adopt. But perhaps our Egyptian experience will have taught us that once we are definitely on the way out (and in the Sudan there can be no haggling about that) we really have no bargaining power. The other side simply has to wait for some of the prize at all events to fall into its lap. From what I could gather the Sudanese Defence Force are expecting us to be generous (as the Egyptians will probably be) and I suggest it would be wise to make a virtue a necessity instead of trying to drive any hard bargains. I am only concerned at the moment with general principles but I cannot help feeling that in these financial wrangles we tend to lose sight of the issues at stake. The figures involved may seem important at the time but are very little as compared with the goodwill which we may be throwing away; and the argument is only too liable to result in our having to give way in the end.

17. I mention this particular point because it may make a good deal of difference between a good or a bad wicket for those who are left to uphold British influence. They will clearly need the best wicket they can get to start on. From that moment the most important thing I suggest is what I may call the "nursing" of personal contacts. It seems to me, if I may say so, that in this field the Governor-General, by the very nature of his activities and entirely within the limits of his constitutional rôle, is bound to be the United Kingdom's greatest asset. What needs consideration is how his achievements can be supplemented by the efforts of the U.K. Trade Commission and of the British commercial community in spheres perhaps more open to them than to the Governor-General and his personal staff.

18. The question of the future establishment of the U.K. Trade Commission is one which I suggest ought to be given urgent consideration. The difficulties of adding to this staff and widening their functions at the present moment are obvious enough. The office is under close scrutiny; its activities are suspect in some quarters and we must expect continued agitation, like that recently inspired by the Communists, for the abolition of the office in the name of the "free and neutral atmosphere". Moreover, any increase in the office or its functions has to be considered in the light of possible increases in its Egyptian counterpart. I discussed the question both with Philip Adams and with Luce and it seems from these discussions that the proper moment to expand the office may not come until and unless the future Sudanese Constituent Assembly has taken its first decision of principle in the sense of opting for independence. From that moment we shall have to start thinking about an eventual diplomatic mission in the Sudan and it will not be unreasonable to start building up to what we want. These things take time however and what I would suggest is that we should begin forthwith to consider what staff we should require so that there will be no delay in providing it as soon as/
as those on the spot judge this to be appropriate. Meanwhile I would like to emphasise—quite apart from political obstacles—the obvious limitations on what can physically be done even under favourable conditions in a huge country like the Sudan by a Mission of which the executive staff consists, apart from its Head, of only one diplomatic secretary, one commercial secretary and an information officer with an assistant.

19. We must not however overlook the very important part which, with guidance and encouragement, the British commercial community may be capable of playing. British enterprises may not be very numerous but some of them (e.g. "Shell", "I.C.I." and the banks) are potentially of considerable influence and some of the heads, I understand, have the right ideas about building up relations with the Sudanese on a basis of mutual interest and partnership. With their help and with that of their commercial counterparts in the United Kingdom and of our various academic and cultural authorities, we ought I suggest to be able to make something of what is at present admittedly a not very pleasing or reassuring picture, having regard to our great past in the Sudan. Might it not therefore be desirable to discuss the whole problem in confidence with the heads of the community and with their principals in London with a view to building up a common effort and directing it with due regard to aims, opportunities and discretion, and the careful selection of staffs to match these things.

20. I realise that in writing in this way I am inviting the criticism of pontificating on the strength of a mere "Cook's tour". What I have tried to do, however, is to bring out some of the problems which, as I see the situation, have to be faced; and what I have written will naturally run the gauntlet of the comments and criticisms of those on the spot.

21. I am sending copies of this letter "Personal and Secret" to Knox Helm, Philip Adams and Ralph Stevenson.

Yours ever,

[Signature]

P.S. It was after the above was drafted that I received telegrams Nos. 64 and 65 from the Governor-General's Office to the Foreign Office, from which it appears that even the Trade Commission may not survive in its present form as one of the points of influence during the "interregnum". I have sent off a suggestion on that particular point in my telegram No. 116 and have felt it best to leave the present letter unchanged.
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

April 27, 1955.

My dear being,

Many thanks for your letter No. 10172/2/59 of March 30 about your recent visit to the Sudan. You may like to have a few immediate thoughts on some of your comments and suggestions about the problems facing the Sudanese and our future relations with the Sudan.

