Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1760 of December 30.

Repealed for information to Washington B.M.E.O.
UKDEL, New York Ankara
and Savoy to Paris UKDEL, Paris.

By telegram No. 1758. Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations.

I think it probable that the following factors may be influencing Egyptians in their present obstinacy about availability and military status of the technicians:

(a) According to secret sources, the régime have recently discovered a plot to overthrow them by assassination and coup d'état led by a terrorist group of the Moslem Brotherhood. They are probably anxious to clear this matter up definitely and complete action against the Nafld before they can feel strong enough to expose themselves to further opposition in the country. This does not necessarily mean that even when they have solved their immediate internal problems, they will have the courage to go far against criticism and the "neutralist" trend of opinion.

(b) Egyptian Ambassador in London, Mr. Grossman and Mr. Bevan have probably been exaggerating the amount of public support in Great Britain for an agreement with Egypt. Mr. Bevan has, in particular, gone on record as saying that if we cannot reach an agreement now, we will be forced to withdraw our troops any way before long and this is a thesis which is bound to make the Egyptians most reluctant to purchase an agreement with us at a price which they consider involves internal difficulties and dangers for themselves. t 1142 4 81.

(c) Egyptians probably continue to have information about the wavering attitude of the United States Embassy here. In spite of representations reported in my telegram 1742, Gaffery has probably created the impression that he has sympathy with the Egyptians and that he would like further pressure brought to bear on Her Majesty's Government. (Ve have confirmation of this from secret sources.)

The Egyptians .........
TOP SECRET

Cairo telegram No. 1760 to Foreign Office

The Egyptians may also think that since the United States Government have now openly asked for a satisfactory availability clause, they might be able to obtain immediate economic and military assistance as a quid pro quo and should therefore hold up on this point for the present.

2. I cannot be hopeful for the future, but it seems to me likely that the Egyptians may prove a little more sensible later on over availability. I doubt whether we can expect much progress on the other question.

Foreign Office pass Washington, UKDEL. New York, Ankara, Paris and UKDEL. Paris as my telegrams Nos. 397, 28, 117 and Saving 538 and 13 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, UKDEL. New York, Ankara and Saving to Paris and UKDEL. Paris].

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Private Secretary
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Mr. R. Allen
Head of African Department
SECRET
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Cypher/OTP
FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET (CABINET)
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 1751
December 27, 1953
D:3.18 p.m. December 27, 1953

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1751 of
December 27
Repeated for information to : Washington New York (U.K. DEL.)
B.M.E.O. Ankara
and saving to : Paris Paris (U.K. DEL.)

Following from preceding telegram.

We opened the discussion by telling the Egyptians about the need for ratification of an agreement: we explained that the agreement would only come into force on exchange of instruments of ratification which might be up to four weeks after signature. (Your telegram No. 412 saving). The Egyptians made no comment on this, and made no further attempt to argue that the agreement should come into force earlier or that time-table for withdrawal etc., should be in any way modified.

2. We then dealt with uniform. We went over the same ground as that covered in meeting of October 21. The Egyptians repeated that the presence of British personnel in uniform would be regarded by public opinion here as a continuance of occupation; we pointed out that no arrangements would be acceptable to us unless the British service personnel in question had the right to wear uniform on appropriate occasion. The Egyptians maintained that, while they accepted fact that technicians would be soldiers and airmen, the only hope of making the base acceptable to people of Egypt and thus ensuring its usefulness was to emphasize civilian character of British personnel. Unless this were done successfully popular feeling would prevent the base from functioning. This clearly involves a great danger of misunderstanding and divergent interpretations of an agreement.

3. We then dealt with the consultation clause and the termination
of the agreement after seven years. We pointed out that the base
must be effective for the whole period of seven years and that we
could not agree to any consultation clause which would have the
effect of shortening that period. We told the Egyptians that we had
no intention of seeking an open-ended agreement and that on the
expiry of the seventh year British technicians would be withdrawn
and the effective working base would cease to exist unless both
Egypt and United Kingdom wished arrangements made for its
continuance. Otherwise the only remaining problem would be the
disposal thereafter of the remaining British property and this
could probably be done by civilian contract. These arrangements
should however be discussed in the last year of the validity of
the agreement and all we intended was a clause saying this.
The Egyptians agreed with this though they pressed hard for an
estimate of the time necessary after the seventh year for the
disposal of remaining equipment. We were unable to give them
any such estimate.

4. We then dealt with the numbers of technicians after the
first four and a half years of the agreement. We told the
Egyptians that our figures were 3,000 for the next 18 months
and 1,500 for the last year. We explained also that there would
have to be a certain amount of tapering off towards the end of
each of these periods. Although the Egyptians maintained that all
the figures we had named were in their view excessive, they
did not reject this latest proposal.

5. As regards air facilities, we pressed the Egyptians to agree
to the text agreed by the Working Party in October (Cairo telegram
U27). They said they were unwilling to include, in an
agreement of principles, any text which might suggest we were
keeping a British air base in Egypt. But they said that they
would be ready to give transit and servicing facilities to
British aircraft at Abu Sueir, that these would include the
aircraft required for the maintenance of the technicians in the
Canal Zone, and that an appropriate number of British technicians
should be installed there to do the servicing. Flight clearances
should be on the same basis as for other service aircraft
landing in foreign territory and they would give us most
favoured nation treatment in this respect both for scheduled
and occasional flights.

6. The Egyptians said that they were ready to discuss further
points of difference in the draft paper on the powers of the
base commander and the organisation of the base. They expressed unwillingness to accept either "Assistant Base Commander" or "Senior British Officer" as the title for the officer in command of the British technicians. We will discuss this point with them further on Tuesday.

7. As regards availability, the Egyptian attitude was that any undertaking amounting to an alliance or involving an obligation to enter a war (except when an attack had taken place upon a member of the Arab Mutual Security Pact) must wait until after the withdrawal of British troops. It would then be possible to make detailed arrangements for defence cooperation between the Western Powers and those of the Middle East on the analogy of N.A.T.O.; but this could not be done now as Egyptian public opinion was strongly opposed to anything which might involve the country automatically in such a war. This feeling was so strong at this moment that no régime could overcome it. They themselves, as soldiers, knew this was nonsense and that Egypt would be bound to be involved but they maintained that they could not put across Egyptian opinion an agreement which would provide both for the continuance of a British base in Egypt and for an undertaking for automatic involvement in a future war.

8. We made it clear that, on the side of British public opinion, no agreement had any value which did not provide for the availability of the base in the circumstances described, otherwise the base would be quite valueless. The Egyptians refused to move at all on this point and kept repeating that the advice they had had from Egyptian politicians was against accepting any undertaking which went beyond the Arab Mutual Security Pact. The Nafe had not been able to accept anything further nor could they. On this point therefore their attitude seems to have hardened in the last few weeks, and they made no reference to Fawzi’s initiative reported in Cairo telegrams 1668 and 1672.

Foreign Office pass Washington, New York (U.K. DEL.) and Ankara as my telegrams 393, 26 and 115 and Paris and Paris (U.K. DEL.) as my saving telegrams 538 and 9 respectively.

A Repeated
1. The Secretary of State instructed me this morning to submit a draft telegram to Cairo warning H.M. Ambassador that we should not be able to accept anything less than the proposals which we have already put forward.

2. Meanwhile Brigadier Dove, who has just flown in overnight from Cairo, brought a message from Sir R. Stevenson to the effect that the Egyptians have asked for a meeting next Saturday, despite paragraph 3 of Cairo telegram No. 1742. General Nasser, Hakim Amer and Salah Salem will be present at this meeting, which is to be "without any papers on either side". The fact that this request for a meeting has been put forward by the Egyptians, together with the information in OPS telegram No. 1774 that they have issued a directive to Governors in the Canal Zone that more effective steps must be taken to improve law and order there, seems to show that the Egyptians are really anxious to get things moving again.

3. I understand from Brigadier Dove that Sir R. Stevenson proposes to try and clear up a few doubtful points at this meeting (the Egyptians are for instance worried about the procedure for ratification of any agreement at this end and wonder how much delay there will be if the operative date of any agreement is the ratification rather than the signature: the Ambassador is briefed on this point), and will listen to anything the Egyptians may have to say. I think that in the circumstances it is a good thing that this meeting should take place, and the fact that it is doing so fits in well with the Secretary of State's wish that some general guidance should be given to Sir R. Stevenson. I submit a draft telegram which could go down to the Secretary of State in his box at 2 p.m. today and he would telephone approval of the draft or changes to the Resident Clerk so that it could be despatched tonight.

\[Signature\]
The Secretary of State rang up yesterday afternoon. He had just seen Washington telegram no. 2774, and was a little disturbed about paragraph 3. I put him in touch with Mr. R. Allen and later, on Mr. Allen's instructions, I sent off Foreign Office telegram No. 2335 to Cairo.

2. The Secretary of State would be grateful if, after the holiday, you could do some research into the following points:

(a) What exactly did the Secretary of State say in the House of Commons last week about the withdrawal of troops?

(b) What exactly did General Robertson say to the Egyptians, and why?

J. Bullard  
Resident Clerk

December 25, 1953.

(African Department.  
(Conf. to Private Secretary.)

[Signature]

[Signature]
Your telegram No. 2766 [of December 22].

Following personal for Ambassador from Secretary of State.

Please take an early opportunity of following up with Mr. Dulles the Prime Minister's message to the President. You should make it clear to Mr. Dulles that we are grateful for the support which he gave us with the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington and for the consideration which he is giving now to our views. The two points on availability and uniforms are the two main outstanding points between us and Egypt. There are a number of other points which the Egyptians have not yet definitely accepted, but we have made our position quite clear to them, and we shall not go back on any offer which we have already made. I think that the United States Government have been kept generally informed of the position throughout the discussions, but I will let the United States Embassy here have a note showing exactly how matters stand between us and Egypt (copy to you by bag).

2. As regards the points referred to in your paragraph 4, the withdrawal period of fifteen months must run from the date of the signature of the final agreement, this is of course the procedure with any treaty.

3. As regards the Status of Forces Agreement, we expect that this will have to be negotiated after the settlement of the heads of agreement. The Americans will realise from their experience of the Bonn Treaty negotiations that this is an important and difficult technical problem. The Egyptians are aware that this is an outstanding matter, though we have not debated it with them.

4. If the Egyptians can be brought to accept our point of view on availability and uniforms, then I think there is a good chance of a settlement. We cannot of course guarantee that the Egyptians will not raise further difficulties, but we for our part shall stand by our offers. The trouble is that the Egyptians are not likely to accept our offers unless they feel that the United States is standing with us, and an offer of economic aid by the United States at this moment would certainly give them the opposite impression.
5. As regards economic aid to other Arab countries, I see no reason why the United States should not fulfil any obligations she may have in the light of the circumstances prevailing in each country. Persia is also a deserving case.
IMMEDIATE

Your telegram No. 5373. Egypt.

Personal for Secretary of State from the Ambassador.

I saw Mr. Dulles early this afternoon and spoke as instructed.

2. When I came to the end of your paragraph 1, Dulles asked whether the note would be drafted in such a way that it could be initialled as it stood. I replied that I had not understood him last night to have requested so precise a formulation. He said that if there was to be joint action there should be a joint paper on which we could both go to the Egyptians and say "this is it". However, perhaps what you had in mind would come to the same thing as draft heads of agreement.

3. In giving him the reply on withdrawal in your paragraph 2, I added that the Egyptians had been told earlier on by General Robertson, without commitment, that we should begin a substantial withdrawal of troops after agreement on principles had been reached (Cairo telegram No. 1490).

