

50 371/108418

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AFRICAN

EGYPT AND SUDAN

JE 1192 /G

FROM Mr. Armstrong,
Was office
to his street

TOP SECRET

No. 0143/5996 (C.2)

Dated May 31

Received in
Registry - June 2

Anglo-Egyptian negotiations

Attaches a draft to take the place of the
existing Article 1 (a) of Annex C - property now in
the base"

References to former relevant papers

JE 1192/61G

MINUTES

See draft on JE 1192/115G

(Print)

(How disposed of)

log
3/6

(Action completed)

(Index)

Reference:-

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Tel. No. Whitehall 9400 Ext: 447

JE 1192 Index G



JE 1192 117

THE WAR OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1.

0143/5996 (G.2)

TOP SECRET

31 May, 1954.

Dear Street,

I understand that there is a possibility that the draft Agreement prepared some months ago may yet be presented to the Egyptians. That being so, we would prefer the attached draft to ~~the~~ take the place of the existing Article 1(4) of Annex C. It would be an improvement in two ways. By the addition of the words "now in the base", it would rule out any possible inference that we would only have the right to sell locally surplus stores imported after the new Agreement comes into effect, and the specific reference to customs duty would narrow the area in which the Egyptian authorities could concern themselves with our disposal arrangements. If they consider that there would be other reasons for intervention, it would appear preferable for the Egyptians to make out their case in the course of negotiations rather than to be given carte blanche at the outset.

I am copying this to Prince, Cary, Lawrence-Wilson and A. M. Allen.

Yours sincerely,

J. E. D. Street, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

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Annex CArticle 1(4)

No property now in the base or imported into Egypt in accordance with the provisions of this article shall be disposed of in Egypt except for the purpose of operations under this Agreement, or to British personnel in the Base, unless the appropriate rate of customs duty is paid to the Egyptian authorities.

I attach a record of part of the Chiefs of Staff Meeting held on May 28 at which General Keightley, C. in C. M.E.L.F., was present. This dealt with Egypt, Jordan and Iraq.

2. As regards Egypt, the important points were that the Prime Minister had told General Keightley that a decision on negotiations with Egypt would be reached by the end of June. The Prime Minister still appeared to be concerned that any agreement reached with Egypt should not appear as a "scuttle" by us. It was put to him that this need not be the case.
3. Stores are to be moved as quickly as possible out of the base subject to the need not to give the impression that we are pulling out of it.
4. The Working Party on Redeployment of the Ministry of Defence has been asked, in consultation with the British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Middle East, to prepare urgently an estimate of what should constitute the minimum base which it would be worth while retaining in Egypt.
5. It was decided that no announcement should be made about the move of G.H.Q. Middle East to Cyprus until a Ministerial decision had been taken about the resumption of negotiations with Egypt. This was decided as a result of the expression of the Prime Minister's views referred to above, and is satisfactory from our point of view.

T. E. Bromley

May 31, 1954

C. B. ...

31/5

J. K.
31.5.

EXTRACT FROM C.O.S. (92) 64/E MEETING HELD 28-5-54. TOP SECRET
1. MEETING WITH GENERAL SIR CHARLES KEIGHTLEY GUARD

SIR RHODERICK McGRIGOR on behalf of the COMMITTEE, welcomed Sir Charles Keightley to their meeting.

SIR CHARLES KEIGHTLEY said that he had a number of points on which he would be grateful for the guidance of The Committee.

JE 1192 / 118

A. Negotiations with Egypt

In company with the Secretary of State for War he had seen the Prime Minister that morning who had said that a decision on this matter would be given by the end of June. The Prime Minister had fully accepted the Services requirements for the base and, although he appeared to be still concerned on the question of "a scuttle from Egypt", it had been put to him that redeployment need not be considered as a "scuttle" provided a sound workable agreement with the Egyptians was arrived at. The Prime Minister had asked for a statement of the shipping requirements for evacuation from the Canal Zone. He (Sir Charles Keightley) would prepare this statement.

The B.D.C.C. (M.E.) was in a dilemma on what stores etc. should be moved prior to an agreement. On the one hand, there was the need to avoid giving an impression that we were evacuating; on the other there was the requirement to move out as much as possible as early as possible. In fact, stores etc. that could be removed were being evacuated now but this process of backloading was not a speedy one. The limiting factor up to now had been the evacuation of R.A.F. stores and equipment since a longer time was required for them than for the army.

SIR WILLIAM DICKSON said that although the R.A.F. difficulty was due to the non-completion of the alternative bases in the Middle East, in which the stores were to be placed, this difficulty need not hold up the evacuation if it became a cardinal point to pull out quickly. The R.A.F. squadrons could for example be brought back to the United Kingdom. The real factor, as far as the R.A.F. was concerned, was to avoid loss of valuable equipment by too hurried a move. 18 months, however, would appear to be sufficient time to avoid any difficulty in that connection.

SIR JOHN HARDING felt that the B.D.C.C. (M.E.) should now take an arbitrary attitude on the backloading of stores on the assumption that the base to be left in Egypt would be small and should not contain more than was necessary for the forces it was proposed to keep in the M.E. in peacetime. It was preferable to remove the valuable stores and equipment now, even though this might mean shortages for a year or so, rather than to lose them. It was unlikely that for a few years the M.E. forces would require these stores which, if left too long might well be lost altogether.

Every sort of exercise on the base had now been carried out, except on what was the minimum worthwhile shell to be retained in Egypt. Such a shell might consist of just the necessary covered accommodation, port facilities, airfields etc. that were required and not entail the maintenance of stores etc. It would be useful to have the facts and figures of what such a minimum shell would consist. The object of retaining such a base would be purely to provide justification for re-entry in the event of war.

SIR WILLIAM DICKSON said that the requirement for a minimum base should take account of the fact that it was unlikely that reinforcement divisions would be available at any rate in the early stages of a war. Allowance would have to be made however for a New Zealand contingent. The destructive power of the hydrogen bomb must also be taken into account in deciding the size of the base in the M.E.

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Mr. BROMLEY (Foreign Office) said that the Americans might be prepared to take part on technical committees for the running of the base. They could not force American civil firms to join in civil contracts for maintenance of the base if they were unwilling to do so. It would be of assistance to the Foreign Office to have the results of the examination of what should constitute the shell of a base in Egypt.

SIR RICHARD POWELL (Ministry of Defence) said that the exercise for deciding what should constitute the minimum shell of a base in Egypt might be more easily carried out in London since the B.D.C.C. (M.E.) did not possess enough information on the general war plans. He felt that enough information was available in London for the exercise to be carried out quickly.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) The B.D.C.C. (M.E.) should continue the backloading of stores from the Canal Zone on the lines indicated by the C.I.G.S., provided the increased backloading did not give the impression that we were pulling out of the base.
- (b) American assistance was clearly required in view of the mutual Anglo-American strategic interests in the Middle East. It should be stressed to them that, in making a request for assistance, the United Kingdom was not seeking for contributions of any military forces from them.
- (c) An examination on what should constitute the minimum shell of the base to be left in Egypt should be carried out as a matter of urgency. This examination should cover the minimum requirements in the way of fixed installations etc. on a care and maintenance basis. The maintenance of stores would not be included. Airfield requirements should be based on the maintenance of two or possibly three airfields, that at Abu Sueier being most important. This examination should be carried out by the Working Party on M.E. redeployment, in consultation with the B.D.C.C. (M.E.)
- (d) It should be borne in mind that the minimum base to be left in Egypt must be demonstrably of value. It should represent the minimum that the United Kingdom would accept if it proved impossible to obtain a more favourable arrangement. No indication should be given to the Egyptians at this stage about this matter.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Invited Sir Richard Powell to arrange for the Working Party on Middle East Redeployment to carry out the examination indicated at (c) above.

31 May 54

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
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"A"

EGYPT

I am submitting separately a draft letter to General Brownjohn to accompany our Cabinet Paper on Egypt. Meanwhile, ought we not to send it to Cairo and Washington? One of the difficulties in the past when we have done this has been that, at the Cairo end at least, some telegrams^{to the} about the contract labour scheme which we intended for the Ambassador's own information got into the B.D.C.C. (M.E.) machine and provoked a spate of comments back to us and the Chiefs of Staff which were sometimes wide of the mark. At the same time, both Cairo and Washington complained with some justification of our niggardliness, in the early stages, in providing them with information about the way in which our thoughts were moving.

