When I was lunching with Cabot Lodge on October 26, he spoke about the Egyptian negotiations. He said that Mr. Dulles had told him that he thought the negotiations would break down on the question of uniform.

I explained our views on this question. Mr. Lodge said that he entirely agreed. I then said that we had had some doubts as to whether we had convinced Mr. Dulles on this subject. Mr. Lodge replied that Mr. Dulles had not given him any reason to think that he disagreed with us.

(Selwyn Lloyd)
29th October, 1955

African Department (to enter)

Copies to:
Secretary of State
Sir William Strang
Mr. R. Allen
I enclose a copy of a letter addressed to the Prime Minister by Mr. Douglas Dodds Parker, M.P., which Sir Winston Churchill would like Mr. Eden to see.

C.A.E. Shuckburgh, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign Office.
My dear Prime Minister,

I am most deeply disturbed by the position in the Canal Zone — on April 22nd last, some of my colleagues and I addressed to you a letter, in which we ventured to set out what we considered the minimum terms we could accept in any agreement with Egypt.

From what I understood at the end of the meeting on Wednesday, 21st October, the United Kingdom will agree to leave the base completely at the end of a stated period of years. Such agreement would not fulfil the minimum conditions, which I still venture to think are essential.

Should present negotiations break down, however, I believe there are only two courses open to the United Kingdom: a) to reoccupy all Egypt or b) to abandon the Canal base by a phased withdrawal. Either of these two courses, even if practicable, would, in my opinion, be even worse than an agreement to withdraw completely by a stated date.

After the deepest consideration I feel I could support such agreement only if determined action were taken at once to counteract the loss of power and prestige which will result in the Middle East and at home.

Such action should, in my opinion include:

a) The appointment of an individual of international reputation, known to have direct access to you, as head of the British Middle East Office, as you
maintained during the War. Today unequalled opportunities exist for turning events to our advantage.

b) The establishment of this office on the nearest British soil - preferably in Cyprus.

c) The appointment of a special Minister, if only for the next two years, to concentrate on the urgent problem of the Middle East, for example, the redeployment of British forces: the oil protectorates: bases in the Persian Gulf: and Iraq: Cyprus: the Sudan after the elections.

Any such appointments, if announced before any agreement with Egypt, would be doubly effective.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) DOUGLAS DODDS PARKER.

PERSONAL
SECRET
GUARD
(10/13/674/526)

BRITISH EMBASSY
CAIRO
October 28, 1953.

Dear [Name],

As you probably know, we have regular meetings here of the heads of Commonwealth missions to discuss current affairs. One of the meetings was held yesterday and was I thought useful in giving us a slightly different angle on negotiations. We keep very much closer contact with McLure-Smith, the Australian Minister, but the Commonwealth colleagues as a whole are for obvious reasons not being given any detailed information about the points at issue.

2. Tayyeb Hussain, the Pakistan Chargé d’Affaires, who is usually well informed, expressed the firm conviction that the reason for the present impasse was that the Egyptians were still receiving from the Americans the impression that H.M.G. could be pushed yet further. He was quite sure that no settlement would be reached while this impression persisted. The South African then capped this by saying that he had information, which he considered absolutely accurate, to the effect that, even when Caffery went to the Egyptians with instructions from the State Department to support H.M.G.’s attitude, a junior member of his staff continued to give the impression to members of the committee and others that the Egyptians could get what they wanted if they pushed the British a little further still. He told me the name of this officer and I was not surprised to learn that it was the person of whom I wrote about as long ago as last March (see my secret and personal letter to you of March 19).

3. I think this may be of general interest to you in the light of Cairo telegram 1499 and Foreign Office telegrams to Washington 4326 and 4327.

4. Incidentally, Panicker’s view was that the Egyptians would in the end give way but not without a further show of fight for it, which he thought was largely face. This may be the case but it will be quite a fight, and our opinion here has in no way altered from what we said in Cairo telegram 1491 para. 5.

Yours ever,

[Signature]

R. Allen, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
LONDON S.W.1.
I have amended the
Draft in the sense required
by the Chiefs of Staff.

2. The amendment to para 13
is quite straightforward. That
to para 10 appears to be
in line with what the Chiefs
of Staff want, but Mr. Brodhdy
may want wish to alter
it in the light of discussion
at the meeting. (Mr. Brodhdy's
personal copy of the draft - with
pencil amendments is at Floy E)

Remy
16/12

(initialled on blueprints)
CONFIDENTIAL

Office of the United Kingdom
Trade Commissioner,
KHARTOUM,
28th October, 1953.

E. 1192/549

Dear Willie,

Foreign Office telegram No. 87 of the 24th October about publicity in the event of the announcement of an agreement on the Canal Base.

2. You will have understood from the absence of a further telegram from me that we can think of nothing to add to this admirable statement of arguments which we shall use to the best of our ability.

3. I am sure that you will equally understand that the Anglo-Egyptian "negotiations" on this subject are regarded here not as negotiations designed to promote co-operation in the defence of the Middle East but as a struggle and a trial of strength. The simple issue for these people is that the Egyptians want us out while we want to stay. The Egyptians have been trying to eject us ever since Abbas Hilmi first began to stand up to Cromer and indeed ever since Arabi's time; and when they at last succeed it will be a triumph in Sudanese no less than in Egyptian eyes. The way will then be clear to concentrate on the second objective of Egyptian policy which she has also pursued with remarkable tenacity and consistency during the last 50 years, i.e. to eject us from the Sudan end to recover her paramount position here.

4. I apologise for repeating the obvious but I gather that Kenrick's telegram No. 539, even allowing for its exaggerated language, came as a novel idea to some at home.

Your very truly,

D.N.H. Riches

W. Morris, Esq.,
African Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.
EGYPT: DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS

Availability Clause

The Egyptians will not agree to make the Canal Zone base available in the event of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or act of aggression. They would, on the other hand, agree to immediate bilateral consultation with a view to reactivation of the base in almost any circumstances.

2. Before we break our negotiations on this point, it may be worth considering the relative advantages and disadvantages, from our point of view, of the alternative courses of making availability (a) subject to a specific recommendation of the United Nations, or (b) subject to immediate consultation with the Egyptians.

3. The advantage of a United Nations clause is that it links our relationship with Egypt to the wider responsibilities for maintaining the peace of the United Nations Organisation. If such a link were incorporated in an agreement, it would enable us to appeal to the United Nations so as to secure reactivation of the base in the interests of the free world. We should have a clear answer to those who raised the cry of "imperialism". Moreover, in the event of a break in our negotiations on this issue, we could show in our publicity how disinterested we have been in our attempts to secure agreement and how unreasonable the Egyptians have been.

4. On the other hand, nobody could claim that the United Nations clause is in practice likely to make the base available quickly in the event of a major war. Before the base could be made available, it would be necessary to organise:
a request for a meeting of the General Assembly in accordance with the terms of the "uniting for peace" resolutions of 1950, i.e. by seven members of the Security Council or by a majority of the Member States;

(ii) a majority vote in the General Assembly for a resolution requesting Egypt to make the base available;

(iii) compliance by Egypt with the resolution.

5. There is obviously endless scope for delay and filibustering in the second of the three processes listed above. Even if the United Nations General Assembly were to pass a resolution of this sort, Egypt would only be under a moral obligation towards the United Nations to accept its request, if she chose to denounce her specific obligation towards ourselves. There would be particular difficulty in obtaining the passage of a resolution of this sort, if Egypt herself were opposed to it. In any case, it is hard to imagine the passage of the resolution without some form of consultation in regard to its drafting, not only between ourselves and Egypt, but also between Egypt and most of the other Member States.

6. One must therefore have some fellow-feeling for the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs when he says that he doubts whether the United Nations General Assembly is a sufficiently responsible body to trust with a strategic decision of this sort. Mr. Fawzi has had first-hand experience of the United Nations at work, and knows as well as anybody how irresponsibly it can act upon occasion.

There is no clear answer by us to the Egyptian question why, if we will accept all the consultation necessary to obtain the passage of a United Nations resolution, we will not accept a simple bilateral consultation between Egypt and ourselves.
7. The disadvantage of a clause in the agreement under which there would be immediate consultation, with a view to making the base available in the event of a major war, is largely a matter of presentation. In conceding dependence upon a United Nations resolution, we have in practice, even though it may not appear so on the surface, conceded consultation. If we now stated that we would agree to a clause under which Egypt and ourselves would enter into immediate consultation with a view to making the base available in the event of a threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or act of aggression, we should in fact cut out the tiresome process of organising the passage of a specific resolution by the United Nations, and at the same time possibly secure the removal of the last stumbling block in the way of agreement between the Egyptians and ourselves.

8. If we must bring the United Nations into it, we could have a clause binding Egypt and ourselves to immediate consultation in the event of a decision by the United Nations that there existed a state of affairs which constituted a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or act of aggression. This would provide us with the advantage of the link between our responsibilities and those of the United Nations Organisation and at the same time get away from the dangerous dependence upon a specific resolution by the United Nations General Assembly.

October 28, 1953
(CAIRO RADIO IN HEBREW) - THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE HAS DECIDED TO ISSUE A NEW LEGAL ORDER FOR THE CONFISCATION OF ALL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF THE TEL-AVIV GOVERNMENT PASSING THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL. EXISTING LEGISLATION ALLOWED FOR THE CONFISCATION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT DESTINED FOR OCCUPIED PALESTINE. THE NEW ORDER IS IN LINE WITH THE NEED TO IMPOSE AN ECONOMIC BOYCOTT OF THE TEL-AVIV GOVERNMENT.

END BBC MON. 17/10. IB.
The Israeli Ambassador handed Sir William Strang a memorandum on October 14. In this Note the Ambassador expressed concern:

(a) that an agreement between us and Egypt "by producing a radical change in the balance of forces as between Israel and Egypt may do violence to one of the basic principles laid down (in the Three Power declaration) on May 25, 1950";

(b) that we might miss the unique opportunity offered by our general settlement with Egypt of binding Egypt to a faithful compliance with the Security Council's decision of September 1, 1951 under which Egypt was asked to allow free passage of cargoes in transit to or from Israel.

2. On October 30 we answered the Note saying that we would keep the considerations raised in mind. In regard to (a) above, Her Majesty's Government fully intended to take such action as might lie in their power to fulfil the Three Power declaration of May 25, 1950. We hoped that a settlement with Egypt would eventually conduce to a greater degree of stability in the Middle East and consequently to the maintenance of peace in that area. We avoided reference to (b) above, but it has been made clear to the Israeli Ambassador that Her Majesty's Government could not make observance of the Security's Council's resolution of September 1, 1951 a condition of our settlement with Egypt. If we were to accept that,
it would be hopeless to expect to get any agreement at all.

3. We may expect further representations from the Israeli Government to concentrate on the Suez Canal point. The B.B.C. Monitoring Service heard Cairo Radio announce in their Hebrew broadcast on October 27 that a new order had been issued by the Egyptian Government for the confiscation of all imports and exports of the Israeli Government passing through the Suez Canal. We have not so far received any report confirming that this new order has been put into effect.

E.B. Berkley

November 2, 1953.

I do not think the Israeli Ambassador expects to secure any change of policy by A.M.G., but he wants to express to the Secretary of State personally his Government's wishings best on Anglo-Egyptian agreement may encourage Egypt to be more intragressant against Israel. We hope the reverse may happen, and in any case it would only put up the backs of the Egyptians vis-a-vis Israel to ask Egypt for this kind of assurances the Israeli fact suggest.

