CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD SAVING TELEGRAM
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

By Bag

No. 112 Saving
November 26, 1953

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 112 Saving of November 26.
Repeated for information Saving to: B.M.E.O. No. 827
Washington No. 4093
Ankara No. 24.0
Paris No. 3069

Your telegram No. 1578 [of November 13: Egypt Negotiations].

Following for Delegation.

Parliament would certainly wish to debate this agreement before it entered into force. It should therefore provide for ratification and for its entry into force immediately upon exchange of ratifications either at London or Cairo. After signature it must follow normal ratification procedure. Text would lie before Parliament until there was a debate and a division, or failing that for 21 days. The instrument of ratification would then be signed with a view to exchange against corresponding Egyptian instrument. If Parliament were sitting, the delay between signature and ratification would not be likely to exceed four weeks, and might well be less. Nothing can be done while Parliament is in recess between about December 20 and January 31, and April 15 and 27.

2. The above only holds true if there is no need for United Kingdom legislation before the Agreement comes into force. It seems unlikely that there will be any necessity for legislation, but it is impossible to be certain until full text is available.
Following from Delegation.

Cairo newspapers this morning carry a report that there will be an 'intra-Arab' meeting next week. The members of the Egyptian delegation, including Gamal Abdel Nasser, have left Cairo on tour. Naguib in an interview with New Arab News Agency yesterday spoke of the need for further patience. He is going on tour himself for about ten days and told the Australian Minister that he did not expect anything decisive to happen while he was away.

2. There is no suggestion on the Egyptian side that the talks are not to be resumed eventually, but their present delaying tactics are evidently deliberate. This attitude may be partly connected with Indian elections or be uncertainty as to their own next move. In any case it puts us in an embarrassing position by keeping us hanging about on the doorstep. We suggest that some action on your part to indicate that an interlude in the discussions is quite welcome to ourselves also might be good tactics.

Foreign Office please pass Washington, Ankara and Cairo to:

Washington, B.M.O.
Ankara
U.S.N.I. Paris
U.S.P.I. New York

Distributed to:

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Passed for information to:

Mr. H. Allen
Mr. C. Strong
Mr. B. Allen

Private Secretary
Head of Africa
Head of News Department

2. The evidence of the past few days all points towards a hardening of the Egyptian attitude on this subject. It seems probable that after his private talk with Creswell on 23rd October, Fawzy received no encouragement at the hands of the C.R.C. This is borne out by Hassar's remarks to Little referred to in Creswell's letter of 26th October and also by Salah Salem's subsequent interview (Cairo telegram 276 Saving). You will note in particular from Salah Salem's interview that the Egyptians are now saying that a written commitment allowing us to bring back our troops under broadly defined conditions would permit us directly to influence Egyptian foreign policy. In other words Egypt might automatically be dragged into a war without having any say in the matter herself.

3. It is hard to say whether the Egyptian attitude is determined by a real attachment to neutrality (cfr. Creswell's letter 1043/167/53G of 2nd April, 1933) or by a reluctance to confront the Egyptian public with an admission that in spite of their many statements to the contrary, they have accepted a fresh commitment. It may be partly due to both motives. It may also to some extent result from Soviet pressure which we suspect has been exerted recently.

4. Whatever the motive, the result is pretty serious. It would be entirely understandable that Her Majesty's Government should regard the issue as a fundamental one and conclude that they could not defend an agreement which ignored it. It is possible that the Egyptians can be got to give way on it, but they will not do so readily, nor quickly. The only possible way to get them to give way is for Her Majesty's Government to take

x /some
APPENDIX 'A'

The following tentative suggestions have been discussed within the British Delegation:

(a) Fawzi himself offered a very general preamble on the lines of both governments "bearing in mind their obligations under the United Nations Charter etc. etc."

(b) Fawzi suggested on October 22nd that "there shall be immediate consultation between the United Kingdom and Egypt if recommendation is made by the United Nations that the Base should be made available in the event of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression."

(The Americans maintain that Fawzi had scored a great point by getting the C.R.C. to accept any form of words reaffirming Egyptian obligations under the United Nations. This seems to us to be nonsense, and the above two formulae so vague as to be valueless.)

(c) The form of words given in Creswell's letter to Allen of October 26th.

(d) A suggestion that immediate reactivation of the Base should be linked, in conditions when there is a general threat to the Middle East, to an S.O.S. appeal to the United Kingdom and Egypt by a member of the Arab Pact (presumably Iraq or Syria) if it considered that the threat to itself was sufficiently imminent. The wording suggested was as follows:

"Recognising their common responsibilities under the United Nations Charter to assist in maintaining peace and resisting aggression, the Governments of Egypt and the United Kingdom agree that the full facilities of the Suez Base shall at once be made available to Her Majesty's forces whenever a member of the Arab Security Pact is the victim of attack, or intimates to both contracting parties that it believes such action is necessary to save it from attack, or whenever the contracting parties agree after consultation that such action is necessary to forestall or resist aggression in other quarters."

/ (e) An
An attempt to pick up, out of Haguib's letter to Eisunh, the phraseology "the allies of our allies" in the following way:

"The Base will be immediately reactivated"

"(C) in the event of any ally of any member of the Arab Mutual Security Pact being involved in hostilities in the Middle East area as the result of aggression by an outside power."

The idea here is to build up on the repeated statement of the Egyptians that we should get reactivation in practice through the chain of alliances involving Jordan and Iraq in any war we fought in the Middle East. In this way the Egyptians might conceivably be brought to agree that this was not in practice an extension of their existing commitments.
APPENDIX 'B'

With reference to paragraph of the above agreed statement -

The United Kingdom Delegation has been concerned lest a major war should be launched against the free world without involving an immediate armed attack against an Arab State and therefore without fulfilling the conditions stipulated for immediate reactivation of the Base. The United Kingdom Delegation has drawn attention to the dangers of delay in such circumstances.

Although the Egyptian Delegation has recognised this problem it has maintained that paragraph of the Agreed Statement, particularly the provision for consultation in the circumstances mentioned above, constitutes a practical insurance against any such delays. The Egyptian Government feels itself to be unable to subscribe to any wider undertaking in the absence of a settlement of its outstanding differences with Great Britain.

Moreover the Egyptian Government has given positive assurances that, if such a settlement is reached, a new foundation will be laid for co-operation with the peace loving powers, including Great Britain, in the interests of an effective defence of Egypt and of her Arab allies. The Egyptian Government therefore maintains that there is no cause for the concern which the United Kingdom Delegation has expressed.

The Egyptian Delegation, further, draws attention to the reaffirmation by Egypt in the above agreed statement of her loyalty to her existing commitments towards the United Nations, which will guide her actions in the event of a major war.
EGYPT NEGOTIATIONS

This is the fourth and last section of the draft text of the Agreement to be submitted. It consists of the 3 Exchange of Notes.

2. I am grateful for your views. The next step will be for me to circulate a draft letter to other Depts a draft letter to Cairo containing the amendments suggested in the submission, together with a draft revised text - but I will not propose to do this until you have seen the submission.

[Signature]

[Date: 22/11]

I agree with the comments on the draft exchange of Notes. We have only a very few additional ones.

Note 139.1. 06. 02. 00. 00. 00.

All the notes exchanged are...
intended to be published, this
seemed to afford an additional
reason for not including
paragraph b of Note No. 1.

If it were to be included, the
White would, I suppose, have,
though
admittedly may very approximately,
the strength of the Prime
from six minutes ago
withdrawn and begun. Possibly,

Merely, we agree to leave our

rather more strongly than we leave
in the genuine command on Note
No. 1 against the instruction to
paragraph b. I have not,
however, examined the change, as
it appears to me that it may
be wholly, if not entirely,
merely a legible one.

