

371/162806

92772

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

SAVING TELEGRAM

/HP.

(12) Copy No.....

En Clair by bag.

C.B.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir Ralph Skrine Stevenson

To of Whitehall

No.96 Saving

27th April, 1953.

Repeated Saving to :

E.1190/240

Paris No. 169
Washington No.142
Memin (Fayid) No.167

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.96 Saving of 27th April, 1953, repeated Saving for information to Paris, Washington, and Memin (Fayid).

My telegram No.91 Saving.

E.1192/219

The press has again carried daily reports of speeches by various officers of the Revolutionary Command Council and of the Liberation Group in the course of intensive touring throughout Egypt.

2. The tone of these speeches has very slightly improved since the 18th when Colonel Abdel Naser is reported to have said at Alexandria that he was not optimistic about the outcome of the evacuation talks and was followed by S/Ldr. Hassan Ibrahim who announced that martyrdom was the only path to freedom and that Egypt must be prepared for the worst. However, though he blamed a Mr. Dunlop (formerly a British official here) for Egypt's subjugation to 'mental, intellectual and material imperialism, Naser was concerned with internal reform rather than with action against the British.

3. Major Tahawi, with S/Ldr. Hassan Ibrahim, has been speaking several times a day during the Liberation Week at Alexandria which has just completed its tenth day. Tahawi's only departure from the usual calls for unity, discipline and work in the imminent struggle for freedom, was an attack on the British for having consistently attempted to paralyse Egypt's economy. However the main accent in his pronouncements, and in those of S/Ldr. Hassan Ibrahim, was on industrial development and economic reform. The latter said that the evacuation battle was not the only one. There was a longer and more arduous struggle to be faced - that of reconstruction. A speech during a visit to Shell Company installations was unexceptionable.

4. The same was true of speeches made by Major Hakim Amer, Wing Commander Gamal Salem, Lt. Colonel Anwar el Sadat, Lt. Colonel Hussein el Shafci and Sheikh al Baquri in various Upper Egyptian towns. Their statements were hardly conciliatory

/but

80 APR 1953

but there seems to have been less insistence on the need for martyrdom and bloodshed.

5. General Naguib himself has given only two public addresses of any importance recently. In the first, at Mandi, on the 19th, he drew a distinction between British tourists and residents who must be welcomed as Egypt's guests and the 'British imperialist soldiers' who must be driven out forthwith. The second was on the occasion of the passing out on the 23rd of the first batch of volunteers for military training. This was a noisily militaristic affair, watched by a crowd estimated by the press at 80 thousand. Naguib suited his words to the circumstances by saying that a nation is not respected unless it is strong and that, although peaceful means were preferable, Egypt would not hesitate to win her rights by force.

6. In commenting on the preparations for evacuation talks the press remained resolutely intransigent. Al Gumhour al Misry of the 20th published an editorial of its usual standard. The British were accused of burning Cairo and of being a nation founded on crime, with whom it was useless to negotiate. Evacuation could only be enforced by acts of terrorism. However, if we agreed to withdraw we must go completely and at once, leaving no experts behind. Rose el Youssef of the same day insisted that technical questions must not be discussed because by these the British meant :

- (i) Filling the gap.
- (ii) Maintenance of the Base
- (iii) Defence in wartime.

The first meant that Egyptian resources were inadequate, the second that the occupation forces would be maintained in the guise of experts and the third that Egyptians would die for Britain. The British must be ordered out at pistol-point and had no right to know what would happen afterwards. On the 21st Al Da'wa applauded the mobilisation of the nation's youth in preparation for the struggle, and on the 22nd Al Tahrir's editor, Major Sarwat Okasha, since reported to be one of the Egyptian military experts delegated for the forthcoming talks, described Sir William Slim's views on the Canal Zone as 'British arrogance incarnate'. He then quoted Captain Liddell Hart as saying that the Canal had lost most of its strategic value and, affirming that Egypt's only enemies were the British imperialists, said that if Egypt sided with anyone it would be with those who had declared their neutrality. Al Misry of the 23rd spoke of the 'rotten British mentality' which still attempted to impose conditions for evacuation and accused the British press of printing absurd stories about the talks which did not help to establish the calm atmosphere necessary for negotiation. In its next editorial it pointed out the necessity of military training for the public when negotiations were about to begin. However, it emphasized that evacuation would mark the start of Egypt's international responsibilities which she must be ready to assume.

7. Although certain papers, notably Al Ahram, expressed themselves in reasonable language, the tone of the press was hardly designed to ensure restraint during the negotiations. Yet it was encouraging to find an article

- 3 -

in Al Tahrir by Major Salem violently attacking the Egyptian Press itself and explaining the need for press censorship by pointing out the sloth, incompetence and inaccuracy of Egyptian journalists.

8. It is reliably reported that Army speakers had to face a measure of organised heckling at some of their meetings and that on occasion anti-British themes were introduced to divert attention. In general Army leaders are not optimistic about the outcome of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations and the violence of their statements is to some extent at least due to this.

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637/102806

92772

Measures to maintain our position in Egypt.

An earlier draft of this paper has, I believe, been seen in the Office and I do not know how far we are already committed to agreeing with it.

However, I would venture to make a few observations, based mainly on the two following important points:-

And lose the support of the U.S. The U.S. difficulties shd perhaps be given a separate subpara. to itself.

(a) the probability that we shall have to face violent criticism by world opinion and probable action in the Security Council (paragraph 6(b) of the paper); and

(b) the point already made by the Foreign Office and underlined by Mr. Creswell in his letter at J1192/208, that if measures of the kind contemplated in the paper are taken, we shall have to face hostile action not only in the Nile Delta but also to our communities in the Delta.

3. As regards point (a) above, it is surely vitally important that we shall avoid any action open to strong international criticism unless it can be shown to be directly necessary for the protection of our forces. Now, Serial 11, which is a measure of retaliation and pressure, cannot be brought within this category. Nor would it be easy to include in it Serials 7 and 15, insofar as they relate to Egyptian Army Units in Sinai. In particular it would seem difficult to justify the cutting off of non-warlike supplies to such units (Serial 7).

4. This consideration also applies to the proposal to interfere with supplies for the 200,000 refugees at Gaza. It seems very doubtful whether U.N.R.W.A. would be prepared to accommodate us as the paper suggests. In any case no arrangements could quickly be made: ~~on the other hand~~ we should be unable to work out plans with U.N.R.W.A. in the ~~advance~~. If the Chiefs of Staff are unable to agree to modify the paper to remove the threat of an oil blockade (Serial 11) and adopt a passive attitude to Egyptians in Sinai (Serials 7 and 15), surely we could ask that all measures of this kind should be included in Group C. They are in fact offensive measures.

5. Consideration (b) in paragraph 2 above, would have to be met by additional serials for the concentration and probable evacuation of United Kingdom communities in Cairo and Alexandria (note particularly Mr. Creswell's written postscript in this sense), that is to say, we should try to get as many as possible of our people out

in...

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

in relative comfort and dignity before they are interned or expelled. It is really for the Embassy in Cairo to advise how this could best be done.

6. In any case, the paper as at present drafted should be added to (perhaps in paragraph 6(a)), in order to make it clear that a state of war, including naturally rupture of diplomatic relations and thorough going action against British interests in Egypt, would probably result.

Minor Comments.

7. Serial 9 (Evacuation of 3 wives families) should come under Group A (Immediate Precautionary measures).

8. Serial 16 is a little laughable as it stands. At least 90% of Egyptian labour would already have walked out by the time Group C measures were undertaken. If it is really considered necessary, it should be taken earlier on. And surely in any case this list of measures should include the despatch from the United Kingdom of labour requirements, independently of any dismissals of Egyptians.

Christopher Gandy

(C. Gandy)
25th April, 1955.

P.S. I think we should consider putting it to the Defence Committee first to avoid recrimination and secure some U.S. support if possible we should inform them now of what we propose, without showing them this paper.

I have covered most of these points in the brief for the Defence Ctee now submitted.

Christopher Gandy
25/4

pw
5

TOP SECRET

MEASURES TO MAINTAIN OUR POSITION IN EGYPT

I have seen the attached brief for the Defence Committee meeting prepared by the Department while I was on leave, and I agree with it. I understand that it was also seen in draft form by Sir James Bowker.

2. The only two points which I suggest might be underlined are the following:-

(a) I do not believe that we shall be able to avoid occupying Cairo and probably Alexandria if these measures are put into force. Obviously one cannot foresee exactly what the course of events will be, but not only are there likely to be disturbances in these cities sooner or later, which will threaten British and other foreign lives, but also we may well have to intervene to replace the present Egyptian régime by a new one. We may be able to do this without actually sending troops to Cairo, but given the Egyptian mentality and likelihood of disorders consequent upon any relaxation of the grip of the present régime, we should certainly be unwise not to plan for the probability that forces will have to be despatched to the Delta. Once we have done this, the responsibility will be on us to restore order and good government in Egypt.

CABINET DOCUMENT REMOVED AND DESTROYED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH CABINET OFFICE
INSTRUCTIONS: THE ORIGINAL SHOULD BE
FOUND IN THE CABINET OFFICE RECORDS.

(b) The timing of these measures is all-important. It may be that all the measures in groups (a), (b) and (c) will have to be taken simultaneously and at the onset of trouble. If so, it will be most important, especially from the point of view of world opinion, that we judge the moment rightly.

/We

FO 371/102806

92772

We must not wait so long that our determination can be called in question, but on the other hand we must have sufficient provocation to justify our action. If the measures are however taken seriatim, it will be equally important to judge the moment at which each measure or each group of measures should be put into operation. The Chiefs of Staff memorandum is vague about the timing, and this is probably right, because the appropriate moment can only be judged in the light of circumstances as they arise. But this makes it all the more important that Ministerial approval should be given before any measure or group of measures is taken. I think that this is realised by the Chiefs of Staff, but the Minister of State may wish to enter a specific caveat on this point.

Roger Allen

28th April, 1953.

TOP SECRETMEASURES TO MAINTAIN OUR POSITION IN EGYPT

FLAG A

C.O.S. Paper D(53)25 of April 21.

The Foreign Office have been consulted by the Chiefs of Staff in drawing up this paper and we are in general sympathy with it. It sets out fairly and clearly the main implications of a show-down with Egypt.

2. The consequences of taking the actions outlined in this paper will be most serious both in respect to our relations with Egypt and upon the international position of the United Kingdom in the world as a whole.

