Relations between U.K., Egypt and the Sudan.

Assessment of British interests in the Sudan: importance of maintaining overlying rights; co-ordination of general aims of the three countries.

MINUTES

It might be worth while setting out the six points which Mr. Murray made in paragraph 5 of Cairo despatch No. 214 (No. 1059/21(34)).

(i) Tranquility in the country generally and the elimination of strife there which could have repercussions either in Black Africa or in the Arab World;

(ii) Sufficient detachment of the Sudan from Egypt to ensure that the former could not be dictated to by the latter in all her foreign relations;

(iii) Air staging facilities for our military requirements in East and Central Africa, and possibly in the Persian Gulf and the Far East;

(iv) The retention if possible of security liaison relationships calculated to impede the growth of Communist organisations there;

(v) A general interest in a Nile waters administration to the best possible advantage of both Egypt and the Sudan.

(vi) The maintenance of the Sudan's economy in relation to the U.K., both as a market and as a source of supply.

2. In the letter within Sir J. Sterndale Bennett makes the following comments on Mr. Murray's six points. He says that with certain reservations there would probably be general agreement with the list as a broad statement. He does however think:

(a) That point (ii) is not sufficiently in line with H.M.G.'s policy as stated in Foreign Office despatch No. 320 of December 29 (TE1059/21(34)) and needs strengthening;

(b) Points (i) and (iii) need more emphasis and elaboration to bring home their true importance. The main problem confronting H.M.G. is, he says,
to secure, with the minimum of friction with either the Sudanese or the Egyptians, our essential future requirements, i.e. an independent, stable and friendly Sudan and the ability to rely on the use of essential strategic facilities in the Sudan. He says that in order to achieve stability one of the essentials will be economic development.

3. While this is no doubt true we can at the present make no promises or future plans but it is likely that after self-determination the Sudanese will turn to us for any economic or technical help we can give them. The Egyptians too are interested in Sudanese stability and have recently been expressing anxiety about the likelihood of administrative breakdown as a result of Sudanisation.

4. As regards overflying facilities for the R.A.F., there is nothing we can do to secure them until the Sudanese have achieved self-determination. It is possible that at first they will be unwilling to grant such facilities and one difficulty which we will have to overcome will be the fact that once we have withdrawn our troops and R.A.F. personnel from the Sudan, which we are legally bound to do three months after the Sudanese Parliament asks for self-determination, it will be embarrassing for the Sudanese to accept the return of British service personnel whether in uniform or not or to grant military facilities to a Western power.

5. One important card which we have to play is the maintenance of our trade relations with the Sudan, since the advantage in good trade relations between our two countries lies entirely with the Sudanese. He are their chief buyers of cotton and it is upon cotton that their economy depends.

6. As regards point (iv) of Mr. Murray's despatch, our relations with the Sudanese in this field are at present very good, chiefly because the Sudanese themselves constantly seek our advice on how to combat Communism.

7. I do not think that this letter calls for a reply, but perhaps we shall receive some further thought from Cairo and Khartoum about what our future requirements in the Sudan will be likely to be.

(J.W.G. Ridd)
February 10, 1956

/I think
Minutes.

I think we might send Sir John Uterdale Bennett a brief acknowledgement on the lines of the attached draft. We are now beginning to study the handover agreement. Presumably this will deal first and foremost with the transfer of sovereignty but there are other things as shall want to deal with at the same time, notably the security of pensions and overflying rights. It would probably hardly be appropriate to deal with these in the main instrument but they could perhaps form the subjects of separate and simultaneous agreements. We shall have to consult Cairo and Khartoum about this in due course.

(G.W. Millard)
February 13th, 1959

Sir J. Uterdale Bennet's letter does not seem to have stimulated much thought in Cairo or Khartoum, although we still await a further promised letter about overflying from Adams.
A letter about the final handover agreement has arrived from R. Steffensen.

J.W. G. R.H.
4/3.
I have read with much interest the correspondence between Cairo, Khartoum and London, ending with Foreign Office despatch to Cairo No. 320 (JE 10511 41 of December 29) about our policy towards the Sudan and towards Egypt in relation to the Sudan; and, as you will remember, I took part in a discussion about the main issue in the Embassy in Cairo during the visit there of yourself and Adams earlier in December. I have no comments to make on the conclusions reached in the Foreign Office despatch. But there are one or two points on which it may perhaps be useful to take the correspondence further.

2. Paragraph 13 of the Governor-General’s letter 60/97.8.1 of December 8 to the Secretary of State contains the statement that “Britain’s interests in the future Sudan are in fact few and unimportant”. These terms are of course relative, and it is perhaps hardly fair in any case to quote the passage in isolation from its context. I only quote it because it does seem to me important to have, as a basis for future policy, a detailed assessment of what our real and permanent interests in the Sudan are likely to be.

