5. Dove and Stewart are also working on a third possibility, which is that we might take the 1936 Immunities Convention as a basis and work downwards from that. At first sight this may not seem very promising. On the other hand the Egyptians never seriously denied that the Immunities Convention worked perfectly satisfactorily. I am told we shall have to insist in any case that it is extended in toto during the period of withdrawal, and it is not impossible that the Egyptians might give it or most of it to us during the comparatively short period of agreement which are likely to get. Even if we cannot reactivate the Immunities Convention as a whole we might well be able to revive the Customs Agreement, which was originally concluded in 1921 and which, with amendments, was reaffirmed by the 1935 Treaty. That might at least save the negotiation of new customs provisions. It would have the advantage, which we should not get if we used the N.A.T.O. Agreement, that the customs authorities with whom our people would have to deal, would be using a procedure and working on documents with which they are already familiar.

6. I do not know whether you have discussed the matter in London. I think the main point is that we should have a more or less free hand to work on whichever of the three possible methods of approach we finally decide to be the best.

7. I am sending a copy of this letter to Roger Allen.

(R.M.A. Hankey)
seek other appropriate means of securing free passage through the Canal to and from Israel.

7. The Government of Israel expresses the hope that urgent consideration may be given to the foregoing representations. It ventures to repeat its request that, even at this late stage of the Cairo negotiations, some practical steps may be taken to safeguard Israel's legitimate interests.

18, Manchester Square,

27 November 1953.
I had an unsatisfactory talk with Mr. Dulles after lunch today about Egypt. He read me an extract from a series of telegrams from Mr. Caffery of which the following is a brief summary.

2. The Egyptian Government are shortly to consider a series of proposals by the Committee of the Revolution for cutting Egypt off from active association with the West, encouraging other Arab States to denounce defence agreements with Western Powers, taking the lead in nationalist movements throughout Africa, and so on. The implication is that decisions of this kind may be inevitable unless the Egyptian Government can obtain further concessions from us regarding the Canal Zone agreement.

3. Mr. Caffery reports that he is unlikely to be able to move the Egyptian Government on the two points (availability and uniform) on which, he says, he has pressed them hard in accordance with the State Department’s instructions. He says that the Egyptian Government are taking the line that it is no use their making concessions on these two points, since they have no clear idea what has been agreed on other matters and no assurance "that the British will not raise all sorts of new conditions" once these two matters are settled. Mr. Dulles seemed to have been impressed by this argument and asked me why we could not now suspend discussions on the two outstanding points and set out in writing the measure of agreement reached on all other matters. He suggested that we might include our own preferred version on the two outstanding points.

I said that this was the first I had heard of any Egyptian demand to have the agreed elements set out in one document. It was at the Egyptian request that we had proceeded by the......
by the method of trying to reach agreement in principle instead of negotiating a text. I could not see why Her Majesty's Government should now be asked to put down all the points which we had conceded, leaving unsettled the two essential matters which we required. This would merely invite the Egyptians to re-open what had been agreed.

5. Another telegram from Caffery stated that he thought it would be very difficult to dissuade Neguib from visiting the Sudan.

6. I said I doubted whether Mr. Dulles realised the difficulty which this problem already presented for Her Majesty's Government. We were constantly being asked to make new concessions to an Egyptian Government which abused us publicly all the time and which shifted its ground from day to day. If Neguib went to the Sudan, and if we could not get satisfaction on availability and uniforms, I could not guarantee that we would obtain acceptance of any agreement at all by the British Parliament. We should have to consider what to do, i.e. to fight it out or to take some other measure unilaterally. I would certainly examine whether there was any justification for the suggestion that the Egyptians were in doubt about what had been agreed so far in negotiation, and whether there would be any advantage in putting into one document the "points of principle" which we were trying to establish. I did not think there would be, and I suspected this was merely another Egyptian manoeuvre which Mr. Caffery had taken at its face value.

7. Perhaps Cairo will comment on Mr. Caffery's views.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo, Washington and B.M.E.O. as my telegrams Nos. 5, 211 and 8 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo, Washington and B.M.E.O.]

Advancer Colens
Private Secretary.
Sir I. Kirkpatrick.
Mr. R. Allen.
Head African Dept...
Resident Clerk.
Egypt: Defence Agreement

Mr. Wilson of the United States Embassy called yesterday evening to enquire about the progress of the negotiations and in particular to hear our reactions to the draft 'reactivation' formula suggested by Mr. Byroade (Bermuda telegram No. 59).

2. I gave him our reasons for thinking the formula quite inadequate to our purpose, and he seemed to take our particular point that it was no good referring to an application (of Charter principles etc.) that didn't apply. I went on to say that we had been much heartened to hear from Sir R. Makins (Washington telegram No. 2706) that Mr. Dulles had spoken so firmly and decisively to the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington and added that if the United States Government would continue to apply its power and influence in that sense (rather than in that of trying out new formulae) we could be confident of reaching a satisfactory conclusion.

3. I added that there now seemed a possibility that progress might be made in terms of a non-consultative 'global war' formula.

December 12, 1953
SECRET

FROM BERMUDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(United Kingdom Delegation)

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITELIL SECRET (CABINET)

SECRET

Secretary of State
No. 159
December 9, 1953

D. 1.14 p.m. December 9, 1953
R. 6.30 p.m. December 9, 1953

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 159 of December 9
Repeated for information to Cairo

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text.

Begins.

Egypt and the United Kingdom fully recognize their obligations
under the United Nations Charter and the Uniting-for-Peace Resolu-
tion of the General Assembly regarding collective security
measures, and their application to the use of the Base in the
event of a threat to the peace, or a breach of the peace, or an
act of aggression by an outside Power.

Ends.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo immediate as my telegram
No. 4.

[Repeated to Cairo]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Minister of State
Private Secretary
Mr. R. Allen
Head of African Department
Resident Clerk

bbbbbb
Egypt: Defence Negotiations

We are faced with conflicting advice from the Americans at Bermuda on the one hand and from our delegation in Cairo on the other. Mr. Byroade's tone to the Secretary of State and the formula which he suggested point to the impossibility of getting any availability formula accepted which will not allow for consultation with the Egyptians, except in the case of attack on Egypt or on an Arab State. This was the advice given us by the delegation in their telegram No. 1180 of August 11.

2. The American formula is feeble. Unless the application of the United Nations Charter and the uniting for peace resolution of the General Assembly to the use of the Canal Zone base is specified, the Egyptians might well deny that there is any application at all. If we were to confront the Egyptians with such a formula, they might well treat it as a device to secure our ends by ambiguous drafting, and this would get us no further than before.

3. The delegation on the other hand, in their telegram No. 1694, say that the Egyptians are moving in the direction of an availability formula on lines which would get us back to automatic reactivation in the event of global war, which is what we want. The Department have examined the draft formula suggested by the delegation together with their Legal Adviser, and certainly think the delegation should explore their suggestion further. A letter to Cairo has been drafted giving our views, but advising caution in view of the Bermuda telegrams. We are doubtful whether the Egyptians have really moved as far as this. As General Robertson said in his
final appreciation, the Egyptians may haggle about other points in order to weaken our stand on availability, and we have had indications, among others through the Australians, that when we do resume discussions they may well reopen other issues such as the question of uniforms, the provision for continuing or concluding the agreement, and possibly duration.

4. A draft telegram to Washington is also submitted.

December 29, 1953
OUTFILE

Our first reaction to your telegram No. 1664 was to be rather sceptical, since we are still without a satisfactory indication that the Egyptians would accept automatic availability except in the case of attack on Egypt or on an Arab State, or that in any other case they would go beyond consultation. Pawzi's suggestion mentioned in your telegram No. 1672 was after all a clear try for consultation. Moreover, General Robertson in his final appreciation suggested that the Egyptians would haggle about other points in order to weaken our position on availability, and we concluded that this would be their opening gambit when the talks were resumed.

2. We have examined the formula with our Legal Adviser, and have reached the conclusion that it would give us automatic reactivation, provided that a definition of "global war" acceptable both to the Egyptians and ourselves is included amongst other definitions in an annex to the agreement. On the whole we think your definition is satisfactory, but we would not contemplate making a secret arrangement.

3. With reference to the second paragraph of your telegram, paragraph 9 of our despatch No. 234 of August 20 gives you authority to accept provision for consultation only in the event of an attack against Turkey or Persia, though we have instructed you not to use this authority without further reference.
4. We agree with your comments on Bermuda telegrams Nos. 158 and 159 containing the new American formula, and, like you, we do not think it fits the case at all. As the Secretary of State pointed out to Byroade, it would not give us what we want and we think that the Egyptians might even treat it as a shifty device to secure our ends by ambiguous drafting, which would get us no further than before.

5. Since we shall have to go into this question very thoroughly with the Secretary of State on his return, your explorations should of course remain without commitment for the present. We would, however, like your views on the above consideration, particularly whether you expect, as Robertson did in his final appreciation, the Egyptians to tighten up in other directions when the talks are resumed. We have been told by the Australians that Sabry, in a conversation with McClure Smith, hinted that the Egyptians might wish to reopen the question of duration. There are also the questions of uniforms and the formula to provide for continuation of the agreement, either of which they might use to try to weaken our position on availability.
SECRET

FROM BIRMINGHAM TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(United Kingdom Delegation)

Cypher/OTP.

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Secretary of State. D. 3.17 a.m. December 9, 1953.
No. 153.
December 8, 1953.

R. 9.03 a.m. December 9, 1953.

PRIORITY

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 153 of December 8.

Repeted for information to Cairo. Washington Paris

Egypt was discussed in the plenary meeting held at 12.15 p.m. on December 7.

2. The Prime Minister said that he desired to raise the question of the Suez Canal, a matter of world interest. The 3 Powers should be united in preserving the Canal against neglect and obstruction. If it could be put on an international basis as worthy of respect as that of the Panama Canal, much would be done to stabilise the situation in the Middle East. In the present negotiations with Egypt if we had the moral support of the United States Government a reasonable agreement might be achieved and the dangers of conflict avoided.