Reactions in Egypt

FLAG B

3. The Cairo Embassy have pointed out, and we agree, that the exercise of these measures, even the immediate precautionary measures, is bound to produce an immediate reaction in Cairo and Alexandria which would endanger the large British communities there. If we are to protect them, it may well be necessary to follow these measures up with an occupation of both cities at short notice. This has been accepted by the Chiefs of Staff and plans are being laid accordingly.

4. To fail to take measures in advance to protect British lives when troops are near at hand would no doubt raise bitter criticism at home.

5. Sealing off the Canal Zone is bound to entail incidents involving loss of Egyptian lives. The stoppage of oil supplies affects every household in Egypt, since all Egyptians use kerosene for cooking. The demolition of villages would also involve action certain to arouse violent Egyptian passions. All these measures would undoubtedly be represented by Egypt as outrages to Egyptian national sovereignty, and force any Egyptian Government to continue guerilla warfare regardless of cost.

/Arab Refugees

Arab Refugees

6. It will be noted that the stoppage of road and rail traffic between the Delta and Sinai might cut off food supplies for the 200,000 Arab refugees at Gaza. This was not the case in the 1951/52 skirmishes, because we had not then the active opposition of the Egyptian Army. The refugees are fed by the United Nations WRAPNE and supplies go by rail from El Kantara, through the Egyptian Lines. The Egyptian Army might well try to stop the supplies going, if they could not get their own victuals. It might then be necessary for the United Nations agency to make alternative arrangements to send them through Israel.

Cost of Occupation

7. Either a military occupation of the main cities of Egypt, or the sealing off of the Canal Zone for a long period would involve a heavy military and financial commitment. It is hard to see exactly how things would go, but even assuming a rapid victory, one cannot foretell how long the commitment would last. We should presumably try to install an Egyptian Government favourable to us, but we would have to support it for a long period of time before it could consolidate its ~~population~~ position.

8. The full bill has not been estimated, but, by way of illustration, B.M.E.O. worked out the cost of feeding the civilian population (Egyptian and European) of the Canal Zone on a ration sufficient to avoid famine at roughly £9,000,000 a year, a substantial part of which would be in dollars; it might involve reducing the United Kingdom meat ration. Stocks in the Canal Zone would run out after about four days.

World opinion

9. As has been pointed out in paragraph 6(b) of this paper, we might find ourselves arraigned before the Security

/Council

Council without adequate American support and with the active opposition of the Arab States and possibly some members of the Commonwealth. The possible effect upon Anglo/American relations is the most serious consequence we are likely to have to face. Given the present pro-Arab policy of the United States Administration, the American reaction might well be to support a Security Council move for a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement.

10. It is conceivable that it might prejudice the United States against co-operating with us in other parts of the Middle East vital to our interests.

11. The reaction of the other Arab States would undoubtedly be hostile and the moves which we have at present in mind in Jordan and Libya would have to be postponed. It might well mean the end of all our attempts to associate the Arab States with the West in common planning to resist Communist aggression.

12. In the Sudan, on the other hand, we might expect some relaxation of Egyptian pressure if all Egyptian resources were to be mobilised against us. The main task would be to see that the Sudanese themselves did not embarrass us. We should, therefore, have to reaffirm our intention that the Sudan would have a free choice as to its own destiny. It would serve no purpose to repudiate the Sudan Agreement of the 12th February, since the Sudanese themselves regard this as a milestone on the road to independence. If we want to retain the friendship of the Sudan, we should continue as if the Agreement were still in operation, and try to make it work with whatever Egyptian Government, succeeds Neguib.

Conclusion

13. In spite of these heavy disadvantages, it is clear that if the Egyptians insist upon a show down, we must take the military measures necessary for a military victory. It is

much better that they should be taken at one fell swoop as soon as Ministers are convinced of their necessity, rather than that they should be taken piecemeal, allowing time for opposition to consolidate, and for hostile world opinion to be mobilised.

14. In view, however, of their political effects, it is essential that the responsibility for the decision to act should be taken by Her Majesty's Government. If it is impossible for a full Cabinet decision, the Secretary of State's suggestion last July that responsibility should devolve Flag C upon the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defence, might be revived.

15. The Service Departments should clearly be given authority now to undertake preparatory measures, provided that these do not become evident to the Egyptians. Storage of food, for example, will involve heavy expenditure and the preparation of stocks for the Canal Zone alone would take six or seven weeks. Recruitment of personnel for civil administration is also something which should be pressed on with. The Royal Navy will need to have easy access to the men necessary for work at the ports.

16. If the Defence Committee were to conclude that, in spite of the advice of the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office, no measures are to be taken to protect the British community in Cairo and Alexandria, H.M. Ambassador should be informed so that measures may be prepared at once to enable those British subjects to leave who may wish to do so.

R.T.A. (erwan)

28th April, 1953.

FO 371/102806

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TOP SECRET

FROM : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LONDON

JE 1192/218

TO : G.H.Q. M.E.L.F.

(D)

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATEOZ 2771
TOO 071036AINFO : C IN C MEDITERRANEAN
C IN C M.E.L.F.

DEF 79

7th May, 1953.

For Hatch from Ewbank

Subject. Measures to maintain position in Egypt. *see br 6*

1. H.M. Ministers yesterday discussed COS(53)188 and took note of the paper. They did not repeat not specifically approve in principle the various measures listed at Annex.
2. Ministers emphasised the importance of obtaining prior Cabinet approval to any measures having such far reaching political consequences.
3. Regarding measures for which Ministerial approval has already been given (Annex, Column (b)), they noted that even these measures were only to be exercised after Ministerial decision at the time, or in the event of sudden or serious emergency in circumstances of such immediate and obvious menace as to make any delay out of the question, bearing in mind the inherent responsibility at all times of a Commander for the safety of his own forces.

CIRCULATION

TOO 071036A

Foreign Office
 War Registry, Admiralty
 Message Control, War Office
 Registry Telegrams, Air Ministry
 Mr. P.H. Dean
 Mr. R. Allen
 Mr. R.C. Mackworth Young
 Sir P. Liesching
 Mr. B.R. Curson
 Mr. Armitage Smith
 D.C.O.R. 'B'

Note by Secretary

COS(53)188 is the same as D(53)25 discussed by Defence Committee 6th May.

JE 1192/218A

371/102806

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Minutes. *Arthur J.*
JE. 1192/223

M. Bitsios of the Greek Embassy called this afternoon to follow up an earlier conversation with Mr. Allen on the question of defence negotiations with Egypt.

2. He said he had got the impression from Mr. Allen that we were not willing to bring America or any other country into discussion of our outstanding differences with Egypt, but shortly after this conversation it had appeared that we were willing to invite the Americans. He was also muddled by the fact that we were now entering into negotiations with Egypt, whereas it appeared to the world that Egypt would not accept a Middle East defence organisation and we would not accept unconditional evacuation.

3. I told M. Bitsios that, as Mr. Allen had emphasised to him before, we regarded all the elements involved in settling our differences with Egypt as interdependent and we had not retreated in any way from our earlier position of insisting that some organisation should come into being to ensure the defence of the Middle East.

4. It was not surprising, I said, that he was confused by the various public statements which had been made on the Egyptian side. We could only find out what Egyptian intentions really were when we got down to discussions with them and meanwhile we were not intending to make any announcement regarding the basis for negotiations.

R.T.D. Ledward

(R.T.D. Ledward)
20th April, 1953.

R 20/4

W.P. [unclear]

Li J. Bowler

Western and Southern Department.

RP 1/5

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Return by [unclear]

92772

Registry No.

CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. DULLES IN PARIS

TOP SECRET
Secret
CONFIDENTIAL
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Open

E. 1192/224

Egypt

J

Draft.

Brief for the Minister of State

The Minister of State may wish to remind Mr. Dulles that H.M.G. believe that the only way in which they can reach a settlement with Egypt will be in partnership with the United States Government. Although we have gone ahead on a bilateral basis and intend to start talks, with Sir. R. Stevenson and General Sir. B. Robertson as our representatives, on April 27th, we trust that the United States Government will continue to impress upon the Egyptians their close interest in a satisfactory settlement being reached, which will safeguard the use of a base in the Canal Zone in the event of a war. He might mention that we hope that when the Americans do come in, General Hull will be there.

2. The Minister of State may wish to add that H.M.G. and the United States Government do not yet seem to see eye to eye on the question of arms supplies to Egypt. The Americans will not agree to make arms supplies conditional upon Egyptian cooperation over defence. The Egyptians are taking advantage of this difference. Mr. Creswell reported on April 17th that the Egyptian Foreign Minister

"showed great lack of interest, whether or not the question of arms supplies was to be covered in the forthcoming negotiations. He hardly thought it worth while setting up a Committee for this purpose."

3. Apart from the basic contradiction in our approach, we have narrowed our differences down to argument about the delivery times for /United

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Now cleared with Sir J. Boncker & copies sent to Mr. Bonshell.

United States armoured cars. We have been exchanging Notes with the United States Embassy on this point, but it still appears to be the intention of the United States Government to let the Egyptians have armoured cars within 45 days; We are taking up again in Washington the contradiction between this delivery time and the time of one year given by Mr. Dulles to the Secretary of State.


4. We have now the assurance that supplies will be held up in the event of Anglo-Egyptian relations becoming critical, but this is not enough. The real point, which we do not seem to have succeeded in getting across to the United States, is that if the Egyptians think now that they can get all they want (tanks, ammunition, planes, etc.) from the Americans in the long run, they will be less interested in making any concessions either to the United States or ourselves.

5. Sir R. Makins was instructed on April 17th to take up with the United States Government our suspicions based on secret reports, regarding the neutralist intention of the Council of the Revolutionary Command and the preparations which they are making, with their German advisers, to take action against us. We think that the State Department are relying too much on what the Egyptians say to their face, and not on what is said and done behind their backs.

NOTE FOR TRIPARTITE TALKS WITH AMERICANS AND

FRENCH

6. The French have not been told in so much detail as the Americans the object of our negotiations, but they have been informed of the five
/elements



The same consideration applies to the report received by H.M. Embassy in Cairo from the U.S. Embassy that the U.S. Govt. have agreed to train 50 Egyptian pilots on jets free of charge.

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Reference:-

FO 311/102806

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elements in our proposals of March 28th and of the way in which we should like to see the talks conducted. It may be sufficient at this stage to reassure them that we shall keep them informed of the way things go.

