

SECRETFROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET
DISTRIBUTIONNo. 1164

D. 1.30 a.m. 12th March, 1953

12th March, 1953

EMERGENCYSECRETAddressed to Washington telegram No. 1164 of 12th March,
Repeated for information to: UKDEL New York (for S. of S.)[EMERGENCY]Cairo [IMMEDIATE]

Your telegram No. 548.

Prime Minister does not agree to the use of word
"anxiety" in this draft. He wishes the passage to read
as follows:-"In view of the importance of the questions involved,
the British and Egyptian Governments have expressed the
desire for United States participation in the negotiations
and the United States Government have agreed to take
part. To this end General Hull, the Vice-Chief of
Staff of the United States Army will be associated with
the United States Ambassador in the discussions".

2. Your paragraph 4. We agree.

777777

Reference:-

FO 371/10 27917

92772

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SECRETFROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTIONNo. 185

11th March, 1953

D. 6.33 p.m. 11th March, 1953

IMMEDIATESECRET

Addressed to New York telegram No. 185 of 11th March
Repeated for information to Washington
Cairo

Following for Secretary of State.

Washington telegram No. 544 [of 10th March].

Even though Americans may maintain their view about status of Hull, Prime Minister thinks we need not ourselves in our own announcement spell out the respective positions of Caffery and Hull as is done in the third paragraph of the draft announcement in my telegram No. 169 [of 10th March]. Second sentence of that paragraph might therefore be redrafted to read "To this end they have arranged to make available the services of General Hull, the United States Deputy Chief of Staff".

2. When we have your views on this and on draft as a whole, we will instruct Her Majesty's Ambassador to clear the text with the Americans.

bbbbb

P371/102797

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SECRET

J

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF.

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Makins
No: 549
11th March, 1953.

D: 2.14 p.m. 11th March, 1953.
R: 7.40 p.m. 11th March, 1953.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

JE 1192/45 INDEXED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 549 of 11th March
Repeated for information to: U.K. Del. New York (for Secretary of State).

Cairo. JE 1192/44

My immediately preceding telegram. Egypt.

Following is text of American communiqué, subject to final clearance.

(Begins):

The Governments of Egypt and the United Kingdom have indicated their desire that the Government of the United States take part in discussions which are expected to begin shortly in Cairo regarding various matters of interest to the three countries. The United States has agreed to participate. Among the problems to be discussed are the future of the Suez Canal bases, the defence of the Middle East as a region, and possible future cooperation in the economic and social as well as military fields.

The Honourable Jefferson Caffery, American Ambassador to Egypt, will be the principal American representative in the talks and General John E. Hull, Vice Chief of the United States Army, has been designated as a Special Military Adviser to the Ambassador. General Hull expects to leave for Cairo on March, 1953.

(Ends).

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Cairo as my telegram No: 28.

[Repeated to Cairo].

ADVANCE COPIES:

- Prime Minister.
- Sir W. Strang.
- Private Secretary.
- Sir J. Bowker.
- Head of African Dept..



JJJJJ

SECRET

J

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir G. Jebb
No: 146
11th March, 1953.

D: 8.55 p.m. 11th March, 1953.
R: 9.49 p.m. 11th March, 1953.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

JE. 1192/146

INDEXED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 146 of 11th March
Repeated for information to: Washington.

Your telegram No: 168. JE. 1192/43

I agree with the draft announcement. I suggest, however, that the last sentence of the second paragraph might be omitted and the previous sentence amended so as to end:

"... to conduct these negotiations in association with Her Majesty's Ambassador".

I suggest this, not because I question in any way that Slim will in fact lead our delegation, but because it seems desirable to make Her Majesty's Ambassador's position appear more analogous to that of Mr. Caffery in the public announcement.

2. As regards the third paragraph, I understand Sir R. Makins is reporting further talk with Bevell Smith which may necessitate some adjustment of the text.

[Note by Communications Dept.
Repeated to Cairo on the instruction of Sir W. Strang].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Prime Minister.
Sir W. Strang.
Private Secretary.
Sir J. Bowker.
Head of African Dept..

FO 371/102797

92772

SECRETFROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND WHITEHALL
SECRET DISTRIBUTIONNo. 190

D. 1.32 a.m. 12th March, 1953

12th March, 1953

EMERGENCYSECRETAddressed to U.K. Del. New York telegram No. 190 of
12th MarchRepeated for information to Washington [Emergency]
Cairo [Immediate]

Your telegram No. 146.

Following for Foreign Secretary from Prime Minister.

I agree to your suggested amendment. I have consulted Slim.

K K K K

Reference:-

FO 371/102797

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TOP SECRETFROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

Cypher/OTP

JE. 1192/47

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET
DISTRIBUTION

Sir G. Jebb

D. 11.01 p.m. 11th March, 1953.

No. 153

R. 5.08 a.m. 12th March, 1953.

11th March, 1953.

IMMEDIATETOP SECRET

JE. 1192/44

JE. 1192/45

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 153 of 11th March.Repeated for information to: Washington
Cairo.Washington telegrams Nos. 548 and 549 to Foreign Office,
your telegram No. 185 and Washington telegram No. 26.Following from Secretary of State. *not yet entered - copy attached* N/R

Of the two alternative wordings contained in Washington telegram No. 548 to Foreign Office, I prefer on the whole that in paragraph 2. It adds positively to the definition of Hull's position as contained in the text of the American communiqué in a way that "associated with the United States Ambassador in the discussions" does not.

2. For the same reason I am inclined to prefer it to the third alternative contained in paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 185.

Foreign Office please repeat to Cairo as my telegram No. 3.

[Repeated to Cairo.]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Prime Minister
Sir W. Strang
Private Secretary
Sir J. Bowker
Head of African Department

CCC

18 MAR 1953

Reference:-

FO 371/102797

92772

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

CYPHER

Registry No. JE 1192/47

(Date) 12th March, 1953

Secret
 Open
 Draft
 Telegram

IMMEDIATE

Despatched 1.40p M.

Draft.

[Security classification] SECRET

Telegram to: U.K. Delegation New York

Addressed to Secretary of State (New York)

New York

telegram No. 194 (date) 12/3

No. 194

repeated for information to Washington and Cairo

(Date) 12th March

Repeat to: Washington (1/68)

Cairo 554

Following for Secretary of State.

Your telegram No. 153 crossed telegram to Washington No. 1164

2. This was discussed with the Prime Minister who had a definite preference for *variant* ~~formals~~ given in paragraph 3 of Washington telegram No. 548.

3. We should be glad to know whether in the circumstances you agree to the text contained in my telegram to Washington No. 1164.

W.P.
173

EXOCLEAR
Codex
Cypher.

Distribution:—

Foreign Office
Secret and White-
hall Secret

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

12-157
12/3/53

PRINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTER, ST. MARTIN'S LANE, LONDON, W.C.2

Go

FO 371/102797

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Specimen
J

SECRET

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir G. Jebb

No. 165

D. 5.48 p.m. 12th March 1953

12th March 1953

R. 6.40 p.m. 12th March 1953

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

E. 1192/47A
J

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 165
of 12th March

Repeated for information to Washington Cairo

Your telegram No. 194. Following from Secretary of State.

I agree.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Cairo as my telegram No. 5.

[Repeated to Cairo].

QQQ



Reference:-

FO 371/102797

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SECRETFROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OTP

No. 514

10th March, 1953.

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRETAND WHITEHALL SECRETDISTRIBUTIONIMMEDIATE

D. 1.58 p.m. 10th March, 1953.

SECRETAddressed to Cairo telegram No. 514 of 10th March.

Repeated for information to:-

Washington [Priority].

U.K.Del. New York for Secretary of State [Priority].

My telegram No. 510 [of 9th March].

Please ensure that no announcement is made by the Egyptians until we are ready.

2. We are drafting an announcement here and will send you proposed text as soon as possible. Our present intention is that this announcement should be cleared with United States Government but not with Egyptians.

3. Once you have agreed with the Egyptians on the opening of negotiations, you could concert with them a convenient time for announcements in London, Washington and Cairo to be made simultaneously. This might be tomorrow evening. Please try to ensure that the Egyptians do not allow premature leakage.

SECRET

371/102797

JE 1192/43(A)

92772

SECRET.

EGYPT: DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS

A draft announcement about the opening of negotiations with Egypt and Field-Marshal Slim's departure for Cairo is attached.

2. It is submitted that -

- (i) copies of this draft might first be sent to the C.R.O. and to the Field-Marshal;
- (ii) the text might then be telegraphed to the Secretary of State for his approval and to Cairo and Washington;
- (iii) Washington might be instructed at the same time to clear this text, subject to any comments by the Secretary of State, with the U.S. Government;
- (iv) meanwhile the text should be submitted to the Prime Minister here for approval, and he should be informed of the action taken.

Roger Allen

10th March, 1953.

Dalce
Draws *meanwhile* *initials*
at telegrams to Sir R. Stevenson
instructing him to ensure that
the Egyptian, synchronous and
publicity with ours.
Our statement can be
supplemented

FO 371/102797

92772

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
STATE DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF OF NEGOTIATIONS
WITH EGYPT ON SUEZ CANAL

Her Majesty's Government announced on the 23rd February that, in view of the serious and complicated military issues involved in any discussions which might begin with Egypt about the Canal Zone, Her Majesty The Queen had approved the Prime Minister of Australia's submission that the departure of Field-Marshal Sir William Slim for Australia should be temporarily deferred so that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom could retain for a short period the Field-Marshal's services.

Her Majesty's Government have now decided to open negotiations as soon as possible with the Egyptian Government and Field-Marshal Sir William Slim will shortly be leaving for Cairo to conduct these negotiations in association with Her Majesty's Ambassador.

In view of the importance of the questions involved, the British and Egyptian Governments have expressed the desire for United States participation in the negotiations and the United States Government have agreed to take part. To this end General Hull, the Vice-Chief of Staff of the United States Army will be associated with the United States Ambassador in the discussions.

The Egyptian Government have been informed of the decision of Her Majesty's Government and of the United States Government, and have agreed to open discussions with the representatives of the two Governments.

Registry
No. JE 1192/43

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECRET
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~RESTRICTED~~
~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
IMMEDIATE
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
with priority
without priority
~~SECRET~~

(Date) 10/3/53

Despatched 10:45 PM. (B)

9277/10/3/53

Draft.
u.k. Del
NEW YORK
for Sec. of State

371/102797

[Security classification] SECRET
-if any u.k. Del

Addressed to NEW YORK for Secretary of State

Telegram.

telegram No. 169 (date) 10th March, 1953.

No. 169

repeated for information to CAIRO, B.M.E.O. (PAYID),

(Date) 10.3.53

WASHINGTON, PARIS and ANKARA.

Repeat to: 523
CAIRO (u.k. Del)
BMEO (PAYID) 413
WASHINGTON (u.k. Del)
PARIS 116
ANKARA 164

My immediately preceding telegram [A].
Following for Secretary of State.
Following is text.

Begin:

Her Majesty's Government announced on the 23rd February that, in view of the serious and complicated military issues involved in any discussions which might begin with Egypt about the Canal Zone, Her Majesty The Queen had approved the Prime Minister of Australia's submission that the departure of Field-Marshal Sir William Slim for Australia should be temporarily deferred so that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom could retain for a short period the Field-Marshal's services.

Her Majesty's Government have now decided to open negotiations as soon as possible with the Egyptian Government, and Field-Marshal Sir William Slim will shortly be leaving for Cairo to conduct these negotiations. Her Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo will be associated with Sir William Slim in the negotiations.

In view of their interest in the questions involved, the United States Government have agreed to participate in the negotiations. To

/this

1129 NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

~~EXTRACT~~
~~INDEX~~
Cypher.

Distribution:—
FO WH

(Secret) (Secret)

Copies to:—

7.15 pm
10/3
16.

14-00000 WT.1444/253 100,000 5/51 A.S.E.W.L.75. GP-885

Reference:-

FO 371/102797

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1	2	3	4	5	6

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this end the United States Ambassador at Cairo will be assisted by General Hull, the United States Deputy Chief of Staff.

The Egyptian Government have been informed of the decision of Her Majesty's Government and of the United States Government, and have agreed to open discussions with the representatives of the two Governments.

Ends.

Ry3.
co/3

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

R371/102797

92792

SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

No. 169

10th March, 1953

D. 10.45 p.m. 10th March, 1953

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation New York telegram
No. 169 of 10th March, 1953

Repeated for information to: Cairo Paris
B.M.B.O. Ankara
Washington

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following for Secretary of State.

Following is text.

Begins:

Her Majesty's Government announced on the 23rd February that, in view of the serious and complicated military issues involved in any discussions which might begin with Egypt about the Canal Zone, Her Majesty The Queen has approved the Prime Minister of Australia's submission that the departure of Field-Marshal Sir William Slim for Australia should be temporarily deferred so that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom could retain for a short period the Field-Marshal's services.

Her Majesty's Government have now decided to open negotiations as soon as possible with the Egyptian Government, and Field-Marshal Sir William Slim will shortly be leaving for Cairo to conduct these negotiations. Her Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo will be associated with Sir William Slim in the negotiations.

In view of their interest in the questions involved, the United States Government have agreed to participate in the negotiations. To this end the United States Ambassador at Cairo will be assisted by General Hull, the United States Deputy Chief of Staff.

The Egyptian Government have been informed of the decision of Her Majesty's Government and of the United States Government, and have agreed to open discussions with the representatives of the two Governments.

Ends.

R371/102797

92772

JE 1192/36

SECRET

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Makins
No. 495
7th March, 1953

D. 1.29 p.m. 7th March, 1953
R. 6.52 p.m. 7th March, 1953

EMERGENCY
DEDIP
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 495 of 7th March
Repeated for information to Cairo (immediate).

Cairo telegram No. 151 to Washington.

Cairo 408 & FO

Following from the Secretary of State.

I have had further discussion with Mr. Dulles on this point.

We have agreed that the best procedure would be for Sir Ralph Stevenson to call on the Egyptian Prime Minister or Minister for Foreign Affairs, accompanied by his United States colleague, and explain to him the reasons why it is proposed that the United States Government should be associated in the negotiations. Mr. Caffery would confirm the willingness of the United States Government that he should so participate.