3. I mentioned the two major outstanding points of difference between the Egyptians and ourselves and added that with solid United States support on these two questions we stood a fair chance of reaching an agreement.

4. Mr. Dulles gave an assurance that the United States would withhold economic aid from Egypt until the new year, when a new appreciation of the situation would be made. He did not, however, think that the Americans could continue to hold up economic assistance after the new year.

5. M. Bidault referred to the moral, material and strategic interest of France in the Canal Zone. In particular the supplies to Indo-China were dependent on it. He was satisfied that we should base ourselves on the 1888 Agreement, which was of great importance to all users of the waterway, and approved the references to this in the proposed agreement with Egypt. The French Government was grateful for having been kept so fully informed throughout the negotiations.

Foreign Office please pass Cairo and Paris as telegrams Nos. 2 and 25 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo and Paris]
SECRET

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND MR. BYROADS AT THE MID-OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA

December 8, 1953.

1. While the Secretary of State was having lunch on the terrace of the Mid-Ocean Club on December 8 he received a note from Mr. Byroade (Assistant Secretary for Middle Eastern Affairs at the State Department) asking for five minutes' interview. He sent no reply but Mr. Byroade turned up of course and said he wished to speak seriously about Egypt.

2. Mr. Byroade said that he had had a good conversation with Sir Pierson Dixon about Persia but that on the subject of Egypt the conversation had not been satisfactory. Mr. Byroade expressed doubts about this and produced the formula in Annex A. Mr. Eden said, after reading the document, that it was certainly not adequate, since it gave us no automatic right to return to the Base even in the event of an United Nations decision. Mr. Byroade said that the State Department's lawyers thought it was in fact more satisfactory to us than our own formula. It could no doubt be improved; for example the reference to the United Kingdom in the opening words could be omitted. Mr. Eden said he was prepared to see whether any variant of the document could be considered as a contribution to the settlement, though he thought not.

3. The Secretary of State repeated strongly his belief that if only the United States Government would back us, instead of allowing their Ambassador in Cairo to undermine our position, we felt sure we could get the Egyptians round. In any case it was impossible from the Parliamentary point of view for Her Majesty's Government to make any more concessions.

4. The Secretary of State repeated strongly his belief that if only the United States Government would back us, instead of allowing their Ambassador in Cairo to undermine our position, we felt sure we could get the Egyptians round. In any case it was impossible from the Parliamentary point of view for Her Majesty's Government to make any more concessions.

5. Mr. Byroade said this was discouraging. The State Department believed from the information they were receiving from Cairo, secret and otherwise, that the Egyptians were trying to break off the negotiations if they had not received satisfaction by January 1. Mr. Eden said our information did not support this and it was not the view of General Robertson. He feared that the State Department was receiving more discouraging advice than the facts warranted.
ANNEX A.

Egypt and the United Kingdom fully recognize their obligations under the United Nations Charter and the Uniting-for-Peace Resolution of the General Assembly regarding collective security measures, and their application to the use of the base in the event of a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace or an act of aggression by an outside power.
Flag A

Cairo telegram No. 1694 of December 8

If the Egyptians are really moving in the direction of an availability formula on the lines described in this telegram, it is a good sign. The Department felt some scepticism about this in view of Cairo telegram No. 1180 of August 11, in which Mr. Hankey advised us that the Egyptians would not accept automatic availability except in the case of attack on Egypt or on an Arab State, and that in all other cases they would not go beyond consultation. We have written to Cairo expressing these doubts and giving the following further comments on the points raised in this telegram:

(a) We have already authorised the delegation in paragraph 9 of our Despatch No. 234 of August 20 to accept provision for consultation only in the event of attack against Turkey or Persia, though we have instructed them not to use this authority without further reference.

(b) Regarding the definition of global war, we do not like the suggestion that there should be a secret or confidential exchange of notes with the Egyptians, since the Egyptians can never keep anything secret for long.

(c) Everything would seem to turn on the definition of "global war". If it were defined on the lines suggested in paragraph 3 of this telegram and the definition inserted in an annex to the agreement, there would seem to be no necessity...
to consult Egypt as to whether a global war had
broken out. We should thus have automatic
reactivation. If on the other hand "global war"
were not clearly defined, we should have to
consult the Egyptians when the time came.

2. The delegation will explore the matter further on an
entirely informal and non-committal basis. If they confirm
that the Egyptians are really thinking on these lines, we
would agree with Cairo telegram No. 1704 that it would be
far preferable to the text suggested by Mr. Dulles at
Bermuda. Our views on that text have been
telegraphed to Washington.

December 12, 1953

be had better discuss this on a suitable
occasion with the JCS.

Meanwhile, the delegation shall give us
hint that we would modify our offer.
be can perhaps come in at 11 a.m. whether
ting to a little more pricing.
SECRET

Cairo telegram No. 169 to Foreign Office

here, and the present strained relations between Egypt and Turkey. The case of Turkey is fully covered in the above formula but omission of a specific reference is probably now necessary if we are to get Egyptian agreement to the rest.

3. It would presumably be necessary to record in a secret or confidential exchange of notes, or possibly in the minutes of a formal meeting, the agreement of the two delegations to a definition of global war. A possible definition is "a war involving any three Nations holding permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations involving hostilities in two continents".

4. We would be glad to receive your instructions on the above formula and to know whether you would like us to discuss it informally with Minister for Foreign Affairs in response to his suggestion recorded in Cairo telegram No. 1672. We cannot of course tell whether the Egyptians would accept it.

Foreign Office pass Washington, Paris and Ankara as my telegrams Nos. 384, 60 and 109 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Paris and Ankara].
Mr. Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary for Middle Eastern Affairs of the State Department, who joined the United States Delegation after the start of the Conference, has consistently been asking to see me. I saw him to-day, when he raised the subjects of Egypt and Persia.

Mr. Byroade said that he was very much depressed about the Egyptian situation. He did not think that the Egyptians would come to an agreement if we stood out on availability and uniform. He thought that the effect might be disastrous on the Egyptians if the United States backed us on these two points and at the same time withheld economic aid.

I told Mr. Byroade that there was really nothing I could discuss with him. The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State had made our position absolutely plain. According to our information the Egyptians were quite likely to ask for a resumption of the talks after Sir R. Stevenson's return later this month, and in our judgment there was a good chance of the agreement going through if the Americans would put our position heave behind it and at the same time suspend economic aid. These points were not open to argument from our side.

Mr. Byroade persisted and handed me an alternative for clause (3) of the availability formula. This he said he had worked out at the request of Mr. Dulles.

I told Mr. Byroade that I really was not either ready or competent to discuss an alternative formula on availability. It was clear that the Prime Minister was asking for American support on the present availability formula, which represented our final position. This being so, it would lead to misunderstanding if there was any idea in the minds of the State Department or Mr. Caffery that we were prepared to consider an alternative formula, and I told Mr. Byroade that, in order to make this clear, I would prefer not to accept the text which he showed me.

For its interest, I record what Mr. Byroade said about the availability formula and give the gist of his new formula. According to Mr. Byroade, our formula could never be accepted by the Egyptians because it implied that they would submit themselves in hypothetical circumstances ten years hence to the United Nations. His formula provided that Egypt and the United Kingdom recognised the interest of the United Nations and the relevancy of the Uniting for Peace Resolution to the question of the Base, and that the application of the latter Resolution would be taken into account. I remarked that this formula seemed to provide absolutely no probability of an invocation to the United Nations leading to Egyptian consent to reactivation of the Base. Mr. Byroade admitted this, but said that our present formula was equally unworkable.

On the question of economic aid, I tried to make Mr. Byroade see the elementary point that any support the Americans might give us if negotiations were resumed would be completely undermined if, with the other hand, they were giving economic aid. But he remained unconvinced.

It is evident that we cannot rely on much support from Mr. Byroade for our proposals.

Bermuda.
December 8, 1953.

Secretary of State.

Copy: Sir N. Brook
Delegation Secretary.

Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Mr. Roger Allen
African Department.
Secret.

Minutes: 1149/650

Israel v. Anglo-Egyptian Talks.

Mr. Nutting asked Mr. Falle and me this morning if our draft answer to the Israeli note was not a bit harsh in comparison with the P.M.'s note of April 22 last. We have had another look at the draft in the light of the P.M.'s note and do not consider them incompatible.

R.D. Edwards
9/12

Mr. Kitch. Mr. Nutting has seen this—has written a minute on the draft reply to the Israeli note—see below.

Mr. Atkins 9/12

J. Kitch 10/12
Secretary of State

No: 158

December 9, 1953.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 158 of December 9

Repeated for information to: Cairo, Washington.

Just before he left Bermuda yesterday, Mr. Byroade approached me on subject of Egypt. He said State Department were seriously concerned about the situation. They believed the Egyptian Government were unwilling to accept our position both on uniform and availability and that they were intending to break off negotiations if we had not made some concession by the end of the year. He thought that availability was the more serious issue. Our formula could never be accepted by the Egyptians because it implied that they would submit themselves in hypothetical circumstances ten years hence to the United Nations. He had therefore worked out, at Mr. Dulles' request an alternative formula which he handed to me (text in my immediately following telegram). He said that the State Department lawyers thought this formula would in practice be more satisfactory to us than our own. It could no doubt be improved; for example, the reference to the United Kingdom in the opening words could be omitted.

2. After reading the formula I said that it was certainly not adequate since it gave us no automatic right to return to the base even in the event of a United Nations decision. I was prepared to see whether any variant of the document could be considered as a contribution to a settlement though I thought not. I repeated in strong terms to Mr. Byroade our view that if only the United States Government would back us on our present stand instead of allowing their Ambassador in Cairo to undermine our position, we felt sure we could get the Egyptians round. Our information from Cairo did not support State Department's gloomy view. I said that it was impossible from the parliamentary point of view for Her Majesty's Government to make any more concessions.

3. I should.....
SECRET

U.K., Del., Bermuda telegram No: 158 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

3. I should be grateful if this new text could be examined urgently. If you think it has any merit, or contains the germ of an idea which might break the deadlock without giving away anything in our position, I could discuss the matter further with Mr. Dulles in Paris. Otherwise I think Her Majesty's Ambassador in Washington should be instructed to let Mr. Byrnes know at once that his formula is not acceptable. He may otherwise start airing it in Cairo.