3. Paragraph 5 of Cairo despatch No. 21a (10311/9/54 of November 9 last) attempts a broad statement of them and this might be taken as a starting point for consideration. It is quite clear from the discussions since that despatch was written, and from Foreign Office despatch of December 29, that (ii) is not sufficiently in line with Her Majesty’s Government’s policy and needs strengthening. But apart from this there will probably be general agreement with the list as a broad statement.

4. To my mind, however, numbers (1) and (iii) need more emphasis and elaboration to bring home their true importance.

5. The need to protect British territories in Africa from subversive or hostile influence which might penetrate from the north, gives us a very great subjective interest in the Sudan, i.e. not only in its stability and good administration, but in the existence of a friendly Sudanese government not controlled by influences aiming at undermining British interests in East, West and Central Africa. In saying this, I am not taking a gloomy look forward into a hypothetical future in which Egypt might have fallen into the orbit of a vastly expanded sphere of Communist influence. I am thinking more of anti-western, anti-colonial or general pan-African influences which Egypt and other Arab States might, in certain circumstances, think it expedient to propagate southwards/
southwards. If, for example, it was Egypt and not the Sudan whose territories marched with Kenya and Uganda, the hostile influences working against us in these Colonial territories in recent years would have been considerably reinforced.

6. As regards the second point, namely the maintenance of staging and overflying rights, you may like to look again at Peck's letter No. 12252/2/25G of September 25 last and the B.D.C.C.(M.E.) paper enclosed with it. That letter was not copied to the other recipients of the present one since it was only one step in a discussion of the serious dangers inherent in the fact that after April 1956, under the Suez Canal Base Agreement, flights of British military aircraft across any part of Egypt will be dependent on clearance from the Egyptian government. The B.D.C.C. paper was not primarily concerned with the Sudan but one of its conclusions was that it was of the utmost importance that we should retain our present overflying rights and staging facilities in the Sudan. Recent discussions on the wider questions arising out of our redeployment following the Suez Canal Base Agreement, have shown the potential strategic importance of the Sudan, not only from the point of view of west-east traffic in relation to our present interests in East Africa, Aden and the Persian Gulf but, in the event of major war, as a link between the countries of the Commonwealth in central and south Africa on the one hand and the Middle East area on the other.

7. The main problem, as I see it, is to secure, with the minimum of friction with either the Sudanese or the Egyptians, our essential future requirements, i.e. an independent, stable and friendly Sudan and the ability to rely on the use of essential strategic facilities in the Sudan. We must, in the process, take into account what Egypt's legitimate requirements are in relation to the Sudan and try to engineer arrangements which will satisfy these compatibly with our own interests and without placing her in a position of control.

8. I suggest that stability, defence and the utilisation of the Nile Waters are common interests to the Sudan, to Egypt and to ourselves, and I would say that stability includes, to some extent at all events, economic development.

9. What we want in fact are arrangements which give expression to this tripartite interest and, at the same time, safeguard Sudanese sovereignty and independence.

10. I am now only thinking of general aims. It is perhaps too early in any case to consider the types of arrangements which could produce these results; but it would certainly be presumptuous on my part to put forward any suggestions without first discussing them in Khartoum with the Governor-General and the United Kingdom Trade Commissioner and in Cairo with H.M. Ambassador.

11. I am sending copies of this to Ralph Stevenson and to Adams and I should be grateful if the latter would show it to the Governor-General.
Thank you for your letter 10172/1/69 of January 21 about our long term interests in the Sudan.

2. We agree generally with your comments. The question of overriding rights is one which particularly exercises us. It does not seem to us that there is anything we can do about it for the moment, since the present Sudanese Government could not bind its successors in the period after self-determination. This is one of the points which we shall try to deal with in the final handover agreement and we are at present studying the form which this agreement might take.

3. We shall be glad to see in due course any comments on your letter from Cairo and Khartoum. I am sending copies of this to Sir Ralph Stevenson and Maa.

(C. A. A. Shackleton)

Sir John Storrsdale-Bennett, K.C.M.G., M.C.,
Missions.
Minutes.

Please see the attached letter from Mr. Burden, M.P., regarding his talks in Egypt with Nasser and Salem.

2. If there are any points in this letter upon which you would like to comment, could these please be incorporated in a draft acknowledgement. If there is nothing special you would wish to say, we will send a brief acknowledgement from here.

(C. R. A. Rae)

February 10, 1955

Mr. Bromley.

Mr. Burden came to see me the other day by arrangement with your office with an article on Egypt which he hoped to have published in a newspaper. This article did not deal with the Sudan, but he told me about the exchanges recorded at the end of his letter to Mr. Turton.