4. As regards your paragraph 5, Mr. Dulles said that the Americans did not want just to throw money around in the Middle East. Water schemes in the Levant States were so controversial that it was hard to make progress and the most desirable project seemed to be the dam on the Upper Nile. I observed that there was a great deal of survey work to be done before this project could be appraised.

5. I then gave Mr. Dulles an outline of the talk between Nasser and Her Majesty's Ambassador to Cairo recorded in Cairo telegram No. 1738. I read out the last two sentences textually. Dulles seemed favourably impressed.

6. I think Dulles intends to be as helpful as he can. I hope it may be possible to draft the Note for the Americans on the position in the negotiations as precisely as possible. I personally do not perceive objection to setting out the heads of an agreement in the form in which we would like to see them initialled.

7. While I was seeing Dulles the Counsellor was lunching with Byroade who confirmed that the State Department wished to be helpful.

/He said
TOP SECRET

Washington telegram No. 2774 to Foreign Office

He said that if we were convinced of the harmful effects on the negotiations of economic aid they would certainly withhold it for a reasonable time. Byroade said that they were ready to help us push for an agreement now but what they needed was ammunition to rebut Egyptian suggestion that Her Majesty's Government did not really want an agreement. Consequently he too pressed for a statement in writing of the heads of agreement which would be acceptable to us.

EBE
Sir R. Makins
No. 2774
December 23, 1953.

December 23, 1953.

R. 2.00 a.m. December 24, 1953.

PERMANENT UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. H. Abell

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Your telegram No. 5973. Egypt to see Secretary of State's Minute.

Personal for Secretary of State from the Ambassador.

I saw Mr. Dulles early this afternoon and spoke as instructed.

2. When I came to the end of your paragraph 1, Dulles asked whether the note would be drafted in such a way that it could be initialed as it stood. I replied that I had not understood him last night to have requested so precise a formulation. He said that if there was to be joint action there should be a joint paper on which we could both go to the Egyptians and say "this is it". However, perhaps what you had in mind would come to the same thing as draft heads of agreement.

3. In giving him the reply on withdrawal in your paragraph 2, I added that the Egyptians had been told earlier on by General Robertson, without commitment, that we should begin a substantial withdrawal of troops after agreement on principles had been reached (Cairo telegram No. 1430).

4. As regards your paragraph 5, Mr. Dulles said that the Americans did not want just to throw money around in the Middle East. Water schemes in the Levant States were so controversial that it was hard to make progress and the most desirable project seemed to be the dam on the Upper Nile. I observed that there was a great deal of survey work to be done before this project could be appraised.

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6. I think Dulles intends to be as helpful as he can. I hope it may be possible to draft the Note for the Americans on the position in the negotiations as precisely as possible. I, personally, do not perceive objection to setting out the heads of an agreement in the form in which we would like to see them initialed.

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TOP SECRET

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He said that if we were convinced of the harmful effects on the negotiations of economic aid they would certainly withhold it for a reasonable time. Byroade said that they were ready to help us push for an agreement now but what they needed was ammunition to rebut Egyptian suggestion that Her Majesty's Government did not really want an agreement. Consequently he too pressed for a statement in writing of the heads of agreement which would be acceptable to us.
With reference to paragraph 3 of Washington telegram number 2774 of December 23 the Secretary of State asked:

(a) What he said in the House of Commons on December 17 about the withdrawal of troops; and

(b) what exactly General Robertson said to the Egyptians and why.

2. Taking the second question first, General Robertson said to the Egyptians on October 21 that we should begin a substantial withdrawal of troops after agreement on principles had been reached. He went on to say that this was not a commitment on our part, but something which we were telling them for their information. The extent of this immediate withdrawal would depend upon the state of affairs in the Canal Zone. We should expect complete reduction in tension, cessation of commando training, prevention of carriage of arms by unauthorised persons and complete co-operation from the Egyptian authorities.

3. He was not instructed to do this in our telegram number 1754 of October 16, which informed him of Ministers wishes regarding the offer to be made to the Egyptians. The Department has searched in vain for reasons which would explain why Sir Brian Robertson acted without specific instructions to do so. None the less, as the Minister of Defence explained in Cabinet, the need to begin so much of a movement as could be reversed if necessary is consequential upon the offer to withdraw in 15 months, and this offer General Robertson was instructed to make. The rest would have had to be said to the Egyptians at some time or other, (otherwise the warning about good behaviour would lose its point) unless they were merely left to observe from troop movements beginning on the conclusion of Agreement on Principles
Principles that they had got their way, or from the failure to evacuate in 15 months that we were displeased with them.

4. In the Foreign Affairs Debate on December 17, the Secretary of State said in reply to Mr. Enoch Powell that he was "pretty certain that no action of any significance would occur until the Treaty had been signed". Mr. Powell was concerned that the evacuation of troops should not begin until the Treaty had been ratified. The Minister of Defence informed Ministers that a 15 month withdrawal would be practical if some movement began on completion of Agreement on Principles, but added that withdrawal would be so planned that we should retain in Egypt until the final agreement was reached enough troops to enable us to hold our position if negotiations broke down in details. It is really this statement which justifies the Secretary of State in saying that no action of any significance would occur until the Treaty had been signed, and (since nothing irrevocable would have been done) his further assurance that an opportunity would be given to debate the Heads of Agreement.

E. O. D. McInerney

January 4, 1954.

Sri. N. Kilpatrick

Rogers Allen

J. Kilpatrick

All in the same, I am not too happy about it.

[Signature]

[Signature]
1. I too, am not very happy about this, i.e. what we have said is to happen between P day (agreement in principle) and S day (signature of new Treaty).

2. I think that Robertson's statement to the Egyptians, according to paragraph 3 of 1490 from Cairo, is so conditional as to be all right. If Robertson's conditions are fulfilled between P day and S day, obviously we would withdraw some soldiers and airmen.

3. On the other hand, it is not clear whether Dulles knows of the conditions attached by Robertson to his statement "without commitment". Should that be cleared up, to avoid U.S. suspicions on this matter later?

4. I think G.H.Q., M.E.L.F. telegram 293/CCL of December 21 is relevant. Apparently the Air Force would have to begin to move on P day.

5. With regard to Powell's intervention in the debate and your answer, rational people would infer that he and you were talking about contractual obligations, i.e. were we binding ourselves to begin evacuation between P day and S day? You rightly said no to that. Unfortunately Powell is not a rational person. Ought it to be cleared up with him, that you were only referring to contractual obligations and not to what we might do to suit our own administrative and other conveniences? Would you like to discuss this?

(Selwyn Lloyd)
January 7, 1955
Secretary State
D:9.21 p.m. December 22, 1953
R:9.45 p.m. December 22, 1953

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1738 of December 22
Repeated for information to: Washington Ankara
B.M.E.O. New York (U.K.DEL.)

My telegram No. 1734 (Anglo-Egyptian Defence Negotiations).

I met Gamal Abdel Nasser and Salah Salem at a luncheon arranged by Pakistani Chargé d'Affaires. No others were present.

2. We had a useful talk in the course of which I referred to the stated policy of both our governments to continue their efforts to reach agreement and asked for their views on how this could best be done. Abdel Nasser's reply was that the progress made during the summer had been the result of personal meetings and of discussion without commitment. In that way it was possible to see the whole picture and clear up misunderstandings before they became crystallised into rigid attitudes. Could we not try the same method again? I said that I was willing to do so provided it was clearly understood that the attitude of Her Majesty's Government remained that set forth on October 21. I had no doubt that this was the position of the Egyptian Government also. If it were possible in personal talks to clear up misunderstandings and dissipate misapprehensions, I thought that good might result. We agreed to meet again on December 26 and the Egyptian Ministers guaranteed to keep any mention of the meeting, and of other meetings we may have subsequently, out of the local and foreign press.

3. Some general discussion on negotiations ensued. Egyptians showed much anxiety about the possibility of further unexpected points being raised by us. They explained this anxiety by referring to the "consultation clause" which was put before them for...
for the first time at the October meeting. On this question it became quite clear that the Egyptian Government would in no circumstances accept an "open ended" agreement. I pointed out that at some moment it would be obviously necessary to consult about the future of the base. They agreed, but said this should take place two years before the end of the agreement in order to give time for the necessary arrangements to be made. There was no discussion of either "availability" or the "uniform" points. I said that I could assure them that we would raise no points which had not already been mentioned either in the general remarks made by General Robertson or myself, or which had not arisen in the course of our previous discussions. It seemed to me that the most difficult of the outstanding points was that of the jurisdicitional status of the technical personnel remaining in the base.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Ankara, New York (U.K.DEL.) as my telegrams Nos. 390, 112 and 23 and saving to Paris and Paris (U.K.DEL.) as my telegrams Nos. 530 and 6 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Ankara and New York (U.K.DEL.) and saving to Paris and Paris (U.K.DEL.).]
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM C.1RO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No.1742
December 23, 1953.

D.4.55 p.m. December 23, 1953.
R.6.6 p.m. December 23, 1953.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1742 OF DECEMBER 23
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO:-
WASHINGTON U.K. DEL. NEW YORK B.M.E.O.
ANKARA
AND SAVING TO PARIS U.K. DEL. PARIS

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1734: ANGLO-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS.

My United States colleague called on me this morning and showed me a telegram which he had sent to the State Department after a talk which he had had with the Egyptian Foreign Minister yesterday. In the course of this talk he had pressed the Foreign Minister very hard on the question of availability of the base which he had made clear was a major interest of the United States. He had made it equally clear that Egyptian efforts to restrict automatic reactivation to a case of an attack on a member of the Arab Mutual Collective Security Pact was not (repeal not) good enough. He had also impressed on the Foreign Minister the difficulties of the Parliamentary situation in Britain and emphasised the conviction of the United States Government that these difficulties were very real.

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs had drawn attention to recent efforts of Egyptian leaders to maintain restraint in their public utterances, a matter on which the United States Embassy had been very insistant of late.

3. Minister for Foreign Affairs said he expected a calm period to supervene and promised my United States colleague who is leaving today on a short Christmas vacation that nothing would happen for a week or ten days. He added that he hoped that informal conversations with us would start in the first week of next month.

/Foreign Office pass
SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OTP and
By bag

No. 2333
December 21, 1953.

D. 7.07 p.m. December 21, 1953.

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 2333 of December 21,
Repeated for information to:-- Washington B.M.E.O.
                        and Saving to:-- Paris No. 3309

Your telegrams Nos. 1738 and 1742 [of December 22 and 23: Anglo-Egyptian negotiations].

I understand from Dove that the Egyptians have asked for an informal meeting on Saturday evening. There is no objection to your attending such a meeting and you could try to clear up any misunderstandings which may exist about the points covered by General Robertson during his talks. But I know that you understand that there is no possibility of our being prepared to give way on any point. We cannot accept less than the substance of what we have asked for. If the Egyptians suggest any alternative formula, for instance on availability, which is as good as or better than what we have hitherto insisted on, I would be prepared to consider it, but I rely on you to scrutinise closely any offer which they make, bearing always in mind that we cannot accept anything which would modify in any way to our disadvantage the position that we must obtain by any agreement with Egypt.

*****
SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OTP and
By Bag

SECRET

No. 2335
December 24, 1953

D: 8.46 p.m. December 24, 1953

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 2335 of December 24
Repeated for information to: Washington [Immediate]
Ankara
New York (U.K., DEL.) B.M.E.O.

and saving to: Paris No. 3310

My telegram No. 2333 [of December 24].

