

J
 AFRICAN DEPARTMENT
 EGYPT AND SUDAN

J E. 1022/1.

FROM
 Sir J. Troutbeck,
 Baghdad.
 No. 6.
 Dated Jan 5.
 Received in Registry Jan. 6

Egypt's Policy towards Communist States & neutrality.
 The Iraqi Prime Minister is perturbed by Egypt's attitude & intends to liaise with Lebanon against the policy of neutrality
 Rptd: Cairo; Beirut; A.M.E.D.; Saei, Jeddah
 Damascus, Amman; N. etc.

REFERENCES
 108349

(MINUTES)
 This anxiety is presumably behind the latest revival by Iraq of the idea of a federal state. We shall see whether it has any effect on the forthcoming Arab League meeting.

(Print)

10/1
 10/1
 I think Mr. Samali probably has other motives, general & selfish, for pursuing the idea of federation. In deprecating Egyptian centralistic tendencies I think we can give him some credit for a more realistic appreciation of the importance of effectively defending the M.E. He has spoken to the Egyptians in this sense (by his own account).
 15/1

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
Com 29	WR 7-11-54

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir J. Troutbeck
No. 6
January 5, 1954

D: 4.05 p.m. January 5, 1954
R: 4.31 p.m. January 5, 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 6 of January 5.
Repeated for information to Cairo

Beirut
B.M.E.O.

J E. 1082 / 1

and Saving to Damascus Amman
Jedda Washington

The Iraqi Prime Minister has expressed to me his anxiety at the attitude of the Egyptian Government to the Communist States and talk of neutrality which he said is prevalent in Cairo. He has instructed the Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo to draw the Egyptian Government's attention to the Iraqi's exposed strategic position. He himself intends to visit the President of the Lebanon on January 6 to concert plans to oppose any suggestions of "neutrality" which he fears the Egyptian Government may try to introduce into the Arab League discussions.

Foreign Office pass to B.M.E.O. and Cairo as my telegram No. 3 and 1 and saving to Washington as my telegram No. 3.

[Repeated to B.M.E.O. and Cairo and saving to Washington]

G G G G



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J
BRITISH EMBASSY,
PARIS.

UNCLASSIFIED
1027/2/54

E 1022 /2.

January 6, 1954.

Dear Department,

--- We attach the text of an exclusive interview which General Neguib has given to the correspondent of Le Monde in Cairo. It does not appear to have anything much to commend it apart from its exclusive nature.

2. We are sending a copy of this letter and the enclosure to the Chancery at Cairo.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

African Department,
Foreign Office.

Minutes.

Dans une déclaration au "Monde"

Le général NEGUIB lance un avertissement à l'Occident

Jour après jour les informations venues du Caire décrivent le tournant que les dirigeants de l'Egypte songent à effectuer dans leur politique étrangère.

C'est la définition même de cette attitude nouvelle que le général Neguib, président de la République égyptienne, a précisée à Louis Dalmas dans l'interview que l'on peut lire ci-dessous.

« Les puissances « occidentales » n'ont pas de ligne bien définie. Elles n'ont pas l'air de savoir très bien ce qu'elles veulent. En ce qui concerne l'Egypte elles nous font des promesses depuis soixante-dix ans sans se résoudre à les tenir : la Grande-Bretagne a promis de se retirer de notre territoire, elle ne s'en va pas ; les U.S.A. ont promis une aide substantielle, de nombreuses fournitures, nous n'en voyons pas beaucoup.

« Et pourtant il nous semblerait préférable de nous appuyer sur les puissances « occidentales ». Mais elles doivent comprendre la volonté qui nous anime : c'est celle de l'indépendance avant tout. Nos rapports avec elles doivent être ceux d'homme libre à homme libre. Elle impose de ne pas nous considérer comme une nation à qui on fait des promesses sans les tenir. »

Cet avertissement a donné le ton à l'entretien que m'a accordé le général Mohammed Neguib, président de la République égyptienne, qui a bien voulu me recevoir au Caire, dans le palais gouvernemental, pendant plus d'une heure.

Ce qui frappe le plus chez le nouveau chef d'Etat, c'est sa cordiale simplicité. Après avoir franchi les étapes toujours un peu solennelles imposées par le protocole on se trouve en présence d'un homme aux yeux pétillants, au sourire chaleureux. Vêtu d'un uniforme kaki à col ouvert, il s'assoit à une table dans un coin de son vaste bureau et partage le café avec son hôte, selon les lois de la plus amicale hospitalité.

Son visage bronzé et rugueux est éclairé d'un regard direct, qui suggère à la fois la franchise, la fermeté de caractère, l'humanité. Il a des cheveux noirs coupés en brosse, une petite moustache grise. On a l'impression qu'il aime ses paysans parce qu'il vient de chez eux et qu'il ne l'a pas oublié.

« Que pensez-vous de l'Inde et de sa politique de neutralité internationale ? »

— Je ne veux pas me mêler de la politique étrangère d'une autre nation en exprimant un jugement. Mais on ne peut cacher que cette politique est très importante dans le monde actuel.

— De quoi dépend aujourd'hui la paix mondiale ? Y a-t-il des mesures qui permettraient aux différentes nations de la garantir sérieusement ? Quelles sont à votre avis les conditions d'une détente internationale et de quelle façon l'Egypte pourrait-elle y participer ?

— La paix mondiale est subordonnée actuellement au souci qu'ont les dirigeants des deux blocs oriental et occidental de la sauvegarder et de la mettre à l'abri de toute atteinte que pourraient lui porter les diverses complications de la vie internationale.

LOUIS DALMAS.

(Lire la suite en 3^e page, 1^{re} colonne.)

Dans une déclaration au "Monde"

LE GÉNÉRAL NEGUIB LANCE UN AVERTISSEMENT A L'OCCIDENT

(Suite de la première page.)

« Je crois que si chacun des membres de la famille internationale respectait la liberté et les droits d'autrui, si le fort se montrait bienveillant envers le faible, et si toutes les puissances s'affranchissaient de tout esprit ou de toute visée impérialistes, le monde connaîtrait une ère de paix longue et fructueuse.

« Pour ce qui est de l'Egypte, et précisément sous le nouveau régime, elle ne cherche qu'à établir des liens d'amitié avec tous les pays qui aiment la paix et la désirent sincèrement.

« Enfin je crois que si les sommes considérables dépensées pour les armements pendant cette crise économique qui sévit de par le monde, si ces sommes étaient employées à des buts utilitaires et constructifs, le monde vivrait aujourd'hui une vie bien meilleure et plus prospère.

« Nous respectons ceux qui respectent notre liberté »

— Dans un monde partagé entre l'influence américaine d'un côté, soviétique de l'autre, quelle est la position de l'Egypte ? Quelle est sa politique à l'égard des buts poursuivis par les U.S.A. et à l'égard de ceux poursuivis par l'U.R.S.S. ?

— La présence des forces britanniques dans notre pays nous empêche de déterminer d'une façon nette et définie notre attitude à l'égard des deux blocs, mais comme je vous l'ai déjà dit, nous respectons quiconque ne touche pas à notre souveraineté ni à notre liberté.

— Comment ces problèmes de politique internationale se posent-ils dans le Proche-Orient ? Pensez-vous que l'Egypte doit se ranger dans un des blocs en présence, soit participer à un groupe différent de nations (bloc arabe par exemple), soit défendre ses intérêts sur un plan strictement national ?

— Le pacte arabe de sécurité collective, inspiré des recommandations mêmes de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la création des pactes régionaux, sera-t-il même d'assurer la protection des Etats qui l'ont signé.

— Quelle est l'importance des rapports économiques de l'Egypte avec des nations comme l'Allemagne, la Yougoslavie, l'Italie, les pays de l'Europe de l'Est, etc ? Croyez-vous que des échanges suffisants puissent se nouer entre « petites nations » pour leur permettre de se rendre indépendantes des grandes puissances ?

— Nos relations commerciales avec les Etats occidentaux ont certainement pour base l'intérêt réciproque des deux parties. D'ailleurs tout le monde sait que les grandes puissances ont souvent

besoin des petites pour acquérir les matières de première nécessité que celles-ci produisent. L'exemple du pétrole est là pour illustrer cette vérité. Ainsi si les petits Etats parvenaient à se créer une sorte d'autonomie économique en dormant entre eux les échanges commerciaux, les grandes puissances seraient quand même obligées, dans leur propre intérêt, de traiter avec eux.

« La France devrait changer sa politique en Afrique du Nord »

— Quelle est votre opinion sur la politique du gouvernement français en Afrique du Nord ? Quelles solutions préconisez-vous aux problèmes que pose cette politique et quelle sera selon vous l'évolution de la situation actuelle ?

— La meilleure solution aux problèmes posés par la politique du gouvernement français en Afrique du Nord est le changement complet de cette politique. La répression ne fait qu'aggraver la situation et détruire la possibilité d'établir des relations morales correctes entre les peuples d'Afrique du Nord et la France. Il serait dangereux d'imaginer qu'une grande puissance quelconque puisse dominer une nation contre sa volonté.

« Tout le monde musulman et arabe aspire à apprendre que le conflit entre la France et les nations d'Afrique du Nord a fait place à des relations de compréhension et d'amitié. »

Revenant au problème égyptien, le général Neguib développe sa conception du sentiment national.

« Les hommes deviennent de bons citoyens, dit-il, dans la mesure où ils reçoivent quelque chose de leur pays. Le patriotisme n'est pas un devoir creux, mais un sentiment naturel et vrai qui est provoqué par quelque chose. C'est ce quelque chose que notre révolution veut donner à notre peuple. Pour cela nous avons besoin de l'indépendance et de la paix. »

Il offre des cigarettes et les allume toutes avec la même allumette.

« Economie, dit-il en souriant. Un de nos grands problèmes est l'argent. Nous encourageons le plus possible les investissements, aussi bien étrangers que nationaux. Notre pays a un besoin vital de s'équiper dans tous les domaines. C'est parce que nous sommes décidés à avancer dans la voie du progrès matériel et technique que nous sommes prêts à traiter économiquement avec toutes les puissances.

« L'Angleterre, qui ne veut pas le comprendre, perd un bon marché. Suez lui coûte cher et elle ne peut pas le défendre. Comme toujours, les vieilles méthodes d'occupation coloniales finissent par faire perdre beaucoup plus qu'elles ne font gagner. »

J

AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

J E. 1022/3

EGYPT AND SUDAN

FROM

Sir P. Stevenson
Cairo.

No. 9 (1032/3/53)

Dated Jan '2

Received in Registry— Jan 4.

Egyptian Foreign Policy

The current Egyptian attitude towards neutralism in Communist States is probably opportunistic, with an eye to the Bermuda Conference.
[Copies: Wto; Tokyo; Beirut]

References to former relevant papers

SE. 1022/7 C. (1953)

MINUTES

This is an important development which needs watching closely. As H.M. Ambs points out, if the Egyptian Govt were to commit themselves to a policy of neutralism they could not consistently enter into any undertaking about reactivation of the base.

2. I suggest this dep. be printed F.O. and Whitehall and circulated by African Div. on the Egypt Political Dist. Mr Brothby's authority is necessary for printing.

Renny
19/Jan
I agree.
Bridgman
20/1

1 R. Dept
1 P. Dept

(Action completed)

M.L.C.
Hilli

(Index)

WR
7.4.54

References to later relevant papers

We need to consider carefully how this should be handled in propaganda.

/2. I.R.D.'s

2. I.R.D.'s regular output for the Middle East is largely concerned with exposing the folly of neutralism and the fundamental hostility of Soviet Communism to the Arab Governments and to Islam. In view of the recent Egyptian show of neutralism we have sent to Cairo and Beirut extra material illustrating the violent hostility still shown in Soviet propaganda to the present Egyptian Government. If the Egyptians go on in this vein however we must decide where the emphasis in propaganda is to be placed.

3. We might ^{thus} either:-
- (a) take pains to avoid attacking the Egyptians by ignoring their neutralist or pro-Communist manifestations;
 - (b) make such attacks on their attitude as may be incidental to our general anti-Communist propaganda; or
 - (c) use their attitude to try to discredit them, particularly in the Arab world, as playing into the hands of Communism, i.e. take a positively anti-Egyptian as well as anti-Communist line.

4. This must be decided on general political grounds. The present choice, on which we should welcome early guidance, is presumably between (a) and (b). An anti-Egyptian campaign, however, on the lines of (c) would require preparation and we should like early warning if it is likely to be required.

J. O. Rennie

(J.O. Rennie)
February 15, 1954.

We should be interested to know what is decided. I favour course (b), the present and simplest.

RETTMAN 19/2

I suggest that (b) is the appropriate course at present, laced with increasing quantities of (c) if their attitude persists. I can see no merit in (a)

*Wrennie
22/2*

I agree

Richard

Presumably we want to change mems so there ought to be a 'good deal' of (a) (without taking too many pains) and (b) is so far as our general doctrine happens to apply to Egypt. No (c) for the present perhaps.

IRD.

26/2

27. 2



No. 9. ✓
(1032/3/53)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

CONFIDENTIAL.

January 12, 1954.

E 1022/3.
Sir,

The wave of neutralist agitation in the Egyptian Press to which Mr. Duke drew attention in his letter 1037/39/53 of December 21 to Mr. Boothby, has continued. Though there have admittedly been constant references in the press over the past years to the attractions of neutralism, this present outburst is more marked and sustained than any that has gone before.

2. There seems little doubt that the Council for the Revolutionary Command originally initiated this campaign as a tactical move on the eve of the Bermuda Conference, to impress the Americans and ourselves. They may also have wanted to give the press and the people something other than "armed struggle" to talk about while they themselves examined the consequences of failure to reach agreement with us. There are however obvious dangers in such tactics. In the first place, both because neutralism strikes a fundamentally sympathetic chord in Egypt, and through the deliberate efforts of a left-wing opposition, "neutralism" may, like "evacuation" and "unity of the Nile Valley", become part of the established phraseology of the Egyptian political scene. The C.R.C. might then find themselves prisoners of their own words, and feel compelled by popular feeling to accept as their policy what they had originally intended only as an opportunist tactical move. Something very much like this seems indeed to have happened to the Wafd in 1951. The Wafdist politicians who had originally used the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty as a popular cry to frighten us then found themselves compelled by popular sentiment and by the efforts of their opponents actually to abrogate the Treaty without any adequate preparation for the consequences.

3. A local French newspaper has already been allowed to point out that neutralism would be inconsistent with any undertaking to allow the return of the British forces to the Base in time of war, and that the presence of British troops would become doubly intolerable since they would be an impediment to the official policy of the country. No-one has as yet publicly gone the length of suggesting that the present offer by the C.R.C. to maintain a Base in Egypt is inconsistent with a policy of neutralism and should be withdrawn. Such a suggestion, however, if made, might well put the C.R.C. in an embarrassing position.

4. Egyptian neutralism between East and West is peculiar in that it is accompanied by professed enmity towards the West. The second danger therefore to which the C.R.C. have exposed themselves is that the Egyptian public will draw the conclusion that neutralism involves friendship with the Soviet Union and its satellites. The present neutralist agitation is obviously admirable cover for pro-Russian and pro-communist propaganda; and there are extremists on the staffs of the semi-official Al Gumhouria the Wafdist Al Misri and certain other newspapers who, given any relaxation of control by their editors or the censor, would be ready to seize their opportunity. Though neutralism undoubtedly led to an increased interest in Soviet affairs, the pro-Soviet elements seem

/to

The Right Honourable
Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.

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to have been allowed little rope during December. The return of Lieut.-General Aziz el Masri, the Egyptian Minister to Moscow, however, has been made the occasion for much pro-Soviet propaganda. Aziz el Masri has been quoted both by Al Gunhouria and Al Misri as saying that there is no hostility towards Egypt in the Soviet Union and that everyone in Russia is satisfied and works loyally with the Government: and Rose el Youssef has published an interview in which el Masri was very complimentary about affairs in the Soviet Union. It is too early to say whether this trend will continue.

5. A curious incidental result of the increased interest in the Soviet Union has been that editors are now apparently prepared to print unfavourable as well as favourable material, and there has been a marked increase in the number of anti-communist articles which have appeared in the local press, including a good selection from the Information Department of this Embassy.

6. I shall report further developments as they occur.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, to Sir John Sterndale-Bennett at Fayid and to the Regional Information Officer at Beirut.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

Ralph Skirrow Stevenson

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SAVING TELEGRAM

(12) Copy No....

SAVING TELEGRAM.

En Clair
By Bag.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir Ralph Skrine Stevenson.

No. 21 Saving.

January 28, 1954.

INDEXED
JE 1022/4

ADDRESSED to Foreign Office Saving tel. No. 21 of 28/1 REPEATED for information Saving to:-

Paris	No. 37(S)
Washington	No. 21(S)
Moscow	No. 1(S)
New Delhi	No. 2(S)
Karachi	No. 4(S)
BMEO Fayid	No. 33(S)

JE 1013/3

UNCLASSIFIED.

My Saving Telegram No. 9 paragraph 12.

In an interim review of the consultations now being held by the régime with the Egyptian Ambassadors in London, Washington, Moscow, New Delhi and Karachi, the object of which was stated to be the realignment of Egyptian foreign policy, Al Gumhouria of January 27 quoted a Foreign Ministry spokesman as having described Egypt's new attitude as one of co-operation with only those countries which acknowledge Egypt's rights, sovereignty and dignity, rather than as one of neutrality in the ordinary sense.

2. In its comment, Al Gumhouria said that not even countries hostile to Egypt could object to this new attitude; it was clear that Egypt intended to solve her own problems by herself. A watch was being kept on attempts to grant American economic or military aid to certain Middle East countries and to revive Treaties such as the Saadabad Pact. It had been remarked by Egyptian diplomats that these attempts aimed at isolating Egypt and the other Middle East countries which had objected to the Western Powers' defence plans; Egypt was taking steps to frustrate those attempts and to consolidate her relations with Middle East countries and the States of the Asiatic-African bloc.

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INWARD

SAVING TELEGRAM

ADVANCE COPY

En Clair.
By Bag.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir Ralph Skrine Stevenson.

No. 24 Saving.

February 1, 1954.

E1022/5.

1/2 of white Dist

ADDRESSED to F.O. Saving telegram No. 24 of 1/2
REPEATED for information Saving to:-

Washington	23(S)
Paris	42(S)
Khartoum (Gov.-Gen.)	7(S)
Ankara	22(S)
Memin (Fayid)	37(S)

UNCLASSIFIED.

Lieutenant Colonel Abdel Nasser, in an interview with Al Goumhouriya, replying to President Celal Bayar's declaration in Washington referring to the eastern flank of Turkey as a gap in the defence of the free world, warned the leaders of this so-called free world that Arab nations would not participate in a Middle East defence plan. He described it as unreasonable to expect that any nation should defend her enemies or those who occupied her territories and impaired her sovereignty. The West would not find a single Arab who would support participation in the defence of "the free world". What benefits would the people of the Middle East derive from such participation? The Arab people's prime objective was to liberate themselves from imperialism, from British occupation, and from the poverty, ignorance and disease which imperialist rule had left. Since the end of the first world war, Britain had tried to dismember and spread discord amongst the Arabs, and to control them while spreading corruption to undermine their morale. After the second world war, "the free world" had seized Palestine and offered it to international Zionism. How could the West cry over the defence of the free world in this area?