2. I think it would be preferable simply to send an acknowledgement thanking Mr. Burden for the useful account of his talks. The main point of interest is, of course, the Sudan, but it is difficult to comment on what Nasser said. When speaking to Sir Ralph Stevenson on January 7 Nasser said that there was too much sentimental nonsense talked about the union of Egypt and the Sudan. The only possible bond was one of common

/interest
interest, and if that did not exist any union would be artificial. He did then say that he was pessimistic about the future of the Sudan and thought that a collapse of the administration was a serious possibility. The Egyptians told the Minister of State when he was there that they only contemplated a loose form of union. Where the truth lies it is impossible to tell, and indeed the truth may shift from time to time. The only thing which is quite clear is that the Egyptians are very worried about the Sudan.

(T. E. Bromley)
February 11, 1955
8th February 1955

My dear Sir:

I have pleasure in giving you the information you required about my recent visit to Egypt and interviews with Salem and Nasser.

Communists—

Nasser said the numbers were small about 50,000—estimated—but they are strong and well organized. They work underground and the leaders are not known.

Raiders and Newspapers—

I asked Salem if it was not possible in view of the Government's complete control over the Press and Radio, to influence public opinion as they required, and asked what Press circulation the daily papers received and how many radio sets there are. Salem evaded the answer, but he was subsequently pressed by Patrick Maitland, and said that there were 314,000 quarter million radio sets, that the circulation of daily newspapers amounted to a half a million copies, but it was estimated that these half a million daily newspapers were read by 2 and a half million people.

Sudan—

Following an assertion by Salem, "You do not understand Arabs and Arab aspirations," I answered, "May be, but if we are to attempt to understand the Arabs and their aspirations it is equally necessary for you to understand our point of view." I referred to the danger of complete misunderstanding between the two countries, that was likely to follow similar to the Split Three Ways and he predicted Civil War. He went on to say, "The only salvation now for the Sudan is agreement between Britain and Egypt." He was very cagey on this matter.
Sudan (contd.) - Speech by Mr. Nasser

I think it was Patrick Maitland who raised this matter, and Salem stated that he had been misquoted. He said the question he was asked was, "If you were allowed to choose your priorities, how would you place them?" He said he answered—

1) "I would get the British out of the Canal Zone.

2) "I would deal with Israel."

Nasser—

You will remember Salem asserted with vehemence not once but many times that there could be no question of a pact with Britain, that the word was absolute anathema to all Egyptians. Of this Nasser said, "That better relations with Britain could not come through posts but through confidence not even in the present Government but in myself, and we must build this up." He also confirmed Salem's figures about the Press and Radio.

Two Domestic Interests—

Nasser was asked, "How are you going to educate public opinion to your say?" He replied, "The Egyptian people are always fearful of the Government not working in their interests and all have hatred of foreign domination." These points are important and public opinion is particularly suspicious of them. "If I can persuade the people that I have solved these two points I am sure I can get them behind me. If they know the Government will not grab land or money for ourselves but will help them, and also that we will not be dominated by our own people or anybody outside, then I can get the people behind me. It is a political and social revolution. We liberated the foreigner, "the individual" - we aim to liberate the Government from the rule of Capitalists - corruption. There is no question of an election. I must have a free base parliament, but a question of confidence and faith in me by the
Neguib:

Of Neguib he said, there was great danger until he had gone. It was most critical between March and November. "I could not release Neguib because he is popular. He is the only card these people can play." He was free to meet people while we worked. He is not a strong man and he went about to get popularity. When we got back in February, he came to us. We must have the power to fight the Revolutionary Council's decision. His resignation was accepted. It was a great shock to the people. Neguib returned three days after his resignation. He tried to please everybody Communists and Moslem Brotherhood. He tried to give the impression that he wanted democracy and we were against it. He wanted complete authority. He wanted consultative committees comprising three members of each of the old parties and Army appointments from Battalion Commanders up. I feel that from the day Neguib departed the Government was secure.

Sudan:

Of the Sudan he said, "I think the position will get out of hand of both the British and the Egyptians. The communists are achieving strength because of the dispute between the other parties. In future there must be absolute agreement on each issue between Britain and Egypt." He was asked: 'Would you say that Sudanisation has gone too far and too fast?' Nasser, "Yes, I feel that Britain is against the unity of the Nile Valley. I agree that the Sudanese and the Egyptians must be free to choose this." Question, "Would you agree that in the past there has been too much pressure from both sides?" Nasser, "I cannot concede that the Sudan would be outside our sphere of interest. I cannot concede that the Sudanese can even or their own free will stand absolutely outside in Sovereign Independence!"
Question, "If the majority decided to stand outside, would you interfere? Do you consider yourself free to use meetings and propaganda in order to persuade the Sudanese to agree to unity of the Nile Valley?"
Nasser, "Yes".

Question, "What would you do if there was an emphatic choice for Sovereign Independence?"
Nasser, "We really could not accept this. I hope for complete political unity between Egypt and the Sudan."