2. What we have been told by the Sudan Agency here bears out your remarks on the difficulties facing the Gezira scheme as British technical personnel leave as a result of Sudanisation. I fear, however, that for the moment at least, your suggestion that we should perhaps even now fill the need for a few men to keep the scheme going, is not practicable. The Sudan Gezira Board's Sudanisation scheme is not specifically designed, like the main process of Sudanisation, to create a "free and neutral atmosphere" in the Gezira, but to give the posts now British-held to Sudanese who are waiting to take them. At present the Board is recruiting some extra advisers from India and Pakistan and is looking to the United Nations for technical help. Nevertheless should the Board eventually turn to us for help we would willingly give it. Until they do there is no point in our pressing offers upon them. Such action on our part would make nonsense of their Sudanisation scheme.

3. It appears that the Sudanese Council of Ministers are quite alive to the danger of having too close an association with the Czechoslovak Government. According to our information a Czech request for a liaison officer in Khartoum has not yet been submitted. In any case the Sudanese Prime Minister has told the Governor-General that the Council of Ministers would not agree to such an appointment. In addition the Sudanese Government have now decided that their military mission shortly to tour Europe is to visit France instead of Czechoslovakia.

4. As regards paragraph 19 of your letter, I think that it would be extremely difficult to co-ordinate the influence of British commercial undertakings successfully. Probably the most we could do would be to encourage firms to remain in the Sudan or to develop their interests there and this we will discuss with the Treasury and Board of Trade. On the other hand, we have for some time been considering the question of economic aid to the Sudan. The problem is that it is a question of priorities for limited resources.

5. We have been giving some thought here to what our future requirements for diplomatic representation will be but until the Constituent Assembly has made its choice of future status for the Sudan we will not know for certain our exact requirements. Meanwhile we will keep the suggestion in paragraph 18 of your letter in our minds.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Knox Helm, Ralph Stevenson and Adams.

Yours ever,

(G.A.E. Shuckburgh)

Sir John Sterndale-Bennett, K.C.M.G., M.C.,
British Middle East Office,
Nicosia.
MINUTES

Page 3: We should soon be in position to go to the Egyptians with proposals for the International Commission and the withdrawal of troops.

The only way in which the Commission could be really strong would be to ensure that the Egyptians accept a truly neutral commission with no power to judge and to place a fair amount of power and responsibility on its shoulders. In such a way the power of reference rests which we sent to Cairo and which seem to me to meet the issue. We should perhaps try to hold a ground on that clause which would give the Commission power to reverse the Egyptian laws and stop the process of self-determination if and when situation demanded it.

J.W.P. Reid
MK Reader 14/6
J.B.R. 14/6

References to former relevant papers

References to later relevant papers

47524
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

C.A.E. Shuckburgh Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

THE PALACE
KHARTOUM

28th April 1955.

Prompted by your personal letter of April 12, I may as well let you have some more random thoughts before we leave for the south on May 5. We fly to Wau, trek for over two weeks to Moroko, Tambura, Ezo, Yambio, Maridi, Yei, Juba, Torit, Gilo and back to Juba, whence we return here by river steamer. We should be back about May 30. The whole thing ought to be great fun though already I see that it's going to be quite a job to keep the programme within limits remotely reasonable for one of my age. On our return we plan to be here till June 17 when we leave for the Red Sea hills before taking ship from Port Sudan for Genoa on July 1. From about July 17 you can shoot as many questions at me as you like.

I have now almost completed five weeks here and I may say at once that my impressions are more favourable than I had expected them to be. First of all I like the place and, so far at least, both of us have kept well. Secondly, like many before us, we like the Sudanese, and I think they like us. We have met many and quite a lot have been to the house. They are more cultured than I had expected and entertaining them is much easier than our experience in some capitals, not least Ankara where such a thing as dinner talk could be, and often was, very hard work. These people do play the ball and don't just stop it dead. Thirdly, the depression which weighed with the entire British community, official and business, is weakening. This could be ascribed to the fact that many of the Government people have gone. This is probably so up to a point i.e. the shock caused by the summary cutting of so many careers. But I believe that there is an improved spirit even among those still on the way out and it has interested me to hear many of them say that conditions today are so much better than they would have believed possible a year ago.