Please be careful in particular not to commit
yourself to the possibility of any withdrawal
starting before the conclusion of the formal
agreement. There can be no obligation on us in
regard to this.
Secretary of State.

I have ascertained from Lord Alexander's private secretary that the Prime Minister eventually decided not to summon General Festing back until "early in the new year". I have impressed upon the Ministry of Defence your close interest in this and they have undertaken to keep you informed. I have asked them to tell No. 10 that a copy of the Prime Minister's minute to Lord Alexander has been sent to you.

December 22, 1953.

Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Mr. R. Allen
African Department.
TOP SECRET

AND PERSONAL

COPY

10, Downing Street, S.W.1.

Prime Minister's Personal Minute
Serial No. M.334/53.

MINISTER OF DEFENCE

I think you and I ought to have a talk with
General Festing next week. Can he be spared from
the Canal Zone in this critical period? I hope
so. He need only be here two or three days. We
really must go through the local situation on
both sides of the Suez Canal and discuss what
would happen if the Egyptians break off negotiations
and assail us. Could Festing, for instance, come
to London on December 27 or 28 and meet us both
with the C.I.G.S.? This is not a political but
a defence matter, and we must know precisely what
cards we hold in our hand and make up our minds
what would be the best way to play them.

(Sgd) WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

December 20, 1953.
21st December, 1953

Dear Shuckburgh,

I am sending you a copy of a minute which the Prime Minister sent to Lord Alexander today as I think you ought to know what is proposed as regards General Festing coming home.

The C.I.C.S. is lunching with the Prime Minister today and will probably take the opportunity of discussing this proposal. When he gets back I shall ask General Brownjohn to initiate action to get General Festing home. Prima facie, Lord Alexander sees no objection to the proposal but no doubt General Brownjohn will wish to consult the Chiefs of Staff.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

2 A.E. Shuckburgh, Esq., C.M.G.

TOP SECRET
The attached letter from Mr. Hankey clears up the confused position which followed his telegram number 1694. In the telegram we were told that the Egyptians were moving in the direction of an availability formula that might get us back to automatic reactivation in the event of global war, which is what we wanted. The Department were doubtful about this and suspected that in any case the Egyptians would probably go on haggling on other points in order to weaken our position on availability. Moreover, we have been told by the Americans that the Egyptian position had hardened.

2. Mr. Hankey now confirms that we shall have to discuss all the other points again before we can get down to availability. It is far from certain that the Egyptians would accept the formula on the lines in telegram number 1694 even with all the other points out of the way. It was simply a new attempt to find common ground.

3. The Department think that, provided that there were to be included in the Agreement a definition of "global war" acceptable both to the Egyptians and ourselves, there would be advantage in pursuing the suggestion further. We would hope not to be tied irrevocably to the United Nations formula, if we can get something better along these lines. There seems, however, to be no point in putting the suggestion to Cabinet now, when the evidence that the Egyptians would really accept something on these lines is still extremely tenuous.

December 21, 1953.

[Signature]

I do not think we can do any more about this.
for the moment, we must see
where the current exchange with the
Americans get us.
I think I submit these papers as a
matter of interest and information.

Sir I. Kilkpatrick

Roger Allen 22/12.

J K 22/03
Thank you for your Secret letter JE 1192/641 of December 11 on which I have the following comments.

(a) I agree that the Egyptians will probably try to weaken our position on availability by haggling on other points. All the indications are that they mean to be tough. In view of the overriding importance of availability, it will probably be necessary to discuss other points first: in particular we shall probably do well not to try to reach agreement with them on availability first, since in that case we would risk losing our requirements on the others or alternatively reaching a break on an unsuitable point.

(b) You are right in thinking that we have no indication that the Egyptians would accept an automatic availability clause. The formula in Cairo telegram 1694 was designed to try and extend, in a direction acceptable to Her Majesty's Government, the suggestion made by Fawzi reported in telegram No. 1672. He may or may not have consulted his colleagues in the Council for the Revolutionary Command.

(c) We cannot yet assess the likelihood of getting the Egyptians to shift their position to the extent of accepting an automatic clause. We think it may be difficult to get them to accept a publishable annex containing a definition of global war. I suppose you are satisfied that a global war formula on the lines of telegram No. 1694 would not be enough for the House of Commons, even if the definition were kept secret.

2. In writing the above, we have necessarily had to mention one or two questions of tactics. I must however reserve the Ambassador's position over that. He will clearly have all sorts of ideas of his own on the subject, and has probably thought a lot about it on the journey.

Yours ever,

Robin Hankey

(R. H. A. Hankey)

E. B. Boothby, Esq.,
African Department,
Foreign Office.
Mr. Creswell

No. 1694  D. 6.37 p.m. December 8, 1953
December 8, 1953  R. 7.35 p.m. December 8, 1953

PRIORITY
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1694 of December 8
Repeated for information to E.M.E.O. Paris
Washington Ankara

Cairo telegrams Nos. 1668 and 1672.

Following from Delegation.

The Egyptians have moved in the direction of a formula involving the concept of a global war and should you consider this to be a promising line of approach opportunities may arise for pushing them further in this direction before any more informal meetings are held. We have therefore been considering what formula on such lines might satisfy our requirements. The following is a suggested text:

Begins

(1) In the event of (a) an attack by an outside Power on Egypt or on any other country which is a party to the Arab Mutual Security Pact; or (b) a global war; or (c) an outbreak of hostilities which is considered by both countries as the beginning of a global war; Egypt will afford to the United Kingdom all such facilities as may be necessary to place the base on a war footing and to operate it efficiently. These facilities will include the use within the limits strictly indispensable for the above mentioned purposes of Egyptian ports by British forces.

(2) In the event of a threat of cases (a), (b) or (c) above arising there shall be immediate consultation between the United Kingdom and Egypt.

Ends.

2. Omission of specific mention of Persia or Turkey in (2) above has become important in view of internal political situation here.
SECRET

Cairo telegram No. 1694 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

here, and the present strained relations between Egypt and Turkey.
The case of Turkey is fully covered in the above formula but omission of a specific reference is probably now necessary if we are to get Egyptian agreement to the rest.

3. It would presumably be necessary to record in a secret or confidential exchange of notes, or possibly in the minutes of a formal meeting, the agreement of the two delegations to a definition of global war. A possible definition is "a war involving any three Nations holding permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations involving hostilities in two continents".

4. We would be glad to receive your instructions on the above formula and to know whether you would like us to discuss it informally with Minister for Foreign Affairs in response to his suggestion recorded in Cairo telegram No. 1672. We cannot, of course, tell whether the Egyptians would accept it.

Foreign Office pass Washington, Paris and Ankara as my telegrams Nos. 381, 60 and 109 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Paris and Ankara].

666666
ANGLO/EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS

Stage reached after meeting on October 21

The following is the understanding of Her Majesty's Government of the stage reached in the Anglo-Egyptian defence negotiations following the meeting on October 21, when the British delegation tried to secure agreement on principles on nine points:

I Duration of the Agreement

The Egyptians have accepted the British compromise proposal of a seven-year agreement on principles, but they have qualified this by a provision that Her Majesty's forces must dispose of the contents of the Base before the end of the period unless agreement is reached, by the end of the fifth year, permitting us to retain the Base for a longer period. This qualification is unacceptable to the British side as it stands, since it would have the effect of curtailing the effective life of the Agreement; it would mean the last part of the period of agreement would be spent in clearing stocks away.

II Provision for consultation at end of Agreement

The British proposal was as follows:

"The Parties would consult together at the end of the period specified for the duration of the Agreement to decide what arrangements were necessary to provide for the continued maintenance of the Base thereafter."

The Egyptians would not accept this proposal, since it implied a commitment to continue the maintenance of the Base even after the conclusion of the period of the duration of the Agreement.

III Withdrawal of troops

The Egyptians have accepted a fifteen months' period in principle but have qualified this by saying that it must run from the date of signature of the Agreement instead of from the day on which the Agreement enters into force.

IV Number of technicians

Both sides are agreed on 4,000 technicians for the first four and a half years of the Agreement and a gradual reduction to a minimum of 2,500 technicians during the period from four and a half years to six years. The Egyptians are still not in agreement with us regarding the numbers proposed for the final year. The British Delegation consider those should number a minimum of 1,000 (excluding the small numbers required by the Royal Air Force in connexion with their staging facilities at Abu Sueir).
V.

**Availability**

The British suggested the following formula:

In the event of —

(a) an attack by an outside power on Egypt;

(b) an attack by an outside power on any country which is a party to the Arab Mutual Security Pact; or

(c) a recommendation by the United Nations that the Base should be made available in the event of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression;

Egypt will afford to the United Kingdom all such facilities as may be necessary to place the Base on a war footing and operated efficiently. These facilities will include the use within the limits strictly indispensable for above mentioned purposes of Egyptian courts by British forces.

In the event of a threat of an attack on any of the members of the Arab Mutual Security Pact, Iran or Turkey, there shall be immediate consultation between the United Kingdom and Egypt.

The Egyptians accepted this formula with the exception of clause (c) above concerning the recommendation by the United Nations. They would not accept, they said, anything which would make the Base automatically available to the British except in the case of an attack on one of the Arab countries.

VI.

**Uniforms**

The British suggested the following formula, in an effort to meet the Egyptians:

"Within the Base installations and in transit between them British personnel will be entitled to wear the uniform of the service to which they belong and to carry a weapon for their personal protection. Outside the area of the Base they will wear plain clothes."

The Egyptians proposed the following counter formula:

"Outside the Base area and when off duty in it, British personnel will wear civilian clothes. Then on duty within the installations, and in transit between them, they will wear a unified civilian dress to be agreed upon. They may carry a pistol for their personal protection."

By "unified civilian dress" they said they meant "cork helmets, overalls or shorts and shirts (non-khaki)."

VII.

**Air Matters**

Verbal agreement was reached on an understanding of the position and a text was prepared on the technical level by the British delegation and handed to the Egyptians, who neither accepted the draft nor put forward amendments to it. The draft is as follows:

"Having regard to the need for:—"
(a) facilities for handling Royal Air Force aircraft connected with the movement of personnel and equipment required in the maintenance of the Base;

(b) facilities for handling Royal Air Force aircraft in transit through Egypt;

 Provision will be made for the use of a designated Egyptian air force airfield in the Canal Zone at which Royal Air Force technicians will be employed for the handling and servicing of British aircraft and for the movement and control of personnel and freight. This includes provisions for flying boats.

 The airfield will be under the command of an Egyptian air force officer and would not necessarily be used exclusively by Royal Air Force aircraft. Egyptian airport authorities for immigration, health and customs will be provided in accordance with international customs. British technicians would come under the command of the senior Royal Air Force officer in accordance with the general principle governing the command and discipline of the British technicians within the whole of the Base.

 All Royal Air Force aircraft movements will require clearance in accordance with procedures which shall be agreed from time to time.

 Overflying rights will be accorded to Royal Air Force aircraft subject to notifications in accordance with procedures which shall be agreed from time to time.

 VIII Organisation of the Base

 The British delegation have put forward a text on the lines of the first four paragraphs of the following; the full text is a revised draft which we shall shortly be discussing with the Egyptians.

 "Duties of the Base Commander and Assistant Base Commander"

 (1) Upon the completion of the withdrawal of Her Majesty's forces the Egyptian Government shall appoint a senior Egyptian officer as Base Commander. He will administer the Base and ensure the efficiency and smooth running in accordance with the provision of this Agreement. To assist him the United Kingdom Government shall appoint an Assistant Base Commander with the duties set out in paragraph 2 below.