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Cairo as my telegram No: 3.

[Repeated to Cairo]

ADVAIUE COPIES:
Sir I. Kirkpatrick.
Minister of State.
Private Secretary.
Mr. R. Allen.
Head African Department.
Resident Clerk.

JJJJJ
SECRET

FROM BERMUDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(United Kingdom Delegation)

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND WHITEHALL SECRET (CABINET)

SECRET

Secretary of State

No. 159
December 9, 1953

D. 1.14 p.m. December 9, 1953
R. 6.30 p.m. December 9, 1953

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 159 of December 9
Repeated for information to Cairo

Washington

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text.

Begins.

Egypt and the United Kingdom fully recognize their obligations under the United Nations Charter and the Uniting-for-Peace Resolution of the General Assembly regarding collective security measures, and their application to the use of the Base in the event of a threat to the peace, or a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression by an outside Power.

Ends.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo immediate as my telegram No. 4.

[Repeated to Cairo]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Minister of State
Private Secretary
Mr. R. Allen
Head of African Department
Resident Clerk

bbbbbb
Mr. Hankcy
D. 12.42 p.m. December 10, 1953
No. 1704
December 10, 1953

Immedmate
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1704 of December 10
Repeated for information to Washington

Bermuda telegrams Nos. 158 and 159.

Following from Delegation.

It seems to us that formula suggested in Cairo telegram No. 1694 would be far preferable to the American text. Indeed even the Egyptian suggestion in Cairo telegram No. 1672 seems better.

2. It also seems possible that the Egyptians, in view of their present attitude to American policy, will prefer to do business on the basis of a global war formula than to revert to any wording mentioning the United Nations. This was probably the implication of Fawzi's remark to Creswell reported in paragraph 5 of Cairo telegram No. 1672, and it would in any case be better to concentrate on the new Egyptian approach rather than to tackle this problem from two different angles at the same time.

3. As regards Mr. Byroade's suggestion that Egyptian Government would break off negotiations if we made no concession by the end of the year, Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed Iraqi Ambassador that he expected talks to be resumed with Her Majesty's Ambassador about January 6.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington as my telegram No. 385.

[Repeated to Washington]
If the Egyptians are really moving in the direction of an availability formula on the lines described in this telegram, it is a good sign; though the Department do not feel at present sufficiently sure that the Egyptians could be got to discuss a formula on these lines to warrant a fresh submission to Ministers.

As General Robertson has said in his final appreciation, the Egyptians may haggle about other points, but the reason for haggling is mainly the hope that they will weaken our stand on availability. So far we have seen signs that when the discussions are resumed they will continue to haggle on other points (notably uniforms, provision for continuing or concluding the Agreement, and possibly duration again). This is the first indication that they might accept a compromise formula on availability.

The formula proposed in this telegram would give us automatic reactivation in the event of a global war "or an outbreak of hostilities which is considered by both countries as the beginning of a global war." The Legal Advisers may wish to consider whether the latter set of circumstances does not simply duplicate and define a global war, and whether we should not in consequence be obliged by such a formula to consult Egypt in any case as to whether a global war had broken out. 

It would seem that such a formula would get us back to the position we were in at the beginning.
of August, when Mr. Hankey advised us "that the Egyptians will not accept automatic availability except in the case of attack on Egypt or on an Arab State. In all other cases they will not go beyond consultation."

4. With reference to the second paragraph of this telegram we have already given the delegation authority, in paragraph 9 of our despatch No. 234 of August 20 to accept provision for consultation only in the event of an attack against Turkey or Persia, though we have instructed them not to use this authority without further reference.

5. Regarding the definition of a global war, the Department do not like the suggestion in paragraph 3 that there should be a secret or confidential exchange of notes with the Egyptians. We have always maintained that secret agreements with Egypt were a contradiction in terms. Otherwise, the definition suggested is as good as any that might be thought up.

6. The Egyptians are obviously anxious to get away from the United Nations formula, which we only resorted to because they would not accept reactivation "in the event of a major war." We should presumably try to retain some reference to the United Nations, and this could easily be done by inserting into the Preamble a clause on the following lines: "Recognising their common responsibilities under the United Nations Charter to assist in maintaining peace and resisting aggression."

7. Draft telegram to Cairo is attached, designed to explore the question further.
of "global war" is to be defined as the basis suggested in paragraphs 3 of Einsatzkassen No. 1694.

In the present context, however, there is any need for (c) in paragraphs 1 of the proposed formula.

Of course, the situation in which two nations holding permanent seats in the Security Council from one or two continents, would be no doubt that this was the beginning of a "global war" within the meaning of the definition.

These might, however, be circumstances in which a definition broke out: one continent only and involved only two permanent members of the Security Council, let, whereas it seemed likely that, at any moment, another permanent member of the Security Council could be drawn on, and how fast it would spread to another continent. Possibly, this is the situation where (c) is designed to occur and, thus being so, (c) could now be imposed (d).

Of a definition of "global war" which is acceptable both to the Egyptians and Africans is evolved one and included, amongst other definitions, in an annex to the Agreement. This would seem to be no necessity because Egypt as to whether a "global war" had broken out. Of, on the other hand, the expression "global war" seems to remain undefined, some words seem to be too
Alternative to fluctuations between
right and wrongness or in wrongness, such
as was bad, or bad was, broken on us.

J. C. Cullen
December 9, 1953.

Mongla, in J.E. 192/641.

St.
Telegram to Cairo
No:—
(Draft)
Addressed to: Cairo
Telegram No:—
(Date)

B.M.O. Fayid
Washington
Paris
Ankara
Cypher

Distribution
Copies to:
—
B3EMCE6JCXX
WBBXXKXX
PRIORITY
HOUWKXXX
X&RS5XXXX
DEFERRED

Despatched

Your telegram No. 1694 [of December 8]:

1. You express the opinion that the Egyptians would accept some such formula, by all means subject to further informal discussion.

2. With reference to Turkey and Persia, please see paragraph 9 of my despatch No. 234 of August 20.

3. I am against any secret exchanges of notes, in connection with our general settlement with Egypt, since the Egyptians can never be relied upon to keep them secret. We think it would be better to incorporate any definitions in an annex to the agreement itself.

If you really think there is some likelihood of the Egyptians accepting some such formula, by all means subject to further informal discussion.

Since your telegram No. 1160 of August 11, when you advised us that the Egyptians would not accept automatic availability except in the case of attack on Egypt or on an Arab State, and that in all other cases they would not go beyond consultation, we had ruled such possibilities out.

With reference to Turkey and Persia, please see paragraph 9 of my despatch No. 234 of August 20.

The Egyptians speaking some such formula, by all means subject to further informal discussion.
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

Sir R. Makins
No. 2697
December 10, 1953

Foreign Office
AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

DELEGATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2697 of December 10,
Repeated for information to UKDFL Bermuda

Egypt.

This morning's New York Times contains a most unfortunate article written in Bermuda by Cyrus Sulzberger. Extracts are contained in my immediately following telegram.

2. I am afraid this article will both encourage Egyptian intransigence and make our relations with the State Department more difficult. I am taking steps to try to dispel the impression that we have no confidence in Byroade.

ADVANCE COPIES:
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Minister of State
Private Secretary
Mr. R. Allen
Head of African Department
Head of News Department
Resident Clerk

7777777
Sir R. Vakins
No: 2698
December 10, 1953.

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 2698 of December 10.

Following are extracts.

The basic United States effort has been to induce the British to make concessions on the two remaining disputed points.

2. The British feel that Jefferson Caffery, United States Ambassador to Egypt, is far too hostile to them and too sympathetic to the Egyptian viewpoint. They also think Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State who heads the Middle Eastern Division of the State Department, has insufficient knowledge of the area and insufficient understanding of its problems.

3. The Three-Power talks were brief and not illuminating. The talks between British and United States representatives were longer but inconclusive. The British maintained that a draft drawn up by John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State, months ago, suggesting a formula providing for the re-entry of British troops to the Suez base in a case of crisis, was acceptable to them. But the United States mediating position has altered. A new draft for such a formula was shown by a United States representative to a British diplomat and was viewed with a marked lack of enthusiasm.

ADVANCE COPIES:
Sir I. Kirkpatrick.
Minister of State.
Private Secretary.
Mr. R. Allen.
Head African Department.
Head News Department.
Resident Clerk.
Sir R. Makins, D. 7.52 p.m. December 10, 1953.
No. 2706.

December 10, 1953.
IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2706 of December 10.
Repeated for information to Cairo.

Bermuda telegram No. 156: Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations.

Dulles told me this evening that he had seen the Egyptian Ambassador and impressed on him definite and categorical terms that no further concessions from the British side were on the cards. He had told Ahmed Hussein that he had gone over the situation very carefully in Bermuda, and he urged the Egyptians to settle on the basis of the present British proposals.

2. Dulles said he had the impression, (shared by me), that the Egyptian Ambassador here is amiable but rather stupid. He had, therefore, sent a telegram to Caffery recording his conversation and impressing on Caffery his view that nothing further was to be expected from us and that the Egyptians had better settle.

3. I thanked Mr. Dulles for the action which he had taken. It would be very helpful.

4. Dulles added that while, as he had told you, the United States Government would have to resume economic assistance to Egypt in the new year, he had, of course, given no hint of this to the Egyptian Ambassador.

Foreign Office pass Cairo as my telegram 125.

[Repeated to Cairo]

ADVANCE COPIES:
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Minister of State
Private Secretary
Mr. R. Allen
Head of African Dept.
SECRET

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP. FOREx OFFICE SECRET AND WHITEHALL SECRET (CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Makins. No.2706.

D. 7.52 p.m. December 10, 1953.

R. 1.30 a.m. December 11, 1953.

December 10, 1953.

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.2706 of December 10.

Repeated for information to Cairo.

Bermuda telegram No.158: Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations.

Dulles told me this evening that he had seen the Egyptian Ambassador and impressed on him in definite and categorical terms that no further concessions from the British side were on the cards. He had told Ahmed Hussein that he had gone over the situation very carefully in Bermuda, and he urged the Egyptians to settle on the basis of the present British proposals.