2. Al Goumhouriya, in an editorial on the same subject, assured its readers that the people of the Middle East would not commit the same mistake twice. They were already suffering from occupation. They did not fear any other occupation, and would not allow themselves to be made cannon-fodder. The condition for any discussion of alliance with the free world was that the Middle East countries should first attain their own freedom.



1954

J
 AFRICAN DEPARTMENT
 EGYPT AND SUDAN

J ¹⁰² E 1022/6

FROM Sir R. Stevenson,
 Cairo.
 No. 179.
 Dated Feb. 10.
 Received in Registry Feb 11.

Egyptian Foreign Policy.
 at a Press Conference on Feb 10
 Salah Salem dealt with the Anglo-Egyptian question, the Sudan and the Israel complaint in the Security Council.
 Rptd: U.K.T.C. Khartoum, Saw: W. Str, Paris, S.M.E.O.

REFERENCES

MINUTES
 Para. 4. The implication of this is that Salem (the Sudanese Govt.) accept it as a fact that compensation will have to be paid.

(Print)

W Morris
 12/2

(How disposed of)

Tomlinson
 15/2
 Yes, but as little as possible.
 And the last sentence of para 4: it may be a hint that 2/3 money would be forthcoming - but if it ever is, I am sure it will not be enough.

(Action completed) (Index)
 9 Y W.P. 227-54

Rd 15/2.
 x/mij 17/2

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

NO. 179

D: 12.00 p.m. February 11, 1954

February 10, 1954

R: 1.07 p.m. February 11, 1954

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 179 of
February 10

Repeated for information to : U.K.T.C. Khartoum

and saving to : Washington

E 1022/6

Paris

B.M.E.O.

At a Press conference at mid-day today Major Salah Salem dealt with three matters of Egyptian foreign policy, the Anglo-Egyptian question, the Sudan and the Israel complaint in the Security Council.

2. He defined Egyptian foreign policy as one of neutrality or whatever his audience liked to call it, questions of terminology did not interest Egypt. She would not cooperate with anyone who infringed her liberty or her dignity, but would with all who assisted her whether in the east, or in the west. Her preference would be determined by the attitude adopted by other countries towards her, whether in economic matters or otherwise, and the integrity of the country would always be safeguarded.

3. Rejecting protests that his visit to the Sudan had impaired the neutral atmosphere provided for in the Sudan Agreement, he said that there was in fact no neutral atmosphere in the Sudan. Hundreds of British officials occupied key posts and the visit of one individual like himself could therefore hardly be considered an infringement of the agreement. Egypt would accept with pleasure that Great Britain should do as she had done in the Sudan. Why did not you, sir, go and inform the Sudanese of British intentions and discuss their problems with them? Egypt would not protest against such a visit.

4. The financial situation in the Sudan was difficult and a large number of indemnities would have to be paid to
British

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Cairo telegram No. 179 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

British officials when they left the government service, it was no exaggeration to say that 70 per cent of the inhabitants of the Southern Provinces were without public health, education and other services. In Kordofan half a million Sudanese had no drinking water and 4 cans of water cost pt 40. There was no Sudanese army. The 8 old cannon which the Sudanese army had, although unusable, were hired to them by Her Majesty's Government. Egypt would aid the Sudan in righting all these wrongs and practical measures were being studied.

5. On the subject of Israel, Major Salem reiterated Egypt's case as already published and her charges against Israel of having occupied El Ath and El Auja in contravention of the Armistice Agreement.

6. Full text to Foreign Office by bag.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Paris as my Saving telegrams Nos. 30 and 54 respectively.

[Repeated saving to Washington and Paris].

<p>1954</p>	<p>J AFRICAN DEPARTMENT EGYPT AND SUDAN</p>	<p>J E 1022/7¹⁰²</p>
<p>FROM <i>Sir R. Stevenson, Cairo.</i></p> <p>No. 182. Dated Feb. 11. Received in Registry— Feb. 12</p>	<p><i>Salah Salem's Press conference on Feb. 10.</i></p> <p><i>gives answers to questions by journalists</i></p> <p><i>Rptd: U.K.T.C. & C.G. Khartoum; See: W'ton, Paris; B.M.E.O</i></p>	
<p>REFERENCES TE 1022/7</p>	<p>MINUTES 2. pp</p> <p><i>X Para. 2. This is false; and the fact ^{fact} will be rubbed well in in Khartoum.</i></p> <p><i>Para. 3. The B.B.C. are pointing out that no Egyptian member has yet been proposed.</i></p>	
<p>(Print)</p>	<p><i>Morris 13/2</i></p>	
<p>(How disposed of)</p>	<p><i>S. E. Millard v. G. ... 15/2 15.2.</i></p> <p><i>Wray 16/2</i> <i>Ra 15/2</i></p>	
<p>(Action completed)</p> <p><i>Sing 16 2</i></p>	<p>(Index)</p> <p><i>WR. 7-4-54</i></p>	

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

Sir R. Stevens

JE 1022/7

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

No. 182

February 11, 1954

D. Untimed February 11, 1954

R. 8.30 p.m. February 11, 1954

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 182 of February 11.
Repeated for information to Khartoum (Governor-General)
Khartoum (U.K.T.C.)
and Saving to Washington Paris B.M.E.O.

After delivering a prepared statement of which my telegram No. 179 was a summary, Major Salah Salem answered journalists questions.

Sudan.

2. Asked whether there was any question of modifying the Nile Waters Agreement he said that the Sudan had not yet made full use of the quota allocated to it in the 1929 Agreement. After the revolution Egypt had immediately conceded a request from the Sudan for more water than the quota allocated in the Agreement. Eventually the stored water in the Gebel Awlia Dam had been increased by two hundred million cubic metres, but this extra water was not utilized and was allowed to go to waste into the Mediterranean. It was sufficient to irrigate over eighty thousand feddans. He had an official letter from the Sudan Irrigation Department, signed by a British official, which stated that the Sudan had surplus water. There were, moreover, many millions of feddans of land in districts of the Sudan in which there was rainfall from 5 to 10 months of the year, not a single feddan of which was yet cultivated.

3. Asked whether Egypt had drawn the attention of the Governor-General of the Sudan to the fact that his obstruction of the Sudanization Committee was a breach of the Sudan Agreement. He said that if such a complaint was received, Egypt would no doubt support the Sudan Government, so that the Sudan Agreement should be properly implemented.

4. Asked to comment on the attitude of British officials in the South, he said that they still considered any person loyal to the Sudan Government as an enemy to be persecuted. Asked if he could give names of chiefs who had been oppressed, he instanced Aki Riskalla, and Sersio Iro. Asked about incitement of the /inhabitants



"Le Journal D'Egypte": 11th. Feb., 1954.

LA QUESTION EGYPTIENNE

Le major Salah Salem a commencé sa conférence par la question égyptienne. Il a dit :
 « La Grande-Bretagne s'est bien rendu compte que sa politique actuelle l'a complètement isolée de la population de la vallée du Nil. Et les trente millions d'habitants de cette Vallée — quelles que soient leurs différences — sont unanimes à ne pas collaborer avec la Grande-Bretagne tant qu'elle persiste dans son attitude à l'égard de leurs demandes. La Grande-Bretagne pourrait réussir à prolonger son séjour au Canal et au Soudan ; mais il est nécessaire qu'elle sache que par ses agissements, elle s'étrangle elle-même. Si cette région est menacée du danger de guerre, la Grande-Bretagne ne doit s'attendre à aucune collaboration ou aide. Je peux affirmer que c'est le contraire qui se produira.

« Nous avons pris l'engagement de reconstruire notre pays sur des bases solides et de le préparer à réaliser ses demandes. Il est hors de doute que l'attitude actuelle de la Grande-Bretagne attisera l'esprit de rancune et de la haine dans le nord et le sud de la vallée. Le jour où ce peuple dira son mot, le monde entier saura que l'Egypte et ses hommes entendaient ce qu'ils disaient. Les agissements de la Grande-Bretagne dans la zone du Canal aboutiront à une catastrophe pour tout le monde ».

LA POLITIQUE DE NON-COLLABORATION

Le ministre a ajouté :
 « Quant à la politique de l'Egypte, vous pouvez la dénommer neutralité ou n'importe quelle dénomination qui vous plaît.

« Mais la dénomination ne nous intéresse pas. On ne peut ne pas être d'accord sur l'interprétation de la neutralité ; mais ce qui nous intéresse, c'est que nous refusons de collaborer avec quiconque se dresse devant nos aspirations. L'Egypte a pris des dispositions pratiques pour renforcer la collaboration avec les puissances de l'Occident et de l'Orient sans distinction. Nous ne serons un satellite de l'une ou de l'autre.

« En résumé, nous voulons vivre libres et nous lutterons pour obtenir la liberté. Nul ne pourra nous blâmer pour n'importe quel acte pour obtenir la liberté, laquelle ne peut faire l'objet de marchandages.

LES ENTRETIENS

« Je vous prie, Messieurs, dit le ministre, de ne pas me demander des détails sur les conversations ou les négociations, car j'ai presque oublié ces termes. La situation demeure ce qu'elle était le 21 octobre 1953.

LE SOUDAN

« A l'occasion de mon retour du Soudan, j'aime parler de l'attitude de la Grande-Bretagne et de son gouverneur général ainsi que de leur protestation contre ma visite au Soudan. J'ai appris qu'ils soutiennent que cette visite est contraire à la convention qui exige d'aménager une atmosphère libre et neutre au Soudan. Or, l'atmosphère actuelle au Soudan ne peut être considérée comme neutre. Autrement, il n'y avait pas de nécessité à fixer une période transitoire de trois ans. Elle ne peut être considérée comme neutre en raison de la présence d'un grand nombre de fonctionnaires et de forces britanniques. Dans ces conditions, la visite de Salah Salem, qui n'a aucune autorité ou influence, peut-elle constituer une infraction à la convention ? Si j'avais voulu répondre aux invitations que j'ai reçues, mon séjour au Soudan n'edt pris fin qu'à l'expiration de la période transitoire.

« En résumé, ce que j'ai vu au Soudan est de beaucoup plus fait que n'importe quelle décision sur le sort du pays. Tous ont confiance dans l'Egypte.

« Il est de mon devoir de dire que nous accueillons avec la plus grande faveur que l'Angleterre fasse de son côté ce que nous faisons pour le Soudan. Pourquoi M. Eden ne visiterait-il pas le Soudan pour rencontrer ses habitants et les tribus et les entretenir des intentions de l'Angleterre ? Je vous affirme que nous ne protesterons nullement contre de telles visites.

« Quant à la situation actuelle au Soudan, la mission du ministre est ardue à cause de la situation du budget et des énormes indemnités qui seront payées aux fonctionnaires à cause de la soudanisation de l'administration. Pour avoir une idée exacte des mauvaises conditions du pays, je signalerai que plusieurs moudirihs sont privées de communications, de l'enseignement et de l'hygiène. Certaines régions, comme le Kordofan, sont privées d'eau et le bled est vendu à 40 piastres.

« De plus, le Soudan ne possède pas d'armée. Les forces soudanaises ne possèdent que huit vieux canons qui lui sont loués par le gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

« Avant toutes ces circonstances, l'Egypte déploiera tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour aider le gouvernement national afin que le Soudan se tienne sur ses pieds. A l'heure actuelle, j'étudie les dispositions qui seront immédiatement prises.

« Et j'invite la Grande Bretagne de suivre l'exemple de l'Egypte pour le bien du Soudan ».

LES PLAINTES D'ISRAEL ET DE L'EGYPTE AU CONSEIL DE SECURITE

Le ministre de l'Orientation Nationale, abordant la plainte d'Israël et celle de l'Egypte au Conseil de Sécurité dit :

« Vous n'ignorez pas qu'Israël s'est plaint, à plus d'une reprise, contre les restrictions imposées à la navigation dans le Canal de Suez. La commission de l'armis-

tice avait décidé que l'attitude de l'Egypte à l'égard de cette navigation ne constitue pas une violation de l'armistice.

« Mais Israël vient de renouveler sa plainte; mais ce qui est fiable, c'est que cette plainte s'appuie sur le code international. Or, nul n'ignore qu'Israël a violé l'armistice et n'a respecté aucune décision de l'O.N.U.

« Jusqu'à cette heure, nous sommes en état de guerre avec Israël et nous avons le droit de défendre notre existence en vertu du code international et de l'article 10 de la Convention de Constantinople de 1855. Depuis le 1er septembre 1951, l'Egypte n'a saisi aucune marchandise passant par le canal. Durant cette période, sur les 32.447 navires qui ont transité le canal, 35 navires seulement ont été perquisitionnés.

« Pour ce qui est de l'inspection des navires dans la zone d'Alexandrie, il convient de relever que cette zone est entièrement dans les eaux territoriales égyptiennes et l'Egypte a le droit de la contrôler totalement. L'inspection des navires dans cette zone ne peut être considérée comme une violation de l'armistice ni une atteinte contre Israël. Par contre, l'occupation d'Israël par la force du port d'Haït constitue réellement une violation de l'armistice. La dernière agression d'Israël a été contre la zone démilitarisée d'El Auja où il a construit des ouvrages militaires ».

LES EAUX DU NIL

Un journaliste a demandé au ministre :

— Est-il question de modifier la convention des eaux du Nil conclue entre l'Egypte et le Soudan ?

— Jusqu'à maintenant, le Soudan n'éprouve pas le besoin d'eau qui lui est réservé par la convention de 1928. Après la révolution, l'Egypte a été sollicitée d'accorder au Soudan des quantités supplémentaires d'eau. L'Egypte a retenu dans les réservoirs deux millions de mètres cubes. Malheureusement, ces quantités n'ont pas été utilisées et se sont déversées dans la Méditerranée, alors qu'elles pouvaient servir à l'irrigation de 20.000 feddans. Tout cela a été fait au moment où l'on accuse l'Egypte de priver le Soudan d'eau. Or, nous possédons une lettre d'un haut fonctionnaire britannique du gouvernement du Soudan disant que les irrigations soudanaises disposent d'abondantes quantités d'eau.

L'EGYPTE ET LES SOVIETS

Une autre question est posée :
 — Vous avez dit, M. le ministre, que l'Egypte est disposée à collaborer avec n'importe qui lui tend la main. Est-ce que la Russie Soviétique vous a donné une aide économique ?

— Le gouvernement égyptien a soumis à toutes les puissances ses principaux projets. Des contacts se poursuivent à ce sujet et il y a de grandes probabilités que la Russie se charge de la réalisation de certains de ces projets si un accord définitif est réalisé.

Nous n'envisageons que l'intérêt de l'Egypte, et l'offre la meilleure sera acceptée quelle que soit la puissance qui la présente. Nous nous soumettrons à aucune pression ni à aucune condition pour la réalisation des projets économiques vitaux.

— Quels sont les projets que

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la mission économique égyptienne a examinée avec la Russie et les pays de l'Europe Orientale?
 — Ce sont tous les projets qu'énumérera le lieutenant-colonel Ingénieur Samir Nimi, membre du Conseil Permanent de la production nationale.
 Ces projets sont soumis à toutes les puissances et à toutes les grandes sociétés mondiales.

LA SITUATION EN SYRIE

— Pouvez-vous nous dire quel que ce soit au sujet de l'attitude de l'Egypte à l'égard de la Syrie?
 — La politique de l'Egypte tend à créer une sorte d'union entre les peuples arabes. Mais cette union doit être basée sur les désirs des peuples et par les voies constitutionnelles reconnues. De plus, la politique de l'Egypte est de ne pas intervenir, d'une manière quelconque, dans les affaires intérieures des pays arabes. Nous voulons que les différends entre ces pays se dissipent car les dangers qui nous menacent sont plus importants que ces différends.

— Est-ce que l'Egypte a offert une aide quelconque au président Tchichakly?
 — L'Egypte n'a offert aucune aide. Nul n'a le droit d'intervenir dans les affaires intérieures d'un pays.

LE GOUVERNEUR GENERAL DU SOUDAN

— Le gouverneur général du Soudan entrave la convention du Soudan. En votre qualité de partis dans cette convention pourquoi n'y avez-vous pas attiré son attention?

— Lorsque nous recevons une plainte officielle de la part du gouvernement national, nous la soutiendrons jusqu'à ce qu'il obtienne l'exécution de la convention.

LA POSSIBILITE D'UN ACCORD AVEC L'ANGLETERRE

— Bien que vous ne reconnaissez ni les conversations, ni les négociations, avez-vous un espoir quelconque d'arriver prochainement à un accord avec l'Angle-

terre?
 — Nous l'espérons depuis soixante-quinze ans.

L'INDEPENDANCE DU SOUDAN

— Quelle est l'opinion du gouvernement égyptien au cas où le Soudan déciderait d'être indépendant?

— Nous acceptons ce que les Soudanais décideront : l'indépendance ou l'union avec l'Egypte.

LE SUD DU SOUDAN

— Quelle est la véritable situation dans le sud du Soudan?

— L'administration britannique considère comme hostile tout homme qui proclame son loyalisme au gouvernement national et cet homme est l'objet de diverses sortes d'oppression.

— Pouvez-vous nous donner les noms des chefs qui ont été opprimés?

— Voici, pour exemple, Aki Rizkallah et Serah Ifo.

— Durant votre visite, avez-vous vu des gens qui incitaient les habitants du sud contre le nord du Soudan?

— Les fonctionnaires de l'administration disent aux Sudites qui font preuve de collaboration avec les Nordistes qu'ils sont en train de vendre leur pays aux Arabes du Nord. Cela s'est produit avec le député Coamo. Vous voyez comment le gouverneur du Soudan, qui est responsable de l'unité du Soudan devant les deux pays, sauvegarde cette unité!

LES F.M. SOUDANAIS

— Avez-vous conseillé au gouvernement soudanais de dissoudre la branche soudanaise des Frères Musulmans?

— La décision prise par l'Egypte pour dissoudre l'association des Frères Musulmans est une mesure d'ordre intérieur. Nous n'avons rien à voir avec ce qui se fait là-bas et je n'ai donné aucune directive à ce sujet.

PROCHAINES VISITES

— Après la protestation britannique comptez-vous visiter de nouveau le Soudan?

— Je continuerai à visiter le Soudan jusqu'à ce qu'il obtienne sa liberté complète.

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Egypt And Arab Unity Schemes.

Asked whether there was any truth in reports to the effect that Egypt was opposed to any scheme for Arab unity, he said that Egypt was desirous of seeing Arab unity achieved at once and she had repeatedly declared her stand towards this objective.

He added that under the new régime Egypt had abandoned the old stupid idea of claiming the position of leadership in the Arab world because it was infinitely better for Egypt to occupy an inferior position in a strong Arab bloc than to be at the head of a group of weak Arab peoples. It was inconceivable, he pointed out, that Egypt should insist upon such leadership when she was still in need of reform in many fields.

Egypt earnestly hoped that Arabs should form a formidable front, irrespective of the position she might occupy in such a bloc, and she would be extremely gratified if the leadership of the group was entrusted to Iraq or Yemen so long as the interests of the Arab world were safeguarded.

