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TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 8.....

General Brief for United Kingdom Representatives
in Defence Negotiations with Egypt.

Object of Negotiations

1. It has been agreed between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States that there shall be negotiations between representatives of the two governments and representatives of the Egyptian government with a view to securing, through negotiation, a settlement of the dispute arising from the presence of British forces in the Canal Zone and the voluntary association of Egypt with the West in arrangements for the defence of the Middle East against outside aggression.
2. At the outset the Chief Representative of Her Majesty's Government, together with his United States colleague, will propose to the Egyptian Government a general settlement comprising -
 - (a) A phased withdrawal of British armed forces from Egyptian territory;
 - (b) The maintenance of the Canal Zone base in peace with a view to its immediate use in the event of war;
 - (c) An arrangement for the air defence of Egypt.
 - (d) The participation of Egypt in a Middle East defence organisation; and
 - (e) A programme of military and economic assistance by the United Kingdom and the United States to Egypt.

Method of Negotiation and Channel of Communications

3. The negotiations will be conducted for the United Kingdom by Field Marshal Sir William Slim, and for the United States by General Hull, Deputy Chief of Staff. Her Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo and the United States Ambassador will be associated with them. Her Majesty's Ambassador and the Commanders-in-Chief (Middle East) will make available to Field Marshal Slim such facilities and such expert advice as he may need. Field Marshal Slim will report to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on the negotiations through Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who will be responsible for obtaining, where necessary, any further instructions
/from

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from Her Majesty's Government in connexion with any points which may arise in the course of the negotiations.

The Initial Approach

4. It will be made clear from the outset that Her Majesty's Government regard as interdependent all the elements listed in paragraph 2 above as comprising the general settlement. The Egyptian Government will be given to understand that there will be no withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone until the negotiations have made a start and are seen to be making good progress. It is imperative that proper arrangements be made for the defence of the Middle East, and in the absence of such arrangements we cannot contemplate the withdrawal of our forces. Her Majesty's Government have, on the other hand, no wish to leave three divisions in the Canal Zone if such arrangements can be made. In discussing the arrangements, Her Majesty's representatives will be guided by the papers annexed to the Foreign Secretary's memorandum to the Cabinet (C)(53)17) revised, which are also annexed to this brief.

5. It is probable that the Egyptian Prime Minister's attitude towards this approach will be unfavourable. He may insist, as his spokesmen have insisted on many occasions, that British troops be withdrawn "unconditionally". He may say that Egyptian public opinion feels so strongly on this issue that his own position would be intolerable unless Her Majesty's Government agreed to evacuate without any specific undertaking by the Egyptians in return. He may add that he himself believes that it is in Egypt's interests to place herself on the side of the West and to co-operate in defensive measures, also that the Egyptian armed forces could, if properly equipped, undertake the defence of the Suez Canal in the terms of Article 8 of the Anglo/Egyptian Treaty of 1936.* If General Neguib maintains his insistence upon his formula of unconditional withdrawal, the United Kingdom representatives will suggest that the first step is to examine seriously the problem of defending the Middle East. While avoiding, so far as possible, a wide-ranging discussion of strategy, it will be pointed out that in order to avoid a vacuum in Middle
/East

* Under Article 8 the King of Egypt authorises His Majesty to station forces in Egyptian territory in the vicinity of the Canal, in the zone specified, with a view to ensuring in co-operation with the Egyptian armed forces, the defence of the Canal "until such time as the High Contracting Parties agree that the Egyptian army is in a position to ensure, by its own resources, the liberty and entire security of navigation of the Canal."

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East defence, it is essential, as an absolute minimum that arrangements be made for the maintenance of the Canal Zone base in peace with a view to its immediate re-activation in the event of war and that the problems of air defence be solved. It may be stated that the strategic concept of the defence of the Middle East is that any thrust by Soviet forces into the Middle East should be met at the earliest practicable moment after the Red Army has crossed the Soviet frontiers.

6. General Neguib, as a soldier, should be brought to realise that it will only be possible to meet an overland and air threat from this direction from an active base in the Middle East itself and without any long line of sea communications. The base in Egypt took $3\frac{1}{2}$ years to build. In addition to workshops, storage depots and installations in supply, repair and administration, it contains airfields, communications, power stations, hospitals and other amenities for the troops. The total cost has been of the order of £500 m. No alternative base could be built on the same scale or in a short period of time. Egypt is the only place in the Middle East where all the elements essential to a base coincide with a strong strategic position.

7. It will be recalled that in the conversations held in 1949 and 1950 the Wafd Ministers negotiating on behalf of Egypt made the following reply to a similar approach: Nahas Pasha said:-

(1) Egypt will not be attacked by Russia direct, unless there are foreign troops in Egypt who will be a target for Russia's aggression.

(2) The Egyptian people regard the British occupation as a standing fact; the other danger is a great threat. It would be very difficult to persuade the Egyptian people that a Russian occupation would be worse than the British occupation.

(3) Co-operation in war does not necessarily involve joint defence, even joint air defence and 'other traces of occupation' in peace time. The majority of alliances concluded between independent States are on this basis.

(4) The greatest weapon exploited by Communist propaganda in Egypt is the occupation of part of the country by British forces and the economic and social effects resulting from it."

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8. It is probable that these arguments may be used again and they can only be met if the Egyptians can be persuaded to work from the premise that they are as concerned as we are about the security of the Middle East. It is here that General Neguib and the army junta may prove to be more realistic than their predecessors.

The Canal Zone Base and the withdrawal of British Forces.

9. If it is possible to make a start on these lines, it will be suggested to the Egyptians that it would be useful to discuss in greater detail the problems of maintaining and securing the base on the assumption that British forces have been withdrawn from the Canal Zone. It will have been made clear that the rate of such withdrawal, and the need to leave behind British technicians and administrative personnel depend, to some extent upon the arrangements which can be made with the Egyptian armed forces for maintenance and security; thus it should be possible in such discussion to reach agreement also on the details of evacuation. It will, at the same time, be made clear that the Egyptians understand that the question of Egyptian participation in a Middle East regional defence organisation is only left on one side for the time being, and that it will have to be settled before there can be any question of a firm agreement in principle to withdraw British forces. On this understanding negotiations may start on a bilateral basis between the United Kingdom and Egypt on items (a), (b) and (c) in paragraph 2 above.

10. The facilities which Her Majesty's Government would wish to obtain in Egypt under conditions of peace and war are set out in paper No. 1 and its appendices of the papers agreed during the United States - United Kingdom talks on Egypt held in London from 31st December 1952 to the 7th January 1953, annexed to this brief. Every effort should be made to secure case A. as described in these papers with as few modifications as possible.

/If

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11. If it is seen in the course of discussions that case A is completely unacceptable to the Egyptians, even with some of the elements of case B included in it, there should be further reference to Her Majesty's Government. It has been agreed with the United States Government that our representatives should consult together at this point and that no radical departure from case A will be made by the two governments, unless Field Marshal Slim and General Hull both recommend that such a departure be made.

Middle East Defence Organisation

12. Egyptian agreement to participate in a regional defence organisation is an essential part of any general settlement, and if discussion with the Egyptians proceeds first on points (a), (b) and (c) of the agenda, it will be necessary at the appropriate time to revert to the question of a regional defence organisation. Detailed proposals for a Middle East Defence Organisation, on the principles of which there is general agreement between Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the other sponsoring powers - the United States, Turkey, France, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand - are set out in the enclosure to paper No. 2 attached. The enclosures have been written in a form which can be used as a basis of a paper to be handed to the Egyptian government. The form of any such regional organisation is less important than the substance of Arab, including Egyptian, co-operation in defence. If such co-operation can in fact be secured - in the case of Egypt by acceptance of adequate arrangements for the base and for air defence - the actual organisation needed to give effect to it may develop almost automatically. Her Majesty's representatives need not, therefore, insist too rigourously upon the details of our proposed Middle East Defence Organisation,

/though

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though they should not accept any changes which may be suggested by the Egyptians without reference back to Her Majesty's Government, since it would be necessary to consult the other sponsoring powers before coming to a final decision.

General

13. Separate briefs have been prepared covering in detail the various aspects of this settlement not included in the papers annexed to this brief. These papers set out, inter alia, the factors governing the rate of any withdrawal, the military equipment which we could supply to Egypt, the proposals for the disposal of stores and installations in the Canal Zone insofar as this may be necessary, and possible financial arrangements between Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian government.

14. In general terms it will be the task of our negotiators to try to make the Egyptian government aware of the realities of the world situation and of the special problems involved in the defence of the Middle East against an aggressor. Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to shuffle off any of the responsibilities which have devolved upon them there without an assurance that adequate alternative arrangements can and will be made to fulfil the defence requirements of this area. The willing help and collaboration of the Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, is very desirable in order to secure this end. But the first difficulty is that Her Majesty's Government must be satisfied that practical effect will be given to promises of co-operation. If they are not so satisfied, then there will be no alternative but to terminate these negotiations. This step will, of course, not be taken without prior reference to Her Majesty's Government. The consequences of a failure to reach agreement may be so serious that every effort must be made to

/convince

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convince the Egyptian government of the desirability, and the advantage to themselves, of joining with us in working out the satisfactory arrangements, and thus contributing to a lasting and fruitful settlement of the problems of the Middle East as a whole.