 (2) The Base Commander

 (a) The Base Commander will be responsible on behalf of the Egyptian Government for the discharge of its undertakings for:

 (i) The Security of the Base, of the installations and of equipment contained therein, or in transit, and of all the personnel needed to run it.

 (ii) The running of the public utilities and telecommunications required for use within the Base in peace and the upkeep of those of such roads, railways, bridges, pipelines and wharves as may be required for the Base in war including where necessary, any new construction and the observance of the conditions attached to the installations listed in Appendix II.

 (iii) The recruitment, administration and reliability of all labour employed in the Base (other than the British technicians and domestic labour hired under private arrangements).
arrangements). It will be the duty of the Base Commander with the assistance of the Egyptian administration generally to ensure that the members of the labour force are of the necessary competence to the standard required by the Assistant Base Commander.

(iv) The provision and efficient upkeep of motor transport required in the Base.

(v) The provision and allocation of rail and water transportation and port facilities where required.

(vi) The provision and maintenance of buildings and works.

(vii) The hygiene of the Base.

(b) In execution of his responsibilities the Base Commander will give full support to his Assistant Base Commander in ensuring that the facilities which the latter requires (as defined in paragraph 4 below) are promptly furnished and that the administrative needs up to normal British standards of his Assistant Base Commander and the personnel in his charge are met.

(c) As part of the Base Headquarters there will be a joint Base Communications Centre. Its organisation will be governed by the following considerations:

(i) There will be a signal link operated by British and Egyptian personnel to the appropriate British radio communications network.

(ii) All messages received by the signal link mentioned in sub-paragraph 3(c)(i) above will be passed when decoded to a joint message distribution centre, which will transmit them promptly to the Assistant Base Commander with a copy to the Base Commander. Outward messages will be similarly handled.

(3) The Assistant Base Commander

(a) The Assistant Base Commander will:

(i) be responsible through the Base Commander in each case for the control of the installations listed in Appendix I. He will be in full and effective charge of all British-owned equipment stored or used in these installations;

(ii) pass on all instructions received through the Base Communications Centre from British authorities and initiate all other instructions necessary under sub-paragraph 4(a)(i) above;

(iii) apply to the Base Commander for transport, labour and other facilities required for the efficient operation of these installations. He will indicate the standard of competence required of such labour and will arrange for its engagement and payment. He may discharge any man for incompetence, indiscipline or unrelability and may refuse to re-employ him;

(iv) control and distribution of all personnel, both technical and unskilled, employed in these installations.
(b) He will be the adviser to the Base Commander on all technical matters and in this capacity will be responsible for advising him on the efficiency and maintenance of installations and facilities other than those listed in Appendix I. For this purpose he and his staff will inspect such installations as often as they may consider necessary and will render reports to the Base Commander and to Her Majesty's Government.

(c) He will be in full military command of the British technicians in the Base. He will be responsible for their personal administration, including their pay, discipline, welfare, rationing, clothing, terms of service, medical attention and all similar matters affecting them as individuals. He will apply to the Base Commander for, and will be entitled to receive from him, whatever assistance may be needed for their maintenance.

(d) He will be responsible for training Egyptian personnel in technical functions in the Base.

(4) (a) The Base Commander shall discuss any matters of detail not covered by the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 above with the Assistant Base Commander in order to reach a satisfactory working arrangement directed towards achieving the efficient running of the Base.

(b) Should matters of any nature arise at any time on which the Base Commander and the Assistant Base Commander cannot come to an understanding, they will be free to refer the issue to the Egyptian Government and Her Majesty's Ambassador respectively. To lessen the possibility of any misunderstanding such reference shall be in the form of a joint memorandum setting out both points of view."

(5) The United Kingdom Government will have the right:

(a) to hold war reserves of British equipment in the Base and to use the installations listed in Appendix I as a working base for the supply, maintenance, repair and modification of the arms and equipment of the Forces supported by the United Kingdom Government in the Middle East and for the maintenance, repair and modification of the British equipment contained in the Base;

(b) to move at any time into and out of the Base and the installations comprised therein and between installations, any equipment which it may be necessary to move in order to fulfill the purposes for which the Base is maintained. The level of British equipment will not however be appreciably increased without the consent of the Egyptian Government;

(c) to move personnel into and out of the Base at any time within the limit of the agreed numbers.

(6) The United Kingdom Government shall have the right to propose new constructions in the Base and the Egyptian Government shall afford all the assistance necessary for their execution.
(7) Each contracting party shall accord reciprocal over flying rights to the service aircraft of the other. Abu Sueir Airfield and the flying boat base at Panara may be used as staging posts for British service aircraft and points of entry of British personnel to the Base. The Egyptian Government retains the right of immigration, quarantine and customs surveillance at those installations subject to the provisions of paragraph ...
(customs privileges) of this annex /or of the separate annex on customs/.

(8) The United Kingdom Government may make direct arrangements on a commercial basis with the Shell Oil Company of Egypt and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for the maintenance, repair and operation of the oil tankage and ancillaries including pumps, loading and unloading facilities and pipelines, and the provision and turn over of oil stocks, required in the Base in war. Such oil stocks may be drawn upon at all times for the maintenance of British Forces outside Egypt. The Egyptian Government undertakes to protect these arrangements in any legislation that may in future affect the above mentioned Companies during the currency of this Agreement. Insofar as the installations concerned lie within the area for which he is responsible their security will be the responsibility of the Base Commander. Technical Liaison with the Shell Oil Company and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company will be the responsibility of the Assistant Base Commander /who will keep the Base Commander informed/.

(9) The Egyptian Government undertake to facilitate, on the recommendation of the Assistant Base Commander, temporary visits of British service personnel and civilian experts for the purpose of inspection in the Base.

(10) Should the Egyptian Armed Forces wish to make use of any of the installations listed in Appendix I, the Base Commander and the Assistant Base Commander will agree administrative arrangements which are mutually satisfactory and the necessary financial arrangements will be agreed between the controlling parties.

IX. Navigation of the Suez Canal

Agreement was reached on the following formula on October 7 for inclusion in the preamble on a draft Agreement:

"Recognising that the Suez Maritime Canal is an integral part of Egypt and a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance; and being determined to uphold the 1888 Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal."

The British delegation would also wish to see a joint statement of determination to uphold the 1888 Convention in the main body of the text.

Footnote

The British understanding is that the Agreement on principles would not be a negotiated text. It was in fact at the request of the Egyptians that both sides adopted the method of trying to reach agreement in principle on the most knotty outstanding problems instead of negotiating a text. Once the agreement on principles was reached, there would presumably be an announcement briefly stating what those principles were. This would not necessarily repeat in full all the texts given above. Thereafter the two sides would start to discuss a text. There would undoubtedly be further matters for discussion at this later stage, and these would include questions of finance and the question of the status of the technicians left in the Base.
FROM
BRITISH AMBASSADOR, CAIRO, to
Mr. Allen,
Confidential
No. 1043/115/521
Dated Dec. 21
Received in Registry--Dec. 24

Reference to former relevant papers
JE.1192/651
JE.1192/645
JE.1192/440
JE.1192/102

(After completion) (How disposed of)

MINUTES

Availabiity of the 1333 and Uniforms for
1333cians
Report made fully on his conversation with
the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Statements handed over by

Received Dec. 26.
CWFIDcVTTAL.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
Cairo.
December 21, 1953.

Dear Roger:

The salient points in the informal and personal conversation which I had on December 19 with Fawzy (my telegram No. 1734) were as follows:

(1) Fawzy hinted that the best way of proceeding might be to put on paper the progress we had made. He did not lay this down as a condition but it is obviously a reflection of what has been said either by him or by the W.R.O. to the Americans (Paris telegram No. 502 to Foreign Office).

(2) Fawzy was of the opinion that the attempt to find a "United Nations" formula for availability had confused the issue. He stressed the fact that in the event of a world war Egypt would be pressing us to reactivate the Base even if we were not very keen to do it ourselves. He agreed that the main difficulty was the reluctance of the Egyptians to extend automatic reactivation beyond the Arab Collective Security Fact and the impossibility of our accepting automatic reactivation. I asked whether in these circumstances it would not be possible for us to elaborate some description of a world war which we could both agree to accept now as necessitating the reactivation of the Base. He thought that this as being more concrete was probably a more fruitful line of effort but referred somewhat ruefully to the difficulty in which we were placed by not being able to say in so many words that an attack by the Soviet Union was what we meant. He did not himself explain to me the reason for Egyptian dislike of a "United Nations" formula but he has done so to Hugh McClure Smith. The latter tells me that the underlying reason for the Egyptian attitude is that by accepting such a formula they would put Egypt in a different position from any other member of the United Nations, none of whom is legally bound to accept any particular recommendation issued by the United Nations.

(4) When I emphasized the fundamental importance of the uniform question and pointed out that in the nature of things the Egyptians could be sure that our right to wear uniform could not be abused by the technicians as they would be much too busy for parades, Fawzy rather surprised me by making light of the difficulty of finding a solution. He repeated of course the time-honoured excuse of the Egyptians that unless British uniforms disappeared from the Canal Zone people would in fact never believe that evacuation had taken place. I said this was nonsense as at a distance of 500 yards it was quite impossible to distinguish Egyptian from British military personnel and unless the Egyptian Army changed their uniforms these would remain a familiar sight to all inhabitants of the country.

R. Allen Sec., J.M.O.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.
2. The impression left on me by my first talk with Jefferson Caffery was that he is tired of the whole business. He explained to me how unpopular he now is with the C.R.C. I asked him why that was so, as I thought they could not possibly consider that he had led them up the garden path in any way. His reply to this was that unfortunately they could do so. He expanded this by telling me how urgent had been the appeals from the State Department for him to "do something" with the Egyptians. He had responded to these appeals by persuading the Egyptians to accept ideas suggested to him by the State Department which he eventually proved unacceptable in London to the establishment of the Egyptians. It may be that it is a similar feeling of guilt which is pushing Mr. Dulles in the direction of resuming economic aid to Egypt next month (Washington telegram No. 2706).

7. You may regard me as having jumped the gun in talking to Fawzy as I did in advance of any reply from you to paragraph 5 of Cairo telegram No. 1581. But it would have been difficult, if not impossible, not to respond in some way to Fawzy in view of the Secretary of State's statement of Her Majesty's Government's policy in the House of Commons. And in any event I emphasized the fact that Her Majesty's Government's attitude had not changed since October 21. I do not think there is any likelihood of the Egyptians coming back to a "United Nations" formula on availability for the reason given in paragraph 1(4) above. In these circumstances I would be most grateful for an indication whether a "world war" formula would in fact be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government.

Yours ever,

Ralph Hume Sturman
Egypt: Defence Negotiations

Flag A

I attach a note of a conversation with Mr. Wilson of the United States Embassy in elucidation of Mr. Dulles' remarks to the Secretary of State in paragraph 3 of Paris telegram No. 562, which is attached. Mr. Wilson also said that he wanted to elucidate further the conversation between Mr. Merchant and Sir Pierson Dixon in Paris, of which our own account is attached at 'B'.

Flag B

2. It appears that we are now asked to consider giving the Americans for their own information an account of where we believe the present negotiations stand on other than the two main points at issue of availability and uniform. I believe the object of the Americans is to try and tie us down at least to our understanding of what has already been agreed, and that they want to satisfy criticisms which Mr. Wilson told me were now current in Administration circles outside the State Department, that we ourselves might be contemplating a shift of position from our offer of October 21.