Arab Union.

With regard to Dr. Jumali's scheme for Arab union, he declared that Egypt supported such union but that all he feared were the discords and intrigues among the Arabs as well as imperialist conspiracies.

He believed that Arab peoples should have the final word in the matter as, according to the axiom "Vox populi vox Dei," peoples' will was above any other will and he was quite sure that the Arab peoples would not blunder if they were to be consulted on this issue. He, therefore, supported the proposal for the convocation of a congress of the representatives of Arab peoples.

AL-GHONOURI

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10252/4/54

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

E 1022 / February 22, 1954.

Dear Department,

We enclose a summary translation of an article which appeared in Al Gomhourish of February 19, reporting an interview with Major Salah Salem in which he discussed the Sudan question and that of Arab unity. For some reason which we cannot at present explain, there was no mention of this article in the French evening paper, the Bourse Egyptienne, of the same day, nor in the morning press next day. It is most unusual for Major Salah Salem to fail to make headlines in the evening press with an exclusive statement to a morning paper.

2. We are sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Levant Department and to the United Kingdom Trade Commissioner, Khartoum.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

African Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

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COPY.

AL-GOMHOURIA:

February 19, 1964.

Important Statement by Salah Salem to
"Al-Gomhouria"
"Vox Populi Vox Dei And Peoples' Will
Is Above Any Other Will."
"It is Better for Us To Occupy An
Inferior Place In A Strong Arab Bloc
Than A Position Of Leadership In A
Group of Weak Arab Countries".
"The Sudan Has Been The Refuge For British
Officials Driven Out Of Iran And Eritrea"

Major Salah Salem, Minister of National Guidance, yesterday declared that peoples' will was above any other will as established by the axiom "Vox populi vox Dei" and that the Arab peoples would not blunder if they were to be consulted upon the issue of union or unity.

He stressed the fact that the unity of the Sudan was seriously threatened by the machinations of British officials who are in actual and exclusive charge of administration in the southern regions of the Sudan and that it was, therefore, imperative that the Sudanisation Committee should immediately on its formation take a speedy decision regarding these British administrative officials as the Sudan had become the refuge for British nationals driven out of Abadan and Eritrea.

The above important declarations were made yesterday in the course of an interview by Major Salah Salem to "Al-Gomhouria" on important political problems which are now engaging public opinion in Egypt and the Arab world.

Asked whether a decision had been taken concerning the early formation of the Sudanisation Committee, he said that he believed the Governor-General's Commission would shortly take a final decision about the choice of the Sudanisation Committee members from the list of five candidates submitted by the Prime Minister.

As to the expected work of the Committee, he believed that the first step to be taken by them would be the consideration of the attitude of the British administrative officials in the southern regions of the Sudan as it had already been established that the unity of the Sudan was seriously threatened by the dangerous machinations of these officials who are in actual and exclusive charge of the administration of the southern regions of the Sudan.

Moreover, the Committee, in his opinion, should consider the position of British officials in excess of the normal establishment in the Sudan which had become in the past few years the refuge for British officials driven by Dr. Mossadeq out of Iran or dismissed from Eritrea.

He gave as an example the appointment of British oil experts as road construction engineers with the result that the efficiency of the Staff of Public Works had considerably deteriorated while embezzlement had become frequent.

/Egypt And.....

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1075/9/54

CONFIDENTIAL



BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

February 22, 1954.

E 10262/11.

Dear Department,

You may be interested in the attached summary translation of an Editorial which appeared in Al Gomhourieh of February 19 in the form of an open letter "to Iraq", by an author who signed himself "S...", and who may perhaps have been Major Salah Salem himself.

2. We are copying this letter to Eastern Department and Bagdad.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

African Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

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- 2 -

Egypt And Arab Unity Schemes.

Asked whether there was any truth in reports to the effect that Egypt was opposed to any scheme for Arab unity, he said that Egypt was desirous of seeing Arab unity achieved at once and she had repeatedly declared her stand towards this objective.

He added that under the new régime Egypt had abandoned the old stupid idea of claiming the position of leadership in the Arab world because it was infinitely better for Egypt to occupy an inferior position in a strong Arab bloc than to be at the head of a group of weak Arab peoples. It was inconceivable, he pointed out, that Egypt should insist upon such leadership when she was still in need of reform in many fields.

Egypt earnestly hoped that Arabs should form a formidable front, irrespective of the position she might occupy in such a bloc, and she would be extremely gratified if the leadership of the group was entrusted to Iraq or Yemen so long as the interests of the Arab world were safeguarded.

Arab Union.

With regard to Dr. Jamali's scheme for Arab union, he declared that Egypt supported such union but that all he feared were the discords and intrigues among the Arabs as well as imperialist conspiracies.

He believed that Arab peoples should have the final word in the matter as, according to the axiom "Vox populi vox Dei," peoples' will was above any other will and he was quite sure that the Arab peoples would not blunder if they were to be consulted on this issue. He, therefore, supported the proposal for the convocation of a congress of the representatives of Arab peoples.

AL-GOMHOURI

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- 2 -

"Arabs everywhere.... the road to salvation is now paved. Let us fight our enemies in every possible front. Let us declare a Holy War."

AL-GOMHOURIA.

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

SAVING TELEGRAM

En Clair by bag

1022/14
E 1023/16

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir Ralph Skrine Stevenson

[Redacted]

No.105 Saving
April 14, 1954

CB (F01) Whitehall
Dis)

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.105
Saving of April 14, 1954, Repeated for information
Saving to:-

B.M.E.O. No.174
Washington No.119
Paris No.139

UNCLASSIFIED

Dealing with foreign affairs at a press conference yesterday, Colonel Nasser said that participation by any Arab country in the Turkish-Pakistani Pact would undermine Arab unity and would mean subservience to Anglo-American imperialism. He went on to say that there appeared to be little difference between British and American policy, and that there was nothing to justify the U.S. Ambassador's optimism on the subject of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement.

APR 15 1954
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M W K A M



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JE 1022 14

2nd April 1954.

Dear Morris

Thank you for your letter of the 5th March about the report of a proposed Pan-African Conference, to be held in Cairo under the joint auspices of Mr. Nehru, Dr. Nkrumah and General Neguib. We were interested in Cairo's comments on this. As you will know reports of preparations for a conference of this character have been circulating intermittently over the past two years, varying only in the choice of venue and sponsors. We have no information from Colonial Governments which would throw any further light on this latest African-Asian conference proposal.

2. As regards Dr. Nkrumah's participation, this on the face of it seems implausible in the case of any congress convened during the next few months. A general election is likely to take place in the Gold Coast in June, and preparations for this should keep him fully occupied with affairs at home during the immediately foreseeable future.

3. Obviously we cannot discount the possibility of an Indian-Egyptian alignment, that is outside the United Nations where to a certain extent it already exists, based on common hostility to "colonialism" in Africa, which could have serious repercussions on our policies in the African territories and we would be very glad if you would continue to keep us informed of further reports on this topic.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to Molyneux at the CEO.

Yours sincerely,
JDBShaw
(J. D. B. Shaw)

W. MORRIS, ESQ.

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E 1023/47

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

In Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WINDHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 536
April 20, 1954.

B. 6.21 p.m. April 20, 1954.
R. 7.40 p.m. April 20, 1954.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 536 of
April 20

Repeated for information having to: B.M.E.O. Paris
Washington Ankara.

At a press conference at Kafr El Bawar yesterday after the distribution of land to peasants under the agrarian reform scheme, Lieutenant-Colonel Abdul Nasser answered questions on Egypt's foreign policy.

2. Asked whether Egypt would proclaim a policy of neutrality in international relations, he said that the question was not one of neutrality but of cooperation or non-cooperation. Neutrality was of no avail, particularly in wartime. Adequate strength was necessary in order to preserve neutrality. Egypt's policy was non-cooperation with those who occupied her territory or encroached upon her sovereignty.

3. Asked if his assumption of the premiership meant a better chance of an Anglo-Egyptian settlement he replied "you had better ask the British". The Anglo-Egyptian situation was still the same as on October 21 last. The new cabinet did not (repeat not) mean any change in Egypt's foreign policy.

4. He said that Egypt had not considered the question of recognition of Communist China, East Germany and Albania.

5. The Egyptian Government was working to strengthen the army and supply it with heavy weapons. These could be obtained only from the Great Powers, but the Western States had persistently refused to supply such weapons to Egypt.

6. Replying to a question about the pressure being brought on the Arabs to conclude a peace settlement with Israel, he said that Egypt would defend herself in conjunction with the other Arab States who were her partners in the collective security pact, and would meet Israeli aggression by force. The same applied in the case of an attack on any other Arab country.

/Foreign

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COPY.

February 19, 1954.

AL-GOMHOURIA:

To Iraq
by "S"

Addressing the Arab people, the writer says:

"We have agreed between ourselves that the only solution for our problems is to be frank with each other, even if such frankness leads to crises and differences.

"Today I wish to raise before you, in complete frankness, a particular issue which has often occupied my mind, and for which I found no explanation. Today I feel it my duty to say that it is the issue of evacuation from Iraq.

"For recent years, I have repeatedly heard Iraqi responsible men, and others, saying that Iraq was waiting for the settlement of the Egyptian case, and then demand a solution of its own. Some of them, even went as far as saying that Iraq has sacrificed a great deal by waiting for an Egyptian settlement.

"My Iraqi Brothers.....

"I must be frank and say to you that this theory is beyond comprehension. And in fact this attitude of "wait and see" is detrimental, not only to the Egyptian case, but to all Arab questions.

"It is better for us to open more than one front for Britain, if we truly believe in Arab unity. This will weaken Britain in all fronts.

"What harm could be done if Iraq rose today and insisted on immediate evacuation and the abrogation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty?

"Would'nt that strengthen our say and add to the zest of our current position?

"We can coordinate our plans and write our demands in order to make our tactics both united and positive.

"Would'nt you agree with me that the policy of "wait and see" can only afford better chances for the British to succeed in each front on the account of our freedom and independence.

"If we accepted the logic of "wait and see" in the Levant, what could have happened then if Syria or Lebanon decided to postpone their struggle against France until the Egyptian case was settled?

"I think that British occupation constitutes the essence of our problems.

"The British were the custodians of Palestine, but they betrayed the trust, and handed the country to the Jews.

"The British occupy Jordan and intimidate her by Israel.

"The British occupy Egypt and Iraq, and they always let us down in every international battle.

/"Arabs...

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Cairo telegram No. 536 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

Foreign Office please pass Washington, Paris and Ankara as my Saving telegrams Nos. 132, 152 and 31 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Washington, Paris and Ankara].

.....

J
 AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

JE 1022/16

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM

Chancery,
 Cairo.
 To: African Dept.
 No. 10310/1/54
 Dated May 24th
 Received in
 Registry— May 26

Egypt and Arab Unity.

Encloses a summary of a speech made on May 22nd by Major Salem in which he criticised the campaign launched against Egypt in the press of certain Arab countries. Also reports a conversation between Major Salem, the minister and the Oriental Counsellor during the course of which Major Salem said the Council for the Revolutionary Command had been convinced that the West was seeking to isolate Egypt. He said that cooperation between the Middle East region and the West was possible (copied (letter only) Beirut Damascus, Baghdad)

References to former relevant papers

JE 1022/14

MINUTES

The increasing isolation of Egypt from the other Arab League states is matched by that of the C.R.C. within Egypt itself.

John Street
 27.5

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Levant Dept

SE Asia Dept 6/6

There was a report in the Times the other day that Nasser had informed the Syrian Ambassador that Egypt would not object to union between Syria & Iraq, or to Iraq entering into a pact with Turkey & Pakistan. I don't think we have seen anything about this from Cairo or Damascus. Have Levant Dept. any information?

(Action completed)

(Index)

SIC u/b W.P. 22.7.54

References to later relevant papers

John
 27/5.

There was one report, which I cannot
now trace but I think was related
to Zafullah's visit to Cairo and was
perhaps entered ~~in~~ African or South East
Asia, that Nasser had said that ~~there~~^{Egypt}
would not resist Iraqi accession to the
Perso-Pakistan agreement; we doubted whether
there had really been any change in
the Egyptian attitude.

2. We have not heard of anything being
said to the Syrian ambassador or of any
suggestion that there has been any weakening
in Egyptian opposition to Iraqi-Syrian union.
A recent report from Damascus about the
Syrian elections showed that the Egyptians
(and the Saudis) have recently been
particularly active in their anti-union
campaign.

Hewell Jones
29/5

SEM
2/6.

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

CONFIDENTIAL
(10310/1/54)

May 24, 1954.

E 1022/16

Dear Department,

We enclose a summary of a speech made on May 22 by Major Salah Salem, Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, in which he criticised the campaign launched against Egypt in the press of certain Arab countries, and spoke of "certain plots organized while Egypt was facing the crisis of last February".

2. Major Salem announced that these attacks were attempts by the imperialists to disrupt Arab unity. He recalled in particular that on February 23 "a certain Arab personality" announced that his country would join the Turko-Pakistani Pact without consulting the other Arab nations. Major Salem then said that articles were subsequently published in the press of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and other countries attacking the "Government of Lieutenant-Colonels" which was ruling Egypt, describing them as traitors at a time when they were actually struggling against imperialism and feudalism. Major Salem concluded by saying that the present Egyptian Government took pride in these Lieutenant-Colonels who had come from the people and were working for the people.

3. Major Salem referred to this speech when the Minister, accompanied by the Oriental Counsellor, paid a courtesy call on him this morning. He said that Her Majesty's Government's apparent unwillingness to restart talks on the Canal Zone question, in spite of a major concession offered by the Egyptian side as far back as the first days of February, had convinced the Council for the Revolutionary Command that the West was seeking to isolate Egypt. He mentioned the overthrow of the Shishakli régime in Syria, the subservience of Pakistan and in particular of Sir Zafrullah Khan, attempts by Iraqi politicians to join the Turkish-Pakistani Pact and the events of March 1 in the Sudan. Cooperation between the Middle East region and the West was possible but only after national aspirations had been satisfied. He said the Egyptian Government knew well that Iraqi politicians were bent on associating their country with the Turko-Pakistani Pact, but would not dare because "they would not live for ten minutes". On the other hand, he himself envisaged a tie-up between the Arab Security Pact and, for example, the Turkish-Pakistani Pact, with the full support of Egypt, once the Canal Zone question was settled.

/4. ...

African Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

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4. The régime are no doubt rattled by the reception given to the Aboul Fat'h brothers in the Levant states and in Iraq. It is clear, however, that the matter is deeper than that and that Egyptian fear of isolation is very real.

5. We are sending copies of this letter, without enclosure, to the Chanceries at Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad and to Levant Department.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY. *aps*

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"EGYPTIAN GAZETTE" 23rd May, 1954.

AN appeal to the Arab countries to unite their ranks and rid themselves of imperialism and reactionaries, was made last night by Major Salah Salem, Minister of National Guidance, in the course of a speech at a Ramadan gathering in Bab el Shaaria, organised by the Liberation Rally last night.

The Minister criticised the campaign launched against Egypt in the Press of certain Arab countries and spoke of certain plots, which were organised at a time when Egypt was facing the crisis of last February.

In his speech, Major Salem said that at the time when the Revolution began to free the Egyptian nation, not with words, or through corrupt parliaments, but by directing it on the right path, thus liberating it from feudalism, which had collaborated with imperialism to humiliate the people, the Revolution turned to the Arabs to strengthen their solidarity.

For that reason imperialism realised that it was facing a crisis. Therefore, it tried to smash these efforts.

"I remember February 23 last, when a certain personality in a certain Arab country announced that his country would join the Turco-Pakistan Pact, and that they would not consult the other Arab nations, as they were free to join any pact they liked," Major Salem said.

"Why did this happen on February 23 in a particular at a time when Egypt was passing through a crisis?" Major Salem asked. "It was an opportunity for reactionary elements to be able to join the West, so that imperialism would continue to be a threat to the Arabs."

PLOTS ORGANISED

"A series of plots were then organised in the Arab world and some started to attack the government of lieutenant-colonels, which is ruling Egypt, describing them as traitors. Articles were published on these lines in the Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and other countries," Major Salem said.

He then went on to disclose that these plots were organised "when the government of lieutenant-colonels — and we take pride in this description — said to the British 'no, we are not collaborating with you.'"

"This is happening when the government of lieutenant-colonels is struggling in the Sudan to liberate it from imperialism, which oppressed it under the government of pashas, of feudalism, of drug-traffickers and traders in arms, newsprint and liberties. We, the government of lieutenant-colonels, take pride in the fact that we have not surrendered to the imperialists" "by not accepting joint defence," Major Salem said.

"Nothing would have been easier to have accepted it in order to gain a cheap evacuation and a handful of dollars and arms."

"The present government prides itself in these lieutenant-colonels, who come from the people and work for the people," the Minister said.

INWARD *Saving Telegram*

J

SAVING TELEGRAM

ADVANCE COPY

En Clair by bag.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir Ralph Skrine Stevenson.

No.139 Saving
May 31, 1954:

UNCLASSIFIED

E. 1022/17

*CB (70) / Subalace
Dist*

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.139 Saving of May 31, 1954, repeated for information Saving to :

Paris No.168
Washington No.151
B.M.E.O. (Fayid) No.211

At a reception given on May 29 by Major Salem for students from Arab, Asian and African countries Lieutenant Colonel Naesser and Major Salem spoke on the theme of Arab unity.

2. Major Salem recalled that he had previously asked for an Arab Conference. Contacts had been made and discussions begun, but imperialism had intrigued against the Revolution: the results of its intrigues could be seen in the Sudan and elsewhere. Western powers had approached certain Arab countries with offers of assistance and of alliances, but the Arabs knew no enemy except the one which occupied their land and they recognised only those who were ready to fight with them against imperialism. The Arabs sought independence and would not sell their dignity to either the East or the West.

3. Major Salem went on to say that he regarded the students as ambassadors. When they returned home it was their duty to enlighten their peoples, to combat conspiracies and to create confidence in Arab nationalism and unity. This task was more important even than their studies, as only thus could the glories of Islam and Arabism be regained.

4. He then announced that the Egyptian Government were ready to establish an Arab Club. He also asked his audience to consider the Egyptian State Broadcasting 'Sawt al Arab' programme as their own and said that he himself, as Minister of National Guidance, was ready to discuss matters with them in order to lay a solid foundation for Arab unity.

5. Colonel Nasser expressed his pleasure at meeting Arabs gathered from all corners of the earth, saying that this reminded him of the dream of Arab unity and nationalism. He went on to speak of imperialistic attempts to spread dissension and to enslave the Arab world. These attempts would always fail and the Crusades would not end until the Islamic countries were freed from the fetters of imperialism. The imperialists had spread their intrigues after both world


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wars; they had killed Palestine and created Israel. They were now trying to stir up hatred amongst the Arab peoples, but they should know that the Arabs hated only imperialism.

5. Before making his final appeal for Arab solidarity Colonel Nasser expressed the hope that Egypt and the Arab countries would form a unit sufficiently powerful to be feared by all nations, so that any would-be aggressor would think twice before infringing the Arabs' rights.



...agreement between the Arab nations and members of the Turkey-Pakistan pact.