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Tel. No.: Whitehall 7000

SECRET

JE192/51

Ames J
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

STOREY'S GATE,

S.W.1

13th March, 1953. *JE119*

Dear Allen,

Powell, who is away from the office to-day, has asked me to send you his suggestions for amendment of the General Brief for United Kingdom Representatives in defence negotiations with Egypt. These are as follows:-

*micro-printed
in final
version*

Paragraph 6 line 8 after "cost" insert "of the base and of the stores and equipment it contains"

Paragraph 9 line 4 after "British" insert "combat"

Paragraph 13 line 13 delete "shuffle off" and substitute "relinquish".

We should be glad to see a copy of the final Brief in due course.

Yours sincerely,

Alan Dain

R. Allen, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

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E.R.

Enter G

JE 192 52

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TOP SECRET

FIELD MARSHAL SIR WILLIAM SLIM
 MR. ROGER ALLEN (FOREIGN OFFICE) ✓
 C. I. G. S.
 C. A. S.
 V. C. N. S.


Reference: C. O. S. 494/4/3/53

Copies to: Sir Harold Parker
 Lieut. General Sir Nevil Brownjohn
 Mr. Powell

DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT

At your Staff Conference this morning, you instructed me to draft and circulate for your approval a telegram to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, informing them of the arrangements decided regarding military advice for Field Marshal Sir William Slim during the forthcoming defence negotiations in Cairo.

- I attach a draft telegram.
- I should be grateful for very early telephone clearance of the attached draft telegram, if possible by 6 p.m. tomorrow, Thursday, 5th March.



Secretary,
 Chiefs of Staff Committee.

4th March, 1953.

I think this will do, as amended.
 It should be cleared with the Prime Minister before despatch, I think.

My understanding is that we do not finally commission F. H. Slim until we know the result of the S. G. L's talks with ^{President} Eisenhower. But here again No. 10 must decide.

TOP SECRET

W.S. 573

I have inf'd
 W. G. L. Smith,
 Lt. Col. Pennington,
 accordingly.
 R.A. s/s.

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E.R.

TOP SECRET

DRAFT

FROM : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LONDON
 TO : G.H.Q., MIDDLE EAST LAND FORCES
 INFO : C-IN-C, MIDDLE EAST AIR FORCES
 C-IN-C, MEDITERRANEAN
 EMBASSY, CAIRO

4th March, 1953.

DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT

For Commanders-in-Chief from Chiefs of Staff.

30/9/53 Reference COS(ME)789

Field Marshal Sir William Slim has been appointed *(Head of the W.D.C. Department)* [H.M. Ambassador Extraordinary] for the forthcoming negotiations with Egypt. He will be responsible to H.M.G. through the Foreign Secretary.

2. ~~On the political side the Field Marshal will be assisted at the negotiations by H.M. Ambassador in Cairo.~~ *with the H.M. Ambassador in Cairo.*
3. We have agreed that Sir William Slim should obtain his military advice from the appropriate Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, according to the subject under discussion. He will therefore require at least one of you or your Principal Staff Officers in Cairo *(to be seen to this)* throughout the negotiations.
4. Your representative at the negotiations will attend in the capacity of adviser to the Field Marshal and not as an adviser to H.M. Ambassador or to the B.D.C.C.
5. Field Marshal Slim will cover questions of military policy as well as political issues in his telegrams to F.O. and will ask direct by this channel for such advice as he needs on both aspects. But, if you should wish to communicate direct with us on the military aspects of the defence negotiations, there will be no objection to your doing so, in your corporate capacity as C-in-Cs(M.E.); provided you clear your signals with the Field Marshal before despatch.

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351192/53

July 19

DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT

With reference to Foreign Office telegrams Nos. 1077, 1078 and 1079 to Washington and Washington telegrams Nos. 511 and 512, the Department wish to go on record as saying that they entirely agree with the view of the Secretary of State as expressed in paragraph 7 of Washington telegram No. 511 and in Washington telegram No. 512.

2. The Department's view is that it is absolutely essential that the Americans should join with us in any defence negotiations with Egypt. To leave them out would change the whole basis of our proposed approach to Egypt. On all the evidence, the chances of success on the basis of our negotiating alone and insisting rigidly upon the full requirements of Case A (with perhaps a slightly reduced number of technicians and administrative personnel) are nil.

3. The Department would draw attention to the following points:-

Let have now reminded the S. of S. of this. led. 9/13

- (a) The package idea seems to be in process of being lost sight of. For this to succeed, it is essential that we have American assistance; if on the other hand we drop it, and simply concentrate on trying to secure Case A, we shall fail.
- (b) The Egyptians will not look at Case A, and arguments about the parallel with American bases in this country are irrelevant. We are dealing with a Middle Eastern country.
- (c) If we do not have the Americans in, they will certainly influence the Egyptians against our proposals outside the conference room, and will strengthen the Egyptian position by offering arms and economic assistance not in conjunction with us, i.e. they will give the

.../Egyptians

13/3

Egyptians the bait out of the package proposals while we are struggling to force a naked hook down the Egyptian throat.

4. In other words, it is the view of the Department that with American assistance we may in fact get something like 75% of our requirements from the Egyptians; without American assistance there is no chance of our getting anything. If we decide not to start the negotiations on the American terms, it is for consideration whether it would not be more honest to tell the Egyptians that we are not prepared to have any negotiations at all and to stand on the 1936 Treaty. To go forward on the basis contemplated in our telegrams to Washington would certainly be regarded by Egypt as another example of British perfidy and would make nonsense of our efforts to secure a settlement in the Middle East, including probably the recent Sudan agreement.

Roger Allen

9th March, 1953.

I agree fully with this minute.

*Ry? over leaf
9/3*

I don't follow the argument of the last two sentences: but otherwise I am in general agreement.

It is nice for the department to be so plainly on record. But in an inter-ministerial situation like the present, there are sometimes better ways

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of moving events in the desired direction than giving a plain shove, which may merely provoke a more obstinate resistance. There is now good hope that, as a result of further exchanges between London and Washington, and between the S. gov. and the Americans, the talks in Cairo may get started on a firm Anglo-American basis.

Minister of State

W. L. Craig
9/3

JV 10/3

This can be entered for the
Re A- read.

EFW
20/5

SECRET

NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT

- I agree with the attached letter from Mr. Creswell and the enclosure and have really little fresh to add.
2. I do not think we should underestimate the weakness of Neguib's position. ^X He is unlikely to be able by himself to make his views in favour of a reasonable agreement with us (if those are his views) prevail over the views of the more extreme elements in the Higher Military Committee. The latter intend to try to secure first the evacuation of British troops and then to hold us and the United States to ransom and extort the highest possible price in terms of economic and military assistance in return for Egyptian participation in some kind of M.E.D.O.. ^X
 3. If we refuse to open negotiations, I agree with Mr. Creswell that course 4(d) is the likeliest and that this will almost certainly lead sooner or later to guerilla warfare, though the Egyptians may start off by doing other more or less unpleasant things, such as rounding up the British community in Cairo and Alexandria, laying ⁱⁿ complaint before the Security Council, and generally taking various nuisance measures against us in the Canal Zone.
 4. The only real chance of getting the Egyptian Government to agree to reasonable terms would be if the Americans would really back us and be prepared to make themselves thoroughly unpleasant to the Egyptians if the latter showed signs of intransigence. Even on this hypothesis, we should have concluded an agreement with an Egyptian Government which might well throw over Neguib in a few months, and the agreement itself would then be of little value.
 5. Given the uncertainty of affairs in Egypt, however, this may be a risk worth taking. The alternative of staying put

/really

really leads nowhere. And the third course of telling the Egyptians that we do not propose to have any negotiations but that we shall make arrangements to withdraw our troops in our own time will not give us any kind of alternative base, will not allow for the disposal of the majority of the base installations in the Canal Zone, and may even lead in the end to much the same difficulties with Egypt as a decision to stay put, since our withdrawal is not likely to be rapid enough to satisfy the Egyptians.

R. Allen

(R. Allen)
18th March, 1953.

I have incorporated some of these thoughts in a separate submission.

Gen. Gray

R. J. Bowler
19/3

not received for entry.

L. B. Adams
May 24th 1954.

1007
25/5



BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

/DHP
(1043/125/53 G)

SECRET

16th March, 1953.

JE1192 /53 AG

My dear Roger

I have asked the Chancery to prepare a short paper, based on recent reports, secret and other, about the likely intentions of the Egyptian régime on the eve of the opening of negotiations. ... The attached note is the result.

2. You will see that it does not venture an opinion upon whether or not, if faced with an impasse, the régime will themselves force the pace towards guerrilla warfare, or whether they will, in the event, give way rather than cause an open and violent crisis. Personally, as I told Willy Morris, I think that the former view is the right one; for many of them would relish a further outbreak of violence and are sufficiently fanatical and irresponsible not to mind if that ultimately leads to their own downfall. Nor do they face facts. But it is a moot point, and we have inadequate evidence here on which to base a firm conclusion.

3. Although, here again, we have no firm evidence, I have myself a feeling that there is a wide divergence of view between different members of the Military Committee as suggested in paragraph 2 of the note. I think it possible that this divergence of opinion (in which the extremists have prevailed) is responsible both for the recent outbreak of trouble-making about the Sudan and for the rejection by the Egyptians yesterday of the proposal for American participation.