2. On this occasion I think we might send copies of the Cabinet Paper to our two Ambassadors personally, indicating that the paper is for their information only at this stage. We could tell them that the paper is unlikely to be taken for a little time, and that the idea is that members of the Cabinet should have a short period to reflect on it. The Americans know that the Secretary of State will review the question on his return, and I do not think that we need say anything more to them for the present.



June 2, 1954

Seen by Mr. Shuckburgh. Letter drafted

Thurs 2/6.

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371/108418

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Registry
No. JE1192/1196

Outline

Top Secret.
Secret.
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Open.

Draft. letter

General
Brownjohn
from
Minister of State

I enclose a copy of a paper on Egypt which I am having circulated to the Cabinet.

I hope it will not appear discourteous of me not to have sent it over for the Chiefs of Staff to see before this was done; the Foreign Secretary has seen it at Geneva and we wanted to get it out as soon as possible in order that members of the Cabinet might have sufficient time to reflect upon it before it is finally taken. As you know, there is likely to be a short interval before a decision is reached.

I believe the paper to be in line with the general thinking of the Chiefs of Staff on the subject, and felt that the interval before it is taken by the Cabinet would in any event give them time to comment on it if they so desire.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

*Approved
2/6.*

*Seen by
Mr. Shindler.*

Mr. Duff.

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JEN 192/119

"b"

FIRST SEA LORD
C.I.G.S.
C.A.S.

REFERENCE: COS.769/3/6/54

Copies to: Sir Richard Powell,
Mr. Bromley, Foreign Office ✓

EGYPT - DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS

You will recall that at your meeting⁺ on 19th May, 1954, you invited the Foreign Office to arrange for your consideration of their draft memorandum on this subject.

2. I am informed by the Foreign Office that it has not been possible to circulate the memorandum as a draft but that it has been issued in final form^o. The Foreign Office would however, welcome your comments on it.

3. I propose therefore to place this minute on the Agenda for your meeting on Wednesday, 9th June, 1954, so that you can consider the memorandum^o. I will invite representatives of the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence to attend the meeting.

(Sgd.) E. V. M. STRICKLAND

Secretary
Chiefs of Staff Committee

3rd June, 1954

JEN 192/119

Mr. Strickland - 8 min
2/6 4/6

+ COS(54)58th Meeting, Minute 2

C. (54)187

JEN 192/119
↑

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Put with pp. g

TOP SECRET

JE 1192/119

JE 1192/1195

EGYPT: CABINET DISCUSSION

Flag A The Cabinet will be considering on June 15 our paper (C.(54) 187) on Egypt. JE 1192/1209

Flag B 2. Our general views on the course which ought to be pursued are contained in our telegram No. 1052 to Geneva, which the Secretary of State has now approved. It is suggested that the following line might be taken in the Cabinet.

3. As stated in the last paragraph of the Cabinet Paper, the Foreign Secretary will want to raise the question urgently on his return from Geneva. His return may now not be very long delayed.

4. The Secretary of State will wish himself to be present at any final Cabinet discussion about resuming negotiations with Egypt, and the purpose of the present discussion is not, therefore, to deal with that problem nor to deal with the question of what size of base it would be desirable to maintain in view of all the factors involved. But there is one point on which it would be most useful to have the views of the Cabinet in order to facilitate the work which must be done before a final decision is taken.

5. As will be seen from the Cabinet paper, there appear to be two ways in which negotiations may be resumed with some prospect of success. The first would be on the basis of the existing technicians scheme. ^(reach agreement on that basis with the inclusion of Turkey in the availability clause) But in order to secure the inclusion of Turkey in the availability clause on that basis

it still appears that it would be essential for us to give way on our insistence that our technicians should in certain circumstances be permitted to wear uniform. The second possibility would be to propose the maintenance of the base by a civilian organisation. The second of these appears to

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us to be preferable, for the reasons given in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the telegram to Geneva. The cost of maintaining a base with civilian labour on the scale previously envisaged would probably be prohibitive, but it is likely that something smaller than that would now be sufficient for our purposes, and particularly in view of the new strategic conceptions which are emerging as a result of nuclear weapons.

6. We hope, therefore, that the Cabinet will be prepared to rule out the first alternative and be prepared to consider in due course proposals based upon the second. Jc 1192/1209

7. At the office meeting held last week it was decided that it would be preferable to say as little as possible about American participation at the Cabinet meeting. But if it comes up the line taken might be that set forth in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the telegram to Geneva. The main point is that we want to secure American support in the most useful way we can. We particularly want American help after the signature of an agreement to ensure that the agreement is properly carried out. We are unlikely to be able to secure American participation in other than token form in the management of the base, and even that is likely to prove a stumbling block as far as the Egyptians are concerned. It would be better to get an agreement in a form which the Americans would wholeheartedly support, and that in turn is likely to make them readier to put pressure on the Egyptians subsequently to see that the agreement is observed. There is also the point that American participation in the running of our base might not be too well received in this country, but that is perhaps not a point which could safely be made in the Cabinet.

June 14, 1954

W. Brown

JE 1192/119

Paper A

Prefer 2 years to 20 years to help to agreement

EGYPT

PW JE 1192/119c

Flag A.

The Cabinet will consider the attached paper C(54)187 tomorrow.

2. It has been broadly accepted by the Minister of Defence, Service Ministers and Chiefs of Staff.

3. We have worked out a revised Draft Heads of Agreement

Flag B.

(Flag B). This gives a clearer picture of our proposals than paragraph 8 of the Cabinet Paper. In particular it contains the latest formula on availability. Copies are attached for circulation to Cabinet if desired.

4. The figures for the duration of the Agreement and for the period of our withdrawal, in paragraphs 2 and 7, have been left blank. It would not be desirable for the Cabinet to tie the hands of our negotiators too closely. We should start by asking for 20 years and 2 years respectively. We are most unlikely to get 20, and should probably have to be satisfied with 10 or 12. But the 2 years for withdrawal are a practical necessity, and we should fight very hard for them.

5. When our new proposals are presented to the Egyptians, we shall want American support. This might take the form:-

(a) Of a public statement by the United States Government to the effect that they consider the new proposals reasonable and soundly conceived from the strategic point of view.

(b) A private intimation to the Egyptians that United States aid will be dependent upon the Egyptians reaching agreement with us on the new basis and carrying the agreement out in good faith.

(c) (at a later stage) public support for the clause about freedom of navigation.

6. If the Cabinet approve the proposals in C(54)187, Sir Ralph Stevenson should at once give Nasser to understand that we are about to come forward with new and constructive proposals.


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7. It is for consideration whether he could not go further. There would be much to be said for giving Nasser an outline of our new proposals before the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary discuss the matter in Washington. It would avoid the risk that the Egyptians hear of our proposals first through the Americans. It would reduce the likelihood of our being pressed to make concessions before we have even begun; it would enable the Prime Minister to invite President Eisenhower's support for a specific set of proposals; and it would mean that a public statement of United States interest and support could be made at the conclusion of the Washington visit. (Such a declaration could hardly be made by the United States Government unless we had already approached the Egyptians.) Moreover, any delay in opening negotiations may make agreement more difficult, and incidents may occur which would set back the prospect of opening negotiation.

8. The Minister of Defence may raise in Cabinet the need to retain (a) war reserves in store, and (b) base workshops in operation to maintain our Middle East forces in peacetime. There is no reason why both these requirements should not be met within the framework of our paper.



June 21, 1954.

FO 371/108418

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EGYPTJ61192/119
E

The Cabinet will be taking the Minister of State's paper C(54)187 tomorrow. 51 1192/1196

The conclusions of this paper have been, broadly speaking, agreed by the Minister of Defence, Service Ministers and Chiefs of Staff. The Minister of Defence, however, is circulating certain commentary.

It is most necessary that something should be said to the Egyptians before the Washington visit (see especially B.D.C.C. telegram No. 940). 51 1193/1196

If the Cabinet finds itself in broad agreement with the Minister of State's paper, it might be possible to do more than merely hint at resumption of negotiations. There is much to be said for giving Colonel Nasser at least an outline of our new ideas before the Prime Minister sees President Eisenhower. This has three advantages:

(a) It will show the Egyptians that we are not waiting upon the Americans before putting proposals.