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7/19/4

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CONFIDENTIAL

JE 1192 | 237 | J

M. de Beaumarché of the French Embassy said to-day that the French had had a long report from their Ambassador at Cairo on a conversation which he had had with the Egyptian Foreign Minister. M. Fawzi had stated that the Egyptian Government certainly took the question of the Canal Zone base seriously and regarded it as an essential element in the defence of the Middle East. He had agreed that foreign technicians would be needed to run it, though their numbers might be taken off as and when Egyptians were trained to take over. The only new point M. Fawzi seems to have made is that he had said he would not mind foreign troops coming back to Egypt from Cyprus or elsewhere to hold joint manoeuvres with the Egyptian Army.

2. I thanked M. de Beaumarché for this information, but warned him that there had been many contradictions between the statements made by the Foreign Minister to us in private and the statements made by Egyptian Army officers in public. We should only know what the true Egyptian position was when we got round a table with them and this we intended to do on the 27th.

3. I mentioned that the Minister of State would be ready to discuss the question of freedom of navigation of the Canal in the forthcoming tripartite talks in Paris and that we would make common cause with the French in order to get secret tripartite talks going on this subject.

4. The French are very anxious to be helpful over Egypt and we may find them useful allies in trying to get more sense out of the Americans on the arms issue.

R.T.D. Ledward

(R.T.D. Ledward)
20th April, 1953.

Lt J. Bowler

Gen. ...

R.F. ...
21/4

Minister of State

see 24/4

W. ...
21/4

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

The Egyptian Ambassador came to see me on 20th April to discuss two points.

2. The first one he did not succeed in making clear to me owing to his imperfect knowledge of the English language. I understood him to say that Dr. Fawzi had made clear to Mr. Creswell that the Egyptian Government had not at any time, and were not now contemplating a defence agreement. Dr. Fawzi wished this to be clear to us before the negotiations started. I asked whether that meant that the Egyptian Government were now seeking to make it a condition precedent to the opening of negotiations that we should agree that there would be no defence agreement. The Ambassador said no, he didn't mean that. He meant that the Egyptian Government were not agreeing that there would have to be a defence agreement. I said that if that were the position I saw no difficulty. I thought each side was entering upon these negotiations to discuss the whole range of problems but without prior commitment on either side. I think that the position was made clear before our conversation concluded but I am not absolutely certain that I really got the sense of what the Ambassador wanted to say or that he really understood my reply.

3. He next raised the question of the Israeli Ambassador's recent call upon me and the Aide Memoire asking for consultation between the Israel and United Kingdom Governments before our negotiations with Egypt began and during them.

4. I said that we did not acknowledge the right of any country to consultation with us about these matters but we would decide for ourselves whether at any stage we would talk with any other interested Government about the course of the negotiations. I said that of course if we were to discuss the negotiations with any other interested Government we would discuss them in confidence.

Distribution:

African Dept. (to enter)

(Signature)
Selys Lloyd
20th April, 1953.

Copies to:

- Sir William Strang
- Lord Reading
- Mr. Butting
- Sir James Balker
- Mr. Ross
- Mr. Lockwood

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The Egyptian Ambassador's comments to the Minister of State, recorded in paragraph 2 of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's minute of April 20th, refer to the little contretemps M. Hakki had with the Egyptian Foreign Minister. Cairo telegram No. 659 Priper of April 15th refers.

SE 102/1000

2. I attach a draft telegram to Cairo reporting it, as we may get into a further muddle at the Cairo end.

R. S. Selwyn

21st April, 1953.

The reason why the Ambassador has tackled us once again on this question is probably that he has now had a letter from the Egyptian Foreign Minister on the subject. In paragraph 5 of his telegram No. 659 Mr. Creswell said that he suggested to Fawzi that he should write privately himself to Hakki, but at the same time Mr. Creswell suggested that the less now said the better, and I doubt whether it is really necessary to send him a telegram. I think it would be enough to let him know of the conversation by letter.

Yes. W.S.

We should let Cairo know of the Ambassador's reference to the ^{Israel} Egyptian Note. This could be done when sending them copies of the Note and the reply which the Minister of State is, I understand, handing to the Israel Ambassador this morning.

Yes. W.S.

H. J. Bowker

22nd April, 1953.

Sir W. Stanger

No need to telegraph. I am sending a copy of the Minister of State's ^{reply} record

79

J

CONFIDENTIAL

JE.1192/221

Mr. Palmer of the U.S. Embassy told me to-day that Mr. Caffery had had conversations on April 20th with the Egyptian Foreign Minister and with Colonel Nasr. ~~Mr. Fourny~~ had said that he was very pleased with the calming effect upon members of the Council of the Revolutionary Command of the announcement that negotiations were to start. Colonel Nasr had said that the Egyptians proposed to try to get a declaration from the British on evacuation at the first meeting on April 27th; Mr. Caffery had replied "Try that one and you will wreck the negotiations".

2. Mr. Caffery clearly said the right thing and we should give him credit for it.

R.T.D. (Edward)

21st April, 1953.

The Egyptians may well try this one.

*Minister of State
Copy for W. Stamps.*

*R. F. Lawrence
21/4*

SV 21/4

Copy sent to Prime Minister

W.D.

6571/2006

92772

J

AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

J E. 1192/219

EGYPT AND SUDAN

FROM
 Sir R. Stevenson,
 Cairo
 Confidential
 No. 41(S)
 Dated 21st Oct.
 Received in
 Registry— 24th Oct.

Press has carried many statements on evacuation and the Egyptian decision not to consider joining a defence pact at least until after evacuation.
 (Rptd. Paris, Wilson, Fayid)

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

References.
 JE 1192/176
 JE 1192/186

The statements by military leaders in para 4 are the same. We had, I think, been under the impression that they had stopped since Nasir's Observer interview.

Uninterfered
 25/4

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)
 M.M.F. Davis, M/Def.
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(Action completed.)

(Index.)

22/5

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Next Paper.

13371/102806

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/JAH

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir Ralph Stevenson.

No. 91 Saving

Date: 21st April, 1953.

C.B. F. O. [unclear]
E 1190/019

Repeated to: Paris No. 166 Saving
Washington No. 138 Saving
Memin (Fayid) No. 162. Saving

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office saving telegram No. 91 of 21st April, 1953, repeated saving for information to Paris, Washington and Memin (Fayid).

Following from Creswell.

My telegram No. 648.

The press of the past week has carried almost daily official pronouncements on evacuation. On the tenth Colonel Abdel Naser, continuing his tour of Dakahlia Province, is reported to have made a lengthy speech repeating the statements reported in my telegram under reference. Commenting on British apprehensions that their withdrawal would leave a vacuum he said that the British troops themselves constituted a vacuum which must be removed. He told his audience to prepare for the struggle as the day of liberation was at hand. He spoke in similar terms at Damietta on the same day and at Mit-Ghamr on the eleventh.

2. On the 13th Colonel Abdel Naser's statement to the Observer was published (my tel. 654, para 3) with the following underlined phrases, which appeared in one or another of the drafts, omitted from it:

(i) Egypt will not discuss a Middle East pact until after evacuation.

(ii) We know we will want technicians, and since it is British equipment in the base we will need British technicians.

(iii) I myself supported the Sidky-Bevin draft agreement. I cannot support it now.

3. Press comments on the joint communiqué on Anglo-Egyptian talks announced on the 16th were favourable and hopeful. It was generally assumed that we had accepted the principle of evacuation. On the same day an interview given by Neguib to the correspondent of the Washington Post was reported. The General insisted that evacuation must be immediate and unconditional but added that once Egypt was free the way would be clear for further negotiations.

APR 1953
4

FO 371/102806

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4. Press 17th carried an account of a speech by Major Khaled Mohieddin at the Coptic Patriarchate where pursuing the theme of religious tolerance he said that just as the enemy in Palestine had made no distinction between the two religions so, when Egypt had risen against the occupier, the latter had fired on both alike. Later, at the Press Club, S/L. Hassan Ibrahim stated that there would be no bargaining over evacuation. If unconditional withdrawal was not conceded, the Egyptians would take another way to the Canal Zone. Major Ibrahim al Tahawi, Assistant Secretary-General of the Liberation Group, said at the same meeting that the Egyptian colossus had returned with increased strength, that it had no aggressive intentions but that, if necessary, it would, in self-defence, march to the Suez Canal and throw the British troops into it.

5. All these statements were echoed in an enthusiastic chorus of editorial comment. Several editors felt able to assure their readers "on the highest authority" that the talks concerned nothing but the timetable and technicalities of evacuation. Ahmed Abul Fath, writing in Al Misry said that all Arabs would regard the signing of a joint defence pact with the West as a treasonable act. They would not die for Britain and America who had already caused them incalculable sufferings. The Arab governments should take warning that the people would revolt against any government which betrayed its trust by signing such a pact. Abul Fath concluded: "May God preserve us from the evils of joint defence".

6. The purpose of this general campaign in the Press, which is so unhelpful at this moment just before negotiations open, is mainly, I think, the mistaken belief that by putting pressure on us in this childish fashion and by seeking to build up public opinion against us, the Egyptians will cause us to make more concessions in negotiation than we would otherwise make. In other words, it is a continuance of the process of blackmailing us with threats of violence. On the other hand, it is more than likely that certain newspapers such as Al Misry, are repeating the game they have played in the past, by pushing the Government into a position where there is no escape without loss of face and presenting it in due course with a crisis when it will be committed to violent action against British forces. Such a policy is of course particularly effective since the newspaper engaged in undermining the Government in this way is apparently only guilty of violently nationalistic and "patriotic" sentiments and can thus easily avoid criticism and disarm counter measures against it. This is a particularly safe course when it is only quoting, and commenting upon a statement by a member of the régime.

Reference:-

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135

Enter

JE.1192/226

J.

THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR telephoned to me this morning to say that he had had a message from Mr. Comay, the Deputy Director of the Israel Foreign Office to the effect that the Hebrew Press in Tel Aviv had published a Reuter message from London to the effect that the Minister of State received the Israel Ambassador on the 21st April and handed a reply to the Ambassador's note about the forthcoming Anglo-Egyptian talks. Mr. Comay had assured the Ambassador that the Israel Government had given out no information whatever on the subject and that the leakage had clearly come from London. The Ambassador said he was most anxious that the Foreign Office should know that there had been no leakage in Tel Aviv or in the Embassy here.