4. If a crisis, caused by what the Egyptians will regard as British intransigence, is superimposed upon this state of affairs there are, theoretically, five possible lines of development:-

- (a) The extremists will ultimately change their tune and agree to a solution on other lines.
- (b) The split will continue and widen to a crisis but Neguib and the moderates will win and displace the extremists.
- (c) The split will continue and widen to a crisis but the extremists will win.
- (d) The extremists will increasingly prevail upon Neguib and the others to adopt a provocative and violent course.
- (e) The problem will be resolved by H.M.G. giving way under American pressure.

The only comment I have to offer is that I think (a) extremely unlikely and (b) improbable, and that though (c) is more likely than (b) I do not believe that under circumstances which one can now expect, a split is likely to become as far-reaching as this.

R. Allen, Esq., C.M.G.,
The Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

/I



- 2 -

I therefore consider that (d) is the most likely outcome in the absence of any possibility of (e), which after all is your business and not mine, but I think I am right in leaving this eventuality out of account.

5. I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Hugh Stephenson at Fayid.

Yours ever
Michael

(M.J. Creswell)

*P.S. All this above is of course based solely on the assumption that the negotiations will be opened on the "package deal" deal. If you change the assumption, you change the whole thing! *g.**

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Egyptian Intentions in Defence Negotiations

The Egyptian intention is to secure the evacuation of the largest possible number of British troops in the shortest possible time and the maximum of military and probably economic aid. Any interest they may have in the defence of the Middle East as a region against the danger of Russian aggression is secondary compared with the importance in their eyes of their main objective. They will make no concessions which are not absolutely necessary to gain their objectives.

2. Neutrality is a natural instinct of the Egyptian public. It is publicly advocated as a policy by the Moslem Brotherhood and probably supported by a section of the High Military Committee. On the other hand General Neguib and another section of the High Military Committee seem to realise its impossibility. It is the general expectation of the press and public and almost certainly the collective intention of the High Military Committee that on her own terms Egypt will eventually collaborate with the West to the extent necessary to secure her own interests.

3. The Egyptian terms which have repeatedly been stated are "unconditional evacuation". It is certainly the aim of the High Military Committee to secure a public and unconditional promise of evacuation before agreeing to any form of collaboration. It is perfectly possible that they will press this demand to the point of breaking off negotiations. At present they probably intend to do so. Neither we nor they know what they will actually do when the time comes. It is certain however that the "package" proposals will be resisted fiercely.

4. The High Military Committee are probably confident of considerable American support during the negotiations. There are strong local reasons for this and Egyptians anyway are wishful thinkers. If they decide that they are getting enough American support they may be unwilling to antagonise the Americans and may claim that they are more than willing to play their part in defence as soon as their just demands are met. If they are disappointed in the extent of American support they will probably try to scare the Americans by claiming that British intransigence is leading to a violent clash and that Egypt is being pushed straight into the arms of Russia. American reactions in the past are such as to suggest to the Egyptians that considerable success will result from these tactics.

5. Although the High Military Committee are on occasions genuinely influenced by public opinion they are unlikely in the last resort to be deterred for this reason from any settlement on lines which they would themselves accept. But there is enough genuine fanaticism in the High Military Committee to make it very unlikely that they would wish to accept any settlement offensive to nationalist sentiment.

6. As part of a general settlement the Egyptians are probably ready to accept a number of foreign technicians to maintain the base. They are likely to press, perhaps without great determination, for agreement that they should not necessarily be British. They will certainly be determined to cut numbers to the minimum.

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7. The Egyptians will probably propose a period of about 6 months for the evacuation of all combatant troops. Secret sources report that they would in the last resort agree to 1 year for this.
8. There is likely to be strong resistance to the proposal for integrated air Defence.
9. It is most unlikely that the Egyptians will agree to join the Middle East Defence Organisation in its present form even after they have obtained a promise of "evacuation".
10. The Egyptians are very unlikely to sign any agreement valid for more than a period of a few years. They will probably in any case insist on an escape-clause allowing for the unilateral denunciation of any agreement if "circumstances alter".
11. The Egyptians are unlikely to accept any commitment to allow the reactivation of the base on the threat of war however imminent, and will insist, at the best, on reactivation only on the actual outbreak of war.

Minutes.

TOP SECRET

Class A

Please see the attached minute by Mr. Shuckburgh of the 12th February asking for a draft Cabinet paper pointing out the doubtful value of retaining our present forces in the Canal Zone.

attached,

After talking with Mr. Roger Allen I have attempted a first draft a copy of which I am giving to Eastern Department.

I will telephone Mr. NA. (1612) to check with the best use of precedents.

J.N. Henderson

(J.N. Henderson)

11th February, 1953.

African Department. (Mr. Allen).

Copies to:

Eastern Department
Mr. McDermott

I agree with this so far as it goes. My criticism of it would be that it does not attempt to show how we should maintain our interests in the M.E. if we left the Canal zone, or at least that it skates over it rather lightly, instead of arguing pro & con.

JN

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

In any case, ^{Minutes.} this paper may already have been orientated by events, of which the Private Secretaries are aware. I had thought of sending this to the J/S as it stands, since he will, I believe be working on this question on Sunday afternoon, but on reflection I feel that it would be wrong for me to forward someone else's paper in draft stage.

I would however suggest that you should have a word about all this with the Private Secretaries and.

✓
Roger Allen

14/2

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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JE 1192 54
JE 1119

Mr. Harrison

The Secretary of State would like to put a short note into Cabinet setting down the basic reasons why he considers we must reach an agreement with Egypt not only over the Sudan but also over the Canal Zone.

The sort of line he would like to take is that, in our reduced circumstances, since two world wars, we must concentrate our resources at the points where our vital interests are concerned. These fall broadly into two categories:-

- a) our security (here the defence of Western Europe in Germany is the main responsibility) and the protection of British territory throughout the world;
- b) our means of livelihood (e.g. the points from which we get our oil and other essential commodities).

He would like to show that the keeping of 80,000 men in the Canal Zone is not a necessity from either of these points of view.

I believe that a longish paper is in preparation already on this sort of strategical-political thinking. Could you possibly prepare a brief summary which would not take up more than one page of print for the Cabinet?

Ch. Sturges

12th February, 1953.

SECRET

Recd J

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No.460
12th March, 1953.

D.1.26 p.m. 12th March, 1953.
R.1.56 p.m. 12th March, 1953.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

JE 1192/55 INDEXED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.460 of 12 th March
Repeated for information to Washington

U.K. Delegation New York
(for Secretary of State)

Washington telegram No.550. *Prisco*

My United States colleague has received his instructions but agrees with me that we cannot act on them until the texts of our respective announcements have been cleared.

2. He showed me American text in which he has suggested certain modifications. He made it clear that United States Government insists that American participation in negotiations shall only be on invitation of Her Majesty's Government and Egyptian Government. This will be brought out in the American announcement. When we make our approach to the Egyptian Government I shall therefore urge them to join with us in inviting the United States Government and Mr. Caffery will express latter's readiness to accept the invitation.

3. Tomorrow being Friday, it is probable that the earliest moment at which we can see Foreign Minister and General Neguib will be on Saturday morning.

Foreign Office please pass Washington and United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegrams Nos.158 and 6 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and United Kingdom Delegation New York].

ADVANCE COPIES TO
Sir W. Strang
Private Secretary
Sir J. Bowker
Head African Department



B B B

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP.

*Egypt and
Defence*
JE 1192/56
FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No: 470
14th March, 1953.

D: 9.20 a.m. 14th March, 1953.
R: 9.32 a.m. 14th March, 1953.

EMERGENCY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 470 of 14th March
Repeated for information to: Washington.

Your telegram No: 569: Negotiations.

I have arranged for my United States colleague and myself to call on General Neguib and Egyptian Foreign Minister today at 1 p.m. local time.

2. Issue of announcements in London and Washington will of course depend on results of our meeting. If Egyptians accept straight away I will suggest that Egyptian announcement should not (repeat not) be made before 6 p.m. G.M.T. today. If on the other hand Egyptians require time to consider our proposal I will inform you by emergency telegram.

Foreign Office please pass Washington (immediate) as my telegram No: 161.

[Repeated to Washington].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Sir W. Strang.
Private Secretary.
Sir J. Bowker.
Head of African Dept..
Head of News Dept..

JJJJJ

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JE 1192/56A

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 476
14th March, 1953

D. 12.34 p.m. 14th March, 1953
R. 12.40 p.m. 14th March, 1953

EMERGENCY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 476 of 14th March
Repeated for information to Washington.

My telegram No. 470: Negotiations.

No announcement can be made tonight. Please see my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office please pass emergency to Washington as my telegram No. 163

[Repeated to Washington].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Sir W. Strang
Private Secretary
Sir J. Bowker
Head of African Department
Head of News Department

K K K K

Bag Monday Sunday

Fair d/pt.

14th Mar

JE 1192/57

JE. 1192/57

Deep to Paris

no 241

CONFIDENTIAL.

Sir William Strang on 13th March

THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR came to see me this afternoon after his talk with Mr. Nutting about the French reply to our memorandum about the E.D.C. He said it was not about this that he wished to speak, but about Egypt.