I hope this will be of use to you.
FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(United Kingdom Trade Commissioner)

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

To Adams

No. 29

February 15

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 29 of February 15.
Repeated for information to Cairo

B.M.E.O.

Following is translation of message to the Sudanese people from Salah Salem carried in the Khartoum daily "El-Telegraph" of February 11.

Begins.

Two years ago on February 12 the Sudan "Liberation Agreement" was signed in Cairo. The agreement recognizes the right of the Sudanese to govern their own country and determine their future. Conclusion of the agreement was not an easy task. Liberals in Egypt and the Sudan had to do much before they were able to sign the agreement. You all know that if the provisions of the agreement are not respected and executed in spirit before they are in letter, it will be only "ink and paper". We never hesitated at any time we felt that the agreement was in danger, to come to your aid running every risk, to restore to the agreement due respect and sacredness.

2. I remember, and I think you also remember, that day when a British Minister came to you to talk about your country under your noses in an open Press conference, discussing things not relative to the agreement and bringing in the question of closed districts, you remember how Egypt declared that she would not embark on any negotiations on evacuation of her own land unless the Sudan agreement was duly respected. Egypt meant what she said. She did not turn to her own case until after she was assured about the observance of the Sudan agreement. Egypt will continue at your side and will not pay any attention to misleading intrusions until all dangers are passed and all conspiracies defeated.

3. We will do all we can to help you and open all the doors before you so that you enter into the world through widest portals of power and glory.

You have
Khartoum telegram No. 29 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

1. You have fought your way through so far with success and you have proved to be more sober and formidable than "they" had thought. You were not shaken by the storms that came your way through the last two years and you never stopped on your road to freedom. You united with the Liberals and won the battle and you were determined in your struggle for Sudanisation, and your country has become all to you. But the road is still full of obstacles. The enemy will be on the move next year and his agents, who work under the mask of patriotism, will try to gamble with your future. You must be careful to open your eyes and ears to watch them.

5. We shall continue to be vigilant to watch out for any such effort or manoeuvre. I, who have lived with you with my soul and feeling and served you with all my power, am sure that my Sudanese brothers will go from victory to victory with unity and self-denial.

6. Only the strong deserve glory and freedom.

May God help you.

Ends.

G G G G
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 15</td>
<td>Address by Sudanese Prime Minister on the 2nd Anniversary of the Sudan Agreement. Gives text of the address by Sayed Ismail El Aghari on February 12.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MINUTES**

While there is an extremely worthy speech in reference to Britain and British officials and to Sir Redif Hameed one way or another. Comparison of this speech with the one he delivered on the 34th Anniversary shows a considerable change of attitude towards us. Last year his praise was for Egypt and his warnings for Britain. This year we are praised equally with, if not more than, the Egyptians. This is partly due to the Suez Canal Agreement which he was so concerned in his speech last year, but it is also evidence of a considerable shift in his opinions.

J.W. S. Fild. 19/12

Let's have a go.

46819

[Signature] 19/12

[Signature] 19/12

[Signature] 19/12
Dear Sir,

For your information the following is the text of an address given by Sayed Ismail Al Azhari, P.E. on the occasion of the 2nd Anniversary of the Sudan Agreement - 12.2.55, which we have just received from the Information Officer, National Guidance Office, Khartoum:

"I address myself to our guests and foreign residents who share our celebrations.

To my free countrymen, women and children in the East, West, South and North Sudan, in the chief capitals and villages, in towns and rural areas, in the remotest parts of the country and everywhere they live.

My sincere affectionate greetings and congratulations on the first signs of emancipation which I send to you all from my heart whose faith and confidence in God are strengthened by its faith and confidence in you, and which never palpitated except with love of good, freedom, glory and happiness for you, and with thanksgiving to God who changed weakness into strength and prestige, slavery into emancipation and sovereignty, and made of a divided, scattered people, a united, solid bloc.

My sincere affectionate greetings and congratulations on the prelude to salvation which I address on this national occasion to the rising brave army, to the gentlemen of the administration and police the vigilant security forces, the faithful painstaking civil servants, the hardworking school boys, the struggling workman, the happy cultivators and the honest merchants.

These are the pillars of the renaissance, the makers of glory and the builders of liberty and prestige for this young enterprising people which set the best example in one year - the first after the signing of the Agreement demonstrating its great capacity and profound resolve to live a free, civilised honourable life.

We have always known its aptitude for survival and have been alive to the fact that they live in a land of plenty.

Our confidence has never been shaken because we knew that the real spirit of the people will come up in the end in spite of foreign rule and its attendant difficulties. The Sudan Agreement being the implement of reactivating the fire which revealed the real metal of the Sudanese."
Gentlemen.