2. Sir Ralph Stevenson would base his argument broadly on the fact that these negotiations will, we hope, lead up to a settlement of Middle East Defence problems and the building up of Egyptian Economy, in which the United States Government are bound to take a prominent part.

3. No action should be taken on this telegram in Cairo pending further instructions.

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Cairo as my telegram No. 21.

[Repeated to Cairo]

ADVANCE COPIES

Sir W. Strang
Private Secretary
Sir J. Bowker
Head of African Department
Head of Western Organisations Department
Resident Clerk

DDDDD

SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK
 (United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

Cypher/OIP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

No. 168

10th March, 1953

D: 9.55 p.m. 10th March, 1953

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation New York
telegram No. 168 of 10th March.

Repeated for information to Cairo (Immediate)

B.M.E.O.

Washington (Immediate)

Paris

Ankara

Following for Secretary of State.

Egypt: Defence negotiations.

My immediately following telegram contains the text of a draft announcement about the opening of negotiations with Egypt. The text has been cleared with Field-Marshal Sir William Slim and is being submitted to the Prime Minister.

2. Subject to your comments Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington will be instructed to clear the text with the United States Government.

3. Her Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo has been instructed to ensure that the Egyptians synchronize their publicity regarding the opening of negotiations with ours.

4. If all are agreed, we suggest that announcement might be made from No. 10 Downing Street. Timing of announcement will depend upon the timing and result of two Ambassadors' approach in Cairo and upon the speed with which we can obtain clearance.

G G G G

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as, 169

SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

No. 168

10th March, 1953

D: 9.55 p.m. 10th March, 1953

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation New York
telegram No. 168 of 10th March.

Repeated for information to Cairo (Immediate)

B.M.E.O.

Washington (Immediate)

Paris

Ankara

Following for Secretary of State.

Egypt: Defence negotiations.

My immediately following telegram contains the text of a draft announcement about the opening of negotiations with Egypt. The text has been cleared with Field-Marshal Sir William Slim and is being submitted to the Prime Minister.

2. Subject to your comments Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington will be instructed to clear the text with the United States Government.

3. Her Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo has been instructed to ensure that the Egyptians synchronize their publicity regarding the opening of negotiations with ours.

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G G G G

R371/102797

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Green

Jeng

TOP SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

JE 1192 36

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No.428
7th March, 1953.

D.12.12 p.m. 7th March, 1953.
R.12.22 p.m. 7th March, 1953.

EMERGENCY
DEDIP
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Washington (for Secretary of State) telegram
No.151 of 7th March,

Repeated for information to Foreign Office

JE 1192 / 359

Your telegram No.479 to Foreign Office.

I could of course tell Neguib that in view of the great importance to the whole Western world of the question of the Canal Zone base, and in view of United States concern about M.E.D.O. and their interest in the supply of arms to Egypt, we would be glad of Egyptian agreement to American participation in the talks at the outset. My conviction is however that immediate Egyptian reaction would be to try and make this a bargaining point, seeing that we ourselves desired American participation. He would therefore say that since in Egypt's view discussions on M.E.D.O. etc. could only begin after evacuation, he would only agree to American participation provided we first of all accepted the principle of the withdrawal of our troops.

2. It would also be rather undesirable for it to become publicly known that we were unwilling to open the talks except on a tripartite basis; and the Egyptians also would probably be unwilling to take the responsibility of asking for American assistance.

3. By far the most satisfactory course would be for us and the Americans to make a joint approach to the Egyptians, emphasising the importance of this issue to the West as a whole, and ourselves proposing tripartite talks.

I cannot understand the extreme American reluctance to do so, on a tenuous pretext of punctilio. I suspect that this advice

/may have been

TOP SECRETCairo telegram No.428 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

may have been tendered by their Ambassador in Cairo who is notoriously unwilling to take a chance. If however the Americans maintain their refusal, I see no alternative to taking action on the lines suggested in paragraph 1 above, though I should infinitely prefer the matter to be raised by parallel representations from my United States colleague and myself, which is what was contemplated during the London discussions on the official level.

Foreign Office please pass emergency to Washington as my telegram No.151.

[Repeated to Washington].

ADVANCE COPIES

Sir W. Strang
Private Secretary
Sir J. Bowker
Head African Department
Head Western Organisations
Department

B B B

Reference:-

FO 371/102797

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TOP SECRETFROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Green

Cypher/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No. 430

7th March, 1953.

D. 12.38 p.m. 7th March, 1953.

R. 12.50 p.m. 7th March, 1953.

EMERGENCYDEDIRTOP SECRETAddressed to Washington (for Secretary of State)telegram No. 152 of 7th March.

Repeated for information to Foreign Office.

My telegram No. 428.

The third paragraph of Washington telegram No. 480 to Foreign Office fills me with misgivings. There is to my mind little doubt that the Egyptians will give every indication of a complete intransigence at any early stage of the negotiations. It seems to me that it is essential therefore that we should know from the start to what extent we can count on American support for, if the situation arises, it will be necessary for us to act promptly, firmly and in evident harmony with them. It seems to me important, therefore, that there should be no misunderstanding of the firmness and persistence of purpose which will be required and of the strain to which we both may be subjected if we are to obtain the desired result.

Foreign Office please pass emergency to Washington as my telegram No. 152.

[Repeated to Washington].

ADVANCE COPIES:-

Private Secretary

Sir W. Strang

Sir J. Bowker

Head of African Department

To be used only and to be returned to the Division in which issued

371/102797 : 92772

TE 192 | 38 / G

(34)

FROM Brig. Eusbank
(Min. Defence) to
Sir W. Strong

TOP SECRET
No. 504/5/3/53
Dated 5.3.53.
Received in
Registry— 9.3.53.

Defence Negotiations with Egypt.

Record of a discussion which Field Marshall
Sir W. Slim had with the Minister of
Defence and Chiefs of Staff on 4.3.53.

References

MINUTES

I am not quite sure what the Minister
of Defence meant by (A). Would there
be any justification for the view that since the
Egyptians illegally repudiated the 1936 Treaty
they cannot insist on our fulfilling the provisions
of Articles 8 and 16 of the Treaty relating to
revision, and that we are in consequence
entitled to maintain our rights under the
Treaty indefinitely? This, I believe, is what
he is getting at.

Rennell
12/March

Mr Fitzmaurice

I think the interpretation of the passage in
question suggested by Mr. Mackworth Young must be the
right one, because if it were the fact that the Egyptian
denunciation of the Treaty terminated its existence for
the United Kingdom, this would not help us much since
it is only on the basis of the Treaty that we have any
right to have troops in Egypt at all.

I think the Minister of Defence must have had in
mind the view which has always seemed to me to represent
the correct effect of the Egyptian denunciation, namely
that it terminated Egypt's rights under the Treaty while
leaving ours intact. For reasons of policy we have not
wanted to insist on that view but probably it is the
correct one.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Mr Chanery (Cairo)
from Africa Dept
17 March
Mr D.H.E.O. Fayid
17 March

(Action completed)

(Index)

257/3

Despite this, if the position were that the Treaty on its own terms came to an end in 1956 or that our right to maintain troops in Egypt came to an end in that year, that would not be affected by the Egyptian denunciation, for in that case the Treaty or our right to maintain troops would in any case have come to an end at a certain time, whether or not the Egyptians had purported to denounce the Treaty earlier.

However, the Treaty does not do this. It provides no definite date for its termination nor any date for the withdrawal of our troops. In effect, it makes both these things contingent upon negotiations, and it could therefore be argued that, by denouncing the Treaty, the Egyptians have forfeited the right to insist that negotiation shall take place. This is perhaps an extreme view of the position, but purely as a matter of law I think it would not be indefensible, if we wanted to do so, to take the line that we were not bound to enter into any negotiations so long as the Egyptians were purporting to maintain that the Treaty which provided for these negotiations was not in force, and that unless the Egyptians admit the validity of the Treaty, there is no basis for negotiations. This could be coupled with the argument that, since Egyptian unilateral denunciation of the Treaty clearly cannot destroy our rights under it, the net effect is that we can maintain our troops in Egypt indefinitely until such time as the Egyptians reinstate the Treaty and ask for negotiations under it.

G.G. Fitzmaurice

(G.G. Fitzmaurice)
12th March, 1953.

22
 7/16/53

Reference:-
FO 371/102747

92772

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Tel. No. Whitehall 7000

AND PERSONAL

TOP SECRET

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,

STOREY'S GATE,

S.W.1

REFERENCE: C.O.S.

504/5/3/53

5th March 1953.

Sir J. Bowker 2/3

Mr. Allen 5/3

Dear Sir William 6/3

TE 1192 38

DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT

You may wish to have a copy of the record of a discussion which Field Marshal Sir William Slim had yesterday with the Minister of Defence and Chiefs of Staff. I accordingly attach a copy*.

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee

Sir William Strang, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., M.B.E.,
Foreign Office.

* COS(S)(53)1st Meeting Item 7.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

7. Defence Negotiations with Egypt

SIR WILLIAM SLIM said he understood that the Foreign Secretary would be discussing defence negotiations with Egypt with the United States Government on 6th March. He (Sir William Slim) did not think that President Eisenhower would support the proposal for a prominent United States military figure to co-operate in a joint Anglo-American approach to the Egyptian Government. As regards the timing of the negotiations, he understood that the Prime Minister was anxious that they should begin as early as possible. He (Sir William Slim) considered it inevitable that General Neguib would initially adopt the attitude that the purpose of the discussions was to negotiate the withdrawal of British forces from Egypt. He intended disillusioning the General on that score right from the start, explaining firmly that if the Egyptians were not prepared to discuss the "package" proposals the negotiations would be broken off without more ado. His own tendency was broadly to stand fast on Case 'A', allowing a little latitude where necessary.

THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE drew attention to the importance of facing the Egyptians with a joint Anglo-American front; it would be unfortunate if a leading American military figure was not nominated to take part. It was also of fundamental importance that any agreement reached with the Egyptians should not give the impression that we were being bulldozed out of Egypt. If the Egyptians were not prepared to accept satisfactory arrangements for the allied Base in Egypt - and its air defence - nor to contribute to the allied defence of the Middle East, we should be firm and break off the negotiations. Moreover, if, in relation to the problem of evacuation, the Egyptians argued that the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty would expire in 1956, the British attitude should be that since it had already been abrogated by the Egyptians themselves its existence was no longer binding to the United Kingdom. (A)

SIR WILLIAM SLIM questioned whether the figures of 5,000 Army and 2,000 R.A.F. personnel - Case 'A' - to run and control the Base depots and installations could be fully justified; it might be to our own interests to reduce those figures. In any event, the Egyptians were certain to raise this point, so he would like to be given a detailed breakdown of those figures. He personally felt it to be in our own interests to keep the numbers down, since the men would be hostages to fortune.

SIR WILLIAM DICKSON said that the Americans would be anxious to ensure that their equipment at Abu Sueir was maintained only by American or British personnel. If the Americans undertook that task, it would give an added "allied flavour" to the requirement for a Base in Egypt.

SIR WILLIAM SLIM explained that for the purpose of the negotiations he had been appointed H. M. Ambassador Extraordinary and would be responsible direct to H.M.G., through the Foreign Secretary. His channel of communication, on both political and military aspects of the negotiations, would be from H.M. Embassy in Cairo to the Foreign Office. H.M. Ambassador in Cairo would be his political adviser but would not, as a matter of routine, report back to the Foreign Office on the

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subject of the negotiations. He (Sir William Slim) had agreed with the Foreign Office that, if H.M. Ambassador wished to signal the Foreign Office concerning the negotiations, there would be no objection provided he cleared his signals with him (Sir William Slim) before despatch. Sir William Slim suggested that a somewhat similar arrangement should be agreed on the purely military side, whereby he would also be assisted at the negotiations by the appropriate Middle East Commander-in-Chief (or at least his Principal Staff Officer). For example, General Robertson (or his Chief of Staff) should be present to advise him when the Base was discussed, and Air Chief Marshal Sanders (or his S.A.S.O.) when air defence was raised. The Commanders-in-Chief would attend as his military advisers and not as advisers of H.M. Ambassador or of the British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Middle East. There would however be no objection to their communicating in their corporate capacity as the Commanders-in-Chief Committee, Middle East - not as B.D.C.C. - direct with the Chiefs of Staff on the military aspects of the defence negotiations provided their signals were cleared with him before despatch. He would require at least one Commander-in-Chief - as appropriate - or his Principal Staff officer to be present in Cairo throughout the entire negotiations.

In discussion, it was agreed that:-

- (q) The arrangements proposed by Sir William Slim concerning the channels of communication and the provision of military advice at the talks were fully acceptable to the Minister of Defence and Chiefs of Staff.
- (r) The detailed briefs being prepared by the Ministry of Defence should contain details of the minimum requirements acceptable under Cases 'A', 'B' and 'C' and should give a detailed breakdown of the personnel requirements for each case.

THE MEETING:-

- (6) Instructed the Secretary to draft, for the approval of Sir William Slim and the Chiefs of Staff, a telegram to the British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Middle East, informing them of the arrangements agreed at (q) above.
- (7) Invited the Ministry of Defence to prepare the detailed briefs for the negotiations, as agreed at (r) above, and to forward copies direct to Sir William Slim as and when ready.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

4TH MARCH, 1953.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(JE 1192/380)

17th March, 1953.

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Dear Chancery,

We have been looking into the question of our right to retain troops in Egypt after 22nd December, 1956, and have reached the following conclusion.

2. The effect of Egypt's illegal denunciation of the 1936 Treaty was to terminate her rights under it, while leaving ours intact. (For reasons of policy we have not wanted to insist on that view, but it is probably the correct one.)