He said that the Quai d'Orsay had now received from H.M. Embassy a paper about the forthcoming negotiations on defence questions in Cairo. He gathered that this had caused some uneasiness in Paris and, though he had no instructions, he thought it well to speak to me. His Minister had already explained to us the keen interest which the French Government would take in the course of these negotiations and the reasons for this interest. In view of this, he would not conceal from me that the fact that we were associating the Americans with ourselves in the negotiations and placing the French on the same level as the Turks would be likely to create serious disquiet in Paris. After the general tripartite declaration about the Middle East, and after the tripartite approach to Egypt about the Middle East Command, the exclusion of France from the present negotiations would be taken by the world as meaning that tripartite collaboration over the Middle East was at an end. This would be a very serious matter for France, not only from the point of view of prestige but also from the point of view of the vital French interest in the Suez Canal.

M. Cassin

He said that French uneasiness had been increased by the news just received from Washington that the State Department had ~~just~~ informed the French and British Embassies that, in view of the imminent opening of negotiations in Cairo, they thought it would be premature to open the proposed tripartite talks in Washington about the Suez Canal on the basis of the Anglo-French memorandum. The State Department seemed to think that the success of the Cairo negotiations would make any further step about the Canal unnecessary.

Sir W. Strang

I said that we had not yet heard about this latest development from Washington. It was quite true that we were hoping to associate the Americans with us in the negotiations in Cairo. The two Ambassadors were about to make an approach to the Egyptian Government, suggesting that the Americans should participate in the negotiations. We did not know what the Egyptian reaction to this would be. We did however think that American participation would offer the best hope for a successful outcome, though I was bound to say that I was not very optimistic about the negotiations. The justification for associating the Americans with the negotiations in this way was that, as well as exercising useful political influence, they could make a contribution in the form of military and economic assistance which might well be an essential element in any solution.

Sir W. Strang

So far as France was concerned, I put the question to him point blank: did he really think that, if we had suggested that France also should participate, that there was any hope that the Egyptians would have agreed and that, given the present relations between France and the Arab

/States,

Let's dept
 3/10/57

Copy
 W. Strang 345
 Cairo
 Foreign
 P. A. D. A.
 D. A.
 Beirut

States, it would have helped in any way towards a solution if France had been in any way associated with the negotiations? The Ambassador said he knew quite well that the answer was "no". But the fact remained that our action had created a problem for France and it was most desirable that we should do what we could to relieve what might become a situation of tension. At the very least could we not, in matters which were of concern to France, let the French Government know what our intentions were in the negotiations, and keep them informed as the negotiations proceeded, so that they might state their views to us, in the light of their own vital interests in the area?

(Sir W. Strang)

I (said that this was quite different from the suggestion that France should have been asked to participate. We would certainly consider what we could do to meet this request. We were well aware of the extent of France's interest in the Canal.

I am sending copies of this despatch to HM Ambassadors at Cairo and Washington and to the Head of the Arab Middle East Office at Cairo.



13th March, 1953.

Top: African Dept. (to enter)

Copies: Secretary of State
Minister of State
Lord Reading
Mr. Nutting
Sir P. Dixon
Sir J. Bowker.

*Baghdad,
Damascus and
Beirut*

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No. 477

14th March 1953

INDEXED D. 2.44 p.m. 14th March 1953
R. 3.55 p.m. 14th March 1953

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

E 1192/58

JE 1192/48

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 477 of 14th March
Repeated for information to Washington
B.M.E.O.

Your telegram No. 569. Negotiations.

My United States colleague and I called on General Neguib and Egyptian Foreign Minister today. I informed General Neguib that Her Majesty's Government were ready to begin negotiations with Egypt in regard to the Canal Zone and connected problems. I went on to say that in view of the extreme importance of these questions Her Majesty's Government proposed that the United States Government should be associated with these negotiations. I urged the Egyptian Government to join with us in inviting the United States Government accordingly. My United States colleague said that if such an invitation were issued the United States Government would be glad to accept it.

2. General Neguib said that he very much appreciated the attitude of the United States Government in this matter and he and the Foreign Minister personally were in favour of issuing the invitation, but would have to consult their colleagues. From the point of view of Egyptian public opinion it was, however, necessary to make the basis of United States participation quite clear. It would be quite unacceptable if it were to be implied by United States participation that the withdrawal of British troops was dependent on agreement on Middle East defence. Egypt desired the United States to come in as a common friend of both countries. My United States colleague here said that it would be as a common friend that they came into any negotiations and they would only come in if invited by both sides. I then told General Neguib that Field Marshal Slim would come here to conduct /the negotiations



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CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 477 to Foreign Office

-2-

the negotiations in association with myself. My United States colleague said that General Hull would be coming to Cairo as his military adviser.

3. General Neguib said that he would convoke a special Cabinet meeting tonight and hoped to let me and my United States colleague have the definite decision of the Egyptian Government by midday tomorrow. In the event of his colleagues being, as he hoped, in agreement with him, announcements could be made in London, Washington and Cairo tomorrow evening. He agreed that they should be simultaneous and that sufficient time should be given for the Egyptian reply to reach London and Washington.

4. I informed the Egyptian Government of the gist of our proposed announcement as did my United States colleague. General Neguib said that the Egyptian announcement would probably be on more or less the following lines:-

"In order to facilitate the progress of discussions the British and Egyptian Governments have extended an invitation to the United States Government to take part in them as a common friend. The United States Government has agreed to participate".

Foreign Minister made a tentative suggestion that if the status of the United States Government as a common friend could be brought out in the British and American announcements, so much the better. I gave him no reason to suppose that Her Majesty's Government would agree to anything of the kind.

5. It was decided that if all went well negotiations might be started on Wednesday or Thursday of next week.

6. It was agreed that General Neguib should inform the press that my United States colleague and I had called on him and the Foreign Minister today and that "various problems were touched upon".

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Washington as my telegram No. 164.

[Repeated to Washington]

ADVANCE COPIES:-

Sir W. Strang

Private Secretary
Head African Dept.

Sir J. Bowker
Resident Clerk

QQQ

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SECRET

JE 1172/60

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 481
15th March, 1953.

D. 1.40 p.m. 15th March, 1953.
R. 1.51 p.m. 15th March, 1953.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 481 of 15th March.
Repeated for information to Washington.

Washington telegram No. 546: Negotiations.

There appears to be considerable uncertainty in the United States Embassy here as to the basis to be put forward to the Egyptians for negotiations. They appear to envisage that the items of the package as listed in your telegram No. 1100 to Washington should be stated to the Egyptians as topics for discussion, but that the order of priority in which they are to be taken up should be agreed with the Egyptians, and that no suggestion should be made that they are all interdependent. This means, of course, that the Americans here are prepared to accept Egyptian insistence that agreement must be reached on Item (C), "Phased Withdrawal of British Armed Forces from Egyptian Territory", before any of the other items is considered. Their reason, as stated to a member of my staff by a member of the United States Embassy, is that they are all convinced, including Caffery, according to the informant, that to insist on the interdependence of the various items would lead to an immediate breakdown of negotiations.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington immediate as my telegram No. 166.

[Repeated to Washington]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Prime Minister
Sir W. Strang
Private Secretary
Sir J. Bowker
Head of African Department
Head of News Department
Resident Clerk

LLL.

Registry
 No. JE 1192/60

Top Secret
 Secret
 Confidential
 Restricted
 Open

Draft.

Washington

tel.

No. 1234

15-3-53

Repeat

Cairo 590
 (Priority)

RECEIVED IN C.B.
 16 MAR 1953
 Cypher

Same distⁿ as
 reference.

F.O. Secret
 white hall
 Secret.

IMMEDIATE RECEIVED
 Addressed Washington tel No. 1234.
 of 15th March. Repeated for info to
 Cairo. 15-3-53
 RECD 7-50 P.M.
 Cairo tel. No. 481

This is characteristic of CAFFERY
 and is the sort of thing from
 which we have long suffered.
 Please speak to DULLES and
 do your best to have CAFFERY
 correctly instructed.

W.S.
 14/3

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND

WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 482
15th March, 1953

D. 2.08 p.m. 15th March, 1953
R. 3.08 p.m. 15th March, 1953

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

E 1192/61 INDEXED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 482 of 15th March
Repeated for information to Washington
B.M.E.O.

My telegram No. 477: Negotiations. JE 1192/58

General Neguib asked me to call this morning and he and the Egyptian Foreign Minister told me that on further consideration the Egyptian Government were not (repeat not) prepared to issue an invitation to the United States Government to take part in the negotiations in regard to the Canal Zone. My United States colleague has also been conveyed and is doubtless being informed in the same sense.

2. The Egyptian Government have come to this decision on the ground that United States participation in the talks from the beginning would be interpreted in Egypt as involving the country in negotiations for Middle Eastern defence. This Egypt is not prepared to contemplate unless and until the question of the withdrawal of British troops has been settled.

3. I expressed great disappointment over this decision and developed the arguments set forth in Washington telegram No. 495. The Egyptian Ministers said that a point might come in Anglo-Egyptian talks in which both sides might be glad of the help of the United States Government but not (repeat not) of United States participation in the talks.

4. The Egyptian Ministers went on to ask me when Her Majesty's Government would be ready to begin negotiations. I replied that had the Egyptian Government been ready to join with us in inviting the United States Government to participate, the British Government would have been ready to start talks

/immediately ...

16 MAR 1953
10 11 12
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CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 482 to Foreign Office

2.

immediately. As it was, a new situation had been created and I could not answer the question without reference to you. Foreign Minister said he hoped that this did not mean that Britain made the opening of negotiations dependent on United States participation. I said that I could not answer that question.