At the first anniversary of the Agreement in February, 1956, when the country's sons from among leaders and cabinet ministers with varying masses in close ranks behind them were preparing to take over the reins of power, the atmosphere was cloudy and filled with doubts about the outcome of the experiment and the extent of loyalty to the Agreement of those who signed it.

Amid that unfavourable atmosphere I stood up on this very spot defying doubts and challenging openly the defeated and the cynics and declared that the Sudan will win in the end and that we would not hesitate to renounce power once we discovered that our presence in office contradicted with the country's supreme interest.

In complete faith and confidence I indicated that what sometimes appear to be dissensions among the Sudanese will soon disappear as soon as the feeling of any danger threatening the unity of their country or its freedom seems on the horizon.

It was in that spirit of self-reliance that I defied doubts and with God's help the Sudan triumphed.

A year has since passed during which the Sudanisation Committee accomplished its great historic liberation task without fear of the gravity of responsibility or regard for the advantages of immediate fame. The Committee succeeded in satisfying the ends of liberation with special emphasis being placed on the selection to Sudanised posts of able Sudanese retaining at the same time the services of expatriate technicians.

Thus the Committee won the country's gratitude and the people's admiration for its fair and thoughtful recommendations which the Council of Ministers endorsed with His Excellency the Governor-General's assent which had been obtained smoothly.

Indeed the country passed through a difficult and delicate phase of its history when we started implementing those recommendations and the beginning of application would have been extremely arduous had it not been for faithfulness, perseverance and resolve on the part of the Government and His Excellency the Governor-General whose gifts and goodness coupled with his high traits of character were greatly responsible for the removal of obstacles attached to the initial execution of the Sudanisation decisions.

I should like here to display admiration and gratitude to the British officials affected by the process of Sudanisation for the goodwill they showed whilst handing over their functions to their Sudanese colleagues which caused us to honour their memory on departure.

Gentlemen.

I have been able during the past year part-
cularly in the course of my numerous tours to establish contacts with tribal leaders and local heads as well as members of local Government Councils in the West and South, the Gezira and the North and East. I gained additional faith in their patriotism and sense of responsibility towards home rule. I am in a position to declare openly that the entire people stands like one man behind the Nationalist Government prepared as it is to protect it against attacks and preserve and strengthen its structure.

Gentlemen,

We have been able to cover one stage of emancipation in which we gained experience of difficulties which will stand us in good stead in our future stride confident of God's help and guidance in our endeavour to fulfill the people's will and inspired by its support.

It is in this spirit that we embark on the remaining spell of interim period which the two Contracting Governments agreed under Article 9 of the Agreement should be terminated as soon as possible within the prescribed period of 3 years.

It shall be brought to an end in the following manner. The Sudanese Parliament shall pass a resolution expressing their desire that arrangements for Self-Determination shall be put in motion and the Governor-General shall notify the two Contracting Governments of this resolution.

Article 10 of the Agreement lays down that when the two Contracting Governments have been formally notified of this resolution the Sudanese Government, then existing, shall draw up a draft law for the election of the Constituent Assembly which it shall submit to Parliament for approval. The Governor-General shall give his consent to the law with the agreement of his Commission. Detailed preparations for the process of Self-Determination, including safeguards assuring the impartiality of the elections and any other arrangements designed to secure a free and neutral atmosphere shall be subject to international supervision. The two Contracting Governments will accept the recommendations of any international body which may be set up to this end.

Article 11 lays down that Egyptian and British Military Forces shall withdraw from the Sudan immediately upon the Sudanese Parliament adopting a resolution expressing its desire that arrangements for Self-Determination be put in motion. The two Contracting Governments undertake to complete the withdrawal of their forces from the Sudan within a period not exceeding three months.

Article 12 defines the terms of reference of the Constituent Assembly as follows:-
The Constituent Assembly shall have two duties to discharge. The first will be to decide the future of the Sudan as one integral whole. The second will be to draw up a constitution for the Sudan compatible with the decision which shall have been taken in this respect, as well as an electoral law for a permanent Sudanese Parliament. The future of the Sudan shall be decided either:

(a) by the Constituent Assembly choosing to link the Sudan with Egypt in any form,

or

(b) by the Constituent Assembly choosing complete independence.

According to the terms of Article 13, the two Contracting Governments undertake to respect the decision of the Constituent Assembly concerning the future status of the Sudan and each Government will take all the measures which may be necessary to give effect to its decision.

Gentlemen,

We are perfectly sure we shall with God’s help pass successfully through these stages one after the other till the country attains its final objective.

We are equally sure, now that its awakening to consciousness is complete, the Sudanese people who have tasted freedom are certain to realise it in face of all threats. The seekers of freedom shall not differ.

We must always remember Egypt’s good turn in taking the initiative to endeavour ceaselessly to arrive at this Agreement. She gave priority to our cause over her own.