I cannot judge whether this improved morale has affected the British business community of whom I have made a point of seeing a good deal. Anyway they seem to me a particularly good lot and I think they are in good heart. They realize that the future of British interests here is largely in their hands, and I am quietly doing what I can within the limits open to me to encourage them to lay firm foundations for the new British social order here. Actually I am surprised that they are as numerous as they are - some 120 males in all and - of course unlike Turkey with its poor Maltese and others - all of them in good jobs. Incidentally their employers - Barclays and the Ottoman Bank, Shell, Gellatly Hankey etc. - are far from blind to their well-being and liberal annual leave, with journeys paid, is more the rule than the exception. (I have no axe to grind with Roddie)

/Barclay
Barclay in saying this).

So far as I can make out, the community's only real concern at the moment arises from the slow (almost non-existent) market for Sudan cotton. Nearly a quarter of last year's crop is still unsold and the new season's crop is hardly moving. The banks, and particularly Barclays, are quite heavily involved and credit is seriously extended. Also there is a strain on the government's ready money resources which of course affects business generally. The budget's assistance to Lancashire may help but a good deal will depend on the surplus cotton policy of the United States which has still to be declared. Actually, and provided the present stocks (lying mainly at Port Sudan) can be liquidated at a fair price without undue delay, the present stringency may prove a good thing, for if this Government had taken over control in anything like the boom conditions of 1951-2 they would hardly have been humane if they had not embarked on extravagant schemes which would have brought quick retribution under less exceptional conditions. As it is I am told by Gemichael that there should be no early danger of anything resembling a financial breakdown.

Meanwhile Parliament has risen, Azhari is half way through his Asiatic tour, and there is little in the political field that I can add to what Luce wrote to Bromley in his letter No. GG/36.13.3 of April 22nd. It seemed to me that the general picture emerging from Adams' reports - largely perhaps because they had to be pot boilers to satisfy the Department's apparent appetite for hot news - required some correction if a somewhat misleading impression was not to be created in your minds. I have no doubt that the vast majority of Sudanese want independence without strings attached, but I am far from thinking that it is all over bar the shouting. The key to future developments, if not to the self-determination issue itself, lies with the Egyptians and here all the indications are that they are going to use it. It is true that Nasser is reported to have told Azhari at Bandung that Egypt would respect the wishes of the Sudanese. But so far as Egyptian and particularly Zulfacar's activities here are concerned that would seem to apply only if these wishes were union with Egypt. The details are in Luce's letter and I wont repeat them, but apart from Zulfacar's apparent successes the press - a strange collection of eight dailies with circulations varying between 1000 and 14,300 - that there are serious divisions in the N.U.P. and that Zulfacar is playing hard on these. It would be nice to think that Azhari will pull things together when he gets back on May 17. But I am not inclined to put much money on that - not so long as Salah Salem is in charge of Sudan Affairs in Cairo and Zulfacar is their man here.

Probably it is a question of how far the Egyptians are prepared to go. I am sure myself that it would be playing into their hands if the Sudanese were to press for the modification of the self-determination procedure laid down in the Agreement. I am therefore glad that less has been heard of this idea in the past fortnight. An odd drop of cold water here and there may have helped.
That does not however answer the question. My fear is that the Egyptians will not readily accept defeat and that they will put all they've got into influencing the election of the Constituent Assembly and its members after their election. If these efforts were successful and the Sudanese were faced with a fait accompli in the shape of a union which they did not want, serious trouble would almost certainly follow. If on the other hand the final decision went against them and even if (which is most unlikely) they accepted it with the best grace possible, there would at the very best have been so much stirring up of the waters that they would take a long time to settle down. And the very best is seldom attainable in this world.

The question therefore inevitably arises of what H.M.G. should or could do about it. That is one for you people to answer. A fairly obvious course, in view of the improved relations with Egypt, would be an appeal to Cairo to behave and to allow the Sudanese a fair run. You can judge the prospects of the success of that better than I can, but I should be surprised if you rated them very high.