(b) It will enable the Prime Minister to ask for the President's moral support for a specific plan already determined.

(c) It will save time and be sure of holding the position in Egypt.



June 21, 1954.

Reference:-

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G. R.

TOP SECRET

*Mr Brindley
Are they going to insert the minutes? (M)*

Enter

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,

STOREY'S GATE, JE1192

S.W.1.

REFERENCE: C.O.B. 801/10/6/54

10th June, 1954.

Dear Mr Shuckburgh

Yls. Please

copy of letter attached

The 11/6

good

EGYPT - DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS

You will recall that at their meeting⁺ on the 9th June, 1954 the Chiefs of Staff discussed a memorandum by the Minister of State and also a report^o by the Working Party on Middle East Re-deployment regarding the composition of a nucleus base in the Canal Zone.

(M) 11/6

2. I attach for your information a copy of the relevant minute and would draw your attention to Conclusion (2) thereof.

*Yours sincerely
H.A. G. Jones*

+ Secretary
Chiefs of Staff Committee

C. A. E. Shuckburgh, C.B., C.M.G.
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

JE 1192/1192
+ COS(54)69th Meeting, Minute 2
C(54)187
OOS(54)185

TOP SECRET

JE1192

121 G

FO 371/108418

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EXTRACT FROM C.O.S.(54) 69th MEETING HELD 9-6-542. EGYPT - DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS TOP SECRET

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(54) 64th Meeting, Minute 11)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a minute⁺ by the Secretary referring to a memorandum^b by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on defence negotiations with Egypt. In addition a report^c by the Working Party on Middle East Redeployment about the minimum worthwhile shell for the Canal Zone Base was circulated at the meeting.

MR. SHUCKBURGH (Foreign Office) agreed that our right of re-entry to the Canal zone should be "on the threat of war" rather than "if an attack is made on the Arab States or Turkey"^{*}. It should also be our aim to maintain for as long as possible an "optimum" rather than a "minimum"[£] form of nucleus base.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) The main objective was to obtain an agreement with Egypt, which must include the right to come back to the Canal zone to a demonstrably useful base. The size of the base to be retained would depend, among other things, on how much the Egyptians would accept and how much we could afford.

+ COS: 769/3/6/54

b C(54) 187

c C.O.S.(54) 185

* Paragraph 8(11) of C(54) 187

£ Paragraph 7 of C(54) 187

I did not say this. I signed it. Should we use the formula already agreed

CM

11/6.

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reference:-

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- (b) The military value of the base had decreased since the advent of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. The installations in the base which it was essential to maintain after re-deployment should be related to these changed conditions observing that the majority would be liable to early destruction in war.
- (c) The maintenance of installations in the base after re-deployment could be carried out more effectively and cheaply by technicians from the armed forces but, if they were not allowed to wear uniform, this alternative appeared unacceptable.
- (d) It was unlikely to be acceptable to Egypt that United States civilian contractors should contribute to the maintenance of the Base after redeployment.
- (e) In order to facilitate the maintenance of the essential installations of the Base, consideration might be given to placing contracts with existing large firms with branches in Egypt and also to handing over some installations to the Egyptian Army to use and maintain.
- (f) Although there was no need at this stage to discuss with the Egyptians the details of installations to be retained in the base, the list contained in the report by the Working Party would probably be acceptable to them. The list was also considered to be within the capacity of civilian contractors.
- (g) It would be undesirable to reduce the base to such an extent as to give the impression to Egypt and the world that there was no longer any organisation left which could be effectively used in war.

/ COS(54)185

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MR. WOOD (Ministry of Defence) suggested that a meeting should be held by the Minister of Defence with the Service Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff to discuss the whole question before the memorandum by the Minister of State was discussed by the Cabinet. The Ministry of Defence could prepare a paper summarizing the position, for consideration at such a meeting.

In further discussion THE COMMITTEE agreed that:-

- (h) It would be desirable to hold a meeting as suggested by Mr. Wood, so long as consideration by the Cabinet of the memorandum by the Minister of State was not thereby delayed. A paper for consideration at the meeting should be prepared by the Ministry of Defence in the light of the points made in discussion.
- (j) The list of installations to be retained as a nucleus base by the Army as set out in the report by the Working Party should be re-examined prior to the meeting at (h) above in the light of the points made in discussion.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Took note of the report by the Working Party on Middle East Re-deployment and invited the War Office to take action as at (j) above.
- (2) Invited the Foreign Office to take note of their views as expressed in discussion.
- (3) Invited the Ministry of Defence to take note of their views as expressed in discussion and to take action as at (h) above.

6 C(54) 187
7 C.O.S.(54) 185

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

June 10, 1954

TOP SECRET

JE 1192/1214

Please refer to the record of Item 2 in the 69th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff held on June 9 (Egypt - Defence Negotiations).

2. May I make a comment on Mr. Shuckburgh's remarks as reported in the record? As I remember the discussion, the First Sea Lord raised the point about re-entry to the Canal Zone "on the threat of war". I think Mr. Shuckburgh said that we would look into that but that our intention in the reference to this matter made in paragraph 8(11) of our draft Cabinet Paper was not to alter (except as regards the inclusion of Turkey) the availability clause as previously proposed by the British side in the discussions with Egypt.

3. I think that in point of fact this clause did lay down that there should be the right to re-enter in the event of an attack. In the event of a threat of an attack on the countries concerned there should be immediate consultation between the United Kingdom and Egypt. In this connexion perhaps I may quote paragraphs 3 and 4 of Foreign Office telegram No. 126 to Washington of January 9, which was part of

/s

Lieut-Colonel E. V. Strickland, D.S.O., M.M.,
Ministry of Defence.

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a series of telegrams sent to Washington at that time to explain our position to the Americans. The quotation is as follows;

"3. The Canal Zone base and its contents will be maintained in efficient working order as a working base to supply and maintain in peace the forces supported by Her Majesty's Government in the Middle East and to be capable of immediate use in accordance with the following paragraph.

4. In the event of -

(a) an attack by an outside power on Egypt;

or

(b) an attack by an outside power on any country which is a party to the Arab Mutual Security Pact;

or

(c) a recommendation by the United Nations that the base should be made available in the event of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or act of aggression; Egypt will afford to the United Kingdom all such facilities as may be necessary to place the base on a war footing and operate it efficiently. These facilities will include the use within the limits strictly indispensable for the above mentioned purposes of the Egyptian ports by British forces.

In the event of a threat of an attack on any members of the Arab Mutual Security Pact, Iran or Turkey, there shall be immediate consultation between the United Kingdom and Egypt."

4. This was the last formula given to the Egyptians. The latest formula produced in this office is as follows:-

(S. P. 100)

5 371/108418

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"(1) In the event of -

An attack by an outside power on Egypt,
on any country which is a party to the
Arab Mutual Security Pact, or on Turkey

Egypt will afford to the United Kingdom all
such facilities as may be necessary to place
the Base on a war footing and operate it
efficiently. These facilities will include
the use within the limits strictly indispensable
for the above mentioned purposes of Egyptian
ports by British forces.

(11) In the event of a threat of an attack on
any of the members of the Arab Mutual Security
Pact, Iran or Turkey there shall be immediate
consultation between the United Kingdom and
Egypt."

That was based generally on paragraph 5 of Cairo
telegram No. 133 of January 30 but with the omission
of Persia from the countries on which an attack
would result in the reactivation of the base. The
indications still are that Egypt would now accept
Turkey but not Persia in this portion of the
availability clause.

(T. E. Bromley)

J

Sir I. Kirkpatrick.

The attached draft telegram from the Minister of State to the Secretary of State results from a meeting held by the Minister of State ~~the~~ morning at which the two Parliamentary Under Secretaries and the Department and I were present.

2. The Minister of State felt that it would help to push matters along if the Cabinet could look at our paper before Mr. Eden comes back, though he would not, of course, attempt to extract a decision on the broad question from them. The point would be to get them to say whether they are willing to go ahead with the civilian contractors scheme which we all think is better than a scheme of technicians without uniform.