3. To comply with this request would be less disagreeable if Mr. Dulles' remarks to the Secretary of State in Paris did not lead us to suppose that they were trying once more to precipitate Mr. Caffery into the details of the negotiations. On the other hand, the day-to-day contacts with the Americans here, in Washington, and in Cairo should by this time have sufficed to give them a good idea of what the exact terms of our offer to Egypt consist of.

Flag C

4. I attach a further note based on General Robertson's report of the State of affairs as he left them, and would /propose
propose that Mr. Wilson might be shown it by the Department, with the explanation that we think it useless and undesirable to start probing the Egyptians again regarding the supposedly agreed points before they show themselves amenable to the reopening of the negotiation as a whole.

December 19, 1953

I see no harm in giving the Americans the conference paper as prepared by the Department. They have not really got Egyptian agreement to very much, but the Egyptians have definitely objected to very much, apart from availability and uniformity. The effect of giving this to the Americans should be to show them that the uncertainty is not on our side, but on the Egyptian side. It may, of course, stimulate the Americans into some sort of activity, but it might to be apparent to them that if we were making progress, it is the Egyptians.

Sir J. Kirkpatrick

Roger Allen

J. Philpott

22.4.64

F. Geere

Ref: [Note headed to P. E. Wilson today]

29/12/64
5. Mr. Wilson referred to Sir Pierson Dixon's conversation with Mr. Merchant of the State Department on December 16 and repeated Mr. Merchant's view that it was widely believed among certain circles in the United States (Mr. Wilson said this did not mean in the State Department) that Her Majesty's Government did not really want an agreement with Egypt. This belief was indeed one of the factors which made it difficult for the administration to back us wholeheartedly. Mr. Wilson added that he knew we sincerely wanted an agreement, although there were certain members of the Conservative Party who did not want an agreement on the lines contemplated.

December 18, 1953
Egypt: Defence Negotiations

Mr. Evan Wilson of the United States Embassy called today, to explain what the American understanding was of the conversation between the Secretary of State and Mr. Dulles in Paris on December 15.

2. With reference to paragraphs 3 and 4 of their telegram, Mr. Wilson said that their understanding was that the Americans would like to have a piece of paper setting out the stage reached with the Egyptians following the conversation on October 21. Mr. Dulles had really not meant to suggest that we should now draft and try to obtain the consent of the Egyptians to "an agreement on principles" omitting the disagreed points. He simply wanted to know where we stood on all the outstanding issues and what items we would still want to raise before an agreement was concluded.

3. As was pointed out to Mr. Wilson, it really was rather surprising that the State Department were not already in possession of all these facts in view of what had been said to them in Cairo, in London, and in Washington. The Department have, however, drafted a document composed of the items put forward by the delegation on October 21 and General Robertson's understanding of the position reached at that meeting.

4. The State Department further held that the best move we could make would be to allow negotiations to be resumed before the Sudanese Parliament had assembled. Mr. Dulles was still serious about going ahead with American economic aid to Egypt in the New Year. He thought it would be very difficult to hold out on the Egyptians after the end of this year.
Since the Secretary of State's telegram number 562 of December 15 from Paris regarding his talk with Mr. Dulles about the Egyptian negotiations, the Department have had further conversations with the United States Embassy here.

2. With reference to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the telegram under reference, the Embassy said that their understanding was that the State Department would like to have a piece of paper setting out the position reached with the Egyptians following the conversation on October 21. Mr. Dulles had not meant to suggest that we should now draft and try to obtain the consent of the Egyptians to "an agreement on principles" omitting the disagreed points. He simply wanted to know where we stood on all the outstanding issues and what items we would still want to raise before an agreement was concluded.

3. We expressed surprise that the State Department did not already know of these facts in view of what had been said to them in Cairo, London and Washington; but we offered nevertheless to give them a document composed of the items put forward by our delegation in Cairo on October 21 and the delegation's understanding of the position reached at that meeting. A copy of the paper, which was handed to the United States Embassy on December 29, is enclosed.

4. We hope that the effect of giving this paper to the Americans will be to show them that...
the uncertainty is not on our side, but on the Egyptians' side. The Embassy have made the point that they want to satisfy those in administrative circles outside the State Department who say that we ourselves may be contemplating a shift of position from our offer of October 21. There is, however, the danger that it may stimulate the Americans into some sort of activity, but they may be so in any case, and it is better that they should get their facts straight. Our main object is to show that if anyone needs prodding, it is the Egyptians.

5. I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Duke at Cairo, Scott-Fox at Ankara, Rumbold at Paris and Stephenson at Fayid.
Mr. Julian Amery's telephone conversation with the Private Office.

Mr. Julian Amery spoke to me on the telephone on Friday evening, December 18 about the point in your speech where you said:

"I would like to negotiate an agreement which would come into operation and take the place of the 1936 Agreement which runs out in 1956."

(cols. 691 and 692, Hansard, December 17).

Mr. Amery said that a number of his colleagues - a clear reference to "the rebels" - had been exercised about this sentence. Mr. Amery assumed however that this was a point at which you were not speaking from your notes since there had just been an interruption. (He is right - it was he who interrupted). He felt sure that you were not intending in this passage to introduce a specific legal interpretation of the relevant passage of the Treaty but were merely speaking colloquially.

Mr. Amery then went on to say that the reason for his telephone call was that he understood that a journalist was going to ask about this passage in the speech at the News Department's morning conference on Saturday, December 19. He was letting us know so that the News Department could take the opportunity to put this in the right perspective.

I said merely that I was not competent to deal with the legal interpretation of the specific articles in the Treaty and thanked him for letting us know that a journalist was likely to put a question on this subject.


December 19, 1953.

[Signature]

Copies to:

Minister of State
Parliamentary Under Secretary
News Department.
British Treaty
With Egypt

No Terminal Date Provided For

From PATRICK MAITLAND, M.P.,
In the House of Commons, London, W.C. 2.

SIR—A misstatement crept into the Foreign Secretary's speech to the House of Commons about Egypt. Of the Suez Canal Convention he said we were not now trying to revise it. It "has no terminal date at all.

Then he went on to the 1936 Treaty, and said it "goes on without dispute until 1956, except that the Egyptian Government have denounced it. We do not accept their denunciation. We would like to negotiate an agreement which would come into operation and take the place of the 1936 Agreement which runs out in 1956."

I can find no provision in the text to justify that. For, like the Suez Canal Convention, the 1936 Treaty has no terminal date either. What it does contain is two articles relating to the presence of British forces in the Canal Zone, the termination of their presence there, and revision of the Treaty itself. By Article 8 it is understated that at the end of the period of 20 years specified in the articles in the question whether the presence of armed forces of the High Contracting Parties will, at the request of either of them, enter into negotiations with a view to such revision of its terms by agreement between them as may be appropriate in the circumstances as they then exist.

This article continues by referring to the possible procedures for agreeing upon the time of an eventual British withdrawal. Nothing in it suggests that the Treaty ends or lapses in 1956.

The Foreign Secretary's words are:

"...in case either party in war the other will immediately come to his aid in the capacity of an ally."

Where does the Treaty specify that, in the Foreign Secretary's words, it "runs out in 1956"?

Yours faithfully,
PATRICK MAITLAND.
House of Commons, S.W. 1.
Egypt: Defence Negotiations

Mr. Evan Wilson of the American Embassy called today to say that Mr. Dulles was not prepared to try to dissuade Neguib from visiting the Sudan. The State Department have in fact given as their own reaction to our proposal the view that it would be impracticable to dissuade General Neguib from visiting the Sudan, if the Sudanese invited him; and that it would be deleterious to the American position in Egypt if they attempted to do so. Mr. Caffery's role was simply to agree with the State Department's view. We should take this as a definite negative response.

2. The State Department further held that the best move we could make would be to allow negotiations to be resumed before the Sudanese Parliament had assembled. Mr. Dulles was still serious about going ahead with American economic aid to Egypt in the New Year. He thought it would be very difficult to hold out on the Egyptians after the end of this year.

December 18, 1953

Not at all helpful. It is not stopping negotiations. But if Neguib has a triumphal progress through the Sudan, I imagine a good many people here will be strengthened in the view that negotiations should be suspended.

Sir J. Kirkpatrick
Sec. of State

[Signature]

Roger Allen 1972
The attached note from the head of our African Department shows that the American position over Egypt becomes increasingly unhelpful. I view all this with grave concern, for I fear they are trying to treat us over Egypt as they treat France over the Suez. The Americans will have no friends left if they go on this way.

2. In the meanwhile, it seems that the Indian Ambassador, without any request from us, has spoken seriously to Regub, and that he may not go.

(End) ANTHONY EDEN

December 31, 1963
Sir O. Harvey
No. 562
December 15, 1953.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 562 of December 15
Repeated for information to: Cairo, Washington, E.I.E.O.,

Following from Secretary of State.

I had an unsatisfactory talk with Mr. Dulles after lunch today about Egypt. He read me an extract from a series of telegrams from Mr. Caffery of which the following is a brief summary.

2. The Egyptian Government are shortly to consider a series of proposals by the Committee of the Revolution for cutting Egypt off from active association with the West, encouraging other Arab States to denounce defence agreements with Western powers, taking the lead in nationalist movements throughout Africa, and so on. The implication is that decisions of this kind may be inevitable unless the Egyptian Government can obtain further concessions from us regarding the Canal Zone agreement.

3. Mr. Caffery reports that he is unlikely to be able to move the Egyptian Government on the two points (availability and uniform) on which, he says, he has pressed them hard in accordance with the State Department's instructions. He says that the Egyptian Government are taking the line that it is no use their making concessions on these two points, since they have no clear idea what has been agreed on other matters and no assurance "that the British will not raise all sorts of new conditions" once these two matters are settled. Mr. Dulles seemed to have been impressed by this argument and asked me why we could not now suspend discussions on the two outstanding points and set out in writing the measure of agreement reached on all other matters. He suggested that we might include our own preferred version on the two outstanding points.

4. I said that this was the first I had heard of any Egyptian demand to have the agreed elements set out in one document. It was at the Egyptian request that we had proceeded
by the method of trying to reach agreement in principle instead of negotiating a text. I could not see why Her Majesty's Government should now be asked to put down all the points which we had conceded, leaving unsettled the two essential matters which we required. This would merely invite the Egyptians to re-open what had been agreed.

5. Another telegram from Caffery stated that he thought it would be very difficult to dissuade Neguib from visiting the Sudan.

6. I said I doubted whether Mr. Dulles realised the difficulty which this problem already presented for Her Majesty's Government. We were constantly being asked to make new concessions to an Egyptian Government which abused us publicly all the time and which shifted its ground from day to day. If Neguib went to the Sudan, and if we could not get satisfaction on availability and uniforms, I could not guarantee that we would obtain acceptance of any agreement at all by the British Parliament. We should have to consider what to do, i.e. to fight it out or to take some other measure unilaterally. I would certainly examine whether there was any justification for the suggestion that the Egyptians were in doubt about what had been agreed so far in negotiation, and whether there would be any advantage in putting into one document the "points of principle" which we were trying to establish. I did not think there would be, and I suspected this was merely another Egyptian manœuvre which Mr. Caffery had taken at its face value.