Private Secretary

Roger Allen 2/11.
To take the first of Mr. Alport's points, the Department have always thought the uniform of technicians a bad subject on which to break off our negotiations with the Egyptians. It is not one on which we could expect much sympathy from the outside world. On the other hand, we have never accepted the Egyptian argument that if we forced through an agreement containing provision for the continued wearing of British uniform in the Canal Zone, we should be giving a lever to Egyptians who wanted to continue anti-British activities. If anti-British agitation goes on being a political asset for Egyptian politicians after a new agreement with us, then there will be plenty of other things apart from uniforms to agitate about — for example, the very presence of British technicians in the Canal Zone, the presence of British officials in the Sudan, and so on.

2. It is hard to see what Mr. Alport means when he talks about "the revival of a Levant Service". If he means the old Levant Consular Service, it would have very different functions from that of maintaining the Canal Zone Base. It would also not be possible to recruit the maintenance personnel for the Base from the Sudan, since the personnel would be largely members of the Armed Forces.

3. It is hard to see how there could be one Service for British personnel serving in various non-diplomatic capacities in the Canal Zone and in the other countries mentioned. But perhaps Mr. Alport means that there should be some special unit of the three Armed Services which would be called "Levant Service" and would have special distinguishing marks on its uniform. If this is what he means, the matter might be referred to the Service Departments;
they have never objected to men serving in the Canal Zone
wearing a distinguishing flash on their shoulders.

4. It is not for this Department to comment on the
connexion between such a Levant Service and the proposed
Commonwealth Service, but it looks as if Mr. Alport has
not thought this out properly. The Parliamentary Office
may wish him to come and discuss it further with them.

5. A draft answer is attached referring only to the first
point raised.


October 30, 1952.

If Mr. Alport means that he would like the uniform
question to disappear from the text, rather than that
we should give in on the subject, the idea is one
which the Embassy have brought up recently and, if
proposed by the Egyptians in the right form, might
cosiderably be of interest. But I don’t think we
need it discussed at from him in this context.

C. D. [Signature]

The Secretary I stress may wish to be a little
more non-committal about uniform as a possible
breakthrough point, in writing to Mr. Alport. I have
accordingly suggested an amendment to the first
sentence of the draft.

Mr. Alport’s views on a “Levant Service” seem
at muddled.

Roger Allen

Private Secretary.
uniform, the British case will be very gravely weakened. I also believe that a concession in this matter by us would make it easier for the Egyptians to accept our demands on the point of availability.

If, on the contrary, we gain our point with the Egyptians, I think that we will find that those in Egypt who do not want Anglo-British solutions to impose will use it as a means of subverting their own Government and attacking us. Many of the benefits of the agreement will thereby be lost.

Yours ever,

[Signature]

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, C.C., M.P.,
Foreign Office,
S.Y.L.
I spoke to you last Thursday about the question of the right of British technicians remaining in the Canal Zone to wear uniform. I believe that the inclusion of this proviso in the negotiations is an irrelevancy. In the long run it will continue the basis of disagreement between ourselves and the Egyptians in circumstances which will make it almost impossible for us to give to British subjects any real measure of protection. It will appear outside this country simply as a face-saver and a sop to certain elements in the party who are opposed in principle to any agreement.

I believe that there are, on the other hand, very strong arguments in favour of the revival of a Levant Service on which Canal maintenance personnel, and indeed many other categories serving in official and semi-official employment in Middle Eastern countries, could be enrolled. For instance, those remaining on in the Sudan after self-determination would form part of this Service. We might also find them serving in Libya, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Persia and Turkey. They would wear their own service uniform. They would be subject to codes of discipline. Army, Navy and Air Force individuals or units could be seconded to the Levant Service for special purposes.

In due course then, as I hope, the Commonwealth Service is instituted, this Levant Service might quite easily become a branch of it. My first paragraph is perhaps over-irrelevant, but I feel very strongly that if negotiations in Cairo break down over the question of

Continued.
November 6, 1955.

I have given careful thought to the questions raised in your letter of October 27.

I note your view that the issue of uniform alone would be a bad point upon which to break off our negotiations with the Egyptians. There are, of course, other outstanding matters, notably the conditions under which the Base could be reactivated and, as you know, the negotiations are at the moment in a state of suspended animation. But I am grateful to you for the ideas which you outline. I fear that if after the conclusion of a new agreement Egyptian politicians want excuses for anti-British argument, they will be able to find them even without the question of uniform.

O.J. McO. Alport, Esq.,
T.D., M.P.
I am not sure that I quite understand your proposal of reviving a Levant Service, but you may care to develop this further.

I am very grateful to you for writing, as I asked.
Please refer to your letter No. JE 1192/655G of October 9 giving your comments on the main part of our draft Agreement.

2. It is obviously much too early for any final wording, but there are a number of points which I think it worth making at this stage. The references below are to the articles of your second draft.

3. We are not convinced that articles 6 and 7 are an improvement. Article 6 seems to be open to much the same objection which you raised against our original article 3. It merely states an existing fact and does not lay obligations on either side. We thought that this defect was less obvious in our original article 4. We thought it necessary to put in the first sentence of that article in order to lead into the provisions dealing with the coordination of air defence and technical assistance.

4. Perhaps on the whole it might be more acceptable to the Egyptians if these two articles are redrafted into a single article on the following lines:

"6. The responsibility for the local defence of the Base as of all Egyptian territory rests with the Egyptian Government. Since the effective defence of Egypt from air attack depends upon coordination in peace with the air defence arrangements made by other friendly powers the United Kingdom Government undertakes to consider sympathetically such requests for cooperation and for technical assistance for this purpose as the Egyptian Government may make from time to time."

(You will note that we have left out the word "advice" as this is surely included under the term "technical assistance").

5. We agree that article 1 giving the definitions will be most important, but it will be impossible to draft it in anything like final form until much more of the Agreement itself has been settled. The definition of the base or base area may be difficult. It may well be impossible to have a geographical definition in the sense of drawing a line around all the installations and saying that everything inside it

E. B. Boothby, Esq.,
African Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.
is the base area. This would include Suez and Port Said among other Egyptian towns and villages. We shall probably have to start discussion on this point by finding out what geographical authority the Egyptians are going to give their base commander and acting accordingly. We may well find that the base or base area will have to consist only of the installations themselves and cannot include all the territory between the installations but we will certainly watch your point and ensure drafting which does not deprive British personnel of their status.

6. We wonder whether there is a misprint in sub paragraph (iii) of your comment on definitions. Our view is that "installations" must exclude all British owned equipment and not merely specialised equipment. Indeed, the very first definition which we have in mind is one providing that the base will consist of the installations and exclude the equipment contained in them. We are proposing to define British equipment as all movable property, whether or not of a warlike nature, belonging to Her Majesty's Government.

Honourable

(M. J. CHESWELL)
I enclose a letter from Her Majesty's Embassy in Cairo in answer to Boothby's letter of October 9 (HE 1192/4250) to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, commenting on the delegation's draft text of the main part of the Defence Agreement. In this letter Her Majesty's Minister makes three points:

(a) He does not like our redraft of the original Article 4 and proposes a further redraft.

(b) He appreciates the importance of ensuring that our "technicians" should not be deprived of such status as they may have at their place of work, when in their living quarters, or in transit between their living quarters and place of work. He doubts, however, whether this can be done by having a wide definition of the term "installations".

(c) He disputes our view that "installations" should include specialised equipment.

2. As regards (a), we are inclined to accept Mr. Creswell's redraft of the 4th Article (Articles 6 and 7 in our revised draft). We could clearly not get the Egyptians to agree to any form of words which might commit them to accepting such advice and assistance in the field of air defence as we might wish to give them. The best we could hope for is to secure, in the text of the Agreement, a tacit admission that the effective air defence of Egypt depends/
depends upon adequate co-ordination in peace with the air defence systems of other friendly countries, joined to an offer on our part to consider sympathetically such requests as the Egyptians might make for our assistance in this field. Mr. Creswell's redraft does this in the neatest possible way. The admission we require, instead of being introduced by the somewhat categorical expression "the contracting parties recognise" is now introduced merely by the conjunction "since". This will make the phrase much easier for the Egyptians to swallow. The amendment also makes this part of the clause follow on well from the first sentence (Article 6 of our revised draft) so that it no longer seems necessary to keep this sentence in a separate Article.

Subject to your views and to those of the Service Departments, we would propose to accept the Embassy's redraft.

3. We feel we should leave (b) to the delegation. They have taken our point and will no doubt cover it as best they can.

4. As regards (c), Mr. Creswell seems to have made a sound point. If equipment - and including specialised equipment - is to be included in the definition of "installations", it will be difficult to arrange that we shall be entitled to remove it at will from Egypt. The object of the Air Ministry's amendment was, as you will remember, to ensure that this gear should remain under our management and not have to be handed over to the Egyptians. Perhaps this point could best be covered by specifically \[signature\]
providing, elsewhere in the text, that all moveable equipment, unless otherwise provided for, was to remain British property under British management, and could be removed if necessary. "Installations" could then be defined so as to include only immovable property.

5. I am copying this letter to Brigadier Baker, Major Cochrane, Sir D. Roseway, Cocker, Way and Holl at the War Office, Sir P. Sanford, Orme, O'Grady, Cary, Air Vice Marshall Melville, Jordan, Air Commodore Walling, and Group Captain Williams at the Air Ministry, Commander Talbot-Smith and Shawyer at the Admiralty, and A. M. Allen at the Treasury.

6. I shall be grateful if you and a representative of the other Departments would kindly let me have your comments.
CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Macworth-Young,

1. Would you please refer to your letter No. JE1192/587G of the 4th February, 1954, in which you asked for comments on the Cairo Embassy's proposals in their letter No. 1043/607/53G of the 27th October, 1953 - which you enclosed with your letter No. JE 1192/587G of the 10th November, 1953.

2. As there have been no many developments on this subject since November including the two meetings we had on "status of personnel" and the "definitions" articles, I thought that it was not necessary to give our views again on these particular points.

3. We have no naval interest in the "defence of the base" article (originally article 4), but I personally agree with you that the new proposal by Cairo is an improvement on the previous two draft articles (articles 6 and 7 of the revised draft).

4. Copies of this letter go to Prince (Ministry of Defence), O'Grady (Air Ministry) and Armstrong (War Office).

Yours sincerely,

H. L. LAWRENCE WILSON
Dear Mackworth-Young,

I write with reference to your JE 1192/5876 of the 18th November, 1953, in which you drew attention to three points in connection with the Egyptian negotiations.

I can confirm that the War Office are in agreement with the line which it is proposed to take.

I am sending a copy of this to Prince at the Ministry of Defence.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

R. C. Mackworth-Young, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.
Dear Mackworth-Young,

In reply to your letter, J.E.1192/587G, of the 18th November, enclosing a copy of a letter from Cairo, dated 27th October, I confirm that we accept your comments on points (a) and (b) referred to in your letter.

With regard to (c), I think that the point made by Cairo is a sound one, but it will obviously be necessary to consider the point in greater detail when we have the full text of the agreement before us. Since you wrote your letter of the 18th November, you have circulated to us a tentative draft of the "Definitions" article prepared by Cairo, and I think that the point raised at (c) in your letter of 18th November can best be dealt with in conjunction with our consideration of this new article.