Note No. 2.

From the nearly identical
point of view, this note
may be treated as
merely a legible one.
In a letter commenting on other parts of the draft text, the War Office have commented as follows:

"Paragraph I of Note No. 2 provides for the Assistant Base Commander's correspondence arising from paragraph 3 (new paragraph 4) of Annex A being accessible to "appropriate officers of both nations". Are you quite satisfied that this does not commit us to making available to the Egyptians documents concerned with matters of purely British interest, such as those arising from the Assistant Base Commander's responsibilities for the command of British personnel? (paragraph 4 (c) of Annex A). We are strongly against letting the Egyptians have access to documents relating to British personnel administration, which is of purely British concern.

2. Do you think the War Office's fears are justified? I notice that "such correspondence" refers to correspondence arising from "the exercise of the responsibilities of the Assistant Base Commander as defined in paragraph 3, Annex A". This paragraph lists the following among the duties of the Assistant Base Commander:

"He will be in full command of the British technicians in the Base. He will be responsible for their personal administration, including their pay, discipline, welfare and all similar matters affecting them as individuals."

3. If they are justified, we should perhaps add a small phrase in parentheses to the end of paragraph 1 as follows:

(except for correspondence of purely domestic British interest such as/
Minutes.

as the administration of British personnel).

4. I should be grateful for your views.

R.M.J.

(H.C. Mackworth Young)
January 18, 1954.

I think there is some substance in the point the War Office has raised, but I agree with Mr. Mackworth Young that a small addition to paragraph 1 of Note 1 will meet the case...
In my letter of Oct. 27 (JE1192/5614)

1. I sent you our draft comments on
   Annex A of the Defence Agreement.

2. I now enclose draft comments
   on the Three Exchange of Notes,
   together with a draft revised text.

3. There are three points
   which have arisen since the
   meeting of September 20 and
   which this text was discussed:

   (a) We do not now
   propose to transfer the customs
   provisions about customs is from
   the first paragraphs 1(c) and
   2 of the first Note to the
   separate Annex on customs.

   (b) We now think that these
   provisions (like the rest of Note
   No. 1) will expire when the
   withdrawal has been completed.

   (c) This Note is the best place
   for them.

   (d) as you will see from
Paragraph 6 of the draft letter, we have doubts about the advisability of attaching associate note No 3 with the Agreement. The comments in para 6 of the draft provisionally have been cleared on the telephone with Mr. Chr. Carew at the Air Ministry. 

We have designated the Royal Air Force counterpart of the General Officer Commanding, British troops in Egypt, as the "Senior Royal Air Force Officer in Egypt."

4. I am sending copies of this letter, with enclosures, to Armstrong, Way, and Krigsvo in Elshq at the War Office, Commander Talbot-Hick at the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Austria-Hungary, and Mr. L. W. C. Colvin at the War Office, Bess, Orme and Milward at the Air Ministry and A. A. Allen at the Treasury. I should be grateful if you and a representative of each of the other Deptt concerned could let me know in due course whether you agree to the drafts.

[Signature]
Under cover of his letter of September 3 to Mr. Allen (J5 1192/455/0), Mr. Hankey sent us a first draft text of the Agreement. This text consists of a Preamble, the main Agreement, annexes concerning the running of the base, jurisdiction and financial arrangements, and the exchanges of notes.

2. The Preamble, main Agreement and annexes have been considered in separate submissions. Texts of the remaining two annexes are awaited from Cairo. The purpose of the present submission is to consider the exchanges of notes.

3. These notes cover the following subjects:

   Note No. 1.
   Procedure and facilities for withdrawal of troops.

   Note No. 2.
   Procedure for running the base.

   Note No. 3.
   Exchange of air forces.

4. The first question to consider is whether these subjects can most suitably be covered in exchanges of notes annexed to the Agreement, rather than in the body of the Agreement or the annexes.

   Note No. 1, concerns matters which will cease to be of interest within 15 months of the coming into force of the Agreement. After this period the provisions of the main Agreement and the annexes will come into full operation. It therefore seems reasonable that the provisions concerning detailed procedure for withdrawal should be made the subject of a separate note.

   Note No. 2, concerns certain detailed arrangements for running the base, namely:

   /4/4 Channels
(i) Channels of correspondence between British technicians and British military authorities outside Egypt.

(ii) Access of Egyptians to installations under British management.

(iii) Relations between British and Egyptian personnel.

There would be a case for including all these points in Annex A, which concerns the organisation of the base. The Delegation do not say why they want to put these matters in a separate exchange of notes. It may be that they regard them as too detailed for Annex A. Alternatively, they may think it wiser to keep provisions which will be relatively unpopular with the Egyptians out of the Agreement proper (including Annexes). I do not think it much matters one way or the other. But I think we should ask the Delegation for their reasons before agreeing to this particular Note.

7. As regards Note No. 2, I should have thought it would seem improbable that the Egyptians will be keen on exchanges of air force squadrons for training purposes. However that may be, there seems no objection in principle to covering this matter, if it is to be covered, in a separate Note. Indeed it might well be better to leave this matter out of the Agreement proper altogether.

6. It remains to consider the text itself. This has been examined by the Departments concerned. The following analysis incorporates their comments:

Note No. 1.

This Note contains six paragraphs, on the following subjects:

(1) Availability of Egyptian transport, customs, and labour facilities for withdrawing
The first five paragraphs are all necessary and appear in general to cover the subject adequately. Paragraph 6 is only to be inserted if the Egyptians insist. The Delegation are quite right to make provision for it, though we naturally want to avoid being tied down to detailed time-tables if possible. We should also want to avoid the necessity for the detailed strength of our forces.

Paragraph 1. The question of customs facilities might be better covered in the separate annex on customs, the necessity for which we have already made clear to the Delegation in our comments on Annex A (see Mr. Boothby's letter of 1192/76). We might suggest this to the Delegation.

Paragraph 2. The first 9 words are ambiguous. They should read "until the withdrawal has been completed".

Paragraph 3. The British Air Officer commanding will also be involved in the handover. He should therefore be mentioned.

1. withdrawing British troops.
2. Customs and other immunities during period of withdrawal.
3. Setting up of Egyptian military authority to plan the handover of installations in conjunction with British Commanders.
4. Subjects requiring planning.
5. Time at which transfer of responsibilities to Egyptian Commanders should take place.
6. Phasing of withdrawal.

Comments.

General.

The first five paragraphs are all necessary and appear in general to cover the subject adequately. Paragraph 6 is only to be inserted if the Egyptians insist. The Delegation are quite right to make provision for it, though we naturally want to avoid being tied down to detailed time-tables if possible. We should also want to avoid the necessity for the detailed strength of our forces.

Paragraph 1. The question of customs facilities might be better covered in the separate annex on customs, the necessity for which we have already made clear to the Delegation in our comments on Annex A (see Mr. Boothby's letter of 1192/76). We might suggest this to the Delegation.

Paragraph 2. The first 9 words are ambiguous. They should read "until the withdrawal has been completed".

Paragraph 3. The British Air Officer commanding will also be involved in the handover. He should therefore be mentioned.
be mentioned in this paragraph.

Paragraph 6.

Service Departments do not wish any details of the phasing of withdrawal to go into the draft at this stage.

Note No.2.

This note contains 3 paragraphs, covering the following subjects:

(1) Correspondence between British technicians and British military authorities outside Egypt.

(2) Access of Egyptians into installations under British management.

(3) Relations between British and Egyptian personnel in the base.

Comments.

General.

All these paragraphs are necessary.

Paragraph 1.

"General Headquarters Middle East Airforces" should of course read "General Headquarters Middle East Land Forces and Headquarters Middle East Air Forces".