3. The Treaty provides no definite date for its termination nor any date for the withdrawal of our troops. In effect, it makes both these things contingent upon negotiations. It could therefore be argued that, by denouncing the Treaty, the Egyptians have forfeited the right to insist that negotiation shall take place. This is perhaps an extreme view of the position, but purely as a matter of law we are advised that it should not be indefensible for us to take the line, if we wanted to do so, that we were not bound to enter into any negotiations so long as the Egyptians were purporting to maintain that the Treaty which provided for these negotiations was not in force, and that unless the Egyptians admit the validity of the Treaty, there is no basis for negotiations. This could be coupled with the argument that, since Egyptian unilateral denunciation of the Treaty clearly cannot destroy our rights under it, the net effect is that we can maintain our troops in Egypt indefinitely until such time as the Egyptians reinstate the Treaty and ask for negotiations under it.

4. We should be grateful for any comments you may have on this and on the separate memorandum on alleged breaches of the Treaty which we are sending under cover of a letter from Bowker to the Ambassador.

5. We are sending a copy of this letter to the British Middle East Office at Fayid.

Yours ever,

AFRICAN DEPARTMENT.

(ii) the Meteors and Vampires in paragraph 12(1),

already ordered;

(iii) further components for production of Vampires under licence;

(iv) new orders for piston engined aircraft, particularly 24 Spitfires in which the Egyptians have expressed an interest;

(b) Phase B - ammunition and armament spares on order for aircraft already held;

(c) Phase C - any new orders for jet aircraft and armament spares.

TIMING OF PHASES

14. Subject to the outcome of the discussions between Mr. Eden and Mr. Dulles (see paragraphs 18 - 20), the Egyptians should be told at the outset of the negotiations that we are willing to supply the equipment in Phase A (all three Services).

15. Phase B equipment should be offered at a stage in the negotiations when it is reasonably clear that Egypt is prepared to participate in preparations for regional defence.

16. Phase C, which is tantamount to a complete lifting of an embargo, would start when the negotiations had reached a successful conclusion.

17. The list of Army equipment at Appendix A gives an indication of the delivery dates that could be offered. Delivery prospects for the Air equipment are as follows:-

Phase A - Meteors, Vampire components (18 sets), Spitfires and machine tools	1953/54
Vampire fighter bombers *	Start in 1953/54; bulk in 1954/55
Further components for local production of Vampires	Start in 1953/54
Vampire night fighters*	1954/55

* The bulk of the Vampires, both fighter bombers and night fighters, could be delivered in 1953/54 if priority over an Indian order were given. A decision on this is required.

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War Office stocks and the rest from the trade. For the most part they would be non-lethal items which it would be anomalous to continue to withhold in view of the departures (see paragraph 4 above) which have been made from the general policy.

9. Phase B. The major items here would be:-

- (i) some static 3.7" A.A. guns;
- (ii) spare parts for Centurion tanks already held by the Egyptians;
- (iii) wireless sets from War Office stocks;
- (iv) one or two radar sets Mark III

10. Phase C. The major items are:-

- (i) Centurion tanks Mark II and armoured cars;
- (ii) machine guns, with some small arms and ammunition, from War Office stocks.

11. An up-to-date list of Egypt's requirements has just been received and is attached at Appendix A.

R.A.F.

12. The following orders are still held up under the embargo:-

(i) Jet aircraft

Meteor 8	12
Vampire Night Fighter	16
Vampire Fighter Bomber	22
	18 sets of components
	18 Goblin engines

(ii) Ammunition and armament stores for aircraft already held by Egypt and machine tools for Vampire production

The value of these orders is some £.....m. against which Egypt has made advance payments of £.....

13. The phasing would be as follows:-

- (a) Phase A - (i) the sets of Vampire components and associated 18 Goblin engines, and machine tools (this is the Air equipment mentioned in paragraph 4 which was approved for export but is now being held back);

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Phase B - Ammunition and armament spares [To be completed]

Phase C - New orders for jet aircraft Depends on orders
and armament spares

UNITED STATES POLICY

18. The United States Government have so far been unwilling to accept our view that equipment should be released only in the context of negotiations for a defence agreement. In order to create, as they see it, a favourable climate for the negotiations they have insisted on making an immediate offer of equipment to the value of about 11 million dollars, and on 13th February offered the Egyptians the equipment to this value shown at Appendix B.

19. The main arguments which have been used to try to dissuade the United States from their policy are summarised at Appendix C. In minimising the effect of their offer, largely of lethal weapons, the Americans have argued that delivery could not start for at least 45 days after a sales agreement - to which they are not yet committed - had been signed and in most cases would take a year (the ammunition two years); that the need to pay in dollars might impose further delay; that the early consignments of weapons and ammunition would be limited to training quantities; and that in implementing the offer they would take account of the state of negotiations and would curtail deliveries by administrative action if the situation in Egypt was unsatisfactory.

20. Discussions with Mr. Dulles continue with a view to ensuring that no lethal weapons of the sort to which we object (armoured cars, tanks etc.) are supplied until it is reasonably clear that defence negotiations are going to succeed. Pending the outcome of these discussions it remains our policy, as set out above, to link the supply of United Kingdom equipment with the progress of the negotiations.

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PAYMENT

21. The Egyptians are short of free sterling and may find it difficult to pay for the equipment we offer. They may ask for special releases from their blocked sterling balance to pay for it. The effect of this, however, would be to give away United Kingdom exports without requital. If additional releases were not made the export of the military equipment would merely result in Egypt having even less sterling available for ordinary commercial purchases from the United Kingdom. Normal payment terms should therefore be demanded. These are as follows:-

- (a) for short-term delivery orders (i.e. delivery not later than 12 months from the date of ordering), prepayment of 80% of the value of the order;
- (b) for longer-term delivery orders, prepayment of H.M. Government's likely outgoings from the date of placing the order until deliveries begin; thereafter prepayment of 50% per annum of the value of deliveries in a given year, the balance to be paid on delivery.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

22. Subject to the outcome of the current discussions between the Foreign Secretary and the United States Secretary of State,

- (1) the first opportunity should be taken to offer the equipment summarised in paragraphs 6, 8 and 13(a) above and set out in detail, so far as the Army is concerned, in paragraph of Appendix A;
- (2) as soon as it is reasonably clear that Egypt is prepared to participate in preparations for a regional defence, the equipment summarised in paragraphs 9 and 13(b) and, for the Army, set out in detail in paragraph of Appendix A should be offered;
- (3) the equipment in paragraphs 10 and 13(c) above and paragraph A should not be offered before the successful conclusion of negotiations.

23. No expectations of payment terms more favourable than those set out in paragraph 2) should be aroused.

SECRETAPPENDIX BEQUIPMENT OFFERED TO EGYPT BY THE UNITED STATES

1. For delivery within 45 days:
 - 70 Jeeps
 - 70 Armored cars
 - 100 Jeeps with machine gun mounts
 - 70,000 Helmets

Total \$1,102,600

 2. For delivery within one year:
 - 10 Dozer assemblies
 - Spare parts for armored cars
 - 100 Drive shafts for tanks
 - 100 Panel drivers for tanks
 - 200 Mine detectors
 - 200 Jeep trailers
 - Spare parts for jeeps
 - 70,000 Helmets
 - 100 Tanks:
 - Spare parts for tanks

Total \$5,374,814

 3. For delivery within two years:
 - 100,000 rounds ammunition,
 - 76MM (for tanks)

Total \$3,289,000

 4. Commercial purchases: (Delivery period unknown)
 - 50 Armored trucks

Total \$1,200,000
- Overall total
for programme \$10,966,414

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APPENDIX C

OBJECTIONS TO THE UNITED STATES IMMEDIATE
OFFER OF EQUIPMENT IN APPENDIX B

- (a) Experience over the release of jet aircraft to Egypt gives us no reason for supposing that any further releases of equipment would make her more amenable.
- (b) Judging from recent provocative statements by highly-placed Egyptians, any equipment released might be used against our own forces.
- (c) It is difficult to justify the release - except as part of a defence settlement - to Israel, with whom the Arab States maintain they are still at war.
- (d) If substantial quantities of equipment are provided otherwise than in the context of the defence negotiations, other Arab States - as well as Israel, and possibly other countries - will no doubt press for further supplies, without commitment to the West.
- (e) It will be more difficult than ever to restrain other friendly powers from bringing to an end their own embargoes, thus opening the floodgates to immediate large supplies of arms.
- (f) We shall thus have thrown away a powerful bargaining lever in the defence negotiations.
- (g) Although the Americans have promised not to release equipment over and above the \$41 million consignment until progress in the negotiations has been achieved, the Egyptians will believe that in the last resort they would be able to obtain more from the United States and will be less convinced of the need for a settlement with the United Kingdom.
- (h) Contrary to the wishes of both the United States and United Kingdom Government, Egypt might henceforth look to the United States rather than ourselves as her habitual supplier of arms.

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TOP SECRETTOP SECRETAIR MINISTRY BRIEF ON 785/CCLPara.6(e) Continuing works services in the base, cases A, B & C.(i) & (iii) Backlog of essential maintenance and new works

There is no major backlog in essential R.A.F. maintenance work for which we could expect the Egyptians to take responsibility. However, agreement should be obtained that under cases "A" and "B" any essential backlog could be made good under the supervision of an Allied Works Services Organisation, and any new work needed to maintain the base for the purpose envisaged should be supervised by the same organisation, which should be given facilities for importing the necessary materials and for conveying it to the sites; this might necessitate some Customs concessions.

2. Under cases "B" and "C" it will probably be necessary to allow the Egyptians to do the work, but the standards should be laid down by the same Allied authority, which might be linked with the resident inspection team referred to under para.6(h).

3. Unless the British, or whatever Allied authority may be set up, are allowed to supervise maintenance work, such things as airfield pavements, power supplies and electrical services, water supply and treatment plant, and technical buildings will deteriorate.

(ii) New Works

We should request a clause in the agreement stating that questions of new works should be subject to negotiations in each instance. If an Allied organisation is agreed, we should ask for facilities

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similar to those granted to us under the SHAPE organisation.
Instances of specific items on which clear agreement will be needed are:-

- (a) Provision of married quarters for R.A.F. personnel left in Egypt.
- (b) Payment for Air Defence installations and equipment, and arrangements for the continued maintenance and operation of any such equipment left in Egypt under Case "C".

TOP SECRETTOP SECRETAIR MINISTRY BRIEF ON 785/GCLPara.6(f) Policy for holding stores and war reserves in the base in CASE 'C'

Our present policy for stockholding in M.E.A.F. (including war reserves) is to hold 3 months stocks at war rates. Since the C.O.S. view is that it will take 90 days to reactivate the base, there is no point in putting any of our war reserve stocks there except for such local Air Defence Units as may remain in Egypt, and in fact there would be none to put there since such stocks would be held in unit war stations in local areas. This does not, however, apply to war reserves of P.O.L., which depends upon availability of tankage.

We should need time to build up stocks outside Egypt, and during that time should require facilities for existing stocks to remain in our depots in Egypt.

Restocking of the Egypt base on the outbreak of war would be by shipment from the U.K.

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AIR MINISTRY BRIEF ON 785/CCL

Para.6(h) Inspections of base under case "C"

1. We agree with the War Office view that, if inspections are to be effective, they must be done by resident inspection teams, preferably composed of uniformed personnel under R.A.F. control. It will be essential to get agreement for a channel for reporting and taking action to rectify faults. Since, however, under case "C" the Egyptians themselves will be fully responsible for control and maintenance of the base, any rectification that may be necessary will be dependent, in the last resort, on their goodwill in the interpretation of their responsibility.
2. We agree in general with the conditions specified in the War Office brief for the administration of the inspecting staff, right of access, channel of reporting, and general facilities.

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TOP SECRETTOP SECRETAIR MINISTRY BRIEF ON 785/CCLPara.6(j) Signals Network.

In Cases A and B a proportion of the land line network in the Zone and its terminal equipment will be required to provide essential C. & R. communications for the R.A.F. element of integrated air defence. We consider it vital that such communications should be under R.A.F. control, both trunk routes and internal airfield circuits. If the trunk routes are handed over to E.S.T. and T. they can be regarded as lost, and there could be no question of rapid re-activation of these circuits in war. Again, all this is well known to Signals Staff H.Q., M.E.A.F.

There is no R.A.F. financial problem in the Egyptian signals lines network. All the lines and equipment have been provided by the Army, are owned by the Army, and have not been paid for by the R.A.F. The subject of lines and equipment is, in fact, being included by the War Office in their brief.

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AIR MINISTRY BRIEF ON 785/CCL

Para.7 Outline Proposals for an Integrated Anglo-Egyptian Air Defence Organisation in Egypt

Introduction

1. It is hoped that in the Anglo-Egyptian defence negotiations it may be possible to secure Egyptian agreement to the establishment of an integrated Anglo-Egyptian Air Defence Organisation for the protection of the Canal Zone and the Nile Delta. The necessity for such an integrated organisation arises not only from the relative inexperience, inefficiency and lack of equipment of the Egyptian Air Force but also because the effectiveness of air defence depends entirely on active and realistic training, applying modern tactical doctrine and using target forces of adequate size and performance. This can only be done with the assistance of a major air power. This note outlines our views on the form which this organisation should take.

Freedom from Restriction on Training Flying

2. For the reason stated in para.1 above, and also because of the fundamental necessity of combined training in an Allied organisation, it is important that any agreement with Egypt should safeguard the following points:-

- (a) All Allied air forces must be allowed freedom to fly over Egypt in the course of properly authorised training or exercises.
- (b) The area over which these forces are allowed to fly for such training or exercises must not be restricted or circumscribed, it being of course understood that:-
 - (i) Egyptian Air Forces would be given reciprocal facilities.
 - (ii) Flying will in general take place over desert areas, and that flying over populated areas will only take place when necessity so demands.

Main Components of Proposed Organisation

3. The organisation should consist basically of a Force H.Q. commanding a number of operational sectors - in the first instance probably two. The main components would be:-

- (a) Force H.Q.
- (b) Fighter component consisting of:-
 - (i) British Wing of two day and one night fighter squadrons.
 - (ii) Egyptian Wing.
- (c) A control and reporting organisation based on two Sector Operations Rooms or Centres, one probably controlling the R.A.F. fighter wing and defending the Canal Zone and the other, controlling Egyptian fighter forces, defending the Nile Delta.

/(d)

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- (d) An anti-aircraft component. (Egyptian, but with a few British advisors if possible).