The Turkey-Pakistan pact was an alternative to the Middle East defense organization which we rejected. No defense pact for the Middle East will be successful until the various Arab problems, including the Suez dispute, are settled. Once this is done the Arab and other Middle Eastern nations can together study the possibilities of building up the defense of their area. The Arab League collective-security pact can well be

...the great powers have possessed any of these weapons from reaching us. If they were to change this policy, I am sure that our armed forces would be a deterrent to any aggressor.

Do you think that U.S. policy toward Israel is more balanced? What solution do you see to the Israel problem?

The last Administration was most unfair to the Arabs in its support of Zionism, disregarding Arab rights and even American interests and prestige in the Arab world. It is ironic that in

...development of culture, industry and commerce. Our main emphasis is on the economy because we feel that this has been neglected for a long time and that Egypt has great industrial possibilities. Besides the surveys we have made we have also changed our policy to encourage foreign investment.

How will you make the principles of the revolution the permanent basis of Egyptian life?

The principles of our revolution are based on giving Egypt a real democracy instead of a parliamentary dictatorship under the old feudal system. We now are in the transition stage -reorienting the people and imposing upon them the privileges and responsibilities of a real democracy.

Can Such a Power for Arab World?

On July 23, Egypt celebrates the second anniversary of the revolution that threw King Farouk out of the country. The celebration comes at a time when the revolutionary regime of young officers seems close to achieving its greatest success—a settlement with Britain on the Suez question. Against this background, Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser tells in the following interview with Sam Souki, Newsweek Middle East correspondent, how he sees the future in relation to the West and the rest of the Middle East.

How do you envisage Egypt's role in the Middle East after the Suez Canal Zone dispute with the British is settled?

After the Suez Canal question is settled, we consider that we still have other political problems which will be of primary concern to us. We intend to play our part in helping settle all problems affecting the Arab nations or peoples because we consider any problem concerning any Arab state our own problem. We feel our aim must be to build up the Arab world into a unified family that will take its rightful place in the concert of nations. I am convinced that this unified Arab world will be one of the greatest factors for peace, not only in the Middle East but in the world. This I believe must be Egypt's role once the Suez Canal dispute is settled—to build up an Arab world that will contribute its share to progress and civilization.

Do you foresee a coordinated defense agreement between the Arab nations and members of the Turkey-Pakistan pact?

The Turkey-Pakistan pact was an alternative to the Middle East defense organization which we proposed. No defense pact for the Middle East will be successful until the various Arab problems, including the Suez dispute, are settled. Until then, we are unable to discuss any pact with Turkey and other Middle Eastern powers. We are, however, in favor of a general Arab defense pact which would be based on the principle of collective security.

the nucleus for this defense plan. The defense of this area is naturally of primary concern to the people of this area, and the defense pattern must be ours, rather than one imposed on us.

What role can Egypt's armed forces play in the defense of the Middle East, and what do you need to improve your forces?

An expanded Egyptian armed force could play a vital role in the defense of the Middle East. When the population of Egypt was about 8 million,



Nasser: Toward Arab unity

our army was over 200,000 men. Today our population is about 23 million and there is no reason why we cannot build up an army of hundreds of thousands. The Egyptian soldier is very quick to learn how to handle modern equipment. We need heavy armor, planes, and artillery. I am confident that our soldiers and officers can quickly adapt themselves to the modern equipment. However, the obvious political cause of the great powers has prevented us from this. We must have a change in the policy of the great powers toward the Arab world if we are to have any chance.

Do you think that U.S. policy toward Egypt is more balanced than that of other great powers?

U.S. policy toward Egypt is more balanced than that of other great powers. We are grateful to the United States for its support of our revolution and for its fair and balanced policy toward the Arab world.

trying to solve the plight of the European Jews. American policy created an even greater problem in the Middle East. The solution to the Israeli problem is to restore to the Arabs their lands and their homes and persuade Israel to abide by the resolutions of the United Nations. I have noticed a better understanding of the Arabs since this present Administration took over. But it will take a great deal of moral courage on the part of the present Administration to right the wrongs of the Truman regime and to prevent Israel from continuing her present aggressive policy. If it is allowed to continue, it will create a very delicate and explosive situation in the Middle East.

Are the Communists more active in Egypt, and what is being done to combat them?

Our revolution dealt the greatest blow that Communism has received, not only in Egypt but in the entire Middle East. We destroyed the greatest factors that were creating a growing Communist movement in our country—a corrupt monarchy, feudal oppression of the peasants, and a disregard of the rights of workers and the masses. Only one major unwitting ally to Communism remains in Egypt—the British troops in the Suez Canal Zone. This enables the Communists, disguised as nationalists, to stir up trouble and gain supporters.

What does Egypt need most for economic development?

We have laid down a three-pronged plan for economic development—agricultural, industrial, and commercial. The main emphasis is on industrialization because we feel that this will be the best method for a long time and that it will give us a high rate of production. Besides the services we have received from the United States, our laws and regulations are being improved.

How will you make the principles of the revolution the permanent basis of Egyptian life?

The principles of the revolution are being put into effect through a series of laws and regulations. We are working to create a new social system based on justice and equality. We are also working to improve the standard of living of the Egyptian people.

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INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

Already entered Jt 102220

FROM SAING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 190 SAVING
September 3, 1954.

R. September 8, 1954.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 190 SAVING
of September 3.

Repeated for information SAVING to
Washington Paris B.M.E.O.

In the course of an interview with the United States Weekly, "United States News and World Report" on August 5, which was reported in the Egyptian press on August 31, Colonel Nasser made the following points:-

(i) He was opposed to any form of Middle East Defense Organisation in which America and Britain might participate. As he had told Mr. Dulles, any such organisation would be to the disadvantage of all, as it would act as a focus for Communist-inspired hatred. The existence of American bases in Libya had already given the Communists a propaganda opening in the Middle East.

(ii) The Arab States could mobilise, once they were adequately armed, 12 divisions in much less time than that which would be needed by France to prepare the divisions which might be her contribution towards the European Army. Colonel Nasser was however opposed to participation by any Arab State in any alliance similar to the Turco-Pakistani Pact.

(iii) The Communists had been trying to convince Egyptians that the Point IV programme was nothing but a form of imperialism. Colonel Nasser himself criticised the programme as providing only very slight technical assistance. It offered no tangible results which were essential if the public were to realise that aid was in fact being given.

(iv) He was amazed at the attitude of the United States towards Communist China. The United States should acknowledge
Communist China

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Saire telegram No. 190 Baving to Foreign Office

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Communist China as an established State and should formally recognize her. He had met people who had visited China and had been told that the Chinese people loved their present Government.

(v) He paid tribute to the policy of ~~Mandate~~ France in Tunisia and said that a similar policy should be applied to Algiers and Morocco.

B B B

<p>1954</p>	<p>J AFRICAN DEPARTMENT</p> <p>EGYPT AND SUDAN</p>	<p>102 J E 1022/21</p>
<p>FROM SECRET Sir Roger Stevens Tehran to Mr Shuckburgh. No. 1198/40/549 Dated Sept 8 Received in Registry - Sept 14.</p>	<p><u>Egyptian Policy</u> Reports on the Egyptian attitude to Persia since the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Heads of Agreement. The Persians are both dishevelled and uncertain and would be grateful for a lead. (Closed Case, Fayid)</p>	
<p>References to former relevant papers</p> <p>-119</p>	<p>MINUTES</p> <p>Mr. Entezam is getting well into the habit of asking for our advice on major issues of Persian foreign policy. He is of a much higher calibre than might be expected of a Persian Foreign Minister, and we have on occasions given our advice very frankly.</p>	
<p>(Print)</p>	<p>2. I think that the analysis of Egyptian policy contained in African Department's draft would certainly be useful to him, but it would be more valuable if we could complete it with some practical advice. Could we, for example, sum up by saying that although the intentions of the present Egyptian leaders are almost certainly good, their foreign policy may well continue to be influenced, and quite possibly vitiated, by internal developments in Egypt? Even after, as we hope, Anglo-Egyptian differences are finally laid to rest, they will be faced with some very difficult and even almost insoluble economic problems. They may for a long time to come be difficult to deal with; they have certainly shown few signs of taking a wider view if this conflicts with Egypt's immediate self-interest. Anything that the Persians can do to persuade the Egyptians of the realities of Middle East defence will be all to the good, but if they eventually decide to adopt a positive policy, even that sphere they may well find that they must do it without, or despite, the Egyptians.</p>	
<p>(How disposed of)</p> <p>Off Sir Roger Stevens from Mr Shuckburgh 21/10</p>	<p>D. L. Stewart (D.L.L. Stewart) October 19, 1954.</p> <p>I agree generally. Nathan 19/10</p> <p>African Dept.</p> <p>I have added this to the draft.</p> <p>McGrouley 20/10 Street 20/10 22/10</p>	
<p>(Action completed)</p> <p>NAK 25/10</p>	<p>(Index)</p> <p>for 11/10</p>	<p>46515</p>
<p>References to later relevant papers</p>	<p>46515</p>	

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(JE 1022/21)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

SECRET

October 21, 1954.

My dear Roger

OUTFILE

In your letter 1198/40/540 of September 8 you asked for our present estimate of Egyptian foreign policy.

2. It is obviously too early to form an opinion about the effects of our agreement on Egyptian policy. The initialling of the Heads of Agreement seems to have come as a surprise to the Egyptian leaders; they evidently did not believe until the last moment that they would achieve what had eluded every other Egyptian Government. The result was that in the excitement of the moment they said, and doubtless believed, that Egypt and Britain would be firm friends in the future. We must see how this feeling develops but we intend to assist its growth as much as we can.

3. One indication is the trend of Egyptian propaganda. After the initialling of the Heads of Agreement the position improved, though we have had some cause to complain of Egyptian attacks on our policy in the Sudan. The extension of their influence there is of course a matter to which the Egyptian Government attach a great deal of importance.

4. Another indication is the reaction of the Egyptian Government to recent proposals by the Iraqi Prime Minister about Middle East defence. We have always thought that the Egyptians would fight very shy of entering into any commitment of this kind. For some time the Heads of Agreement have been strongly attacked by certain sections of Egyptian opinion, notably the Moslem Brotherhood, on the ground that they tie Egypt to the West; and the whole tenor of official Egyptian propaganda has been to emphasise that, as a result of the Agreement, Egypt is now free of all alliances. It is clear that this is their firm policy, at least for the present, since they must clearly be unwilling to present their public with any more controversial issues for the time being. Nuri-Es-Said has told us that he has discussed this problem with the Egyptian leaders, whose reaction was that for internal reasons they could not participate, but were quite happy that he should go ahead. When the evacuation in the Canal Base is completed, and if Anglo-Egyptian relations continue to improve, the Egyptian leaders may feel themselves strong enough to take a more co-operative line. But it will probably take time.

5. The major problem now confronting the Egyptian Government is that of Israel. It is pretty certain that the Arab States are not at present strong enough to mount a second attack on Israel and know it. But now that the embargo on arms supplies to Egypt has been lifted we have to watch the question of arms deliveries

/very

Sir Roger Stevens, K.C.M.G.,
Tehran.

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very closely. With the Suez Base dispute out of the way, we hope that our relations with the Arab States, who have generally welcomed the agreement, will improve and that our influence with them will increase. We shall of course use this influence wherever we can to promote a more realistic approach to the question of Israel. But this too, is bound to be a slow business.

6. Some indication of the general line on which the ideas of the Egyptian leaders are moving is given in a pamphlet published last year over the signature of the Egyptian Prime Minister. Nasser evidently thinks of Egypt as taking the lead in three main spheres: the Arab League, the continent of Africa, and the Islamic world. In the last connexion you may know that Nasser has accepted an invitation from the Indonesian Government to attend an Afro-Asian conference to be held in Djakarta at the end of this year. While, therefore, we believe that the Egyptians are now genuinely anxious to improve their relations with us, we cannot afford to ignore the signs which point to their intention to play a greater part in the affairs of Islam, and, particularly, of Africa. As to the Arab League, it appears that for the moment at least the Egyptians are content to let the Iraqis pursue their plans for common defence. So long as Egypt does not participate, these arrangements are likely to widen the split in the League and to increase the isolation of Egypt and Saudi-Arabia. This is bound to be unwelcome to the Egyptians and in time, therefore, they may come to revise their ideas.

7. As you can see, this is all rather speculative but if you think that it would be of interest to Mr. Entezam, there is no objection to your speaking to him on the above lines. You may like to add that though the present intentions of the Egyptian leaders may be good, their foreign policy is likely to be influenced by internal developments in Egypt. For example the Government now have to face some very difficult economic problems. They can not be expected to take a wide view on Middle Eastern problems if that would conflict with Egypt's immediate self-interest. Anything that the Persians can do to persuade the Egyptians of the realities of Middle East defence will be all to the good. But the Persians should realise that, if they eventually decide to adopt a positive policy, they may have to do so without or despite the Egyptians.

yours ever

sgd (C.A.E. Shuckburgh)

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EXTRACT from the "HINDU MADRAS"

5th September, 1954.

JE/1022/23

PROMOTION OF PEACE.

INDIA'S ROLE IN S.-E. ASIA.

COL. NASSER'S TRIBUTE

By. R. Parthasarathy. Madras, September, 5th,

"I would like to say that India and Egypt should always be able to co-operate in all spheres which would contribute to world progress; that I believe should be one of the main topics of discussion and action at the forthcoming Jakarta meeting of African and Asian Premiers", Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser, Prime Minister of Egypt, has told me in reply to a question.

Indicating that he would attend a conference of Asian and African Premiers Col. Nasser says: "We fully support the idea of a conference of African and Asian Premiers because we believe that it could bring better understanding and relations among the participating countries".

Referring to China, the Prime Minister says: "We have been following very closely the developments in the Far East and the position of Red China. We are still studying the question of recognising Red China, even though we are against Communism".

The Egyptian Premier's answers are in reply to a list of questions which I submitted to him during my recent visit to Cairo at the invitation of the Egyptian Government. Since he was busy in connection with the negotiations on the Suez Canal issue he said he would send the replies on my return home.

The following are the questions and answers:

Q: What do you think of the role of India in South-East Asia and in the International scene?

A: India is one of the great nations of the world and as such must play an important role in South-East Asia, and in the international scene. Nobody doubts that Indian leaders are sincere in wanting to contribute to the maintenance of peace in their region and to world peace in general. Many people may disagree with India's policy but no one can doubt the sincerity of her leaders. In any case, India has played and will continue to play a leading role in the international scene.

Q: India is following a policy of ensuring areas of local peace. It has seen success in South-East Asia. Will Egypt co-ordinate her foreign policy and co-operate in extending the area of peace to the Middle East?

INDIA'S POLICY OF PEACE

A: India with a 2,000-mile common frontier with China has a delicate problem and must follow the policy it deems fit to ensure her own safety and to ensure peace in the areas surrounding and affecting her - that is, in South-East Asia. Only time will tell how successful that policy will be. Egypt has her own local, regional and international problems. No nation can apply the policies of another nation without various adaptations to suit local considerations and varying problems. In any case, Egypt will always co-ordinate her policy and co-operate with all nations whose sincere intention is to further world peace.

/Q: Has the

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Q: Has the Egyptian Government studied India's Five-Year Plan? Does it see anything in it worthy of emulation?

A: Certainly we have scrutinised very carefully India's Five-Year Plan. It is definitely a plan that has taken a very considerable amount of study and thought. There is much in it that is praiseworthy. But as I said before, every country has its own pattern and problems.

Q: Does Egypt support the idea of a conference of African and Asian Premiers as proposed by Indonesia at the conference of Asian Premiers?

CONFERENCE OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN PREMIERS

A: We fully support the idea of a conference of African and Asian Premiers. Because we believe that it could bring better understanding and relations among the participating countries and it is my intention, God willing, to attend that conference in Jakarta.

Q: Have you any views to offer on the racial policy followed in South Africa, and in some British colonies in Africa?

A: We have always condemned racial and religious discrimination and we are certainly highly critical of the racial policy of South Africa. We believe in justice and freedom for all.

RECOGNITION OF CHINA

Q: Is there any likelihood of Egypt according recognition to Red China, taking into account the historical and geographical facts in this connection?

A: We have been following very closely the developments in the Far East and the position of Red China. We are still studying the question of recognising Red China even though we are against Communism.

Q: Do you envisage increased trade relations between India and Egypt in the next few years?

A: It is my sincere hope that trade between India and Egypt should be increased considerably. I think that this will be to our mutual benefit.

Q: Are there any spheres in which India can be of particular help to Egypt?

A: I have not thought of any at the moment. But I would like to say that India and Egypt should always be able to co-operate in all spheres which would contribute to world peace and progress. That I believe should be one of the main topics of discussion and action at the forthcoming Jakarta meeting of African and Asian Premiers.

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Interview

—with EGYPT'S PRIME MINISTER—

Lieut. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser

WHAT SHOULD U.S. DO IN MIDDLE EAST?

EDITOR'S NOTE: *What does the U.S. have to do to keep the Middle East on the side of the West? Should American troops be sent into the area? Should U.S. arm the Arabs? What kind of U.S. aid, on what terms, is really best?*

The Arab states and Israel disagree. To get the views of an Arab leader, "U.S. News & World Report" sent John Law, Regional Editor, to Cairo to interview Prime Minister Nasser of Egypt.

The views of an Israeli leader will appear in a subsequent issue. The interview with Egypt's Prime Minister is published herewith.

GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, Prime Minister of Egypt at 36, has carved a niche for himself in history as the man who got the British to take their troops out of Egypt.

A career Army officer, Colonel Nasser came into prominence two years ago when a small group of Army officers forced King Farouk into exile and took charge of things themselves.

Colonel Nasser is outspokenly anti-Communist and friendly to the U.S. He has definite ideas as to what the U.S. should and should not do in the Middle East.

At CAIRO

Q Colonel Nasser, do you believe that international Communism is a threat to the Arab area?

A Yes. I think its methods and its tactics here in our country and in all Arab countries are directed to stirring up disorder and hate. I think no country can continue building itself up for the benefit of its people if there is disorder and hate in it.

Q What things are you doing here in Egypt to attempt to keep the Communists from making trouble?

A We just pick them up. That's really the only way.

Q They have no legal status of any kind?

A No. But they are very well organized. They are organized underground and are quite active. They put out eight weekly underground newspapers and hundreds of pamphlets. They have their own underground printing presses. So far, we've picked up six such presses, but whenever we pick one up it seems to get replaced by another one. After a very short time the same underground newspaper begins publishing again. We recently discovered a brand-new press under a house, in a dugout.

Q Do the Communists seem to have lots of funds, and are these funds probably coming from the outside?

A Oh, yes. Most Communists in Egypt are people like unemployed lawyers.

Q The party is mostly unemployed intellectuals?

A Yes.

Q Would you say the party is still capable of causing lots of trouble in Egypt?

A Yes, certainly.

Q What is your idea as to the best way for the Middle East to protect itself against any Communist aggression from the outside? What form should this defense take?

A When I speak about the Middle East area, I want it understood I am not including Turkey in my remarks—just the Arab nations. In the Arab nations we have a sort of complex concerning the West's major powers—England, France and the U.S.—because our experiences in the past have taught us the lesson that a major power will always dominate us. I think, therefore, that the most effective way of defending this area is to leave it in the hands of the area's people.