I suggest that the other departments concerned should send you their comments on the draft "Definitions" article and that we should then call a meeting of the Working Party to consider any points on which there is not full agreement. In the unlikely event

R.C. Mackworth-Young, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
LONDON. S.W.1.
event of there being no comments raised, there will, of course, be no necessity for a meeting but, in view of the importance of the "Definitions" article, there will, no doubt, be a number of points which can best be cleared by discussion.

As soon as the other departments are ready, I will arrange for a meeting of the Working Party.

I am copying this letter to Armstrong, War Office, Carsy, Air Ministry, Commander Talbot Smith, Admiralty and Allen, Treasury.

Yours sincerely,

\[\text{[Signature]}\]

(R.H. Prince)
Effect of an agreement with Egypt upon the Sudan election.

Considered that it would be best if an agreement with Egypt were concluded after the Sudan election.

There now seems to be a fair amount of evidence that the Egyptians do not want an agreement before the election. The reason may be that they differ in their assessment of the effects of an agreement. They differ from that of the Sudanese. They may consider that their supporters will be demoralized if they can no longer point to Britain as the enemy of Egypt, and the important power determined to remain until she is thrown out.

2. On the other hand (and I am inclined to think this is more likely) they may be deliberately waiting to see the results of the Sudan election before deciding whether they dare make an agreement. The Sudanese agreement has never been regarded as an Egyptian victory in Egypt (another point on which Sudan and Egypt's assessments differ), and if the Sudanese win, the policy of reaching agreement with us may seem in the light of public reaction, to be too dangerous. If so,
On the other hand, the N.U.P. have a considerable success; it may (in the view of the
Emir.) give them sufficient prestige to carry off a definite agreement worth-while.

(Morris) 2/11

I agree with Mr. Morris' analysis. It does not change the Ministry of State's order of preferences,
though it makes his (1.) even less likely of achievement than (2.).

(Radcliffe) 2/11

The United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations, New York.

23rd October, 1953

A thought on Egypt and the Sudan.

I raised with Moyo when he came to see me the day before the trilpartite talks, on October 15, the effect of an agreement with Egypt upon the Sudan elections. He then did not think that there would be an adverse effect from our point of view, but I seem to remember just before I came to New York a telegram from Shortrom saying that they thought there would be very adverse effect, i.e. people climbing on the Egyptian band wagon. The Egyptians probably realise this and therefore may be anxious to get an agreement before those elections are over.

I do not know whether you will agree to make any further concessions or not, but it seems to me that the order of preference is as follows:

1. The best: An agreement with Egypt on our present terms arrived at after the Sudan elections.

2. Second best: An agreement with Egypt on our present terms arrived at before the Sudan elections.

The Right Honourable

Anthony Eden, P.C., M.P.
5. Third best: An agreement with Egypt involving further concessions (if approved by you) arrived at after the Sudan elections.

4. Fourth, and worst of all worlds: An agreement with Egypt involving further concessions, arrived at before the Sudan elections.

I do not mean by this to suggest that I am in favour of further concessions to Egypt.

I think 2 and 3 are in the right order.

I feel we must avoid 4 at all costs.

I have to draw this all the
wax already seam to go.
Availability

The debate was anxious that the memorandum before should be seen and commented on by UN and the legal advisers. It demonstrates that availability on U.N. instructions is a pretty shaky security for the object we have in mind and that consultation, being the only reasonable alternative, ought to become our policy.

I do not think it has anything which Ministers would find alluring. You might none the less wish to invite Mr. Fitzmaurice (see note Saturday's minute). Yours, 30.X.

M. Allen, now on leave.
Some of this gets me much further. The U.N. formula we have put in the past suffers, in my opinion, from prior disadvantage, but if we can go through the whole laborious process with the U.N. we get automatic reactivation, i.e. we can, with justification, reactivate even against Egypt's will.
I don't think that is the moment to put anything more to writers, who I think feel they have already gone further than they think right. Therefore will tend to move back rather than advance now.
D 31/10.
EGYPT: DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS

The Department would welcome the opinion of the Legal Advisers and the United Nations (Political) Department on the attached memorandum about the availability clause in our proposed new agreement with Egypt. There is no disposition on the part of Ministers at present to accept anything short of automatic reactivation of the Base, and the memorandum only deals with "consultation" as a hypothetical alternative.

(E. B. Boothby)
Oct. 28, 1953

U.N. (Political) Department
Legal Advisers

Mr. Williams told me before his departure for New York that he had been consulted about this, but I have not myself seen any papers on it.

2. I agree with para. 4 of the memorandum. We should not however forget that there is another stage (which would be (1)) which would add to the delay. The Uniting for Peace machinery cannot, so far as I can see, come into operation unless "the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its /responsibility
responsibility in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace etc." This is to some extent implied by the present (i). I think, however, that we must assume that there might be at least a few days delay while the Security Council tries and fails to exercise its responsibility.

3. I particularly agree with para. 5 of the memorandum. The General Assembly might well not pass a resolution authorising us to reactivate the base. Even if it did the resolution would have no more force than a recommendation. I can see a debate of this sort getting completely out of hand, particularly if it occurs in the heated atmosphere of a serious threat to the peace.

4. As regards para. 8 there is this additional point. Steps to reactivate the base would probably, though not necessarily, amount to "measures taken by Members (of the United Nations) in the exercise of (their) right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter." If Article 51 were applicable the United Kingdom or Egypt or both should report to the Security Council immediately what steps had been taken. It is of course impossible to say at this stage whether Article 51 would necessarily be applicable.

5. Although this is not strictly within my field, I wonder whether the proposal in the memorandum might not be supplemented as follows. There might be immediate bilateral consultation on the request of either party plus automatic consultation in the event of a U.N. decision that there existed a threat to
the peace etc. If, as suggested in para. 4, there were some delay in U.N. action, it would be open to us to ask for consultation without awaiting the result of the U.N.'s discussions.

Chad Cope

(C.I.S. Cope)

October 29, 1953.

I do not know if H. Vroom has been consulted about this. May I suggest that he should see it after the Legal Adviser has minuted?

Chad Cope

Mr. Fitzmaurice is away until Monday (November 2) and I am always a minority here. Notes in his absence. May he should see with his advice.

On purely legal grounds, they would seem to be considerable advantage in not directly linking reactivation of the Base
While I hold no particular brief for recourse to United Nations action, I think the memorandum and the preceding minutes tend to overlook two important points.

First, it must be remembered that our original proposal to link reactivation with United Nations action was put forward in substitution of a formula which would have allowed us to reactivate the base automatically in the event of a major war, which the Egyptians would not accept. The idea was therefore that, if a major war broke out, in particular one involving Russia, which was the case generally in mind, the United Nations would in any event inevitably be brought into it: that in such circumstances it would be almost sure to authorise reactivation and would probably act pretty quickly. If we have to assume
Minutes.

that, even in the event of a war involving Russia, the United Nations might refuse to authorize reactivation, for instance on the ground that the active area of hostilities was for the moment confined to Europe, or if we have to assume that, even in those circumstances, there would be inordinate delay, then I agree that the United Nations formula would not be of much use as a substitute for the major war formula.

The other point is that a formula limited to consultation with the Egyptians, while it might involve automatic consultation, would not involve automatic reactivation. The department are in the best position to judge, but it is difficult to see anything in the Egyptian attitude about these matters to justify one in thinking that the consultations would result in any Egyptian agreement for reactivation unless Egypt herself, or some other Arab State, were directly involved or obviously menaced. In short, it would add materially nothing to the other parts of the reactivation Article. The Egyptians are hardly less skilful at procrastination than the United Nations.

The advantage of the United Nations formula, on the other hand, is that it does involve automatic reactivation if and when a United Nations resolution can be procured.

If, of course, we intend, in the event of a major war, to reactivate the base anyhow, irrespective of Egyptian consent, and merely to go through the motions of consultation - I mean if that is the underlying idea of the line which the department are now suggesting - then I agree that a United Nations formula would be positively hampering, since it would make it very difficult for us to take forcible action unless we had at least gone through the motions of recourse to the United Nations.

Article 7/
Minutes.

Article 7 of the 1936 Treaty will, I think, afford us a basis for unilateral reactivation should we become engaged in war, but as it is a long time since I have seen the other Articles of our proposed Agreement with Egypt, I am not sure whether we intend that they shall be regarded as formally replacing the provisions of the 1936 Treaty.

(G.G. Fitzmaurice)
November 3, 1953.
22nd October, 1953

Dear Prime Minister,

You will remember that on April 22nd you received a letter signed by a dozen Conservative members expressing concern at the reports then current of the negotiations in Cairo. The view was then expressed that our minimum terms should include:

1. Britain to retain in the Canal Zone, bases, airfields and port facilities, and sufficient British personnel to maintain and to operate them.

2. Britain to retain in the Canal Zone, fighting units sufficiently strong to ensure the safe landing of further forces should the necessity, of which Britain must be the sole judge, arise.

At yesterday's meeting we learned that far from having insisted upon any such conditions Her Majesty's Government were prepared to agree to remove all fighting units from the area within eighteen months and to abandon the Zone completely within seven years.

We feel it our duty to inform you that we could not support this policy either in the country or in Parliament.

Yours sincerely,

Ralph Assheton
Charles Waterhouse
W. R. Rees Davies
Charles Williams
E. A. H. Legge-Bourke
R. P. Crouch
G. Nabarro
Patrick Hintland
J. Enoch Powell
Julian Amery
Sir Robert Grimston
Hamilton Kerr

Sir Fergus Graham
C. J. Holland-Martin
Sir Guy Lloyd
Patrick Donner
Sir John Hailor
Walter Bromley Davenport
Paul Williams
John Morrison
William Teeling
Lord Hinchinbrooke
F. P. Crowder
Ralph Bayner
W. P. A. Burden
Dear Prime Minister

When Anthony Eden spoke to the Foreign Affairs Committee some weeks ago, he assured us that the Government had minimum terms on which they would insist in negotiations with the Egyptian Government about the Canal Zone, though he was naturally unable to disclose those terms.

Since then reports have appeared in the Press which are causing anxiety. We believe that the present negotiations may well be the turning point in our position as an Empire and that if we were to give way, or appear to give way, disastrous results must follow, both abroad and at home. We know you share this conviction.

We do not ask that you should tell us your minimum terms, but we feel it our duty to tell you that we think it essential that, in the present negotiations, they should include the following:

1. Britain to retain in the Canal Zone, bases,
airfields and port facilities, and
sufficient British personnel to maintain
and to operate them.

2. Britain to retain in the Canal Zone,
fighting units sufficiently strong to
ensure the safe landing of further forces
should the necessity, of which Britain must
be the sole judge, arise.

We have the honour to be, Sir,

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.)

CHRISTOPHER ROLLAND-MARTIN

DOUGLAS DODDS-PARKER

A. GORDON-DUNCAN

HARRY LEGGE-Bourke

CHRISTIAN RUB

JOHN MORRISON

GUY LLOYD

CHARLES WATERSHOUSE

RALPH ASSHETON

FITTERY MACLEAN

J. BRUGO POWELL

J. HINCHINGBROOK

JULIAN ABERY

I.M. HORGAIN

10, Downing Street,
London, S.W. 1.
We have authority (Foreign Office telegram No. 951 of May 10) to deliver a warning to the Egyptian Government if organised attacks appear imminent on members of Her Majesty's Forces by persons who are or have been members of the Egyptian armed Forces, or who have been trained or armed by the Egyptian Forces. It is to be considered whether some similar warning should not be given in case the Egyptian Government were to start to take vindictive or arbitrary action against civilian British subjects in the Delta, or were to fail adequately to protect their life and property from terrorist or mob violence (or threaten to break off diplomatic relations). But the only sanction which could be used to back up such a warning would be the threat that if the warning were ignored British forces would move on Cairo. If such a warning were given, the effect might be sufficient to deter the Egyptian Government from hostile action or connivance at disorders against British subjects. The warning delivered at the time of the coup d'état of July 23, 1952, certainly had a salutary effect, but the situation then was entirely different. The revolution was directed against the Palace and the old régime not against the British or any other foreigners. On this occasion the danger that a warning might not be heeded is obviously much greater (particularly if the Council for the Revolutionary Command were embarking on a course of which they had previously worked out the different phases) and before it was given it would be necessary to have a clear decision that the threat would be carried out if necessary - with all that that would imply. Such a decision could clearly only be taken by the Cabinet.