I thanked the Ambassador for telephoning to me. I said I could assure him that Reuters had not been given the information by the News Department and that I supposed that their message was based on their own assumption.

R. J. S. [Signature]

24th April, 1953

SIR WILLIAM STRANG

Copies to News Department
Eastern Department.

[Signature]

24/4

Enter J

SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

Cypher/OTP

PRISEC

No. 1659

D. 6.05 p.m. 15th April, 1953.

15th April, 1953.

JE 1192/216

IMMEDIATE

DEDIP

SECRET

SECRET
JE 1192/216

My telegram No. 1652.

Following from Private Secretary.

Following is text of Private and Personal letter from Prime Minister to General Bedell Smith. The Prime Minister wishes you to communicate this to General Bedell Smith in advance of letter which follows by bag.

Begins.

Now that in Anthony's unfortunate illness I have had to take over the Foreign Office, I shall look forward to corresponding with you and your chief, Foster Dulles. I like the news which Makins conveys me of his talks with you about the Persian tangle, and have cabled you to this effect officially.

2. I hope you will give real help in our attempt to solve the Canal Zone problem on the lines we have agreed with you. This gives far the best chance of an agreement meeting our joint strategic needs. But I hope if you do come in, you will act as a reinforcement on major points, and not as a mediator, remembering that we went a long way in our joint talks to reach agreement with you. I do not feel like being whittled on substance.

3. There is a point of detail on which I shall have to insist, namely that the British military personnel left to guard or look after the base shall be in uniform and carry personal arms. If not, they would simply be hostages and could be arrested at any time by the Egyptian police. On the other hand, if armed, such an aggression and breach of the agreement would amount to an act of war, and would therefore in all probability not occur. There are sure to be disagreements in the future about Sudan, and they cannot remain defenceless yet charged with great inter-allied responsibilities, at the mercy and good faith of any Egyptian dictator who may jump or crawl into office overnight. I am sure you will think of these points in a realistic way.

/4. It

Reference:-

FO 371/102806

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SECRETForeign Office telegram No. 1659 to Washington

- 2 -

4. It is very nice to be working with you again.

5. I am very glad you will look at the excerpts from my final Volume which the President tells me he will entrust to you. I will have them sent you shortly.

Ends.

[Copies sent to the Prime Minister].

O 371/102806

92772

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COPYSECRETFROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

PRIPER

Mr. Creswell

No. 659

15th April, 1953. T E 1012 190

D. 2.07 p.m. 15th April 1953.

R. 3.13 p.m. 15th April, 1953

PRIORITYDEDIPSECRET

My immediately preceding telegram and your telegram No. 767.

Following personal for Strang from Creswell.

Fawzi asked me to see him privately last night about the conversation you had with Hakki on 9th April.

2. Hakki had reported that you had defined Her Majesty's Government's attitude about the inter-dependence of the five points on the lines of your telegram No. 717 and that you had said you understood the Egyptian Government had no objection. "In an excess of diligence" Hakki had reported this in an official despatch which exposed Fawzi to some danger, since he thought that some members of the régime might maintain that Hakki's acquiescence in your remark constituted official acceptance by Egypt of the proposals I had made on 28th March. He will therefore show the despatch to Neguib and nobody else.

3. I said that if Hakki had been over-diligent so had I, and I had reported fully to you on Fawzi's attitude (my telegrams 609, 620, 631 and 636). I summarized this as being that the Egyptian Government fully understood Her Majesty's Government's position, were unwilling formally to accept the proposals made on March 28th, but did not wish to reject them; they wished to open talks on the technical level as soon as possible about the practical issues involved.

4. Fawzi confirmed this. But he said that the position was "fragile" and that indeed had the communication of 28th March (my telegram No. 571) been made in an official Note instead of as an oral communication with aide mémoire, things would be very difficult.

5. He asked me to report our conversation to you. I think that the sooner we can get away from all such nuances and get down to practical talks the better. When, therefore, he suggested that you might see Hakki again "to put this right" I suggested that he should write privately himself to Hakki and that the less now said the better. Fawzi is evidently skating on very thin ice with his own people here.

6. The Ambassador has seen and agrees.

148.
Rozzi/No 2006
92772
JE. 1192/225 J.
~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ISRAEL AND THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS

Flag A.

On April 14th, the Israel Ambassador left with the Minister of State the attached note (JE 1192/189) the last paragraph of which requests an opportunity for United Kingdom-Israel consultations before Anglo-Egyptian negotiations begin. I understand that the Israel Ambassador has already asked the Minister of State to receive him again in order to get our reply, and this will have to be tomorrow, April 17th, at the latest, since the Minister of State is then leaving for his constituency.

Flag B.

2. It would in any case have been difficult to accede to the Israelis' request, much as we sympathise with their concern about the result of the negotiations; but the Israel Embassy have made it even more difficult by putting out this morning (for publication this afternoon) a statement reporting Mr. Elath's démarche. The attached version of the statement as carried by Reuters has been, we understand, considerably softened by Reuters themselves: other agencies may reproduce the more forcible language employed by the Embassy.

Flag C.

3. We shall clearly be compelled to reveal the tenour of our reply which will therefore have to be anodyne, and non-committal, if it is not to prejudice the prospects of the negotiations, and rally the other Arab countries behind Egypt. A draft is attached.

4. In speaking to Mr. Elath, however, the Minister of State could be rather more forthcoming. He can hardly avoid opening by pointing out how unwise it was of the Israelis to make a public statement before receiving a reply to their representations. This statement, he might add, has in fact

/made

25/4

made it impossible for us to deliver as helpful and sympathetic a reply as we should have wished had the discussion remained confidential. Attention might be drawn to what is rapidly becoming a habit in the Israel Embassy of re-enforcing diplomatic representations with premature, unnecessary and harmful publicity.

5. There seems no reason why the Minister of State should not go on to give the Israel Ambassador an outline of our conception of the forthcoming negotiations, ^{with the Egyptians} like that already given to the French and the Turks. But before this is done, the Ambassador should give a categorical assurance that neither the information nor the fact that it has been given to him will be allowed to reach the press.

6. The Minister of State might then say that it will be our object in the negotiations to reach a settlement which will provide for the adequate security and stability of the Middle East, an objective with which Her Majesty's Government believe the Israel Government to be in entire agreement.

7. Thereafter he might take the occasion to inform the Ambassador in general terms of our idea of stationing an armoured brigade in Jordan, which we believe the Israeli Government would welcome as re-enforcing stability in the area. The Ambassador should be told that Her Majesty's Embassy in Tel Aviv will shortly make a more detailed communication about this. (The draft of such a communication has already been submitted to the Prime Minister).

8. The premature publicity given by the Israel Embassy to their representations will certainly produce newspaper enquiries, for which News Department must be adequately

/briefed

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briefed. I suggest that they should be authorised to inform enquirers of the tenour of our written reply, at the same time making it clear that there is no question of consultation with the Israel Government either before or during the negotiations.

9. If the Minister of State is to see Mr. Elath before his departure we cannot consult the United States Government beforehand but we should propose to telegraph the text of our written reply and the gist of the accompanying remarks to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Tel Aviv and Cairo.

R. J. Zacher
16/4

Sir W. Sturges.

This only reached me this morning.
The Minister of State has already addressed a minute to the Prime Minister on this subject.

W. J.
15/4

6371/102806

42772

It has been suggested that when the Minister of State sees the Israeli Ambassador to give him the reply to his Note Verbale about our talks with Egypt, he should tell the Ambassador in general terms of the basis on which we have agreed to start talks. For this purpose, I attach a note summarising the position and suggest that the information in the Note could be given to the Israeli Ambassador, subject to a previous assurance from him that the fact that this information has been given will on no account be made public. This information has been given to the French and the Turks.

If the Israeli Ambassador presses the point that final agreement should include a guarantee of freedom of transit through the Canal, I suggest the Minister of State should confine himself to saying that the question of transit through the Canal is one which we have, and shall continue to have, very much in mind.

R. G. Lawrence

17th April, 1953.

Gen. Strang

W. Strang
17/4

*Seen by Minister of State.
As you know, he may not
now see the Israeli Ambassador.*

Sir J. Bunker

20/4

Prime Minister

The Israeli Ambassador called upon me on Tuesday, the 14th April, and delivered the attached communication requesting consultation with us before the commencement of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the Suez Canal area and, while they are in progress, on all aspects of the problem bearing on the interests of Israel.

In the meantime, without prior warning to me, the Israeli Embassy have announced that this note has been sent.

I attach the Reuters message. You will observe that they have sent a similar note to the United States Government.

It would in any case have been difficult to accede to the Israelis

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

request, much as we sympathise with their concern about the result of the negotiations.

We could however ^{tell} have given them privately the ~~information on the progress of the negotiations which we have promised to give to the French and the Turks.~~

However the situation has been complicated by this public announcement. It means that our reply must also be public.

I suggest that we should give a rather colourless reply along the following lines ^{of the attached memorandum. Should we} at the same time ^{keep them quiet} promising to keep ^{them} the Israelis generally informed of the progress of the negotiations provided they ^{that is all} guarantee to keep ~~it~~ quiet.

What has we changed who has he promised to give?

and in general terms the basis on which we have agreed to open negotiations. We have of course already done this with the French & the Turks.

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M/S's file

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P.M./M.S./53/48

JE. 1192/225A

PRIME MINISTER

The Israeli Ambassador called upon me on Tuesday, the 14th April, and delivered the attached communication requesting consultation with us before the commencement of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the Suez Canal area and, while they are in progress on all aspects of the problem bearing on the interests of Israel.

2. In the meantime, without prior warning to the Israeli Embassy have announced that this note has been sent. I attach the Reuters message. You will observe that they have sent a similar note to the United States Government.

3. It would in any case have been difficult to accede to the Israelis request, much as we sympathise with their concern about the result of the negotiations.

Ww/

- 2 -

We could however tell them privately and in general terms the basis on which we have agreed to open negotiations. We have of course already done this with the French and the Turks. However the situation has been complicated by this public announcement. It means that our reply must also be public.

4. I suggest that we should give a rather colourless reply along the lines of the attached memorandum. Should we at the same time tell them that we will keep them generally informed of the progress of the negotiations provided they guarantee to keep that fact quiet?