We have enough man power in this area to defend it, but the man power is dispersed and it is not being channeled in an effective direction. We are about 50 million in the area, you know, and if we band together we can defend our area and at the same time we will be convinced that this defense is for our own safety and our own interests. But if we take on as a partner any of the major powers of the free world, such as the United States or the United Kingdom, we will be giving the Communists a weapon to use to destroy the defense of this area with, because the Communists will be able to convince the people that such a partnership is for the interest of the West only, that the West is exploiting us, that we will be attacked by atomic weapons, and so on.

You know, the Communists are always trying to take advantage of situations by trying to pretend to be more nationalistic than anyone else, and they play on

Military Help, but No Military Missions . . . "Colonization" Causes Hatred . . . How Communists Play on Nationalism

the nationalist theme. So any sort of defense of this area in which one of the major powers is a partner will end up by being to the disadvantage of us and of the rest of the free world, because the Communists will have an opportunity to stir up hate against such a partnership, and this would ruin us, the Arab nations, in a few years. This is what I told Mr. Dulles [Secretary of State John Foster Dulles] when he visited our country, because he was insisting on a Middle East defense organization in which America, Britain and other countries of the free world would take part.

I cannot defend any of these schemes because our people are poisoned against an organization of this type. They consider such an organization as an imperialistic thing, and just colonialism in disguise. But if the Arab countries are strengthened, and are given the opportunity to take advantage of the resources of their population, and the people are directed in the right way, I think we may get good results.

Q What if the Arab countries went into a defense partnership with the new Turkey-Pakistan alliance? Turkey and Pakistan are not major powers or "colonial" powers. So would the same objections you have made apply there, too?

A Yes. The objections are the same, because Pakistan is allied with Turkey, and Turkey is in the North Atlantic Pact, where the big powers are. Remember, three or four years ago the Egyptians were keen to join the Atlantic Pact and they asked the free world to let them join the pact. Now it is different, because the country was in the meantime bombarded by the Communists' slogans—"no pacts, no pacts, no pacts." Now everyone is convinced that any pacts tying in with the major powers are infringements on the sovereignty of the country. I would not dare to agree to any pact. It would be interpreted as a sort of "colonization."

Q Doesn't that part of the Suez agreement which allows the British to reoccupy the base in the event of an attack on Turkey tie you in with the North Atlantic Pact anyway?

A That is the only point of the agreement that our



United Press
PRIME MINISTER NASSER

people are attacking—Turkey, Turkey, Turkey.

Q Do you feel that this clause ties you in too closely to the North Atlantic Pact?

A Well, from a strictly military point of view, we feel that any attack on Turkey may bring us into the battle, and we like to see the battle as far away as possible from our frontiers.

Q There has been some talk of setting up a so-called "northern" defense barrier, going from Turkey to Pakistan, and passing perhaps through Iran and Iraq. Is that a plan that goes against the wishes of the Egyptian Government?

A Any such pact which includes Iraq would cause trouble with the other Arab countries, because such a tie-in would affect the Arab League. Iraq would leave the Arab League and the Arab League would thus be weakened. I think any defense will need depth, not just a chain around Russia.

Q If Iraq were included in such a pact with Turkey and Pakistan, Iraq would have to leave the Arab League?

A There would be a great protest from the other Arab countries if Iraq joined such a pact, because Iraq now forms part of the Arab League Collective Security Pact.

Q Do you feel that a substantial amount of arms aid is required to make Arab countries capable of defending themselves?

A I think we could raise about 12 divisions. And we could raise them in a much shorter time than France has taken to prepare her divisions for a European Army.

Q Do you have the arms and equipment for 12 divisions?

A No, we do not. All we have is the man power. We do not have any money for it either. You know, the most expensive thing there is is raising an army, and at the same time we want to develop our country. I prefer to have social development, and to raise the production of my country, rather than

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Interview

... "We don't need a guarantee" from the big powers

to develop the Army, because I think by developing the Army I will be keeping the standard of living of the people at the same low level it is now. If you want to build an efficient army, you must base it on people who have a good standard of living, who are interested in their work and are not worrying about their families' living conditions and unemployment.

Q You say you believe the Arab area needs arms aid from the U.S. Do you believe that the recent agreement by which the U.S. gives arms aid to Iraq is a step in the right direction?

A Yes. We are not against that agreement. But they have not yet received any arms, I believe.

Q But you believe the principle is a good one?
A Yes.

U. S. BASES CAUSE HATRED—

Q How about the American agreement with Libya, for example, for keeping an air base there? Do you feel that such an agreement is strengthening the area, or is that a different type of aid than you had in mind?

A We are against bases. I think that by having bases in these countries you are hurting yourself, because bases mean occupation, occupation means hatred and hatred means non-co-operation. It is a completely different thing to have bases in England—although you know what the feeling of the British is against the Americans because of those bases—than it is to have bases in our countries, where there is such a complex about bases. I know that the agreement for the Libya bases is supposed to run for 20 years and that you are going to pay 3 million dollars a year or something like that, but I don't think that agreement will last for 10 years.

Q You think the Libyans will get tired of having foreign bases on their soil?

A The Communists in Libya will stir up hatred, and they will do it with efficiency and with money to back it up. If you compare what you spend on your information offices with what the Communists spend on propaganda, you are getting your information work done practically for nothing. The Communists are very clever, and they use slogans that people like—enthusiastic slogans, nationalistic slogans: "occupiers go home," and that sort of thing.

I think all the Libyans I have ever talked to are against having the foreign bases there. The presence of these bases gives the Communists a strong propaganda argument throughout the Arab world, and that is something I always try to tell the American officials I see. If you want to gain the friendship of this area you must study their psychology and treat them with this in mind. We have a complex, owing to Turkish, British, Italian and French occupation. If you Americans continue on this path, the hatred

which was directed against them will be directed against you.

After the last war, the people in this country were hoping that you Americans would be liberators. It was a great disappointment to them when you followed the British and French policy toward us. The result was America, in the public mind, became like Britain and France. You were indulging in their policy.

Q You say this area should defend itself as a unit, without any tie-in to the big powers. What would be your feeling, however, if the big powers should issue a guarantee—in writing, or otherwise—to come to the aid of this area in the event of aggression from any quarter?

A We don't need a guarantee. It is a natural thing, well known to everybody, that you would come to our aid. It is automatic. Such a guarantee would cause trouble. Such a guarantee might even cause an attack. Many people in Egypt are already saying that the agreement on Suez will make us a target for the atomic bomb or H-bomb. You must remember that the people in our area are good and honest people, but very simple people, and it is easy for them to believe things they are told. The Communists have agents everywhere and they have the power of convincing people of many things. There are the free newspapers, but nobody reads them. The Communists, on the other hand, are very successful in spreading their ideas.

Q You mean they do it mainly by word of mouth?

A Yes, and this is much more effective. The Communists are also able to influence many people by posing as true nationalists. For example, they have managed to convince the majority of Egyptians that American Point Four is an imperialistic venture. Once I was asked by a university student: "Why are you continuing to allow Point Four to operate in this country?" When I asked the student if he knew what Point Four was, he said he had very little idea but the only thing he knew for sure was that it was a type of "colonization."

WHERE POINT FOUR FAILS—

Q Aren't there people in the country who can see what American Point Four aid is doing?

A Point Four gives the country a little technical aid, but there is no material result that can be seen by people when they look around them. Nobody can feel the technical assistance. The man in the street has to see a material thing, and he doesn't see it. It is widely thought here, as a matter of fact, that Point Four is a sort of project that the U. S. Government is using to employ Americans abroad, because there is unemployment in the United States. The people need something material that they can touch, in order to be aware of the aid.

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... "You don't realize how Communists exploit small things"

Q But when a farmer, say, is shown a better way to sow his fields, doesn't he see the benefit of this aid?

A If he happens to be in a technical-aid project, he sees it. But there are very few of these. Since people don't see the results of American aid, they joke about it, and are encouraged to do so by Communist propaganda. There was a Point Four project for breeding better chickens, and now everybody jokes about it. They all laugh about American "chicken aid." The saying is that, after all the talk about American aid, all we got were a lot of chickens.

Q Most people here, then, are not aware of American aid?

A As far as Point Four is concerned, we were in a position to convince many people that Point Four was a technical help, and not in any way a sort of "colonization." However, when we come to military aid, things will be more difficult. Whenever you, the U. S., give military aid to a country, you install a military mission in that country. But by putting a military mission in this country you will be destroying all your efforts.

Because of our history we have complexes in this country about some words—especially those which imply that we are being tied to another country. Words like "joint command," "joint pact," "mutual defense" and "mission" are not beloved in our country because we have suffered from them. We are trying not to use any of these words in our agreement with the British, for example. I insisted that we call it an "agreement," not a "treaty," because our people don't like treaties—they think it means chains that tie them.

I think your men who deal with this area should understand the psychology of the area. You may send military aid, but if you send 10 officers along with it nobody will thank you for your aid, but instead will turn it against you.

HOW MILITARY AID CAN HURT—

Q If you entered into an agreement to receive military aid from the U. S., would you expect that the aid would be given, but that no military mission would be sent?

A I could not receive a military mission at all. I think that according to your laws it is not possible to give aid without a mission. However, here in our country doing this would work against you and against the regime. The people will say that after great efforts we were able to get rid of the British mission, but that now this Government is bringing us an American mission—and that our country will therefore be under American rule.

Q But suppose, for example, that you were given some new tanks or new jet airplanes that your country had never used before. Wouldn't you need some American officers to teach the forces how to use the equipment?

A We could learn much of it from reading books. Also, we would be quite ready to send our own officers to the States, where they could learn about the tanks and planes and then come back to teach it to our own forces. You don't realize how the Communists exploit such small things. As a matter of fact, I don't think you have sent any mission to Tito [President of Yugoslavia], but just have a few military people attached to the Embassy as attachés.

Q But, of course, there are always some military attachés in an embassy anywhere—

A Yes.

Q Is the difference then between a group of military attachés and a military "mission" a matter of size?

A It is also a matter of psychology. As I told Mr. Byroade [U. S. Assistant Secretary of State Henry A. Byroade], who works on Middle Eastern problems, you must deal with this area from the psychological point of view—not with agreements, treaties, etc. I think Byroade has been successful in being able to change the American position over the last six or seven months.

UNDERSTANDING THE ARABS—

Q You feel that the Eisenhower Administration has been more understanding of the Arab area's problems—especially the Israeli question—than the Truman Administration was?

A Oh, yes.

Q Mr. Prime Minister, do you believe that a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute is indispensable before you can get an effective defense scheme in the Middle East?

A I think the existence of Israel will always affect the defense of this area as it is now, if only for one reason: Israel separates the Arab bloc into two parts. Egypt, Libya and the Sudan are on one side and the others are on the other side.

Q Will the continued existence of the Arab-Israeli dispute hinder any effective arms build-up that might be made in this Arab area?

A Not as far as any action of our side is concerned. Of course, the Israelis will use all their efforts to try to stop any supply of military aid to us, and in doing that they will affect the defense of the Middle East. They will affect your interests even more than they will affect ours. Really, I wonder—where are you going to bring troops from to defend the Middle East during the next war? From the U. S., as you did in Korea? Are you prepared to send American troops to the Far East, to the Middle East and to Europe?

Q Do you feel that the presence of American troops will really be necessary?

A If there are no local forces, composed of the na-

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Interview

... "Everyone here would be against" a pact with U. S.

tives of these countries, you will be obliged to bring your troops to these areas, to defend the oil of Iraq and other countries, to defend the principal strategic points, as well as our own strategic position.

Q *Don't you believe that this area can be built up strong enough?*

A It will not be easy. If the Russians attack tomorrow they will be able to reach the Suez Canal in two days. To build up this area will require a great deal of work and planning. It needs more than just troops and arms. It needs an infrastructure: airfields, roads, lines of communications. I think there is a defense vacuum in this area even if you count the 80,000 British troops now in the Canal zone.

Q *Even while those troops are still here?*

A Yes.

Q *So that when they go there will be a greater vacuum?*

A I think that now we Arab countries must reorganize our plans, and co-ordinate our efforts. Doing this, of course, will not be fruitful unless we can raise and equip strong forces.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH SEATO—

Q *Speaking of regional defense, do you believe that it is necessary to have the defense organization in Southeast Asia that is now being talked about—a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization? Do you believe that the countries in that area should get together to build up a defense there against any future Communist aggression?*

A Yes, but none of the major powers should be included in such a treaty. I have told you about the complex of colonialism that exists in this area. The same situation exists in the Far East. If there was a defense agreement that included Britain, France or the U. S.—do you think the people of Indonesia would welcome such an agreement? Do you feel that all those countries who are or were under colonization or military occupation like to have this sort of thing? It would have the same psychological effects there as it would here.

Q *You believe it might be worth while if those countries out there united in a defense organization independent of the major power—a pact among Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, etc.?*

A Yes. If there is an act of aggression, they will ask for help. The same thing goes for here. If there is an act of aggression here I will ask for help from the outside, and the people here will be convinced that I am asking help for their security and their safety, not asking a country to come and dominate us. If there were a pact today among us, Britain and the U. S., everyone here would be against it, because they would think that this would give you an opportunity to dominate us. The psychological effect would be bad.

If there were a pact of that sort in which we were partners, the Communists in this country would have an opportunity to stir up more and more hate, and then if an aggression came along I imagine that very many people would be sympathetic to the aggressors, because of the hate which had been stirred up.

On the other hand, if there is a defense organization to which no major power belongs, there will be no hate. If there should be an aggression and you came in to help, nobody would be against such help because you would be coming to assist us against invasion. Then you would have the full co-operation of the people and you would be coming as liberators, not as occupying forces.

Q *But don't you think a guarantee of some sort by the big powers would help protect the little powers from aggression?*

A No. Take Korea as an example. Korea was not in any pact, but the United Nations decided to help her anyway. You saw how the U. N. came into Korea.

Q *Yes, but many people think that the reason the Communists invaded South Korea was that they were convinced the U. S. would not defend it. The situation might have been different, they say, if there had been a pact—*

A True, but Korea was a first trial. Now, after the example of Korea, the Communists know what will happen—pact or no pact.

HOPE FOR MOROCCO—

Q *Lately the situation in Morocco and Tunisia has been getting more and more troubled. Do you think there is hope in the recent efforts of the French Government to solve the Tunisian problem? Is the French Government on the right path?*

A The policy which Premier Mendès-France is adopting is the right policy. He has proved that he is a courageous man. I think that by going the way he is going he may gain the friendship of the Tunisians.

Q *Is it logical to assume that some similar thing should be done in Morocco as well?*

A Yes. And in Algeria.

Q *But Algeria is a part of North Africa that the French have never considered giving independence in the past few years, isn't it? I mean, haven't the French made Algeria an integral part of France?*

A Yes, but that cannot go on.

Q *You think the problem is the same in Algeria as it is in Tunisia and Morocco?*

A Yes. As far as Morocco is concerned, I have already told your people about the effect of your position toward Morocco. When Morocco was up before the U. N. you voted against the Moroccan side. It is things like this that make people here feel that you must be against liberty in all these countries. You will

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... U.S. attitude on Red China "a sort of international joke"

not gain friends here that way. There are certain concrete actions you must perform in order to gain friendship. By adopting the policy you have adopted toward Morocco you are causing people to hate you and are giving the Communist cause a chance to grow and grow.

Q A word used a lot these days is "coexistence." Mr. Churchill has said of late he believes we can achieve a peaceful coexistence between the Communist and non-Communist worlds, and President Eisenhower has mentioned a modus vivendi. What are your ideas on that?

A Because of the invention of the atomic bomb and the H-bomb, I think the two blocs must get together. I think it is not an easy thing now to decide to go to war. Who will have the courage to decide to go to war? I think no one will have enough confidence in himself to be sure of what the other side is preparing. For instance, I think America's position today is completely different from its position during the last two wars, because the man who decides war today will have to have in mind that America will be a target for bombs. So I think the two blocs must get together.

NEHRU'S WORLD ROLE—

Q What do you think of Indian Premier Nehru's ideas on coexistence? Doesn't he say he is trying to bring the two world power blocs together in peaceful coexistence?

A As long as there is a "cold war," I think his work will be difficult. And you—in the U.S.—are helping make it difficult, by being as responsible for the cold war as Russia is. You are giving Russia the chance to penetrate into many countries. For instance, if Indo-China had been made independent, under good guidance, after the last war, I think that the Communists would not have had the opportunity to take advantage of the situation. Suppose, for example, that my country is a neighbor of Russia's and is under foreign colonization. If I am a man who is interested in my country's freedom and I have the opportunity to get help and aid from Russia, do you think that I would hesitate to accept aid from a Communist country to get rid of the oppressor?

Q If the French had withdrawn from Indo-China in 1946, in other words, you think there might be a non-Communist government throughout Indo-China today?

A Yes, that is what happened in India. If Britain were still in India can you imagine what the circumstances would be there now? Quite different indeed.

Incidentally, I am astonished about the U.S. position regarding Communist China. Communist China is a fact, which your country should accept. You refuse to accept the fact of Communist China. By adopting this position you are neglecting the peo-

ple of China. You are trying to make those 400 or 500 million fanatical against you. If there were normal relations between Communist China and the U.S. you would have the good feeling of those millions of Chinese.

Q One of the points of view of the American Government is that a substantial number of the 400 million don't like their present Government, and that if the U.S. recognizes Communist China it will discourage those Chinese who still have hopes of liberation from Communism and they will feel that the U.S. has abandoned them—

A I have seen some people who visited Communist China and I know from them that the people like their Government. This whole thing is a cause of the cold war. You recognize a few people on Formosa and neglect Red China's millions. It is a sort of international joke.

Q If the U.S. recognized China, do you think it would reduce tensions in the cold war?

A Yes. I think it would be a step toward finishing the cold war. The cold war is going on inside the countries in which there is hatred against colonization. For instance, in the Middle East there was a sort of cold war directed against you not only because of Communist activities but also because of the Communist China situation. Also, if there is no cause for nationalist movements I think there will be more peace in the world.

Q By nationalist movements you mean not only in the colonial countries but also in places like Formosa where there are nationalist movements in exile? You think that, by not recognizing China, the U.S. is giving encouragement in Formosa to people who are attempting to change the status quo?

A They won't be able to change the facts unless they pull you with them into a war.

"NEUTRALISM": A HELP—

Q What are your ideas on Nehru's policy of neutralism? Do you think neutralism is useful for his part of the world?

A I think in that part of the world it will help in ending the cold war. Because you know the position of India. On which side can Nehru decide to step now? If he said that he was against the Communists and was going to enter a pact with the West, what would be his position? He would be attacked if there were a war. If he says he is with the Communists against the West, what then? The same thing. I think he will decide his position when and if there is an aggression made against him.

Q But suppose the Communists miscalculate his attitude. Suppose they think that, in case of an aggression, Nehru will be with them. Won't that encourage them to attack?

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Interview

... Israeli question? "We will settle that problem ourselves"

A Let's take Turkey as an example. During the last world war, it stayed neutral all the time. I think Nehru is trying to follow the Turkish policy of that time.