2. Dulles said he had the impression, (shared by me), that the Egyptian Ambassador here is amiable but rather stupid. He had, therefore, sent a telegram to Caffery recording his conversation and impressing on Caffery his view that nothing further was to be expected from us and that the Egyptians had better settle.

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Foreign Office pass Cairo as my telegram 125.

[Repeated to Cairo]

ADVANCE COPIES:
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Minister of State
Private Secretary
Mr. R. Allen
Head of African Dept.
The Secretary of State has already read Mr. Hankey's letter at 'A' attached. It is largely a repetition of an earlier letter of June 24 to Sir William Strang ('B' attached) expressing views generally destructive of the policy of making a defence agreement with Egypt without a practical alternative proposal. Sir William Strang answered Mr. Hankey's first letter after consulting Sir Brian Robertson and Lord Salisbury ('C' attached) on lines which the Department would think equally appropriate to the present occasion.

2. Mr. Hankey is, however, returning very shortly and will, no doubt, see the Secretary of State.

3. It would seem therefore better to leave his letter unanswered, and should he say anything more in the sense of his two letters, the Secretary of State may wish to say something to him on the lines of Sir William Strang's letter.

December 10, 1953

I discussed this with African Dept., as this line was agreed between us.
This is in fact a personal letter to the Secretary of State, into which the rest of the Cairo Embassy do not agree, and I think it can better be dealt with solely by the Secretary of State, than by sending a written reply.

Sir J. Kidgpatrick

Roger Allen 1912
Throughout the summer and autumn I have tried loyally together with General Robertson to get the Egyptians to agree to a defence Agreement on the lines we require. But I think I must not tell you at this juncture of the increasingly serious doubts I feel about the probable outcome of this policy.

A. General Naguib and other members of the C.C. have constantly made it clear that their object is to get the British out altogether, not only from Egypt but from the whole Nile valley. In this they are merely following the constant trend of Egyptian nationalism since the end of the last century. They have made anti-British speeches in this sense, many of them very venomous, every few days on an average since I have been in Cairo. These speeches may be less objectionable than those of the qaitist Government, but that is not saying much.

For some time I tried to persuade myself that it was all talk, that Egyptian speeches and inspired newspaper articles did not mean much, and so on. But recent Egyptian actions are also very anti-British. They behave in a most unfriendly way to British subjects and British interests in Egypt. The Embassy has a major struggle to prevent this from being arrested and expelled or imprisoned without trial. Our commercial community feel that there is little justice for them. Egyptians who know members of our Embassy are often frightened off by the new Egyptian Intelligence organization, efficiently established with German help and run on Gestapo lines. It is the same in Egyptian foreign policy. The Egyptians have done their best to wreck our Libyan Treaty. They have deliberately procured United Nations action on behalf of Sudanese. Their performance in the Sudan has been intolerable. It seems to me that their object in making the Libyan Agreement with us can be seen in retrospect to have been not really to promote Libyan independence but to eliminate all British influence and to take the Sudan under their own wing. In short the central object of their policy is to get us out of the Middle East, and they do not trouble to conceal this in their speeches.

3. The question arises whether on this background we can trust the Egyptians to carry out a new defence Agreement. They make many smooth speeches to us about being on our side in another war, but their performance, when it comes to writing anything down, falls far short of what they say. They explain that their public will not allow them to undertake any new
Defence commitment towards us, or to have any joint defence
measures, either in the form of a M.E. defence organisation or
in any other form, even it would seem a suitable availability
clause. But meanwhile they have constantly preached hatred and
contempt of us to their own people and have fostered the very
internal political conditions which make it difficult or
impossible for them to be less unfriendly.

5. I have several times taxed them with this during the
summer. They reply "But when we sign an agreement everything will
be different". But if it is merely like it is in the Sudan, it
will not be different at all. I think that as General Robertson
said in his recent appreciation, the Egyptian Government do
want an agreement with us about the Suez Canal Zone. But I have
come to the conclusion that that is only because they see no
other way to get rid of us and that they probably have no other
object in concluding such an agreement.

6. In short, I no longer consider that we can feel
reasonably hopeful that Naguib and the CEC will apply a new
defence Agreement in a friendly way or that they will abide by
the spirit or the letter of it. I do not think the leopard can
change its spots so radically. There will no doubt be an initial
honeymoon period while we are encouraged and helped to remove
our troops. But after those 15 or 18 months we shall be reduced
to 4,000 technicians whose lives can easily be made a burden
to them, simply by the Egyptian failure to play their part to
the full. The new agreement, contrary to all previous agreements,
requires active and efficient Egyptian cooperation, providing
transport and labour at the correct time and place, working the
telephones, telecommunications, railways, ports, waterworks
and other public utilities, and above all guarding the base and
British personnel. In all these matters the Egyptians are
normally very inefficient unless working under European
supervision. Given a continuance of even a part of their present
hostility, either in Cairo or at administrative levels, and I
cannot imagine the treaty working at all. It seems to me that
it does not really make sense to conclude an agreement of this
sort with a government which shows no sign of a change of heart.
I have formed the very strong impression during my second
period of service in Egypt that if we are easy-going with the
Egyptians and overlook their misdoings, they merely despise us.
If after making the new defence agreement we are held in the
same utter contempt as we seem to have been since we made the
Sudan Agreement, no favourable outcome in the Canal Zone
can conceivably be hoped for. (I refer to the Sudan Agreement
here chronologically, not necessarily as a cause).
7. The large common defence interests on both sides ought to make a defence agreement easy to reach. Naguib, Nasser and Fawzy have all paid lip service to this aspect. But I regret to say that when it comes to the point the CRC do not seem to take a broad view of their real interests in defence questions. They show no interest in our cooperation with the Arab world for defence purposes. On the contrary they have done everything in their power to make it impossible. In the circumstances I foresee that the Egyptian Army may very well regard the base they are supposed to be guarding, mainly as a source of useful war material or private booty; and that once our forces are withdrawn and the initial honeymoon period is over, many Egyptians both in the CRC, in the Army and in the administration may be anxious to make the agreement a farce, so as to ensure that we do not regard its renewal as worth while. Naguib and his closer henchmen (if they remain in office) may or may not take this view — though as I have said above I now believe their main object is to get us out — but I feel sure many of their countrymen will and that any Egyptian Government will find it hard to oppose them even if it desires to. The fact that the base provides much employment for Egyptians will not seriously affect the issue then any more than it does now.

8. If the Egyptian Government does not play straight, I think the dangers of an agreement vastly outweigh the advantages. Indeed it will almost infallibly prove disastrous for our interests.

9. Once we are gone the Egyptians are very likely to start nibbling at the Suez Canal Company, winking out the foreign experts to get their jobs, demanding a larger share of the profits, etc. The canal is much more important to us than it was. Traffic has increased by leaps and bounds. United Kingdom traffic alone is now 35% of the whole and is over 50% larger than the whole international traffic in 1939. The huge increase is mainly in a vital strategic commodity, oil, which can otherwise only be obtained in the required quantities from dollar sources. The Egyptian Government have tried several times during the last six months to discriminate against our shipping both at Port Said and Suez. Once our forces are gone I foresee that the Egyptian Government will be sorely tempted to make difficulties for our traffic or over the entry and departure of supplies to and from the base on the ground that they may be used against an Arab country (e.g. at Buraimi) or in an "imperialist" way (e.g. against the Mau-mau). The projected agreement would appear to protect us legally against this sort of thing, but I doubt if it would in practice. To judge by my
experience in Cairo we must expect the Egyptian Government to be difficult and obstinate in all such questions. A nationalist agitation against the Canal has already begun and has been discreetly damped without overt discouragement.

9. To sum up the preceding paragraphs, once the Egyptian Government think they have got us out after the conclusion of the projected Defence Agreement, I really doubt if there will be any holding them from venting their very ill-conceived nationalist ideas on our interests. I certainly feel there is little foundation for any optimistic belief that they will not do so. We are unlikely to get the agreement renewed, and it may well be turned into a farce before its expiry. I believe the effect of such a development on our position in the other Arab countries and on our whole position in the Mediterranean, in the Persian Gulf and in the Indian Ocean would be incalculable. I feel convinced that it would far surpass the effect of Abadan or Palestine.

10. It is a fundamental disadvantage of the projected agreement that we have to exchange performance on our side (withdrawal of forces) against promises of goodwill and cooperation on the Egyptian side. It would seem only reasonable that the Egyptian Government should do something serious to earn our confidence before we place ourselves in their power by concluding the new agreement. At the very least I suggest that they should cease their policy of spreading hatred and contempt of us, discontinue the arrests and expulsions of British Subjects, stop persecuting our employees and friends both in Cairo and the Canal Zone, and drop the pressure and discrimination against our material interests in Egypt. More particularly the local authorities in the Zone should cooperate with our authorities there instead of conniving at daily armed thefts and robberies and periodical murders. I have already suggested as an absolute minimum that we should insist on this as part of the agreement on principles; and if we are not completely satisfied I do not think we should conclude or ratify the treaty. Even if we do this we shall be taking a colossal risk.

11. The dangers of our being betrayed after the withdrawal of our forces would be less if we could find any sure means of ensuring respect for the treaty. I am told it would be very awkward to reoccupy the Canal Zone by force once we had left. An appeal to UNO would certainly prove useless. I hoped at one time that American and British economic help might be cut and that this might prove effective. It is probably the best bet but I wonder if we are justified in setting much store
by this. The Egyptians are so very anti-western and anti-
capitalist that I think any Government would expect to acquire political credit by publishing its rejection of any such threat. I am afraid the conclusion is that if we make the new Defence Agreement we have to take the Egyptians largely on trust. But I do not think we can now place any trust in them.

12. If we cannot reach a satisfactory agreement or if the Egyptian behaviour convinces you as it is convincing me, that the risk of an agreement being disregarded is so large as to be unreasonable, then I would urge strongly that we should find other means of maintaining our position in the Canal Zone. This would be expensive, but not half so costly as to be manoeuvred out of our position in the Canal Zone with incalculable damage to our position in the rest of the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.