(Signed) Selwyn Lloyd

16th April, 1953

1	2	3	4	5	6

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Registry
No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft.
AIDE MEMOIRE
FOR ISRAEL
AMBASSADOR.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Her Majesty's Government have considered the Israel Government's note number EE/34/61650 of the 14th April.

As the Israel Government are aware, Her Majesty's Government are ready at all times to give sympathetic study to any matters which the Israel Government may care to put before them, and to exchange views with them on subjects of direct mutual interest.

In the particular questions raised in the Israel Government's note, as in other matters affecting Israel, the Israel Government may rest assured that Her Majesty's Government understand the concern of the Israel Government and will keep Israel's interests in mind.

FO 371/102806

92772

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Minutes.

JE 1192/225 (B)

EMBARGOED 1600 G.M.T. THURSDAY, 16th April.

Reuters.....

Israel has sent a note to Britain asking to be kept in touch on those aspects of the further Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the Canal Zone which "have a bearing on Israeli interests" the Israeli Embassy announced here today.

The note was handed last Tuesday to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, British Minister of State at the Foreign Office by Elihu Elath, the Israeli Ambassador in London.

The Israeli Embassy also announced that a note had been handed on the same day to the United States State Department in Washington "since the U.S. is likely to be consulted by one or both parties to the pending negotiations".

The announcement said that Israel had requested Britain to provide an opportunity for consultation on those aspect of the Suez Canal Zone question which affected Israeli interests.

Ref 371/102806

92772

INDEXED

CONFIDENTIAL

JE.1142/225(D)

DRAFT AIDE MEMOIRE TO ISRAEL

Following the Prime Minister's minute M 94/53, the aide memoire has been redrafted by African and Eastern Departments, and its language made warmer and crisper. It does not, however, accept the Israeli request for consultation. This increased cordiality makes it all the more important that we should obtain an assurance from the Israeli Ambassador that the terms of our reply will, on no account, be made public, and that they are for the confidential information of the Israel Government alone.

2. Meanwhile, the Minister of State has told the Egyptian Ambassador that we do not acknowledge the right of any country to consultation with us about these matters, but we would decide for ourselves whether at any stage we would talk with any other interested government about the course of negotiations.

3. In these circumstances, News Department should say to enquiries that a reply had been given to the Israel Government, the terms of which were not for publication; Her Majesty's Government understand the concern of the Israel Government, but have not agreed that any country has the right to consultation regarding our negotiations with Egypt.

4. Once the text of the reply has been agreed, we

will/

will telegraph it at once to Tel Aviv, Washington, Cairo and Fayid, asking Her Majesty's Ambassador at Tel Aviv to repeat our warning about publicity to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

R.T.D. Ledward

(R. T. D. Ledward)
21st April, 1953.

I have turned the Aide Memoire into a Note, which is more formal and politer.

I think this is in accordance with the spirit of the Prime Minister's instructions.

A note of what the Minister of State might say to the Israel Ambassador about the Egyptian talks is attached at Flag A.

R. J. Sawyer

21st April, 1953.

FO 371/102506

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50 11/1/88

NOTE TO THE
ISRAEL
AMBASSADOR.

Mr. Churchill presents his compliments to His Excellency the Israel Ambassador and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his Note No. EE/31/61650 of the 14th April regarding the talks which are about to begin between Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government.

Mr. Churchill wishes to assure His Excellency that Her Majesty's Government ^{will} ~~are~~ always ready to give friendly and ~~active~~ ^{active} sympathetic study to anything the Israel Government may have to say about the many interests common to the two Governments and to exchange views wherever their interests are directly affected. They entirely understand how much concern the Israel Governme. ^{Ambassador} must feel in the matters raised in their Note and the Israel Government may rest assured that Her Majesty's Government will always be mindful of Israel's interests.

~~EE~~ ~~11/1/88~~

WBA

CONFIDENTIALFROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

Cypher/OTF and By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTIONNo. 154

April 24, 1953

D. 4.53 p.m. April 24, 1953

IMMEDIATECONFIDENTIALAddressed to Tel Aviv telegram No. 154 of April 24.

Repeated for information to: Cairo

and Saving to: Washington No. 1426

B.M.E.O. No. 289

Bagdad No. 80

Beirut No. 88

Damascus No. 77

Amman No. 55

My telegram No. 145: [of April 20, Israeli Note].

Minister of State saw Israel Ambassador this morning, and expressed our surprise at the Israel action in making the gist of their Note public before we had replied. He then gave the Ambassador a Note, text of which is contained in my immediately following telegram.

2. He next outlined in general terms the basis on which the Egyptian talks will open, emphasising that this was for the strictly confidential information of the Israel Government.

3. Minister said that he would prefer contents of our Note not to be made public at this stage. We have since agreed with Israel Ambassador that nothing should be said to the Press here except that he had seen the Minister of State and discussed current matters.

Reference:-

FO 371/102806

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CONFIDENTIALFROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIVCypher/OTP and
By BagFOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTIONNo. 155
April 24, 1953.

D. 5.4 p.m. April 24, 1953.

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIALAddressed to Tel Aviv telegram No. 155 of April 24.
Repeated for information to Cairo [Priority]
and Saving to Washington No. 1427

B.M.E.O. (No. 290)

Bagdad No. 81

Beirut No. 89

Damascus No. 78

Amman No. 56

My immediately preceding telegram [of April 24:
Israel Note], paragraph 1.

Following is text referred to.

[Begins]

Mr. Churchill has the honour to acknowledge the receipt
of his Note No. EE/34/61650 of April 14 regarding the talks which
are about to begin between Her Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government.Mr. Churchill wishes to assure His Excellency that
Her Majesty's Government will always give friendly and active
study to anything the Israel Government may have to say about
the many interests common to the two Governments and to exchange
views wherever their interests are directly affected. They
entirely understand how much concern the Israel Government
must feel in the matters raised in the Ambassador's Note and the
Israel Government may rest assured that Her Majesty's
Government will always be mindful of Israel's interests.

[Ends].

Reference:-

FO 371/102806

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under SE 1192

SECRET

E.1149/227

I asked the Israeli Ambassador to call on me this morning and said that I had been surprised at the public statement issued by Reuters containing the substance of his Government's communication to the Prime Minister of 14th April, 1953. The Israeli Ambassador said that he had not known himself that there was going to be publication. It had been done in Tel Aviv. He said that it was not an excuse but an explanation of his personal position.

I handed him the reply from the Prime Minister which I said we would prefer not to be made public now. I said we did not insist on that and there might come a time when it might be advisable for one or the other to reveal it. He quite agreed and appeared pleased with the friendly terms of the reply.

I then said that I could tell him something about the negotiations about to begin with the Egyptians, provided he promised that the information would be kept confidential by his Government. He promised to treat this information as strictly confidential. I then read to him the attached.

Deane

for Minister of State.

22nd April, 1953.

African Department (to enter)

Copies to:

Sir W. Strang
Lord Reading
Mr. Nutting
Sir J. Bowker
Mr. Ross.

FO 371/102806

92772

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p.w.
E.1149/327(A)

[A]

Brief for M/S's talk with
Israel Amb. on 22/4.

We have agreed to start talks with the Egyptians on the understanding, which we have always maintained and must continue to maintain, that the five points which in our view represent the "military complex" (namely: maintenance of the base in peace, with a view to its quick reactivation in war; air defence of Egypt; withdrawal of British forces; Egyptian participation in defence of the Middle East; and military and economic assistance to Egypt) are interdependent, but that we do not mind in which order they are discussed so long as it is understood that we cannot sign an Agreement on any single point until satisfactory understandings have been reached on all. We should therefore be prepared to leave discussion of the question of regional defence until the other points have been examined, although it is likely in practice to be impossible to exclude consideration of it altogether in the course of discussions on the other points.

As already announced, negotiations will be conducted on our side by Her Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo and General Sir Brian Robertson, who has been relieved of his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces, for this purpose.

J.E. 1142/227(B)

(B)

On instructions from the Minister of State, conveyed to me by Mr. Gandy, I telephoned this morning to the Israel Ambassador and told him that our News Department were saying the following about the Ambassador's visit to the Foreign Office this morning.

"The Israel Ambassador called at the Foreign Office this morning at 11 o'clock and was received by the Minister of State."

I said that the News Department would say no more than this and make no comment in reply to any questions. We hope that the Ambassador would follow a similar line.

The Ambassador told me that he had already given instructions for an exactly similar line to be taken by the Embassy, but with the addition of the words "and discussed current matters." He said that unless this additional remark was made, it was assumed that he was hiding something and the Embassy would be put in a difficult position. I said there could be no objection to this.

News Department have been told.

22nd April, 1953

Later.

The Ambassador telephoned again half an hour later to say that Reuters' correspondent had telephoned to his Counsellor to ask if the Israel Embassy could confirm the information which Reuters had gathered from the Foreign Office, namely, that a Note would be delivered to the Ambassador this afternoon and that the Foreign Office might have information to give about it later. The Ambassador said that the Counsellor had refused any comment. I said that I was sure that the News Department had given no such information and that it sounded as if this was a ruse on the part of Reuters to get information. I later confirmed from Mr. Fellowes that the News Dept. had strictly adhered to the line already agreed.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Mr. Gandy.

Secretary Dept.
homb

Page 3.
22nd April, 1953

371/102906

92772

p.w

[C]

CONFIDENTIAL.

JE 1192/2270

Israel and the Egyptian Negotiations.

The Minister of State saw the Israel Ambassador this morning and handed him a Note, the draft of which had previously been approved by the Prime Minister. He emphasised that H.M.G. would prefer that the contents of this Note should not be made public, at any rate ~~not~~ for the present, and it was later agreed with the Israel Ambassador that nothing should be said to the press except that a meeting between the Minister of State and the Ambassador had taken place.

2. We should clearly inform H.M.Ambassador at Tel Aviv at once of this conversation and ask him to do his best to see that the Israelis do not give publicity to our Note or to the Minister of State's remarks. The need for this is underlined by the fact, which the Israel Ambassador admitted to the Minister of State this morning, that the publicity given to the Israel démarche was initiated by Tel Aviv and was not his personal responsibility.

3. I accordingly attach a draft telegram giving an account of the interview and instructing Sir F.Evans about publicity (Flag A), together with another reproducing the text of our Note (Flag B).