We must likewise remember Britain’s contribution, it being understood that the greater burden fell to the lot of the British in the process of implementation. We shall never forget Britain’s faithfulness to her pledges to work the Agreement smoothly and in a spirit of noble courage.

History is beginning to note down on its pages the final chapter concerning the real intentions of those who lived among us over a period of 50 years and the effect of this chapter shall remain alive in the minds of future Sudanese generations.

It is our strong conviction that it will be a happy ending which is never to be forgotten and it is up to the Sudanese to hold fast to their gains, which they won without great sacrifices, with all their might and unity of purpose, and let us adopt the motto:

"Unite in order that you may preserve your freedom"

Ismail El Azhari
PRIME MINISTER.

Yours Faithfully,

(P. Thorne)
for Sudan Agent in London
I asked the EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR to call today in order to speak to him about the attached message to the Sudanese people from Salah Salem.

2. I reminded the Ambassador that after the visit of the Sudanese Prime Minister we had asked the Egyptian Government to let us know at once if they had any preoccupations in the Sudan. Since then we had loyally executed our undertaking to promote a free and neutral atmosphere. This had been publicly recognized by the National Unionist Party Prime Minister, who, in a recent public message had paid tribute to our fairness and impartiality.

3. In these circumstances we were justifiably indignant at Salah Salem’s message. At this point I handed the Ambassador a copy of the message and underlined for his benefit the most offensive passages.

4. The Ambassador did not attempt to defend Salah Salem but remarked that he was an impetuous individual. I said that we had heard all this before but we were getting tired of hearing this sort of excuse made for Salem’s utterances. He was a Minister and if he could not bring himself to behave wisely he must at least observe the elementary canons of civilized behaviour. Not long ago, any country using this sort of language would have received an ultimatum, and, failing satisfaction, would have received a declaration of war.

5. I asked the Ambassador to express to his Government in the strongest terms the indignation which we felt at Salem’s language and behaviour. I added that the Secretary of State might wish to raise the matter with the Egyptian Prime Minister on Sunday.

6. The Ambassador who looked thoroughly crest-fallen and mortified, said that he would send a strong telegram to his Government.

Distribution

African Department (to enter)

Copies to:
Private Secretary
Lord Reading
Mr. Nutting
Mr. Turton
Lord John Hope
Sir H. Caccia
Mr. J. O. Ward
Mr. C. A. E. Shuckburgh

February 17, 1935
BRIEF FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO CAIRO

THE SUDAN

The Egyptians may raise the question of the Sudan.

2. The Secretary of State might make use of the following points:-

(i) We kept the Egyptian Government informed of our discussions last year with the Sudanese Prime Minister.

(ii) We were glad that quick agreement was reached over the new Governor-General.

(iii) Our policy has not changed. We want the Sudanese to make their eventual choice freely. Our people are leaving the Sudan and we have not tried to prevent the process of Sudanisation, or to use our people to influence the Sudanese choice.

(iv) We understand the Egyptian desire for close relations with the Sudan, and the fact that there are interests common to the two countries. But Egyptian pressure on the Sudan is no way to achieve this. The future status of the Sudan must commend itself to the majority of the Sudanese. Egypt's real interests will be best served if the Sudanese are allowed to feel that they are making their own choice freely.

(v) We have not yielded to the temptation to counteract Egyptian pressure on the Sudanese. But we too have our public opinion, which is much concerned about Salah Salem's speeches about the Sudan. The Egyptians, if they want improved relations with the United Kingdom, must observe the spirit as well as the letter of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan.

February 14, 1955
Adams has shown me Sterndale-Bennett’s letter 1017/1/56 of 21st January to you, about British policy towards the Sudan.

I entirely agree with the remarks in paragraph 5 of his letter. I have always understood that it is U.K.G.'s object that there should emerge a reasonably stable and well-governed independent Sudan, in friendly relations with Britain and, if possible, Egypt. When I said in paragraph 15 of my letter 67/9/L-1 of 6th December to the Secretary of State that "Britain's interests in the Sudan are in fact few and unimportant", I was, of course, thinking in terms of material interests.

I would like in particular to stress the importance of Sterndale-Bennett's remarks about the need to protect British territories in Africa from subversive or hostile influence from the north. Apart from the growing menace of international Com- munist, there is danger of Egyptian efforts to undermine the British position in Uganda and Kenya. There is already some evidence of Egyptian attempts to use certain Southern Sudanese to carry out propaganda in Uganda against British interests in that territory, and it would certainly be unwise to assume that Egyptian ambitions for unity of the Nile Valley stop short at the southern border of the Sudan.