4. In addition to the R.A.F. fighter squadrons mentioned in 3(b)(i) above the following R.A.F. manned units would also be required initially as part of the Air Defence organisation until the Egyptians were able to take over their functions:-

- (a) R.A.F. Regiment L.A.A. Wing of H.Q. and 2 Squadrons.
 (b) H.Q. Flight (Short Range Communications and Target Towing).

(We should not insist on the L.A.A. Wing being R.A.F. Regiment manned if the Egyptians showed any interest in fulfilling this task from the start).

5. Additionally, and purely in connection with the Air Defence Organisation, staging facilities for heavy R.A.F. transport aircraft would be required, preferably at the R.A.F. occupied airfield. It is appreciated that negotiations will be carried on to maintain an R.A.F. manned Staging Post quite apart from the Air Defence requirement, and if the Egyptians accept this there will be no need to raise the requirement in negotiating the Air Defence Organisation.

Constitution and Location of R.A.F. Element

6. The R.A.F. Element outlined above should be accommodated normally at a single major airfield which should, if possible, be Abu Sueir in view of the Anglo/American war interest in this base, or possibly Deversoir. For economy and continuity in providing facilities and communications there would also be advantages in putting Force H.Q. alongside the S.O.C. at Ismailia. The actual choice of airfield and H.Q. must rely largely on recommendation from H.Q., M.E.A.F. but whichever airfield is selected as the main base a second airfield should be kept in use and would be earmarked for dispersal in war.

7. The R.A.F. Fighter Wing should be constituted as a single entity; it would not for example be acceptable to form a mixed fighter wing of R.A.F. and Egyptian squadrons. The actual agreements for the use of the bases should, however, be similar to those governing the U.S.A.F. bases in the United Kingdom.

Command and Control

8. It would of course be preferable for the first Air Defence Commander at least to be British so as to establish the organisation as soundly and quickly as possible. It is however probably not realistic to hope for Egyptian agreement to this and if this is the case command and control would best be exercised as follows:-

- (a) Force H.Q., under some form of Allied or Anglo/Egyptian higher direction and commanded by an Egyptian Air Defence Commander. The latter would have a British deputy or chief of staff and a small integrated Anglo-Egyptian staff.
 (b) Sector H.Qs., commanded by British and Egyptian officers respectively.

9. We should probably have to introduce certain safeguards to prevent the misuse of our forces by Egyptian Commanders (or Commanders of other Nationalities should M.E.D.O. come into being), but it is not practicable at this stage to advise as to what form they should take.

Control and Reporting Organisation

10. In the initial planning stage no attempt should be made to preserve national identity in units of the C. & R. organisation, which should be manned

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throughout by personnel of either nationality, although it is appreciated that language difficulties may enforce a measure of segregation. Initially it is certain that a high proportion of British personnel will be required, particularly in the British Sector since it would not be acceptable to have British squadrons operating without an effective C. & R. System.

11. On the same principle, at least initially, we consider that essential telephone, teleprinter, and radio communications for the R.A.F. element of the Air Defence organisation should remain under British control. This implies that much of the land line (signals network) system in the Zone should not be handed over to Egyptian State Telegraphs. Furthermore part of T.C.M. should be retained to provide essential C. & R. and Ground/Air Fighter Communications, at S.O.C.

12. In general however our aim should be to train as many Egyptian personnel as possible and progressively to increase the proportion of posts which they fill.

C. and R. Equipment

13. Under existing plans (i.e. VAST) the R.A.F. in the Canal Zone is due to receive one Master and two Satellite G.C.Is., and three surface watching Radars during 1954. If the Egyptians agreed to an arrangement such as Case A or B we would probably fulfil the planned programme for refurbishing the British C. and R. System in the Canal Zone. In Cases C and D we should deploy the radars elsewhere, but Egypt would be able to buy Radar Equipment surplus to R.A.F. requirements through existing channels.

Training Assistance to the Egyptians

14. The Egyptian Air Force would be likely to require considerable training assistance, not only in the numerous skilled and semi-skilled trades required to operate and maintain a C. and R. system but also perhaps in aircraft maintenance trades as well. We should be prepared to meet them to the greatest extent possible without detriment to our own requirements. In general, initial training and training in semi-skilled trades could be given "on the job" and offers of such assistance could be given freely during the negotiations. Training could also be given at technical schools in U.K. to a certain extent to personnel of a high enough standard to benefit, but such assistance brings in financial implications and no specific offers should be made at present.

Maintenance of British Element

15. We have not assessed in detail the technical and administrative organisation which would be required in Egypt to support the British element. So far as the maintenance and repair of aircraft and other technical equipment is concerned, R.A.F. installations will have been dispersed to other locations in the Middle East as part of the evacuation of the Canal Zone and in general therefore only minor work would be done in Egypt. The total British manpower bill for "tail" services should therefore not be large and could no doubt be reduced still further by the progressive handing-over to the Egyptians of responsibility for works services and airfield maintenance and by the maximum use of local labour where operational considerations permit.

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NEGOTIATIONS FOR DEFENCE AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT
SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Preliminary Brief for the United Kingdom Negotiators

1. The supply of military equipment to Egypt is at present the subject of discussion between the Foreign Secretary and the United States Secretary of State, as a result of which it is possible that our policy for the future supply of United Kingdom equipment may be modified. For the time being it is as set out in paragraphs 5 - 17 below.

HISTORY AND PRESENT POSITION

2. Before proceeding to a statement of our future policy it may be useful to summarise the recent history of the supply of equipment to Egypt and the restrictions which are at present in force.

3. Since October, 1951, when the then Egyptian Government denounced the 1946 Treaty, we have maintained a virtual embargo on the supply of military equipment to Egypt. The rules are as follows:-

- (a) The export of items of an exclusively military nature is not allowed.
- (b) The export of lethal material and equipment (such as commercial explosives and shotguns) for civilian use is not allowed, unless satisfactory arrangements can be made to ensure that they do not fall into the hands of Egyptian terrorists or the quantities are negligible. The Egyptian Government are encouraged to take H.M. Embassy into their confidence when orders are placed for commercial explosives, and when the Embassy can show that orders are within normal industrial requirements and that the destination is genuine, no objection to them is raised.
- (c) Machinery known to be required for manufacturing requirements for (a) and (b) above is not allowed.

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- (d) The export of goods not included in (b) and (c) above is allowed, even if the goods are destined for use by the military authorities, provided that in the opinion of the United Kingdom Service Departments they would not markedly increase the efficiency of the Egyptian forces.
- (e) Borderline cases and those in which there is some special reason for departing from the above principles are decided on their merits by the Arms Working Party (comprising representatives of the interested Government Departments, under Ministry of Defence chairmanship), with reference as necessary to the Arms Export Policy Committee (a higher-level body representing the same Departments) and finally to Ministers.

4. Recent major exceptions which have been made under 3(e) above are as follows:-

- (a) In October, 1952 the embargo on the supply of maintenance spares, other than arms, for operational aircraft was lifted. At the same time we agreed to release a consignment of Chipmunk trainer aircraft.
- (b) In November we agreed to the release of 15 Meteor jet aircraft (12 fighters and 3 trainers). Four of these have been delivered and the next batch will be released about the middle of March, subject to further reference to Ministers.
- (c) In December we approved the exports of certain machine tools, engines and sets of components required in connection with the manufacture of Vampire aircraft in Egypt and some spares and minor items, mostly non-lethal, for the Egyptian Army. These, however, are being held back in order not to weaken the stand we have taken with the Americans (see paragraph 18 - 20 below) that no further supplies

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should be released except in the context of the coming negotiations for a defence agreement.

UNITED KINGDOM POLICY FOR THE FUTUREOutstanding Egyptian Orders

5. A large number of Egyptian orders are held by the War Office, Ministry of Supply and the trade, in respect of some of which advance payments have been made. The orders are for small quantities of major items of equipment, such as aircraft and Centurion tanks, and larger quantities of a wide range of maintenance spares, ammunition and stores. It is intended to release this equipment in phases. The equipment in each phase and the timing of its release are set out below, by Services.

Royal Navy

6. The quantity of naval equipment required by Egypt is very small. It consists of the following, all of which would fall into Phase A :-

Army

7. The phases would be as follows:-

- (a) Phase A - small quantities of equipment the release of which would remove anomalies in the existing policy (this would include the Army equipment mentioned in paragraph 4(c) above);
- (b) Phase B - equipment required for the defence of Egypt;
- (c) Phase C - the balance of Egypt's requirements.

Further particulars of the equipment in these three phases are as follows.

8. Phase A. Spares and minor items of relatively unimportant value fall into this category. Some would be provided from

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AIR MINISTRY BRIEF ON 785/CCL - JEN 11/2/579

Para.5(a) Availability of Shipping and Additional Air Transport for redeployment in all Cases and for Evacuation of Stores in Case D

1. The question of the availability of vehicles of movement and of physical movement itself for redeployment in all cases is one requiring co-ordination between the three Services and the Ministry of Transport. We understand that the J.M.C.C. are briefing on this point.
2. Availability of shipping and additional air transport for the evacuation from the Canal Zone under Case 'D' of approximately 106,000 tons of R.A.F. stores (43,000 tons equipment, 27,000 tons A.M.D.G.W. stores, 36,000 tons explosives) and 3,250 vehicles is expressed at Appendix as an estimate of capacity for movement. This estimate, which is of necessity given in broad terms based on tentative estimates of destinations and on average shipping availabilities, shows that if 'special' arrangements can be made the R.A.F. element of the Egypt Base could be cleared in a matter of two years from the commencement of the move.
3. The estimate assumes:-
 - (a) That there will be full Egyptian co-operation. (Without this it is not likely that the rate of movement indicated will be achieved).
 - (b) That 'fair shares' of available shipping will be given to the different Services in proportion to the size of their holdings in the Canal Zone.
 - (c) That the air freight services which might be made available will be reserved exclusively for the R.A.F. (it is understood that airlift will be of little value to the Army)
 - (d) That 'awkward lifts' included in A.M.D.G.W. tonnages will be taken into account with Army 'awkward lifts'.
4. It seems likely that the main limitations of movement will be those of packing and manhandling in the Canal Zone, transportation facilities to the docks, and loading the ships. Similarly there may be limitations on the rate at which consignments can be received and cleared at various destinations.
5. If the airlift does not materialise, the length of time taken to move the tonnages shown at Appendix will be increased by about two months in each case.
6. In view of the probable two year period required for the complete evacuation of stores it will be necessary to establish an order of priority for shipment to ensure that items urgently needed elsewhere are evacuated first.

The attached paper was considered under Item 1 a meeting of the Middle East Redeployment Committee on Tuesday, 3rd March, 1953.

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Notes

- (a) The above tonnages etc. are approximate
- (b) Account has been taken of Army demands on shipping likely to arise concurrently with R.A.F. requirements. A rough ratio of 4:1 Army:R.A.F. has been allowed for shipping space but no allowance for Army is made in the estimate for airlift capacity.
- (c) Assessments have been made on the basis of full Egyptian co-operation in all phases of the movement i.e. labour at R.A.F. units, docks, and transportation.
- (d) Full co-ordination between Army/R.A.F. and Ministry of Transport (for shipping movements) will be necessary.

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TOP SECRETTOP SECRETAIR MINISTRY BRIEF ON 785/CCL

Para. 6(a) Egyptian participation in command and administration under Cases "A" and "B"

Command

1. Under both cases we consider that there would be an Egyptian Base Area Commander with an integrated or Allied staff. On our experience with staffs integrated with the Americans we would prefer parallel staffs at the outset rather than integrated staffs, despite the duplication of effort and consequent expense, to ensure a smooth hand-over.
2. Under case "A" each depot and installation would have a British Commander with British staff, and under case "B" an Egyptian commander with an integrated or Allied staff.

Administration

3. It is desirable to have separate channels of administration for the Army and the R.A.F.
4. Where British airmen are placed under an Egyptian commander, their status must be such that for discipline etc. they are administered by a British officer. This status, together with their position under Egyptian civil law, will have to be safeguarded in the agreement.

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TOP SECRETTOP SECRETAIR MINISTRY BRIEF ON 785/CCL

Para.6(b) Scale of use by Egyptian Air Force of our depots and installations, Cases "A" and "B"

We agree with the War Office view that:-

- (a) Egypt would expect, as a partner in an Allied organisation, to be able to use bases established in her own territory.
 - (b) We should encourage the constant use of facilities and installations so that they are kept in such a state as to be readily re-activated in an emergency.
2. Under case "A" depots and installations would be controlled by the British, but we should allow the Egyptians to make use, in peace and war, of such facilities as we leave there and which are not needed solely for our own purposes. The control of signals communications should, however, be reserved to British personnel.
3. Under case "B" the Egyptians will, in any event, hold the title to the depots and installations, and will be able to make as much use of them as they wish.
4. Apart from any R.A.F. units that may be left in Egypt as part of the integrated Air Defence organisation, we do not visualise any maintenance of R.A.F. units in the Middle East being done in Egypt in peacetime. If, however, an Air Defence organisation is set up, its R.A.F. units will be maintained from the base organisation in Egypt, and we should retain as much control of depots etc. as we can for that limited purpose.

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TOP SECRETAIR MINISTRY BRIEF ON 785/CCLPara.6c(i) Bulk Fuel Installations.

The signal 785/CCL called only for comments on R.A.F. bulk fuel installations. There is, however, the Army problem to be considered and the following brief has been prepared to cover both Army and R.A.F. points of view.

Storage required.

2. The storage requirements for all three Services have been estimated as follows:-

<u>Service</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Requirements - Tons</u>
RAF/RN	AVTUR	72,000
	AVGAS	
ARMY	MT/70	90,000
	MT/80	
	DIESO	33,000
	KERO	6,000
		201,000

3. The total Army requirement is, therefore, 129,000 tons, which has been calculated as being the requirement for 6 divisional slices for 3 months. The 6 divisional slices represent the force to be deployed in the Middle East by M + 6 months. The requirement for ground fuels also covers the needs of the appropriate R.A.F. increment.

Storage available

4. The only existing military white oil tankage available in the area is located in Egypt. The effective net capacity is estimated to be 76,000 tons, of which the Army has 54,000 tons in use for its reserves and the balance of 22,000 tons is loaned to the R.A.F.