5. It was decided that the Foreign Minister should inform the press that we had discussed the Sudan (see my telegrams Nos. 483 and 484) and "plans for the forthcoming talks".

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Washington as my telegram No. 167.

[Repeated to Washington].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Sir W. Strang
Private Secretary
Sir J. Bowker
Head of African Department
Head of News Department
Resident Clerk

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SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET
DISTRIBUTION

No. 1236
15th March, 1953

D. 8.22 p.m. 15th March, 1953

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 1236 of 15th March
Repeated for information to: Cairo /Immediate /
B. M. E. O.

Cairo telegram No. 482 to Foreign Office / Negotiations /

This is quite unacceptable.

2. To begin negotiations on this basis would be to abandon our package proposal and could only result ultimately in the defence vacuum which the President agreed with me could not be accepted.

3. Moreover it appears to be the Egyptian intention to use the Americans as mediators at the moment that suits them. This of course is exactly what I do not (repeat not) wish.

4. I propose therefore to instruct Her Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo to inform the Egyptians that we are not prepared to proceed any further so long as they maintain this attitude. We must insist that the United States representatives participate from the outset in any talks, and our negotiators must be free to put forward our proposals in their entirety. We should however refuse to be drawn into a discussion of what those proposals will be, before the negotiations open.

5. Please inform United States Government who I hope will have no objection.

DDDD

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Enter

E. 1192/62

THE FRENCH MINISTER called to see me today. He referred to a recent statement by General Neguib, insisting on unconditional evacuation, and he asked whether we regarded that as rejecting in advance our proposal to negotiate on the basis of the "package" proposal. I said that we did not regard the statement in that light, though we had already pointed out to General Neguib that such statements must inevitably prejudice the chances of successful negotiations.

I then took the opportunity of telling Monsieur de Crouy Chanel that we had now decided to tell the Egyptian Government that we were ready to start negotiations on defence; that the Americans would be associated with us in those negotiations, and that the British and American Ambassadors had now been instructed to inform the Egyptian Government accordingly. I then gave Monsieur de Crouy Chanel a summary of the formal communication which we were now instructing Her Majesty's Ambassador in Paris to make to the French Government on the subject.

Monsieur de Crouy Chanel said he wished to make two requests on behalf of his Government. The first was that we should now associate ourselves with the French in suggesting to the Americans that Tripartite talks on the Suez Canal should start as soon as possible, so that the results of the talks should develop at the same time as the negotiations with the Egyptians on defence. The second request was that the French should be kept closely informed, either in Cairo or in London, of the course of the negotiations with Egypt, so that they shall have a chance of expressing a point of view on any matter of importance before a decision was reached. Monsieur de Crouy Chanel explained once again the importance which the French Government attached to ensuring that there should be no interference with traffic through the Suez Canal. A further point which they regarded as important was the location of M.E.D.O. Headquarters. If the Headquarters were on the Suez Canal, that in itself would help to maintain the principle of international importance of the Canal and its security.

On the first point I said that I thought we were very ready to go ahead with the Tripartite talks, which had in fact already started when we put our joint proposals to the Americans. As regards the second point, I said we fully understood the French Government's wish to be kept informed of the progress of the defence negotiations with Egypt and, as I had told him, this point was covered in the formal communication which we should now be making to the French Government.

R. P. Lawrence

12th March, 1953.

*Dir. Sec. Straw
 Secy. Africa Dept.
 Eastern Dept
 W. S. Harrison
 Minister of State
 Mr. Neill*

by [Signature]
 12/3

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
MURCHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

No. 1220

14th March, 1953 D. 3.15 p.m. 14th March, 1953

Repeated for information to:

Paris

Cairo

Repeated for information Saving to:

Oslo No. 70

Copenhagen No. 50

Stockholm No. 52

The Hague No. 135

Athens No. 50

Brussels No. 96

Ankara No. 60

Tokyo No. 69

Panama No. 3

Moscow No. 75

Tel Aviv No. 46

Madrid No. 19

Wahnerheide No. 168

Bagdad No. 54

Beirut No. 69

Damascus No. 56

Jedda No. 50

B.M.E.O. No. 194

New York (UKDEL) No. 152

Paris (UKDEL) No. 242

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 1220 of 14th March

Repeated for information to Paris and Cairo and Saving to other posts.

Your despatch No. 48 [of 2nd February: Suez Canal].

The French Ambassador called on Sir William Strang on his own initiative on 12 March, to say that our intention, which we had now formally communicated to his Government, to associate the Americans, but not the French, with ourselves in the forthcoming negotiations with Egypt, and so to put the French on the same level as the Turks, would be likely to cause serious disquiet in Paris.

2. He added that this disquiet could only be increased by a recent report from Washington, according to which the State Department had informed the French and British Embassies that in view of the imminent opening of negotiations in Cairo, it would in their view be premature to open the proposed tripartite talks about the Suez Canal on the basis of the Anglo-French memorandum. The State Department seemed to think that the success of the Cairo negotiations would make any further step about the Canal unnecessary.

3. What is present position?

666666

SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET
DISTRIBUTION

JE 1192/63

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 491
16th March, 1953

D. 1.22 p.m. 16th March, 1953
R. 1.55 p.m. 16th March, 1953

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

JE 1192/61

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 491 of 16th March
Repeated for information to Washington and B. M. E. O.

Your telegram No. 1235 to Washington: Negotiations.

My United States colleague told me this morning that at his interview with General Neguib and Egyptian Foreign Minister yesterday they had shown very great embarrassment. They had admitted that they had both been in favour of issuing the desired invitation to the United States Government but that at their subsequent meeting with the Cabinet and Military Committee had found unanimous opposition. They attributed this to the fact that the news of the Anglo-American joint approach had convinced all concerned that Britain and the United States were "ganging up" on Egypt, that you, Sir, had unduly influenced the United States administration and that the whole thing was "a British trick" to transfer some of the odium with which Britain is regarded in Egypt on to the United States. In these circumstances the Egyptian Government, to their great regret, were unable to issue the invitation.

2. My United States colleague expressed his disappointment but said that the attitude of the United States Government had been, that unless invited by both sides, they were not prepared to participate in the negotiations.

3. According to my United States colleague, the members of the Military Committee, with whom his staff are in close contact, had expressed great regret that they had not been warned of the idea beforehand, as if they had, they might have been able to ensure a different reply. My United States colleague agrees that it is easy to say this kind of thing after the event. His impression, which I am inclined to share, is that General Neguib has completely lost his position of pre-eminence and that the dominating personality in the Egyptian picture is Lieutenant-Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser. Proof of this in Mr. Caffery's view lies in the fact that on Saturday after our joint meeting General Neguib and the Foreign Minister had decided to issue the invitation and had obviously been overruled.

Foreign Office please pass Washington Immediate as my telegram No. 168.

[Repeated to Washington]

ADVANCE COPIES

Sir W. Strang
Private Secretary
Sir J. Bowker
Head of African Department
Head of News Department

16 MAR 1953

DDDD

Minutes.

p.w. [unclear]
Com [unclear]
 491

Cutting of **DAILY TELEGRAPH** **A**
23 MAR 1954 195

**U.S. ENVOY'S
 SUEZ MESSAGE
 UNAUTHORISED**

**WASHINGTON
 CABLES CAIRO**

**FEAR OF WRONG
 IMPRESSION**

From ANTHONY MANN,
 Daily Telegraph Special Correspondent
 CAIRO, Sunday.

A message issued to the Egyptian Press on Thursday evening by Mr. Caffery, United States Ambassador here, has been the subject of an exchange of telegrams between Washington and the Cairo Embassy, I understand.

In his message Mr. Caffery stated: "It should be made clear that my Government has no wish to take part in any discussions regarding the Suez question unless asked to do so by both Egypt and Great Britain. The United States has inquired of the Egyptian and British Governments whether it might be helpful, and if so how."

I was authoritatively informed today that: "Ambassador Caffery issued his statement following questions from the Egyptian Press. He published the message on his own authority and without reference to the State Department."

It is undisputed in diplomatic quarters that the withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone must remain technically a matter for Anglo-Egyptian negotiation. But it is felt that Mr. Caffery's statement may have conveyed a wrong impression of the current trend of American Middle East policy.

**U.S. ATTITUDE
 Indifference Suggested**

A recent suggestion that a senior American general should visit Cairo during the negotiations is known to have been opposed by Mr. Caffery.

The communiqué issued at the conclusion of Mr. Eden's visit to Washington stressed the intention of the British and American Governments to collaborate in seeking constructive solutions in the Middle East. Observers here point out that the "Suez question" referred to by Mr. Caffery is not only an integral part of the Middle East problem, but probably its most important factor.

The principal effect of Mr. Caffery's message, which expressly purported to convey the views of his Government, has been to convince the régime that America is prepared to remain indifferent to the outcome of the Suez Zone dispute and accepts the contention that the future of the zone bases does not affect American interests.

The statement caused much irritation in British diplomatic quarters. Mr. Caffery greatly prizes his reputation as "a good friend of Egypt."

No doubt he felt he was in danger of losing his reputation when rebuffed last Saturday week by the refusal of Gen. Neguib, the Egyptian Prime Minister, to consider him as a negotiating party. He therefore volunteered his assurances to the Cairo Press.