My own feeling is that the best hope lies in the international commission being really strong and in its being established here at the earliest possible date after the passing of the self-determination resolution. Assuming the latter in late August that would mean the Commission's arrival by mid-September. A period of two months between the Commission's arrival and the elections for the Constituent Assembly would be no more than enough for them to settle down, see something of the country and familiarize themselves with their problem. I do not for a moment suggest that the Commission's presence would be decisive but it ought at least to act as a brake on Egyptian antics and at the worst it could show these up to the world.

Mid-September is however not far away and the season is summer at that. To us therefore it looks as if you ought to be moving quickly if you are to get agreement with the Egyptians and the members of the Commission appointed and here in time. Moreover an early approach to the Egyptians might reveal something of their intentions and that in itself would be useful. The same applies to the suggestion we have made for the early coordination with Cairo of arrangements for the departure of the troops during the ninety day period following the self-determination resolution. Though it may cause inconvenience to our Army people I earnestly hope that things will be so arranged that the interval between the departure of the main British and the main Egyptian contingent will be reduced to a minimum.

This letter has become 'heavier' and longer than I intended at the beginning. I haven't even got a mildly amusing tailpiece. But I hope that in a talk I had with Azhari before his departure I nipped one dangerous idea in the bud. Strikes have become a very popular pastime in the Sudan since the government-sponsored visit a few years ago of a not very happily chosen British trade unionist. This week hospital nurses and gardeners as well as others have been out for limited periods, fixed in advance, but for reasons about which they are much less clear. Normally everything passes off quietly and nobody seems to mind much. Periodical four
days paralysis of the railways - they've had two in six weeks - is however more serious especially as it extends to river traffic and to the railway (practically only) hotels. Moreover the railwaymen are well-paid. So the Government are concerned and Azhari had apparently conceived the notion of using the Sudan Defence Force to keep things moving during such periods. He stressed that the S.D.F. personnel would of course be withdrawn immediately the strikers had completed their demonstration and returned to work. I hope I said enough to convince Azhari that he'd better forget that one.

M. 

[Signature]
Dear Tom,

I had a long talk with Abdullah Bey Khalil on April 26. He took a fairly calm view of the situation but said that the new methods the Egyptians were using for bribery and the scale on which they were now operating could constitute a very grave danger. However there was no doubt he thought that virtually the whole "public opinion" was now solidly for independence and there could be no going back.

2. I think he is right in the sense that the bulk of the electorate seem to have made it clear to their representatives that they want an independent Sudan. But things here are such that these representatives are easily swayed, and as you know some of them have never had any scruples at all about changing sides. Abdullah Bey thought that the rank and file of the NUP were now "sound"; but their parliamentary leaders were all at sixes and sevens and the Egyptians were naturally exploiting this fact.

3. Abdullah Bey thought that the NUP ministers were likely to remain divided between themselves at least until Azhari's return. The Opposition had no intention of trying to exploit this except by exposing, at the due time, the traitorous links of certain ministers with Egypt.

4. I asked whether reports of the defection of Buth Diu and a bunch of Southerners were correct. Abdullah Bey said that Buth Diu had accepted money from the Egyptians and in fact sent him a note to say that he had been terribly short of cash and had felt obliged to take it. The money would not be spent in any way which could be injurious to the pro-independence cause and Buth Diu promised that when parliament re-assembled he and his followers would be in their usual places on the opposition side. Laughingly Abdullah Bey said that these Southerners always needed money and if they couldn't get it in one place they would take it in another; but their opinions could not be changed so easily. Perhaps S.A.R. has felt unable to continue to foot Buth Diu's beer bill; he is a powerful drinker as well as a powerful orator, and Abdullah Bey's story may be true.

5. He claimed that they had fairly good evidence that money was being brought in by Egyptian military aircraft and distributed by Egyptian officers; £E1,200 appeared to be the basic ration. One Southern politician, a friend of Buth Diu's, after receiving his ration had given a party in his house at Khartoum at which everyone got rather drunk.

T.E. Bromley Esq.,

Foreign Office,

Khartoum.

April 29, 1955.
Next morning £800 in cash had gone and the politician suspected his servants of stealing it. When he told Abdullah Bey the latter urged him at once to notify the police; after all £800 was a lot of money to lose no matter where it came from. The Southerner said he had no intention of reporting the incident to the authorities; he knew that if Buth Blu took him back to the Egyptian barracks the officer would make good the loss.