5. We do not wish to appear alarmist and it is of course true that the Egyptians would not at present embark on a course of violence unless they are convinced that negotiations have irretrievably failed - in this respect there is I think a great improvement in their mood since last spring. But it seems rash and improvident to blind ourselves to the fact that the chances of a breakdown of the talks in the near future are about equal to the chances of securing an agreement, and that if the talks do breakdown the situation may deteriorate even more rapidly than the Egyptians themselves wish. It seems essential therefore to give some thought to the possibilities in advance so that considered decisions can be taken rapidly if the need arises.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter to Hugh Stephenson at the British Middle East Office.
FROM

Mr. C. A. M. Alport, M.P., 15
15th Edern.

No.

Dated Nov. 8.

Received in Registry Nov. 11.

References to former relevant papers

JE 1192/697

MINUTES

Mr. Alport has written again on the two points he raised in his letter of Oct. 27 (JE 1192/697):

(a) our insistence on the right of our men to wear uniform in Egypt under any new arrangement for the base.
(b) his proposal for a new Levant Service.

2. In his previous letter he describes (a) as an "irrelevancy", he now calls it "unnecessary". I think we must contest both views.

3. On (b) Adenian dept are not very competent to advise. I have therefore tried my hand at a draft and we be grateful for the views (and amendments) of

Levant dept (2)

Personal dept (1)

R. E. Young

13 Nov.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE PROVIDE BOTH
POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.
Minutes.

I submit a suggested 2. draft of pages 4-6.

This African set view like to draw
on a thin sheed pit.

[Signature]
13/11

To. Purbrick.

[Signature]

I agree with his

redraft as amended.

[Signature]

S.H.

[Signature]

P.R. [date illegible]

Private Secretary

[Signature]

71/1

[Signature]
From: C.J.M. Alport, M.P.


Thank you very much for your letter of 6th. November. I quite understand that anybody who wishes to use anti-British sentiment for political purposes has little difficulty in finding an excuse for doing so.

The gamble we have to take with our negotiations with Egypt is, however, whether the Egyptian Government is capable of carrying out any agreement in good faith. I admit that there are long odds against but my view is that unless we try to establish an agreement against a background of mutual confidence the chances of good faith being shown by the Egyptians are very small. Therefore we have to go at least half way in trying to establish an atmosphere of mutual confidence between ourselves and the Egyptians. Anything which detracts from this unnecessarily, is in my view, unfortunate. I regard the question of uniforms as being one of these.

As far as the Levant Service is concerned what I really mean is that we should establish a service whose conditions, pay and pension are guaranteed ultimately by the United Kingdom Government. This Service would be available for work in any Middle

Continued.
East country and would consist of experts in Middle East conditions. The oil-fields will require advisers for an indefinite period. We need trade representatives in Saudi Arabia—both political and trade representatives in the Sudan. The same may apply in future to Egypt, Turkey and elsewhere.

One of the great strengths of British influence in the Middle East prior to 1939 was the existence of men like Russell Pasha, St. John Hope, Ingrams, Lawrence and also those who acted as oriental secretaries to Middle East Embassies before World War I. Glubb is a contemporary example of this group. It was this type of man who really represented British political influence in the Arab world and who by getting the confidence of the Arabs did more than regiments of soldiers who maintain our prestige.

It will not be easy to get similar men in the future to take on this type of work unless some sort of security exists as membership of a United Kingdom or Commonwealth Service. They have seen too many of their predecessors become victims of recent political changes.

I am sorry to write at length when you are so busy but you kindly invited me to expand the idea which I put to you in my previous letter.

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.
November 20, 1953

Thank you for your second letter, of November 9, on the two questions of the current negotiations in Egypt and your suggestion for a new Levant Service.

On the first point I note your view that our insistence on the right of our men to wear uniform in Egypt will detract unnecessarily from Egyptian goodwill, and so prejudice the chances that Egypt will carry out her obligations under the agreement in good faith.

Our main difference is I think over the word "unnecessarily". This is not merely a matter of prestige. We are advised that it is essential, both for discipline and for self-protection, that our men should have the right to wear uniform. Secondly I do not think our insistence on this point will turn the scales from Egyptian co-operation to non-co-operation. It may well be that this right will be little exercised in practice, and then only in areas far removed from the main centres of population. If the

Egyptians want to make the Agreement work I feel sure the existence of this provision will not deter them.

As regards your suggestion that we should establish a separate "Levant Service", you will of course be aware that the Foreign Service already maintains diplomatic and commercial representatives, all of whom are paid from the Foreign Office Vote, in almost every country of the Middle East. We have for example recently appointed a regular Arabic-speaking member of the Foreign Service to be United Kingdom Trade Commissioner at Khartoum. In the same way the staffs of the Oriental Secretariats at Her Majesty's Missions in the Middle East are paid by Her Majesty's Government and are largely composed of established Foreign Service officers. The Oil Companies maintain their own cadre of advisers and I am inclined to doubt the extent to which they would welcome the attachment of advisers from any government service. They are, of course, free to apply to the staff of Her Majesty's Missions abroad and indeed of the Foreign Office for advice if they so wish.

In addition to our diplomatic missions and consulates, the activities of which are much more varied and extensive than they were before the war, we also maintain the British Middle East Office. This co-ordinates the regional interest /cf
of Her Majesty's Missions and Colonial Governments in the area, and includes a number of specialists who are available to advise the Governments of Middle Eastern countries on such matters as agriculture, finance, economic development etc.

There remains the question of service under foreign governments. The particular difficulty here is that individuals who take up service with such governments must clearly be paid by them and accept the conditions which they offer. If Her Majesty's Government were to guarantee their pay or pensions this would be an invitation to the governments concerned to default on their obligations. Moreover, while I agree that British influence in the Middle East has owed much in the past to the confidence inspired by such persons as Russell Pasha, Lawrence and Glubb, it is doubtful whether present-day Arab Governments would repose much trust in advisers who belonged to the Civil Service of this country. The positions which Russell and Glubb won for themselves were surely largely due to the fact that they ceased to be the servants of Her Majesty's Government and became in every way the servants of the country by which they were employed.

I am grateful for your
consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Anthony Eden
NOTES ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE

EGYPT

Mr. McNeil, speaking first for the Opposition, associated himself with the Secretary of State's statement on the Sudan. The Opposition were at one with the Government in trying to insist on the Sudanese right to choose their own Parliament and to determine their own destiny.

2. On EGYPT, Mr. McNeil did not share the optimism of his friends over revision of the 1936 Treaty. Unless revision secured the stability of the Middle East, it would be no good. He laid down three conditions without which he could not support a settlement:

(i) The treaty must be coupled with reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 regarding the stability of Middle Eastern frontiers.

(ii) If Egypt is to get more arms as a result of a settlement, we must insist that these arms should not be used for aggressive purposes against Egypt's neighbours.

(iii) We must get fresh assurances from the Egyptian Government in regard to freedom of navigation of the Suez Canal.

Notes for Answer

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary will presumably not wish to be drawn on the detailed terms of the settlement with Egypt. He may, however, wish to say that the three points Mr. McNeil has raised are certainly in the minds of Her Majesty's Government, and even if some of them may not be /suitable
suitable for incorporation in the text of an agreement (e.g., reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration by Britain, France and the United States), he hopes we will in due course be able to satisfy the Opposition on all three points.
Mr. Enoch Powell led off the Conservative opposition to an agreement with Egypt. His case was briefly:

No agreement signed by Egypt would be worth the paper it was written on. The Secretary of State had already referred to breaches of the Sudan Agreement of February this year, and we all knew what happened to the 1936 Treaty. If our troops left Egypt, the technicians left behind would be subjected to terrorism, the Egyptians would make inroads on the Suez Canal, there would be bad repercussions in Iraq and Jordan and throughout the Mediterranean area. In the long run the Egyptians could be forced to give in and supply their labour as they had done in the past. He ended, however, by saying that he could not support the Government's policy in this unless "substantial members of British troops remained in the Middle East area."

2. Mr. Powell then went on to assert that United States policy was directed to supplanting British interests in the Middle East and to disrupt the Commonwealth. It was ridiculous that the Americans should be forcing us out of our bases in Egypt on the grounds that we were infringing the sovereignty of Egypt while at the same time they were negotiating bases for themselves in Crete and Spain.
Notes for Answer

If this is an isolated speech, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary may not wish to answer it. But if there are more, and it is felt that an answer is called for, he may wish to say that Mr. Powell has entirely misunderstood the objective of the negotiations between Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government. We do not believe that the twin objectives of a settlement with Egypt and the maintenance of the security of the Middle East are incompatible.

Mr. Powell has suggested that we should forcibly subject the Egyptian people to our will. This appears to be the only alternative policy which he has to offer. He also objects to the withdrawal of British combatant forces from Egypt as part of a settlement. Why did he not say so in the Foreign Affairs Debate in May, when the Prime Minister made it clear that the conditions we were putting to the Egyptians "if accepted in good faith, would render possible the reduction of the British forces in the Canal Zone from 80,000 to a small fraction of that number."

2. Mr. Nutting may also wish to refute Mr. Powell's allegation that the United States are forcing us out. As the Prime Minister said on May 11, "After careful and thorough discussions with the American authorities, both military and civil, under the Truman Administration, we reached conclusions on the necessary conditions." ... "When, after the Presidential election, President Eisenhower came into power, all this matter was reviewed." The upshot was that in March we proposed to the Egyptians that the British and United States delegates should meet them and discuss the position. It was the Egyptians, and not the United States Government, who did not accept this course. On July 21 the Chancellor...
Hansard
of
July 21.

of the Exchequer referred to the talks which had been conducted by Lord Salisbury in Washington and at which General Sir Brian Robertson, who has conducted the negotiations with Egypt on our behalf, was present. There has been throughout the closest consultation between the United States Government and ourselves on all the issues that are at stake. Her Majesty's Government dissociate themselves completely from any suggestion that the United States Government are forcing our hand in this matter.
The Secretary of State's intention has been to make a statement on the Cairo negotiations as soon as an "agreement on principles" has been reached with the Egyptians. When Parliament reassembled on October 20 we hoped that this would occur on the following day. In his statement to the House the Secretary of State accordingly said that he hoped to be able to make an announcement within the next few days.

2. No agreement was, however, reached on October 21.

Meanwhile two questions about the negotiations were down for October 26. The Secretary of State replied to these that he was still unable to make a statement but would do so at the earliest opportunity. These questions gave rise to various supplementaries, but there was no pressure on the Secretary of State to make any statement before he felt able to do so.