Q In other words, you don't think Nehru would ever enter a war unless he was attacked directly?

A No, he wouldn't.

Q In other words, the Communists are fairly sure already that they can do what they want in other parts of Southeast Asia without fearing any resistance from India, unless they attack India first—

A Yes, unless India had a pact with other independent Southeast Asia countries.

Q You mean with Ceylon, Burma—

A Yes, Thailand, Indonesia and so on. I think such a pact will safeguard the small nations depending on India.

Q Can you tell me what you feel Egypt's role in the world should be as far as the rest of the world is concerned—particularly as regards the East-West struggle?

A I think at the present time we are not in a position to affect the East-West struggle at all. But we are certainly interested in our area—the Arab area, that is.

Q Do you see Egypt's role in the Middle East as similar to India's role in the Far East?

A Yes, I think Egypt can collect a group around her. And if there is an attack, we will ask for help.

Q But do you think that, as far as alignment with the Communist and non-Communist power blocs is considered, Egypt's position is similar to India's? You feel you are on the side of the West, don't you?

A That is owing to our geographical position. We must not sit down and write a confession that we are on the side of the West. In spite of everything, we must be on that side because we are far away from the Russians. If there is ever a government here that wants to be on the side of the Russians, I don't think it can be this Government.

AFTER SUEZ, WHAT?—

Q Now that the Suez question has been settled, are there any other issues standing in the way of complete harmony between Britain and Egypt?

A Yes. I think there are some minor issues—the release of weapons, for example.

Q You mean—

A I mean we used to buy our weapons from Britain, and we paid for them, but owing to what happened regarding the Canal zone they stopped supplying us with these weapons. They said they were waiting for a settlement of the dispute. I think agreement on this will follow soon. I think it will be a minor problem—it will hardly be a problem at all.

Q At the present time don't you also hope to make arrangements to get weapons from the United States?

A We do indeed, but we also hope there will not be any complications in U. S. dealings with us. We hope no pressure will be put on us, especially as regards a prior settlement of the Israeli question. We will settle that problem ourselves.

Q Can you give me some examples of the type of "complications" you mean?

A Any sort of conditions tied to the military aid. We cannot have that.

STRONGER EGYPT COMING—

Q You have said before that one of the big objectives of your revolution was the evacuation of the Suez Canal zone. What are the other objectives?

A Rebuilding our country. This is the main objective. The existence of British troops on our soil is an obstacle between us and the rebuilding of our country. We have put all our feelings into that Suez problem. Now we need all our efforts to rebuild our country in order to raise the standard of living. This is the main objective.

Q The presence of the British troops would not allow that?

A No, because it caused instability. The people were giving all their attention to the Canal-zone situation.

Q You believe this will now allow Egypt to assume a bigger role within the Arab world?

A The people will now have an opportunity to think of other subjects, because up to now they were always thinking of one thing. I have said that after the withdrawal of British troops there will be a political vacuum and that we will have to direct the thoughts of the people into another channel. The politicians have always directed hate toward the British. We want to redirect the thought of the people now. It will not be an easy way. There is a vacuum of political thinking. Our people have not thought at all, strategically, about how they will defend themselves. Nor have they thought much of the building of their country, because they concentrated on the existence of the British troops. At that time, the people were distracted from what their politicians were really doing. Now there will be new fields for thought.

Q Are you as optimistic about the future of the world as you are about Egypt's future?

A You know that in our Suez agreement with the British it is provided that the British may reoccupy the base within the next seven years under certain conditions of outside attack. We are inclined to agree with the British about the dangers that the next seven years may present.

Q But you don't feel that war is inevitable between East and West, do you?

A I think the two blocs can get along together. With all the new inventions of powerful bombs, we will live together in peace.

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JE 1022/24. INDEXED
inter

NB11. = EGYPTIAN RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST BLOC: FAWZI REASSURES SOVIET ENVOY. =

(ARAB NEWS AGENCY- CAIRO):- CAIRO: THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO EGYPT DAN 'IL SOLOD, YESTERDAY VISITED THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DR. FAWZI AND ASKED HIM ABOUT THE FUTURE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES.

DR. FAWZI REPLIED THAT THE SIGNING OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT WOULD LEAVE EGYPT COMPLETELY FREE TO COOPERATE WITH ANY COUNTRY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS FRIENDLY POLICY TOWARD ALL NATIONS.

(END) (KY) BBC MON 1152 28/9. MW.

1954

J
AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

JE 1022/25

FROM
Mr Murray
Cairo

204
No. 1051/2/549
Dated Oct 27
Received in
Registry— Nov 3.

The Middle East

Encloses a paper by Mr Hamilton on the changing scene in the Middle East in which an assessment is made of the way in which Middle East countries and especially Egypt may be expected to move

References to former relevant papers

MINUTES

(Print)

This paper really deals with the Middle East as a whole. So far as Egypt is concerned, Mr Hamilton reminds us of her perennial instability and of the fact that democratic institutions are not necessarily suitable. He thinks that the Egyptian Govt may now concern themselves more with Africa than the Arab League. While the dangers that the Egyptians, having got the British out, will now set in train a policy of leading a drive against imperialism in Africa are real, I think there are no signs that Egypt intends to abandon her interest in Arab League affairs. As to Africa, Mr Murray makes the point in his covering despatch that the Egyptians may not wish to set themselves up in clear opposition to British interests. They will, however, doubtless continue their hostile propaganda against French

(How disposed of)

Dft) Mr F.R.H. Murray
Cairo.
from Mr Murray
Jan 6.
Gross) B.H.F.O.
Jan 6.

(Action completed)
Murray

(Index)
J H

References to later relevant papers

French policy in North Africa.

KS Street
6/11/54

Levant Dept
Eastern Dept

Scimitary
10/11

I apologise for having held this up, although it has not been for nearly so long as would appear.

2. Mr. Hamilton's paper, though interesting, seems to me too speculative to be of much immediate value. For example, -

- (a) there have been no signs yet, nor do we expect any in the foreseeable future, of a movement back to a smaller Lebanon and a rapprochement between the Christian part of the Lebanon and Israel (see paragraphs 8 and 14); and, more important,
- (b) it has yet to be proved that the Arab League will not continue to play an important role in developments because it is based on a belief in Arab unity which does not, in fact, exist. Sir J. Troutbeck in his valedictory despatch (Bagdad despatch No. 245 of December 9) said that the over-riding political factors in Iraq were the three emotions of Arabism, Islam and nationalism. Arabism finds its political expression in the Arab League and what is said at the Arab League meetings to a large extent sets the tone of the foreign policy of the member States. Sometimes Iraq appears to go her own way, as we hope she will in coming to some defence arrangement with Turkey. It is curious, nevertheless a fact, that the other Arab League States, habitually look for a lead from Egypt, not herself an Arab State. This has usually been an impediment to our Middle East policy. But if we are right in suspecting that Egypt is the member of the Arab League most likely to come round to a more realistic attitude to Israel, for once this factor will work in our favour.

3. At the end of the paper, in paragraph 16 - 18, Mr. Hamilton states two propositions with which many of us who have something to do with the Middle East are in agreement, namely,

- (a) parliamentary democracy has failed to provide governments sufficiently effective to ensure stability and long economic development. (On the whole the Middle Eastern countries seem to do best when under authoritarian rule).

I agree. It is a beautiful idea, derived from historical reality, & a sense of what would be nice, & desirable, rather than of what is likely to happen.

Yes, this is so.

Yes, but social & economic conditions have not yet been tried.

(b)

Minutes.

- (b) In affording economic help to backward States, virtue must be its own reward, and we must not expect political dividends to accrue to ourselves.

✓
Eggs
MP
11/1

J.F. Brewis

(J.F. Brewis)
December 23, 1954.

This is indeed a stimulating paper, though I do not agree with all of it.

I do not think it is right to dismiss Egypt's intervention in Arab politics as having brought little but expense & trouble: they have in fact brought leadership of the Arab world and unshakeable support in her quarrels with us. I should have said that it had been a highly successful policy.

I agree strongly with para 2 (b) of Mr Brewis's minute. I believe that what the Arabs call "Arabism" is an immensely powerful force in the M.E. to-day. Not only does it help them to stick together despite their innate provincialism, but it is at the base of their resistance to foreign influence, foreign techniques

and

✓
Eggs
MP
11/1

✓

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Minutes.

and foreign help. They feel that in a changing world if they are swamped and lose their "Arabian" they will lose both their identity, their personality. It would be a mistake to underestimate them. The Americans always seem to ^{us} fail to do so, ~~when~~ ^{in the} they fail to understand when Arabs recede from their lavish offers of help.

I hope it is not departmental patriotism that causes me to wish that Mr Hamilton had listed the future of the Persian Gulf States a Mercat as one of the problems of the M.E. but only their internal affairs, but their relations with Saudi Arabia and with the Arab League are likely to become very important.

I too agree strongly with what is para 16.

A. ... Samuel
24/11

Interesting minutes on rather star-gazing & theoretical paper. ^{See marginal comment} AM, 1/1

St Cairo
Katy at

I agree with this. But it is possible to imagine the Arabs gaining self-confidence as time passes & they get richer, if there is no war. AM
1/1

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

October 27, 1954.

No. 204 ✓
(1051/2/54G)

CONFIDENTIAL

JE 1022/25

Sir,

Before Her Majesty's Ambassador left Cairo on United Kingdom leave, he discussed with Mr. John Hamilton, Counsellor at this Embassy, the changing scene in the Middle East and the possibilities which these changes offer of a favourable development of relations between Great Britain and the Middle Eastern countries. Mr. Hamilton had prepared a paper, of which I enclose a copy, in which he attempted some assessment of the direction in which the countries of the Near and Middle East, and in particular Egypt, might be expected to move. His Excellency was in general agreement with the conclusions which Mr. Hamilton reached in this stimulating paper, and in particular wished to draw attention to paragraph 12 of it. Much of the present pattern of politics and frontiers in the Middle East is fortuitous, and His Excellency wished to guard against too rigid a tendency to regard the existing arrangements as sacrosanct.

2. So far as Egypt is concerned, prophecy is made even more difficult and dangerous than in the case of the Middle East generally, by the existence of a revolutionary regime, and the deliberate destruction of much of the traditional, though not always entirely desirable, Egyptian setting. We should, perhaps, be wary of supposing that any increased pre-occupation on the part of Egypt with the African Continent or with her relations with the West will necessarily diminish her intrigues and activities in the Arab world. The new regime in Egypt has not, so far, shown any disposition to abandon the attempts to dominate the Arab world which, as Mr. Hamilton points out, have brought her little but expense and trouble in the past. Egypt's present rulers are confident that they can avoid the mistakes of their predecessors, and are disposed to demonstrate that they can do better than the old regime in Arab politics as well as in other spheres. The circumstances which formerly inspired that policy have not greatly changed. The present regime ought,

/of course...

The Right Honourable
Sir Anthony Eden, K.G., M.C., M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.

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- 2 -

of course, to turn their attention more and more inwards; but their problems are of such a nature that a solution can come only from sustained effort of a very unspectacular kind. One of the great weaknesses of Egypt's performance is shortness of stamina, and the diversion of attention from intractable internal problems by external adventures is likely to continue to present an unconquerable temptation to Egyptian governments. In this context, despite an increasing awareness of the possibilities of the African Continent and of the Muslim World, the Arab World remains the most tempting field for the exercise of Egyptian energies. Indeed, if Egypt genuinely pursues better relationships with the West, she is likely to find such an association more difficult to reconcile with a policy of penetration into Africa (which might bring her into conflict with a number of western powers), than with her attempts to assert hegemony in the Arab world. Developments in recent months tend to support this view. In general there has been a welcome diminution in anti-western propaganda and activity, particularly with regard to the African Continent (except in the case of French North Africa). This has been accompanied by a marked intensification of Egyptian activity in the Arab world.

3. Egypt's future now clearly depends on how effective a ruling class the Egyptians themselves can produce. So far in their history - even in their ancient history, if Dr. Derry's theories of successive ways of invasion by dolichocephalic peoples from the North East are correct - there has never been an indigenous ruling class. It is doubtful if such a class can be brought into existence in a short space of time, nor without a prolonged period of relative stability. Past experience, as Mr. Hamilton has pointed out, is not encouraging; but there is perhaps a sufficient measure of truth in the trite tributes to the "new era" following the signing of an Anglo-Egyptian Agreement to encourage some hope that past experience may for once prove, at least in some degree, misleading.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Head of the Political Division at the British Middle East Office, Fayid.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

Resh...

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CONFIDENTIAL



The Shape of Things to Come

- PERHAPS -

The purpose of this memorandum is to try and assess in what direction the countries of the Near and Middle East, and Egypt in particular, may go, now that an Agreement with Egypt is in sight and a major problem (we hope) removed from the Near Eastern scene. Any prophecy regarding these parts must be hazardous and tentative; but perhaps some thought on the subject may prove of use in handling new developments as they may arise in the near and distant future.

2. Anyone cognizant of the history of these countries - and for practical purposes the campaigns and conquests in the Middle East by Alexander the Great in circa 300 B.C. provide a useful starting point - will agree that the most significant element in that history has been the constant series of kaleidoscopic changes and events. Since that time, except for certain periods of stability under the Roman, Byzantine and Turkish Empires, the history of these parts has been one of conflicts, immigrations, deportations and civil and religious wars which have produced a medley of races and changes of frontiers which resemble the patterns formed inside a kaleidoscope when the instrument is shaken or revolved. Such being the case, I think we should be wary of assuming that the present political alignments are sacrosanct or stable. In fact, when one looks around at the various stresses and strains developing, it is unlikely that the present alignment will last a decade. Present stability depends on certain treaties between some of the countries concerned and Great Britain, and on the Three Power declaration of 1950. But it is this temporary stability which will allow the forces which may destroy it to develop sufficiently to break it down: in the same way that without the stability given by the Roman Empire, Christianity would never have become the widespread force it eventually did.

3. Looking around the Middle East the following are some of the problems which are developing under our eyes and which may bring about readjustments in the not too distant future:

- (1) A new regime in Egypt which may cause her to interest herself more with the West and the African continent, and so diminish her intrigues and activities in the Arab world East of Sinai.
- (2) The possibility of militant Jewish expansion and the age old problems which arise from the pouring of new wine into old bottles.
- (3) The stresses and strains now arising between the Christians and Muslims within the essentially plaster state of the Lebanon.
- (4) The potential economic development and growth in importance of Iraq through her newly acquired oil wealth; and her somewhat special problems arising from her geographical position on the flank, and from her close ties with the Persian Gulf and the Indian Continent.

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- 2 -

- (5) The opening up of the previously isolated state of Saudi Arabia, and her political and dynastic interest in what happens in Iraq and Syria.
- (6) The weakness of the Kingdom of Jordan as a state, now trying to integrate with the West Bank of Jordan and digest half a million refugees.

4. An enumeration of the above problems shows, I submit, the fallacy of assuming that there is an essential unity in the so-called Arab world - a conception which has arisen from the superficial view that the use of the Arabic tongue and the preponderance of the Islamic religion have given a lasting basis to unity. In fact this so-called unity arose largely out of the exigencies of the late war, when this part of the world was cut off from its normal geographic and economic channels, and because a negative form of unity has arisen out of general hostility to the Jewish state.

5. Reviewing the problems in the order given above it is submitted that Egypt's future, given a reasonable degree of stability, will lie where it always has lain in history, northwards to the Mediterranean, southwards into Africa. The Arab element in Egypt is a small one and Islam amongst the greater part of her population has never gone very deep. The fellahen of Egypt are still largely animistic in their beliefs and more interested in their own local saints and holy men than in the wider brotherhood of Islam. Her military adventures East of Sinai have in the long run always ended in disaster and have usually been inspired by the ambitions of her foreign rulers, rather than by any natural desire for expansion Eastwards. In more recent times her interference in the politics and problems of the Arab world have involved her in great expense and have brought her nothing but trouble. They have been due to the ambitions of politicians who have wished to cut a figure in the Middle East, and have been "boosted" by a press largely controlled by Levantines in Cairo.

6. There is some reason therefore to hope that with the elimination of the two problems which have bedevilled Anglo-Egyptian relations (the Canal Base and the Sudan) Egypt will become more engrossed in her own internal problems and cease to interest herself in matters which are not primarily her concern. It may also be that a more realistic attitude towards the new State of Israel will show itself after the experience of her Palestine campaign and that she will in due course arrive at some modus vivendi with the Jews. Her relations with the Sudan are also likely to absorb a great deal of her attention. Egypt's main problems for the future will be her own internal economic and administrative ones. Even if she should fail to solve these and relapse into a state of near administrative anarchy, it is unlikely that such a state of affairs would draw her nearer to the East rather than the West, from which latter alone can come her material salvation.

7. During the last decade the demographic texture of the Israeli state has changed considerably with the influx of a large number of Jews from Bagdad, the Yemen and North African towns. There has also been a considerable diminution in the number of Jews coming from Europe, and a not inconsiderable trickle of old established Jews out of Israel. The result of this must be that Israel will approximate more to a Levantine

.../state

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state and may diminish her expansionist tendencies. This does not, of course, mean that the setting up of an energetic westernised state in the Levant will not continue to present many problems, but it may mean that tensions will decrease and that relations with the Lebanon, Egypt and the West Bank of Jordan may become adjustable. I am not able to speak about continued American aid to Israel, but I understand that since the declaration of the independent Jewish state the emotional appeal for cash support from private individuals in America has sensibly weakened. Lastly, God is not mocked: and I cannot think that a state conceived as a result of injustice to 3/4 million Palestinians can have the elements of moral assurance.

8. The growing approximation of Israel to a Levant state may have a considerable effect on the future of the Lebanon, where already there is considerable friction between the Muslem and Christian populations. The present Lebanon is an artificial creation of the French in 1925 when four Kazas, mainly Muslem, from Syria were attached to make the greater Lebanon. The Christian element, which it is believed is now slightly smaller than that of the Muslem, is becoming gravely concerned about their future. It may well be that the present stresses may lead eventually to a movement back to the smaller Lebanon, created after the troubles of 1860, and to a closer association with the Jews of Israel. Such association would in itself be a reconstitution of the Phoenicia of biblical times.

9. Anyone who knows Iraq will be aware of the strangely different atmosphere prevailing there to that in the states bordering the Levant coast. The people seem more virile, though less clever, due no doubt to a strong Turko-Kurdish mixture, and with the flowing of the Tigris and Euphrates into the Persian Gulf the traveller senses an orientation towards the Indian continent. There is also, a close connection with Persia and the Shia world. Given a stable administration and a competent development policy - a large assumption perhaps - she has now with her vast income from oil royalties an opportunity of creating in time a prosperous state.

I do not believe myself that proposals to join up with Jordan and Syria have in themselves any true foundation in geography or economics. Such proposals are largely dynastic and political, and I have always myself been sceptical of the Fertile Crescent scheme. Syrians and Iraqis have always disliked each other and the history of the two countries has generally been one of antagonism, rather than of collaboration. A great deal could be done in the way of customs arrangements, visas and financial co-operation which would be of benefit to the two countries, but further than that I am doubtful whether anything can or should be done. Neither state is politically stable, and, as one cynical Frenchman once remarked to me on the subject, "Two Nonsenses do not make one Sense".