Paragraph 2.

No comment.

Paragraph 3.

The War Office do not wish Egyptian civilians to be in a position to issue ordinance to British service men. They therefore wish to delete the square brackets around the word "service" on the two occasions on which it appears in this paragraph.

/Note No.3.
Note No. 3.

This note contains only one paragraph, concerning the exchange of British and Egyptian Air Force squadrons for training purposes. There are two comments:

(a) The Air Ministry have decided that any British squadrons coming into Egypt under this scheme should be based at "Abu Sueir" airfield. This decision entails the deletion of "Fayid", airfield, and of the brackets around "Abu Sueir", from the text.

(b) It would seem unwise to state specifically in a document to be published, that the Egyptian squadrons to be exchanged under this scheme will be based at a British airfield in Cyprus. Britain's position in Cyprus is that of a Colonial power, and as such is presumably resented by the Egyptians. There is no need to specify the location of the British airfield, and the Air Ministry have agreed that the reference to Cyprus should be deleted.

9. A fresh draft text of the Notes, revised in accordance with the above comments, is attached.

Recommendations.

That the revised text be sent to our Delegation in Cairo under cover of the attached draft letter from Mr. Boothby to Mr. Creswell. The departmental legal adviser agrees.
You have now received our comments on all sections of the draft text of the Defence Agreement enclosed with Hankey's letter to Allen of September 3 (1043/474/53G) except for:

(a) The section on status of personnel.
(b) The three Exchanges of Notes.

2. We are awaiting your reply to the text before commenting on (a). The present letter deals with (b).

3. The first question is whether these subjects can best be covered in separate Exchanges of Notes annexed to the Agreement, or whether some other instrument would be more suitable.

4. Note No.1 concerns matters which would cease to be of interest within 15 months of the coming into force of the Agreement. It will be only after this period that the provisions of the main Agreement and the annexes come into full operation. It therefore seems reasonable that the provisions concerning detailed procedure for withdrawal should be made the subject of a separate Note.

5. From the purely drafting point of view we think that Note No.2 would be more suitably included in Annex A. It concerns detailed arrangements for the organisation of the base, which is the subject of that Annex. But there may be some special reason which has escaped us for making these points the subject of a separate Note. Perhaps you would let us have your views on this?

6. As regards Note No.3, it seems to us unlikely that the Egyptians will be keen on making
making exchanges of Air Force squadrons the subject of any part of the Agreement or annexes thereto. Moreover there seems no particular virtue in regularising this matter at the same time as the Agreement itself is signed. It seems to us that it might well form the subject of an entirely separate instrument. We should be grateful for your views on this point also.

7. On the text itself we have the following comments:

Note No. 1.

Paragraph 1.

The question of customs facilities might better be covered in the Annex dealing with equipment whether this forms part of Annex A, or is made the subject of a separate Annex (this question is discussed in my letter to you of ...). - IF 1192/4(a).

Paragraph 2.

The first 9 words appear to be ambiguous. We suggest "until the withdrawal has been completed".

Paragraph 3.

After the words "General Officer Commanding British troops in Egypt" add "and the Air Officer Commanding British Air Forces in Egypt".

Paragraph 6.

We agree that no paragraph on this subject should be included unless the Egyptians insist. Not only do we want to avoid being tied down to detailed time-tables, but we do not want to give detailed publicity to the strength of our forces in Egypt before and during the process of withdrawal. Meanwhile, /we should
we should prefer to suspend the actual drafting of this paragraph, at this stage, and to substitute for the present wording the following statement: "A detailed programme for the phasing of withdrawal (which will need to be carefully considered) will be inserted if the Egyptians insist".

Note No. 2. - Caps

Paragraph 1.

Delete "general Headquarters Middle East Air Forces" and substitute "General Headquarters Middle East Land Forces and Headquarters Middle East Air Forces".

Paragraph 2.

The Service Departments do not wish Egyptian civilians to be in a position to issue orders to British servicemen. We should therefore like the square brackets around the word "service", on the two occasions on which it appears in this paragraph, to be deleted.

Note No. 3. - Caps

We have two comments:-

(a) The Air Ministry have decided that any British squadrons coming into Egypt under this scheme should be based at "Abu Sueir" airfield. This involves the following amendments:

(i) Delete "Fayid".

(ii) Delete square brackets around "Abu Sueir".

(b) Subject to your views, we wonder whether the Egyptians might not resent a specific statement in a document to be published, that Egyptian squadrons
to be exchanged under this scheme will be based at a British airfield in Cyprus, since Cyprus is a manifestation of British imperialism. The Air Ministry have agreed that the reference to Cyprus may be deleted. If you agree, the text could be amended accordingly, i.e.

Line 9: Delete "will be based at a suitable airfield in Cyprus", substitute "will be based at a suitable British airfield".

Line 14: Delete "in Cyprus", substitute "in British airfields".

8. Enclose a revised text incorporating the above amendments.
I have only one comment on your letter of the 29th October circulating revised drafts of the three Exchanges of Notes. The Air Ministry letter of the 26th September commenting on the draft Agreement suggested that mention of the necessity for adequate signals facilities for the local and long range control of aircraft should be made in Note No. 3. According to my recollection, it was agreed at our meeting on the 30th September that this should be done. This is of course an Air Ministry point and no doubt Air Commodore Wallis will comment on it.

I am copying this letter to Armstrong (War Office), Commander Talbot-Smith (Admiralty) and Air Commodore Wallis, Orme and Melville (Air Ministry).

Yours sincerely,

(R.H. Prince)
Mr. Hankey
No. 1501
October 27, 1953

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1509 of October 27
Repeated for information to
B.M.E.O. Ankara New York (U.K. Del.)
Washington Paris Paris (U.K. Del.)

My telegram No. 1501—
Following from Delegation.

Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs asked Creswell to call this morning, ostensibly about the Sudan (see my immediately following telegram). —JE 10/53—78.

2. Fawzi was anxious to disclaim the responsibility for a further move which he said you had placed on the Egyptian Government during your interview with the Egyptian Ambassador. He was told that although it seemed undesirable to lay too much stress on procedure, the fact remained that the Egyptian delegation had, on October 21, only given their immediate reactions to Robertson's statement and that it should not be too much to hope that the Egyptian Government, after thinking it out carefully, would be able to give a further reply which would enable informal conversations to be resumed.

3. Fawzi also repeated his remarks about the unacceptability of our sub-paragraph (c) on availability. He was told that we have nothing more to say on this point and if the Egyptian Government could see a better way of defining the circumstances under which, as they must surely understand, we would need immediate reactivation of the base, they should put forward a draft suggestion. He expressed considerable scepticism about the impartiality or wisdom of a General Assembly recommendation in such circumstances, and suggested that the recommendation might be made in consequence of some quite minor incident and forced through by pressures exerted on minor members of the Assembly.

4. We are reaching the conclusion that the deadlock on availability is not merely a matter of words but that the Egyptians are determined not to give an undertaking of immediate reactivation in the event of major war.

5. Fawzi did not mention uniform or other points but Creswell emphasized that we were far from satisfied over the Egyptian answer of October 21 on consultation and on air facilities. Fawzi did not propose any further meeting and it seems possible that there will not be one in the near future.

/Foreign Office
Defence Negotiations with Egypt.

Report of conversation with Faiz on
23.10.53. on the subject of UNIFORM.

Agreements about one country maintaining military bases in the territory of another frequently fail to include any specific provision about the wearing of uniform. This is of course because it is assumed that members of the armed forces will wear uniform. The latest example is the United States/Spanish Agreement. This makes no mention of uniform, but it is clear from frequent references to United States troops that uniform is to be worn.