4. At the same time we should inform H.M.Ambassador in Cairo, who will of course be seeing the telegrams about the Minister of State's meeting with the Israel Ambassador, of the relevant part of the Minister of State's conversation with the Egyptian Ambassador on April 20th and instructing him to reply in a similar way to any enquiries the Egyptian Government may make. I attach a third draft telegram in this sense (Flag C).

R. J. Lawrence

22nd April, 1953.

Erw. Strang
Prime Minister

W. Strang 22/4

Reference:-

FO 371/102806

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J

AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

EGYPT AND SUDAN

JE.1192/220

FROM
Sir R. Stevenson,
Cairo.
Confidential
No. 43 (5)
Dated 23rd Apt.
Received in
Registry— 24th Apt.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs have given the names of the Egyptian representatives for the negotiations.
(Incl. BHEU)

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

References.

JE1012/3(52)

This is under as expected. But it is notable that for these "Technical" negotiations the team chosen are predominantly occupied in politics, and that there is no viable equivalent to a military Chief of Staff.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Deprac dist: 29th April

Christopher Farley
25/4

Widely
25/4

Mr. Allen (on return)

Re
28/4


(Action)

(Index.)

FO 371/102506

9272

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SAVING TELEGRAM

/HP.

(13) Copy No.....

En Clair by bag.

E. 1140/920

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir Ralph Skrine Stevenson
No.93 Saving
23rd April, 1953.

Repeated Saving to :

British Middle East Office for
General Robertson. No.164.

Handwritten notes:
B
(F O / Skrine
J-21)

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.93 (S) of 23rd April, 1953, repeated for information to the British Middle East Office for General Robertson.

Following from Creswell.

Negotiations.

I have received formal note from Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that Egyptian Government have designated Neguib, Fawzi, Colonel Nasr, Wing Commander Boghdadi, Majors Abdel Hakim Amer and Saleh Salem as its representatives.

DISTRIBUTION

- File
- Library
- H.E. (2)
- H.M.M.
- H. of C.
- Oriental Counsellor
- Legal Counsellor
- Information Dept.
- Mr. St. John
- W/C Everett.



(104) R 571/102808

92772

FROM Mr Cresswell,
Cairo to Mr Allan

Defence Negotiations with Egypt.

SECRET

No. 1045/228/534
Dated 23. 4. 53.
Received in Registry - 29. 4. 53.

Record of a meeting with Mr Lewis Jones who asked what arrangements were to be made to keep the Americans in the picture.

References

MINUTES

I have not yet seen any account of a new approach on Axis by Mr Caffery. Meanwhile I take it that we are saying as much as we feel we can to Mr Palmer.

(Print)

Shall we not also

write to Wilson authorizing Sir C. Steel to pass on as much information about the negotiations as he thinks fit to Mr Bedell-Smith?

(How disposed of)

Chiropterford

See report number 2/5

1. Mr Austin shd see

2. Mr Cargill ^{initialed} _{on a note} _{attached to this}

J 7/5

(Action completed)

(Index)

es 1/5

We are keeping the US Embassy

in the picture; likewise the French Embassy.

Redford

14/5
L 4/5

FO 311/102806

92772

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- 1. Encl 9.
- 2. Mr. Clifton Green

JE 1192 239

JE 119

See T. Bowyer to see before encl.

/MHP

BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

23rd April, 1953.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

(1043/228/534)

RJ

27

RJ 28/4

JE 1192 | 239

My dear Roger,

Lewis Jones asked me this morning what arrangements we would make to keep the Americans in the picture about negotiations.

2. In all the circumstances I thought it wiser to say to him that I thought the best channel on the desk level would be through the United States Embassy in London. The American Embassy here would, of course, be able to hear the Egyptian side of the case, and as we would be reporting in great detail to London, no doubt you will keep Palmer in the picture.

3. I do not think Lewis Jones liked this much, and perhaps it was not very tactful of me to take the bull by the horns. But I see no other alternative as it is obviously essential to prevent the Egyptians getting to know too much about our thinking via the Americans.

4. He said he felt his Ambassador would like to know rather more and would, he thought, be seeing Ralph. I hastily agreed and said I was sure the two Ambassadors would keep in close touch as always; what I had said referred to the more detailed work on the desk level.

*Yours are
Michael*

(M.J. Creswell)

R. Allen, Esq., C.M.G.,
The Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

FC 371/102806

92772

EXTRACT FROM C.O.S. 52nd MEETING HELD 21-4-53

4. MEASURES TO MAINTAIN OUR POSITION IN EGYPT TOP SECRET

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (53) 48th Meeting, Minute 2)

- J.P. (53) 69 (Final)

JE 1192 229

THE COMMITTEE had before them a report by the Joint Planning Staff covering a draft submission to the Cabinet Defence Committee on the measures required to maintain our position in Egypt.

SIR JAMES BOWKER (Foreign Office) said that the Foreign Office now confirmed that Ministerial approval still existed for the delegation of powers in the event of "sudden or serious emergency" to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, as had been agreed by the Defence Committee. The Foreign Secretary had subsequently confirmed with the Minister of Defence his agreement to the continuation of the delegation of such powers, provided it was clearly understood that the Commanders-in-Chief would assume such powers only in circumstances of such immediate and obvious menace as to make any delay out of the question and would otherwise obtain prior Ministerial approval before putting these powers into force.

African Affairs
wh
h.g.
22/4

+ D(52) 7th Meeting, Minute 4.

- 8 -
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

In discussion THE COMMITTEE agreed:-

- (a) to accept certain amendments^ø to the paper proposed by the War Office;
- (b) To submit the report for consideration by H.M. Ministers, subject to the amendments proposed by the War Office and to certain other minor amendments;
- (c) That the Commonwealth Relations Office could inform the old Commonwealth countries that this problem was under active consideration.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Instructed the Secretary to arrange to circulate the report, as amended in discussion, to the Defence Committee.
- (2) Invited the Commonwealth Relations Office to take note of their views concerning information to be given to the old Commonwealth countries.

ø Annex III

TOP SECRET

ANNEX III

Amendments to J.P.(53)69(Final)

1. Annex, para 6(c)

Delete last sentence and substitute:-

As far as is practicable adequate preparation should be made now.

2. Appendix, Columns (b) and (c)

Delete from Column (c) Serials 4 and 10.

Substitute respectively in Column (b):-

4. Occupy installations within the Canal Zone necessary for our own security.

10. Expel, disarm or take lesser action as circumstances require against Egyptian police in the Canal Zone in the event that they assist terrorists, intimidate workers or otherwise imperil our security.

3. Appendix, Serial 7

Column (1). Delete last sentence and substitute:-

As it would also sever food supplies for the 200,000 Arab refugees at GAZA, it would also be essential, before cutting off food, to make alternative arrangements with the U.N.W.R.A.P.N.E. administrator.

4. Appendix, Serial 14

Column (1). Delete last sentence and substitute:-

As early a start as possible in the stockpiling of food should be made.

5. Appendix, Serial 16

Column (1) All at end:-

Plans already exist for the despatch from the U.S. to the Canal Zone of 1,270 all ranks. With the existing number of the East African Pioneers the bare essential labour could be replaced.

Reference:-

FO 371/102806

92772

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TOP SECRET6. Appendix, Serial 17

Column (3) Delete last two sentences and substitute:-

This stockpiling for the existing population would take seven weeks. It cannot be done in advance of an emergency because the turnover of the food is not possible. A delay of seven weeks in the imposition of full military government might result.

7. Appendix, Serial 18

Column (3), Delete last sentence.

TOP SECRET

Reference:-		PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE					
FO 371/102806		1	2	3	4	5	6
		92772		1	2		
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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No. 722

D. 10.25 a.m. April 30, 1953.

April 30, 1953.

R. 11.57 a.m. April 30, 1953.

CONFIDENTIAL

E1192/241

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 722 of April 30.

Repeated for information Saving to Washington Paris B.M.E.O.

Evidence of the Egyptian Government's determination, for the present anyway, to control local press is afforded by the fact that the reporter and co-ordinating editor responsible for headlining in "Al Ahram", Nasser's remark that he would feel no peace of mind until the last British soldier had left Egypt (my telegram No. 712), were arrested yesterday and put in gaol at least for the night. Reports are conflicting as to their release today.

2. The chief press censor has issued a directive that no material "hostile to the British" is to be published and that all material dealing with the present negotiations is to be submitted to him for prior approval. I understand that Gamal Nasser is himself scrutinising this material and that he spoke sharply to representatives of the local press about irresponsible comment or speculation about the negotiations.

Foreign Office please pass Washington and Paris as my Saving telegrams 146 and 175.

[Repeated Saving to Washington and Paris]

LLL.

FO 371/102806

92772

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CONFIDENTIALFROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No. 726

D. 5.39 p.m. April 30, 1953.

April 30, 1953.

R. 8.00 p.m. April 30, 1953.

PRIORITYCONFIDENTIAL

E.1192/242

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 726 of April 30.
Repeated for information to B.M.E.O. and Washington.

My telegram No. 715. JE 11915/4

Creswell saw Counsellor of United States Embassy today and explained how Egyptians had apparently thrown over the original procedure for appointing technical committees and now seemed to be working to force the issue, particularly on the principle of technical control of the base. He pointed out also that publicity had been given here to the interview between Fawzi and Caffery between the second and third meetings of the delegations.

2. In reply Jones said that the meeting had been held at Fawzi's request and that he had given Caffery a very optimistic forecast, saying that the delegations were three-quarters of the way towards agreement on the terms of reference for the committees.

3. It was suggested to United States Counsellor that Egyptian change of tactics might be due simply to Fawzi (who had suggested the original procedure) having been overruled by other members of the committee. But Creswell said he wondered whether there could conceivably be any connexion between these new Egyptian tactics and the forthcoming visit of Mr. Dulles. He said he felt sure that the Egyptians would seek to make the best use of Dulles visit and try to put pressure on us at that time; he wondered whether they might be working for a break between now and May 11 with that in view.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington as my telegram No. 226.

LLLL.



107

REFS AND INDEX
No 371/102806

42772

R. Stevenson,
Cairo
Secret
732
1 May 1
ived in
istry - May 2

Conversation between the U.S. Ambassador and General Robertson. The latter speaks of the Egyptian change of attitude in the negotiations. Mr Cuffey undertakes to find out what the Egyptians are trying to achieve.
(Rpt. W. L. W., BHEP, Paris, Ankara)

(Minutes.)

Last Paper.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

W. L. W. 2.

It becomes clearer & clearer that Fawzi does not count, & cannot be relied on to state unpalatable facts either to us, to Americans or his colleagues.