13. I feel that it would be beyond the proper scope of this letter to suggest in any detail how we should maintain our position in the absence of a defence agreement. But in order to avoid the charge of birking the most difficult issue, I might perhaps be allowed to add the following.

14. We can legally stay in the Canal Zone under the 1936 treaty until at least December 1956; but to rely only on that would be an unattractively negative policy. In any case we should, I feel sure, sooner or later have to defend ourselves, with results which we have often tried to foresee. It seems to me however that we really ought to be able to muster some international and especially NATO support for a policy of ensuring the availability of base and defence facilities in the Canal Zone. The U.S. policy of securing bases and facilities all over the Mediterranean (Morocco, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Libya, even Malta) and in the Persian Gulf is very striking. We cannot say that bases overseas are unnecessary or out of fashion. Both Greek and Turkish representatives in Cairo show anxiety about our position in the Canal Zone, which is certainly the most important strategic point of the lot and (to state it no higher) is vital for NATO's position in the Eastern Mediterranean.

15. One way of proceeding on this sort of background might be to issue a declaration either unilaterally or in association with any other Powers who were willing to be associated with us, to the effect that we have gone to the furthest possible limits of friendly conciliation with the Egyptians; that our minimum offers have been rejected and we have been treated with little but unfriendly contempt and hostility; that we should still prefer a policy of friendly cooperation based on our real community
of interests with Egypt and other NE countries; but that in the circumstances we can no longer ignore our vital interests in the Suez Canal Zone, which is the nerve centre of the whole NE area. We therefore intend to continue to station such forces and installations there as may be necessary to protect the interests of the British Commonwealth and of the NATO powers, and to add to them or diminish them as may from time to time seem necessary. And if the state of local law and order declines to such a condition as to endanger the security of our troops or the efficiency or free transit of the Suez Canal, we shall take and exercise such local administrative powers as may be necessary to restore the situation, on the rough analogy of the Panama Canal Zone.

16. Under a policy of this sort we might have to administer all or part of the Canal Zone. Much local labour might go away, but at least we could prevent those workers who remain being intimidated or arrested and put on trial on flimsy charges. We might have to bring in Maltese and Cypriots to replace some of the local population. We might find it paid to remove some of our installations, but our military authorities may want to do that anyway, and we should at least keep them under our own control. There might be difficulty about water. We might for a time have to intervene in the Delta and to evacuate British Subjects from Egypt, but unless there is a big change I foresee that we shall find that many of our interests have been eliminated by hostile administrative pressure in coming years. The Americans and other Powers would have to finance Egypt and preserve it from Communism. In doing this they might be able to moderate some of Egypt’s hostility towards us. Some part of our present predicament is due to the U.S. Embassy’s attitude, so the punishment would fit the crime.

17. We could not of course expect a quiet life in the Canal Zone. This letter is based on the growing conviction that we can expect little but serious trouble in Egypt whatever happens. But if trouble came in the Canal Zone we should have the means to cope with it and our attitude would command respect, however much the nationalists denounced it. Many of our present difficulties are due to the fact that we exercise no local administrative powers in the Canal Zone and cannot influence effectively either the local or the central government authorities. Consequently we are obliged to pursue the undignified policy of the football. It would be futile to pretend that it does not matter. But perhaps if the Egyptians found us firm, strong and well established they might eventually make a less chancy agreement.
with us.

19. Of course, a satisfactory Defence Agreement with Egypt, providing real cooperation in defence matters, would be incomparably better than any such policy as I have outlined, which is by comparison a very poor second best. But unless the Egyptian leopard changes his spots, I do not think we can now hope for cooperation or indeed anything but veiled hostility ending in our own total elimination either at the end of the new agreement after only seven years, or possibly even before that. But that would be such a very costly disaster that it would, I believe, far outweigh the cost of staying in the Canal Zone without Egyptian consent.

19. I apologise for the length of this letter, but I feel that before I cease my second period of service in Egypt, I must in all conscience reveal to you the very grave doubts I now feel about the probable outcome of our present policy in the light of the Egyptian Government's behaviour.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

R.M. Hawley.
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM BERMUDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(United Kingdom Delegation)

Cypher/OTP

Secretary of State
No.173
December 10, 1953.

D.7.28 p.m. December 10, 1953.

R.12. 5 a.m. December 11, 1953.

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Washington telegram No.57 of December 10
Repeated for information to Foreign Office.

Your telegrams Nos.2697 and 2698 to Foreign Office

This is a one-sided account of a private conversation
in a private house during which I also paid a warm tribute
to the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles. It was an attempt
to meet Sulsberger's suggestion that Egyptian affairs were
the "sore thumb" in our relations. Mrs. McCormick was
present.

2. I fear this is a piece of sharp journalism and
I agree with the action you are taking.

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African Department

BBB
SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

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No. 5217
December 11, 1953 B. 4.12 p.m. December 11, 1953 IMMEDIATE SECRET


Our view of Byroade's proposal is that, as the Secretary of State told Byroade, this formula would not get us automatic reactivation. Unless the application of United Nations Charter and the Uniting for Peace Resolution of the General Assembly to the use of the Canal Zone base were specified, the Egyptians might well deny that there was any application at all. Moreover, we feel that if we were to confront the Egyptians with such a formula at present, they might well treat it as a device to secure our ends by ambiguous drafting; and that would get us no further than before.

FFF
11th December, 1953.

Dear Boothby,

EGYPT

You will recall that at their meeting on 10th December 1953 the Chiefs of Staff discussed the formula for the availability of the Canal Zone Base proposed by Mr. Byroade of the United States and by H.M. Embassy in Cairo.

I attach for your information a copy of the relevant minute and would draw your attention to the conclusions thereof.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

*Secretary,

Chief of Staff Committee

E. R. Boothby Esq.,
Foreign Office.

Ref. COS(53)141st Meeting Minute 4.
THL COMMITTEE had before them three telegrams covering proposals for a formula regarding the availability of the Canal Zone Base for discussion with the Egyptians.

M.R. BOOTHEY (Foreign Office) said that the formula proposed by the United States was entirely inadequate. The proposal from H.M. Embassy in Cairo however would shortly be submitted to Ministers with a strong recommendation that it be put to the Egyptians.

In discussion the COMMITTEE agreed that:

(a) From the military point of view the United States formula did not cover our requirements.

(b) If the Foreign Office so required, the military views on the Cairo formula would be considered at their meeting on Thursday, 17th December.

THE COMMITTEE:

(1) Invited the Foreign Office to take note of their views as agreed in discussion.

(2) Invited the Foreign Office to inform the Secretary if they required the views of the Chiefs of Staff on the Cairo formula.

- 6 -
Dear Tenison,

I am replying in Skilling's absence to your letter to him reference J.E. 1192/318, dated 17th August, 1953, about the work done by the Egyptians in accordance with their obligations under paragraph 6 of the Annex to Article 3 of the Treaty of 1936.

The roads listed in paragraph 6(a) were constructed by the Roads and Bridges Department of the Egyptian Ministry of Communications. Until the unilateral abrogation of the Treaty in 1951 these roads were maintained by that Department. Some assistance in road maintenance was provided by the War Department during the war but the major work in this direction was on roads additional to those specified and the War Department expenditure in this respect is now the subject of claims against the Egyptian Government. In 1952 the War Department repaired certain portions of the Port Said - Ismailia - Suez road at a cost of £17,000.

As regards railway facilities (paragraph 6(b)) the direct line between Zagazig and Tanta was not doubled since it was agreed in 1940 that the construction of a loopline bypassing Alexandria (running from Abd el Kader to Kafr el Dawar) should be substituted for the doubling of the Zagazig-Tanta line. Work on

E. H. Tenison Esq.,
Foreign Office,
LONDON,
S.W.1.
this loopline certainly started, and presumably it was completed. The Cairo Embassy would probably be able to confirm this. The work on the Alexandria - Marsa Matruh line was completed before the date of the outbreak of the last war. It is not easy to determine what was done under sub-paragraph (i). Details of the work required to be done are given in the enclosure to the first of the notes exchanged in Egypt on the Treaty. That at Monosor was carried out by the Egyptians. At Geneifa the work at the entrainment station, ((a) of the Note) appears to have been done by the Egyptians but most of the work in the Depot area was done by the War Department. The Treaty had been in existence only three years when the war broke out and during the war the Depot area at Geneifa underwent a considerable change so it is quite likely that its railway lines are now entirely different from those envisaged at the time the Treaty was signed. It is possible that some of the lines required under the Treaty were laid by the Egyptian State Railways but were later pulled up and re-laid by the War Department to fit the requirements of the enlarged Depot area.

With regard to the other roads mentioned in the Annex to Article 8, the Egyptians bought the Marsa Matruh line to the required standard. The roads specified in paras 7(ii) and (iii) were not built, since we built ourselves during the war in substitution a road from Qena to Fort Safaga. It was the
intention that the Egyptian Government should in due course pay the cost of construction of this road, but I have not traced whether any payment was actually made. We have in the War Office no information as to what work was actually done on the Nile Valley road from Cairo to Qus, though if you wished we could make enquiries of our people in Egypt.

Yours sincerely,

R. Somers
December 8, 1953

Dear Dorman,

Thank you for your letter 118/Egypt/404 (J.P. Abd and Gen) of December 1 about Egypt’s obligations under paragraph 6 of the annexed to article 8 of the 1936 Treaty. It will be most useful to have this information on file.

With regard to your last paragraph, you may think it worth pursuing the question of the Suez - Port Said and Cairo - Alexandria roads a little further, in case there is any basis for a claim against the Egyptian Government on this account. We are, of course, anxious to assemble as many potential claims against the Egyptians as we can before possibly offering to negotiate a settlement of outstanding claims on both sides as part of an eventual agreement on defence.

(Sgd) (R.H. Tenison)

R.B. Dorman Esq.,
War Office.
Parliamentary Question

Major Sir Guy Lloyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether he will give an assurance that the terms of any agreement between Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government over the Suez Canal Zone will be debated in this House before ratification.