Balance of storage required

5. There is at present a deficiency of tankage which amounts to 125,000 tons for all three Services. It is hoped to cover this deficiency by hiring tankage at HAIFA for 95,000 tons and by new construction at MAFRAQ for 30,000 tons. There is no other tankage available in the Eastern Mediterranean which might be used to hold a proportion of this reserve. Tankage exists at TOERUK and in CYPRUS but it is now in use either for services maintenance stocks or for civilian stocks.

6. Evidence available at the Ministry of Fuel and Power and from the discussions which were held in ISRAEL in October last between the British Military Mission and the Israel Armed Forces, indicates that there is sufficient tankage available in HAIFA for our needs, and that the problems of arranging for holding reserves there are not unsurmountable.

7. A reconnaissance party from M.E.L.F. has recently reported on the possibility of constructing tankage at MAFRAQ. They selected a suitable site in the area, but construction may not begin for some time owing to the shortage of works potential available to GHQ.M.E.L.F.

/Importance

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Importance of retaining tankage in EGYPT

8. If we are unable to retain facilities for storage of white oil in the CANAL ZONE, we will have no theatre reserves of oil whatsoever, until alternative arrangements can be made for storage in HAIFA. Until the question has been further examined with the Israelis it is not possible to say if the tankage available to us at HAIFA could be increased from 95,000 tons to 171,000 tons even if the risk of concentrating all our reserves in this limited area were to be accepted. The problem of turning over such large stocks in ISRAEL (particularly of aviation grades) in peacetime is likely to limit the size of the reserve which we could hold there.

9. It is most important that under all cases we should attempt to get Egyptian agreement to retain as much tankage in Egypt as possible.

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TOP SECRET**TOP SECRET**AIR MINISTRY BRIEF ON 785/CCLPara. 6(c) (ii) Post-strike base, ABU SUEIR

The American requirement is that this airfield should be available for operational use within a few days of the outbreak of war. This necessitates not only the maintenance and modification of American equipment held in Egypt now, but also the completion of works services for the storage, distribution and supply of aviation fuel, the maintenance of the airfield with its buildings and installations in working order, and the presence immediately on the outbreak of war of sufficient personnel to operate the airfield.

2. Under our present arrangements with the Americans the R.A.F. have undertaken to meet these requirements. The Air Ministry are anxious to support this project, which is a most important factor in Allied strategy, but when the Treaty with Egypt is signed we shall be unable to do so in full.

3. Under Case "A" we expect to have about 2,000 R.A.F. personnel in Egypt, all needed solely for R.A.F. purposes. If we are successful in getting an integrated Air Defence organisation, we may base R.A.F. fighter squadrons at ABU SUEIR in peacetime under a British C.O., and in that event the airfield and its installations would be kept in working order. Beyond this bare minimum, however, we should be unable to meet the full American requirements.

4. Under any cases worse than "A" our contribution would be considerably smaller. We would be unable to do more than keep the airfield in working order, and then only if there were an

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integrated Air Defence organisation with British squadrons at ABU SUEIR.

5. If the American requirement is to be met in full, it seems that some separate agreement will have to be made between the U.S. and Egyptian Governments.

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TOP SECRETTOP SECRETAIR MINISTRY BRIEF ON 785/OCLPara.6(c)(iii) Signals Communications

Given time, we will evacuate all radio equipment and ancillaries for use elsewhere in the theatre, leaving only sufficient for use by such forces as may be left in the Canal Zone. We do not favour leaving equipment on a care and maintenance basis; if we return to the Canal Zone we intend to re-install the facilities we need in mobile form initially and, according to the situation, build up with static installations if necessary.

C. & R. Requirements

In cases A and B it is probable that a part of T.C.M. will be required to remain to provide essential Teleprinter and Radio Communications for the S.O.C. at El Firdan. This point is, however, well known to Signals Staff H.Q., M.E.A.F.

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M.E.R./P(53)5
2ND MARCH, 1953

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 WORKING PARTY ON MIDDLE EAST REDEPLOYMENT

Note by the Secretary

Circulated herewith is a copy of a paper by the War Office for consideration at tomorrow's (3rd March) meeting of the Working Party.

(Signed) M.McF. DAVIS

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.
 2ND MARCH, 1953

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Copy No. 6

Ref:- 3139/Q(Ops)1

Whitehall 9400 Ext1982

Memorandum for:-

The War Office,
London, S.W.1.

The Secretary,
Ministry of Defence Working Party
on Middle East Redeployment.

2 March, 1953.

Subject:- Defence Negotiations with Egypt

52195/274

Reference 785/CCL dated 23rd February.

1. Enclosed are 50 copies, each, of briefs on the following matters:-
 - (a) Our views on Egyptian participation in the command and administration of a restricted base under Cases 'A' and 'B'.
 - (b) Our views on the scale of use by the Egyptian Army and Air Force of our depots and installations under Cases 'A' and 'B'.
 - (c) Our views on:
 - (i) The future of signal communications
 - (ii) The political and financial arrangements for the hand over of signal line network to Egyptian State Telegraphs.
 - (d) The policy for holding stores and war reserves in the base in Case 'C'.
 - (e) The conditions under which we can carry out effective inspections of the base under Case 'C'.
2. The above matters have been discussed with the Air Ministry who agreed, in committee, the policy outlined. We understand that they are in any case putting in separate papers themselves on these subjects.
3. We have based our briefs on two fundamental points of principle:-
 - (a) We have taken C(53)17 Revise of 16th January 1953, with its annexes as the authoritative document against which we had to consider the answers to the Middle East questions.
 - (b) We have assumed that the policy of HMG remains that a phased withdrawal of British forces from Egyptian territory would be accompanied by commitments on the Egyptian side to participate in MEDO. Our briefs have been prepared therefore against the principle of Egypt being an equal partner in this organisation.
4. As Case 'D' does not feature in C(53)17 Revise, and was not in fact discussed with the American authorities we have not prepared any brief on the policy for disposal of stores and fixed assets in Case 'D'. We do not believe that, at this stage, our briefs should extend beyond the scope of the papers agreed with the Americans.
5. We understand that the Treasury have already drafted a note covering para 6(e) of 785/CCL. We have therefore not covered these points in the War Office briefs, although we would hope to raise any points important to us, and not already included, when the briefs, as a whole, are discussed in your committee.

[Handwritten signature]

Director of Administrative Planning.

who has approved.

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Egyptian Participation in the Command and Administration of a Restricted Base under Cases 'A' and 'B'.

1. This note should be read in conjunction with COS(51)535 dated 18 September 1951 and Cabinet paper C(53)17 dated 14 January 1953 where the United Kingdom views are clearly stated.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. The following assumptions have been made in this paper
- (a) A Middle East Defence Organisation under a Supreme Allied Commander Middle East (SACME) will have been set up before the Base is handed over.
 - (b) There is Egyptian representation on the staff of SACME.
 - (c) Under Case 'A' the installations and depots in the Base are required to act as a working maintenance base for a proportion of the Middle East Land Forces in peace.
 - (d) Under Case 'B' a working maintenance base on the scale of Case 'A' is not contemplated. Provision is made however for turn-over of stocks and also for maintenance of the Arab Legion and any British Forces stationed in Jordan.
 - (e) The Base in Egypt is in both cases an Allied Base.

No. 6

CASE 'A'

COMMAND

3. The Base Area will be commanded by an Egyptian, with an Allied (British) Deputy Commander and an Allied Staff. Initially it will be necessary to have two parallel staffs, one British and one Egyptian, until the latter can take over some of the responsibility. This Base Area Commander will be responsible for

- (a) The security of his area.
- (b) The general administration of his area.
- (c) The local administration of the troops of his own nationality within his area. The local day to day

administration

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administration (both a and c) of the troops of other nations in the area will be the responsibility of the Senior officer of each other nation as directed by S.C.M.E. This principle must be clearly established.

(d) The co-ordination of labour and transport for working the ports and installations.

4. Installations and depots that we require within the Base will each be commanded by a British officer with a British Staff. Thus, within the installations and depots, the responsibility for day to day maintenance and administration (pay, discipline etc.) of British troops is a British responsibility.

5. ^{Operative} The operational chain of command in this case is S.C.M.E - Commander Base Area (Egyptian) - Depots and Installations (British controlled with Egyptian labour).

6. The administrative chain of command in the case of British personnel is GHQ M.E.F./M.E.F. - Senior British officer at Base Area HQ - Depots and Installations (British). It would greatly facilitate administration if there were to be separate administrative channels for the Army and the Royal Air Force but this is not considered to be an over-riding requirement.

7. It is essential that, although the base is under Egyptian control, the peace time maintenance of that portion of the Middle East garrison which is dependent on the base shall not be interrupted. This applies with particular force to any troops that may be stationed in Jordan.

CASE 'B'

8. The Base Area will, as in Case 'A', be commanded by an Egyptian, with an Allied (British) Deputy Commander and an Allied Staff. The responsibilities of the Base Area Commander will be as set out in paragraph 3 above.

9. The main and essential difference in this case is that the

/installations and.....

installations and depots will be under Egyptian ~~(British)~~ control. There will thus be a considerable lessening of British influence, which will be virtually limited to a British Mission of technicians and supervisory personnel working in the depots. It will, initially, be necessary to retain the British personnel in the Depots until the Egyptians are capable of taking over.

9 10. The operational chain of command of the Base Area in this case is SACME - Commander Base Area - Depots and Installations.

✓ 11. The administrative chain of command of the personnel retained in Egypt as part of the "British Mission to the Base in Egypt" will be GHIQ HELF/MEAF - Senior British officer at Base Area HQ - Senior British officer in each Depot/Installation. Although not absolutely essential, it would considerably ease British administration if separate channels were established for Army and RAF personnel.

12. It is an essential requirement of the acceptance of this Case that arrangements must be negotiated and agreed so that we may

- (a) maintain from the base the Arab Legion and any British Forces that may be stationed in Jordan in peace time.
- (b) Effect turn-over of stocks as required.
- (c) Quickly regain control of the depots and installations on mobilisation or in the event of war becoming imminent.

13. If there is to be any form of integrated command it will clearly be necessary that subordinate officers (whether British or Egyptian) must, in the day to day performance of their duties, accept orders from superior officers irrespective of their nationality. No formal direction to this effect is necessary but it could be issued is required.

14. It is clearly unacceptable that British officers and soldiers should be made subject to the Egyptian code of military law; conversely an Egyptian officer could not exercise jurisdiction over British troops under our military law. It must therefore be agreed

/that the senior.....

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that the senior British officer exercises such jurisdiction in respect of military offences. He may hold a delegated court-martial warrant from C-in-C IELF.

15. Similarly, senior British officers at subordinate HQ or Depots must deal with all matters of discipline affecting British officers and OR under them.

16. In respect of offences other than those which are purely military, British officers and soldiers must be dealt with, as must civilian "followers" and "dependants", under the terms of whatever general jurisdiction agreement is reached with the Egyptian Government.

What shall it be?

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OUR VIEWS ON THE EXPECTED SCALE OF USE BY THE EGYPTIAN
ARMY AND AIR FORCE OF OUR DEPOTS AND INSTALLATIONS UNDER
CASES 'A' AND 'B'

1. We consider that two main factors govern the extent to which the Egyptian armed forces should use the depots and installations in the base.
 - (a) Egypt, as a partner in MEDO, would expect, by right, to be able to use a Base established on her own territory.
 - (b) By the constant use of facilities and installations they are kept in such a state as to be more readily reactivated in time of emergency.
2. To the extent that we would have control over the depots and installations, and in Case 'B' this passes to the Egyptians, we consider that we should show our willingness to accept in principle that:-
 - (a) In war, Egypt should have full and unrestricted use of all base installations and facilities.
 - (b) In peace, Egypt should have the use of facilities e.g. workshops, pipelines, signal communications, storage accommodation in so far as these facilities were functioning under the agreed peacetime arrangement.
3. As regards depots, it must be accepted that in peace the stores therein are the property of the nation concerned. Depots holding British stocks are run by the Egyptians for us on an agency basis. It will be necessary for the Egyptians to have their own stores, which they have either received under M.D.A.P. or bought: these should be kept in separate depots or in separate sheds or depots. It is essential that, in peacetime, there should be a separate accounting system for each nation and this would be impossible if depots were shared.
4. As regards workshops, it is considered that these could run on a joint basis, stores and work being charged to the nation concerned as in a civilian garage.
5. It will be remembered that under Case 'A', the Base will be acting, in peace, as a working maintenance base for a proportion of the Middle East Land Forces. Under Case 'B', the Base, apart from some turnover of stores and equipment for use by the Middle East Land Forces in peace would be largely on a "mothball" basis, e.g. the base workshops would not be working. It is

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evident therefore that the more nearly the final agreed arrangement approaches Case 'A', the more benefit would the Base be to the Egyptian armed forces. We believe that this is an argument which should be used during negotiations. It is, in any event, important that we should try and get agreement to maintaining the Arab Legion in peacetime from the Base, and also any other troops, such as an armored brigade, that we may station in Jordan.

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DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT

SIGNALS : ARMY WIRELESS AND ALL LINE COMMUNICATIONS[&]

AIM

1. This paper gives general guidance only on the hand over of signal communications. The exact terms of the agreement to be reached must depend on the course of the negotiations.

PRESENT COMMUNICATIONS

2. Present static communications consist of :-
 - (a) an extensive line communication system
 - (b) a multi-channel wireless system as reserve for line
 - (c) static wireless equipment for the Army Wireless Chain
 - (d) a Forces Broadcasting wireless station and studio.

LINE

3. The line equipment (paragraph 2(a)) consists of :-
 - (a) buried cables and overland routes
 - (b) large telephone exchanges and associated telephones
 - (c) other terminal equipment (e.g. channelling equipment, frames, telegraph equipment, small telephone exchanges and telephones).
4. The cables (paragraph 3(a)) are in bad repair due to theft. It would be impracticable to recover them or the heavy exchanges in paragraph 3(b). The system in paragraphs 3(a) and (b) should therefore be handed over to the Egyptians.
5. In Case A, and to a lesser extent in Case B, it will be necessary to leave such line equipment as is essential to the working of the depots etc. As far as is possible this equipment should be maintained by British personnel. The rest of the line equipment in paragraph 3(a) should be recovered for use elsewhere.