7. Perhaps Cairo will comment on Mr. Caffery's views,

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo, Washington and B.M.E.O. as my telegrams Nos. 5, 211 and 8 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo, Washington and B.M.E.O.]
ROM
Het Hoogek, Cairo,
6 Mar. 43 Bombay
Confidential

Mention in Anglo-Egyptian
Defence negotiations

Reports conversations with Lewis Jones,
Counsellor at the U.S. Embassy, and
Het Cuffrey, the U.S. Ambassador.
(Copied Washington)

MINUTES

Nothing very new in the way of
Egyptian propaganda. Evidently no
Washington is going to send any
and we Cuffrey is still unfriendly.

[Signature]
27/3

Action
completed)

(How disposed of)

Reference to former relevant papers

JE 1192/697

(Print)

JE 1192/688

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Lewis Jones, the American Counsellor here, showed me recently a record of the interview between the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington and Mr. Dulles before the Bermuda Conference. The Ambassador begged the U.S. Secretary of State to increase pressure on the British to conclude an acceptable Canal Zone agreement. He said that the British were delaying making an agreement, were haggling unduly about the details, and were going back on what had already been agreed. Feeling in Egypt and particularly in the C.R.C. was in consequence maturing in the wrong direction and there was a growth of neutralism, both among the public and in the C.R.C. which was causing the Egyptian Delegation acute concern. He felt that the U.S. Government regarded the British as more valuable to them than the Egyptians but the fact remained that present developments were most unfortunate from the point of view of relations between the Arabs and the West. He pressed the U.S. Government strongly to use their influence at Bermuda to hasten the discussions.

2. Mr. Dulles received his representations most politely. He said that the Egyptian Government must be fully aware of the real sympathies of the U.S. Government with peoples and territories which did not enjoy full independence. The U.S. Government could not set everything to rights all at once but the Egyptian Government must have patience. He undertook to see what, if anything, could be done in the matter.

3. Lewis Jones contrived to let me know that Caffery was himself very critical of our slow handling of the negotiations.

4. I thanked Lewis Jones for letting us see this record. I said that as he would be aware, there was no excuse whatever for the Egyptians to accuse us of procrastination. Both the Ambassador and General Robertson, and since the Ambassador's departure, General Robertson and I, had done everything conceivable to hasten these negotiations forward and bring them to a successful conclusion. The Egyptians on the contrary had broken off the discussions when Mr. Dulles was arriving in May; they had created many incidents and much tension in the Canal Zone in preparation for the Washington Conference and had quite deliberately woken up the Ismailia incident in July to a major crisis at the time of the Washington Conference. In spite of all that, we had negotiated through the summer, but General Robertson and I had always tried in vain to have our meetings held at less than an interval of about one week. I recalled that when General Robertson went away in September the Egyptians had refused to examine some of the technical matters outstanding, e.g. air matters and the powers of the Base Commander, and report back to the Delegations on
General Robertson's return. I was not aware that we had gone back on anything at all that had been agreed, though the Egyptians had done so in the case of the availability formula. Finally the Egyptians had refused to continue the conversations after October 21 either on general issues or in reply to our suggestions on some of the technical questions which were still outstanding. They had almost certainly wanted to provoke an appearance of tension during the Sudan elections. Most of the present tension seemed to me to be deliberately provoked with an eye to the Bermuda Conference, and that went for almost all the talk about neutrality, though it was admittedly dangerous. I was personally hoping that the Egyptians would now settle down again and resume discussions with the Ambassador when he returned, though in view of their behaviour I had become extremely pessimistic about the outcome of the negotiations and of any treaty that might result from them.

5. Lewis Jones also said that in conversation with Mr. Caffery the Egyptians were deploiring our "niggling" attitude in the negotiations and that Caffery had much sympathy with them over that also. Later in our conversation however when I asked him how the Americans proposed to negotiate economic aid, he told me that it would have to be most carefully arranged agreement with precise clauses to show how the economic aid would be used and what were the obligations on both sides, so I warned him that the Americans would very probably have the same accusations of "niggling" made about them.

6. Caffery told me last night that if economic aid were not negotiated and signed for by June 30, the Congressional appropriation for 1953 would be lost. I pressed him again not to negotiate it before agreement is reached on principles in our discussions. He argued that the granting of some aid would encourage the Egyptians to conclude a Canal Zone agreement. I said we entirely disagreed.

7. I asked Caffery whether the Americans had given any thought to the "new framework" within which defence arrangements between Arab nations and the Western Powers might be set up and agreed after we had made a new Canal Zone agreement. It seemed to be common form in American thought to assume that an Anglo-Egyptian Canal Zone agreement might be a transitory affair and that the real importance of this area in strategic questions would be taken up on a larger plane shortly after the agreement had been concluded and the British troops had withdrawn. How did the Americans envisage that this might be done? Caffery had no idea to offer on the subject. Lewis Jones however concurred vaguely when I said the only solution seemed to be a series of bilateral pacts, because nothing broader could be arranged until there was peace with Israel.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Washington.  

(R. M. A. Hankey)
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Ambassador of Israel and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of His Excellency's Note No. ER/34/63871, of the 27th of November, concerning the current negotiations between the United Kingdom and Egypt. In this communication the Ambassador, after expressing the appreciation of his Government for the assurances contained in the Foreign Secretary's earlier Note of the 30th of October, asks that certain specific measures be taken in fulfilment of these assurances.

/After
After careful and sympathetic study of these proposals Her Majesty's Government regret that they cannot add to the statement they have already made to the Israel Government on this matter. They are, however, glad to take this opportunity to re-affirm their adherence to the Tripartite Declaration of May, 1950.

The Ambassador also asks that, if the balance of armaments between Israel and the Arab states should be upset to Israel's detriment as a consequence of any Anglo-Egyptian agreement, the United Kingdom should facilitate the acquisition of arms by Israel. While Her Majesty's Government are unable to give a specific undertaking in the terms proposed,
proposed, they will continue as at present to
give careful consideration, in the light of
the Tripartite Declaration of May, 1950, to
any requests which the Israeli Government may
put forward for the supply of military
equipment.

FOREIGN OFFICE, C.W.I.
December 29, 1953.
Israel and the Egyptian negotiations

The Israel Government have now sent us a further note about the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations to follow up their note of October 14, to which we replied merely by reaffirming the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 and expressing the hope that a settlement with Egypt would eventually lead to greater stability in the Middle East.

2. We are now asked for more specific assurances, of which the most important is the suggestion that an Anglo-Egyptian settlement should be made contingent either upon a specific guarantee by Egypt about the use of its military assets or upon Egyptian conformity to the Security Council's resolution of September 1, 1951.

3. We should have preferred to deal with this point orally, but since the Israelis insist on a specific reply it is proposed that we should answer as in the attached draft, with which the Minister of State agreed subject to the Secretary of State's concurrence.

[Signature]

December 22, 1953

The Secretary of State is prepared to sign this note if paragraphs 2 and 3 are amended to read as follows:— (making one paragraph)

"2. After careful and sympathetic study of these proposals H.M. Government regret that they cannot add to the statement they have already made to the Israeli Government on this matter.

/They
They are, however, glad to take this opportunity to re-affirm their adherence to the Tripartite Declaration of May, 1950."

If the Department see no objection to this rewording, the note may be typed for signature.

December 23, 1953.

Although the Israelis may still try to extract from us an answer to the question 'Will you make your agreement with Egypt conditional on certain guarantees which we think essential to our safety?', it is more probable that they will accept the answer, redrafted as the Secretary of State wishes, as meaning 'No.', and I have had it retyped.

December 24, 1953

Private Secretary. Roger Allen 24/12.
counter any moves in this direction by diplomatic action in Bonn. The short answer is that given good-faith in the relations between ourselves and Egypt and ourselves and Germany, this danger is a slight one. Given good-faith on the other hand, the danger is a real one, but not insuperable given joint action between the Americans and ourselves.

5. Perhaps the note may now issue?

December 15, 1953.

The Suez might be able to use some base installations against Israel (e.g., airfields); but they could not easily plan to do so without our knowing. If we knew, we should have to decide whether we had the power to stop them.

The Israelis are right, in my opinion, in fearing that Suez potential will be increased as a result of an agreement; but how much depends on your assessment of Suez capability to use the base at all efficiently; a question they could, I would, use it. It depends on the determination of the Great Powers to stop a recurrence of Arab-Israeli war.

Mr. Dean, seen by handling state

Roger Allen 9/12
SECRET

Israel and the Egyptian Negotiations.

The Minister of State has asked what the position would be if an agreement were reached on the present terms and the Egyptians, say in 1956, attacked the Israelis.

2. The answer to the Minister of State's question must surely depend upon three factors:

(a) The willingness of the United Kingdom, the United States and France to abide by the 1950 Declaration;

(b) their ability to do so, in terms of troops available and near to the scene of operations; and

(c) the relative arms strength of Israel and Egypt (and her Arab allies) at the time.

3. These factors would only be indirectly influenced by the conclusion of an agreement with Egypt whereby we would then have withdrawn from the Canal Zone. The presence of British troops in the Canal Zone did not stop fighting between Israelis and Arabs in 1948. The troops remaining in the Canal Zone in 1956 might be preoccupied with maintaining their position against the Egyptians and therefore less free to operate in defence of Israeli frontiers than troops based elsewhere in the Middle East.

4. There is the consideration that if the Egyptians chose to eject our technicians and to take over the base installations and munition dumps, they would increase their arms strength. We should presumably see to it that in the normal running of the agreement, the Egyptians would not take over the more dangerous of the installations until nearer 1960. They would not be technically capable of doing so without outside help; and we should have to counter...
CONFIDENTIAL

Israel and the Egyptian negotiations

Please see the Secretary of State's minute below.

We were not able to discuss the draft note at the meeting with the Secretary of State yesterday, and it should perhaps now be resubmitted to him in case he still wishes to discuss it.

December 22, 1963

To J. Kirkpatrick. Roger Allen 24/12

Now see new submission.
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Ambassador of Israel and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of His Excellency's Note No. EE/34/63871, of the 27th of November, concerning the current negotiations between the United Kingdom and Egypt. In this communication the Ambassador, after expressing the appreciation of his Government for the assurances contained in the Foreign Secretary's earlier Note of the 30th of October, asks that certain specific measures be taken in fulfilment of these assurances.

2. After a careful and sympathetic study of these proposals Her Majesty's Government have reluctantly reached the conclusion that the aims which His Excellency had in mind would not be served by understanding to make a settlement of Anglo/Egyptian problems conditional either upon securing a specific guarantee concerning the use of the military assets now in the Canal Zone Base or upon conformity by Egypt to the Security Council's resolution of the 1st of September, 1951.

3. This conclusion in no way affects the adherence of Her Majesty's Government to the Tripartite Declaration of May, 1950.

4. The Ambassador also asks that, if the balance of armaments between Israel and the Arab states should be upset in Israel's disfavour as a consequence of any Anglo/Egyptian Agreement, the United Kingdom should facilitate the acquisition
acquisition of arms by Israel. While Her Majesty's Government are unable to give a specific undertaking in the terms proposed, they will continue as at present to give careful consideration, in the light of the Tripartite Declaration of May, 1950, to any requests which the Israel Government may put forward for the supply of military equipment.
ISRAEL AND THE EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS

Flag A

The Israel Government have now sent us a further note about the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. In their earlier note, dated October 14, they asked

(i) what guarantees were envisaged in the Agreement to prevent the development of an arms race in the Middle East, and

(ii) that the Agreement be made contingent upon Egypt's execution of the Security Council resolution of September 1, 1951 concerning the restrictions on traffic through the Suez Canal.

Flag B

Our reply of October 30 (JE 1192/580) reaffirmed the Tripartite Declaration of May, 1950, and expressed the hope of Her Majesty's Government that a settlement with Egypt would eventually lead to greater stability in the Middle East.