His attitude is humanly understandable, but there is some feeling that greater issues are at stake than Mr. Caffery's local reputation for amiability.

It is thought likely that the Ambassador will seek a further interview with Gen. Neguib as soon as the Prime Minister returns from his 2,000-mile tour of Upper Egypt. The General left Cairo last evening on the first stage of the tour.

This morning he addressed 8,000 people on the Nile banks at Assuan. Though the greater part of the speech was devoted to local problems, the Prime Minister reiterated the demand for total and immediate evacuation of the Canal Zone.

"We shall achieve evacuation or perish," he declared. "We are ready to sacrifice everything to destroy the barriers erected against our country in international affairs. We insist on evacuation, immediate, total and unconditional."

He added that the Assuan Dam scheme would be proceeded with. The district would be turned into rich pasture-land, and a new industrial centre would be established.

Apart from Gen. Neguib's reference to evacuation, which has now become a matter of ritual in all public statements by members of the régime, there has been some slackening during the week-end in the tension over Anglo-Egyptian differences.

In conjunction with the signature of the statute of self-Government in Khartoum Major Salem's mission to the Sudan appears to have assisted local détente which may have been its principal object.

**NEUTRAL EXPERTS
 Hint of New Approach**

There is some disposition here to allow the Sudan expedition of Egyptian lawyers, headed by Mr. Salah el-Din, to sink into decent obscurity. A hint of a possible new approach to the question of the Canal Zone bases appeared yesterday in the newspaper Akhbar el-Yom.

This indicated that a group of "neutral experts" might visit the zone to assess the time needed to transfer the installations and the extent to which the Egyptian authorities would be in a position to administer them.

Under suitable conditions there is no reason to suppose the British military authorities would oppose a visit by neutral experts who could satisfy themselves of the magnitude of the technical and administrative task involved.

Swiss Munition Experts

A party of Swiss munitions technicians arrived in Egypt yesterday, but their visit is not connected with the Suez problem. Following Egypt's rejection of American participation in the Canal Zone talks, the views of an American military commission would presumably not be regarded here as neutral.

E.1192/63(A)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

<h1>J</h1> <p>AFRICAN DEPARTMENT</p>	JE 1192/64
--------------------------------------	------------

FROM
 Sir R. Stevenson,
 Cairo.
 Secret
 No. 489
 Dated 16th March
 Received in
 Registry— 17th March.

Defence Negotiations
 Discussed the question of safeguarding technicians left in the Suez Canal Zone after withdrawal of our troops.

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

References.
 JE 1072/30

When, in the summer of 1951, it became obvious that the then Egyptian Govt would not agree to our retaining troops or military installations in Egypt on a bilateral basis, it was decided to try to leave our hands by inviting Egypt to join a Middle East Command. The invitation was rejected, and the odium which attaches to the British "occupation" now also attaches to any form of regional defence organisation inspired by ourselves.

(Print.)

2. In consequence we can no longer regard a M.E. defence organisation as an inducement to the Egyptians to give us what we want. On the contrary, it is a hindrance. The less we say about a M.E.D.C., the heavier we are likely to get to Case 'A'.

(How disposed of.)

3. If, therefore, we are to insist on a M.E.D.C. as an element in the 'package', it must be because it would give us something over and above our requirements in the base and in air defence. It must be worth while in itself, not as a means to an end.

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
22 28/4	WP. 53 87

4. Personally, I cannot see that it would be. If the Egyptians understood, and were prepared to take account of, strategic realities in the Middle East, then a M.E.D.C. would be an excellent instrument for carrying out our common strategic purpose. But there is at present no common purpose, so that the instrument, if constructed, would have ~~no~~ to ~~use~~ lack a unified control. Moreover, so long as

Next Paper.

Counsellor/

Councils remain divided, it is obviously far more important that we should keep the base going and reach a satisfactory arrangement over air defence and return in war or imminent danger of war. This action we can at least use our own limited resources, possibly helped by the Americans, to the best strategic advantage in the Middle East. In conclusion, I cannot see ^{no} any advantage, and much harm, whatsoever in our sticking to a demand for Egyptian participation in MEADO, at this stage. But if, having got the best terms we can over the box, air defence, and arrangements for wartime, we do secure Egyptian goodwill and a common purpose, there would then be much to be said for setting up some organisation to give substance to that purpose.

Rumney
17/3

(This is also the American view - see para 2 of W/tn tel No 590 of 16th March - JE 1192/69)

Our instructions for the negotiations are much more in accordance with Sir R. Stevenson's ideas and our idea of a MEADO, much less rigid than Sir R. Stevenson realises.

Afr reply submitted

EDD (Edward)
20/3

W.O. Dept }
Eastern Dept } H.M.S.

We have to be a bit careful about MEADO. It's use is not primarily in the

Minutes.

the Middle East, but in the House of Commons. (I rather wonder how useful it will be there, either). But we need not now go so far as to say this.

Mr R. Stevenson has rather missed the point in this tel. If ~~MEDO~~ comes into being, we can at least complain there if the ^{Egypt} misbehaves on the people we leave in the base, & (a) we shall have ^{an extra} ground of complaint, in that Egypt will be doing wrong to a fellow-Medvite, and (b) we may be able to mobilize supporting opinion against her.

Apart from all this, MEDO may help to get the Americans involved

Nothing to be written in this margin.

Minutes.

involved in the Middle East.

But I agree that we must retain flexibility in our conception of M.D.O. & that it may in fact grow out of efforts at cooperation between us & Egypt (if there are ever made) over the base.

I think we might try a rather more full-scale draft to Sir R. Stevenson & Sir J. Rapp now (taking account of the latter's letter to me 11/9/52/08/53 of 18th March).

Ad 3/3.

Redraft. submitted.

Bridgman
7/2/53

W. Dept
Eastern Dept } 27/3

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Minutes.

I agree with Mr. Allen.
 It has always seemed to me that if we can get the Egyptians to agree to reasonable arrangements for maintenance of the base in peacetime that, in fact, is the main contribution which we should expect from Egypt as a member of M.E.D.O., and will be of greater practical importance than Egyptian participation in a formal M.E.D.O. But Egyptian participation in M.E.D.O. must remain of considerable political importance as an outwardly visible sign that by withdrawing our troops from the Canal Zone, we are not leaving a defence vacuum.

Ry

28th March, 1953.

*Mr Ledwith to see
 W. O. [unclear]
 E. [unclear]*

*Letter sent on JG papers
 (JG 1072/3/G).*

*Re
 307/3*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

FILES

Cypher/OTP.

Sir R. Stevenson
No: 489
16th March, 1953.

D: 12.23 p.m. 16th March, 1953.
R: 2.37 p.m. 16th March, 1953.

PRIORITY
DEDIR
SECRET

N/P

JE 1192/64

Your telegram No: 1226 to Washington.

Following personal for Bowker.

I find it difficult to follow argument in second paragraph [sic] of paragraph 2 since in my view there will be no (repeat no) real or military safeguard for the relatively small numbers of technicians left in the zone, and their security will depend solely upon the good-will of the Egyptians and the general state of Angle-Egyptian relations.

2. A prolonged wrangle about Egyptian participation in M.E.D.O. followed, perhaps, by reluctant Egyptian agreement, would not in my view be the best way of ensuring this. It seems to me, indeed, that the best safeguard we could have would be the rapid conclusion of negotiations on terms acceptable to the Egyptians, i.e. by the exclusion of M.E.D.O. until afterwards.

3. If, however, you have in mind a political and legal safeguard or justification of British action if position of the technicians were to be physically threatened, this advantage seems to me outweighed by the practical disadvantage suggested above. And would M.E.D.O. participation in fact give us legal justification for military action in peacetime in support of these men?

4. Moreover Egyptian agreement to maintain the base with the aid of British technicians (which we would hope to secure from the "withdrawal" phase of the talks) would constitute a better political and legal safeguard than formal Egyptian participation in M.E.D.O..

5. I realise that this runs directly counter to Her Majesty's Government's policy, but I think we must face the facts:

(a) that in.....



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SECRET

Cairo telegram No: 489 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

(a) that in their present mood Egyptians will not accept M.E.D.O. participation until after the successful termination of negotiations for withdrawal of British troops and the maintenance of the base;

(b) that technicians left behind in the zone will have very little if any real safeguard in case of Egyptian hostility to their presence except the ultimate sanction of force.

JJJJJ

J

AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

JE 1192/65

1963

FROM
 Sir R. Stevenson,
 Cairo
 Secret
 No. 494
 Dated 16th Mar
 Received in Registry— 17th Mar.

A member of the U.S. Embassy had a conversation with Col. Gamel Abdel Nasser, and other officers, who said that the Egyptians were willing to participate in a regional defence organisation after evacuation of the Canal Zone.
 (Rptd. W'ton, BMEU)

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

You may care to see this with refs.

References.
 JE 1192/63
 JE 1052/23
 WU. 1198/27

Remy
17/3

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)
 Difference dist. 17th Mar.

There is a great deal to be said for the argument that we should go for our bases & forget MEDO (or let it follow logically from our agreement on the bases) if & when we can get round a table with the Egyptians. The point is taken care of in our brief. JE 1192/149

Re
20/3

(Action completed.)
 25/2/4

(Index.)
 WR. 53
 87

See now also a draft & personal letter to me from Mr. Newell dated 29 March.
 28/3.

Next Paper.