2. Our trouble arises of course from the fact that, in an attempt to satisfy Egyptian susceptibilities, we have decided to describe the troops we are leaving in Egypt by the neutral term "technicians". Clearly there is no implication that "technicians" will wear uniform. If therefore we wish to ensure this right, we can only do so by

(a) a specific provision to that effect in the Agreement;

(b) a secret understanding to this effect with the Egyptians.

3. Course (a) is what we are trying to do at the moment. The purpose of Mr. Creswell's letter is to suggest an alternative proposal in case this course fails.

4. Course (b) by itself is unworkable. The point would almost certainly be raised in Parliament, and the existence of a secret agreement would have to be revealed.

5. Mr. Creswell suggests an ingenious variant of (b). The Agreement would state that the technicians should normally wear working dress when on duty and plain clothes when off duty. There would at the same time be a tacit agreement that if Her Majesty's Government were to say in Parliament that British personnel are not denied the right to wear uniform, the Egyptians would not try and dispute it.

6. If the Egyptians accepted this suggestion, and carried it out faithfully, it would work. I suggest therefore/
therefore that we should keep it up our sleeves for the moment. If we reach a solution on availability, and it then appears that uniform is the only remaining obstacle, it is conceivable that Ministers might wish to solve the question in this way.

Rem

(R. G. Mackworth Young)
November 3, 1953.

There has been so much publicity given to our difference with the Egyptians on this topic that it will, I agree, be hard to leave it out of the agreement now. I am inclined to think that a 'tacit' understanding with the Egyptians on any subject is a contradiction in terms, since sooner or later misunderstanding & criticism in both countries compel the silence to be broken.

And I am inclined to agree with Mr. Mackworth Young. As I don't think it would matter very much if there was an agreement on principles or later, tacitly. Did break down, it would merely be a question of trusting the Egyptian Government not to break any obligations it might make, and I don't think they would want to. As to the question of the technicalities, we have largely compensated for this by spelling out the military chain of command notions in our stipulations regarding the duties of the base Commander. Gen. Negus' conversation with Mr. Little ('A') is reassuring on both these points. As the same time, I don't think we should entirely
Minutes.

I think Parliament here will insist that we mean our existing law to be kept uniform.

We have passed the Royal Charter agreements with Egypt about what they do or do not say in Parliament on any good; if, indeed, they can mean (cf. Sudan Agreement).

I think we shall have to pour some cold water on this. [signed]

Dfr. Ruming to this subject of least.

E. C. Berkle\n
1.1.4
October 26, 1953.

It may interest you to know that towards the end of his conversation with me on October 23 (my telegram No. 1501) Fawzi turned to the subject of uniform. He said that the great difficulty for the Egyptians was our request that they should subscribe to a public undertaking that Egypt agreed in principle to the technicians wearing uniform. He quite understood that we cannot allow them to be denied that right and I told him also that we could not be expected to agree to a statement that they would wear only uniform with Egyptian permission. In general, he seemed ready to consider the substance of the arrangement we had proposed about uniform (including our conception of what constituted working clothes) but unable to subscribe to a written undertaking.

2. At one moment Fawzi went further and said that he saw no reason why technicians should not put on uniform on appropriate occasions such as some particular parade, provided this was done with Egyptian permission. This would clearly be unacceptable to us, but it is perhaps of interest that he should have volunteered this statement.

3. There can of course be no question of our agreeing to modify our attitude on the point of substance, but is there any likelihood of our position being sufficiently safeguarded, if the agreement merely stated that the technicians would normally wear working dress when on duty, and plain clothes when off duty, provided that at the same time a tacit agreement were reached that the Egyptians would not try and dispute it in any way if H.M.G. were to say in Parliament (e.g. in reply to a question) that British personnel are not denied the right to wear uniform?

You will have noted of course that the Delegation have specifically stated (Cairo telegram No. 1490), that it has no recommendations to make to H.M.G. now either about availability or about uniform.

Your ever,

Michael

(V.J. CRESWELL)
We have given some thought to the proposal in your letter of October 26 (10/5/53/530) about uniform.

I am afraid there are weighty reasons against it. In the first place it seems likely that Parliament will insist that our men are explicitly given the right to wear uniform. In the second place, I do not think, after our experience over the Sudan Agreement, that we could place much reliance on tacit agreements with the Egyptians about what we do or do not say in Parliament and how they react.

For the moment, therefore, I do not see any other way in which the substance of our requirements could be safeguarded. I am sorry to be writing in this dampering vein.

(R. Allen)

H. J. Creswell, Esq., C.M.G.,
Cairo.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
November 11, 1953
I

INFORMATION OFFICE,
BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

October 26, 1953.

Dear Department,

You may be interested in publicity which Mr. Caffery, the American Ambassador here, is getting for his role in current Anglo-Egyptian affairs. Some of this publicity is no doubt the spontaneous result of Egyptian hopes that the Americans may yet apply the final pressure to make us cave in, but it seems highly probable that in addition our colleagues in the U.S. Embassy have been active.

2. Immediately after the meeting last Wednesday Mr. Caffery called on the Foreign Minister. On coming out of the Ministry he is reported to have said that he was hopeful that a fair agreement would be reached, and that the differences of view between the two sides were not great. He added that he had called on the Minister to inform himself of the latest developments, and he would submit a report to his Government in due course. These statements were widely reported in all the main newspapers. "Al Ahram" had an eight-column headline drawing attention to his visit and photographs of him were given equal prominence to those of the British and Egyptian delegates. You may be amused by the attached photograph from "Al Ahram" showing the aged pundit surrounded by his Egyptian disciples.

3. On October 24 all the papers carried a detailed account of a television interview which Mr. Caffery had given to the National Broadcasting Company of America. Asked about U.S. intervention in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, he said:

"Sincere and patient efforts have been made to solve the Suez Base problem. It is of such great importance that I hope for a settlement which will be of mutual benefit to Egypt and to Great Britain. As long as the present informal talks continue, there is reason to believe that success may be achieved."

The text of this statement had undoubtedly been released by the U.S. Embassy here.

4. This statement also was prominently featured in the local press, and was supported by editorials urging the United States to carry on their efforts to persuade Britain to accept Egypt's point of view. "Al Ahram" wrote: "We sincerely appreciate Mr. Caffery's efforts. We know that the U.S. Government is sparing no effort to remove all obstacles and that important contacts are taking place between Washington, London and Cairo. Nothing could make us happier than the success of these efforts and contacts."

5. On October 25 Mr. Caffery again called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and once again provided good material for the local press. We attach a translation of "Al Ahram's" account of what he said after the meeting. You will see that on at least one occasion he did not hesitate to assume the functions of the British Embassy spokesman.

African Department,
6. Publicity has of course also been given to reports that the Americans are "mediating" also in London and Washington. "Arbar el Yom" of October 25 carried a large front-page photograph of Mr. Dulles in conversation with Ahmed Hussein, the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington.

7. We should be glad if you could show this letter to Information Policy Department.

Yours ever,

INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
"AL AHRAM" 22.10.53.

"Mr. Jefferson Caffery, the American Ambassador to Egypt speaking to journalists at the end of his meeting with Dr. Mahmoud Pawi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs yesterday afternoon."
MEETING BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR

Review of Anglo-Egyptian Relations and the decisions taken by the Political Committee in Amman.

The need for a decisive stand at the Security Council to stop the Israeli aggressions.

Mr. Gaffery, the American Ambassador, asked to meet the Minister of Foreign Affairs yesterday. The meeting took place at 1 p.m. and lasted 20 minutes.

Telegrams from the U.S. Government

At the end of the meeting, Mr. Gaffery said that he had studied with the Minister of Foreign Affairs the Anglo-Egyptian relations, the decisions taken by the Political Committee of the Arab League at its meeting in Amman, and the situation in Jerusalem.