10. The same considerations apply in some measure to schemes for the incorporation of the Kingdom of Jordan into an overall Hashemite monarchy. Apart from the fact that the two countries are separated by miles of desert, the Kingdom of Jordan is an artificial creation of ours to satisfy our obligations to the House of King Hussain, and its stability is now further complicated by attempts to digest, not only many refugees, but also that part of Palestine on the West Bank of Jordan which is not too happy, I gather, under the rule of Amman. Its stability and finance depend on the continued interest and support of Great Britain. Geographically and economically Jordan east of the river would seem to belong rather to Syria than to Iraq, and its future may lie in a closer association with Damascus.

.../11.



- 4 -

11. There remains the future of Saudi Arabia. Until the development of her oil resources, Saudi Arabia was always geographically outside the main political stream of the countries which we have been discussing. It is true that her big nomad tribes move backwards and forwards between her northern grazing grounds and those of Iraq and Syria. It is also true that out of Arabia came the original Arab forces which brought Islam into those territories; but, as will be seen from a quotation in the appendix attached to this note, the desert warriors mostly faded back into Arabia proper, leaving the countries to be administered by their previous Byzantine and Christian officials. Dynastically her ruling family will, no doubt, still play a large part in the politics of Damascus, Amman and Bagdad. But this will be induced more by jealousy of the Hashemites than by any desire for direct political control in those countries. She, Saudi Arabia, will have plenty of her own problems to face in dealing with the social disturbance arising out of the impact of great wealth and materialism on a primitive society. Further, family feuds amongst the sons of King Ibn Saud may yet affect the internal stability of the state.

12. If the above thoughts present a reasonable appreciation of the problems of these states, they indicate a state of affairs in the Near and Middle East which is potentially charged with instability. It would seem therefore that British Government policy should be highly flexible in order that, when the stresses and strains have produced a state of affairs conducive to change, we should be in a position to guide, rather than to obstruct, the necessary adjustments.

13. I believe that we should in the first place regard the Egyptian problem as sui generis, and not one that is closely bound up with the so-called Arab world. With the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement she will now have to work out her own salvation. I wish I could be more optimistic about future developments, but Egypt's past history gives little ground for optimism. Her troubles are climatic, economic and political, and throughout the ages the Egyptians have shown an inveterate tendency, as soon as their successive over-lords have in turn departed, to fly at each other's throats. It may be that the present regime will be able to inspire some general patriotic feeling in the breasts of her citizens; but there are already signs that there are people in Egypt who for their own motives would like to bring the present regime down. The C.R.C. seized power by the sword and will have to continue showing it, if it is determined to remain in control. How long they will be able to do this is anyone's guess.

14. As regards the rest of the Near and Middle East, unless stability can be maintained by the over-riding influence and power of the countries of the Tripartite Declaration, I have a feeling that the shape of things to come may well be the creation of a Christian/Lebanon - Israeli complex, (possibly including what is now the West Bank of Jordan) approximating to the ancient Phoenicia, with a hinterland of perhaps fifty miles and a seaboard handling the entrepot trade of the Middle East. Syria and the East Bank of Jordan may well join up conceivably under a monarchy or strong dictator, if the present chronic instability in Damascus continues indefinitely. Iraq, I fancy, will be drawn, as far as foreign affairs are concerned, into relations with Pakistan/and perhaps Persia with weaker links for form's sake with the Arab world. Saudi Arabia will continue in a somewhat isolated position.

Turkey

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15. I am aware that in drafting this note I have hardly mentioned the Arab League. In its present form I do not think it will play a very important role in developments. It is falsely constituted and based on unrealities. It is not without significance that activity in the Arab world is now being conducted, not through the League machinery, but by direct contact between Egyptian and Arab leaders, e.g., the visits of Salah Salem and those proposed for Colonel Nasser. Major Salah Salem's remarks on the necessity of revising the Arab League Charter are also significant. But is it possible to tinker with the League without displaying its fundamental weakness? I think not. Relations between the so-called Arab states will, I believe, in future take the more specific and realistic form of direct arrangements between individual ones, based on an assessment of mutual interests, rather than on some emotional belief in a unity which does not in fact exist.

16. In conclusion there are two further points which, as a result of experience during the last decade, may be noted. The first is the apparent failure of the western brand of parliamentary democracy to provide governments in the Middle East sufficiently effective to ensure stability and long-range economic development. The second is the fact that, whilst foreign economic aid may be a good thing in itself, it does not necessarily bring dividends, either in the shape of political gratitude or in stemming the growth of Communism. Raising standards of living can promote, rather than suppress, revolutionary sentiments, and I believe it to be historically true that revolutions have usually occurred in countries when conditions were showing a tendency to improve, rather than when misery was most widespread. It would seem therefore that in affording help to backward States, virtue must be its own reward, and that we must not expect political dividends to accrue to ourselves.

17. In this connection it may be noted that we, who rescued Egypt from chaos, set her firmly on her feet and handed over in 1936 a fully developed economy and financial prosperity, are the ones being shown the door, without a word of thanks or even recognition of the great work accomplished on her behalf.

18. On these two subjects, namely the suitability of parliamentary democracy and the efficacy of economic aid to counter Communism in the Near and Middle East, it would be wise, I submit, to be somewhat more realistic in our thinking.

(SGD) JOHN HAMILTON



APPENDIX

HISTORY OF PALESTINE

JACOB DE HAAS

Page 147

The real Arab stock in Islam was exceedingly small, for the people found by the First Companion in Palestine and Syria were a melange, "ethnologically a chaos of all the possible human combinations to which, when Palestine became a land of pilgrimage, a new admixture was added." The myth, that has influenced Near Eastern policies to this day, that there are countless "sons of the desert," has no basis in fact. The original tribes which conquered Palestine were small and, as we have seen, had to draw forces from various fronts in order to conduct their wars. Moreover, they had to call in the aid of forces that were not Arabic. As Gibbon points out, "one of the fifteen provinces of Syria, the cultivated lands of the eastward of the Jordan, had been decorated by Roman vanity with the name of Arabia," and the title stuck.

.....

Page 149

Though "sons of the desert" were part of every great foray that went east, west, north and south, the majority of the desert folk returned to their desert wastes, and to their free, roaming life. History, song, and story, attest this strange reversion to type, by which the real Arabs disappeared in the sand storms, while a world was conquered in their name, and faith.

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(JE 1022/25)

January 6, 1955.

CONFIDENTIAL

We were very glad to have your despatch No. 204 of October 27 enclosing John Hamilton's stimulating paper on the Middle East. Please thank him very much for it. We have the following comments gathered from all the Departments concerned in the Office.

2. We agree with the general proposition, made in paragraph 16 of the memorandum, that Parliamentary democracy has failed in the Middle East to provide governments sufficiently effective to ensure stability and long term economic developments; and it appears to be the case that Middle Eastern countries seem on the whole to do best under authoritarian rule. On the other hand, while many Middle Eastern states have adopted the outward appearance of parliamentary institutions they have not so far tried the western brand of social and economic democracy.

3. There have been no signs yet, nor do we expect any in the foreseeable future, of a movement back to a smaller Lebanon and a rapprochement between the Christian part of the Lebanon and Israel as is suggested in paragraphs 8 and 14 of the paper. We also consider that Hamilton goes too far in suggesting that the Arab League will not play an important rôle in the future. It is true that the League is based on a belief in Arab unity which does not in fact exist. But the League survives because it is a political expression of "Arabism" and we believe that this is a very powerful force in the Middle East to-day. Not only does it help the Middle Eastern states to stick together despite their perpetual quarrels but it is at the base of their resistance to foreign influence, foreign techniques and foreign help. The Arabs feel that in a changing world they will have lost their identity and personality if they lose their "Arabism"; though it is possible that, if there is no war and if they get richer, they may gain in self-confidence as time passes. As far as Egypt herself is concerned, it may be going too far to suggest that her attempt to dominate the Arab world have brought her nothing but expense and trouble. Those she has certainly had, but she has also obtained leadership of the Arab world and very considerable support in the past in her dispute with us.

4. Finally, Hamilton is of course right in pointing out in paragraph 17 of the paper that we have received no thanks or recognition of the work which we have done in Egypt, but I think we should be wrong to expect that, when we afford economic or other help to backward states, political dividends will accrue to us. Virtue in such cases must be its own reward.

(T.E. Bromley)

F.R.H. Murray, Esq., C.M.G.,

CAIRO.

1954

J

AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

JE 1022/26

FROM Chancery (Cairo)
to African Department

No. 1032/23/54
Dated Nov. 23
Received in Registry— Nov. 30

Statement by Major Saleem of Egypt attitude towards the Arab states.

Enclosed copy of the text of Major Saleem's statement made at interview with correspondent of Lebanese daily newspaper. A violent expression of bitter feelings harboured in Egypt against the rest of the Arab world.

References to former relevant papers

MINUTES

(Print)

Whatever the reasons for this outburst, it can hardly be expected to improve Egypt's standing in the Arab League.

(How disposed of)

105 Street
1/12

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Legat ^{12/12} Sept

Eastern ^{12/12} Sept

Saudi Arabia is hardly a constitutional monarchy (para. 4 within).
lt
4/12

Very odd.

Schmittard
2/12

D. 113
2/12

Kerry
9.12

(Action completed)	(Index)
Secd 10/12	J 4/14

References to later relevant papers

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INWARD TELEGRAM
CBI

SAVING TELEGRAM

EN CLAIR BY BAG

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

SIR RALPH SKRINE STEVENSON

INDEXED

NO. 190 SAVING

SEPTEMBER 3, 1954.

JE 1022/20.

FOWH.
J

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office Saving telegram No. 190 of September 3 repeated for information Saving to Washington 192, Paris 203 and B.L.E.O (Fayid) 317.

In the course of an interview with the U.S. Weekly, "U.S. News and World Report" on August 5, which was reported in the Egyptian press on August 31, Colonel Nasser made the following points:-

- (i) He was opposed to any form of Middle East Defence Organisation in which America and Britain might participate. As he had told Mr. Dulles, any such organisation would be to the disadvantage of all, as it would act as a focus for Communist-inspired hatred. The existence of American bases in Libya had already given the Communists a propaganda opening in the Middle East.
- (ii) The Arab States could mobilise, once they were adequately armed, 12 divisions in much less time than that which would be needed by France to prepare the divisions which might be her contribution towards the European Army. Colonel Nasser was however opposed to participation by any Arab State in any alliance similar to the Turco-Pakistani Pact.
- (iii) The Communists had been trying to convince Egyptians that the Point IV programme was nothing but a form of imperialism. Colonel Nasser himself criticised the programme as providing only very slight technical assistance. It offered no tangible results which were essential if the public were to realise that aid was in fact being given.
- (iv) He was amazed at the attitude of the U.S. towards Communist China. The U.S. should acknowledge Communist China as an established State and should formally recognise her. He had met people who had visited China and had been told that the Chinese people loved their present Government.
- (v) He paid tribute to the policy of Mendes-France in Tunisia and said that a similar policy should be applied to Algiers and Morocco.

SEP 11 1954
F O W H

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1032/23/54

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

November 23, 1954.

JE 1022 '26

Dear Department,

The Cairo press of November 18 carried the text of an interview given to Maitre Basem el Jisr, correspondent of the Lebanese daily newspaper "Al Jarida", by Major Salah Salem. The interview was also broadcast by the Egyptian State Broadcast on the evening of November 17. A comprehensive summary translation is enclosed.

2. It is difficult to account for the delivery of this extraordinary tirade at the present moment - or indeed at any time by "Egypt's Ambassador to the Arab World" and a candidate for the office of Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The article undoubtedly represents a real feeling of bitterness against the other Arab countries which has existed in Egypt since the Palestine war, and which is especially intense amongst the officers of the Egyptian Army who were actively engaged in that campaign. The effect upon the garrison of Falloujah appears to have been particularly lasting. Nevertheless a grudge of such long-standing would hardly account, on its own, for the present outburst.

3. More recent sources of irritation have been the criticism of Egypt in Syria since the fall of the Shishekly regime, and in Iraq by way of retaliation against the Egyptian propaganda campaign against Iraqi adherence to the Turco-Pakistani Pact. The escape of Mahmoud Aboul Fath to Syria, the failure of the Syrian Government to restrain his activities, and the parallel situation which has recently developed in the case of the Moslem Brethren who succeeded in taking refuge there, have exacerbated Egyptian feelings with regard to Syria. In the case of Iraq, on the other hand, the atmosphere appeared to have improved to some extent, and Major Salem himself claimed only a short time ago to have placed Egyptian relations with Iraq on a satisfactory basis of mutual understanding.

4. There also clearly exists in the minds of the present rulers of Egypt a feeling of uneasy resentment originating in the fact that they are, since the disappearance of the Shishekly regime in Syria, the only acknowledged dictatorship in a company of parliamentary democracies and constitutional monarchies. The fact that the Egyptians see as clearly as the rest of the world the hollowness of the "parliamentary" and "constitutional" edifices which surround them, serves only to increase their bitterness at criticisms of their own regime coming from such sources.

5. Coming so shortly after the dismissal of Neguib, it may well be that the outburst was occasioned by reports that the Council for the Revolutionary Command's decision had been badly received in Arab countries. One rather surprising aspect of the affair is that the text was apparently not drafted, as one might have expected, by the impetuous Major.

6. We are sending copies of this letter to the British Middle East Office, Fayid, Beirut, Amman, Damascus, Baghdad and Jeddah.

African Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

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Important Declarations by Major Salam.

Crucial development in Egypt's attitude towards the Arab States.

An interview with Mtre. Basem El-Jisr, correspondent of the Lebanese daily, "Al-Jarida".

"I shall tell the whole truth to the Arab world, irrespective of its bitterness.

When the Revolution began in Egypt in order to change the situation which had almost undermined the future hopes and national aspirations of the country, Egypt was still feeling bitter towards the Arab world.

Palestinian Tragedy.

In our hearts, there were deep scars left by the Palestine campaign. We men of the Egyptian Army who participated in this War, still remembered what had happened in Palestine. We remembered how certain armies refused to fight, and how the army of Egypt was stabbed in the back several times, and how Egypt sacrificed its blood and its money (£E.80 million), at a time when it was in need of even 80 million milliemmes.

We also remembered how Egypt had mobilised every soldier in its armed forces and every rifle in its possession for the battle of Palestine, leaving its security forces to guard the home-front with sticks. We remembered all these sacrifices, as well as the attitude adopted then by many Arab Governments.

The Revolution did not overlook the negligence of former politicians in Egypt, but we felt that Arab politicians were equally if not more negligent.

Yes, Egypt had shouldered the greatest burden and is still carrying the remains of this legacy of negligence. But the word "negligence" is a word...and to be frank one must say "treason, high treason".

polite /

Arab Onlookers.

"To-day Egypt is revising its policy and is planning the road to the future in order to avoid another tragedy or defeat. On their part the Arab states stood in silence, watching, as if nothing had happened, as if no tragedy had befallen them, and as if their honour and their dignity had not been trodden under foot.

We felt bitter towards the Arab world, but we put our feelings aside and marched towards the Arabs. We told them: let us forget the past, let us forget the deceptions, the lies and the conspiracies of the past...Let us forget the cheap politics of the past which lead us to verge of a chasm. Let us open a new page and forget our scars. We believe in you and believe in our brotherhood. We look forward to our cooperation and unity and we shall not let you down. We shall always sacrifice in order to achieve our renaissance.

This is what we said to the Arabs, and we are still determined to follow this path despite of all obstacles. And we shall not despair.

/But...

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But remember that we are human and our patience can be exhausted...I am afraid to say that it has almost been exhausted.

Conspiracies.

"For the first time in the history of the Arab world, conspiracies against Egypt and its régime are being planned. Yes, conspiracies are planned to "murder" the Revolution of Egypt. And where? In the Arab world, while the Governments are looking on."

Major Salem reviewed the efforts made by Egypt to assist the nationalist rise in Morocco, Algiers and the Sudan while the Arab Governments continued their attitude of "onlookers".

Major Salem referred to Egypt's endeavours to build-up its military strength in face of Israeli aggression, and in the interest of the Arabs. "But the conspiracies continued to undermine this army".

Arabs Protect Traitors.

"An Egyptian attempted to undermine the Revolution and was tried. But he took refuge in Arab States where he found protection from the respective Governments and was entertained at State banquets. Mahmoud Aboul Fath

Meanwhile, the Arab press continues its attack on the Revolution and demands the return to the pre-revolutionary position.

Remember that our press can be unleashed, our broadcasts can be relayed to every corner of the globe and in many languages, in order to talk and destroy. Our voices can be raised, and in our possession there are thousands of accusations, and material proofs of treason! We can destroy. We can answer back.

But we shall not employ the weapons of Farouk and Karim Tabet, his press advisor, the weapon of money which can dominate the press and make it sing for our glory.

Surviving The methods of Farouk and his henchmen, which have been obliterated in Egypt, are still ~~surviving~~ surviving in various corners of the Arab world.

Last but not least, what if Egypt ^{were} forced to adopt a policy of isolation from the Arabs and ceased to cooperate with and protect them. What if Egypt left the Arab League and violated the Collective Security Pact? What if the Revolution acted in accordance with what goes on in the minds of the Egyptian people regarding these campaigns and allegations? What if we were carried away by our feelings? What would happen to you Arabs?

I do not deny that Egypt would be harmed, but the Arab world would be doomed. These are a few frank words which I address to the arm-chair sitters who simply watch what is going on their countries against Egypt and the Egyptian régime.

In God's name cease to talk about Parliamentarianism and Democracy, for if we open this door you will not be happy with what you see. Wake up, Arab statesmen, and see the bitter facts."

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(1064/24/54)

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BAGDAD.

December 7, 1954.

Dear Chancery,

With reference to your letter 1032/23/54 of November 23, to the African Department about Major Salah Salem's statement to the correspondent of the Lebanese newspaper "Al Jarida", we believe that the bitterness felt by Major Salem can probably be explained, in so far as Iraq is concerned, by the fact that the Bagdad Press continuously denigrates the present Egyptian Government. There is no paper so far as we are aware which supports it. The conviction of members of the Moslem Brotherhood and in particular the death sentence passed on them are likely to increase these Press attacks. The attitude of the Iraqi Press, therefore, is probably enough to convince Major Salem, whatever Iraqi politicians may have told him when he was here, that the Iraq Government is in fact working against Egypt. JED 20/26

2. There is also no doubt that Dr. Jamali took advantage of the fact that the Egyptian Government was preoccupied with internal revolutions and with the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, to make a bid for Iraq to take the lead in the Arab League, particularly by pushing his plans for Iraqi-Jordan federation.
3. The above may explain the Major's bitterness but, we admit, it gives no clue to the purpose (if there was a purpose) or the timing of his present outburst.
4. We are sending copies of this letter to the African Department of the Foreign Office, British Middle East Office Cyprus, and Chanceries at Beirut, Amman, Damascus and Jeddah.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

Chancery,
British Embassy,
CAIRO.