3. One of the advantages of getting this aired in the Cabinet next week is that it may get into the Prime Minister's mind, before he takes his journey, the kind of support we now want from the Americans. We have rather changed our views on this since the idea of American participation was first mooted. We now want general and public support for our agreement as a whole rather than American participation in the management of the base or an American share in the right to re-enter. The reasons for this are set out in the telegram.

C.A.E. Shuckburgh

(C.A.E. Shuckburgh)
June 14, 1954.

P.S. Unfortunately it now appears that the Minister of Defence cannot manage a meeting with the Minister of State next week. (See Mr. Frank Wood's letter attached). This is v. unsatisfactory. The Minister of State may wish to visit on seeing Lord Alexander ~~at~~ some time before Tuesday's Cabinet, to make sure ~~we~~ he is in general agreement on the contractor scheme, & will support this line in Cabinet. The details could then be worked out afterwards at a lower level.
Minister of State.

entered separate tab
JE1192/108418

I. Kirkpatrick
16. VI.

Reference:-

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Tel. No. : Whitehall 7000

SECRETPut with Mr.
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE~~STORES GATE,~~

S.W.1

12th June 1954

Dear *Cuy,*

Your letter of 11th June.

We agree that the minutes are not accurate on this point and we apologize. But I do not think, either, that we agreed to rule out technicians entirely. We are told from time to time that one or other Minister has said that technicians in mufti are politically impossible. But there has been no collective Ministerial decision to this effect and until there is my feeling is that we are in duty bound to go on pointing out politely but firmly that, except on the issue of uniforms, technicians are miles better (as you know my view is that the distance can only be measured in light years) than civil contractors.

I am copying this to Baker.

Yours sincerely,

G.E. Millard, Esq.,
FOREIGN OFFICE.*David Wood***SECRET**

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JE1192

JE1192/122

M. E. R. / M(54)11

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

WORKING PARTY ON MIDDLE EAST REDEPLOYMENT

MINUTES of a Meeting held in Conference
Room 'F', Ministry of Defence, S.W.1, on
TUESDAY, 8TH JUNE, 1954, at 3.0 p.m.

PRESENT

Mr. F. Wood,
Ministry of Defence.
(In the Chair)

Major General C.D. Packard,
War Office.

Brigadier G.H. Baker,
War Office.

Mr. A.C.W. Drew,
War Office.

Mr. H.L. Lawrence-Wilson,
Admiralty.

Mr. A.L.M. Cary,
Air Ministry.

Squadron Leader G.V. Ridpath,
Air Ministry.

Mr. J. MacPherson,
Treasury.

Mr. G.E. Millard,
Foreign Office.

SECRETARY:

Mr. R.H. Prince,
Ministry of Defence.

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS

THE CHAIRMAN suggested that the meeting should consider first the Cabinet paper C.54(187) by the Minister of State, as that would provide the background for the discussion on the other items on the agenda.

1. C.54(187) - MEMORANDUM BY THE MINISTER OF STATE

Point made in discussion were:-

- (i) The Foreign Office representative said that the memorandum had been circulated by the Minister of State in order that Ministers could give preliminary consideration to the problem but it was unlikely that the Cabinet would discuss the paper until the Foreign Secretary was available.
- (ii) The War Office representatives said that reduction of the Base to a nucleus would not save much money. It cost little more to maintain British soldiers in Egypt than in this country. While some savings would result from the disbandment of coloured Pioneer units, this would be offset by losses of stores which would result if we had to close down within two years.
- (iii) The War Office fear was that the Minister of State's paper gave too much away. Although, in the last resort, a nucleus Base, coupled with the right of re-entry, would be better than nothing, the best solution would be the restricted base run by 4,000 British technicians; this had already been agreed by the Egyptians, apart from the uniform difficulty. Negotiations with Egypt should aim at keeping the essentials of the restricted base scheme, if necessary run by civilian contract or direct labour on a reduced basis; and the idea of a nucleus base accepted only if no better solution could be achieved.
- (iv) MR. MILLARD said that the proposals in the paper had been drafted as widely as possible so that, if the Cabinet approved them, the Foreign Secretary would have considerable room for manoeuvre in negotiations. The suggestion that the Base should be reduced to a nucleus had been made in view of the necessity to reduce costs to a minimum. It must also be remembered that time was running out as the present Treaty would expire in 1956.
- (v) The War Office required the use of the Base Workshops in Egypt in peace-time and if this could not be secured by an agreement with the Egyptians we should have to incur large expenditure on bringing equipment back to this country for repair or on providing workshops elsewhere in the Middle East. The workshops in Libya would not be available after 1958. It would also be necessary to keep the war reserves in Egypt for the re-deployed Middle East forces until it was possible to provide alternative accommodation for them elsewhere in the Middle East.

P 371/108418

- (vi) Although the civilian contract scheme might prove too costly, this could only be found out by experience and it would be for the Service Departments to decide in the light of their financial position what sort of Base they could afford to retain.
- (vii) The suggestion in the Minister of State's paper that all stores should be removed or sold within two years was impracticable in view of the lack of storage elsewhere.
- (viii) The Air Ministry requirement was for the airfield at Abu Sueir with the associated flying boat base at Fanara but it was hoped that the Egyptian Air Force would themselves maintain other airfields.

After further discussion, THE MEETING agreed that:-

- (1) The essential requirements were for the nucleus of a Base, coupled with the right of re-entry in war, for the retention of war reserves safeguarded if possible by British soldiers in the Base until alternative storage accommodation could be provided elsewhere in the Middle East, and for the Base Workshops to be retained on a civilian manned basis.
- (2) On the understanding that the intention of C.(54)187 was to obtain Cabinet approval for a wide measure of discretion for the negotiations, there seemed no reason why we should not try for a form of restricted Base with 4,000 technicians and accept the nucleus Base scheme only if nothing better can be obtained.
- (3) It would be useful if the Ministry of Defence could arrange for an early meeting of Service Ministers, the Minister of State and, possibly, a Treasury Minister to discuss the position with the Chiefs of Staff before the Cabinet took the Minister of State's paper.

2. REPORT TO CHIEFS OF STAFF ON THE MINIMUM BASE

A draft report by the Ministry of Defence based on the information in M.E.R./P(54)5 and 6 was circulated.

THE MEETING invited the Ministry of Defence to submit the report, as amended in discussion, to the Chiefs of Staff.

3. MOVE OF JOINT H.Q. IN CYPRUS

THE CHAIRMAN referred to the Chiefs of Staff discussion at their meeting on 28th May and said that the Ministry of Defence wanted to know whether any action was being held up by lack of financial authority. It seemed from M.E.R./P(54)5

References:-

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and 7 that two points only were outstanding (i) Treasury approval for expenditure on temporary camps at Episkopi and (ii) Treasury approval for hiring of additional married quarters.

MR. MACPHERSON said that the Treasury had some doubt whether the dates planned for the moves were firm enough to justify the expenditure contemplated on these items. With regard to (i) the Treasury had just received a reply from the War Office to certain queries; (ii) had not previously been put to the Treasury.

THE MEETING:-

Invited the Treasury to consider these questions urgently and let the Ministry of Defence know whether they considered further authority for the planned dates of removal was required.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

10TH JUNE, 1954.

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SECRET*Original**Entry*

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

June 11, 1954.

I have one comment to make on the minutes of the meeting of the Working Party on Middle East Redeployment on June 8, (M.E.R./M (54) 11).

2. On page 3 it is stated that the meeting agreed that "there seemed no reason why we should not try for a form of restricted base with 4,000 technicians".

3. This was not my understanding of the conclusion reached at all. I thought that it had been accepted that for political reasons, a solution based on military technicians must be ruled out; but that there seemed to be no reason why we should not try, at the outset of the negotiations with the Egyptians, to secure the facilities required by the War Office for storing the war reserves and for the maintenance of equipment in the base workshops. It might, however, be necessary, if this for various reasons proved too difficult, to come down to the conception of a minimum nucleus base, as set out in C(54) 187.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to Baker in the War Office.

(G.E. Millard)

F. Wood, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION)

Cypher/OTF

DEPARTMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION

No. 1052

June 12, 1951.

D. 1.31 p.m. June 12, 1951.

IMMEDIATE
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Following for Secretary of State from Minister of State,
Egypt.