Perhaps we should consider instructing, or suggesting to the Embassy that all important communications should be made & received either thru Gen Nagib or in writing.

Christopher Jones

2/5

No harm in continuing to use Fawzi as a post-box; but I agree, he has no influence.

Prof. Jones

7+5

Fawzi has his uses, so long as one does not believe what he says.

Rd 4/5.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

235/5

W.P.
107-53

Next Paper.

SECRET

R 371/102806

J 92772

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP.

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No: 732

May 1, 1953.

D: 5.40 p.m. May 1, 1953.

R: 7.17 p.m. May 1, 1953.

E 1192/244

PRIORITY

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 732 of May 1

Repeated for information to: Washington. B.M.E.O.,
and Saving to: Paris. Ankara.

Following from Delegation.

Mr. Caffery called on General Robertson yesterday afternoon to return the call made by the latter on April 21.

2. Robertson explained to him that the Egyptians had completely changed their attitude and had now insisted on clarifying basic principles in advance of the work of the committees. They had thus created a serious situation which unless they were prepared to change their ways would lead to a disastrous result.

3. Caffery expressed great surprise at this development as he had understood from conversation with Fawzi that the negotiations were going reasonably well. He undertook to find out what the Egyptians were really trying to achieve, and to give them a warning of the consequences of persisting with their present attitude.

Foreign Office please pass Washington, Paris and Ankara as my telegrams Nos: 230 and Savings 179 and 20.

[Repeated to Washington and Saving to Paris and Ankara].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Prime Minister.

Sir W. Strang.

Private Secretary.

Sir J. Bowker.

Head of African Dept..

Head of News Dept..

Resident Clerk.

JJJJJ



371/102806 in 92772

JM
Mr R. Stevenson,
Cairo

702
dated Apr. 28
received in
registry— Apr. 29

In an interview on Apr. 26 with a Reuters
correspondent, Colonel Abdel Naser spoke of
Egypt's feelings towards Britain and towards
Communism, and how they would be affected by
the outcome of the negotiations.

(Rept. Paris, W'ton, B.M.E.U.)

REFERENCES

MINUTES

Has Mr (particularly III & IV)
appeared anywhere in the
press here? No trace in our
cuttings.

(Unnoted)

27/4

News Dept

(Print)

(How disposed of)

M. Mc.F. Davis, M/Def.
Colonel V.W. Street,
M/Def.
Major H.S. Hancock, W.O.
R.C. Sawyer, Admiralty.
M.H. O'Grady, Air Min.
B.R. Carson, C.R.O.

D.R. Serpell, Tay.
C.R. Lombe, B. of E.
I.A.H. More } B.O.T.
R.J.W. Stacey }
B.P.H. Dickinson,
M.O.T.

D.H. Crofton,
Min. F. & P. 29

P.T.O

(Action
completed)

(Index)

28/4/5

WR
10-7-53

This interview was carried in full by Reuter
on the 26th April (pace Cairo telegram No. 711 of the
28th April). Most national newspapers had messages
from their own correspondents in Cairo and did not
use the Reuter story, but the attached cuttings from
The Scotsman and the Birmingham Post of 27th April
show that some provincial newspapers made use of the
Reuter message, though there is no reference in these
examples to Colonel Naser himself.

P. E. L. Fellowes
(P.E.L. Fellowes)
30th April 1953

RP

11/5

- A) Mr Creswell, Cairo, no 711. Apr. 28
- B) Extract "The Scotsman". Apr 27
- C) Extract "Birmingham Post". Apr 27.

RP 12/5

Reference:-

FO 371/102806

9777

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE ANDWHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No. 702

D: 12.16 p.m. April 28, 1953

April 28, 1953

R: 2.27 p.m. April 28, 1953

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 702 of April 28.

Repeated for information Saving to Paris

Washington

E.M.E.O.

In an "eve of negotiations" interview on the 26 th with a Reuter correspondent, Colonel Abdel Naser is reported to have made the following points.

(I) Egypt was anti-Communist but the British occupation played Russia's game by exacerbating Arab nationalist feeling.

(II) The main problem was the re-action of mutual confidence after the unhappy history of the past. Egypt wished to end anti-British feeling which would subside after evacuation. An era of productive friendship could then well begin.

(III) He repeated that it would be sensible to use British technicians to maintain the Base. Provided that this was not felt to be another form of occupation.

(IV) The Arab States opposed the Four Power Middle East Defence Proposals which were regarded as another form of occupation. The only way to defend the Middle East was by means of an Arab Security Pact and Egypt was ready to maintain the Suez Canal Zone as an Egyptian base for this purpose.

(V) The Arab States needed western economic help to keep Communism at bay. Only the Communists would gain should the talks fail.

Foreign Office please pass Paris and Washington as my telegrams saving 170 and 143.

[Repeated saving to Paris and Washington]

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Reference:-											
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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

E. 1190/233(1)

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Creswell

No. 711

April 28, 1953.

D.5.00 p.m. April 28, 1953.

R.8.20 p.m. April 28, 1953.

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 711 April 28

Repeated for information Saving to Paris

Washington

B.M.E.O.

My telegram No. 702.

Colonel Abdel Naser's interview was actually with Patrick Smith, B.B.C. correspondent in Cairo.

Foreign Office please pass Paris and Washington as my telegrams Saving Nos. 172 and 144.

[Repeated saving to Paris and Washington].

B B B

X

CS
5/5

29
APR

FO 371/102806

92772

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SCOTSMAN

E. 1192/233 (B)

1953

dated

27 APR 1953

CANAL ZONE TALKS TO-DAY

Evacuation Issue

Cairo, Sunday.—Britain and Egypt will begin formal talks here to-morrow which Egypt hopes will eventually lead to an alliance of Arab armies being entrusted with the vital security of the Middle East.

Egypt goes into the negotiations with the aim of achieving her national aspiration—the sovereignty and independence of her territory—through the evacuation of British forces in the Suez Canal zone.

Egyptians, though not minimising the difficulties, hope an agreement can be reached by July 23, when the country will celebrate the first anniversary of her "liberation" from Farouk and the "black days" of party politics.

Egypt is ready to allow British experts to remain behind to help in the maintenance of the £500 million base. She wants Middle East security entrusted to Arab armies bound together in a collective security pact and armed with modern weapons from the West. After the evacuation, Egypt would be willing to discuss a defence alignment with the Western democracies.

The British attitude is that the canal zone is indispensable to the defence of the Middle East, and that arrangements must be made so that its efficiency and strength are not impaired. It must be kept as a well-cared for "balloon" capable of "inflation" in the time of war—in other words, the "caretakers"

must have the base constantly ready for equipping divisions to be put into the field in the event of hostilities.

BRITISH NEGOTIATORS

Britain's team of negotiating experts will be headed by Sir Ralph Stevenson, the Ambassador. He will have as his chief assistant General Sir Brian Robertson, former C-in-C. Middle East Land Forces.

Sir Ralph will go from the Anglo-American hospital, where he is being treated for sciatica, to attend the opening meeting, and will return to the hospital to continue treatment. It is not known when he will finally leave the hospital.

Egypt's team will be headed by General Neguib, whose chief assistant will be Dr Fawzy, the Foreign Minister. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Saunders, C-in-C. Middle East Air Forces, will be the principal military adviser to the British delegation, it was announced to-day.

A British Embassy Press statement said that Air Chief Marshal Saunders will be assisted by Brigadier Dove, of General Headquarters, Middle East Land Forces. Mr Michael Creswell, British Minister in Cairo, will also be present at the meetings.

Officers from the War Office in London have arrived here to form a politico-military secretariat for the British delegation.—Reuter.

FO 371/102806

92772

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JE 11912/1233 (C)

BIRMINGHAM POST.

27 APR 1953

dated

News from Abroad

BRITAIN AND EGYPT BEGIN TALKS IN CAIRO

Hope of Arab Defence Pact

Britain and Egypt will begin formal talks in Cairo to-day. The Egyptians hope that these talks will lead eventually to an alliance of Arab armies being entrusted with the Middle East's security.

Egypt aims to achieve the sovereignty and independence of her territory through British forces evacuating the Suez Canal Zone. But she is prepared to allow British experts to help in the maintenance of the base. After the evacuation she would be willing to discuss a defence alignment with the West.

The British attitude is that the Canal Zone is indispensable to the Middle East's defence, and that arrangements must be made so that its efficiency and strength are not impaired.

Reference:-

FO 371/102806

92772

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

E. 1199/235

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTIONSir R. Stevenson
No. 712
April 29, 1953.

D. 7.56 a.m. April 29, 1953.

R. 9.25 a.m. April 29, 1953.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 712 of April 29
Repeated for information Saving to Paris Washington B.M.E.O. AnkaraEvacuation Talks.

Press 28th reports that Ali Husny Head of the Political Department at the Presidency of the Council and an Egyptian delegate to the present talks stated, in reply to journalists questions, that the atmosphere of the first meeting of the two Delegations on the 27th was good.

2. Replying to Journalists after the Egyptian Delegation's private afternoon conference, General Neguib said that all was well. He added "when you know your rights and insist upon them and have the nation behind you, you must not fear anything, our rights are crystal clear and just, and we are insisting on them with the full support of the nation. Therefore we fear nothing".

3. When asked whether he was happy about the talks Colonel Abdel Naser said that he would be happy when the last British soldier had left Egypt.

Foreign Office please pass Paris, Washington and Ankara as my Saving telegrams Nos. 173, 145 and 75.

[Repeated Saving to Paris, Washington and Ankara].

EEE

FO 371/102506

92774

J

AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

JE.1192/238

FROM

Sir R. Stevenson,
Cairo

Secret

No. 720

Dated Apr 29

Received in
Registry— Apr 30

The U.S. Ambassador had a conversation with the Lebanese President during the latter's visit to Cairo. Starnum gave his views on the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations.