Flag C

2. The latest Israeli note asks for more specific assurances, in particular

(a) for a specific provision in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement that any military assets which might be transferred to Egypt under the Agreement should never be used except for "the defence of the area as a whole against outside aggression".

(b) that "a way be found to bring home to the Government of Egypt the urgent need for complying with its obligations" in respect of free passage through the Suez Canal. The present negotiations must be utilised for this purpose.

/3.
3. In addition, the note points out that any agreement with Egypt is bound to upset the arms equilibrium which now exists between Israel and the Arab States, and asks that the United Kingdom undertake to afford Israel "facilities" to redress the balance. The Israel Ambassador, when he delivered the note, explained that by "facilities" his government meant favourable prices.

4. There is a sensible answer to (a) which it would, however, be difficult to incorporate in a formal note. It is as follows. The Government of Israel must always have known that the 1936 Treaty was due to come to the end of its normal term in 1956. It could only be renewed either by agreement with the Egyptians or by arbitration. In neither case is it likely that any guarantees of the kind now required by the Israel Government would have been obtained. If matters are allowed to take their course and our forces withdraw in 1956, the Israelis' worst fears will be realised and they will have no means of redress. They will be much better off than this if we secure an agreement with Egypt on the lines now proposed. The agreement is to last for some seven years, and for most if not all of it we should have sufficient control of the most important installations to ensure that they are not used against Israel. It therefore virtually gives the Israelis an extra five years' breathing space. We shall not, however, get any agreement with the Egyptians if we seek to include guarantees of the kind now demanded by the Israelis. They will therefore do better to encourage us to reach agreement on the best terms we can without these guarantees, and rely for protection against Egyptian aggression on our reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration.
5. There is also a fairly good answer to their point about freedom of passage through the Suez Canal, although this, once more, is not suitable for a formal note. Briefly, it is that the Egyptians are doing just what they like now in restricting Israeli traffic, despite the presence of British troops in the Canal Zone, and despite the Security Council resolution of September, 1951. They would secure no greater freedom in this field when our troops withdraw. In addition, the matter is not an appropriate one for single-handed action by the United Kingdom. It is one in which all those powers which are users of the Canal are interested.

6. What we cannot tell the Israelis is that we have been seeking to mobilise the maritime powers concerned in secret to act jointly in the matter of freedom of transit through the Canal, and that our efforts have so far been blocked by the United States Government.

7. As regards the veiled request for cheap arms, we would not wish to commit ourselves in any way. We see no reason to let the Israelis have arms on more favourable terms than they or the Arab States at present enjoy: i.e. every application for arms is considered on its merits in the light of considerations set out in the Tripartite Declaration and, if it is approved, the arms must be paid for at the current economic price. We have recently, in conjunction with the United States and French Governments, been restricting releases to Israel in view of attempts by her to secure arms in such quantities as would gravely disturb the balance of strength in the Middle East. In our reply on this point we cannot therefore promise the Israelis any better terms than they are now receiving.
8. The Department suggest that the best way to reply would be to answer each point briefly and in general terms in a formal note, and to use the arguments in paragraphs 4 and 5 above orally when the reply is delivered. It remains to consider exactly how points (a) and (b) should be handled in the formal reply.

9. The earlier drafts of our reply to the Israeli note of October 14 contained a sentence specifically rejecting the suggestion that an Anglo-Egyptian settlement should be made contingent either upon a specific guarantee by Egypt about the use of its military assets, or upon Egyptian conformity to the Security Council resolution of September 1, 1951 (see draft at JE 1192/580). At the Secretary of State's wish, this passage was omitted. Since the Israelis had seen fit to insist on a specific reply on these points, it is for consideration whether our reply to their further note should not include a passage on these lines.

10. A draft reply is submitted. Levant and Economic Relations Department agree.

December 7, 1953

One can understand the Israeli anxieties, but I do not see how paper guarantees by Egypt would greatly help them. If Egypt is determined upon a revanche against Israel, no amount of guarantees in an Anglo-Egyptian agreement will weigh much. But for us to introduce /fresh
fresh conditions of this kind into our negotiations at this stage would mean that we would never reach agreement with Egypt. The Egyptians would claim that a limitation on the use of the base would be an infringement of Egyptian sovereignty; and they are particularly sensitive about their right to prevent the transit of cargoes bound for Israel through the Suez Canal.

2. As for the Israeli request for cheap arms, I certainly do not think we could commit ourselves.

3. I therefore agree with the draft reply to the Israeli note. I also agree that we might use the arguments in paragraphs 4 and 5 of African Department's submission above when handing the note to the Israeli Ambassador.

Sri J. Kirkpatrick

Roger Allen

(R. Allen)

December 7, 1953.

Mr: Doddle Park, 9.25 am.
Mr: Naship
Ministry of State.

I discussed this with Mr. Allen. It seems we must send a written reply and can't get away with an oral one. But this draft seems to me a bit on the last side. If the Israelis publish it together with an account of the P.M's appearance, it would seem almost like a set-back in the negotiations. It will look a bit out of line with the latter.
Cd. we def. see if we really might be

skeptical a little, without giving anything away.

Mr. R. Nixon, RB 10/2
Min. of State.

P.S. The Israeli Hubs did not raise

this question today.

The Min. of state would

like to see the re-arg.

[Signature]

[Date]

[Note: See page number.]
Suggested re-draft of paragraph 7 of the attached submission and of the final sentence of the draft Note is submitted.

(J. E. Powell-Jones)
December 5, 1955

The amendments to the Note have been written in; I am trying to fit it in.

Z. H. Bess Paper 1 reads as ne

These papers.

S. Bender
n/27

African paper.

Levant Dept amendments have been incorporated in the draft.
SECRET

Israel and the Egyptian Negotiations.
(11th Meeting's minute at 'L')

In consultation with Levant Department African Department have slightly redrafted the second paragraph of the draft Note to the Israel Embassy to make it sound a bit less abrupt. We still feel, however, that we ought this time to come out against the Israeli proposal to make a settlement of Anglo-Egyptian problems conditional either upon securing a specific guarantee concerning the use of the military assets now in the Canal Zone Base or upon conformity by Egypt to the Security Council's resolution of September 1, 1951. We do not consider this to be incompatible with the tone of the Prime Minister's Note of April 22 last.

[Signature]

December 11, 1953.

[Handwritten note]

Mr. Kisch
Mr. [illegible] (His has re-examined)

Roger Allen 11/12

I think this is about right now.

Perhaps Mr. Oden-Parker will care to return the reply to Mr. Flayn.

[Signature]

[Handwritten note]

What under the formula of an agreement has received his formal notice of Egypt in 1956 about the islands? In 1416?
This is a brief note about what happens at the end of the agreement (a subject we have usually misnamed "consultation").

Mr. Edwards has seen it somewhat amended. It could be kept in cold storage or used as you think fit.

2. Can I have Mr. Hanbury's letter back soon as there is other advice to be taken in.

R. Young

28/xi

Mr. Boothby

Minutes.

TE 1192 699 - 1ow

C. A. 11/02/24
Provision for continuing or terminating agreement.

Formulae tabled in Cairo

A. British formula

The parties will consult together at the end of the period specified for the duration of the Agreement to decide what arrangements were necessary to provide for the continued maintenance of the base thereafter.

B. Egyptian formula

The parties will consult together not later than two years before the end of the period specified for the duration of the agreement concerning the remaining British owned property. If they are unable to agree on this question the British Government shall, before the end of the specified period, withdraw or otherwise dispose of the remaining British owned property.
PROVISION FOR CONTINUING OR TERMINATING AGREEMENT.

In his final appreciation General Robertson has pointed out that the formula we have put to the Egyptians (see A on attached sheet) implies a commitment for the Egyptians to allow the base to remain even after the end of the period for which the Agreement is to run. He goes on to say that the Egyptians will never accept this.

2. The Egyptians on their side have produced a formula which provides only for consultation on disposal of British property remaining in the base at the end of the period. Failing agreement it is to be removed or otherwise disposed of (see B on attached sheet). This is of course unacceptable to us, since it implies that the Agreement itself terminates at the end of the period.

3. The formula we put to the Egyptians was never intended to do more than ensure that the Agreement could be extended if both parties were willing. It appears from JBO 628 that the Minister of State and Mr. Byroade may have jointly said as much to the Egyptian Representative at the U.N. Mr. Rodawi himself nevertheless suspects some form of prolongation of the agreement (see JBO 628).

Hence General Robertson is clear that we shall not persuade the Egyptians to accept any form of words which might imply that the agreement necessarily terminates at the end of the period for which it is to run. We can do this in two ways:

/(a) by
(a) by having no "consultation" clause at all;
(b) by rewording our clause to avoid any
implication either way.

5. Since our aim is a negative one it might well
appear that it would best be served by the negative
solution – namely (a). This is the course
recommended by General Robertson. But if we omit
from its text all reference to procedure for
renewing or terminating the Agreement we shall
almost certainly have contradictory statements
in Cairo and London about whether it can or
cannot be renewed. The Egyptians will start by
asserting to their own people that it definitely
terminates at the end of the period mentioned in
the text, and we shall have to reply that there is
nothing to prevent the parties renewing it by
mutual consent. If this kind of public wrangle
developed before ratification, one side or other
might well feel unable to ratify. If, after
ratification, the necessary atmosphere of goodwill
for the working of the agreement would be lacking.

6. Course (b) would therefore seem preferable.
This is the course recommended by Mr. Hankey.
We need a form of words which is entirely
unambiguous, which commits neither side to
renewal or termination, and which provides that
either course may be taken, at the end of the
period specified in the text, by mutual consent.
The following form of words has the advantage of
fulfilling these conditions:

"This agreement may be renewed by mutual
consent of the contracting parties".

Mr. Hankey informs that the Egyptians
may be a little keen about this formula.
Even this formula will meet with
considerable Egyptian resistance. But we
could hardly accept less.
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT

MINUTES of a Meeting held in Mr. P. Wood's Room, Ministry of Defence, S.t. 4, on TUESDAY, 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1953, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT

Mr. P. Wood,
Ministry of Defence.
(In the Chair)

Mr. R.C. Mackworth-Young,
Foreign Office.

Mr. A.M. Allan,
Treasury.

Commander G. Talbot-Smith,
Admiralty.

Mr. F. C. Armstrong,
War Office.

Mr. A.L.M. Cary,
Air Ministry.

Gp. Captain R.C. Ayling,
Air Ministry.

Mr. M.H. O'Grady,
Air Ministry.

SECRETARY

Mr. R.H. Prince,
Ministry of Defence.
TOP SECRET

This could best be done by including Abu Sueir in Annex I of the Agreement. The delegation should also be reminded that British service aircraft would include personnel (crews and troops in air transit) who would be additional to the manpower ceiling. The delegation should be asked to cover this point in the best possible way. The Air Ministry would prepare a draft for the Foreign Office to send on to the delegation.

(viii) The Foreign Office said that a revised Note on Status was being prepared by the delegation and would be circulated as soon as possible.

(ix) A separate Note on Customs Duty questions would be required and this should cover in particular the question of duty on oil.

(x) The position of Navy House, Port Said was being considered separately.

(xi) Article 6 of Exchange of Notes No. 1 should be omitted. If the phasing of the withdrawal has to be specified, the question would need to be considered by the Chiefs of Staff.