3. The prospects of reaching an agreement on principles in the immediate future have now somewhat receded. Nevertheless, it is still possible that this agreement might be secured in the next few weeks or even days. Meanwhile it would be best, if possible, to avoid making any Ministerial statement about the negotiations, since no form of words could be devised which would satisfy public opinion both in this country and in Egypt. The ultimate effect of any such statement must therefore be to make the prospects of an agreement on principles more remote.

4. There will no doubt be several references to the Cairo negotiations in the course of the debate even if no Ministerial statement about them is made. These will not in themselves do much
do much damage even if some of them take the line that an agreement on the lines now proposed would be against the interests of this country. Indeed their effect on the Egyptian negotiators may in the long run be good.

5. It is therefore recommended that the Secretary of State should confine his remarks on this subject to renewing his promise of a statement as soon as possible. A draft passage to this effect is submitted.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE

Egypt Negotiations

I had hoped before now to be able to make statements on the progress of our discussions in Cairo. I am sorry to say that this is still not possible. I can, however, assure the House that it is still my intention to make a statement as soon as the situation makes it desirable or necessary. Meanwhile we must be content to wait patiently for developments.
Mr. Creswell

D. 12.24 p.m. November 11, 1953

Re: 1567

November 11, 1953

R. 2.07 p.m. November 11, 1953

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1567 of November 11
Repeated for information to Washington

Your telegram No. 4662 to Washington.

Following from delegation.

There is of course a danger that the Egyptian Ambassador at Washington will not convey to his Government the full force of United States representations. He has already been in trouble with the C.R.C. and like most Egyptians is probably unwilling to be the bearer of ill tidings.

2. To be fully effective action must also be taken in Cairo with the Military Committee, and so long as Caffery and certain members of his staff remain here the Egyptians will always (repeat always) consider that the real sympathies of the United States are on their side and that they can afford to try and push Her Majesty's Government still further back. So long as they think this the Egyptians will not clinch.

3. In any case they are less impressed by words than by action and the most effective jolt would undoubtedly be the departure of Caffery and his replacement by someone who could give us a degree of support commensurate with real value to the N.A.T.O. Powers of a functioning base in Egypt.

4. The real issue is whether we can afford the risk of Egyptian neutrality at the outbreak of a major war. The Soviet Government have sent one of their ablest officers (former Minister at Beirut) to take over their Legation here. They are clearly exerting active pressure on the Egyptians now and will do even more in the event of war. In spite of all their protestations the Egyptians might well succumb to such pressure through timidity. To break their neutrality by force would involve a considerable diversion of our forces at a highly inconvenient time. Apart from the political implications of such action it would not be effective in securing Egyptian cooperation.

4. In this diplomatic struggle between ourselves and the Russians one can only say of Caffery that he who is not with us is against us.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington as my telegram No. 374.

/Repeated to Washington/
Flag A  In the letter at JE. 1192/20/596G Her Majesty's Embassy at Cairo ask for guidance in the event of a breakdown of the present talks in Cairo. They point out that we seem to have no remedy for a situation in which the Egyptians refrain from open violence against our forces in the Canal Zone and against British subjects in the Delta, and concentrate on vindictive measures against the latter and British interests in general. Before considering this particular aspect of the problem, it may be of value to review the question as a whole.

AIM OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

2. If the talks break down, our aim in Egypt will be to secure:

(A) In the Canal Zone
   Security of British forces and property.

(B) In the Delta
   (i) Protection of the interests of British subjects;
   (ii) Protection of their lives.

THREATS AND COUNTER MEASURES

Canal Zone

3. The threat to (A) consists of
   (a) Guerilla action
   (b) Direct action by Egyptian armed forces
   (c) Administrative action by Egyptian Government to disorganize essential civilian services in the Canal Zone.

4. We have prepared for these eventualities as follows:-
   (a) Plans exist for nineteen "measures to maintain our position" which G.O.C., B.T.E. will take, mostly after reference to Ministers (see D(53)25 Flag B of April 21 - JE. 1192/218G).

/(b)
(b) Our forces are strong enough to meet this threat.
(c) Proclamation of full military government with provision for feeding the civilian population and running the Canal Zone as an economic entity separate from Egypt. (This is actually one of the measures referred to at (a))

Delta.

5. The threat to (B) is as follows:-

(i) Interests of British subjects
(d) "Nibbling" - discrimination against British commercial and other interests, refusal of visas, etc. This has already started.
(e) Outright legal action to expropriate British subjects and companies and prevent their commercial and other operations.

(ii) Lives of British subjects
(f) Judicial murder.
(g) Connivance of Egyptian Government at disorders against British subjects.
(h) Breakdown of law and order.

6. We have no plans to counter (d) and (e). There are no important reprisals we could take except for expropriation of the Egyptian blocked sterling balances. This would represent a grave contravention of international banking practice and might well have disastrous effects on confidence in sterling. The Treasury would therefore strongly resist it. Our reaction would in consequence be confined to protests, which would probably have no effect.

7. Nor have we any plan to deal with (f) or (g). The Turf Club murders of January 1952 are a fairly good example of the sort of situation that might arise under (g). On that occasion the disorders
were brought under control in 24 hours, and we did not launch RODEO. Meanwhile we were unable to protect British subjects in Cairo. The lesson to be learnt from this would seem to be that we shall find it politically impossible to launch RODEO unless there has been a breakdown of law and order in the Delta which is both complete and prolonged. This means that we cannot use RODEO as an answer to (f) or (g). There is no other remedy. Our reaction would therefore, as in the case of (d) and (g), have to be confined to ineffectual protests.

8. Our answer to (h) is RODEO.

PROBLEM RAISED IN HER MAJESTY'S EMBASSY'S LETTER

9. We have not hitherto given adequate thought to (d), (e), (f) and (g). This is because it has been widely assumed that a breakdown of negotiations would inevitably be followed by (h), to which we reply with RODEO. The argument is roughly as follows: If talks break down the Council of the Revolutionary Command will find it politically necessary to start military action against us in the Canal Zone. This will unleash subversive para-military elements and will also provoke strong reprisals from Her Majesty's Forces. When it becomes apparent that the Regime cannot prevent the latter, the subversive elements will get out of hand, and will take violent action against British subjects, and possibly also overthrow the Government. RODEO will then be necessary.

10. The present letter from Cairo disputes this analysis, without, however, giving clear reasons for doing so. They probably reason on the following lines. The Council of Revolutionary Command might feel that they could satisfy political hotheads in Cairo, and so be able to keep subversive elements under control, without starting a full-scale guerrilla war in the Canal Zone, by taking vindictive but carefully controlled measures against British subjects and interests in
the Delta. They might succeed, at least for a time, in doing this. We should thus be faced with (d), (e) and possibly (f) and (g), but not (h).

11. In these circumstances we cannot launch RODEO. There seems to be a school of thought in Her Majesty's Embassy (see Mr. Creswell's letter of May 22 - J.E.1052/130G) which advocates Flag C RODEO to meet both this situation and (a), (b) and (c) (the threat to our position in the Canal Zone), as a means of suppressing the trouble at its source. This course would clearly be politically impossible, and is in any case not the policy of Her Majesty's Government. The sole purpose of RODEO is to prevent a massacre of British subjects. (a), (b) and (c) are already adequately catered for by the strength of our forces in Egypt and the plans for measures to maintain our position in the Canal Zone. Against (d), (e), (f) and (g) we must face the fact that we have no real safeguards whatever.

12. There would in fact be only two courses open to us to meet the threats to British subjects and interests in the Delta.

(1) To let events take their course;

(2) To choose a suitable moment to clear all British subjects who were not prepared to forgo the protection of Her Majesty's Government out of Egypt, and cut our losses.

13. Course (2) would be a very drastic step. Our interests in Egypt are considerable. It might turn out that we had jettisoned them unnecessarily. (In May of this year we went as far as advising all "inessential" people to leave. This did not however involve any large scale abandonment of British property or interests). evacuation of British subjects would also involve Her Majesty's Government in considerable expense.

14. There are, however, weighty arguments on the other side. We should lose immense prestige by sitting back and watching our interests driven out of Egypt and British subjects victimised. /To
To cut our losses and clear the decks for action would have the opposite effect. Secondly, commercial operations in a foreign country depend on the goodwill of the local government. In Egypt there would be no goodwill. We might as well recognize that the basis of our commercial position in the country would have gone. Thirdly, we should be free to take any measures we thought necessary in the Canal Zone and the Sudan, without fear of repercussions on British subjects in the Delta. Finally, when it comes to the point, G.H.Q., M.E.L.P. may well, as they did last time, find it impossible to mount RODEO. (Mr. Creswell himself advocated a policy of this kind in his letter of May 11 (JE.1052/117/G), but for different reasons).

15. Nevertheless the fact remains that if Course (2) had been our policy in 1951 we should certainly be out of the Delta by now.

CONCLUSION

16. Any decision to adopt Course (2) could only be taken when threats (e), (f), (g) and (h) appear imminent. Meanwhile all we can do is to clear our own and the Embassy's minds on the nature of the various threats, the remedies (or lack of them), and the decisions which may have to be taken.

RECOMMENDATION

17. We should reply to Her Majesty's Embassy informally on the above lines.

November 12, 1953.

[Signature]

/It is
SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

Mr. Creswell

No. 1578

November 13, 1953

D. 6.38 p.m. November 13, 1953

R. 7.18 p.m. November 13, 1953

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1578 of November 13

Repeated for information to B.M.E.O.,

and Saving to Washington

Ankara

Paris

My telegram No. 1490, paragraph 9.

Following from delegation.

It would be useful for us to know in advance Her Majesty's

Government's view on the possibility of agreeing to the entry

into force of the agreement immediately on signature of the main

text, (i.e., a month or so after the Agreement on Principles - the

time depending upon the progress of detailed discussions).

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington, Ankara

and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 394, 68 and 198 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Washington, Ankara and Paris]
CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD SAVING TELEGRAM
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

By Bag

No. 412 Saving
November 26, 1953

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 412 Saving of November 26.
Repeated for information Saving to: B.M.E.O. No. 827
Washington No. 4093
Ankara No. 240
Paris No. 3069

Your telegram No. 1578 [of November 13: Egypt Negotiations].

Following for Delegation.

Parliament would certainly wish to debate this agreement before it entered into force. It should therefore provide for ratification and for its entry into force immediately upon exchange of ratifications either at London or Cairo. After signature it must follow normal ratification procedure. Text would lie before Parliament until there was a debate and a division, or failing that for 21 days. The instrument of ratification would then be signed with a view to exchange against corresponding Egyptian instrument. If Parliament were sitting, the delay between signature and ratification would not be likely to exceed four weeks, and might well be less. Nothing can be done while Parliament is in recess between about December 20 and January 31, and April 15 and 27.

The above only holds true if there is no need for United Kingdom legislation before the Agreement comes into force. It seems unlikely that there will be any necessity for legislation, but it is impossible to be certain until full text is available.
Dear Department,

Mr. Little, of the Arab News Agency, discussed the defence negotiations with General Neguib on November 7. He has given us an account of the President's statements and of his own view of the situation, of which the following are the main points of interest.

2. General Neguib said that he was determined to reach an agreement with the British but added the proviso that Egypt's sovereignty and vital interests must not be prejudiced. He said that the Egyptians were prepared to be patient and referred to the régime's strengthened position in the country. He was convinced that the British Government were delaying matters until after the Sudan elections.

3. Mr. Little's own feeling was that, on the strength of the recent improvement in their internal position, the régime might be less ready to make concessions, and that this disinclination might increase as time went by. There was, as thought, probably some increasing support among them for the thesis that the Egyptians should sit tight until 1956.