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SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 494
16th March 1953

D:8.17 p.m. 16th March 1953
R:8.49 p.m. 16th March 1953

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

JE 1192/65

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 494 of 16th March

Repeated for information to : Washington

JE 1192/63
British Middle East Office

My telegram No. 491 : Negotiations.

A member of the United States Embassy told one of my staff that he had met last night Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser, Colonel Uakim Ali Amr, Colonel Abdel Moneim Amin and Colonel Anwar Sadat. According to the American, Nasser had stated more clearly and definitely than ever before that the Egyptian Government were ready to discuss the question of the maintenance of the base at the same time as withdrawal of British troops from the Canal zone and were willing to give express undertakings to let the Western Powers return to the base on the outbreak of hostilities. After the question of evacuation had been settled they would be prepared to participate in a regional organisation. They wished to come in with the Western Powers but it was for the latter to make it possible for them to do [? grps omitted] until the evacuation issue had been satisfactorily settled.

3.[sic]The American official was emphatic that the Egyptian officers had spoken with sincerity and meant what they said. He suggested that we might lose an opportunity of getting the substance of what we require, namely a satisfactory agreement for the maintenance of the base, if we insisted on linking consideration of this question with that of M.E.D.O.. The best Egyptian contribution to such an organisation in any case would be, he argued, to agree to the efficient maintenance of the base.

4. As you know I have long advocated taking these negotiations in two phases, the first dealing with the future of the Canal zone and the second with the organisation of regional defence

/ and



SECRET

Airo telegram No. 494 to Foreign Office

JE1057/23 - 2 -
and economic and military supplies for Egypt (see my telegrams Nos. 159 and 248). — WU 1198/27 — J Dept.

5. The Egyptian officers enlarged upon the theme that it would not be in American interest to participate in negotiations now, for if these negotiations were unsuccessful, the Americans would suffer from the odium attaching to the British and it was therefore preferable that the American position should not be compromised. This last argument is one which Mr. Caffery has frequently propounded in the past in a more personal form — although in fairness to him I should add that he has not done so on this occasion.

Foreign Office please pass Washington as my telegram No. 169.

[Repeated to Washington].

[Note by Communications Department: Repetition of omitted groups is being obtained].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary
Sir W. Strang
Sir J. Bowker
Head African Department
Head News Department

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SECRET

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Makins

No. 584

D. 1.00 p.m. 16th March, 1953

16th March, 1953

R. 6.21 p.m. 16th March, 1953

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

E. 1192/66 JE 1192/61

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 584 of
16th March,

Repeated for information to Cairo (Immediate)

Your telegram No. 1235: Egypt.

The main points in Caffery's report on his conversation with Neguib are the following.

2. Neguib suggested that the motive of Her Majesty's Government in seeking to draw the Americans into the negotiations was to transfer to them some of the hostility expressed by Egyptian opinion against the British. The Egyptian Government wished to maintain their friendly relations with the United States Government and intended to cooperate eventually with the West in Middle Eastern Defence. Rather than have the American Ambassador at the table during the negotiations with Her Majesty's Government they much preferred that he should play a similar part to that which he had played during the negotiations about the Sudan.

3. I will telegraph further later in the day.

Foreign Office please pass immediately to Cairo as my telegram No. 38.

[Repeated to Cairo].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Sir W. Strang

Private Secretary

Sir J. Bowker

Head of African Department

Resident Clerk

7 77777



Entel

TOP SECRET

JE 1192 68

DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT.

I submit a draft letter from Sir William Strang to Mr. Shuckburgh enclosing the first draft of a possible directive to Field-Marshal Sir William Slim. I think that the letter and the directive together are self-explanatory. If they are approved, it might be desirable to get them off as soon as possible by bag to Washington, since the Secretary of State will already be engaged in his conversations there. The draft may of course be overtaken by events, but if so it could be modified as necessary.

2. If the draft is approved for submission to the Secretary of State, I suggest we might send a copy to the Minister of State now. If the directive is finally issued by the Prime Minister, we should of course send a copy to Sir Ralph Stevenson.

Roger Allen

5th March, 1953.

156

I think the draft is on the right lines. I am sure that if the negotiations are to have any chance of success there will have to be a certain elasticity as regards tactics. I have suggested a few small additions.

Genl. Strang

*R. of Stevenson
5/3*

This is on the right lines. But

if

RECEIVED
17 - MAR 1998

if it is to catch this evening's bag, I have not the time to study it in detail.


W.S.
9/3

On Sir W. Stamps's authority, this is now being submitted for the M/S to see. I attach behind a fleecy copy of the draft "directive" in case the Minister would like it for his own use. I shd. be grateful if this minute & the draft itself could be returned to the Dept. as soon as possible.

M. Dept.

Rd. 6/3

Thank you. Cops of the directive retained for the Minister.


6:3

5th March, 1953

Registry
No. JE192/682

Top Secret.
~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~RESTRICTED~~
~~SECRET~~

Draft letter to
Mr. Shuckburgh,
Washington.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

From Sir William
Strang.

Roger Allen
5/3
R. G. Saunders
5/3

5/3

See Chief of Staff in last

I enclose a ~~copy of a~~ draft directive to Field-Marshal Sir William Slim in connexion with any negotiations on defence which may be held with the Egyptian Government. The Department have drafted this on the assumption that it will be decided to go ahead more or less on the lines at present contemplated, but of course the draft ~~could~~ ^{can} be altered if necessary to conform with the results of any conversations which the Secretary of State may have in Washington. It has nevertheless seemed worthwhile trying to get something down on paper at this stage.

You will see that the draft has been done in the form of a directive from Her Majesty's Government to the Field-Marshal. We have it in mind that this might be signed by the Prime Minister. I saw Slim yesterday: he is obviously not altogether happy about this job, ~~and~~ I think it would not only clarify the position, but also help him if we can in due course let him have some written instructions somewhat on the lines of this draft. The instructions are intended to make it clear that we shall take a ~~strong~~ tough line with the Egyptians, in accordance with what I understand to be the views of the Cabinet; but they do give Slim ~~a~~ ^{some} latitude as regards the tactical approach to the Egyptians. I think this is right.

Would you show this draft to the Secretary of State and get his views? If he approves it generally, perhaps you would let us know by telegram, and we would then, if he agrees, submit it to the Prime Minister for his consideration. We have not yet discussed the draft with Slim or with anyone outside the office.

W.S. 5/3

Registry
No.

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Draft.

Draft Directive
to Field-Marshal
Sir William Slim

From The Prime
Minister.

*in accordance
with the despatch
received from
the Prime Minister
British forces in
the Canal Zone
Copy under
cover of
separate
despatch to -*

H.M. Ambassador,
Cairo.

Repeated to -

Fayid
Washington
Paris
Ahkara
U.K. Represent-
ative on the
North Atlantic
Council.
U.K. Represent-
ative to the
United Nations.

Print:
Foreign Office
Secret and
Whitehall
Secret.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have, as you know, requested Her Majesty's Government in Australia to obtain The Queen's assent to make use of your services for a short period before you take up your appointment as Governor-General of Australia, and the Royal Assent has been given. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have accordingly now decided to request that you will go to Cairo and there enter into negotiations with the Egyptian Government with a view to securing through negotiation the voluntary association of Egypt with the West in arrangements for the defence of the Middle East against outside aggression. Her Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo will be associated with you in these negotiations, and he and the Commanders-in-Chief (Middle East) will no doubt make available to you such facilities and such expert advice as you may need. You will report to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on the negotiations, through Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who will be responsible for obtaining, where necessary, any further instructions for you from Her Majesty's Government in connexion with any points which may arise in the course of the negotiations.

2. By agreement with Her Majesty's Government, the United States Government will participate in these negotiations. has been designated as the United States representative, and you should concert with him, within the framework of your general instructions, the method of your approach to the Egyptian Government, and.

/any

any other necessary details. It is probable that, on certain aspects of the negotiations in which the United States Government are not directly concerned, it will be found convenient for you to deal with the Egyptian representatives without the presence of the United States representative; on other matters, it is hoped that your United States colleague, whose instructions may be expected to be similar to your own, will reinforce the views which you express to the Egyptian Government, and materially contribute to a successful outcome of the negotiations.

3. Together with your United States colleague, you should propose to the Egyptian Government a general settlement comprising -

- (a) A phased withdrawal of British armed forces from Egyptian territory;
- (b) The maintenance of the Canal Zone base in peace with a view to its ^{earliest possible} immediate use in the event of war;
- (c) An arrangement for the air defence of Egypt;
- (d) The participation of Egypt in a Middle East Defence Organisation;
and
- (e) A programme of military, and economic assistance by the United Kingdom and the United States to Egypt.

4. You should make clear from the outset that Her Majesty's Government regard all these elements in the general settlement as interdependent. The Egyptian Government should be made to understand that there will be no withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone until the negotiations have made a start and are seen to be making good progress.

/It

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(44088) W1.22837/248 (100.000 (4 UP) 11/81 A.B.E.W.A.T.R. GP.685

It is imperative that proper arrangements be made for the defence of the Middle East, and in the absence of such arrangements we cannot contemplate the withdrawal of our forces. Her Majesty's Government have, on the other hand, no wish to leave three Divisions in the Canal Zone if such arrangements can be made. In discussing the arrangements, you should be guided by the papers annexed to the Foreign Secretary's Memorandum to the Cabinet C.(53) 17 Revise.