6. I asked about the proposed National Charter and what the Umma hoped to achieve by supporting it. He explained, as he has often done in the past, the dangers to the independence cause of allowing the self-determination process to include two more elections which might well be rigged by the Egyptians. The National Charter as published had been intended only as a draft which anyone was free to modify, and a first attempt at the formulation of a policy which might be acceptable to both sides. He admitted that there were slender hopes that the Egyptian Government would ever agree to an amendment of the 1953 Agreement which would in fact deprive them of possible advantages. But he hoped that if it proved impossible to suppress parts of the process laid down in the Agreement it might be possible at least to arrange for a national plebiscite. He hoped this could be fitted into the framework of the Agreement. He thought that world opinion would be impressed by the argument that a handful of politicians ought not to be given responsibility for deciding the fate of a nation of some 10 millions. If necessary the opposition would appeal to some member of UNO, perhaps India, to take up their cause.

7. Abdullah Bey said that attempts to get the two Sayeds together had failed and had now been given up for the time being. No one doubted Sayed All’s wish for an independent Sudan; but he was naturally afraid of losing ground to S.A.R. and for that reason would hold on to his Egyptian ally until the last moment. It had also been impossible to arrange for full co-operation with Mirghani Hamza; but he and his supporters were still firmly pro-independence and would be a useful force in parliament.

8. Abdullah Bey concluded by saying, as he has often before, that continued Egyptian interference (which was changing in character but increasing in degree) could only disrupt the administration here and lead eventually to bloodshed. He seemed to agree with my own belief that it may well be Egyptian policy to play for a breakdown in the Sudan which would delay self-determination and enable the Egyptians to move in in a big way at a later date if it suited them to do so. He seemed less inclined to think that, for quite different reasons, the communists, with whom his party are allied in the Independence Front, were also hoping for a breakdown.

9. I have found that Abdullah Bey tends to extremes of optimism and pessimism. This time he was more balanced than usual, and I am inclined to agree generally with his view of the situation. The underlying dangers, it seems to me, are that the power of their money is probably sufficient to enable the Egyptians to produce a result...
very different from that which the majority of Sudanese wish to see; and that the Opposition, in what they conceive to be a patriotic attempt to thwart Egyptian ambitions, may by ineptitude aggravate their effect.

10. I am sending copies of this letter to Garvey, Peck and Luce.

Yours ever,

Thos Adams

(P.G.D. Adams)
Sir,

In his letter 1039/15/55 of 10th April to you, and his despatch No. 15 of 15th April to the Secretary of State, Adams has commented on recent political developments in the Sudan. H. E. has suggested that I add some observations and highlight what appear to us to be the salient features of the present situation.

2. There is no evidence that the Sudanese Ministers who visited Cairo at the end of March came to any kind of agreement with the Egyptians about the future of the Sudan or were able to persuade them to accept the growing Sudanese demand for independence. On the contrary, since the publication of the N.U.P. statements of policy and the simultaneous breakdown of the Nile Waters discussions, the Egyptians have made the most strenuous efforts to undermine the position of the N.U.P. Leaders. Bribery of individual N.U.P. Members of Parliament, the creation of discord in the South and the encouragement of Southern "separatist" tendencies are their principal weapons. They have already had an appreciable measure of success. Ten Southern N.U.P. Li.Ps and 11 Southern Liberal Party M.Ps who previously supported the opposition have issued separate but almost identical statements calling for a constitutional link with Egypt, who, according to the statements, alone can help to develop the South. A number of M.Ps from both the eastern and western Sudan are also believed to have been persuaded into reverting to a link with Egypt. To achieve these results the Egyptians have dropped all pretence of subtlety, and have resorted to lavish and almost open bribery. A striking example is the case of Buth Diu, who was generally believed to be a man of strong principles; it is said more or less openly that he has already been given £E. 5,000 and, from his behaviour recently, he is certainly very much in funds. It is difficult to imagine the effect of temptation on this scale on a Southerner who only a few years ago was receiving £E. 3 monthly as a District Commissioner's servant. Once again it is being amply proved that the effects of Egyptian bribery in this country can be incalculable.