I believe that the situation is now more propitious for reaching a settlement than it has been for some time and that we ought not to delay much longer. The Egyptians are obviously keen to negotiate and are making practical efforts to restrain terrorism in the Canal Zone. Anticipation has been heightened by the recent series of press reports about a possible resumption of negotiations. A sudden loss of patience by the Egyptians might lead to a crop of incidents which would make resumption very difficult.

2. I do not suggest that you can take a decision to this effect in Geneva, still less that we should try in your absence to get such a decision from Cabinet. But I do think we should be clearing our minds as to what sort of settlement we might now expect to obtain. The main question at issue is whether

(a) to return to the technicians scheme and make the concession on the wearing of uniforms in return for the inclusion of Turkey in the availability clause, or

(b) to pursue the idea of a scheme based on contract labour, on the lines of the draft Cabinet paper contained in Foreign Office telegram No. 809.

3. We have think that (a) should be rejected for the following reasons.

(i) It would be extremely difficult to justify to public opinion in this country the concession on uniforms.

(ii) If we made this concession, we might reach heads of agreement fairly quickly; but we foresee great difficulties in working out the actual agreement with the Egyptians and

TOP SECRETForeign Office telegram No. 1052 to Cedel Geneva

- 2 -

in particular in securing satisfactory immunities.

(iii) Even if agreement were reached, the continued presence of British soldiers in the zone after the fighting troops had left would provide endless sources of friction with the Egyptians. They would be hostages to fortune, and we would be exposed to the same kind of humiliations as we are now suffering in the Sudan.

4. The contract labour scheme eliminates most of this. It also seems more suited to the kind of set up we are now likely to require in the Canal Zone after our troops have gone. There have been some fresh thoughts on this, particularly in relation to the new strategic conceptions which are emerging as a result of nuclear weapons.

5. A revised estimate is now being made (a) of the essential working facilities (repair shops etc.) which we require in peacetime for the maintenance of our forces in the Middle East and (b) of the installations and materials which it is absolutely necessary to keep in our hands in Egypt for reactivation in event of war. The result is likely to add up to a smaller and less elaborate "base" than we have hitherto envisaged. It should not be difficult to maintain this reduced form of base by contract labour and the cost should not be too great. I am to discuss this with the Service Ministers and Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible.

6. It is true that this proposal is new to the Egyptians, and we may have difficulty with them over our requirement for a longer duration for the agreement. But it has the advantage for them that no British soldiers would remain in Egypt. There should be fewer causes of friction and subsequent relations should be easier.

7. The question of American participation is a little difficult. The Americans have made it clear that they are not particularly keen on securing availability for themselves or participating in the operation of the base unless it will really help us, and then only if invited by the Egyptians. Moreover there may be difficulty in securing any American contractors. From the Egyptian point of view it will I fear be a substantial

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TOP SECRET**Foreign Office telegram No. 1052 to Codel Geneva**

- 3 -

stumbling block. In fact I doubt very much whether they could agree to give the Americans as well as ourselves right of re-entry. It would too easily be represented as succumbing to "Anglo-American imperialism".

8. I have discussed this with the Department, and we all feel that the necessary American backing should be secured in other ways, not requiring new "conditions" of the Egyptians? It might, for instance, take the form of a strong public declaration of support for our agreement and an indication to the Egyptians that the flow of United States aid will depend on proper observance of the agreement. As far as British opinion is concerned, I should have thought this would have at least as much value as an arrangement which introduced American contractors to help look after British stores. I believe this is the sort of "moral support" which the Prime Minister should seek from the President.

9. My thought was that I might arrange for our draft Cabinet paper to be discussed in general terms by the Cabinet on Tuesday but without asking them to take any decision to renew negotiations. Provided you agree I would try to get the Cabinet to express a preference for course (b) in paragraph 2 above. This would enable me to get ahead with detailed work on that plan, so as to be ready with clear proposals for you to put to Cabinet on your return.

10. Do you agree?

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JEN 192/120

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (U.K. DELEGATION) TO **B**
FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

DEPARTMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Eden

No. 685

June 13, 1954

D. 2.52 p.m. June 13, 1954


R. 2.53 p.m. June 13, 1954

PRIORITY

Your telegram No. 1052.

Following for Minister of State:

Yes. This is very helpful.

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American Department

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JEN 92/12 G P.W.

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13/15/6

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C.O.S.(54)195

14TH JUNE, 1954

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

EGYPT - DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS

Copy of a letter dated 10th June, 1954 from the Foreign Office to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee

PW
JEN 92/1219

Please refer to the record of Item 2 in the 69th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff held on June 9 (Egypt - Defence Negotiations).

2. May I make a comment on Mr. Shuckburgh's remarks as reported in the record? As I remember the discussion, the First Sea Lord raised the point about re-entry to the Canal Zone "on the threat of war". I think Mr. Shuckburgh said that we would look into that but that our intention in the reference to this matter made in paragraph 8(ii) of our Draft Cabinet Paper was not to alter (except as regards the inclusion of Turkey) the availability clause as previously proposed by the British side in the discussions with Egypt.

3. I think that in point of fact this clause did lay down that there should be the right to re-enter in the event of an attack. In the event of a threat of an attack on the countries concerned there should be immediate consultation between the United Kingdom and Egypt. In this connexion perhaps I may quote paragraphs 3 and 4 of Foreign Office telegram No. 428 to Washington of January 9, which was part of a series of telegrams sent to Washington at that time to explain our position to the Americans. The quotation is as follows:-

"3. The Canal Zone base and its contents will be maintained in efficient working order as a working base to supply and maintain in peace the forces supported by Her Majesty's Government in the Middle East and to be capable of immediate use in accordance with the following paragraph.

4. In the event of -

(a) an attack by an outside power on Egypt;
or

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- (b) an attack by an outside power on any country which is a party to the Arab Mutual Security Pact;

or

- (c) a recommendation by the United Nations that the base should be made available in the event of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or act of aggression;

Egypt will afford to the United Kingdom all such facilities as may be necessary to place the base on a war footing and operate it efficiently. These facilities will include the use within the limits strictly indispensable for the above mentioned purposes of the Egyptian ports by British forces.

In the event of a threat of an attack on any members of the Arab Mutual Security Pact, Iran or Turkey, there shall be immediate consultation between the United Kingdom and Egypt."

4. This was the last formula given to the Egyptians. The latest formula produced in this office is as follows:-

- "(i) In the event of -

An attack by an outside power on Egypt, on any country which is a party to the Arab Mutual Security Pact, or on Turkey

Egypt will afford to the United Kingdom all such facilities as may be necessary to place the Base on a war footing and operate it efficiently. These facilities will include the use within the limits strictly indispensable for the above mentioned purposes of Egyptian ports by British forces.

- (ii) In the event of a threat of an attack on any of the members of the Arab Mutual Security Pact, Iran or Turkey there shall be immediate consultation between the United Kingdom and Egypt."

That was based generally on paragraph 5 of Cairo telegram No. 133 of January 30 but with the omission of Persia from the countries on which an attack would result in the re-activation of the base. The indications still are that Egypt would now accept Turkey but not Persia in this portion of the availability clause.

(Signed) T. E. BROMLEY

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

14TH JUNE, 1954

- 2 -

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SECRET

FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) TO
FOREIGN OFFICE

SR

Cypher/OTP

P R I S E C

Mr. Eden

No. 801

June 19, 1954.

D. 5.21 p.m. June 19, 1954.

R. 5.27 p.m. June 19, 1954.

PRIORITY

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 801 of June 19
Repeated for information to Washington Cairo

Following personal for Prime Minister from Secretary of State:-

You may have seen from yesterday's message from the "Times" correspondent in Washington that "the United States has been becoming more and more restive under accusations of imperialism" and that "the Administration feels that it is being led into support of British imperialist positions in a number of areas which will certainly be mentioned in the talks- Persia and Egypt in particular."

2. I do not much like the tone of this, and I should like it still less if our approach to the Egyptians appeared to come as a result of pressure from the Americans while we were in Washington.

3. To guard against this I think we should consider the Foreign Office saying something to the Egyptian Ambassador before we go in general terms, indicating perhaps that consequent on my return from Geneva we were reviewing the situation and might have some communication to make to them later. Perhaps you would think this over?

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Cairo as my telegrams Nos. 267 and 7 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and Cairo].