5. It is probable that General Neguib's attitude towards this approach will be unfavourable. He may insist, as his spokesmen have insisted on many occasions over the past months, that British troops be withdrawn "unconditionally". He may say that Egyptian public opinion feels so strongly on this issue that his own position would be intolerable unless Her Majesty's Government agreed to evacuate without any specific undertaking by the Egyptians in return. He may add that he himself believes that it is in Egypt's interests to place herself on the side of the West and to cooperate in defensive measures, also that the Egyptian armed forces could, if properly equipped, undertake the defence of the Suez Canal in the terms of Article 8 of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. (Under this Article, the King of Egypt authorises Her Majesty to station forces in Egyptian territory in the vicinity of the Canal, in the zone specified, with a view to ensuring, in cooperation with the Egyptian forces, the defence of the Canal "until such time as the High Contracting Parties agree that the Egyptian army is in a position to ensure, by its own resources, the liberty and entire security of navigation of the Canal.") /6. If

6. If General Neguib maintains his insistence upon his formula of "unconditional withdrawal", you may, at your discretion, suggest that the first step is to examine seriously the problems of defending the Middle East. While avdding, so far as possible, a wide-ranging discussion of strategy, you may point out that in order to avoid a vacuum in Middle East defence, it is essential, as an absolute minimum, that arrangements be made for the maintenance of the Canal Zone base in place with a view to its immediate reactivation in the event of war and that the problems of air defence be solved. You will be aware that the strategic concept of the defence of the Middle East is that any Soviet thrust into the Middle East should be met at the earliest practicable moment after the Red Army has crossed the Soviet frontiers. General Neguib as a soldier should be brought to realise that it will only be possible to meet an overland and air threat from this direction from an active base in the Middle East itself, and without any long line of sea communications. The base in Egypt took a period of three-and-a-half years to build. In addition to workshops, storage depots and installations for supply, repair and administration, it contains airfields, communications, power stations, hospitals and other amenities. The total cost has been of the order of £500 million. No alternative base could be built on the same scale or in a short period of time. Egypt is the only place in the Middle East where all the elements essential to a base coincide with a strong strategic position. You may then suggest to General Neguib that it would be useful to discuss in
/greater

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

640389 WT.22837/246 100.000 (4.07) (1/81) A.B.E.W.L.D. G.P.S.S.

greater detail the problems of maintaining and securing the base on the assumption that British forces have been withdrawn from the Canal Zone. You could make it clear that the rate of such withdrawal, and the need to leave behind British technicians and administrative personnel, depend to some extent upon the arrangements which could be made with the Egyptian armed forces for maintenance and security: thus it should be possible in such discussions to reach agreement also on the details of evacuation. You should, however, at the same time make sure that General Neguib understands that the question of Egyptian participation in a Middle East Defence Organisation is only left on one side for the time being, and that it will have to be settled before there can be any question of a firm agreement in principle to withdraw British forces.

7. If General Neguib will agree to this minimum proposal, negotiations may start between the United Kingdom and Egyptian teams on items (a), (b) and (c) in paragraph 3 above. The United States team need not participate in this committee work, but will return when items (d) and (e) are broached.

8. The facilities which Her Majesty's Government would wish to obtain in Egypt under conditions of peace and war are set out in Paper ^{No} 1 (and Appendices) of the papers agreed during the United States/United Kingdom talks on Egypt in London from 31st December 1952 to 7th January 1953, and annexed to the Cabinet Memorandum referred to. You should concentrate on securing Case A as described in these papers, and you should not accept any substantial /modification

modification of this "case" without prior reference to Her Majesty's Government.

9. In addition, separate briefs have been prepared covering in detail the various aspects of this settlement. These briefs set out, inter alia, the factors governing the rate of any withdrawal, the military equipment which we could supply, proposals for the disposal of stores and installations in the Canal Zone insofar as this may be necessary, and possible financial arrangements with Egypt.

10. As regards the proposed Middle East Defence Organisation, Egyptian agreement to participate in a regional defence organisation is an essential part of any general settlement, and if discussion with the Egyptians proceeds first on points (a), (b) and (c) in paragraph 3 above, you will have, at the appropriate time, to revert to the question of a regional defence organization. The details of the Middle East Defence Organisation, as agreed between Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and other sponsoring powers - the United States, Turkey, France, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand - are set out in the enclosure to Paper No. 2 of the papers agreed at the United States/United Kingdom talks referred to above. It has been written in a form which could be used as the basis of a paper to be handed to the Egyptian Government. The form of any such regional organization is less important than the substance of Arab, including Egyptian, cooperation in defence. If such cooperation can in fact be secured, the actual organization needed to give effect to it may develop almost /automatically.

- in the case of Egypt by the acceptance of adequate arrangements for the base and for air defence -

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

automatically. You need not, therefore, insist too rigorously on the details of our proposed Middle East Defence Organisation, though you should not accept any changes which may be suggested by the Egyptians without reference back to Her Majesty's Government, since it would be necessary to consult the other sponsoring powers before coming to a final decision.

11. In general, it will be your task to try to make the Egyptian Government aware of the realities of the world situation and of the special problems involved in the defence of the Middle East against an aggressor. Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to shuffle off any of the responsibilities which have devolved upon them there without an assurance that adequate alternative arrangements can and will be made to fulfil the defence requirements of this area. The willing help and collaboration of the Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, is very desirable in order to secure this end. But the first condition is that Her Majesty's Government must be satisfied that practical effect will be given to promises of cooperation. If they are not so satisfied, then there will be no alternative but to terminate these negotiations. You should not however take this step yourself without prior reference to Her Majesty's Government. The consequences of a failure to reach agreement may be so serious that you should make every effort to convince the Egyptian Government of the desirability of joining with us in working out satisfactory arrangements, and thus contributing to a lasting and fruitful settlement of the problems of the Middle East as a whole.

and the advantage to ourselves

TOP SECRET

Enter name

JE 1192/68

EGYPT: DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS

(A)

As instructed, I have produced a much shortened version of the draft directive to Field-Marshal Slim. This can be supplemented by more detailed briefs which are being prepared interdepartmentally here.

Roger Allen

11th March, 1953.

This document deals with the important question of tactics, which are being dealt with in a separate draft brief. Sir W. Strang.

R. J. Jacobson

Could you have a look at my revised draft?

W.S. 13/3

Now submitted to S. of S.

W.S.

13/3

Registry
No.

Top Secret.
~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

Draft.

Directive to
Field-Marshal
Sir William Slim

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

From The Prime
Minister.

It is the object of Her Majesty's Government to settle the dispute with Egypt arising from the presence of British forces in the Canal Zone, and to secure the voluntary association of Egypt with the West in arrangements for the defence of the Middle East against outside aggression. You should therefore conduct negotiations with the Egyptian Government to this end, in concert with representatives of the United States Government. Her Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo will be associated with you in these negotiations, and you should report to Her Majesty's Government on them through Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who will be responsible for obtaining, where necessary, any further instructions for you.

2. Together with ^{the} ~~your~~ United States ^{representatives,} ~~colleague,~~ you should propose to the Egyptian Government a general ~~joint~~ settlement comprising -

- (a) A phased withdrawal of British armed forces from Egyptian territory;
- (b) The maintenance of the Canal Zone base in peace with a view to its earliest possible use in the event of war;
- (c) An arrangement for the air defence of Egypt;
- (d) The participation of Egypt in a Middle East Defence Organisation;
- and
- (e) A programme of military, and economic assistance by the United Kingdom and the United States to Egypt.

In discussing these arrangements you should be guided by the papers annexed to the Foreign Secretary's Memorandum to the Cabinet C(53)17 Revise,

/and

and you should make it clear from the outset to the Egyptian Government that Her Majesty's Government regard all these elements in the general settlement as interdependent. You should moreover stand firm on the principle of Case A ^{as stated} in the papers referred to. The United States Government have made it clear that in their view it may be necessary to fall back on an arrangement lying between Case A and Case B, and in the last resort on Case B, but it has been agreed with them that you and General Hull, their military representative, shall judge the technical conditions which are necessary to achieve our objective and that no modification of Case A shall be made with which you and he do not both agree.

3. If the Egyptians prove completely intransigent, a new situation will be created on which you should refer for instructions to Her Majesty's Government.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Sir J. Bunker Ryd
Mr. Allen Ra 14/3
To enter 14/3
W.S. 14/3
JE 1192/68

SECRET

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO FIELD MARSHAL SLIM FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

You will proceed to Cairo as head of a delegation to conduct negotiations with Egyptian representatives, in association with H.M. Ambassador, and in concert with a delegation appointed by the Government of the United States.

The purpose of your negotiations will be to reach agreement with the Egyptian representatives on the future of the British forces and of the British base in the Canal Zone and to secure the association of Egypt with the Western Powers in arrangements for the defence of the Middle East against aggression from outside.

Your objectives in the various matters for negotiation, which are to be regarded as an indivisible whole, are set out in papers which have been supplied to you. The general outlook of Her Majesty's Government on these matters will be known to you from the consultations with Ministers which you have attended in London. You will report to Her Majesty's Government through H.M. Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and through him will seek any necessary instructions from Her Majesty's Government.

You will not break off the negotiations without prior reference to Her Majesty's Government.

(Initialled) *(Initialled)*
AS *W.S.*
14 March 1953 *14.3.53*