4. We are not ourselves entirely convinced by this line of argument. In the past, the suggestion has so often been made that it was because of their internal difficulties the régime could not put to the country terms which they might otherwise be willing to accept, that we felt that the converse ought, to some extent at least, to apply. The ideal from a negotiating point of view is presumably to catch the Egyptians in a mood midway between over-confidence and pessimism and the régime's stronger internal position might enable us to do so. But the opportunity may well be a fleeting one.

Yours ever,

[Signature]

CHANCERY.
Mr. Creswell  
No. 1591.  
November 16, 1953

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1591 of November 16.

Repeated for information to: Washington  
                        B.N.E.C.  
                        Ankara  
                        U.K.  Del New York  
                        and Saving to: Paris

Following from Robertson.

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 1000 hours this morning to tell him that Her Majesty's Government had decided that I must return to the United Kingdom and that this decision was solely due to the urgent necessity for my taking over my responsibilities with the Transport Commission.

2. Before I had time to say more the Minister for Foreign Affairs took the words out of my mouth. He said that although he was sorry that I was going he recognised that it was inevitable. He had known for some time about my new appointment and was aware that there had been pressure for me to take it up.

3. When I gave him an advance copy of the press communiqué he expressed satisfaction with its contents and was good enough to say that he particularly welcomed the last sentence. He said that the time chosen for its issue, namely 1300 hours local time, was well chosen. It would enable him to inform General Neguib so that he did not hear of it first on the wireless.

4. Far from implying that my departure might lead to a break in the discussions, he expressed emphatically the opinion that the discussions must continue and succeed. We were, he said, in fact in agreement as to what should happen. Even on the question of availability there was no basic disagreement. In the event of danger Egypt would need her friends and would certainly wish to grant them the facilities necessary to resist the danger. The only difficulty was to find suitable words in which to express the agreement that in fact existed.

/5. I said
5. I said that we had put forward on October 21 proposals for a final composition of outstanding differences. We felt that our proposals were very reasonable and should be acceptable to the Egyptian Government. We were disappointed at their reception. The Egyptian Delegation had focused attention on availability but at the same time they had entered qualifications or reservations on every other point. We were not, of course, unwilling to discuss matters further. But we had no fresh suggestions to offer. On availability in particular, the crux was that if world war III should come, we wanted to have the base immediately and fully available to us without delay or argument. Since the Egyptian Government did not oppose this idea, they should now come forward with their proposals as to how the problem could be solved, taking into account our proper preoccupations on this point.

6. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that availability was the main point at issue so far as Egypt was concerned. If that could be solved other points were unlikely to cause much difficulty. They could not accept that the responsibility for producing a solution should rest with them exclusively. They would do their best to find an answer (I am sceptical about this) but both parties should feel a common concern and responsibility. So much had been successfully resolved that it would be a matter for blame for both Great Britain and Egypt if they were unable to get over the last hurdles. He had stated our position on October 21 and he understood that this was still our position. They had done likewise. It was now the task of diplomacy to find means for reconciling the two positions which he said did not really lie far apart.

7. I said that although there would be an interval between my departure and the return of Her Majesty's Ambassador, that did not mean that no progress could be made meanwhile. Creswell was fully competent to discuss matters with them. I suggested that there might be an advantage in informal discussions with him. Delegation meetings inevitably attracted some publicity. It would be good if some of the differences could be ironed out in advance, so that when the delegations next met they would at least be able to report that progress had been made. In any case I urged strongly that contacts should be maintained at all levels.
SECRET

Cairo telegram No. 1591 to Foreign Office

8. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he interpreted this as meaning that we did not consider the situation in the Sudan to be a bar to progress here, and that the two problems could be regarded as separate. I agreed. He said that this was his view also. He agreed with the necessity for maintaining contact and expressed a willingness to discuss matters with the Embassy.

9. Crewe and I emphasised the necessity for preserving a good atmosphere both by control over the press and by reduction of incidents in the Canal Zone. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was quite receptive on both points. As regards the Canal Zone he said "we must see what we can do to reduce incidents, or even stop them altogether". I should not like to be too positive about the practical outcome of this.

10. The interview was most friendly throughout. I said that I should be inviting members of the Egyptian Delegation to my farewell party to my friends in Cairo and the Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated that the invitation would be accepted.


ADVANCE COPIES TO:
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Private Secretary
Mr. R. Allen
Head African Department
Head News Department

-0-0-

bbbbb
Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations.

Refer a conversation with Mr. Dulles on

1. Deucean signature formula for assistance
   to Egypt. 28-32 balanced.

References

MINUTES

Separate submission.

See within

F.O. Minute, H. Boothby of 4th November

F.O. Minute, H. Boothby of 9th November

(Acted upon)
EGYPT: DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS

Washington telegram number 2574 of November 5

Mr. Dulles is willing to give the Egyptians a jolt in Washington. This is an offer which we can scarcely refuse, particularly as it seems to offer some security against further mishandling by Mr. Caffery. It provides after all the best chance open to us at present of bringing home to the Egyptians that they can exact no further concessions from us through American mediation.

2. But if we accept, we must also provide Mr. Dulles with the means of clearing up any Egyptian misunderstanding of our availability position. The suggestion has been made that the Egyptians see in our present formula a quibble which would allow the United Kingdom and the United States to provide themselves with the means of entering Egypt in the event of an Arab war with Israel, after denunciation by the United Nations. It may therefore be advisable to suggest to Mr. Dulles that he should reaffirm to the Egyptians that what our two governments have in mind is the hypothesis of a major war involving a threat to the Middle East. All that we are seeking is a provision that the Base will be made immediately available if in such circumstances and in order to counter this threat, a recommendation is made to this effect by the United Nations.

3. In this way it should be possible for Mr. Dulles to ascertain what the Egyptians' motive may be in rejecting our formula. If the motive is a more serious one and, as suggested in paragraph 3 of General Robertson's letter to Mr. Allen of October 29, it has its roots in a real attachment to neutralism,
then this will become apparent more quickly. It is important
that Mr. Dulles, no less than ourselves, should satisfy himself
on this point.
4. The Department are not now suggesting that we should offer
any redraft of the formula to Mr. Dulles as a possible solution.
The delegation themselves have not advocated this and we should
only put the Americans back into their rôle of mediator which
they seem at long last to have abandoned for the rôle of ally,
if we were to suggest it. We want the Egyptians to suggest it,
and if there must be a third party, we might prefer a non-
American.
5. Should a word from Mr. Dulles have the effect of eliciting
something from the Egyptians, there are a number of variations
on our formula which General Robertson considers tolerable in
varying degrees (see Appendix A to his letter at 'A' attached)
but not particularly likely to appeal to the Egyptians. It
is possible that a useful prod from Mr. Dulles, provided that it
is delivered in Washington, as he gave [to] understand it would
be, might tip the balance.

November 4, 1953

Sir W. Strong  Roger Allen 47th

Pain 3 is difficult to draft, but I have
tried a variant, after discussion with Mr. Allen.

W. Strong
I am very doubtful about this, let us discuss further.

I am well pleased at present so far as registering themselves go. I am strongly inclined to let the Egyptians make an effort more.

F. E. Novs.
EGYPT: DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. Dulles' offer to give a jolt in Washington

Please see the Secretary of State's minute below.

2. Now that the Foreign Affairs debate is over, we can again consider Mr. Dulles' offer to 'give a jolt' to the Egyptians so that they may know where they stand in respect of American policy.

3. We have now had a telegram from Cairo (No. 1549) rather disposing of Mr. Dulles' idea that what is really inhibiting the Egyptians on reavailability is the fear that our formula is only a quibble to permit us to reactivate the base in a localized Israeli-Arab quarrel. The reality seems rather to be that there is a good deal of neutralist sentiment in their attitude or, to put it more sympathetically, they want to have their hands free to negotiate with us when a world-war situation arises.

4. The Delegation goes on to welcome Mr. Dulles' proposal but emphasises the importance of careful timing since it appears that the Egyptians have come to the same conclusion as us (but for opposite reasons) that it would be better not to reach agreement till the Sudan elections are over.

5. It seems to follow that we should let Mr. Dulles know without further delay that we welcome his offer, at the same time exposing what we think to be a fallacy in respect of Egyptian fears about reactivation in a local affray and explaining our views about what would be the right time for him to act - and in Washington, not Cairo.

November 9, 1953

I have noted this with the Department and agree.

C. E. Peabody
agree with this line.

I do not think we can ignore Mr. Dulles' offer, but the time for a jolt may be a bit later, especially if we are going to recall Eisenhower. In short, I think we should at least see the Egyptian reaction to that. Probably also it will not be effective until after the Israeli elections.

Sir P. Averun.

Rysen Allen

9/11

Secretary of State.

T. Dixon

9/11

Yes, it is important not to move until after Israeli elections.

Alex may know what Egyptian

in his will made of it.

Interviews: I don't think

anyone else can read them.

Dulles will have to speak

fully credibly.

BN. No. 10
When I saw Dulles this evening he said he understood that the negotiations were, for the moment, at a standstill. I remarked that the principal difficulty seemed to me to be the formula for availability. Dulles asked why the Egyptians were objecting to the formula based on the uniting for peace resolution which he had thought the Egyptians had in principle accepted. I quoted the remarks of the Egyptian Foreign Minister to Creswell reported in Cairo telegraph No. 4376 [sic 1509 may refer] and said that one possible explanation was that the Egyptians were afraid of a possible condemnation of other Arab States if there were a war with Israel. In which event Egypt would not want to see the Base reactivated. Dulles seemed to think that this was quite a probable explanation, and wondered if he saw any way to meet this Egyptian fear, since he supposed that it was not in fact an eventuality in which we should want to reactivate the Base. If you would let me have your views on this point he would be very willing to give the Egyptians what he called a "jolt" here.

2. As regards uniform he said that he realised the difficulties on both sides. He personally still wondered whether it was not possible to devise some special "Base technicians' uniform". But he was obviously reluctant to intervene in this question either by making further representations.
SECRET

Washington telegram No. 2374 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

representations to us or by putting pressure on the Egyptians.

Foreign Office pass Cairo, B.M.E.O., Ankara and
Saving to Paris and U.K. Del. Paris as my telegrams Nos. 120,
100, 32, 336 and 199 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo, B.M.E.O., Ankara and Saving to
Paris].
Your telegram number 2374 [of November 3] Egyptian Defence negotiations.

Please tell Mr. Dulles that we welcome his offer to give a jolt to the Egyptians in Washington (not Cairo needless to say).

2. You should let him know
   (a) that we do not now believe (see Cairo telegram 1549) that Egyptian hesitations over availability are based on anything more complicated than a wish to remain uncommitted in the general situation in which both the Americans and ourselves would want to see the base reactivated without negotiation or delay. It is really that state of mind which most requires a jolt.

   (b) that we regard the timing of the step as most important. Cairo telegram under reference confirms our belief that the Egyptians are prepared to accept the present lull in the negotiations until after the Sudan elections at the earliest. What we most want to avoid, when
they are again in a mood to reach a conclusion, is that they should go on expecting us, as they do at present, to take the step of proposing a formula. 'We have and shall have nothing to propose. Mr. Dulles knows this of course. If he will say so at a well-chosen moment, which I think should not be before the end of this month, it might have a most valuable effect and help us to attain an object which I am sure is his as much as it is mine.