@ 785/CCL of 23rd Feb 53 para 6(c) (iii) and
785/CCL of 23rd Feb 53 para 6(j).

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6. In Case A or B it will be essential to retain one British Army wireless station for communication between the Senior British Officer at the Headquarters Base Area and GHQ MELF.

7. Except as in paragraph 6, all the wireless equipment in paragraphs 2(b) and (c) must be withdrawn for use elsewhere.

8. A Forces Broadcasting Service would be desirable in Case A or B. We should prefer therefore, in either of these cases, to retain the existing station at least temporarily.

HAND OVER

9. The Egyptians should be offered a small British staff to remain for a short time to hand over diagrams and records and to give technical help. Any question of payment for this service will be dealt with as part of a general financial settlement.

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

10. The very rough value of the equipment to be left (paragraphs 3(a) and (b)) is £300,000. It may be less as a result of theft and sabotage. It is accepted that to assess it accurately and to agree the value with the Egyptians would take a long time. If as part of the general agreement Egypt is to compensate us for the value of what she takes over, it will be desirable to agree a figure, albeit inaccurate, before we leave in order to avoid a long drawn-out argument afterwards.

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THE POLICY FOR HOLDING STOCKS AND WAR RESERVES
IN CASE 'C'

1. An implication of Case 'C' is that it would take at least 90 days to reactivate the Base, in war. It would be necessary therefore to retain at least 90 days stocks for the whole of the Middle East garrison in locations outside the Canal Zone in peace.

2. As to what stores are retained in the Canal Zone, the following principles should, in general, govern their type:

- (a) They should be stores requiring the minimum turnover. The right to turn over stores that become, from time to time, outdated or which are perishable, must be retained.
- (b) They should be stores of long life requiring the minimum maintenance.
- (c) They should not, if possible, be stores of an "attractive" nature.

3. We foresee, therefore, under the conditions of Case 'C' the following policy for stores holding in the Middle East:

(a) OUTSIDE EGYPT - 90 days stocks

These stores would, however, have to remain in Egypt until suitable storage had been built for them elsewhere. It is important that negotiations should establish this point and we should also need an assurance that we would have rights of entry into Egypt to withdraw these stores when storage was ready for them.

(b) IN THE CANAL ZONE

- (i) Equipment and vehicles for first priority units required to reactivate the Base. This requirement cuts across the principles outlined in para 2 above, but it is unavoidable.
- (ii) Accommodation and project stores required for the reactivation of the Base and build up of the line of communications during the first 90 days of war.
- (iii) The balance of the engineer and transportation project stores at present in the Canal Zone Base required during the first six months of war.

(c) BALANCE. The balance of stores over and above (a) and (B) above would be removed from the Middle East or disposed of locally.

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(d) POL

In view of the absence of alternative POL storage accommodation at present available to us in the Middle East, agreement should be reached that Shell of Egypt will maintain stocks of fuel at an agreed level on our behalf in peacetime and arrange the necessary turnover.

TOP SECRETTHE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH WE CAN CARRY OUT EFFECTIVE
INSPECTIONS OF THE BASE UNDER 'C'.

1. There appear to be three alternative systems of inspection. These are, in descending order of preference:
 - (a) Members of the Forces stationed in Egypt, preferably in uniform, but, if necessary in plain clothes.
 - (b) Civilians stationed in Egypt.
 - (c) Visiting teams of military or civilians, stationed outside Egypt.
2. The important phrase is "effective inspection". By virtue of the size of the Base, inspection would be a daily and continuous task, if it was to be in the slightest degree effective, and this therefore should be a fundamental principle in the negotiation of inspection arrangements. It will be seen, therefore, that (c) above is unacceptable.
3. If we stand by the principle of effective inspection we would hope to obtain it under the following broad conditions:
 - (a) The inspectorate should be properly established under its own commander and with its own essential unit administration.
 - (b) Subject to the normal courtesies, members of the inspectorate should have freedom of movement within the Zone, and right of access to any installation holding British equipment or stores at any time.
 - (c) The inspectorate would be able to make representations through the appropriate authority in the Middle East (Military Representatives Committee of MEDO), and through the appropriate British headquarters if they considered that stores and installations were not being maintained in satisfactory condition.
 - (d) The inspecting unit in Egypt should be entitled to normal facilities for families, canteens, customs concessions etc.

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CAJ

African Dept.
Sir W. Stanger
Wed
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PW
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GENERAL EISENHOWER'S REPLY

I have read your personal letters regarding Egypt with great interest and I confess with some concern; however, as you know we are in general accord with the agreed position arrived at during the January conferences in London. I would rather not make a final decision on the other matters you mention, such as military representation during the Suez discussions, until Dulles and I have had the opportunity to discuss the entire problem with Eden, who I understand arrives next Wednesday.

As you know, I have the highest regard for Slim and personally feel his participation in the discussions will have a good and stabilizing effect.

Your old friend, etc.

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Sir W. Strangford ² ^{42A} ^{Enter P.W.}
 Sir J. Barber ^{26/2} ^{W.S.} ^{P.W. "B"}
 African Dept. ^{26/2} ^{10, Downing Street,} ^{Whitehall.}
 February 25, 1953

This might now
 be entered green
 Tues 4/5/54

I have kept the copy for S/S. ^{Other copy sent}
 This one can go to Washington ^{to Washington}
 CSM ^{26/2}

Dear Shuckburgh,

The Prime Minister discussed with the Foreign Secretary his further message to President Eisenhower, of which he had sent him a draft earlier in the evening. They agreed that it should be sent through the American Ambassador, and that a copy should be sent to Makins for his information. I accordingly enclose two copies, one for the Foreign Secretary and one for Makins.

Yours sincerely
 C.A.E. Shuckburgh

C.A.E. Shuckburgh, Esq., C.M.G.,
 Foreign Office.

FO File JE. 1192/42 A. -19

COPY from Sir R. Makins.

Personal and Confidential

(American Gallery No 199 DEC)

(21)

PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

1. I had a talk with Aldrich when he delivered your message this morning. The time factor is important to me and Menzies as Slim is needed in Australia by the end of April, but of course if you so prefer, the decision can await Eden's talks with you and Dulles.

2. I am sure you will consider my suggestion in relation to Ridgway's front now so advantageously extended to Turkey. All the Egyptian theatre lies behind Ridgway's right wing and if cast away might be a source of weakness to the whole position in Western Europe. The Canal of course is a lateral communication in the whole potential front which I believe you would wish to see sustained southward from the North Cape to Korea. Our British interest in the Canal is much reduced by the post-war changes in India, Burma, etc., and we got on all right round the Cape for a long time in the War. I cannot regard it as a major British interest justifying the indefinite maintenance of

/eighty

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~~PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

eighty thousand British troops at immense expense. There are lots of places where they could be used better or the money saved.

3. On the other hand we are not going to be knocked about with impunity and if we are attacked we shall use our concentrated strength to the full.

4. It seems to me that you might by standing with us in the approach to Neguib on the lines on which we have agreed bring about a peaceful solution in the truest harmony with the military and moral interests of the anti-Communist front. This is no question of British Imperialism or indeed of any national advantage to us, but only of the common cause. If an Anglo-American team, military and diplomatic, puts our agreed plan firmly to Neguib all may come well without bloodshed, and other blessings would flow from the success of this decisive accord. Please think of a potential regrouping of forces as a part of your bitter problem in Korea.

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Copy No.

39

ANNEX II TO MIL/1240/3/SE
dated 21st February 1953DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT .RECORD OF MEETING HELD IN THE WAR ROOM, GHQ WELF
ON 20th FEBRUARY 1953 ON THEADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF SERVICE
RE-RESUMPTION AT DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONSPRESENT:

Brigadier G.V. DUKE	Military Attache, His Embassy Cairo
C.B. DUKE, Esq.	Head of Chancery, His Embassy Cairo
Commander F.V.G. LEVITT	Naval Member of Working Party
Brigadier A.J.H. DOVE	Army Member of Working Party
(In the Chair)	
H.S. STEPHENSON, Esq.	British Middle East Office Member of Working Party

SECRETARIES:

Lieutenant Colonel D.G. CUPPAGE	Major G.E. PAGE
---------------------------------	-----------------

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Introduction

1. The meeting considered the administrative points in the Annex to the paper \emptyset by the Working Party.

Documentation

2. It was agreed that as a matter of principle and for the sake of simplicity, we should seek to obtain the right to issue our own passes to personnel we wished to send to Cairo. Brigadier DUKE agreed to take this matter up with the appropriate Egyptian authorities.

Transport in Cairo

3. It was agreed that the service representatives would require service transport in Cairo and that some sort of transferable pass should be obtained to enable these vehicles to enter and circulate in the Delta. Brigadier DUKE agreed to take up this point.

Accommodation

4. (a) Living. It was agreed after discussion that, bearing in mind the possible number of committees and the manner in which negotiations are likely to take place, accommodation might have to be provided in Cairo for:-

- Officers - up to 30
- Other Ranks - 15 - 20

The Embassy considered that, provided sufficient warning was given, the officers could be accommodated in private accommodation, hotels and pensions. It was agreed that it was most desirable that the other ranks should be accommodated in one house under proper supervision. Brigadier DUKE agreed to investigate the possibility of this arrangement and said that he would liaise direct with Brigadier DOVE over the details involved.

(b) Offices. Mr. DUKE considered that sufficient secure office accommodation might be provided in the Annex to the Embassy. He agreed to look into this problem.

Secretariat and Interpreters

5. Mr. DUKE agreed that the Embassy would provide the Secretary for the Plenary conferences, but he considered that the senior member of the Service secretariat should assist him at these meetings.

6. It was agreed that an inter-service secretariat based on four officers and four shorthand typists would be indispensable.

7. Mr. DUKE ...

\emptyset MIL/1240/3/ME dated 19th February 1953

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

7. Mr. DUKE stated that interpreters would not be required at any of the meetings.

Office Equipment, Typewriters and Duplicator

8. Mr. DUKE thought that the Embassy might be able to provide some typewriters and he agreed to investigate the position. He stated, however, that the Embassy had no spare duplicator. Brigadier DOVE said that he would see if GHQ would provide a suitable machine.

Local Administration of Service Personnel in Cairo

9. Brigadier DUKE agreed to undertake this commitment.

D.G.B. Curpage
Major
for (D.G.B. CURPAGE)
Lieutenant Colonel
Secretary

J

SECRETFROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET
AND WHITEHALL SECRET
DISTRIBUTIONSir R. Makins
No. 565
12th March, 1953D. 9.28 p.m. 12th March, 1953
R. 4.07 a.m. 13th March, 1953IMMEDIATE
SECRET

E. 1192/46

JE 1192/47

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 565 of 12th March
Repeated for information to: U.K. Del. New York (For Secretary
of State)
Cairo.

United Kingdom Delegation telegram No. 165 to Foreign Office.

State Department are now happy about our communiqué. To
avoid any possible confusion I am sending in my immediately following
telegram the full text as agreed with them.2. Their own communiqué (my telegram No. 549) has now been
modified in the light of comments by the United States Ambassador in
Cairo, so that the first paragraph will now read:"The Governments of Egypt and the United Kingdom have
indicated their desire that the Government of the United States take
part in discussions which are expected to begin shortly in Cairo
regarding various matters of importance to the three countries in
the fields of military, economic and social cooperation. The
United States has agreed to participate".3. Caffery's draft originally read: "Economic, social and
military". The order of words was changed at our instance.

Foreign Office pass to Cairo as my telegram No. 32.

[Repeated to Cairo]

ADVANCE COPIESSir W. Strang
Private Secretary
Sir J. Bowker
Head of African Department
Head of News Department

DDDDD

Reference:-

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SECRETFROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRETANDWHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
 No. 466
 13th March, 1953.

D. 11.47 a.m. 13th March, 1953.
 R. 11.54 a.m. 13th March, 1953.

EMERGENCY
SECRET

E. 1192/48(A)

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 466 of
 13th March

Repeated for information to:- Washington

U.K. Del. New York (for
 Secretary of State)

Washington telegram No. 565 to you.

Do you agree these texts? If so I propose to go
 ahead.

Foreign Office please pass Washington and U.K. Del.
 New York as my telegrams Nos. 169 and 8.

Repeated to Washington and New York].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Sir W. Strang Head of African Dept.
 Private Secretary Mr. Nicholls
 Sir J. Bowker



Reference:-

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTIONNo. 569

13th March 1953

D:2.08 p.m. 13th March 1953

IMMEDIATEAddressed to Cairo telegram No. 569 of 13th March

Repeated for information to : Washington

United Kingdom Delegation

New York (for Secretary of
State)

Your telegram No. 466 [of 13th March].

Yes.

6371/102797

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SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No.460

12th March, 1953.

D.1.26 p.m. 12th March, 1953.

R.1.56 p.m. 12th March, 1953.

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.460 of 12 th March
Repeated for information to Washington

U.K. Delegation New York
(for Secretary of State)

Washington telegram No.550.

My United States colleague has received his instructions but agrees with me that we cannot act on them until the texts of our respective announcements have been cleared.

2. He showed me American text in which he has suggested certain modifications. He made it clear that United States Government insists that American participation in negotiations shall only be on invitation of Her Majesty's Government and Egyptian Government. This will be brought out in the American announcement. When we make our approach to the Egyptian Government I shall therefore urge them to join with us in inviting the United States Government and Mr. Caffery will express latter's readiness to accept the invitation.

3. Tomorrow being Friday, it is probable that the earliest moment at which we can see Foreign Minister and General Neguib will be on Saturday morning.

Foreign Office please pass Washington and United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegrams Nos.158 and 6 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and United Kingdom Delegation New York].

ADVANCE COPIES TO

Sir W. Strang

Private Secretary

Sir J. Bowker

Head African Department

B B B

R371/102747

SECRET

8 copies to
Cos Secretariat
+ information

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF.

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Makins
No: 566
12th March, 1953.