(Rptd. Wilson, Beirut, B.M.E.U., Antenna, Paris)

REFERENCES

EL10316/2

MINUTES

Mr Caffery has improved -
or perhaps Mr Lewis Jones
is merely concealing his chief's
disloyalties (see 4 & 5 within)

Microphotography
30/4

W. Jones
7/5

Ra 4/5

Earle A.P.
Jones

(Print)

(How disposed of)

- Sheffield, Jozy.
 - Henry Briggs-Dawson, Jozy.
 - M. Mc.F. Davis, M/Def.
 - Colonel V.W. Street,
M/Def.
 - Major M.S. Hancock, W.O.
 - R.C. Sawyer, Admiralty.
 - M.H. O'Grady, Air Min.
 - B.R. Carson, C.R.O.
- Apr. 30

(Action completed)

(Index)

257/5

WR
10.7.53

F271/102806

92772

SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No. 720

April 29, 1953

D. 10.15 p.m. April 29, 1953

R. 12.26 a.m. April 30, 1953

PRIORITY

SECRET

E 1192/238

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 720 of April 29

Repeated for information to Washington

Beirut

B.M.E.O.

and Saving to Ankara

Paris

Visit of Lebanese President.

United States Embassy Counsellor today showed member of my staff the report made by my United States colleague to the State Department of a conversation which he had with Shamun in which the latter stated the impressions which he had formed during his stay in Cairo. The following were the main points:-

(1) It was vital that the present negotiations should have a successful outcome. The confusion and chaos that would follow if they broke down would affect not only Egypt but all the Arab States.

(2) If the talks fail the results would be so disastrous that none of the Arab States, not even Iraq, would be able to enter into any defensive arrangements with the West.

(3) If the Neguib régime fails any alternative government would be more uncooperative and unwilling to work with any of the Western Governments.

(4) The Egyptians had spoken to Shamun in friendly terms about the Americans, but were extremely critical of their failure to supply Egypt with arms. Caffery had explained to Shamun why this had not been done. The President had suggested in reply that if the present talks showed progress the Americans should not delay further in letting the Egyptians have some arms. The Ambassador said he had explained why it might not be realistic to do this.

(5)

30 APR 1953

SECRETCairo telegram No. 720 to Foreign Office

-2-

(5) Shamun had suggested that, if the present negotiations make progress, the Americans should come forward with defence proposals to the Middle East States on the lines of their agreement with Turkey and should supply them all with the arms and equipment which they needed. Caffery said he had explained why this also might possibly not be realistic.

(6) Shamun had promised to counsel moderation on members of the Revolutionary Council, whom he was entertaining to dinner that evening.

2. My United States colleague commented that Shamun seemed able and well-disposed but frustrated in the face of Arab sensitivity generally and Egyptian nationalism in particular.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Beirut and Savig to Ankara and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 224, 57, 16 and 174 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and Beirut and Savig to Ankara and Paris]

bbbbb

Minutes.

I understand that the Minister of State wants to see the Prime Minister's minute, M 103/53 of the 23rd April (JE.1192/228, Flag A).

2. The minute was in reply to a note submitted to the Prime Minister through Sir William Strang on the 22nd April (JE.1192/227, Flag B).

3. As a result of the Prime Minister's minute, certain changes were made in the telegrams informing Tel Aviv and Cairo of what had been said to the Israel and Egyptian representatives, and ~~in issue~~ *two* further telegrams to Cairo, *issued*, giving certain instructions to Mr. Creswell.

Christopher Gandy

(C. T. Gandy)
27th April, 1953.

Mr. Reeve

28/4

Mr. Allen to see on return.

RA 29/4

*RTJ (Edward)
29/4*

25/4

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

FO 371/102806

92772

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*Mr J. Brooke P.F.
Africa Dept. 23/4
Rastan Dept.
Seen by Mr. H. D. 23/4
Mr. Nutting 24/4*

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MINUTE

10, Downing Street.

SERIAL No. Whitcomb

H. 103/53

E. 1192/228

SIR WILLIAM STRANG

Off. reply

Israel and the Egyptian Negotiations

I don't understand why we should be so alarmed about all this. I do not mind it being known here or in Cairo that I am on the side of Israel and against her ill-treatment by the Egyptians. The idea of selling Israel down the drain in order to persuade the Egyptians to kick us out of the Canal Zone more gently is not one which attracts me. We have probably got to have a showdown with Neguib, and Israel will be an important factor both Parliamentary and military. We must not throw away any important card we have in our hand.

2. The latest Secret information shows how dangerous it would be to let things drag on while Neguib uses Nazi Germans to teach the Egyptian Army and the terrorist auxiliaries sabotage and guerilla warfare.
3. Mr. Creswell need not go on protesting against abusive speeches and anti-British propaganda and then

FO 371/102806

92772

- 2 -

Seemingly to be

~~being~~ gratified by vague promises that it will be mitigated. Let us leave them alone till the Conference opens and then confront them with our present overwhelming force and resolute intention to work on the basis agreed with the Americans. All their blustering only strengthens our case. Our aim is to avoid bloodshed but this will not be achieved by our being disturbed by words.

4. Please redraft in this spirit.



23 . 4. 53.

FO 371/102806

92772

Handwritten notes:
Am going to see, first.
23/4
Euler G.
J/ [unclear]

SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OTP

PRISEC

JE 1190/238

No. 847

D. 1.38 a.m. 23rd April, 1953.

23rd April, 1953.

PRIORITY

DEDIP

SECRET

Prime Minister to Mr. Creswell.

We must not be too easily worried by speeches made by members of a usurper government most anxious about their own position. If they are rude while we remain polite this would help us when the conference opens. There should be no question of British "provocation" by Egyptian words. The more abusive and insulting they are the easier it will be for us to take a calm line and also, if need be, a strong one. Pray take this message as a guide in your outlook.

[Copies sent to the Prime Minister].

Reference:-

F0 371/102806

92772

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CYPHER

Registry No. JE11912526

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24-4 1953.

Despatched 4-47 P.M.

Draft.

Cairo

Security classification - Confidential

Addressed to Cairo

telegram No. 856 (date) 24/4

Telegram. to Cairo No. 856

repeated for information to Tel Aviv and saving to Washington, B.M.E.O. Bagdad, Damascus, Beirut, Amman.

(Date) 14 April 24

Repeat to: Tel Aviv, 156 and saving to

My telegram No. 145 to Tel Aviv.

[of 20th April: Israel note]

Washington 1428 sm
 B.M.E.O. 291 sm
 Bagdad 82 sm
 Damascus 79 sm
 Beirut 90 sm
 Amman 57 sm

Egyptian Ambassador on April 20th asked Minister of State about Israel demarche.

Minister replied "that we did not acknowledge the right of any country to consultation with us about these matters but we would decide for ourselves whether at any stage we would talk with any other interested Government about the course of the negotiations. Of course if we were to discuss the negotiations with any other interested Government we would discuss them in confidence.

By G. G. G.

Codes

Cypher.

Distribution:-

F.O. & Whitehall

[2. If asked, you should reply similarly.]

Copies to:-

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

3-10p
24/4/53

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[Handwritten signature]
22/4

[Handwritten signature]
24/4

Reference:-

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CYPHER

Registry No. JE 117/1228

- Top Secret.
- Secret
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- Restricted.
- Open.

(Date) 24/4/48

Despatched 5-11 P.M.

PRIORITY.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[Security classification -if any]

Draft.

Telegram to: Cairo

Addressed to CAIRO

telegram No. 857 (date) 24/4

No. 857

repeated for information to TEL AVIV.

(Date) April 24

Repeat to: Tel Aviv
157

My immediately preceding telegram.
[of 20th April Israel note]
There is no need for you to say

anything more about this to the Egyptians.

Indeed, as you know, I would prefer you not to have any further discussions with the Egyptian Foreign Minister, or members of the Egyptian Government about the forthcoming talks until they start.

If as is probable we have to have a showdown with Neguib, Israel will be an important factor both parliamentary and military. We must not neglect any important card we have in our hand. We should all bear this in mind.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

~~XXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXX~~
Cypher.

Distribution :-
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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

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Mr. Creswell

No. 696

April 27, 1953

E. 1192/231

D. 9.40 p.m. April 27, 1953

R. 10.53 p.m. April 27, 1953

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 696 of April 27.Repeated for information Saving to: Paris
Washington
B.M.E.O.

In an interview on April 26, with Collins, Middle East Manager of the United Press, General Neguib stated the Egyptian attitude towards the evacuation talks in the following terms.

- (1) Evacuation must be unconditional. No scheme for joint defence could be considered until after the withdrawal.
- (2) Thereafter it must be realised, particularly by the United States, that Egypt would be ready to discuss any problems on equal terms.
- (3) The need for maintaining material left in the base was appreciated and he believed it possible to find a method of doing so which would be acceptable to both sides.
- (4) Regarding Israel's demands to be informed of the course of the talks, the matter concerned Egypt alone.
- (5) Egypt desired peace and the recent détente between East and West was welcome.
- (6) Egypt thanked the United States for the moral help accorded during the Sudan negotiations, which would undoubtedly continue during the evacuation talks.
- (7) The negotiations were being opened with a feeling of restrained optimism. Britain must have come to realise the justice of Egypt's cause. It would not be Egypt's fault if the negotiations failed and he refused to envisage such a possibility.

FO 371/102806

9272

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X-30

4/12/53
8/11

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E.1192/236

THE EGYPTIAN COUNSELLOR called this morning and reverted to the request he made to Mr. Ledward on Saturday for a copy of the Israel Note about the forthcoming Anglo-Egyptian talks and of our reply. I said I regretted that it was not possible to give him a copy of the Israel Note which, despite any publicity which there might have been on the subject, was a confidential communication to Her Majesty's Government. Nor could I add anything to what the Minister of State had told the Egyptian Ambassador, namely, that our attitude was that we could not admit the right of any foreign Government to be consulted about our coming talks with Egypt. I could, however, confirm that this was still our view.

Mr. Seoud said he was very glad to have my reaffirmation of our position, which he fully accepted, and he quite understood that we could not give him a copy of the Israel Note. He explained that his reason for reverting to the subject was that the Minister of State's remarks to the Egyptian Ambassador had been made before we had replied to the Israel Note and the Ambassador wondered whether, in view of certain further references to the subject in the press, our position had in any way been modified.

After some conversation on other matters, Mr. Seoud returned to the subject once more at the end of our conversation and asked whether it was true that, according to a report which had reached the Egyptian Ambassador, we had told the Israel Ambassador that we did not wish to complicate our negotiations with Egypt by adding further provisos. I said that this was not the case, but that I was not ready to discuss either the Israel note or the reply which had been made, except to explain our position as I had already done. Mr. Seoud finally accepted my remarks with good grace.

C. J. Beecher

27th April, 1953

Mr. Seoud
replied to the Ambassador

Minister of State

W. Stirling