The American Ambassador was carrying telegrams he received from his Government concerning these questions, and containing instructions which he had expected to receive.

Meeting between the two sides

Mr. Caffery was asked: When do you think a meeting will take place between the British and the Egyptian sides? He answered he did not yet know the date of this meeting and refused to explain why he had not met the British side since the last meeting between the two sides. He said only that Mr. Robert Hankey was ill and that he hoped to see General Robertson soon.

Date of the British Ambassador's return

Asked about the British Ambassador's return to Cairo he said; "The British Embassy here does not know anything about his return".

U.S. efforts for mediation

Concerning the Anglo-Egyptian relations, well-known circles believe that the American Government is having constant contacts with Cairo and London with a view to surmounting the present difficulties.

The American circles still express optimism, and their hope of overcoming these difficulties. The American Government is mediating between the two sides on two points which are supposed to be the main obstacles between them.

Observers say that the present week will see a diplomatic movement of utmost importance between London, Cairo and Washington, which will lead in case of success to a meeting between the Egyptian and the British sides.
Mr. Wyatt: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether he will make a statement on the negotiations between Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government on the subject of the Suez Canal base.

Mr. Wyatt asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will make a statement on the negotiations between Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government on the subject of the Suez Canal base.

Sir T. Moore asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement indicating the progress so far made in his negotiations with the Egyptian Government over the Suez Canal dispute.

Mr. Eden: I regret that I am still not in a position to make this statement. I can, however, assure the House that I will do so at the earliest opportunity.

Mr. Wyatt: Cannot the Foreign Secretary tell us at least as much as he told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Tory Party, and can he take heart and stand up to those 19th Century members of all ages in his party who are trying to prevent the reaching of a reasonable agreement with the Egyptians?

Mr. Eden: I am not sure that I understand who the hon. Member is trying to describe. It would not, of course, be anybody of my acquaintance.

Sir T. Moore: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that he will have general support and confidence in his efforts to bring this dispute to a peaceful end, and also, of course, in maintaining our international and treaty rights in regard to the Canal?

Mr. Shinwell: While I fully recognise the need for a satisfactory conclusion to these negotiations, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman to recognise that it would be most undesirable if the result was that these negotiations, satisfactory though they may be to both parties, were used as a jumping-off ground to enable Egypt to attack any of her neighbours?

Mr. Eden: What we are dealing with is a revision of the treaty which we signed with Egypt. If the right hon. Gentleman has any special point he wants to raise about our side of the question, I shall be glad if he will put it down.

Mr. Amery: Can my right hon. Friend give the assurance that if any agreement appears to be in sight, the terms will be presented to the House for a debate before any decision is taken?

Mr. Eden: My hon. Friend can be assured that the ordinary constitutional procedure will, in any event, be followed.
Parliamentary Question

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, if he will make a statement indicating the progress so far made in his negotiations with the Egyptian Government over the Suez Canal dispute.

26 Oct 1953

There are two questions on this subject, which could be taken together.

2. In his statement in Parliament on October 20, the Secretary of State said that he hoped to be able to make an announcement within the next few days about the progress of the discussions in Cairo. They had reached an advanced stage and he trusted that the House would not press him to say anything more about them on that day.

3. At that time, it was hoped that the meeting which took place on Wednesday, October 21 would be decisive. This was not, however, so. No agreement was reached at the meeting, which issued a communiqué to the effect that a further meeting would be held after the position had been considered by both governments. We do not yet know the date of the later meeting.

4. We cannot therefore yet forecast whether or not the Secretary of State will be in a position to make a statement by Sunday, October 26, or if not, whether he will know by then on what day he will be able to make a statement. Alternative draft replies are therefore submitted to meet the following situations:

(a) that a statement will be made at the end of questions;

(b) that another date can be named on which a statement will be made;

(c) that no date can yet be named.

R. C. Mackworth Young

October 22, 1953
Michael Creswell is writing to Roger Allen by this bag about the two main points on which our negotiations are hanging up. This letter is intended to complete the picture by giving our views on the clause on consultation.

2. The Delegation's preliminary comment was contained in paragraph 6 of their telegram No. 1228. Subsequent events have merely increased the improbability of Egyptian agreement to any clause which would be of concrete value to us. At the meeting on October 21 the Minister of Foreign Affairs said that when accepting 7 years for duration he wished to assert as clearly as he possibly could that 7 years meant 7 years, that there could be no "trimmings" and that at the end of the period Egypt would have no commitment at all unless she had, meanwhile, voluntarily undertaken a fresh one. The chances of getting the Egyptians to move from this position and to accept what they call an "open-ended Agreement" are negligible. We have no doubt that they would break on this point.

3. The Egyptian counter-draft reported in paragraph 6 (i) of the Delegation's telegram No. 1490 is probably largely a bargaining position going as far in one direction as they think the formula at paragraph 3 (v) of your despatch No. 234 goes in the other. We might get them to accept a genuinely "neutral" formula which merely provided for consultation without any commitment at all, but if things came to this point and we could get nothing better than a clause which simply made it clearer than ever that the Egyptians were entirely free to refuse an extension of the Agreement, you might feel that in such circumstances it would be better to drop the consultation clause altogether.

4. As you know the Delegation do not recommend that any concessions at all should be made at this stage. But we think you should know just what the prospects are on this issue. It has not as yet been considered a major point and, as the Delegation understand their instructions, it is not H.M.G.'s intention to break on it, but if the two principal points now in dispute were to be settled the consultation clause would probably move up at once to the head of the list. We hope, therefore, that you can give some consideration to the question what we are to do if the Egyptians remain adamant.
October 26, 1953.

In reply to your letter of October 18, 1953.

It again looks very much, from the enclosed record of a conversation that Tom Little had yesterday with Gamal Abdul Nasser, as though the Egyptians were going to give us the most difficulty of all over availability. Nasser apparently said that the Egyptians were so suspicious of the use which the British and Americans could make of the United Nations as an instrument of their own policy that they were determined not to be bound by any arrangement which could result in a rigged General Assembly meeting enforcing a reactivation of the base upon a reluctant Egypt. He does not seem to have been anything like so emphatic about the issue of uniform.

2. Incidentally it rather looks as though once again, as happened with the last stage of the Sudan negotiations in February, American "support" of us here has had the exact opposite effect to that intended, and has ensured Egyptian rejection of the points which they took up.

3. On the other hand, the conversation I had with Fawzi reported in Cairo telegram No. 1501 did not at all give me the impression that we need abandon all hope as regards availability. You will see from that telegram that what seemed to be chiefly on Fawzi's mind was the possibility that a United Nations formula would involve reactivation against Arab interests, and it seemed to me possible that by suitably narrowing the definition of the circumstances under which this would occur, we might both be able to avoid any such suspicions and cover our main requirement (which is presumably immediate reactivation upon a major crisis of war with Russia and a consequent potential threat to the Middle East).

4. With this in mind I had been rather wondering whether paragraph 2 of the availability formula might not be added to in the following way (the original wording of paragraph 2 is in square brackets):

"2. In the event of a threat of an attack on any of the members of the Arab Mutual Security Pact, Iran or Turkey there shall be immediate consultation between the United Kingdom and /Egypt."
Egypt. The Base will be made immediately available
if, in such circumstances and in order to counter this
threat, a recommendation to this effect is made by the
United Nations."