This question has been raised in Parliament on several occasions. The last occasion was in a supplementary by Mr. Julian Amery on October 26. The Secretary of State replied that the normal constitutional procedure would be followed.

2. The general question of constitutional procedure concerning the ratification of treaties was discussed in the House of Lords on March 11. Lord Swinton made it clear that unless domestic legislation is required (in which case that legislation would in any case have to be laid before Parliament) it must rest with the government of the day to decide whether or not the treaty concerned should be reserved for the approval of Parliament before it comes into effect. It follows from this that Her Majesty's Government would in fact be following constitutional procedure whichever course they decided to adopt.

3. Nevertheless it seems unlikely that Her Majesty's Government would wish to, or indeed feel able to, avoid presenting any defence agreement we may reach with the Egyptians to Parliament before it comes into force. From the domestic point of view, there would seem to be no harm, and every advantage, in saying so now. Nor would it make things more difficult in Cairo to do so. On the contrary, it would be a contributing factor in making the Egyptian Government aware of the strong parliamentary feeling in this country concerning the proposed agreement.

A draft reply is submitted accordingly.

(R.C. Mackworth-Young)
November 30, 1953.
be followed.

Mr. Killick

Roger Allen 2011
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND

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Mr. Creswell
No: 1658

D: 16.26 p.m. December 1, 1953.

R: 11.30 p.m. December 1, 1953.

December 1, 1953.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 1658 of

December 1

Repeated for information Saving to: Paris.
Washington.
B.M.E.O.

At a Press Conference on November 30th, General Neguib stated that it might be inferred that a resumption of the Anglo-Egyptian talks could be expected shortly as Egypt was anxious to settle the problem. This however, would depend upon the attitude of the British. Egypt had done everything possible to meet the British viewpoint, and it was now for them to decide whether or not they wished to close the gap. Any agreement would have to be based on mutual confidence.

2. Failure to reach agreement would only harm Britain. She was, for instance, already losing her commercial position in Egypt, and it would be difficult for her to regain it. Friendly relations would be better than a signed agreement which lacked reciprocal confidence.

Foreign Office please pass Paris and Washington as my telegrams Nos: 517 and 411 Saving respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Paris and Washington]

JJJJJ
Mr. Cresswell

No. 1668
December 3, 1953

To: Mr. Cresswell

No. 1668
December 3, 1953

My immediately preceding telegram.

At the end of my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs today, I mentioned that Her Majesty's Ambassador would be returning on December 17, and I repeated my previous suggestion that meanwhile we should try and make further progress over the resumption of talks. (See my Despatch No. 256 paragraph 9).

2. Fawzi said that he thought it most important to make some progress over availability. Though he did not feel he could put forward any specific formula, he felt that it would be of advantage if we could direct our minds to the possibility of some phrase which would specify that the base would be available in the event of an actual outbreak of a global war. (He did not like the phrase "major" war). He would not accept anything mentioning danger of war since he considered that a danger of war could be said to exist at almost any time. He also felt that it would be necessary to mention that the true judges of whether the case had arisen or not, should be Her Majesty's Government and the Egypt Government and not so remote a body as the United Nations. But if we could together evolve a phrase which would mention events which, in the opinion of the two Governments, amounted to an outbreak of global war he thought we might overcome our difficulties.

3. I have reason to believe that advice to this effect may have been given to Neguib by the Governor General of Pakistan when he visited Cairo on December 1, in the course of his journey back to Karachi. It would probably be better to avoid any possibility of his intervention becoming known.

Foreign Office pass Washington, Paris and Ankara as my telegrams Nos. 361, 57 and 107 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Paris and Ankara]

Private Secretary
Head of African Department

Head of News Department.
From Cairo to Foreign Office

Cypher/TP. ...

Mr. Creswell
No: 1672
December 3, 1953.

PRIORITY
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 1672 of December 3
Repeated for information to: B.M.E.O. Washington

My telegram No: 1668.

Fawzi sent for me again this evening and went a little further on availability.

2. With every possible reserve about this being a purely personal and exploratory attempt at informal thinking and not in any sense a formal or governmental proposal, he proceeded to suggest some such formula as the following:

   "(c) In case of an outbreak of hostilities which are considered by both Governments as the beginning of a global war and as necessitating re-access to the base by British forces."

3. I pointed out that the second half of this formula was redundant since the whole purpose of the availability clause was to define the circumstances necessitating reactivation.

4. Fawzi repeated that the Egyptian Government's formal attitude remained as it was on October 21 and I said that the same was true of Her Majesty's Government.

5. He said that our United Nations formula had led us into difficulties by being too wide and thus covering, in theory at least, a number of possible cases which were not in our minds at all. He was anxious to avoid any similar danger in discussions on the basis of this new approach to the problem.

6. I should like to be able to make some positive response to this gesture in order to make possible some informal talks immediately General Benson arrives.

Foreign Office pass Washington, Paris and Ankara as my telegrams Nos: 382, 58 and 1908 respectively.

[Repealed to Washington, Paris and Ankara]

J.JJJJJ
SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITFORD DISTRIBUTION

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December 5, 1953.

PRIORITY

SECRET

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 2226 of

December 5.

Repeated for information to E.H.E.O. Washington Paris Ankara

Your telegrams Nos. 1668 and 1672 [of December 3: Defence Negotiations].

We cannot let you have any comments at present.

LIL.
I called on the Egyptian Ambassador this morning and impressed on him that I must not be expected to return to Egypt with any magic formula for the solution of our difficulties. I concurred with his view that we had come fairly near an agreement, but insisted on the fact that the Egyptian people did not have a monopoly of feeling in the matter, and that any agreement must appear to be acceptable to the people of this country.

2. I asked him to let the Egyptian Foreign Minister know that there were two things causing me some concern. The first was the hardening of opinion in this country, and the second was the unco-operative attitude of the Egyptian administrative authorities, particularly the police, in the Canal Zone. The Egyptian Ambassador put forward the time-honoured excuse that this misbehaviour by the Egyptian inhabitants of the Canal Zone was seasonal. I accepted that up to a point, but insisted that this made co-operation by the Egyptian police authorities in the maintenance of order more necessary than ever. Continued incidents and pin-pricks directed against British subjects in Egypt only served to poison the atmosphere in this country. I very much hoped that by the time I reached Egypt an improvement in this sphere would be manifest. Otherwise, I felt rather gloomy about our chances of reaching an agreement.

3. The Egyptian Ambassador promised to report our conversation to the Foreign Minister.

December 4, 1953

[Signature]

J. A. Kilkpatrick
ANGLO-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS

Cairo telegrams Nos. 1668 and 1672 of December 5

Mr. Creswell says that he would like to make some positive response to the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs about availability in order to make possible some informal talks immediately General Benson arrives.

Monsieur Fawzi has very informally suggested a new formula on the following lines:

"In case of an outbreak of hostilities which are considered by both governments as the beginning of a global war and as necessitating reaccess to the base by British forces."

2. This formula implies that we should consult the Egyptian Government as to whether conditions justify reactivating the base, a concession which we have no authority from the Cabinet to make. It is useful that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has shown a disposition to keep the matter open, but there is nothing that can usefully be done until Ministers have returned from Bermuda. This means that there is little point in further discussions with the Egyptians until Sir Ralph Stevenson gets back to Cairo.

3. Draft telegram to Cairo is submitted.

December 5, 1953

I think we need only tell Mr. Creswell that we can't commit at present.
Statement on Cairo Negotiations

This question has been raised in Parliament on the following occasions:

October 20: Statement by the Secretary of State.

October 26: Questions by Sir T. Moore, Mr. Woodrow Wyatt.

November 5: Mentioned by the Secretary of State during debate on address.

2. On the last occasion the Secretary of State explained that negotiations were in a state of "suspended animation". We had made our position plain and our offers were open. We were content to wait.

3. This is still the situation. In point of fact neither side wants to resume talks until the Suez elections are over. Meanwhile General Robertson's return has been announced. The terms of the communique carry the implication that further progress in the talks is unlikely before Sir Ralph Stevenson goes back to Cairo in the middle of next month.

4. The Secretary of State might therefore say, in reply to these two questions, that he has nothing to add to his statement of November 5.

5. One of the questioners, Mr. Woodrow Wyatt, recently sent Mr. Nutting a copy of a letter he had received from Mr. Pannikar, the Indian Ambassador in Cairo. Mr. Pannikar expressed concern that the talks were virtually in abeyance, suggested that the position could not be held much longer, and implied that it was up to Her Majesty's Government to make some new move.

6. In reply, Mr. Nutting drew Mr. Wyatt's attention to the views expressed by Mr. Pannikar to Her Majesty's Minister in Cairo two days before the date of the letter in question. On this occasion Mr. Pannikar had recommended that we should stand pat. Mr. Wyatt could draw his own conclusions from this as to the value to be attached to Mr. Pannikar's advice.

(R. G. Mackworth Young)
November 27, 1953.
Mr. Wyatt asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will make a further statement on the Suez Canal negotiations with the Egyptian Government.

Mr. Eden: I have nothing at present to add to what I said on this subject in the course of the debate on the Address, except to say that, as the House will already be aware, Sir Ralph Stevenson, Her Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo, will shortly be returning to Cairo. General Sir Brian Robertson has now returned to this country to take up his duties as Chairman of the Transport Commission. I should like to take this opportunity of expressing the gratitude of Her Majesty's Government to General Robertson and of paying him a personal tribute for the part he has played in these negotiations.

Mr. Wyatt: Is it not the case that these negotiations are now being held up on two very narrow points, first, what clothes the technicians who are to remain behind in the Canal Zone shall wear, and, second, what conditions would precede availability of the base to us again in the event of war? Are we not missing a great opportunity to sign the agreement with the Egyptians while General Neguib can still hold the nationalist element under control, merely because the Foreign Secretary has become afraid of 25 Tory back benchers?

Mr. Eden: The hon. Gentleman can, of course, use his imagination as to the reasons for the attitude of Her Majesty's Government. However, the issues upon which we are at present divided will, I trust, be resolved. I cannot for a moment admit that one of them in particular is other than of major importance.