3. If matters are left in the hands of Mr. Caffery, I fear that Egyptian illusions about the views of the U.S. Government and consequently what to expect of us will remain undisturbed.
Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

[Handwritten note in the margin:]

The attached note, which is a very
dependent, and the only one at present
prepared in U.S. funds, should be
to not imagine you and be
sent to Washington, which is
a letter from the President.

[Partially legible text in the body of the document:]

...we must not make...
Tom Little of the Arab News
Agency was received by General Neguib on
October 29. You may be interested to see
the enclosed record of what Little told
trefo Evans had transpired at the
meeting. As you probably know, Little
is one of the best informed people and
shrewdest observers in Cairo.

E. B. Boothby, Esq.,
African Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.
Mr. Tom Little was asked by General Naguib to call on him this morning. The meeting lasted for about forty minutes and they spoke about the uniform question and the availability clause.

2. On the former General Naguib indicated that the Egyptians would be prepared to agree to our technicians wearing uniform on ceremonial occasions. He gave as an example some of them attending the Alamein ceremony and added there might be occasions when the Egyptians might wish to see them in uniform. Mr. Little referred to the great difficulty which Her Majesty's Government would have in preventing any agreement to Parliament which did not give our technicians the right to wear uniform. General Naguib said he appreciated this fact and went on to say that what was important was that nothing should be written in to the agreement which would give rise to embarrassing questions and answers in the United Kingdom and similarly embarrassing retorts in Egypt. He agreed that there was little difference in our points of view as regards fact and that what remained was to decide what was to be actually said.

3. As regards availability, General Naguib used much the same arguments as Col. Nasser to reject the United Nations formula and maintained that it was not really satisfactory even from the point of view of Her Majesty's Government. Mr. Little told him that Col. Nasser had spoken of a return to parliamentary government in two years or so and that the British were naturally concerned as to what would be the outcome of a mere consultation clause in such circumstances. General Naguib said he would "let Mr. Little into a secret", which was that under the new Constitution the President would be elected for five years with the possibility of renewal for a further five years. There was little doubt therefore that for a decade he would be the Head of the State and that if something should happen to him somebody like Gamal Abdel Nasser would take his place.

4. Turning to internal affairs, General Naguib said that the result of the Tribunal's work had strengthened the position of the régime and that there was general relief in the country that uncertainty about the future of the régime had been removed. Speaking of the Abdel Halil trial, he said that Abdel Halil and certain Secretariat leaders had been working to cause disturbances amongst the students and industrial workers and that such disturbances would have had the effect of undermining the régime. He did not appear to attach such importance to the contacts which these elements have with foreign powers.

5. Mr. Little said that General Naguib was personally most friendly and generally conciliatory towards the British - more so in fact than when he had last seen him several months ago. The General gave no sign that the Egyptian side were thinking in terms of a breakdown in the talks; in fact he said that "more patience" was necessary.

6. The General's health has apparently improved during the last few days - he said that he was feeling very much better.

7. Discussing the talks with me, Mr. Little suggested that it was important that agreement in principle should be reached before the results of the Sudan elections were known.
9. the non-Egyptian party succeeded or failed, the effect on
the Egyptians is, far as our negotiations were concerned,
would almost certainly be unfavourable. I think there is
much truth in this.

(SIGNED)
T.E. EVANS
29th October, 1953.
ANGLO-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS
Position of U.S. Ambassador

Please see Sir William Strang's minute on Washington telegram No. 2330, (attached).

2. There are several pros and cons to the proposition that the State Department should recall Mr. Caffery, but only pros, I think, to the proposition that it would be undesirable for the Secretary of State to accept the invidious responsibility of answering "yes" or "no" to the question imputed to Mr. Dulles at the end of paragraph 3.

3. None the less the reply could no doubt be so drafted as to show at least which set of possible consequences (to Caffery's recall or no recall) are more acceptable to us. Thus, on the assumption of his recall,

(a) we cannot really expect that anything Mr. Dulles may say to Mr. Caffery will convert him. If he suffers no change of heart he will return to his post apparent victor over the State Department and full of new grounds for resentment against us.

(b) Egyptian expectations will be quite abnormally stimulated. No progress in the negotiations of any sort will occur, and there may even be further backslidings from positions we hoped were secure. The Egyptians will certainly feel justified in thinking up further difficulties, and even if the State Department succeed in resisting Mr. Caffery (as we rather fear they will not), they will certainly feel justified in thinking up further difficulties, and even if the State Department succeeds in resisting Mr. Caffery (as we rather fear they will not), they will certainly feel justified in thinking up further difficulties.
I discussed this with the Department and agree generally with the foregoing.

2. I suggest our line should be -

(a) H.M. Ambassador should avoid giving definite advice to Mr. Dulles about this and should if necessary expressly state that we do not feel able to take the responsibility of doing so.

(b) He should try to ascertain definitely that there would in any case be no intention on the part of the U.S. Government of removing Mr. Caffery from his post.

(c) If Mr. Dulles however hinted that this was a possibility, Sir R. Makins should take the line that we should certainly not wish to do anything to prevent such action by the Americans.

(d) If on the other hand, as is more likely, it is only a question of recalling Mr. Caffery for consultations and then sending him back, Sir R. Makins might indicate that such action would in our view be likely to arouse a great deal of speculation in Egypt and would probably have a disturbing effect upon the present Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Our attitude at present towards Egypt is to stand firm and not show undue interest in a settlement, and the effect of this attitude would be largely vitiated by the misinterpretations which the Egyptians would be bound to place upon Mr. Caffery’s recall for consultation.

Sir W. Strong

(R. Allen)

October 29, 1953.
Need we say any more than that it
must be for Mr. Deland to decide whether
or not to recall Mr. Coffey for consultation,
that we should not wish ourselves to suggest it;
and that we think the recall would only
cause a good deal of unnecessary speculation?

W. Strange
30/10

1 sup. It would be interesting
to discover if there is anything in (C).

The President spoke to me
aloud but most emphatically in reference
to his dislike of Coffey. It is
a commentary on his lack
of sight that Coffey is still here.

Sir W. Strange.

SECRET

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

SID R. Adan

Sir R. Makins
No. 2330
October 28, 1953.

SECRET

Your telegram No. 4394, Caffery.

Personal for Sir William Stranj from Sir R. Makins.

I spoke to Dulles this evening. I said that recent reports of what Caffery had been saying to third parties in Cairo had renewed the doubts which, as he was aware, were held in London about Caffery's activities and that this was again becoming a major irritant factor in our relationship.

2. In particular, Caffery had seemed to cast doubt on the formula on availability which Dulles himself had proposed. I observed that it was believed, rightly or wrongly, that Caffery pursued a "personal policy" and did not always reflect positions agreed between us.

3. Dulles at once admitted that my last observation was probably true and that Caffery was not in sympathy with some aspects of the policy which we were pursuing. On the other hand his influence had undoubtedly kept the negotiations alive on several occasions. It was, of course, the case that the Governments had not always agreed on the course to be pursued in these negotiations, but it was understood that, while we might not always agree among ourselves, we would always present a solid front to the Egyptians. Dulles then said that he would be prepared to consider recalling Caffery to Washington for consultation if I thought that would help in the present situation. I replied that I would not want to express an opinion on this myself without knowing the Secretary of State's view.

4. I then remarked that in my opinion it was not what Caffery might or might not have said in the past that was most important now but that we should present an absolutely solid front to the Egyptians on the basis of our latest and final offer. Dulles said that he himself had spoken to the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington this week and had made it quite clear what the American position was on the availability formula. I mentioned the question of uniform. Dulles replied that he would be happier if we could invent some special type of uniform for the base technicians.

5. Finally Dulles said that he would like to reflect on what I had said and consult his advisers. He did not wish to commit himself this evening.
evening to recalling Caffery for consultation but he would let me have his considered view as soon as possible.

G. In the meantime, perhaps you would let me know urgently whether you would in fact like Caffery recalled or not at this delicate juncture in the negotiations. I would expect the State Department to advise against it, and it might indeed stir up a lot of unwelcome speculation.
Ambassador,

I would much prefer Mr. Dulles to make up his own mind regarding the recall of Mr. Caffery for consultations. I certainly do not wish to suggest it and can indeed imagine a good deal of undesirable speculation arising were he temporarily to leave his post.

2. You should know, however, that I have it very much in mind that were there any prospect of removing Mr. Caffery from Egypt altogether I should regard it as so much to the good. Should you find there was anything of the sort in Mr. Dulles' mind you should, of course, not say anything to put him off.
Mr. Creswell  
No. 1637  
November 26, 1953  

D. 12.23 p.m. November 26, 1953  
R. 2.05 p.m. November 26, 1953  

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1637 of November 26

Repeated for information to:  
Paris  
Washington  
B.M.E.O.  

My telegram No. 1633.

Australian Minister has reported fully by saving telegram to Australian High Commissioner, London, on interview yesterday with United States Ambassador.

2. Caffery said he much resented these attacks, and though he had not made representations officially to Fawzi he had done so very strongly in private to Nasr. He attributed the trouble entirely to Egyptian resentment at failure to conclude negotiations with us and he blamed us for it. Egyptians had made a number of concessions, at Caffery’s own suggestion, in the belief that (as the Americans had assured them) they would be able thereby to get a settlement. They now felt they had been deceived.

3. Caffery considered that the Egyptians had now given up hope of a negotiated settlement and would in due course break off negotiations if they could not get more out of us after Her Majesty’s Ambassador’s return. They would certainly go back on the position reached on October 21. He thought they would continue to work up incidents in the Canal Zone and cause trouble to British subjects in Egypt.

4. On the other hand, Caffery clearly admitted to McClure Smith that United States economic aid given to Egypt now would finally wreck all hopes of a negotiated settlement.

Foreign Office please pass Paris and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 55 and 378 respectively.

[Repeated to Paris and Washington].

7777777
Flag A: From the Cabinet Conclusions of November 26 the Department understand that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary intend to try to secure a firm promise of American support in a fresh approach to the Egyptian Government in the event of a breakdown in the current defence negotiations in Cairo. In the briefs prepared for the Bermuda Conference it has been suggested that the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State would wish to make it clear to the United States and French delegations that we intend to stand our ground in the negotiations with Egypt and in the face of the increased number of incidents in the Canal Zone. There has been no suggestion up to now that we should try to look ahead and secure American help on the hypothesis that the negotiations would fail; nor have we revived the earlier Franco-British proposal, which the Americans turned down in 1951, for a secret conference to consider joint action in defence of the freedom of transit of the Suez Canal.

2. It is, of course, rather late in the day to work out new plans for a joint Anglo-American approach to Egypt for presentation at Bermuda, should the negotiations breakdown. It is most unlikely that the Americans would agree to joining in new proposals which were more advantageous from our point of view than those which would have been rejected by the Egyptians. If we have then to make a new approach with the Americans, we may have to make modifications in what we have hitherto regarded as being our minimum requirements, and any suggestion in that direction would need to be very carefully worked out.
3. Would it meet the wishes of the Cabinet sufficiently if we were to add to the brief a paragraph in the following sense?

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary will no doubt try to find out what the position of the United States Government would be in the event of the Egyptians failing to meet our minimum demands and the negotiations breaking down. At the very least we would expect the Americans to use their influence to prevent the situation deteriorating to a point where relations between the United Kingdom and Egypt would be broken off. But have the United States Government any more constructive proposals? Would they, for example, consider there to be any advantage in a visit to Cairo by General Grunther and Lord Ismay in order to present General Neguib with the views of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on the Egyptian problem?