It had seemed to me that such a formula would have the
advantage of giving a rather greater degree of undertaking
in the case of a threat to Persia and Turkey (an undert-
taking for "immediate consultation" being in fact pretty
well valueless) and that it would also cover an outbreak
of war across the iron curtain in Europe since this would
of course involve a threat of an attack on the Middle
East. But in view of Little's report of Gamal Nasser's
views the hopes of getting the Egyptians to put forward any
counter-proposal involving the United Nations formula must,
I am afraid, be now considered to have receded.

5. I put the above to you as food for thought. General
Robertson, who has seen this in draft, is quite emphatic
that we should not put any further proposals to the Egyptians
at this time on this very important issue. Indeed he it
not particularly happy about my writing this letter but
has agreed to it going simply as background thinking.

(E. J. CROSWELL)

P.S. As regards the suggestion that Little's evidence
should be published, Sirim Robertson is very strongly
opposed to publication since, once once and a
reasonable it becomes to be used to us
from the point of view of negotiation. He said his
to Little and I hope Little will now sanction it.

G. G.
Mr. Little, of the Arab News Agency, had a two hour talk with Gamal Abdel Nasser yesterday morning.

2. He received a very clear impression that the Egyptians are not going to give an inch on availability but that they are ready for some practical compromise on uniform.

3. On availability, Nasser used words, as he sometimes does to Mr. Little, to indicate that this was not merely a majority decision of the C.R.C. but one in which he personally firmly believed. He said that the Egyptians were not prepared to let the decision rest with the U.N. They did not trust it and they knew that Britain and the United States will always find means of pushing a resolution through (Mr. Little got the impression that such American support as we have had on this issue had done us much more harm than good). Nasser added the usual remarks to the effect that the Arab countries were the limit for automatic reactivation and that when the time came we would find that consultation in the case of Turkey and Persia gave us what we wanted.

4. He was more hopeful about a compromise over uniform. The Egyptians did not object to a limited wearing of uniform in certain circumstances. They wanted to be quite certain that it was not going to be worn by so many technicians and so frequently that it became noticeable. Mr. Little had the impression that we would have great difficulty in getting in the agreement a categorical statement that British troops would wear uniform but that we would be able to get, if we wanted it, wording which implied the right to wear uniform.

5. Nasser said, in reference both to availability and uniform that whatever anybody said, it was still their intention to restore constitutional life within the next two or three years. This would coincide with the teething period of the technicians' régime and made it essential for them to secure an agreement including the smallest possible number of opportunities for political attack.

6. In everything which Nasser said, there was the clearest implication that he expected the discussions to continue. He made it clear that they wanted an agreement. He admitted that the régime would fail without an agreement but that they would also fail if they accepted a bad one. If they had to choose, they would prefer the former. Mr. Little found the atmosphere very different from that prevailing just before the breakdown of the negotiations in May.

7. Nasser said the C.R.C. had received carte blanche from the politicians whom they had consulted before the meeting on October 21.

8. Nasser was obviously anxious that Mr. Little should publish this expression of Egyptian views. He could not, however, authorise publication since he had agreed with the British delegation not to publish any details of the discussions. Mr. Little could not therefore publish unless he could get clearance from the British delegation. I told Mr. Little that I was sure that the delegation would not want anything published. Mr. Little pointed out that he could write a story without mentioning it to Nasser and simply including the main points as his own estimate of Egyptian views. He asked that it might be confirmed that General Robertson did not wish the interview reported even in this form.
9. Nasser also told Mr. Little that the "revolutionary Tribunal" was going ahead with cases against Nahas, Madam Nahas and Serag el Din. Mr. Little checked on this with Nasser's private office which is doing much of the preparatory work and found that the trials were likely to start very shortly. Those concerned were confident that they had overwhelming evidence.

D. L. STEWART
October 26, 1953.
Brief for interview with M. Hakki.

The Egyptian Ambassador is calling on Monday, October 26 to see the Secretary of State. M. Hakki has always been told, whenever he raises the defence negotiations in conversation with us, that we do not want to duplicate the negotiations in Cairo. This has not deterred him and he spoke with Mr. Nutting as recently as October 20.

2. The Secretary of State may wish to take this occasion to convince M. Hakki that our proposals of October 21 are our last word and that they are reasonable; if they are not accepted, both the Egyptians and ourselves must face the consequences.

He may wish to make the following points:

(a) Availability formula. The behaviour of the Egyptian delegation on this point has led us to wonder if they are serious in saying they want a settlement. First they accepted our United Nations formula. Then they said they could not, but would accept a modification of it. It was a most important modification, making reactivation of the base depend upon a specific recommendation by the United Nations. But when we accepted it, they rejected the modification. It was no use our modifying our position and then finding the Egyptians had changed again. Anyway we have now gone to our limit.

(b) M. Hakki can see for himself the political difficulties facing Her Majesty's Government in trying to obtain acceptance by parliament of an agreement which could in any way impair our ability to meet our obligations in the Middle East in the event of a major war. There
will be many people, and not only people in this country, who will say we have already gone too far. We have a responsibility to the other nations of the Commonwealth and to the North Atlantic Community, as well as to our allies in the Middle East. It is no use the Egyptian Government thinking that they can get the United States Government to persuade us to change our position, because the United States interest is identical with our own when it comes down to planning to meet communist aggression.

(c) Uniform. Egyptian opposition to the residual right of British technicians to wear their own uniforms is incomprehensible. It makes one wonder whether the Egyptian Government are motivated only by a desire to avenge the past and not by any statesmanship or foresight. On our present terms, after 4½ years we shall be reduced in the Canal Zone to 4,000 technicians wearing overalls on duty and civilian clothes off, but with *a residual right to wear uniform if ordered to do so*. We have made general undertakings to see that this residual right is not abused. How can the Egyptians maintain that these 4,000 men, who would be dependent on Egyptian good faith for their security, would be a menace to their national integrity? In showing willingness to place our technicians in this position, we have shown our confidence in Egyptian willingness to carry out an agreement. If Egypt does not reciprocate by placing equal confidence with us, there is no hope for a new relationship based on mutual trust.

(d) The next move is with Egypt. We hope the Ambassador will do what he can to impress upon his government the seriousness and the extent of the effort we have made and the importance of meeting
It in the same spirit.

October 26, 1953.

Private Secretary. Roger Allen.
Secretary of State

Mr. Roger Allen advises that you should, if possible, see the Egyptian Ambassador. He did not demur when I said this might have to wait till Monday.

He suggests you might emphasize that we have reached the end of our tether and have nothing new to say about uniform or availability. You might add that it is for the Egyptians to make up their minds now whether they want an agreement or not.

October 23, 1953.

Mr. Hakki is calling on Mr. S. of S. at 4 p.m. on Monday.

Mr. Allen, 24/10
African Dept., 24/10
J. O. Pritchard 23/10
10, Downing Street, S.W.1.

October 26, 1953.

MINISTER OF DEFENCE

COPY OF MINUTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER

Reference: Lord Alexander's minute of 22.10.53
about removing material from the Canal Zone Base.

"Noted.

J.S.C.
26.10.53
In my minute of 31st July, 1953, I undertook to let you know more of the question of removing material from the Canal Zone base.

2. As I suggested in that minute, some sorting and movement of stores is already in progress. This activity is confined to stores of three broad categories:

(a) Stores surplus to theatre requirements which are at present held in Canal Zone Depots and which are required for re-issue elsewhere.

(b) Stores whose condition is such that they are fit only for scrap, but whose removal from the Canal Zone is required not only for the scrap value of the equipment but also to free space in certain depots which we should continue to use after withdrawal.

(c) Stores which are either sold locally, or are dumped or otherwise destroyed, since they no longer have any military or financial value.