Mr. Speaker rose——

Captain Waterhouse: On a point of order. This is an extremely important subject, Mr. Speaker. Might not one supplementary question be allowed from this side of the House?

Mr. Speaker: I am afraid not now. These are all very important subjects.
You will remember that we discussed briefly the Articles on status and immunities of personnel included in the draft Agreement which we sent to the Foreign Office. You suggested that instead of negotiating the whole of the ten pages of draft dealing with these matters we might do better to take the N.A.T.O. Agreement on status as a basis and negotiate improvements of it.

2. I have now considered the work which Dove has put in on this suggestion. I understand that with a view to your discussion in London you have taken with you copies of his analysis of the difference between N.A.T.O. status and the Libyan Agreement and of his first drafts of paragraphs which would be needed to bring N.A.T.O. status up to the level of our requirements. I think that this is admirable work, but now that I see how many exceptions to N.A.T.O. status we want, I am very doubtful whether this is in fact the best way of proceeding.

3. In the first place there is the fundamental disadvantage of producing as a basis for discussion something which gives the Egyptians considerably more favourable terms than we intend to give them and then proceeding to negotiate further derogations from Egyptian sovereignty. This may be just the way to put into their heads ideas which might not otherwise be there, and some of the ideas, notably the reference in Article VII of the N.A.T.O. Agreement to treason and espionage against the receiving state, are particularly undesirable. Secondly, there is the disadvantage that should any question of interpretation arise reference would have to be made both to our agreement and to the N.A.T.O. Agreement. This would, I am sure, be a frequent source of friction and genuine misunderstanding, particularly at subordinate levels. From the point of view of all concerned with implementation, there is an obvious advantage in having all provisions dealing with status and immunities set out in a single self-contained document.

4. We have had preliminary comments from Fayid on the long draft on status which we sent to the Foreign Office, and it seems that they have no more than drafting amendments to propose. We can very easily meet their points. Dove and Stewart have also been working on this draft to shorten it and have succeeded in cutting it by about 20%. It is still long but I now doubt whether it would be any harder to negotiate than a draft based on N.A.T.O. status, with, as it turns out, a substantial number of amendments.

General Sir Brian Robertson, Bt., CB, CBE, KCMG, etc.,

To Foreign Office,
Minutes.

DRAFT AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT

This was discussed briefly with General Robertson today. We agreed that we must be prepared to give our negotiators in Cairo instructions at short notice on the text of any agreement. I understand that the Powell Committee will be able to produce views at short notice, but I think this should be confirmed. In any case I see no reason why we should not give the Delegation some views on the general clauses of the draft produced by Cairo in the near future without waiting until we have produced a final view on the jurisdictional clauses.

2. As regards the latter, I told General Robertson that I thought we must await the shortened form of the draft Convention on Status which Mr. Hankey's letter of September 14 states (in paragraph 4) that Brigadier Dove and Mr. Stewart are working on. I also said that we were inclined to agree with Mr. Hankey that it would be both too difficult and bad tactics to base ourselves on the "NATO Agreement with exceptions", and that we should try to work out a new draft ad hoc, based in fact largely on the Libyan Treaty. I thought that there would be little hope of our being able to use the 1936 Immunities Convention and work down from that, though General Robertson agreed that this Convention would in fact have to be applied so long as we retained troops in Egypt, i.e. until the beginning of the régime of the technocrats.

3. In view of the time factor, I wonder whether it would not be worth writing to Cairo and asking them if they can hurry up and send us the shortened version on which they are working, since it will obviously mean a duplication of effort if we prepare comments on the longer version enclosed in Mr. Hankey's letter of September 3 to me.

4. Will the Department please keep me informed generally of the position regarding these drafts, because the Delegation may want to be in a position to discuss a text with the Egyptians without delay once we get down to the drafting of an agreement?

(R. Allen)

September 18, 1953.
The Department asked me if you were thinking of making a note of your last conversation with Mr. Seoud. I said I doubted whether you thought the ideas you exchanged had been conclusive enough to be worth writing down. In the meantime I am again beginning to wonder whether there is any possible hope in the notion of a joint affirmation of duty to the U.N. Last time we mentioned this you pointed out the difficulties for us that might be involved in a war confined to Israel and the Arab States alone, but Ministers might well think the risk worth taking and put their hopes, as we have already unofficially encouraged the Egyptians to do in the major instance, on preventing the U.N. from concocting unwelcome orders. The joint affirmation (i.e. something beginning "Both parties recognize their obligations as signatories of the Charter to take measures to comply" etc.) would have the advantage of clearly showing that Egypt is not strictly undertaking anything new, while explaining to the British public how the Base would be automatically reactivated in a major war. We should thus be able to say, in pressing it on the Egyptians,

(a) (as Robertson has said already) that this is an opportunity for the consultation you require all along the line, i.e. both openly and privately at the U.N., to say nothing of the diplomatic channel, and at each stage of the complicated procedural and substantive process which would be necessary before any "instructions" emerged;

(b) that we cannot see how there could be any possible objection to the two parties saying in chorus that they are loyal members of the U.N. For if the U.N. did make a pronouncement about the Base we should either have to make a show of obeying or not obeying, but whether or not we affirmed anything in the text of the Treaty (and we could scarcely affirm disobedience) it would have no possible effect on what the U.N. might do or require when the situation arose.

E. B. Boothby
Nov. 20, 1953

I think you might have a word with
Minutes.

Into the Legal Adviser - UN (P7) Dept.

Fundamentally, however, we are asking for you to do something new: i.e., lend yourselves in advance to comply with a resolution of the General Assembly.

At present there is no obligation on either of us to comply with such a resolution: we do not want to commit ourselves in general terms so as comply, I imagine. What we want is to commit the Secretary in a particular case.

At a more specific point. The case is subject, when the case arises, I think, the U.N. should be bound to give great weight to such an objection: this

is in fact a method of "consultation" as I have pointed out (5 Nov).

N.R. 21/11.
November 25th, 1953.

Anthony Nutting, Esq., M.P.
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
London, S.W. 1.

Dearest Anthony,

I enclose a copy of a letter I have received from my constituent, Mr. Gordon Dale, of 140, High Street, Guildford.

I shall be most grateful for a suitable reply.

Yours ever,

G. R. Nugent

Encl.
Thank you for your letter of November 25 enclosing a copy of a letter from your constituent, Mr. Gordon Dale. I am pleased to learn that you agree that the view that it is not always realised is correct. The removal of a large number of troops from Egypt, which is not what we want, is not always the best means of keeping a large army in the Middle East in peace time if there is any other way in which we can maintain the base and use the installations and equipment in the Canal zone on a basis which best accords with our vital interests but should not only serve our Egyptian and Arab League cooperation and defence of the Middle East.

As you know, we propose to maintain the base there and to use it as a means of keeping a very large number of troops who serve little constructive purpose and are an enormous drag on our manpower and economy. A basis which best accords with Egypt's interests with Egypt should not only serve our agreement with Egypt but should entail a very large number of troops who serve little constructive purpose and are an enormous drag on our manpower and economy.
Thank you for your letter of November 25, enclosing a copy of a letter from your constituent, Mr. Gordon Dale.

I suggest that you might reply on the following lines. Our aim must be to ensure adequate defensive arrangements in the Middle East while at the same time making the best and most economical use of our manpower and resources.

This is the purpose underlying our present negotiations with the Egyptian Government and until the outcome of these negotiations is known it is certainly premature for your constituent to comment as he does. I must in particular emphatically reject his suggestion that our attitude is in any way governed by the need "not to upset the Americans".

(My) ANTHONY NUTTING

(Parliamentary Under-Secretary)

G.R.H. Nugent Esq., J.P., M.P.

House of Commons.
Ref. J2 1192/626

Anthony Nutting, Esq., M.P.
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
London, S. W. 1.

Dear Tony,

Thank you for your letter of December 3rd., under the above reference.

I doubt whether this reply will be much comfort to my constituent.

Yours etc.,

G. R. H. Nugent.
General Sir B. Robertson has written to you below for advice as to whether he should agree to speak about Egypt at a House of Commons dinner in February to which he has been invited by Mr. Geoffrey Stevens, M.P.

2. Although General Robertson, as he says, does not know, and we do not know, what the treaty situation will be like in February, it would I think be excessively cautious to discourage him on principle from speaking as his host proposes. We have always regarded General Robertson as an exceptionally gifted exponent of Her Majesty's Government's policy regarding the Canal Zone, and few people know as much as he does about the details of its application.

3. It might well be, therefore, that we should positively welcome a statement by him to M.P.'s but we should have to see it first. I recommend, therefore, that we give contingent approval to the proposal. If you agree, we should perhaps ask Mr. Nutting to look at our reply in draft.

November 26, 1953

I agree. Anything Gen. Robertson says is likely to be helpful, and it will be permissible a private occasion, so he cannot well object to his speaking.

I think we should approve in principle, so offer to look at his speech a while before he likes.

Dr. draft 26/11.
Many thanks for your letter of November 25 about the invitation to speak on Egypt at a House of Commons dinner in February.

I agree with you that by February the situation in Egypt will have changed considerably. Nevertheless I am sure that anything which you would wish to say to Members of Parliament at an informal meeting such as this would be helpful. The more they become familiar with the real issues involved the better from our point of view.

I take it that it will be a private occasion. In that case the Egyptians could not very well object to your speaking, though they might if it were in public.

If you like, we should be very pleased to see your notes nearer the time and bring you up to date on anything which has happened since you left us.

P.S. to Mr. Nutting first.

Mr. Allen.
I received an invitation a short while ago from Mr. Geoffrey Stevens, M.P. to attend a dinner in the House of Commons in February and to speak on Transport.

I declined this invitation on the grounds that I did not wish to speak about Transport so soon after taking over this appointment. Mr. Stevens has now returned to the charge, asking me to attend their dinner and speak on the subject of Egypt.

It is, of course, very likely that by February matters in Egypt will have changed considerably from the state in which I left them. Leaving that consideration on one side, I should be glad if you would advise me whether, in your opinion, it is advisable for me to accept this invitation and to speak as suggested.