[Copies sent to the Prime Minister].

B B B

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FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE (UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION) TO
FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

JE1192

P R I S E C

Mr. Eden

No.801

June 19, 1954.

D.5.21 p.m. June 19, 1954.

R.5.27 p.m. June 19, 1954.

PRIORITY

SECRET

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Repeated for information to Washington Cairo

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Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Cairo as my telegrams Nos.267 and 7 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and Cairo].

[Copies sent to the Prime Minister].

Reference:-

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J67142 123
"A"SECRETFROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

PRISECSir R. Stevenson
No. 717
June 20, 1954.D. 11.55 a.m. June 20, 1954.
R. 1.55 p.m. June 20, 1954.PRIORITY
SECRETAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 717 of June 20
Repeated for information to:- Codel Geneva
Washington

Codel Geneva telegram No. 801, paragraph 3.

Local considerations also make such a step desirable.
Please see in this connexion paragraph 5 of BDCG telegram
No. 920/OCL to Chiefs of Staff.Foreign Office please pass Codel Geneva and Washington
as my telegrams Nos. 5 and 91 respectively.

[Repeated to Codel Geneva and Washington].

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

Cypher/OTP

P R I S E C

No. 1497
June 20, 1954.

D. 1.43 p.m. June 20, 1954.

IMMEDIATE

DEDIP

TOP SECRET

Following private and personal for Foreign Secretary from Prime Minister.

Begins:

Your No. 801.

321000-123

1. Please do not take the action you suggest until we can discuss the matter tomorrow morning. I was pursuing as you know the line of a joint Anglo-American settlement with Egypt which I believe would be the best solution. I have read Makins No. 1217. *AV 1223/7*

2. I have received the following from Ike:

Begins: June 18.

Dear Winston,

Do you interpret the elevation of Mendes-France and the pledges he has made as evidence of a readiness on his part to surrender completely in South-East Asia. If this is so can you give me some idea of your solution to the resulting problems? If you have formulated any thoughts of these delicate matters I should like to have them so that I can give them some contemplation before we meet. I understand you and Anthony reach here about 10 a.m. on Friday. This will be splendid as both Foster and I are looking forward eagerly to our talks. With warm regard as ever.

Ike.

Ends.

3. I have prepared an answer but I am holding it till I see you tomorrow.

Ends.

[Copies sent to the Prime Minister].

IMMEDIATE

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Handed

19193/1140

FROM : G.H.Q., MIDDLE EAST LAND FORCES

TO : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LONDON

PRIORITY

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(191148A)
TOR 191846A

INFO : H.M. EMBASSY, CAIRO.

940/CCL

19th June, 1954.

For Chiefs of Staff from B.D.C.C.(ME)

Reference COS(ME)73.

1. We note the possibility of delay in coming to a decision on the reopening of defence negotiations and comment on this aspect in paragraph 5 below.
2. As regards the question of wider representations to the Egyptian Government the position is at present as follows. While it is not yet possible to point to concrete results from H.M. Ambassador's representations there are hopeful signs of progress along the lines of these representations. Police co-operation is better. The tone of the Press has improved. Gang leaders are lying low and some of them may even have left the zone. We are also hopeful of being given facilities by the Egyptians to interrogate the driver of the MAFI vehicle which Private Vaux was escorting when he was murdered.
3. It is our view therefore that the time has not yet come for action as suggested by us in paragraphs 7 to 11 of 939/CCL. Our suggestions were in any case dependent on a positive official indication to the Egyptian Government that if they acted in accordance with our demands negotiations would be shortly resumed. It would seem that no such positive and official indication can at present be given.
4. We think therefore that the right course for the present is that H.M. Ambassador should keep up the pressure along existing lines.
5. We would however reiterate strongly our belief expressed in 935/CCL that time is not on our side. Delay increases the risk of another serious incident which at this juncture might make resumption of negotiations impossible. To stimulate the Egyptian Prime Minister to preserve law and order it would in our view be of great advantage if he could be given some private hint regarding the resumption of negotiations (e.g. that

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- 2 -

the decision has been delayed by preoccupation with other matters but that there is a hope of a communication shortly after the return of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary from Washington.

CIRCULATION

FOO 191348B

Foreign Office.
 War Registry, Admiralty.
 Message Control, War Office.
 Registry Telegrams, Air Ministry.
 Mr C.A.E. Shuckburgh, F.O.
 Mr P.H. Dean.
 Major General W.H.A. Bishop, C.R.O.
 Mr Armitage Smith, Colonial Office.
 D.C.O.R. 'B'

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A.

SECRET

At the Cabinet meeting yesterday the Cabinet took note that the Foreign Secretary would consider in the light of the Cabinet's discussion whether, before leaving for Washington, we should make any communication to the Egyptian Government with reference to the defence negotiations, and would consult with the Prime Minister on the terms of such a communication.

2. The position as far as the Egyptian Government are concerned is that they were told that the Secretary of State would review the general question on his return from Geneva. At that time we had expected that the Secretary of State would be able to return from Geneva earlier than was in fact the case. In the event we have not, therefore, been able to say anything to the Egyptians for a considerable time, and there is now the visit to Washington. The Egyptians have been showing some signs of co-operating in preventing incidents in the Canal Zone, and it is most desirable that the position should not again deteriorate before the end of the Washington talks.

3. In the circumstances the Department consider that it would be useful for some message to be passed to the Egyptians through Sir Ralph Stevenson to indicate that the whole question is now under review, with the aim of conducting a holding operation with them during the Washington talks. A draft telegram to Cairo is submitted together with a draft minute to the Prime Minister.

DeBrowley
June 23, 1954

*I have added some explanation for
Sir R. Stevenson.* *C. B. ...*
20/6

/I am

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I am afraid that this draft does not square the circle. Either it will be regarded as an undertaking to resume negotiations as soon as you return from Washington; and in that event there may be a damaging leak in Cairo. Or it will be regarded as a time-saving device calculated to lure the Egyptians into keeping quiet without any assurance that we shall open negotiations; and in that event it may do more harm than good.


I cannot think of any form of words which will do the trick. So I reluctantly recommend that we should keep silent until you come back.

J. Michpatrick

June 23, 1954.

Minister of State
Sec. of State.

Michpatrick
23/6



*We might try this.
But we had agreed
to await their
approach &
I think it would
be better to tell
Sir R.S. to speak
like this if asked.
We might do
them some
here*

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African Dept.

SECRETP.M./54/99PRIME MINISTER

At the Cabinet meeting on June 22 I undertook to consider, in the light of our discussion about Egypt, whether, before leaving for Washington, I should make any communication to the Egyptian Government with reference to the defence negotiations, and consult with you on the terms of any such communication.

I attach a draft telegram to Sir Ralph Stevenson which I hope you will think suitable. As you will see, I feel that it would be better to say nothing to the Egyptians unless they ask what our plans are.

June 24, 1954.

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SECRETDRAFT TELEGRAM TO CAIRO

Following personal for Ambassador.

I have had full discussions with my Cabinet colleagues regarding the future of the Canal Zone negotiations. The Prime Minister and I will be discussing the position with the Americans in Washington and we hope on our return to England to be able to take a final decision regarding renewal of negotiations.

2. I do not want you to say anything to the Egyptians at present unless you are approached by them. In that event you should say that I have been glad to note the improved situation in the Canal Zone and signs that the Egyptian Government are increasing their control over lawless elements. This is certainly producing an atmosphere more conducive to negotiation. I am giving the whole matter urgent personal attention and hope to reach conclusions as soon as I return from Washington. In the meantime, it is to be hoped that nothing will be said or done in either country to spoil the improved atmosphere.

*1/15/57**10/10 of 1956**10/10 of 1956**10/10 of 1956*

SECRET

E1192/116

EGYPT: IMMUNITIES FOR TECHNICIANS

The Secretary of State has asked whether there is a chance that the Egyptians would give us immunities for our technicians, if we returned to the technicians scheme.

2. ^{Nearly} all the discussion on the status of our technicians has been concerned with the question of uniforms and the wearing of personal arms; the question of immunities has never been discussed except in the most general terms. According to the Counsellor of the Egyptian Embassy in London, however, "any text giving our men a status comparable to that enjoyed by troops stationed in foreign countries under existing agreements would quite easily be accepted."