3. As regards staging facilities in the Sudan for the R.A.F., there has been correspondence between my office and the African Department on this subject. The question will have to be dealt with in two stages: first to cover the period between the passing of the self-determination resolution, with the consequential withdrawal of R.A.F. personnel and the establishment of a new Sudanese government under the permanent constitution and, secondly, to cover the future thereafter. During the first period the Governor-General has the constitutional power to grant staging and overflying rights to the R.A.F., provided that they can make satisfactory arrangements with a civil administration to provide essential services, which, I understand, they can; but the use of this power could be quite ineffective without the co-operation of the Sudanese Government who control the airports. There must therefore be some agreement with the Sudanese Government to grant these staging and overflying rights.
In my view, it would be a mistake to approach the Sudanese Government on this subject before the passing of the self-determination resolution and before it is clear that R.A.F. personnel are being withdrawn from the Sudan; an earlier approach would only arouse suspicions that we intended to qualify the withdrawal in some way. I suggest that an exchange of letters between the Governor-General and the Sudanese Prime Minister, embodying agreement on the granting of the necessary rights would be sufficient. When the approach is made, it might be advantageous at the same time to make the offer of R.A.F. assistance on the lines suggested in paragraph 4 of the note attached to Boothby's letter in 11077/2 of 23rd February, 1954, to face; though the Egyptians have to some extent got in ahead of us by undertaking the training of a few Sudan defence force officers as pilots to take over the aircraft which the Egyptian Government have presented to the Sudanese.

As regards the granting of these rights after self-determination, the aim presumably will be to embody this in the final hand-over agreement between H.M.G. and the new Sudanese Government established under the permanent constitution. The present Sudanese Government would certainly not consider itself competent to make any commitments extending beyond the life of the Self-Government Statute.

5. I very strongly agree with the comment in Sterndale-Bennett's paragraph 8 that the stability of the future Sudan must involve some degree of economic development. I have frequently stressed the importance of some assistance from H.M.G. in this direction.

6. I am sending copies of this letter to Sterndale-Bennett, Stevenson and Adams.

Yours ever,

R. S. H. [signature]


Ref: FO 371/113628 87/38

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>AFRICAN DEPARTMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Adams, Khartoum,</td>
<td>EGYPT AND SUDAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Mr. Brozley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 1029</td>
<td>12.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dated</td>
<td>Mar. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received in Registry</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References to former relevant papers
- 17

(How disposed of)
- Mr. Adams, Khartoum.
- Copy to Secretary, Cairo.

References to later relevant papers
- 46819

MINUTES

Sir J. Kirkpatrick spoke to the Egyptian Ambassador about Salah Selim's message. He had given it to him about two months ago. If the subject were mentioned again, the newspapers would make much of this and the Egyptians would see that the Sudanese had not been taking any action.

We might discuss the matter with the Ambassador, but it would be better to let sleeping dogs lie.

J.W.P.R. 23/3
Dear Tom,

The report in the Foreign Office telegram to Cairo no. 48 Saving of February 18 about the Permanent Under-Secretary’s discussions with the Egyptian Ambassador about Salah Salem’s message to the Sudanese people made the most heartening reading we have had for many months. I am sure that this prompt and vigorous action will have had a salutary effect.

Our position here would of course be strengthened if we could let it be known. I know and appreciate the reasons for which the Department has in the past not wished to give any publicity to the various British remonstrances made to the Egyptians. But now that we have told the Egyptians that we intend to speak plainly to them on the Sudan and invited them to do the same, and now also that Azhari seems to feel able to take a slightly firmer line with them perhaps some of your objections will be diminished. Even if no public announcement could be made it might be helpful if I could be authorised to let it be known to Azhari, no less that to the opposition leaders here, that H.M.G. have not let Salah Salem’s impertinent message pass in silence.

I am sending copies of this letter to Garvey and Luce.

T.Y. Bromley Esq.,
Foreign Office.
In Bromley's absence I am replying to your letter 1039/12/55 of March 3 in which you suggested that we should give publicity to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick's protest to the Egyptian Ambassador about Salih Salem's message to the Sudanese people.

2. We do not think that it would be desirable to publicize this now, more than a month after the event. But we should see no objection to your informing Azhari and the Opposition leaders, if a suitable opportunity arises in the course of conversation, that we did not in fact allow Salem's message to pass in silence.

I am sending copies of this letter to Garvey and Luce.
THE SUDAN

Both Mr. Luce and Mr. Adams in Khartoum have been recommending for some time that, in order to sustain the morale of the independence movement in the Sudan and put a stop to rumours that we have done a deal with Egypt, we should be prepared:

(i) to re-state H.M.G.'s policy from time to time;
(ii) to give publicity to our protests against Egyptian interference and propaganda.

2. It is now proposed to deal with the first point in a Parliamentary Question, and the Department have prepared a separate submission on this. On the second point Mr. Adams has suggested that we should give publicity to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick's protest to the Egyptian Ambassador about Saleh Salem's message to the Sudanese people, or at least let it be known to Ashari and the Opposition leaders that we have not allowed this to pass in silence.

3. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick's interview with the Egyptian Ambassador took place over a month ago, and I do not think that there would be any point in giving publicity to it now. But I think that we might authorise Mr. Adams to tell Ashari and the Opposition leaders that a protest was made, if a suitable opportunity arises for doing this in the course of conversation.

March 28, 1955
Cypher/OTP

Governor General's Office
No. 64
March 24, 1955.

D. 3.18 p.m. March 24, 1955.
R. 3.35 p.m. March 24, 1955.

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 64 of March 24.
Repeated for information to Cairo.

Following from Luce.

A motion, signed by 24 members of the Opposition, has been handed in to the Clerk of the Sudan House of Representatives, proposing that the Governor General be requested to take the necessary steps to close down the United Kingdom Trade Commissioner's office and the Egyptian Information office(s) on the ground that their presence in the Sudan adversely affects the free and neutral atmosphere. The text of the motion is given in our immediately following telegram.

2. The Governor General has been requested to give his consent to a debate on this motion under Article 99(8)(e) of the Statute. A decision on this will have to await Sir Knox Helm's arrival here, but for your information I propose to advise him to give his consent to the debate. His refusal immediately on arrival would create a very unfavourable impression with the Independents, and would appear as if he were protecting the Egyptians in their pro-unity activities in the Sudan. It is a matter of common knowledge here that the Egyptian Economic Expert's Office harbours a number of officers and civilians whose sole duty is to disseminate assistance and distribute money in the unity cause. A debate on the motion would, no doubt, produce some criticism of the United Kingdom Trade Commissioner, but far more of Egyptian organisations and would provide opportunity for public disclosure of the latter's activities in the Sudan.

3. As far as is not certain yet what line the NUP would take in a debate on this motion, but they might find difficulty in opposing it. If the resolution were passed by Parliament the Governor General would presumably forward it to the co-Domini for their consideration. It appears to us that Her Majesty's Government would then have three possible courses to take.

(a) They could take the initiative in complying with the Sudanese Parliament's request by proposing to the Egyptians that both offices be closed temporarily pending self determination. There might be considerable local political advantage in this since the Egyptians would stand to lose more than Her Majesty's Government and if they resisted the proposal Her Majesty’s Government would gain kudos from having shown willingness to comply.

You may, however, think that practical considerations and the question of
CONFIDENTIAL

Khartoum telegram No. 64 to Foreign Office

prestige would make it difficult to close the office of the United Kingdom Trade Commissioner temporarily even if the Egyptians were prepared to close their equivalent office.

(b) Her Majesty's Government could propose to Egypt that the co-dominion should reply to the Governor General that, in their view, this is a matter which should be considered by the International body to be set up under Article 10 of the agreement and whose duty it is to take all the necessary steps to secure a free and neutral atmosphere.

This course would have the advantage of showing that Her Majesty's Government are not unwilling to consider the proposal and at the same time of lifting the issue out of the arena of Sudanese party politics and submitting it to the judgment of an impartial international body.

(c) Her Majesty's Government could take the initiative in proposing to Egypt that the request be rejected unconditionally. This seems undesirable in that it would appear to be protecting Egyptian interference and would probably be taken as further evidence of alleged Anglo-Egyptian understanding about the future of the Sudan. It might also be embarrassing if subsequently the international body of its own volition recommended that the two offices be closed during the process of self-determination.

4. Asad, with whom I have discussed the matter guardedly, appreciates that it would be difficult for the Governor General to refuse his consent to the debate, but considers that the International Commission is the proper body to consider the question raised in the motion. I have little doubt, therefore, that he would regard course (b) above as the most suitable.

5. I have discussed this matter with Adams and he has a copy of this telegram.

Foreign Office pass Priority to Cairo as my telegram No. 42.

[Repeated to Cairo.]

DISTRIBUTED TO

African Department
Personnel Department

B B B
MINUTES

In the light of recent statements by the U.S. it seems that Nasser will not be given an opportunity to compromise, but may be presented with the fact of Sudanese independence. What he is more likely to compromise over is the question of Nile Waters during the negotiations which are about to begin again. How long, however, it may be before he can afford to compromise. Indeed, they have a strong card to play. They could reduce their nile allotments, and come in return for Egyptian acceptance of Sudanese sovereignty and independence. In any case we would do well satisfied if Egypt and the Sudan could amicably agree a unified policy on Nile Waters.

W.F. Reid.
4/4.

Submitted 7/8 4/4.
On Egypt last night, Mr Bustani said that Colonel Nasser wanted to visit England in the Autumn.

He said that from his conversation with Nasser he had gained the view that Nasser would compromise on the position of unity with the Sudan, and that he would agree to a position under which the Sudan had independence but relied a great deal on Egyptian and English capital. This would be provided that they could have a complete unity of policy in dealing with the Nile waters.

R. H. Turton
March 31, 1955.