THE MEETING:

(1) invited the Foreign Office to amend the text of the draft Agreement as agreed;

(2) invited the Air Ministry and War Office to take action as recorded above.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

2ND OCTOBER, 1953.
THE MEETING had under consideration Cairo telegrams to the Foreign Office Nos. 1358 and 1359 of 27th September and also the Departmental comments on the draft Anglo-Egyptian Defence Agreement circulated by the Foreign Office with their letter of the 12th September.

MR. MACKORTH-YOUNG circulated a revised draft text of the Preamble to the draft Agreement. He pointed out that this followed the Cabinet's instructions regarding freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and also explained that the "sovereignty" clause had been re-drafted in a form to make it more acceptable to the Egyptians.

THE MEETING accepted the revised draft.

THE MEETING then considered the Departmental comments on the draft text of the main Agreement and Annexes and agreed a number of drafting amendments. Points raised in discussion included:

(i) Particular attention would have to be given to the definitions in Article 9 to ensure that airfields were clearly covered. The definitions would also have to include anything required in connection with the Note on Jurisdiction, etc.

(ii) The Treasury drew attention again to the necessity for a financial annex to be drafted as soon as possible and pointed out that this annex must be made part of the Agreement. The Foreign Office said that the Delegation had already been asked to produce a draft.

(iii) The Air Ministry were not happy about leaving the provision of M.T. in the hands of the Egyptians, although there might be no alternative in view of the manpower ceiling. The War Office agreed to look into the manpower position again to see whether the provision and general management of M.T. could be retained by the U.K.

(iv) The Air Ministry suggested the omission of subparagraph 2(a)(vi) of Annex I so that it might be argued that new construction at places listed in Appendix I was our responsibility. The Foreign Office agreed to write to the delegation on the point, the Air Ministry to produce a draft.

(v) The Air Ministry wished to retain control of certain specialist equipment such as refuellers, etc. It was agreed that this could be covered by a suitable definition of "installations" in the Main Agreement.

(vi) The Foreign Office would check with their legal advisers whether there was any point in the Treasury query regarding the application of Article 4, Annex I, to times of peace.

(vii) The Air Ministry wanted all staging to be done at Fayid but wished to keep a foot in Abu Sueir for the purpose of maintaining the facilities there.

- 2 -

TOP SECRET
Dear Food,

At yesterday's meeting I promised to let you have the War Office view on the Air Ministry's proposal that the responsibility for N.T. in the Egyptian Base (article 2(a)(iv) of Annex A of the draft agreement) should be transferred to the Assistant Base Commander.

The latest plan produced by G.K.E., K.E. and F.E. for the disposal of the Army technicians includes manpower for three transport platoons. These will be able to do little more than provide a small pool and lorries for the day-to-day administration of British personnel and their families. The acceptance of responsibility for N.T. working in the Base would be a commitment for several hundred more personnel. These will not be found within our manpower ceiling unless it is at the expense of employments which G.K.E., K.E., F.E. consider B.A.-essential to the efficient running of the Base. Even if our negotiators were to manage to reach agreement on a total number of technicians larger than is required for the most essential work, the difference would hardly be sufficient to enable us to run Base N.T., and in any case our "surplus" personnel when we were fortunate enough to include within the total figure would be the first to leave when things get "hot" again.

We are satisfied with the planned distribution of technicians by G.K.E., K.E., F.E. The retention of the responsibility for Base N.T. the Egyptians is regarded as only one of the many risks that we are to accept.

I am copying this to Mackworth-Yew (to whom I have already sent these comments), away, Hutchinson and Allen.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) F. W. ARMSTRONG

E. Food, Sec.,
Ministry of Defence,
London, S.W.11.
From: Group Captain R.C. Ayling, O.B.E.,
AIR MINISTRY,
LONDON, S.W.I.

Reference: 111

To: R.C. Mackworth Young, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

SECRET

2nd October, 1953

Dear Mackworth Young,

As I explained to you on the telephone this morning, I have been unable to secure V.C.A.S.‘s agreement to the proposal which we provisionally accepted at Wood’s meeting on Wednesday that our Delegation, in negotiating the question of Abu Sueir with the Egyptians, should not put forward a claim to staging facilities there but should aim to secure its retention simply as an Appendix I installation, i.e. one at which British technical management is required for operational reasons.

He considers that Abu Sueir is the one airfield above all others which the Egyptian Air Force will quite certainly insist on occupying for their own use and that such occupation, while not providing in any way an ideal guardianship from our point of view, will probably do as much to preserve it as we could with the very limited manpower which could be spared under the 4,000 ceiling. He therefore regards the small staging detachment for which we have asked in C.O.S. (53) 479 and our original amendments to the draft agreement as a genuine requirement and not in any sense as providing a cover for a care and maintenance party.

/The

R.C. Mackworth Young, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

SECRET
The difficulty which you foresaw about negotiating a second staging post when the Egyptians so far object to the first need not in his view arise. The detachment at Abu Sueir would not in fact be a staging post at all in the sense of controlling airfield services or of accepting movement from outside Egypt and thus needing customs and immigration services. It would be merely an administrative facility, alongside the E.A.F. at Abu Sueir, enabling us to shuttle aircraft between there and Fayid and thus greatly facilitate movement between the northern and southern parts of the Base area. V.C.A.S. is confident that the logic of this requirement will be clear to those with local knowledge and that it is therefore a reasonable proposition for the Delegation to put to the Egyptians.

The effect of this decision on the papers will be that COS (53) 479 stays exactly as it is and the relevant parts of the draft Agreement revert to the original Air Ministry amendments. For the sake of clarity, I attach an Appendix showing how in the Air Ministry view all the relevant sections of the draft Agreement should now be worded; if however, the Delegation feel that an arrangement such as we propose at Abu Sueir would be made more palatable to the Egyptians by calling it something other than Staging Post, I am sure we would not object to further amendments to this end.

I am sending a copy of this letter and Appendix to Wood at the Ministry of Defence.
SECRET

Appendix to Pol. (A.8.) 32592
dated 2nd October, 1953.

Annex A. Para. 6.

Delete second sentence and substitute:

"Payid and Abu Sueir airfields and the flying-
boat base at Fanara may be used as staging
posts for British Service aircraft. Payid
airfield and the flying boat base at Fanara
shall be recognised points of entry for
British personnel to the Base by air."

Appendix I. Section C.

Delete this Section and substitute:

Payid airfield.
Staging post for landplanes at Abu Sueir and
for flying boats at Fanara.
Workshops Abyad.
Hospital (Payid) (Abyad).

Appendix II. Section G.

Add to this Section:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airfields</th>
<th>Abu Sueir</th>
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R.A.F. Equipment
Depot / Kaafareet

SECRET
Egypt: Defence Negotiations

Should the Egyptians come back ever so a little serious discussion of the text we have offered and make drafting suggestions, it appears to me that it would do no harm to prepare ourselves (as we have already hinted to Cairo) for tolerable rearrangements of the text. For example, were the Egyptians to argue seriously that what irked them was having to give an undertaking to us to do something they would of course do in any case, we might meet them by saying that so far from sympathizing with their objection, we ourselves would be ready to do the same and to make the reaffirmation of our duty to the United Nations a common one. This would enable us to offer a rearrangement of the text as follows:

(i) In the event of any attack by an outside power on Egypt, or (ii) (a) an attack by an outside power on any country which is a party to the Arab Mutual Security Pact, the United Kingdom will afford to the United Kingdom all such facilities as may be necessary to place the base on a war footing and operate it efficiently. These facilities will include the use within the limits strictly indispensable for the above-mentioned purposes of Egyptian ports by British forces.

in the event of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or act of aggression on any of the members of the Arab Mutual Security Pact.

This rearrangement of the text would make it possible to argue seriously that the Egyptians were not having to give an undertaking to do anything they would not do in any case.
But surely this would commit us to deactivating the base in the event of an attack by Israel or an Arab country? Whatever our policy in such a case, we would not wish to find ourselves committed with all that it entails, the might, just conceivably, what the base, but we wouldn’t want the commitment inevitably.

RA. 23/0

This objection is weighty and indeed almost impossible to meet without losing the advantages of rearranging the clause. The pencilled alteration does meet it or very nearly, but also very nearly restores the status quo!

24/10

Yes. And available to whom?

RA. our technicians here to help the US to operate the base against Israel? RA 24/10
Minutes.

To the light of Cairo Tel 1501
I think the considerations involved
in my 'arrangement' idea are
just worth exhausting.

The base would of course be available
to both parties on the assumption
that both wanted to do what the
U.N. said they were to do.

Thus: (a) in the case of operations against
Israel the Egyptians would be keen
to obey. We cannot presumably exclude
the possibility of us being keen also
because
(i) we try to be loyal executors of
U.N. orders.
(ii) the Tripartite undertaking to
keep the peace between Israel and
her neighbours must be secure.

If, in the event, we are reluctant
we show it presumably by voting against
at the U.N. and perhaps withdrawing
our technicians, or by variations
in the terms none of which need involve
us in serious difficulties.

In the case (b) of operations against
an 'Arab State allied to Egypt' (see Tel
above) it would of course be the

-Egyptians
Minutes.

Egyptians who were reluctant that they would have to fight naval war with the U.N. and would not necessarily find that we had appointed ourselves the watchdogs of uniformity.

In short, some form of consultation would inevitably arise over cases which were doubtful in the minds of other parties and that is not unsuitable I think. But in the case of World War, the formula still remains as automatic as we ever expected it to be.

We cannot of course meet the Egyptians 'remote part of the World' objection without reintroducing your original localisation test and might still bear it in mind.

Yours: 28.10.

Let's see what (if anything) the Greeks produce.

It seems unlikely that these will curb us unnoticed, the months, and if only be useful if we want to maintain several divisions in this field. It seems unlikely that we want this commitment in the case of sanctions against Israel.

RA: 26/70
SECRET
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Cypher/OTP

MR. HENKEY
No. 1501
October 21, 1953

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1501 of October 21.
Repeated for information to
B.M.E.O. Washington
Ankara Paris

Following from Delegation.

Your telegram No. 1832.

The communication in your paragraph 1 was made yesterday by Creswell to the Minister for Foreign Affairs who expressed no surprise.

2. It was suggested to Fawzi that to keep the ball rolling we might now discuss, informally and without any publicity, a number of other points which still needed tying up, such as the paper about the organisation of the base. Although he did not altogether reject the suggestion, he said it would be difficult on the Egyptian side, owing to the attitude of the C.R.C.

3. As regards availability Fawzi enlarged upon the Egyptian difficulties over sub-paragraph (c). As drafted this would, he thought, be tantamount to signing a blank cheque for automatic reactivation in circumstances at present unforeseen and undefined without giving Egypt or her friends an opportunity to express an opinion. The case might, he thought, conceivably arise in the event of aggression in some remote part of the world, and the formula would, theoretically, also cover a recommendation by a General Assembly majority in connexion with action against an Arab State allied to Egypt.

/4. He
SECRET

Cairo telegram No. 1501 to Foreign Office

-2-

4. He realized that what we wanted was automatic and immediate reactivation at the outset of a major war, in particular one involving hostilities across the iron curtain in Europe and the consequent threat of aggression in the Middle East. It should not be impossible to draft an article to cover this adequately without involving the other difficulties. He would try and think out something.

5. The upshot is that the onus of proposing a further meeting and devising some better reply to our proposals of October 21 now rests on the Egyptians.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Paris, Ankara as my telegrams Nos. 364, 51 and 98 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Paris and Ankara].

ADVANCE COPIES
Sir H. Strang
Private Secretary
Mr. R. Allen
Head of African Department
Head of News Department

PPTP