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INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

SAVING TELEGRAM

JE 10 22 / 28

En clair by bag.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. F. R. H. Murray

ADVANCE COPY

No. 269 Saving
December 16, 1954.

UNCLASSIFIED

To further Dept

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 269 Saving of December 16, 1954, repeated Saving for information to:

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Baghdad	No. 130	Jerusalem	No. 34
Beirut	No. 158	Tel Aviv	No. 61
Damascus	No. 127	B.M.E.O. (Nicosia)	No. 435
Paris	No. 241	Washington	No. 227

EGYPTO-ARAB RELATIONS

In an interview with the weekly "Akher Saa" published on December 15, Major Salah Salem, Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, made another of his pronouncements on the subject of Egypto-Arab relations.

2. At the time of the Egyptian Revolution, he said, the Arab countries were the laughing stock of the whole world, and the Egyptian Revolutionary regime had told them that the only way to improve matters was to create a united front, unite Arab military strength, and adopt a position of independence with regard to the Eastern and Western camps. Though the Arab countries had agreed to this, their agreement was no more than superficial and, except in Egypt, affairs were still conducted in the same fashion that had led to the Palestine disaster.

3. In every Arab capital there was much empty talk of throwing the Jews into the sea. Egypt, however, seeing that words led nowhere and that the only practical step was to build up military strength, had acted. A paratroop force had been created, munitions factories had been built and Egypt's air force, Major Salem said, was now superior to that of Israel and was in a position to dominate the Arab skies.

4. Major Salem then stated that there were only three deterrents to Israeli aggression:- first Egypt's military strength, secondly the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and lastly, the United Nations Security Council. It was for the Arabs to decide which they wanted. Unfortunately Israel was well aware of this and thus all her attacks were directed against a single Arab capital, namely Cairo. Equally unfortunately, the other Arab countries were not aware of this, and all their attacks were also directed against the same capital.

.../5.

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5. On December 16 al Akhbar and al Gounhouria took up the theme in editorials. The former praised Major Salem's frank speaking and invited the Arabs to choose between solidarity and submission to Israel. Al Gounhouria asked those who, despite Israeli pressure, wished to deviate from the policy of adherence to the Arab League Security Pact, to state what arrangements they proposed in its place.

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SAVING TELEGRAM

En Clair by Bag.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

INDEXED

Mr. F.R.H. Murray

No. 272 Saving
December 20, 1954.

JE 1022/29.

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 272 Saving of December 20, repeated for information Saving to :-

Amman	No. 134
Beirut	No. 160
Bagdad	No. 134
Damascus	No. 130
Jedda	No. 139
Jerusalem	No. 35
Tel Aviv	No. 63
Paris	No. 245
Washington	No. 230
B.M.E.O. (Nicosia)	No. 439

In an interview with visiting Turkish journalists on December 19, Major Salah Salem, Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, declared that the Arabs despite their opposition to Communism were against any alliance, especially a military alliance, with the West. Arab opinion was influenced by the fact that the Western Powers had helped and were continuing to help Israel. Besides, Egypt had been occupied by the British for 72 years despite 76 promises to withdraw. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement had finally been signed, but "certain people" still doubted whether the British would leave Egypt within the 20 months' withdrawal period. Moreover, in 1936 Egypt had signed an alliance with Britain but the British had acted as overlords. They had promised to strengthen the Egyptian army but instead they had hindered its development. Egypt had helped the British in the last war but thereafter Britain had denied Egypt her rights. It was a matter of confidence, and if the West wanted to cooperate with the Arabs it would have to gain their confidence first. Until confidence in the West had been restored, no leader in Egypt or in any other Arab country would be prepared to agree to any alliance with it. This confidence could never be gained unless the Palestinian refugees were allowed to return to their own homes in accordance with the U.N. resolutions.

2. In reply to a question about the threat from Russia, Major Salem asked whether the Arabs could disregard the menace under which they lived in order to consider the possibility of a danger which had not yet been felt. The problems of the Arab States differed from those of the Balkan States allied to the West. If, for example, England had helped Israel to occupy Athens, Greece would hardly have undertaken an alliance with England against a possible Russian invasion. Thus the one million Arab refugees could not anticipate greater sufferings

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from Russian aggression than those already inflicted on them.

3. When asked why Egypt should not conclude an alliance with Turkey to which other Arab countries could accede, Major Salem replied that Egypt was solely concerned with strengthening the Arab Collective Security Pact. The psychology of the people could not be disregarded and it would be remembered that in 1951 Turkey had been associated with Britain, France and America in the proposal for the Middle East Defence Organisation. France's attitude towards the Arabs was well-known; Britain occupied several areas of the Arab World; and the Arabs considered America chiefly responsible for rendering the Palestinian Arabs homeless. Major Salem then emphasised that no politician in any Arab country could convince any section of the Arab people to conclude alliances outside the Arab Collective Security Pact. Iraq, for instance, might have her own problems but she could not ignore other Arab questions. He declared that the Arabs were opposed to Communism and suggested that the West could best remove many of the complications which have arisen between it and the Arab countries by supplying arms and economic aid to the Arab countries so that they might themselves check aggression.

4. Major Salem also pointed out that although the Revolutionary régime had had to face the problems of ridding both Egypt and the Sudan of British occupation, and was still facing the menace of Israel, it had not neglected the rebuilding of the nation, and had achieved far-reaching domestic reforms.

1954

J
 AFRICAN DEPARTMENT
 EGYPT AND SUDAN

JE 1022/30.

FROM
 Mr Murray,
 Cairo.
 No. 228
 (1032/24/54)
 Dated December 15th
 Received in Registry Dec 20.

Conversations Between Mr Shuckburgh and Egyptian Leaders.
 Transmits a record of the conversations which Mr Shuckburgh had with Egyptian Ministers during his recent visit to Cairo.
 Subjects: Israel: Turco-Pakistan-Iraqi Pact.
 Jordan: Defence Relations with the West.
 (Copied: PSM 20, Nicosia: Baghdad: Beirut: Damascus: Amman: Jeddah: Teheran: Ankara: Paris: Washington)

References to former relevant papers

MINUTES
 Mr. Shuckburgh has seen.
 The present divergence of views among members of the Revolution Council comes out clearly from this record. But their attitude to the general defence problem is unanimous and unaltered.
 Paragraph 7 of the record suggests that the Council are still toying with the idea of restoring Shishakli.

(Print)
 P.O. - Levant General

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
APMB 1/2	4/10

References to later relevant papers

Legat ^{5/1} Sept
 Eastern ^{1st} Sept '51
 = leg 6.1
 KDS Sheet
 3/1/55

Sept Minutes.

This is the most thoughtful and complete statement of the Egyptian position we have had in a long time. I suggest it wd be useful to print it for Po. distribution (with and inclusion in the next General volume)

J. Powell Jones

S/O

Yes

I have taken a copy of the enclosure.

9/8/51

6/1

APL

5/1

Payne. Aug 5/1 I agree.

McBromley fish.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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No. 228 ✓
(1032/24/54)

BRITISH EMBASSY, J
CAIRO.

CONFIDENTIAL

December 15, 1954.

Sir,

JE 1022/30.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a record of the conversations which Mr. Shuckburgh had with Egyptian Ministers during his recent visit to Cairo.

2. Mr. Shuckburgh, who discussed with me and with members of my staff the implications of the Egyptian attitude as revealed in these talks, will no doubt on his return himself be offering his comments. I do not propose, therefore, in this present despatch to do more than offer a general observation.

3. It will be seen that the views expressed by the Ministers on Egypt's relations with the other Arab States were somewhat contradictory. Nevertheless the importance which they attached to the Arab Security Pact emerged clearly enough. Their attitude appears to be that the Pact, which they consider served them well as an "umbrella", for the Canal Zone Agreement, is capable of further use to cover any other arrangements between the Arab States and the West. It is perhaps of some significance that they now appear to consider that this Pact, which was originally devised against Israel, could now be the basis of defence against Soviet Russia.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office at Nicosia, and to Her Majesty's Representatives at Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jedda, Teheran, Ankara, Paris and Washington.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

Ralph J. J. J.

The Right Honourable
Sir Anthony Eden, K.G., M.C., M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.

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Enclosure to Mr. Murray's Despatch No.228 to
the Secretary of State.

CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN MR. SHUCKBURGH
AND EGYPTIAN LEADERS

Mr. Shuckburgh had two long discussions with Egyptian Ministers on December 11; the first for an hour with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the second for three hours over dinner in the Oriental Counsellor's house with the Prime Minister and Major Salah Salem.

2. Israel

The Egyptian Ministers differed considerably in their attitude to the problem of Israel. They were all sceptical, however, whether the moment for a settlement had yet come. For his part, Dr. Fawzi discussed in an apparently objective if not constructive spirit the possibility of a basis for negotiation being put forward by the Israeli Government, which should include the cession to Jordan of the Gaza strip and the Negev South of Beersheba as well as other frontier adjustments and he expounded in this connexion the Egyptian thesis of the necessity for a physical land contact between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. He added that compensation for refugees was an essential part of any scheme, but that Egypt, recognising that full compensation to every refugee would ruin Israel and therefore offer no basis for agreement, would be prepared to agree to any compensation scheme from whatever source the necessary finance was forthcoming.

3. Major Salah Salem was in a thoroughly disingenuous mood and asserted that no peace with Israel was possible, even if Israel accepted the United Nations resolutions of 1947; that it would be tolerated neither by Egypt's Arab associates nor by her domestic public opinion; that the resumption of external trade by Israel would damage Egypt's commerce; and that in any case the Jews would never agree to surrender a square centimeter of land to Arab frontier property owners and that therefore no basis of agreement meeting the pathetic needs of the refugees could ever be found.

4. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser corrected his Minister of National Guidance and took a much calmer line. He denied that Egyptian public opinion could not stomach a settlement and asserted that if the moment ever came for one he would have the courage to take an initiative. He was entirely sceptical, however, of the Israelis putting forward a basis for negotiation which could provide a

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starting point for progress. He too insisted on the necessity for a land connexion - and not a mere corridor - between Egypt and the Arab world.

5. Jordan

A separate and somewhat startling point brought forward by Dr. Fawzi was an Egyptian objection - apparently in the name of Arab public opinion - to the continued employment of British officers and particularly General Glubb in the Arab Legion. His attitude appeared to indicate a disposition on the part of Egypt to organise a campaign against these officers and against the degree of control exercised by Her Majesty's Government over the expenditure of their subsidy to the Jordanian forces. His attitude was not echoed by his Prime Minister, although several opportunities occurred for him to take a similar line, and on the contrary he stated that it was not Egypt's intention to attempt to hound the United Kingdom out of the Middle East.

6. Turco-Pakistan-Iraq Pact

All three Ministers displayed unswerving hostility to Iraq entering into any formal Agreement with Turkey or Pakistan. They professed to regard such an Agreement as militarily unnecessary and useless - in that none of the states concerned would bring any material aid to the other in time of war - and in any case, largely because of the Israel problem and of Turkey's relations with Israel on the one hand and the West on the other, as unacceptable to public opinion in Iraq and in other Arab States as well; they pointed out that the Turco-Pakistani Pact had no practical results whatever and that it had antagonised opinion in Pakistan and played the Communist game there; they threw out broad hints that Saudi-Arabian money would be used to intrigue against Nuri Said if he did proceed with the notion; they did not add, but possibly meant, that Egyptian money and propaganda would also be applied if necessary to the task.

7. Defence Relations with the West

All three Ministers made it plain that Egyptian policy at present would be based on a conception of a build-up of the political and military strength of the Arab League and that links with the West should be limited to the indirect ones already existing in the form of our treaties with Egypt, Iraq and Jordan. They admitted and deplored the weakness of the Governments in power in Syria and the Lebanon and Jordan, but stated their wish and determination - in terms which suggested an intention to

/try...

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try to plot to some effect - to see strong Governments installed in those countries. They clearly had no conception of the implications of atomic warfare methods applied to a Russian threat against the Middle East, and were inclined to pooh-pooh the necessity for any British troops or air forces in the area at all, maintaining that British Forces could not be present in all theatres at once and that the defence of this one should therefore rest on the forces of the Arab States built up to appropriate strength and efficiency. They looked forward to a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty on the lines of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of the 19th of October, but admitted under pressure from Mr. Shuckburgh that such a solution might be adapted to the peculiar needs of our military dispositions further north than the Suez Canal. As regards revision of our Treaty with Jordan, after an initial statement that no Arab State could ever invite British troops to enter its territory in peace time, which was duly countered by Mr. Shuckburgh, they became completely vague and confused.

8. The two Ministers developed a complicated thesis to demonstrate that no move towards a formal relationship between the Arab States and the West could be contemplated. Major Salem argued that the West was identified in Arab minds with Israel which was a creation of the Balfour Declaration and United States support. Until the Israeli problem was solved, the peoples of the Arab States could not be brought to believe that any relationship with the West was in their - the Arabs - own interest. The Prime Minister continued this line of thought by urging that, until the "psychological battle" was won of persuading the Arab peoples that the fight against Communism in their midst, and precautions against Russian aggression from outside, were undertaken by their own Governments in their own interest, there could be no question of the Arab League calling the West into partnership, and any attempt so to do would be merely playing Communism's game. The most that could be countenanced was a continuation, with suitable undefined modifications, of our existing defence arrangements with Iraq and Jordan, together with informal consultations, plans and contacts such as those to which he had agreed with Lord Mountbatten.

9. The Prime Minister then discussed his own "psychological battles" in Egypt. He said that he had now won the battle of the Agreement, and far quicker than he expected. He now faced a battle of confidence, and particularly confidence in Great Britain, which would extend over the whole of the twenty months period of the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal Base

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Area. (This statement is consistent with his earlier assertions to Her Majesty's Ambassador and to the Minister of State that no formal steps in defence relationships between Egypt and the West would be possible until the withdrawal was complete). He also spoke of improving relations with Turkey, referred to his recent article on that subject, which, he remarked, could not have been published a year ago, and appeared to look forward to a slow rapprochement with some confidence and even pleasure.

10. It was noteworthy that during the whole of this discussion Gamal Abdel Nasser spoke frequently of himself. "My policy...", "my battle...", "I shall have the courage when the time comes..." etc. A considerable development seems to have taken place in him since his escape from assassination and his triumph over both General Naguib and the Moslem Brotherhood: he is more sure of himself, and perhaps over-confident and even a little inflated. The prospects of the re-introduction of Parliamentary institutions and party political life in Egypt seemed to recede as the evening wore on.

11. The policy which the Egyptian Ministers advocated - and which reflects some of the basic ideas in Gamal Abdel Nasser's profession of faith in his book "The Philosophy of the Revolution" - shewed contradictions which were the more glaring in that Major Salem had at the outset, in a private grumble to Mr. Murray, referred in the most disparaging terms to the Arab League Council meeting which was still taking place. He spoke of the "antiquated gramophone records" put on by the representatives of various States, to the "bad relations" in the League, and the "hopeless politicians" of the "democratic" Arab régimes. Reading between the lines, the Egyptian Ministers' attitude appeared to be inspired at least in part by Egyptian ambition to continue to dominate the League, and in particular to use it, at least at this juncture, to prevent Iraq adopting a separate policy.

PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE OF S.

Mr. Shuckburgh
African

JE1022/31 (54)
 Mr. Shuckburgh, who has been in bed with flu, has been asked to give thought to your suggestion that we might say something to Nasser about Salah Salem, possibly in conjunction with the Americans.

FROM CIREO TO FOREIGN OFFICE
 TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MINUTE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
 DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Murray

No. 1879

December 29, 1954

D: 5.06 p.m. December 29, 1954

R: 6.30 p.m. December 29, 1954

ATP
2/12

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1879 of December 29,

Repeated for information Saving to:-

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|----------|----------|----------|--------------|
| Damascus | Beirut | B.M.E.O. | Washington |
| Amman | Jedda | Paris | H.Q., B.T.E. |
| Bagdad | Tel Aviv | Ankara | |

Major Salah Salem, the Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, made the following points at a press conference of visiting Syrian journalists on December 27.

(1) Egypt had suffered from alliances with the West, and the Revolutionary Government would not tie her to any Western pact. Egypt had agreed to allow British forces to return to the Canal Zone, within a period of five years and four months only, in the event of an attack on Turkey or a member of the Arab Collective Security Pact, in order to secure evacuation without hostilities between Egypt and Britain.

(2) Arab defence should be based on the Arab Collective Security Pact and Egypt would be happy to see a unified Arab command with a unified training and armaments programme. The security pact had originally been designed to meet the menace of Israel, but could now serve other purposes.

(3) Under no circumstances would Egypt conclude a peace settlement with Israel, even if the latter accepted the United Nations resolutions on Palestine, as Egypt could not overlook the fact that Israel threatened her in the economic, military and social fields.

(4) After the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, Egypt had been offered American military aid if she would sign a mutual security pact with the United States. One Arab country had accepted the principle of such a mutual security pact, but Egypt had rejected the offer immediately and had accepted only United States economic aid which was granted without conditions / other than

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Cairo telegram No. 1879 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

other than that Egypt should bear the larger part of the cost of each project.

(5) Egypt as now manufacturing all kinds of small arms, including the new Belgian rifle, and would be exporting armaments to the Arab countries next year. Within a year Egypt would be one of the ten countries in the world producing and exporting jet aircraft.

(6) Parliamentary life would be restored as promised at the end of the three year transition period in January 1956. The Revolutionary Government had not considered shortening this period as the time was needed to prepare the way for democratic life.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Ankara, Paris, Tel Aviv and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 57, 246, 65 and 191.

[Repeated Saving to Ankara, Paris, Tel Aviv and Washington].

44444

SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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Cypher/OTF

INDEXED

**FOREIGN OFFICE AND
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION**

2 Mr Murray

JE 1022/32

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 1000
November 23, 1954

B. 7.10 p.m. December 29, 1954
R. 8.35 p.m. December 29, 1954

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1000 of December 29.

Repeated for information saving to:

Bombay	Amman	B.M.E.O.	Washington
Bagdad	Jedda	Ankara	H.Q.E.T.E.
Beirut	Tel Aviv	Paris	

My immediately preceding telegram.

Major Salem's press conference for Syrian journalists.

This outburst is believed to reflect the increasing difficulty of Major Salem's position in the G.R.E. and possibly to represent an attempt, in the manner of the "old politicians", to strengthen his hand by appealing to extremist public opinion. There is little doubt that both the Salem brothers are at present not fully in harmony with Colonel Nasser and the latter's closest supporters.

2. According to the United States Embassy, Colonel Nasser has, during the past week or two, been showing signs of renewed interest in American military aid and Major Salem's statements may be intended to preclude any move in this direction.

3. It is possible, however, that, as has happened before, the impetuous Major was led on to dangerous ground by deliberately embarrassing questions and that, although his replies represented the views of his more unconstructive needs, his indiscretions were not entirely deliberate.

4. Egyptian officials are attempting to play down the conference. They appear to be apprehensive lest foreign, particularly American, reaction may increase tension in the G.R.E. They rightly point out that the régime cannot, at this juncture, afford yet a further crisis.

Foreign Office please pass saving to Ankara, Paris, Tel Aviv and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 58, 217, 66 and 192.

[Repeated saving to Ankara, Paris, Tel Aviv and Washington]

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