3. The Sudanese Council of Ministers are fully aware of these activities and, as leaders of the N.U.P., the Ministers are alive to the danger to their position. It is common knowledge, and has been openly declared in the Sudanese press, that Zulfacar, with the assistance of Siricio Iro, is the principal agent of Egyptian activity, and the acting Prime Minister, Ibrahim el Mufti, has told me that good proof of this can be found, and that the Council of Ministers (though as you will see from the next para, it cannot be unanimous) is seriously thinking of demanding Zulfacar's removal from the Governor-General's Commission. They are also considering other methods of curbing Egyptian activities.
4. There is no doubt of the strong resentment among the majority of the N.U.P. leaders against this latest Egyptian offensive, nor of their desire to counter it, but they are handicapped by the presence in their midst of a very active and determined fifth column headed by two Ministers and leading party men, Mohammed Nur el Din and Ibrahim el Mahallawi. In the absence of Azhari, not due back from Bandung, India and Pakistan until mid-May, Nur el Din, as Vice-President of the N.U.P., has issued a statement questioning the validity of the recent policy decisions of the N.U.P. Parliamentary Group and Executive Committee on the grounds that only the general assembly of the party can decide such matters. In the meantime, with Egyptian assistance, he and his supporters are doing all they can to swing the branch committees of the party back to a link with Egypt, in the hope that when the general assembly is called it will be possible to reverse the pro-independence movement in the N.U.P.

5. The obvious answer to these subversive activities would be to expel this fifth column from the Government and the Party. But in the eyes of the party bosses there are two difficulties about this; the danger that by splitting the N.U.P. they would play into the hands of the Umma and the fear that such action would lead to public exposure of the help which they themselves have received from Egypt in the past. The influence of Sayed Ali is strongly felt in the first of these two considerations, for his fear and hatred of S.A.R. and of the threat of Mahdist domination will always be his major preoccupation.

6. This problem within the party will present Azhari and his supporters with their greatest dilemma over the next few months; the dangers are that by hesitating too long to take firm action, they will allow the cancer of Egyptian corruption to spread incurably through the N.U.P., or that he will yield to Egyptian pressure and the influence of Sayed Ali for the sake of holding the party together and keeping the Umma out of power.

7. The Umma and other opposition elements, obsessed as they are, and not unreasonably, with the dangers of Egyptian propaganda and bribery, see in the recent decisions of the N.U.P. an opportunity to avoid what they regard as the perils of self-determination through a Constituent Assembly by organising a national demand for the cancellation of the self-determination process on the ground that the whole country is agreed upon independence. The results of the present intensification of Egyptian interference and of the activities of the N.U.P. fifth column, while causing them grave concern only strengthen their resolve. It is of course problematical whether they can in fact reach agreement on this question with the N.U.P., but even if they should succeed in doing so, we do not think that the proposal to cut out self-determination would be the right answer. We can assume, and the Opposition themselves assume it, that for obvious reasons the Egyptians would not agree to such an amendment of the Agreement, and it would only give them the opportunity to stall and prevaricate indefinitely and to upset the whole programme for the liquidation of the Condominium, while feelings within the Sudan would grow increasingly bitter.
8. The Opposition's second line of defence might be to demand that the choice laid down in Art. 12 be made by plebiscite instead of by an elected Constituent Assembly; they think, with some reason, that while Egypt might succeed in bribing a majority of the members of the Constituent Assembly into voting for a link with Egypt, she could hardly hope to influence the whole electorate. The proposal for a plebiscite would be less objectionable, in that it would not involve any change in the principle of self-determination, but only in the method of achieving it. Nevertheless it would require an amendment of the Agreement and again would present Egypt with a dangerous opportunity at least to spin things out, though she would be on weaker ground in doing so.

9. Such, then, are the main features of the present political situation, as we see them. Of the growth in strength of the independence cause throughout the country generally there can be no doubt. But equally there can be no doubt of Egypt's determination to muster all her resources to fight this growing tendency. The dangers of such a situation are obvious, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to escape the conclusion that Egypt's rulers would rather deliberately plunge the Sudan into the state of chaos and strife, which Salih Salem is so fond of depicting, than acquiesce in its independence. Egypt can no longer hope to persuade the Sudanese generally to accept a link with her, and in our view the only alternative to a united independent Sudan is, sooner or later, civil strife in some form or other.