3. Both the Department and the Embassy in Cairo have thought that it would be impossible to obtain total immunity for our technicians, on the lines of the Convention attached to the 1936 Treaty. For reasons of prestige, there would be no chance of the Egyptians agreeing to this, particularly in view of the precedent provided by the N.A.T.O. Status of Forces Agreement.

Flag A.

4. A more favourable precedent, from our point of view, is provided by the agreement with Libya. As this has been published, the chances of the Egyptians agreeing to give us wider immunities than those contained in the Libyan Agreement are very remote.

Flag B.

5. The essential provisions of the Libyan Agreement in regard to criminal jurisdiction are as follows:-

The United Kingdom authorities shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over members of the British forces in the following cases:

/(a)

- (a) Offences solely against the property of the Government of the United Kingdom or against the personal property of any member of the British forces;
- (b) Offences committed solely on the agreed lands (i.e. ^{at} military camps);
- (c) Offences against the security of the United Kingdom, including treason, sabotage, etc.;
- (d) Offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty.

In these cases members of the British forces are immune from the jurisdiction of the Libyan Courts.

In all other cases the Libyan Courts have jurisdiction unless the Government of Libya waive their right to it. They undertake to give sympathetic consideration to any request from the United Kingdom authorities for a waiver of their right.

6. These provisions are broadly the same as those of the N.A.T.O. Status of Forces Agreement. The essential difference between the Libyan Agreement and the N.A.T.O. Agreement is that the Libyan authorities will undertake, if requested by us, to release from custody an arrested member of the British forces on our undertaking to present him to the Libyan Courts, when required, for investigatory proceedings and trial; whereas on this point the N.A.T.O. Agreement merely says that the custody of an accused member of the sending State, over whom the receiving State is to exercise jurisdiction, shall, if he is in the hands of the sending State, remain with that State until he is charged.

7. The reason for this difference is, of course, that we were concerned to ensure that members of the British forces should not languish in Libyan gaols pending trial. We should also be anxious to ensure this in any agreement with Egypt.

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8. A detailed annex to the draft Defence Agreement has been worked out and agreed with the Legal Adviser and all the Government Departments concerned. It follows the Libyan precedent closely and provides that the Egyptian authorities shall release an arrested member of the British personnel on remand, pending investigation or trial. This annex is ready for presentation to the Egyptians at a suitable moment. It has always been intended that this should be done after Heads of Agreement have been reached, and the draft agreed minute on ^(which has not been shown to the Egyptians) Heads of Agreement contains the following paragraph:-

"There will be many questions of detail to be covered in the drafting of the Agreement, including the defence of the Base, the storage of oil, the financial arrangements necessary, the status of the British personnel and their dependents, and other detailed matters of importance to both sides. These will be settled by friendly agreement in negotiations which will begin forthwith."

9. The chances of securing an agreement on status on the Libyan model seem reasonable. The Counsellor of the Egyptian Embassy was told on February 24 that we should certainly require the right to hold accused British personnel, in cases where the Egyptians had jurisdiction, pending their appearance before the Egyptian Court. Mr. Seoud replied that he thought this would be all right.

E. Millard

May 20, 1954

J Entw
A

SECRET

E1192/116(A)

SECRETARY OF STATE

Egypt: Immunities for technicians.

Your minute about immunities for technicians on the enclosed record of conversation with the Egyptian Ambassador.

I attach a note showing how it was proposed that this question should be dealt with under the technicians scheme. You will see that we do not expect to be able to extract from the Egyptians any better immunities than were obtained from the Libyans. These are summarised in paragraphs 5-7 of the note. We would only be able in general to exercise jurisdiction over offences committed solely on the "agreed lands" or arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty. But in other cases we would hope to secure the release of an arrested member of the British forces on giving an undertaking to present him to the Egyptian courts when required.

We hope to send you very shortly a paper on the whole position about which you asked in your minute on telegram No. 935 CCL from the British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Middle East.

J. Richpatrick

May 21, 1954.

Frank Jnr.

Henry

Reference:-

0371/108418

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J

AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

JE 1192/114

FOR MR. J. J. J. J.

FROM
 Mr Mustay, Cairo,
 to Mr Bromley.
 Confidential
 No. 1043/144/54G
 Dated May 24
 Received in
 Registry - May 27

Anglo-Egyptian negotiations
 Reports a conversation with Salah Salem,
 who expressed surprise at the lack of
 response to their gesture of a concession on
 availability.

References to former relevant papers

-/50

JE 11912/21

108418

(Print)

(How disposed of)

MINUTES

Salah Salem must be perfectly well
 aware that the Egyptians can expect us
 move from us until after Geneva.

Must Sheet
 27.5

Seny
 28/5

(Action completed)

(Index)

981/b

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17.54

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Envy

British Embassy,
CAIRO.
May 24, 1954.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1043/114/54G)

E 1192/114

M. J. J.

When calling on Salah Salem today in the course of a round of Ministers, I was the beneficiary of about an hour's eloquence about the situation in general. He sought in particular to impress upon me the growing bewilderment of himself and his colleagues at the lack of response to their gesture of a concession on availability. He pointed out that it was now three months since they had let us know through the Americans what they proposed in this respect, and they were more and more beginning to wonder whether we wanted an agreement at all.

2. Trevor Evans, who was with me, and I sought to deal with this complaint by pointing out that the three months had been largely filled, first, with a domestic crisis, the results of which had only been possible to assess some weeks later, followed by a crisis in the Sudan, secondly a deterioration of the situation in the Canal Zone, and lastly the Far Eastern crisis which had taken the Secretary of State to Geneva ever since the last week in April. It is difficult to know how far this Minister reflects the views of his colleagues and how much of his statements are attempts at rhetorical blackmail. He struck me as somewhat more formidable, and therefore perhaps somewhat more capable of imposing his ideas on his colleagues, than I had supposed. His arguments regarding our lack of response may soon be rather more difficult to counter, but I report them for what you may think they are worth as an indication of Egyptian intentions.

F. R. H. Murray

(F.R.H. Murray)

T.E. Bromley, Esq.,
African Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

1	2	3	4	5	6

AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

JE1192/1156

78A

FROM Mrs Prince,
Ministry of Defence
to Mr Street
Secret

Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations - Customs and
other Fiscal Laws and Regulations

No.
Dated May 24
Received in Registry - May 27

Encloses a copy of a paper MNE(54) - 2 (Final)
of April 20.

References to former relevant papers

MINUTES

Stk
copy
copy
Stk

(Print)

(How disposed of)

DfP Mr Prince,
M/Def, from
Mr Street (with
encl) May 31
DfP Mr Prince (no. 24) from
Mr Street June 9
Cops Lawrence Wilson (Adk)
Ammstrong (w/o) Cary (A.M)
Allen (Jay)
June 11

(Action completed)

(Index)

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Tel. No.: Whitehall 7000.

SECRET

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,

STOREY'S GATE,

S.W.1.

Inter J

24th May 1954

E1192/115

INDEXED

Dear Street,

Herewith the paper I mentioned to you
 on the telephone. Will you please return it as
 soon as possible, as there are no spaces available in
 London.

I should be glad to hear what action
 you think should be taken on the paper.

Yours,

R. S. Brown

J. E. D. Street, Esq.,
 Foreign Office,
 S. W. 1.

1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-

037/108418

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(Copy)

MNE(54) - 2(Final)SECRET20th April, 1954.ANGLO-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONSCUSTOMS AND OTHER FISCAL LAWS AND REGULATIONSPaper by the Middle East Working Party.Introduction

With reference to paragraph 2 of our paper of 23rd January, 1954 we have examined the draft of the Articles headed "Financial and Administrative Facilities" for inclusion in an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty which has been prepared by the Negotiators in Cairo. The draft of the Articles has already been forwarded to the BDCC(ME). It will be noted that we consider the heading of the draft articles should read: "Customs and other Fiscal Laws and Regulations".

Customs and other Fiscal Laws and Regulations

We have examined the draft, previously headed "Financial and Administrative Facilities", and have consulted the Command Secretary GHQ MELF and the Financial Adviser HQ MEAF. Our comments are at Annex to this paper, and relate to the articles and clauses as numbered in the draft.