3. Stores Surplus to Theatre requirement and required for re-issue elsewhere.

Since movement began some six months ago, 8,000 tons of Army stores and 2,500 tons of R.A.F. stores have been moved from Canal Zone Depots to the United Kingdom for re-issue elsewhere. It is estimated that the movement of all such Army stores, amounting to a further 20,000 tons, will be completed by the end of 1954. No
difficulty is foreseen in removal of R.A.F. surpluses as they arise for re-issue elsewhere, though no forecast of quantity can be given at the moment. It is also intended to use for the redeployment programme in the Middle East quantities of engineer stores at present held as surplus in Canal Zone Depots.

4. Stores to be disposed of as scrap.

Out of a considerable tonnage of Army and R.A.F. stores to be sorted and classified as scrap, about 14,000 tons have been back-loaded to the United Kingdom. The programme should be completed by December, 1954. In addition, an appreciable tonnage of such stores has been disposed of locally or by dumping.

5. Stores disposed of locally.

No accurate figures can be given of the total tonnage disposed of to date under this heading, but it is approximately 100,000 tons.

6. This represents the full scope of movement programmes at present planned, apart from the movement envisaged under the Redeployment plan. Under this plan it is intended to move out with the units of the permanent Middle East garrison their mobilisation equipments, to build up stocks for peacetime use in depots established in the deployment areas, to move to the United Kingdom stores surplus to maintenance and reserve requirements for Middle East forces, and to remove from the base, for security reasons, all
TOP SECRET

equipment of a secret nature. All this movement would be completed within 18 months from the order being given.

7. Meanwhile, any further large scale removal of stores must be governed by two factors:

   (a) The needs of the present situation.

   (b) Our policy for the Base.

8. The needs of the Present Situation.

   Substantial stocks of all commodities must be retained in order to maintain the present garrison of the Canal Zone.


   The policy for Army stores is that certain theatre and war reserves should continue to be held in the Base. R.A.F. war reserves held in the theatre will be redeployed, except for aviation fuel, which cannot be moved and will continue to be held in Egypt under commercial arrangements.

10. The physical process of sorting and segregation of equipment will of course continue, in order that every opportunity may be taken of eliminating surplus holdings.

(Off) ALEXANDER
From: General Sir Brian Robertson, Bt., G.C.B., G.B.E., K.C.M.G.,
K.G.V.O., D.S.O., M.C.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO

TOP SECRET

17th October, 1953

With reference to the Delegation's telegram on Press guidance (No. 1464), the aspect of the matter which I believe to be of basic importance is brought out in the draft which I attach.

I really am fearful for the fate of any agreement on principles that may be reached because of the speeches which I very much fear will be made by either side. Normally when two countries come to an agreement on important matters, they at least make some protestation of an intention to co-operate, and say a few polite things about each other. I think it quite likely that this formal courtesy may be lacking on both sides on this occasion.

If you share my apprehensions, you might care to discuss them with the Secretary of State and perhaps offer him my draft as a basis for reflection. If anything on these lines is to be said, it must be said in London and by a Minister. It is no use our doing it from here.

I intend to rub the point in hard here, speaking to Gamal personally about it.

R. Allen, Esq., C.H.G.,
African Department,
Foreign Office.
This agreement is by no means perfect. Plenty of justifiable criticism of it will be heard in this country. It can hardly be regarded as perfect in Egypt, either, if its provisions are compared with some of the foolish promises made so often in the past. A perfect agreement was clearly not to be had by either side: Nor could a perfect settlement have been made by force.

If they eschew sentimentality, jingoism and wishful thinking, the people of Egypt and the people of Great Britain are bound to find themselves up against a fact which both have resolutely declined to face so far. This is that they need each other's co-operation in the present day world. We cannot have an efficient base in Egypt without Egyptian co-operation, and that co-operation cannot be extracted by force. Equally is it true that Egypt will never get out of the social and economic morass into which she has fallen unless she makes a settlement with us that produces enduring friendly relations.

The kind of agreement that some people in England seem to want was not an agreement that would have produced co-operation, even if we could have forced its acceptance.

/Therefore
Therefore it would have been useless to us. This agreement at least faces the facts; it is a workable agreement, given goodwill on both sides, and by its terms it does not make goodwill impossible.

Admittedly Egypt's past record is not encouraging. Plenty of people will say: the Egyptians never have been true to their word and they never will be. It is quite proper that an agreement made with them should contain certain safeguards and that its execution should be watched with a careful eye. On the other hand, it is a big mistake to assume that the present Revolutionary Government of Egypt is no different from its predecessors. That kind of mistake has been made in similar cases before. They are ruthless young men and they have done many things which we condemn as bad or foolish. On the other hand, they have shown a determination and capacity to exact obedience; they live austenely and are not enriching themselves; they work hard and they put the interests of Egypt before their individual interests. They can make this agreement work
if they wish to do so, and they know that it is in the interests of Egypt and of their regime that it should work.

It will therefore be a good deal more sensible on our part to give them a chance to live up to the undertakings which they have given us than to denounce them for dishonesty in advance, and thereby make co-operation impossible.
Saturday's Air Bag

OVAL

Thank you very much for your letter of October 17 enclosing a note on what might be said to British politicians in justification of an Agreement with Egypt. The Secretary of State was very glad to have this and used points from it, together with bits of the longer paper you sent us in June, when facing the 22 Committee on October 21.

2. You will be glad to know that this meeting, at which the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence supported the Secretary of State, went off quite well; though we have since received a further manifesto of misgivings from a number of Conservative members.

3. We all have much in mind the danger to which you have called our attention, that speeches on either side could upset any agreement on principle you may succeed in concluding. We have our fender out ready to absorb shocks. I hope you succeed in persuading Nasser to do the same. At the moment Salah Salem looks like being the most likely man to wreck us but it is hard to judge from this end whether Nasser would be able to wield to gag him.
Israel and the Egyptian Negotiations

I submit herewith a note on the points raised in the Israel Ambassador's memorandum of October 14.

2. The Department's remarks might be considered in connexion with our eventual reply to the Israel memorandum.

October 15, 1953

Sir W. Strong, through the Secretary of State, wishes to have this note of the Department's position. Meanwhile the Department are drafting a reply to the Israeli note.

I think this reply must be on the lines of the attached note; but the language might be rather cold, in view of the Israeli attack on Qibya, and in any event a note in some reference to the fact that just as arms supplied by us to the Arabs are not meant to be used against the Jews, so arms for the Israelis should not be used against the Arabs in acts of aggression.

Sir W. Strong

Roger Allen

Secretary
Secretary of State

I think that you should be aware of this Israeli démarche. A draft reply will be submitted in due course.

W. Strong
16/10

Draft submitted in accordance with instruction.

Ed. (Redout)
5/9/10

See separate minute covering draft note.

Rd. 21/10.
Israel and the Egyptian Negotiations

Please see the record at Flag A of the conversation with the Israel Ambassador when he called to leave the memorandum expressing his Government's fears of the consequences of an Anglo-Egyptian settlement.

Flag B. 2. It was foreseen in Mr. Allen's minute of September 16 that the Government of Israel might make an approach on these lines and indeed a foretaste of this was given in the Ambassador's talk with Mr. Allen on September 29.

Flag C. 3. In his note the Israel Ambassador expresses concern:

(a) that an agreement between us and Egypt "by producing a radical change in the balance of forces as between Israel and Egypt, may do violence to one of the basic principles laid down (in the Three Power declaration) on May 25, 1950";

(b) that in making reference to the freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal in the Preamble of our agreement, we miss "the unique opportunity" of binding Egypt to a faithful compliance with the Security Council's decision of September 1, 1951 under which Egypt was asked to allow free passage of cargoes in transit to or from Israel.