4. As for the freedom of navigation of the Suez Canal referred to by the Prime Minister in the first part of the Minutes of the Meeting, it will be recalled that the French Government have joined us in an approach to the United States Government on two previous occasions with a view to securing a secret meeting of the seven maritime countries most interested in the Canal — namely, United Kingdom, France, United States, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Italy — but the United States have consistently refused to have anything to do with these proposals until the defence negotiations were over. The French are willing to return to the charge with us whenever we give the word, but
neither they nor we have seen any advantage in doing so at
the present Conference.

November 27, 1953

[Signature]

I have spoken to Dr. J. Kirkpatrick
and Mr. Shookburgh. I don't think that
he need do any more briefing (unless
otherwise instructed).

This will suit itself not in due
course, so must hope.

[Signature]

P.U.S.D. found accordingly.

[Signature]
C.O.S. (53) 582
1ST DECEMBER, 1953

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF A BREAKDOWN OF CURRENT TALKS WITH EGYPT ON THE FUTURE OF THE C.N.L. ZONE BASE

Copy of a letter (Reference JE 1192/5962)
Dated 30th November, 1953 from the Foreign Office to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee

I enclose an extract from a letter* from Her Majesty's Embassy at Cairo about the possible consequences of a breakdown of the current talks, together with a copy of a draft letter† to the British Middle East Office (copy to Cairo) in reply.

We should be grateful for the views of the Chiefs of Staff on the proposals in the draft letter.

(Signed) E.B. BOOTHBY

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.
1ST DECEMBER, 1953.

† Annex I
‡ Annex II
2. POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE END OF THE C. H. L. E. S. L.

C.O.S.(53)582. 14/1/54

THE COMMISSION has before them a letter from the Foreign Office covering a draft reply to a letter from Her Majesty's Embassy in Cairo on this subject.

In discussion the COMMISSION approved the proposed reply subject to the following points:

(a) First sentence of paragraph 13 to be rewritten as follows:

"We have discussed these ideas with the Chiefs of Staff who agree that the views of the B.D.C.C.(E.L.) should be sought in this matter."

(b) The beginning of paragraph 10 to be rewritten to make it clear that the proposed "Egypt Local Defence Committee" would be under the B.D.C.C.(E.L.) and H.I. Ambassador.

THE COMMISSION:

Invites the Foreign Office to take note of their views.

+ Annex II to COS(53)582

- 2 -
TOP SECRET
P.M./57/335

PRIME MINISTER

The Canal Zone

On balance I believe we should try to get an Agreement with Egypt on the lines proposed, but without making any further concessions.

2. We should strongly urge the Americans to give us whole-hearted support to this end.

3. If this fails, we shall have to consider what alternatives exist. They will be painful and difficult choices.

4. One alternative might be to announce our intention to withdraw from the zone at once and to abandon the Base (taking away what we can) as a deliberate act of "re-deployment" of our forces; another would be to announce that we would withdraw in our own time completing the process by 1956 when the present treaty expires.

5. Any such move would have to be most carefully prepared. It could be very damaging to our whole reputation and position if it looked like running away from the Egyptians. It could destroy all hope of maintaining our position in Iraq etc. It ought to be timed in relation to our position in Persia.

6. It would be most dangerous to mention these alternative possibilities to the Americans now. Caffery would soon tell the Egyptians, who would then know that they had no need for an agreement with us.

7. I do not believe there is any chance that they would accept the idea of a joint Anglo-American Base in Egypt. Even in the air they went their facilities to be under cover of a British air base. It would probably annoy them to be pressed on this - but otherwise I see no harm.

/Conclusion
Conclusion

Our central purpose in Bermuda therefore should be to get really effective American support in the present negotiations and to make it clear to them that, politically, it is quite impossible for us to make any more concessions.

EDEN

December 1, 1923.
Breakdown of current talks; possible consequences

The Chiefs of Staff's Committee discussed the draft letter at 'A' at their meeting this afternoon. They expressed general sympathy with our intentions but (a) were hesitant about saying that they agreed, in advance of what B.D.C.C. thought and (b) were not very clear in their own minds about how our proposed new committee would fit into the hierarchy spreading out under B.D.C.C. General Brownjohn in particular was very conscious of the fact that the Prime Minister holds the G.O.C., M.E.L.F. responsible for whatever happens in the Zone and did not seem to envisage General Festing having quite the powers he seems to have exercised before. General Brownjohn was inclined to think that Her Majesty's Ambassador would have a better opportunity of making his views known at B.D.C.C. level than working side by side with G.O.C., B.T.E. He understood, however, on further explanations from me that in so far as our proposed local defence committee would be the operators of the small day-to-day pressure it was proposed to put on the Egyptians to make them lay off British interests in the Delta, there would be great advantage in having the Embassy involved before we reached the point where wide and critical decisions had to be made. The paper was approved subject to modifications in the sense above described, with the idea that it might be necessary to show it to the Defence Committee when the comments of B.D.C.C. and the Embassy had been obtained.

E. B. BROADLEY

December 8, 1953

I think it may well be necessary to get the Defence Chiefs' views on this and some
stage; but let us see whether the people in Egypt think first.

Dr. E.12
Mr. Wilson of the United States Embassy came to see me to-day to tell me that the conversation between Sir R. Makins and Mr. Dulles on November 3 (see Washington telegram number 2374 attached) had given birth to drafting efforts by the State Department both on availability and uniform (attached at B). I told Mr. Wilson that the draft on availability had evidently been devised to meet a supposition raised between Mr. Dulles and Sir R. Makins regarding reasons for Egyptian hesitation which we had come to the conclusion was erroneous. We had instructed Sir R. Makins to make this clear to Mr. Dulles (Foreign Office telegram to Washington number 4682 of November 10 at C.)

2. As to uniform I said again that I regretted that the United States and British Governments were not in sympathy. I added that recent indications (e.g. the talk General Neguib had with Mr. Little in Cairo) suggested that the Egyptians were perhaps not so worried over this question as the Americans seemed to suppose. Mr. Wilson said that the State Department did indeed continue to believe that the Egyptians set great store on this point. Mr. Wilson also showed me a telegram from the State Department instructing him to present these two formulae which ended with a request to the United States Embassy to find out "when we were proposing to approach the Egyptians again." I did not conceal from Mr. Wilson my feeling that the State Department might have known better than to put questions like that. He added apologetically that his Embassy had never been in any doubt that we thought it was
for the Egyptians to make a move, not us, and they had made this equally clear to the State Department.

3. Mr. Wilson, who evidently wondered whether I proposed to do any more in the way of submitting the two formulae to higher authority in the State Department, said he very much hoped that I would accept his personal belief that they came from Mr. Dulles himself, and that Mr. Aldrich had authorised him to say this to us. I said that although Mr. Dulles would by this time probably have learned from Sir R. Makins our real reasons for thinking an availability draft such as the one proposed was inapplicable to the present circumstances, I would none the less record Mr. Wilson's wish that the text should reach the Secretary of State. Mr. Wilson added that in reporting what I had said he would ask the State Department why they had not tried their formula on the Egyptians. I said they must do as they pleased about that. What we wanted when the time was ripe, was that the United States Government would say quite unequivocally to the Egyptians that if they wanted a treaty they must somehow meet the case of automatic reactivation in a world crisis, and if they were prepared to do this they would have to explain to us what was wrong with our formula.

November 13, 1953

E. D. Bassett

The availability formula seems harmless.

On uniform, I don't like 'distinctive uniform wearing day' much. They would surely have to have badges of rank anyway, and it seems absurd to go to the Base Commander every time a sailor has to put on his uniform.

Private Secretary
I am not prepared
to consider any proposals
by US forces but will
veto as at X.

The State Dept should
be so informed.

PB Nov 13

I have spoken to Mr. Wilson accordingly. He will see that the State Dept are informed.
The Secretary of State asked for a short note for use at to-day's Cabinet regarding United States activity in connexion with the Egyptian treaty negotiations. Note attached herewith.

November 17, 1953

The American suggests "availability" as a word here at step 3. The former seems harmless, but does not, I think, meet the real point, i.e. Egyptian neutralisation.

Rogu Allen
A member of the United States Embassy told the Head of African Department on November 13 that the conversation between Mr. Dulles and Sir Roger Makins on November 3 had given birth to drafting efforts by the State Department both on availability and uniforms. The United States Embassy were instructed to show us these formulae and to find out "when we were proposing to approach the Egyptians again." The United States Embassy were told, on the Secretary of State's instructions, that we were not prepared to consider any proposal by the United States Government put in terms such as these. What we wanted was that the United States Government should say quite unequivocally to the Egyptians that if they wanted a Treaty they must somehow meet the case of automatic reactivation in a world crisis.

2. On November 14 the United States Ambassador sent the Secretary of State a message from Mr. Dulles in the following terms:

"We have reached a point in Israeli-Arab relations where it is of utmost importance to announce allotment of economic aid to Arabs to counter recent announcement economic aid allotment to Israel. The only place where we would be in shape promptly to make an economic allotment of substantial size is Egypt. We have been holding up all assistance to Egypt in effort help settlement Suez matter. However this settlement has dragged out to a point
where we cannot continue much longer without very grave effect upon all our Arab relationships. If you felt that it was likely there would soon be new moves in Suez matter which might produce agreement, we could still hold up briefly but our time is fast running out.

"Before making final decision would appreciate your reactions."

The Secretary of State proposes to reply that he would hope that this decision would be postponed at the very least until we can take the matter over at the Bermuda Conference. The announcement of an allotment of United States economic aid to Egypt at this juncture would have a grave effect upon Anglo-American relations. It would remove the main inducement to the Egyptians to make a settlement with us before we have even reached agreement on principles. It would be interpreted as a major divergence of American and British policies.

November 16, 1953
MEMORANDUM

The following draft wording conforms to the suggestions made by the Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, to the British Ambassador, Sir Roger Makins, in a conversation on November 3, 1953:

Availability — The clause regarding the United Nations should read: "...in the event of a recommendation by the UN that the Base should be made available in the event of a threat to the peace or breach of the peace or an act of aggression by an outside power, and recognizing her responsibilities under the UN Charter and the Uniting-For-Peace Resolution, Egypt will afford etc."

Uniforms — "...outside Base area and when off duty within it British personnel will wear civilian clothes. When on duty in Base installations or in transit between them they will normally wear distinctive civilian working dress. They may wear service uniforms when so directed by the Base Commander. The Base Commander shall so direct on appropriate occasions".

SECRET

November 12, 1953
General Robertson had a private meeting with Colonel Nasser last night to have a final talk with him before leaving.

2. He said that he was very sorry to go before the negotiations were finished, particularly as the differences between us were now so small. Even on the question of the availability of the base which was the main difficulty there was no difference of substance but only of degree and of drafting. What we wanted was that the base should be available for the defence of the Middle East in the event of World War III. We had no other motive and we believed that this was what the Egyptians also wanted. We had put forward various suggestions to meet these requirements in the belief that they would also satisfy the Egyptian side and were for the moment at least to think of alternatives. It would therefore be helpful if the Egyptians could make some proposals. Both sides should seek a way out of the difficulty. It would be most irresponsible, when no difference of substance existed, not to carry matters to a successful conclusion. General Robertson said that he appreciated a soldier’s impatience at the delay (he himself had felt such impatience and even irritation after the last meeting of the delegations) but having assumed political responsibility Colonel Nasser and his colleagues had to go through with it.

3. Colonel Nasser said that he too earnestly hoped for an agreement and that the Egyptian side had done their best to meet us over technical control, the duties of the Assistant Base Commander /and duration.