10. In para. 38 of his report on his Middle East tour (V.105/1.0 of 17th January) Shuckburgh suggested that "our advice to the Sudanese should always be to work for good relations with Egypt and for close co-operation in such matters as Nile Water". Sudanese of all sorts wish to have good relations with Egypt, but not at the cost of their independence. It is for Egypt to make it possible for the Sudanese to have good relations with her. At present she seems to be bending all her efforts the other way.

I am sending copies of this letter to Sterndale-Bennett, Garvey and Adams, and also to Washington and the Secretariat at Entebbe.

[Signature]

W. H. LUCE

T. E. Bromley, Esq.,
African Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S. W. 1.
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(United Kingdom Trade Commissioner)

Cypher/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Adams
No. 96
May 31, 1955

D: 4.18 p.m. May 31, 1955
R: 6.35 p.m. May 31, 1955

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
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INDEXED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 96 of May 31.
Repeated for information to Cairo

B.M.E.O.

Following from Graffey-Smith.

Begins.

The local press gives hostile publicity to the statement made by my Egyptian colleague on the Governor General's Commission, Air Commodore Hussein Zolficar Sabry, to the Egyptian weekly "Al-Musawwar" giving his personal views on Sudanese self-determination. He defines three possible types of independence open to the Sudan in the world-conditions of today:

(i) "Isolated independence", exposed to the ambitions of the various Colonial powers,

(ii) "Separatist independence", protected by foreign influence in the form of alliances or of economic or administrative controls,

(iii) "True independence," safeguarded by a constitutional link with Egypt.

2. Local journalists have made short work of this double-talk. "Al-Ayyam" asks what sort of independence Egypt herself enjoys, since she has no constitutional link with anybody. And where is the Egyptian constitution which is to be linked to that of the Sudan?

3. But I find a very general resentment that these more or less official Egyptian attempts to influence Sudan thinking on self-determination should pass without comment by Egypt's co-signatories of the 1953 Agreement. You are aware of the Opposition's views about this. The surviving British officials feel no less strongly, and the Mirghani Hamza group press hard...
Khartoum (U.K.T.C.) telegram No. 96 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

for some evidence of British interest in what is going on. I think that the relative hesitancy of the Prime Minister and his closest associates to come out frankly in support of what they knew to be the National sentiment is misjudgment due to the fear of what Egypt may do by bribery and pressures, unchecked by any British remonstrances, during the period before and during the elections for the Constituent Assembly. The common view is that Her Majesty's Government's detachment from the local controversy reflects a basic indifference to the Sudan's fate, arising out of pique at Sudanese "ingratitude." The efforts of fighting the forces of Egyptian intrigue and massive bribery alone, while Her Majesty's Government stand firmly on the side-lines, seems to be proving almost too much for the Sudanese Government. This is rather bad luck on the Sudanese people.

1. I would not of course recommend starting a shouting-match, or wallowing in the gutter at grips with Egypt, but I would suggest that detachment and our own scrupulous interpretation of the Agreement are not really enough. The gross breaches of the joint Anglo-Egyptian undertaking to create a free and neutral atmosphere for self determination, such as my Egyptian colleague's tendentious statement to "Musawwar", should I think, provoke the hostile interest of Her Majesty's Government who are rightly or wrongly held responsible by Sudanese opinion for the proper implementation of the Agreement. The effect on Cairo is admittedly likely to be negligible; but some advertisement here of our active interest in [grpd.undec. ? the necessity of] a free and neutral atmosphere would be very valuable, both to us and to our would-be friends.

5. You may consider that Zulfacar's statement justifies a Parliamentary question. To avoid exacerbating relations in Cairo I would suggest that the reply, after clearly rehearsing Her Majesty's reading of the Agreement, might assume from the assurances already given by the Egyptian Government that Zulfacar's intervention and the opinions held by him can have no official Egyptian sanction or support.

Ends.

Foreign Office pass Cairo and B.M.E.O. as my telegrams Nos. 49 and 34 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo and B.M.E.O.]
SECRET
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/UF

From: [Redacted]
To: No. 1216

June 1, 1955.