Roger Allen, Esq., C.M.G.
Dear Killick,

I attach a letter which Dr. Hill has had from a constituent about the proposed withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone.

I would be grateful if you could let me have a reply for Dr. Hill to send to his constituent.

Yours sincerely,

E. Pendlebury
(Private Secretary)

J. E. Killick, Esq.,
Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.
23, Woodbury Hill,
Luton,
Beds.

Dr. Charles Hill.

25th Nov/53

Dear Sir,

May I write to ask your opinion of the suggested withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone and whether you are in favour of it, or not.

My friends and I are very disturbed over this as we think the Government are weakening. In our opinion, this would be the stupidest thing we could possibly do, as we should have lost our position, which is absolutely vital to us, in the Middle East.

I know the Canal well, having served in Gallipoli and Palestine in the first world war, and spending four years in the vicinity of that strip of desert. We evacuated Egypt proper, and are now only on the fringe.

The Egyptians would not defend the Canal as they are not fighters and never will be. General Neguib is not the wonderful man that Mr. Shinwell seems to think he is. He and his clique are not likely to keep their word in any undertaking. Look at the Sudan elections. Major Salem and his cronies have seen what can be done by others.

The Labour Government, after stating that they would not leave Abadan or abandon the oilmen, very weakly gave in to that lacrymose crook, Mossadek.

This was a definite invitation to the Egyptians and they took immediate advantage of it.

That was a fine article about the Canal Zone in the press recently, written by Mr. Amery, M.P., and I agree with every word.

As a patriotic man I resented the statement made to me quite often by people I discuss general affairs with, that Britain is going downhill, but lately with one thing after another, I find myself wondering if I am wrong and they are right.

Trusting you are in the best of health and hoping to hear from you.

I remain,

Yours sincerely,

(signed)

A.P. Brown.
December 3, 1953

To: Pendlebury

Thank you for your letter of November 27, enclosing a letter to Doctor Hill from his constituent Mr. A.J. Brown, which I return herewith.

Our aim must be to ensure adequate defence arrangements in the Middle East while at the same time making the best and most economical use of our manpower and resources. This is the purpose underlying our present negotiations with the Egyptian Government, and until the outcome of these negotiations is known it is certainly premature for Doctor Hill's correspondent to comment as he does.

Yours Sincerely,

(Sgd) J. E. KILLICK

(J.E. Killick)

Ministry of Food.
The Israeli Ambassador called this morning to leave the attached Note about Israel's interest in Anglo-Egyptian defence negotiations. In presenting the Note the Ambassador said that his Government had been much encouraged by the answer which they had received on this subject when the Prime Minister was Acting Foreign Secretary last summer. This answer had led them to assume that once our talks with Egypt reached a decisive stage, they would be given more precise assurances than had been forthcoming in the Foreign Office Note, to which they were now replying.

I told Mr. Elath that Her Majesty's Government would study this further Note carefully. It seemed that the Israeli Government's main concern and anxiety was the effect of an Anglo-Egyptian defence arrangement upon the equilibrium of forces in the Middle East. The Ambassador would realise that the agreement we were negotiating was to revise the 1936 Treaty, and there was a limit to the range and number of matters which could be included in such a negotiation. Naturally, we had borne and would continue to bear in mind Israel's interest. But I should have thought that his Government would be reassured by the reaffirmation we had given that H.M.G. would uphold the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.

The Ambassador had three comments to make on this. First, he said that Israel considered it important to write into the Egyptian agreement an undertaking that the base and installations and any arms which Egypt might receive, should not be used against her neighbours. This was necessary because any "significant departure from the status quo", by which he meant the strengthening of Egypt's military position, would add to the risks of an attack upon Israel, and would make our commitment under the Tripartite Declaration a much more risky affair. Second, Israel wanted to be assured that she not only would be able to buy more arms from us in order to hold her own, but would be able to get good terms for their purchase. I would notice in Paragraph 5 of the Note there appeared the words "facilities... to acquire further arms". And finally, Israel would like us to get some guarantee in the Egyptian agreement regarding freedom of transit through the Canal. Britain might ask why should she be expected to deal with this question independently when it was an international question affecting many maritime powers, but we must realise that Britain's departure from her present position in the Canal Zone would have a considerable psychological effect upon Egypt. Israel was not unnaturally asking, if Egypt blockades us when on the Canal, what will she do when they have gone?
I told the Ambassador we would take these comments into account in studying his Note. On the first question I could really add little to what I had said about the Tripartite Declaration. On the second, without any commitment, I could say that we could certainly give sympathetic consideration to this request. As the Ambassador knew, we had already behaved generously in regard to agreed terms for aeroplanes. On the third question I said the Suez Canal was very much in our minds. I should however point out that our position in the Canal Zone at the moment had no effect upon the control of traffic through the Canal. Egypt was in full control of the terminal ports. Therefore, the conclusion of an agreement about the defence of the area should have no particular effect upon the question of free transit. In any case, this was a matter, which like other questions of balance of forces in the Middle East as a whole, could hardly be dealt with fully in the context of the present negotiations, and there was also the consideration that we should not wish to prejudice discussions which might take place in future on freedom of transit by giving the Egyptians the opportunity to say that they had already given all the necessary undertakings in the defence agreement.

The Ambassador concluded by thanking me for being so frank and for taking him into my confidence on these matters.

Anthony Nutting

27th November, 1953.

COPIES:
Private Secretary
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Lord Reading
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Mr. Dodds-Parker
Mr. R. Allen
African Department
The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his communication No. JE 1192/580 of 30 October 1953, regarding the negotiations at present in progress between the United Kingdom and Egypt, with special reference to the interests of Israel therein involved. On instructions from his Government, the Ambassador of Israel desires to make the following observations on the Secretary of State's communication:

1. The Government of Israel appreciates the expression of Her Majesty's Government's understanding of Israel's concern for the impact of the anticipated agreement between the United Kingdom and Egypt upon Israel's security position. The Government of Israel also values the assurances, reiterated in the Secretary of State's Note, that the considerations which it has raised will be borne in mind, and notes that Her Majesty's Government are determined to abide by the terms, and to secure the fulfilment, of the Tripartite Declaration of 25 May 1950, relative to the security of the Middle East and the maintenance of equilibrium in the supply of arms to the various states of that region.

2. At the same time, the Government of Israel feels constrained to register its disappointment at the fact that the Secretary of State's reply does not refer in any detail to the points raised in the Ambassador's previous Note. What the Israel Government was seeking was some tangible expression, while the negotiations were still in progress, of Her Majesty's Government's understanding for the concern
of the Israel Government. It appears, however, that Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to allow the talks now in progress in Cairo, or the terms of any agreement which may emerge from them, to be influenced by that consideration.

3. At this moment, when the negotiations with Egypt seem to have reached their penultimate stage, and the pattern of the anticipated agreement is taking clearer shape, the Government of Israel deems it necessary, in its deep concern for the consequences which the agreement would entail for Israel's security, to summarise once again the interests at stake, and to urge that they may be taken into account in a practical manner in the final stages of the negotiations.

4. The grave issue which Israel has to face is that, while there is no peace between her and Egypt, and Egypt persistently refuses to negotiate it, the agreement now envisaged between the United Kingdom and Egypt provides for a substantial increase of Egypt's military strength. Valuable military assets in the Canal Zone will be coming into Egyptian hands. The Egyptian Army is to be so trained as gradually to take over the military defence of the Zone, and will be greatly strengthened by a flow of arms from Great Britain and other countries. As time goes on, all these arrangements are bound to put Egypt in a decisively more favourable position for renewing her attack on Israel. Israel's security, no less than the stability of the Middle East as a whole, would therefore seem to render imperative, before the signing of the agreement, adequate guarantees
or assurances from Egypt that the military assets now coming, or destined gradually to come, into her possession shall never be used except for the defence of the area as a whole against outside aggression. It is felt that the agreement might be so phrased as to make it clear beyond doubt that the utilisation of these assets for any other purpose would be a serious breach of the agreement itself. The lack of such a provision in the agreement might give rise to serious abuse and to dangerous inferences regarding Britain's attitude on the most important question of the internal peace and stability of the Middle East.

The Government of Israel would much appreciate an indication of the views of Her Majesty's Government on this crucial issue.

5. In his Note under reply, the Secretary of State seeks to reassure Israel by a reference to the Tripartite Declaration issued by the Western Powers on 25 May 1950. That Declaration proclaimed the need for maintaining constant equilibrium between Israel and the Arab States in the sphere of armaments and military power. Since 1950, the British Government has, on a number of occasions, reiterated its policy of maintaining this balance in order to assure the safety of the area. The Secretary of State's reply to the Israel Note repeats Her Majesty's Government's determination to abide by that Declaration.

It is clear, however, that the agreement with Egypt now envisaged will upset this equilibrium to Israel's grave disadvantage. The Israel Government regards an arms-race policy as utterly undesirable, both for Israel and for her neighbours, since it can be pursued only at the expense of
the social and economic progress required to raise general standards of living, and to promote political stability, throughout the area. But should the balance be seriously tilted against her by the new agreement, Israel will have no choice but to seek redress. She therefore trusts that, after the agreement with Egypt is signed, the United Kingdom may see its way to make such arrangements, and afford such facilities, as would enable Israel, too, to acquire further armaments for purposes of self-defence in case of aggression.

The Government of Israel would greatly appreciate an assurance on this point also.

6. Another matter of special importance is the problem of free passage through the Suez Canal. Once Egypt is in sole control of the Canal Zone, she will find no difficulty in continuing arbitrarily to deny such free passage through the Canal, unless the present negotiations are utilised in order to impress upon her that it is her duty to comply strictly, from now on, with her obligations in this matter, as well as with the United Nations decisions.

Her Majesty's Government have in the past advised Israel not to raise this matter at the Security Council at an "inopportune moment"; at one stage it was intimated that the United Kingdom would itself bring the question up in the course of the Cairo negotiations.

The Government of Israel would now urge that a way be found to bring home to the Government of Egypt the urgent need for complying with its international obligations in this vital respect. At the same time, the Government of Israel must reserve its right to raise this matter at the Security Council whenever it may see fit to do so, or to