Recommendations

We recommend the BDCC(ME)

- (a) approve our paper.
- (b) authorise its transmission to HM Embassy Cairo as an expression of their views.

S.J. JOUBERT
J.H.S. LACEY
W.E. RANKIN
H.S. STEPHENSON

nt linc.

Ø MNE(54)-1 (Final)
Ø MIL/1240/3/ME dated 24th January, 1954

1st/1/54

SECRET
Annex to
MRE(54)-2(Pinal)

93026

WORKING PARTY COMMENTS

Recommended alterations to draft

Working Party Comments

Amend where necessary

Throughout this Annex we note that Appendix II should read Appendix I. On looking back we note that this also applies to Annex "B".

This would appear to be inaccurate

Fiscal - Administrative facilities

Delete: "FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FACILITIES"

Substitute: "CUSTOMS AND OTHER FISCAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS".

We consider that this clause is not specific enough in referring merely to "goods and commodities". We think that equipment should be included and we would like to make it quite clear that "commodities" includes fuel, oils and lubricants.

Line 3. Delete: "goods and commodities"
Insert: "goods, equipment and commodities including fuel, oils and lubricants".

We think it advisable to omit, as suggested in British Embassy, Cairo, letter 1043/761/5B dated 31st December, 1953, all reference to the time of first arrival in Egypt.

Lines 1 and 2 delete: "at the time of their first arrival in Egypt".

Delete: second and third sentences of the clause in their entirety.

As this stands it would be necessary to obtain an export licence from the Egyptian authorities every time it is wanted to send out of the country any M.D. equipment which has been brought into it. This would be a ridiculous situation. We suggest a modification on the Libyan pattern.

Delete first three lines of this clause.
Substitute "All property imported into Egypt in accordance with the provision of this Article may be freely exported from Egypt without regard to the customs laws and regulations of Egypt. Such property shall not be"

Export not necessary
except this should be
agreed with

Fe 37/1004/18 93026 - 2 -

Working Party Comments Recommended alterations to draft

6. 2. Clause (2) *delete* this Clause stands it would make us liable to a tax the Egyptian Government on all services for which we were prepared to pay.

7. 2. Clause (3) We presume that, in line 5, Appendix I is meant for Appendix II. We think it must include both Appendices I and II. We draw attention to the following:-

- (a) We are not clear why the clause dealing with the remission of taxes etc should apply only to fuel. We feel consideration should be given to the remission of all duties and taxes on all supplies and materials;
- (b) consideration should, we think, also be given to whether oil supplied to certain public utilities at Appendix II should be free of duty or taxes. The public utilities we refer to are those which, although operated under Egyptian control, will be mainly for the purpose of providing power and water etc for installations under British control.
- (c) we also consider that the reference to Appendix II should be retained because it will give immunity from Customs duties to any UK based companies who may eventually, on behalf of the United Kingdom Government, share in the management of installations listed in that Appendix.

3. We consider that this clause should not be included in Annex "C" since the provision of accommodation cannot be included under the heading "Customs and other Fiscal Laws and Regulations". We feel that a clause on the subject of the provision of accommodation, would be more appropriately included in Annex "A" in place of the existing Article 5 which, as it stands, we think is inadequate.

file the main
But we
 No
 This is surely a restriction between
 construction in Annex A Annex C
 housing

Delete: this clause in its entirety
 Delete: Article 5 of Annex "A" to the Main Agreement.
 Substitute: as Article 5 of Annex "A" to the Main Agreement:-
 "Provision of Accommodation
 The United Kingdom Government shall have the right to build within the installations listed in Appendix I, or
elsewhere ...

15821/1024118

SECRET

- 3 -

Serial Article Working Party Comments

Recommended alterations to draft

8 (cont)

elsewhere as may be agreed with the Egyptian Government. The United Kingdom Government shall further have the right to hire accommodation to meet the requirements of operations under the agreement in so far as they are not covered by existing accommodation. The cost of such building or hiring shall be borne by the United Kingdom Government."

Delete: Article 4 in its entirety.

Substitute: "The Egyptian Government will not require United Kingdom Service vehicles to be licensed or registered under the laws of Egypt or to bear any identification marks ordinarily required by the laws of Egypt, but all such vehicles will bear identification marks issued by the appropriate authorities of the United Kingdom Government."

4 We consider that the wording of the equivalent clause in the Libyan Treaty is better in that it specifically refers to licensing and from the Egyptian point of view it promises that service vehicles shall be properly marked.

405

5 We see no reason for the inclusion of this Article because it appears to be adequately covered in the Article of the Annex to which it refers.

N^o

Delete: the Article in its entirety.

Registry No. JE 1192/1150

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Open

-4C

OUT FILE

Draft.

M. R.H. Preece
M/Defence

from M. Street.

You sent me on May 24 a copy of BDCC(ME) paper (Final) which contains the comments of the BDCC(ME) on the draft of Annex C to the Anglo-Egyptian Defence Agreement.

The first point which strikes the eye is that the BDCC(ME) have not seen our letter to Cairo JE 1192/616 of March 4, which commented on the Delegation's first draft of Annex C and suggested a good many amendments.

Second point is that, as you know, the future of this particular Agreement is still undecided and

I think it would be a pity to worry the Delegation with any more detailed amendments unless we have a decision one way or the other.

Nevertheless, in case we do have to negotiate the 'technicians' scheme with the Egyptians, it might be as well to clear our minds

Copies to
 M. Lawrence-Hilton
 Admiralty
 M. Armstrong
 W.O.
 M. ALM. Cary
 1/11

M. Armstrong
 RECEPTION DIVISION
 9/6

Green Div.
 R. Verbruit
 to me as

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

FO 371/108418

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minds on the suggestions in the
 BCC(NE) paper and I therefore
 enclose a note of my preliminary
 comments. I am sending a copy
 of this letter ^{+ enclosure} to Lawrence Wilson,
 Armstrong, ~~W. B. C.~~ ^{Cony} and Mr Allen
 and shall be grateful for their
 observations and yours in due
 course. There does not seem
 to be any point in having a
 meeting.

3. Finally, I should like to refer
 to Armstrong's letter ^{to me} / 0143/5996 (C.2.)
 of May 31 enclosing a suggested
 re-wording of Article ~~1(4)~~ (4) of
 Annex C. I think Armstrong's
 suggestion is a good one.

1/2/56

JE 1192/1176

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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FOREIGN OFFICE COMMENTS ON NMB(51)-2 FINAL

Annex Serial No.

1. No - it is to Annex 'A' that the amendment is needed.
2. I agree that the present title of Annex C is not quite right, but I do not like the new suggestion at all. What about 'Fiscal and Administrative Facilities'? (Fiscal would presumably cover, all taxes and duties and the word 'Administrative' certainly ought to appear.)
3. Our redraft already allows for the specific mention of oil and I doubt if it is necessary to expand this as suggested. But I agree that 'equipment' should be introduced.
4. We have already suggested in our letter of March 4 to Cairo the omission of the phrase 'at the time of their first arrival in Egypt'.
5. This is now paragraph 1(5). Our redraft, already sent to Cairo, seems to cover the point adequately. The phrase 'without regard to the customs, laws and regulations of Egypt' would certainly not be acceptable to the Egyptians.
6. Our letter to Cairo told the Delegation that, at least on first presentation to the Egyptians, the draft of paragraph 2(2) should not include the phrase complained of.
7. See comment on 1 above about numbering of Appendices; in this case Appendix II is right. It is surely not for us to lay down the conditions under which fuel will be supplied to the installations in Appendix I i.e. those to be handed over to Egyptian control.

As to the suggestion that remission of tax should apply to all supplies and materials and not only to oils etc., we are hardly competent to comment, but I should think it unlikely that the Egyptians would agree.
8. If we accept the view that the title for Annex C suggested by the B.D.C.C.(M.E.) is a bad one, then their argument falls to the ground. I think that a clause dealing with the housing of personnel comes properly in an Annex dealing with administrative facilities, but not in Annex A, which deals with the organisation of the base.
9. I agree with this suggestion.
10. This is now Article 6, and the relevant article of Annex A is 15. The B.D.C.C.(M.E.) proposal ignores the fact that Annex A does not require the Egyptians to do more than 'facilitate' visits; this article gives considerable privileges to the visitors. I think it should stay in.