Dr. 1.26 p.m. June 4, 1955.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 1216 of June 1.
Repeated for information Khartoum (Governor-General) [Immediate]
Khartoum (United Kingdom Trade Commissioner)

Your telegram No. 703, Governor-General, Khartoum's telegram No. 115 [of June 3] and United Kingdom Trade Commissioner Khartoum's telegram No. 96 [of May 31; Egyptian Activities in the Sudan].

We cannot pass over in silence statement made by Zulficar, since we consider that effort must be made at this stage to bring home to the Egyptian Government our strong views about attempts to influence Sudanese choice.

2. Minister of State is seeing Egyptian Ambassador on Monday afternoon to protest about statement referred to above. It is proposed that publicity should be given to this and that a parliamentary question for written answer should subsequently be arranged.

3. Minister of State will also inform Egyptian Ambassador that we know that Egyptian bribery is going on, though without elaborating on this. It is not repeat not proposed to give any publicity to that aspect of the question.

4. We are prepared to defer action on course (a) in paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 112 to Governor-General for the time being. As regards course (b) we agree with paragraph 3 of Governor-General, Khartoum's telegram No. 115 and have noted paragraph 4.

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

No. 1241
June 7, 1955

D: 1.10 p.m. June 7, 1955

PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 1241 of June 7.
Repeated for information to Khartoum (Governor-General)
Khartoum (U.K.T.C.)


Minister of State saw Egyptian Ambassador on June 6 and
remonstrated with him about Zulfaoar's statement. He told
Ambassador that he had hoped from the frank talk which he had
had with Egyptian Prime Minister and Salah Salem in Cairo
last October that Egyptian Government would in future be more
sensible in their dealings with the Sudan and would not continue
to violate Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. Z's statement had come
as a sad disappointment.

Minister of State asked how this statement could be
reconciled with provision in the Agreement that Sudanese should
have a free choice between independence and a link with Egypt.
Statement was clearly designed to influence Sudanese opinion
towards choosing a link with Egypt. As such, it was a breach
of the Agreement which said that the choice was to be made in a
free and neutral atmosphere. Her Majesty's Government had
consistently observed both the letter and the spirit of the
Agreement and we expected the Egyptian Government to do like-
wise, but instead of this they persisted in a policy of interferes
and bribery. Minister of State requested Egyptian Ambassador to
call his Government's attention to these remarks and ask them
to put a stop to these practices.

3. Egyptian Ambassador started by denying existence of bribery
but later admitted that some Sudanese elements living in Egypt
might be passing money. He sought, however, to make light of
such practices
such practices. He tried at first to explain Z's statement as an expression of personal opinion only, but on being pressed, said that all Z meant to convey was that true independence did not mean that the Sudanese should be bereft of support from some outside power. Minister of State pointed out that this was not what Z was reported to have said and that when you had taken the matter up with Salah Salem (your telegram No. 711), latter seemed to admit that statement was quite out of order.

4. Minister of State went on to say that he understood that Egyptians were anxious for closest relations with the Sudanese, but they must surely realise that the best way to stir suspicion against themselves and to arouse anti-Egyptian feelings in the Sudan was to try to bring pressure to bear on Sudanese Parliament and people. Egyptians had signed Sudan Agreement, which meant that on paper they accepted freedom of choice for the Sudanese. But because they were so over-anxious and fearful about what choice would be made they were continually doing everything most calculated to make Sudanese choose against a link with Egypt. That was no doubt what had been in Z's mind rather than the more anodyne speculations referred to by Egyptian Ambassador. Egyptian Ambassador took all this without argument and agreed to represent to his Government what Minister of State had said. Latter pointed out that we should be faced with questions in Parliament and would have to publicise the fact that Ambassador had called and had received a protest.

5. Publicity being given to this interview today will be to the effect that the Minister of State summoned Egyptian Ambassador to protest about Z's statement; that he pointed out that Z's views were clearly designed to interfere with freedom of Sudanese to choose their future status; that Her Majesty's Government had scrupulously observed Sudan Agreement and that Minister of State had expressed hope that Egyptian Government would put a stop to any activities designed to influence Sudanese people in their choice.

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