4. Our answer to Israel on her concern lest the balance of power in the Middle East be upset does not rest exclusively upon our determination to give effect to the Three Power Resolution of May 25, 1950 (copy attached) whereby the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and France declare their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between the states in the Middle East area and
their intention to prevent the violation of frontiers or armistice lines. We must admit that the balance will be affected, if an Egyptian agreement is made, but the Government of Israel must still trust us to take the necessary measures to fulfil our obligations under the Three Power declaration if we had to. The fact that, even after withdrawal of our combatant troops from Egypt, we intend to retain a considerable force in the Middle East should be evidence of our intention to carry out our obligations. In giving military aid to Egypt in agreement with the United States, we should obviously have to keep in mind the need to preserve a balance between Israel and the Arab States. How this would be done in practice would be a matter for consideration, but there is no doubt that the equipment supplied to Egypt in the preliminary stages would be primarily for training.

5. In regard to the passage of cargoes through the Suez Canal, we have always told the Government of Israel that we could not make this a condition of our settlement with Egypt. If we were to accept it, it would be quite hopeless to expect to get an agreement at all. On the other hand, in common with the Governments of the United States and France, we have never acquiesced in the failure of the Egyptian Government to comply with the Security Council's Resolution and have never lost an opportunity of bringing this home to the Egyptians. This is a question which can be dealt with far better by multilateral approach to the Egyptians rather than in the context of our own negotiations. We cannot tell the Israel Government that that is what we intend to do, but our intention is to mobilise a joint approach to the Egyptians on the whole issue of freedom of navigation by the main maritime countries; the negotiations preceding this will have to be extremely secret. For the time being all we can tell Israel is that while we regret that
we cannot make our settlement with Egypt dependent upon Egyptian compliance with the resolution of the Security Council, we share Israel's concern in this matter and will continue to work for complete freedom of navigation.

October 15, 1953
JOINT STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES.

(To be released at 1600 hours British Summer Time on Thursday, 25th May, 1950.)

The Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States, having had occasion during the recent Foreign Ministers' meeting in London to review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Arab States and Israel, and particularly that of the supply of arms and war material to these states, have resolved to make the following statement:

1. The three Governments recognise that the Arab States and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defence and to permit them to play their part in the defence of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles. In this connexion the three Governments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the statements made by their representatives on the Security Council on 4th August, 1949, in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab States and Israel.

2. The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all the states in question to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries that the purchasing state does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state. Similar assurances will be requested from any other states in the area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.

3. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.
Israel and the Egyptian negotiations

The effort to introduce at all felicitously into a draft note on this subject the point in your minute below about the proper purposes for which arms are supplied has been rather too much for us, and in particular to reconcile it with your other injunction to be rather cold. Unless you think it might not be better to send for the Israeli Ambassador to take delivery of the note, and make the necessary remarks orally, perhaps you could help us with the draft as attached, or give us further injunctions about redrafting it ourselves.

(E. B. Boothby)
19/10

Mr. Roger Allen

I have had a chat on drafting. I don't know what I'm on, but try it on second dept first.

RA 24/10.
ISRAEL AND THE EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS

Flag A

I submit a draft reply to the recent note from the Israel Ambassador expressing concern lest our agreement with Egypt should upset the balance of forces in the Middle East. We could not in any case satisfy Israeli apprehensions but the tone of our reply has been deliberately kept rather cold in view of recent Israeli behaviour, particularly the Qibya incident.

(Signed) Allen

Senior

October 21, 1953.
Legal

Mr. Nettling

Secretary of State

22 Oct.

I agree that we should be cold, but
Is it necessary to be so

specific in reply as we are in fact?

The Jews will then stir up
Their friends in this sphere to
void assurances. But maybe
he has said all this before
It doesn't much matter but some
general phrase needs some form.

20 Oct. 24
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Ambassador of Israel and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of His Excellency's communication (EM/3/2624) of October 14 regarding the negotiations at present in progress between the United Kingdom and Egypt.

Her Majesty's Government understand the concern of the Government of Israel and have had, and will keep, in mind the considerations raised in the Embassy's note. Her Majesty's Government repeat that they are determined to abide by the terms of the declaration of May 25, 1950 by the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States both in regard to the development of an arms race between the Arab States and Israel, and in regard to the use of force or threat of force between any of the States in the area. They fully intend to take such action as may lie in their power to fulfil that declaration.

Her Majesty's Government regret, however, that they cannot make any settlement with Egypt dependent upon Egyptian guarantees regarding Egypt's use of arms or military assets which may be transferred to her, or upon Egyptian compliance with the Resolution of the Security Council of September 1, 1951. [These are matters which, in their view, cannot be settled before an Anglo/Egyptian agreement on the future of the base in Egypt is concluded.]
ISRAEL AND THE EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS

I now attach a redraft of the draft reply which we submitted to the recent Note from the Israel Ambassador expressing concern lest our agreement with Egypt should upset the balance of force in the Middle East. The Secretary of State, in his minute below, suggested that we should be less specific as to the last paragraph, and we have redrafted it accordingly adding to it a general hope that a settlement with Egypt will improve the situation everywhere in the Middle East.

E. B. DeMille

October 27, 1953

Sg't W. Strong

Logan Allen 27/10.
Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Ambassador of Israel and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of His Excellency’s communication (EE/34/2624) of October 14 regarding the negotiations at present in progress between the United Kingdom and Egypt.

Her Majesty’s Government understand the concern of the Government of Israel and have had, and will keep, in mind the considerations raised in the Embassy’s note. Her Majesty’s Government repeat that they are determined to abide by the terms of the declaration of May 25, 1950 by the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States both in regard to the development of an arms race between the Arab States and Israel, and in regard to the use of force or threat of force between any of the States in the area. They fully intend to take such action as may lie in their power to fulfil that declaration. They do, however, see great difficulty in the suggestion that a settlement of problems concerning the Canal Zone Base should be made contingent upon conformity by Egypt to the resolution of the Security Council of September 1, 1953.

Her Majesty’s Government hope that a settlement with Egypt would eventually conduce to a greater degree of stability in the Middle East, and consequently to the maintenance of peace in that area, which is one of the prime objectives of their policy.
CONFIDENTIAL

ISRAEL AND THE EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. Shuckburgh said he thought the Secretary of State might still want to alter the draft below on the grounds:

(a) that the Israeli point in paragraph 6 of their Note regarding a guarantee for the proper use of the military assets of the Base had still not been fully met, and

(b) that the phrase in the draft about "seeing great difficulty" etc. would look too weak if the Note were ever published.

I said our redraft had been made to meet what we thought were the Secretary of State's wishes regarding greater vagueness, but that the Department were in favour of precision. I said we would try again, and now attach a further effort which I think is better.

(E. B. Boothby)

Oct. 28, 1953

Mr. Roger Allen

[Signature]
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Ambassador of Israel and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of His Excellency's communication (EE/34/3624) of October 14 regarding the negotiations at present in progress between the United Kingdom and Egypt.

Her Majesty's Government understand the concern of the Government of Israel and have had, and will keep, in mind the considerations raised in the Embassy's note. Her Majesty's Government repeat that they are determined to abide by the terms of the declaration of May 25, 1950 by the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States both in regard to the development of arms races between the Arab States and Israel, and in regard to the use of force or threat of force between any of the States in the area. They fully intend to take such action as may lie in their power to fulfill that declaration. They could not, however, accept the suggestion that a settlement of Anglo-Egyptian problems concerning the Canal Zone-Base should be made contingent either upon securing a specific guarantee regarding military assets or upon conformity by Egypt to the resolution of the Security Council of September 1, 1956.

Her Majesty's Government hope that a settlement with Egypt would eventually contribute to a greater degree of stability in the Middle East, and consequently to the maintenance of peace in that area, which is one of the prime objectives of their policy.