D: 9.24 p.m. 12th March, 1953.
R: 4.30 a.m. 13th March, 1953.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 566 of 12th March
Repeated for information to: U.K. Del. New York for Secretary of
State.
Cairo.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text.

[Begins]:

Her Majesty's Government announced on the 23rd February that, in view of the serious and complicated military issues involved in any discussions which might begin with Egypt about the Canal Zone, Her Majesty The Queen had approved the Prime Minister of Australia's submission that the departure of Field Marshal Sir William Slim for Australia should be temporarily deferred so that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom could retain for a short period the Field Marshal's services.

Her Majesty's Government have now decided to open negotiations as soon as possible with the Egyptian Government and Field Marshal Sir William Slim will shortly be leaving for Cairo to conduct these negotiations in association with Her Majesty's Ambassador.

In view of the importance of the questions involved, the British and Egyptian Governments have expressed their desire for United States participation in the negotiations and the United States Government have agreed to take part. To this end, General Hull, the Vice-Chief of Staff of the United States army, will be associated with the United States Ambassador in the discussions.

[Ends].

Foreign Office pass to Cairo as my telegram No: 33.
[Repeated to Cairo].

ADVANCE COPIES: Sir W. Strang. Private Secretary.
Sir J. Bowker. Head African Dept.
Head News Dept.

JJJJJ

No. 232.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(JE 1192/50)

13th March, 1953.

SECRET

Sir,

When the French Ambassador called on Sir William Strang on 10th March, he asked about the results of my talks in Washington. Sir William Strang gave him a brief outline of the result of the discussions on the Far East, Persia and Europe.

2. He then asked about Egypt. Sir William Strang said that we were hoping very shortly to make the promised official communication to the French Government. Meanwhile, he could tell him in confidence that we were hoping, if the Egyptians agreed, to conduct the defence talks in Cairo on a broad basis jointly with the Americans. Monsieur Massigli asked whether Field-Marshal Slim would go out to Cairo. Sir William Strang said that this was the intention.

3. Monsieur Massigli recalled that the French Minister had already spoken of the French interest in the outcome of these discussions. Sir William Strang said that Monsieur de Crouy Chanel had made the French views on this very clear. Monsieur Massigli added that he hoped shortly to give us a paper which would state these views officially.

4. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and to the Head of the British Middle East Office at Fayid.

I am with great truth and respect,

Sir,

Your Excellency's obedient servant,

(For the Secretary of State)

Sgd. Roger Allen

His Excellency

Sir Oliver Harvey, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,

etc., etc., etc.,

PARIS.

SECRETFROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET ANDWHITEHALL SECRETDISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Makins

No. 548

D. 2.34 p.m. 11th March, 1953.

11th March, 1953.

R. 8.50 p.m. 11th March, 1953.

IMMEDIATESECRET

JE 1192/44

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 548 of 11th March.Repeated for information to U.K. Del. New York (for Secretary of State
Cairo JE 1192/43Your telegram No. 168 to U.K. Del. New York and my telegram
No. 546. Egypt. JE 1192/43

The draft in your telegram No. 169 to U.K. Del. New York was shown to the State Department this morning, on the understanding that it awaited final clearance from you and from the Secretary of State.

2. State Department said that the last paragraph setting out the American position would require to be modified to fit in with what they proposed to say themselves, but they would be perfectly happy with the following:

"In view of their anxiety in the questions involved, the British and Egyptian Governments have expressed the desire for United States participation in the negotiations and the United States Government have agreed to take part. To this end General Hull, the Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army, will be a member of the United States Delegation".

3. I hope you will be able to accept this wording which has the advantage of meeting our wish that General Hull's status should be elevated as much as possible. If you preferred to say that Hull will be "associated with the United States Ambassador in the discussions" I am confident that the State Department would not object.

4. State Department suggest that the timing of the announcements should be settled in Cairo as soon as Egyptian consent has been obtained and London and Washington informed immediately of the time agreed. They point out that owing to differences in local time

FO 371/10 2797

92772

SECRETWashington telegram No. 548 to Foreign Office

-2-

it will be impossible to issue the communiqués earlier than tomorrow, 12th March.

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Cairo as my telegram No. 27..

[Repeated to Cairo]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Prime Minister

Sir W. Strang

Private Secretary

Sir J. Bowker

Head of African Department

LLL.

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- 3 -

5. We were very pleased to see the line Ambassador Caffery has taken since your hand was on the tiller.

6. Please talk everything over with Anthony, including the atomic point I made to you. I hope that he can be shown the same kind of picture I was given at the Pentagon last year.

7. Every good wish,

Your much older friend,

WINSTON.

25.2.53.

R 271/102797

92772



Handwritten signature
Cuthbert

BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

21st February, 1953.

PERSONAL AND SECRET

Handwritten initials
R 271

JE 1192 37

Handwritten salutation
My dear Roger

The Ambassador and I went down to Fayid yesterday and we had a very satisfactory talk with General Robertson about military representation at defence negotiations in Cairo (see Cairo telegram No. 344). Rapp was present and, for part of the time, representatives of the other two Commanders-in-Chief (Sanders happened to be away in Iraq). We took with us the Military Attaché and the Head of Chancery and they discussed administrative arrangements etc., on the Staff level. The result will be a Commanders-in-Chiefs' Committee paper which will be summarised in a telegram to the Chiefs-of-Staff in reply to COS(HE)789.

Handwritten notes
JE 1192/10

- ... 2. I enclose two copies of the Brief from which the Ambassador spoke. Robertson agreed entirely with paragraph 2(a) saying that he did not at all subscribe to the view that the matter should be "left to the soldiers on both sides" and that everything would then turn out right. He also endorsed 2(b) and said that this made it clear that military advice must clearly come from G.H.Q., and could not, for example, come from General Festing.
- 3. These things are to some extent a question of personalities and as much an inter-service problem as anything else. Robertson pointed out that if we only had a subordinate representative of the Commanders-in-Chief at the Cairo discussions we might, in fact, run into greater difficulties than if we had someone present who could himself take decisions there and then. It is certainly true that in the case of Robertson himself it would be to every advantage to have him present both for the persuasive argument that he can himself put forward, and for the negative reason that if he were at the end of a telegraph line in Fayid he might well prove more troublesome. I do not think that the same can be said with equal force of the other two Commanders-in-Chief, and as regards the Navy they are quite happy about sitting back and not participating owing to the very small naval interests involved.
- 4. As regards the Sub-Committees, it is clear that the subject naturally falls into five divisions, (a) evacuation, phasing etc., (b) the Base - detailed provision for the status and extent etc., of the Base which will remain after an agreement comes into force, (c) air defence, (d) M.E.D.O., and (e) supply of arms and equipment to the Egyptians. The Commanders-in-Chief are working on a basis of this five-fold division and appreciate the fact that at some stage we shall need to link the Americans in with (d) and (e). They also think that a further Sub-Committee (f) on financial questions, will have to be set up in the course of discussions but it may be of tactical advantage

/not

Handwritten note
X see P.S. outline

R. Allen, Esq., C.M.G.,
The Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

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- 2 -

not to suggest this to the Egyptians at the outset in order not to encourage them at the beginning that we will listen to all the preposterous financial claims which we know they are preparing.

5. I should like to draw your attention to the point about the Secretariat which appears as a footnote to the Brief. We ought to get this going as soon as possible, as even the preliminary contacts should not be carried out without our keeping an accurate British record of what passes. During the Sudan talks we saw clearly the disadvantage of letting the Egyptians prepare the sole full record.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter to Rapp at Fayid.

Worsave
Michael

(M.J. Creswell)

P.S. Robertson said incidentally (ref. para 6. of the brief) that the only officer he had who might conceivably be able to give in-the-house advice was Major Gen. Hull, his new Chief of Staff.

MILITARY REERE SITUATION AT CAIRO NEGOTIATIONS.

(MEMORANDUM FOR HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR).

Comment on COS(HE)789.

1. It is clearly right that the Commanders-in-Chief (Middle East) should represent the Chiefs-of-Staff in this matter. Any other arrangement would involve a great danger of points being discussed in negotiation and perhaps agreed to by H.M.G. without the fullest local military advice. There is no point in military advice being furnished from two different quarters simultaneously - by the Chiefs-of-Staff and by the Commanders-in-Chief.

2. On the other hand:

- (a) The political nature of the talks, dealing as they do with the principal issue in Anglo-Egyptian relations, must be paramount. The negotiations are primarily a matter of policy and they will be conducted on behalf of the Cabinet. Just as in wartime the political aspect must always be subordinate to the successful prosecution of the war, so in peace it would be illogical to jeopardise political interests of the highest importance which may affect our whole position in the cold war (or political battle) in which we are now actually engaged, for the sake of military considerations which will only come into play once a major war begins. We do not know for certain when that war will begin nor if, when it does, enemy strategy will be such as to call into play the military measures for which we are now preparing.
- (b) The Commanders-in-Chief (Middle East) have other interests in the area outside Egypt (in particular, C-in-C M.E. now has a dual rôle). Their participation will of necessity bring up these aspects with greater emphasis and more immediately than is perhaps necessary, at the cost possibly of other considerations more present in the minds of H.M.G. in London.
- (c) Atmosphere being of paramount importance in discussion with the Egyptians, the psychological effect of the presence at meetings of such high-ranking British officers must be borne in mind. The Egyptian military are very rank-conscious and the impression must not be conveyed that they are being given orders or instruction by senior British officers. Our objective is to reach agreement.

3. In some respects the position of the Commanders-in-Chief in these negotiations may be compared with that of the Governor-General of the Sudan over the Sudan negotiations; that is to say, they are the authorities principally concerned with the outcome, yet it does not necessarily follow that they would be the best participants in the actual negotiations.

4. A distinction should, therefore, perhaps be made between actual participation in the discussions on the one hand and consultation and advice (which may well be overriding) on the other.

5. There seem to be two possible solutions:

(a) that negotiations should be carried out by a Minister of the Crown assisted by yourself on the one hand, and by the Commanders-in-Chief (or one of them representing all three) on the other;

(b) that you should yourself head the delegation and be assisted by a high-level representative of the Commanders-in-Chief. In this case all points would, of course, be constantly referred to Fayid, but our communications are good enough to do this anyway.

6. It is also for consideration whether solution (b) could not be adopted and combined with the selection of an officer who, while representing the Commanders-in-Chief (Middle East) would himself be one of our high-level military negotiators recently accustomed to staff talks at S.H.A.P.E. or Washington. The Commanders-in-Chief may not have available here an officer of suitable rank and adequate qualifications; but is there any great objection to having someone seconded to them from London for the purpose? He would be directly answerable to the Commanders-in-Chief (Middle East). There is, it seems to me, great advantage in having someone who would look at the problem from a generally world-wide aspect and not from a purely Middle Eastern one. Such an officer would also perhaps carry more conviction with the Egyptians than an officer they knew to have been one of their direct antagonists in the Canal Zone.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

19th February, 1953.

+ It will in any case be essential to have a British Secretariat to keep records of all the meetings. This could, with advantage, consist of two members, one from the Foreign Office and one an officer from the Joint Staffs Secretariat in London accustomed to keeping records at important military conferences.

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C O P Y

P.W. G

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

P.M. to Gen. Eisenhower

February 18, 1953.

My dear Friend,

Thank you very much for your kind letter of February 12. I now write to you about the Suez Canal and M.E.D.O..

(1) We reached an agreement with the late United States Administration about the minimum arrangements necessary before we began to withdraw our forces. I do not know the level on your side which our discussions with your people had reached; Acheson and Bradley certainly knew. The talks took place here between December 31 and January 7 and the conclusions were set out in agreed papers copies of which I enclose. I have given my assent to these plans, epitomized on page 11, paragraph 1, in the five sub-heads a, b, c, d, and e, and in A in the Appendix on page 7, because of the enormous advantages which might flow from our joint action.

(2) There is no question of our seeking or needing military, physical, or financial aid from you. Alex

/assures

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- 2 -

assures me that our forces in the Canal Zone are in ample strength to resist any attack, and even if necessary, in order to prevent a massacre of white people and to rescue them, to enter Cairo and Alexandria, for which all preparations have been for some time at 96 hours' notice. Moreover, nearly half the effective Egyptian Army, about 15,000 men, stands on the Eastern side of the Canal watching Israel. They could be easily forced to surrender, perhaps indeed merely by cutting off supplies. As for Egypt herself, the cutting off of the oil would, as you know, exercise a decisive effect. There is therefore no question of our needing your help or to reinforce the 80,000 men we have kept at great expense on tiptoe during the last year. The advantages of our working together on the lines agreed with your predecessors are so great that a successful result might be achieved without violence or bloodshed and without exposing you to any military obligation.

(3) We feel however that our Ambassador, Stevenson, requires to be guided by one of our strongest military personalities. The Socialist Government sent

/Field-Marshal Slim

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- 3 -

Field-Marshal Slim out there in 1949 and 1950, and he did extremely well in his visits. He has profound knowledge of the military situation and was indeed until recently responsible as C.I.G.S. for advising us upon it. I am sure you know him well. He would head our delegation if the Austrian Government will agree to postpone for a few weeks his assumption of their Governor-Generalship. If not, it might be Slessor or Portal or Tedder, as the Air has a lot to say. I wonder whether you would consider favourably placing a first class American military figure with Ambassador Caffery? You have many versed alike in policy and defence.

(4) Thus we should present to the dictator Neguib an agreed plan which represents far-reaching concessions on our part, sustained by Britain and the United States and by outstanding representatives thoroughly soaked in the Middle East problem. This would, I am sure, give the best chance of making a
/tolerable

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tolerable arrangement for M.E.D.O. without a renewal of Anglo-Egyptian strife. Let me repeat that if all fails the United States would in no circumstances be involved in military operations.

I shall be most grateful if you will let me know what you think of these ideas.

The President of the United States of America.

P 371/102797

92772

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TOP SECRET

19th February, 1953.

DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT

3 E 1192 40

REPORT BY THE WORKING PARTY

Introduction

/JE1192/174

1. As instructed, we have examined the questions posed in COS(ME) 789 concerning the assistance required by the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, in the forthcoming defence negotiations with Egypt.
2. In our examination it has become apparent that we have not yet got sufficient guidance on the lines which these negotiations are likely to be conducted. It appears essential to obtain the views of IM Ambassador on a number of questions before we prepare a draft reply to COS(ME) 789.
3. We have accordingly drawn up a list of the principal matters on which guidance is required, together with our preliminary views on some of them, for submission to IM Ambassador. These include certain questions, not strictly relevant to COS(ME) 789, but on which we would appreciate guidance at this stage.

MATTERS ON WHICH WE REQUIRE GUIDANCE

General system for Conduct of Negotiations

4. We have envisaged the setting up of:
 - (a) a main Conference, consisting of IM Ambassador and the Cs-in-C in plenary sessions when necessary; which will deal with the principles of evacuation from the base and return to it in war.
 - (b) separate sub-committees with appropriate joint service representation, able to work concurrently and covering:
 - (i) negotiations on our requirements in the Egypt Base.
 - (ii) ...

6 DCC(53) - 3rd Meeting - Min 2(c)(iv)

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

- (ii) integrated Air Defence,
- (iii) methods and speed of evacuation, hand over and assistance we shall receive from the Egyptian authorities,
- (iv) finance. The Treasury will presumably have direct representation on this sub-committee

It is suggested that the main points of principle should be settled before detailed work commences and that work on (b)(iii) should follow agreement in principle on (b)(i) and (b)(ii).

5. From these committees we foresee four agreements:
- (a) First and main agreement - the principle and timing of evacuation and undertakings for our return in war or on threat of war;
 - (b) Second agreement - what we leave behind in Egypt and on what terms, including forces under any integrated Air Defence agreement;
 - (c) Third agreement - how we evacuate, methods of handing over and assistance from Egyptian authorities;
 - (d) Fourth agreement - financial.
6. We would appreciate the Ambassador's views on
- (a) the general working structure of the Conference, and the likely "tempo" of negotiations;
 - (b) how do we start negotiations? For example :-
 - (i) who will be responsible for preparing the agenda?
 - (ii) what will be and who will prepare the working documents on which discussions will be based?
 - (iii) how are the terms of reference of the sub-committees to be drawn up?
 - (iv) shall we be required to table papers giving our views on the subjects in the agenda or merely provide a list of headings of matters which have to be settled?
- (c)

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- (c) whether it will be acceptable for staff officers on sub-committees to attend the plenary sessions as spectators.

Committee of Deputies

7. Is it likely that a Committee of Deputies to the main conference with representatives of the Cs-in-C will be required to act as a steering party on day to day matters?

Sub-Committees - Frequency of Meetings

8. If meetings are to be daily, this may increase the number of staff required and will increase the numbers requiring accommodation in Cairo. If less frequent (perhaps bi-weekly) meetings of sub-committees are likely, many of the staff officers involved could probably live in the Canal zone visiting Cairo by road and air as necessary.

9. We would be grateful for guidance on this aspect.

Sub-Committees - Place of Working

10. As there will inevitably be matters which must be referred to staffs in our Headquarters it would be an advantage if some meetings could be held in the Canal Zone. If this cannot be arranged it is inevitable that large staffs will be required at some meetings in Cairo, or delays will occur whilst matters are referred back to the Headquarters. We understand that the Egyptians have themselves spoken of sending a Military Mission to the Canal Zone. Is it likely that such meetings in the Canal Zone can be arranged?

Egyptian Visits to the Canal Zone

11. Since the Egyptians will have at some stage to assess what is involved in taking over the control of the Egypt base, visits by them to some of our installations appear inevitable. We would welcome guidance as to the stage in negotiations at which such visits would be permitted.

Disclosure of Order of Battle and Strengths to the Egyptians.

12. It will be difficult to keep these subjects secret in negotiations. Subject to the over-riding views of the Chiefs of Staff, has the Ambassador any reasons why information such as numbers of units by general types, should not be disclosed as far as necessary?

Administrative Points

13. A list of administrative points is at Annex.

CONCLUSION

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CONCLUSION

14. We conclude that answers to the above questions will enable us to reply to COS(MI) 789 and to proceed with further planning for these negotiations.

RECOMMENDATION

15. We recommend that HM Ambassador be invited to provide answers to the questions we have set out above.

F.V.G. HEWITT
A.J.H. DOVE
T.W. PEPLER
H.S. STEPHENSON

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TOP SECRETAnnex to MIL/1240/3/MS dated
19th February 1953.ADMINISTRATIVE POINTSDocumentation

1. What documentation will be required for visits to Cairo?

Dress of British Personnel taking part in Negotiations

2. Is the dress to be uniform or civilian clothes for officers/ORs concerned in these negotiations?

Transport in Cairo

3. Is the use of British service vehicles in Cairo suitable? If not, will the Embassy arrange sufficient civilian-type vehicles?

Accommodation

4. At a pendix is a preliminary estimate of the accommodation requirements in Cairo.
5. Can the Embassy arrange this accommodation, including secure office accommodation?

Secretariat and Interpreters

6. We estimate that four officers, four stenographers and three clerks will be required to serve the three military sub-committees.
7. Will the Embassy undertake the secretarial work for the main Conference, Committee of Deputies and the Finance Committee (if formed), and provide such interpreters as may be required for all committees?

Office Equipment, Typewriters and Duplicator

8. Can the Embassy provide these?

Local Administration of Service Personnel in Cairo

9. Will the Embassy undertake this?

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TOP SECRETAppendix to Annex to LII/12403/MS
dated 19th February 1953.ACCOMMODATION IN CAIRO

On the assumption that the sub-committees will be meeting almost daily (the worst case, see paragraph 8 of main paper), our preliminary estimate of accommodation requirements is:

(a) <u>Office Accommodation</u>	<u>Officers</u>
Cs-in-C and personal staffs	5
Senior Staff Officers	2
Secretariat	4
British representatives on each Committee	3
Total	<u>14</u>

(b) Living Accommodation

Assuming Cs-in-C and personal staffs live in the Canal Zone, accommodation will be required for

(i) Officers

RN	1
Army	6 - 9
RMP	6 - 9
Secretariat	4
Total	<u>17 - 23</u>

(ii) ORs

Including clerks, drivers and escorts 10 - 15.

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Military Division,
British Middle East Office,
G.H.Q., M.E.L.F.17.

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Copy No. 27

21st February 1953.

MIL/1240/3/ME

Memorandum

DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYP

Reference: MIL/1240/3/ME dated 19th February 1953.

1. Circulated at Annex I is a record of the meeting held at GHQ MELF on Friday 20th February 1953, between HM Ambassador CAIRO, members of his staff, C-in-C MELF, Head of BMEC and representatives of the staffs of the Commanders-in-Chief.
2. At annex II is a record of the subsequent meeting on administrative aspects.

F.G. Hatch
 (F.G. HATCH)
 Colonel
 Secretary

BRITISH DEFENCE CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE
MIDDLE EAST

DISTRIBUTION:

Head of BMEC	1 - 3	Gp Capt Plans	18
S/POC	4 - 7	JPO	19 - 22
C-in-C MELF	8 - 9	Cdr Admin Plans	23
C-in-C ME&F	10	BGS (SD)	24
-----	-----	Gp Capt Admin Plans	25
C of S MELF	11 - 12	BMEC Pol Div (for HM	
ASO MELF	13	Embassy Cairo)	26 - 29
AS MELF	14	File	30
ICA MELF	15	Float	31
BGS(Plans & Ops)	16 - 17	Spares	32 - 50

In lieu of A.F. 4-16

To be completed and returned to:
Military Division,
British Middle East Office,
G.H.Q., M.E.L.F.17.

Received Copy No.(s) _____ of MIL/1240/3/ME dated 21st February 1953 and
annexes.

Signature _____

Date _____ Branch _____

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ANNEX I TO MIL/1240/3/403 dated
21st February 1953

DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD AT GHQ MELB EGYPT
ON FRIDAY 20th February 1953

PRESENT:

- Sir Ralph STEVENSON
HM Ambassador in Cairo
- Rear Admiral G.H. STONES
Senior British Naval Officer, Middle East
- General Sir Brian H. ROBERTSON (In the Chair)
Commander-in-Chief Middle East Land Forces
- Sir Vice Marshal G.R.C. SPENCER
Representing Commander-in-Chief Middle East Air Force
- Sir Thomas C. RAIF
Head of the British Middle East Office

ALSO PRESENT:

- | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------|
| M.J. CREWELL, Esq. | HM Minister in Cairo |
| Brigadier G.W. DUNE | Military Attache Cairo |
| C.B. DUNE, Esq. | Head of Chancery, HM Embassy Cairo |
| Commander F.V.G. HEVITT | Cdr Admin Plans |
| Brigadier A.J.H. DOVE | EGS(SD) |
| H.S. STEPHENSON, Esq. | Head of Political Division MEC |

Ø Members of the Working Party

SECRETARIES:

- | | |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Colonel A.G. HATCH | Lieutenant Colonel D.G.B. CUFFAGE |
| Major C.E. PAGE | |

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1. The meeting had before them a paper ϕ prepared by the Joint Service Working Party and a paper tabled by HM Ambassador.

2. General System for Conduct of Negotiations (Paragraph 4 of MIL/1240/3/ME dated 19th February 1953). Comparing the forecasts of sub-committee headings in the two papers, the meeting agreed that the following would be the probable headings to deal with each of which a separate sub committee would need to be set up.

- (a) Redeployment - the method and rate of evacuation
- (b) The Base
- (c) Air Defence
- (d) Defence of the Middle East - Planning
- (e) Supplies and equipment to be provided for the Egyptians.

Sir Ralph STEVENSON pointed out that we should be faced with preposterous claims by the Egyptians with regard to finance; they would want everything given to them. For this reason it would be better not to put forward the idea of setting up a Finance Committee at the start; it would be formed as the need arose.

3. The Possible Form of the Agreement (Paragraph 5 of MIL/1240/3/ME). In principle it was to be expected that there would be a short main agreement on a political basis. Annexes to the main agreement might follow the sub committee "headings" (see paragraph 2 above).

4. Working Structure of the Conference and likely "Tempo" of Negotiations (Paragraph 6(a) of MIL/1240/3/ME).

- (a) Working Structure. Sir Ralph STEVENSON said that HM Government would decide at what level the British delegation should be constituted; he could say now that there would be a plenary conference between the delegations of both sides as a result of which a number of sub committees would be set up.
- (b) Tempo. This was almost impossible to forecast; it would depend on our attitude at the start, and on whether we met with an Egyptian delegation who were thinking in terms of negotiations or who were simply tabling demands. Sir Ralph STEVENSON had hopes that the latter would not be the case and that we would be able to avoid being faced with "sacred" demands by the Egyptians. The latter was, however, a possibility. Sir Ralph STEVENSON said he would hope that the conference would be continuous. If it were not so there

would be ...

ϕ MIL/1240/3/ME dated 19th February 1953

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would be a danger of leakages and of the Egyptians 'shying off'.

5. Preparations for the Negotiations (Paragraph 6(b) of MIL/1240/3/45).

- (a) Agenda. Sir Ralph STEVENSON said he thought it probable that the agenda would have to be decided at the first plenary session. Broadly, the responsibility for the form of approach would lie with the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States; this would depend on the form of proposal which they decided to put forward; he hoped that it would not be the 'package' proposal. Responsibility for preparing the agenda would probably lie with the conference and would depend on the broad proposals tabled by the British delegation on behalf of their Government and on the proposals tabled by the Egyptians. The indications were that HM Government would provide a document setting out the agreed approach.
- (b) Terms of Reference. The Terms of Reference of sub committees would not be drawn up until the plenary sessions have started.
- (c) Preparation of papers. The meeting agreed that it would be most useful if papers could be prepared now on each question which was the possible subject for a sub committee. The papers would be sent to Cairo for discussion with the Embassy, subsequently revised as necessary, and would then become an agreed brief from Middle East Command Headquarters to HM Ambassador.

6. Attendance by Staff Officers at the Plenary Sessions as Spectators (Paragraph 6(c) of MIL/1240/3/45). The Meeting agreed in principle that it would be a great help for Staff Officers who would have to do the committee work if they could attend the plenary session. It would depend on whether or not the Egyptians brought their committee staffs to the plenary sessions.

7. Committee of Deputies (Paragraph 7 of MIL/1240/3/45). The Meeting agreed that it was unlikely that there would be a Committee of Deputies. It was agreed, however, that there would have to be civil members sitting on each sub committee, as far as manpower allowed.

8. Sub Committees, Frequency of Meetings and Place of Working (Paragraphs 8 - 10 of MIL/1240/3/45). Sir Ralph STEVENSON thought that it would be preferable that the Service staffs for the sub committees should stay in Cairo. The Egyptians were unpredictable regarding times and dates of meetings and attendance. The staffs must expect to waste a great deal of time. Sir Ralph STEVENSON was doubtful whether the Egyptians would agree to any sub committees sitting away from Cairo

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
except on purely technical matters. He agreed, however, with General ROBERTSON that the Base sub committee, for example, might, during the course of discussions, wish to visit installations on the ground in the Canal Zone.

9. Egyptian visits to the Canal Zone (Paragraph 11 of MIL/1240/3/ME)
The Egyptians would undoubtedly want to visit the Canal Zone after some headway had been made in the discussions.

10. Disclosure of Order of Battle and Strengths (Paragraph 12 of MIL/1240/3/ME). There was no great objection to disclosing orders of battle and strengths. The meeting felt that this was mainly a military point.

11. In answer to other points raised, Sir Ralph STEVENSON said:

- (a) Dress. The Egyptian military members would be in uniform. He would be very much in favour of the British Service members of the delegation wearing uniform.
- (b) Possible time of start of talks. This would depend on HM Government. Sir Ralph STEVENSON himself was in favour of a start as soon as possible. The temper of the House of Commons, however, was such that it is impossible at the moment to forecast when the talks might start.
- (c) The Egyptian attitude in regard to the four British 'Cases' for the Base. The Egyptian attitude would be to see every uniformed soldier out of Egypt, and they would adhere to this as closely as possible.



(P.G. HATCH)

Colonel

Secretary

BRITISH DEFENCE CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE

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