

FO 371/1027-13

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

August 19, 1953.

(JF 1055/23)

CONFIDENTIALPERSONAL

I think your letter of August 1 (10311/14/53) is partially answered in my letter of August 13 to Kenrick, and its enclosure. That should provide some evidence that we are prepared to think of using harsh words. I think that where we (meaning by "we" yourself, and ourselves in this Department) part company with the administrators is that we are only prepared to recommend the use of them when we think that there is something to be achieved by it, and not merely to relieve our feelings. It is only natural that they should therefore conclude that we can't have the right sort of feelings.

2. However, feelings are factors to be taken into account; and it was a consideration in our mind in drafting our aide-memoire that one of the things it might achieve is to give some relief to those, - home and away, - who feel in their blood that we ought to do something, and are not to be convinced that much of the time the best answer is to let the Egyptians do it for us.

(R.T.D. Ledward)

D.M.H. Riches, Esq.,  
Khartoum.

Fe 371/102773

P.H.C. 91698  
Personal

16/3  
Aug: 9 1953

Registry

No. JE 1055, 23.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

W. Morris  
14/8  
24

Draft.

Mr. Riches  
Khartoum  
from  
Mr. Edward.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION.	
18 AUG 1953	
SENT TO	19
TYPE	
DEPARTMENT	

I think your letter of 1<sup>st</sup> August (10321/14/53) is partially answered in my letter of Aug. 13<sup>th</sup> to Kenrick, and its enclosure. That should provide some evidence that we are prepared to think of using ~~the~~ harsh words. I think that where we (meaning by that ourselves - "we" yourself, and ourselves in this department) part company with the administrators is that we are only prepared to recommend the use of them when we think that there is something to be achieved by it, and not merely to relieve our feelings. It is only natural that

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conclude that we can't have  
the right sort of feelings.

However, feelings ~~at home~~  
~~and abroad~~ are factors to be  
taken into account; and it was a  
~~me~~ consideration in our mind that  
in drafting our aide-memoire  
that one of the incidental things  
was it might <sup>achieve</sup> ~~be~~ is to give  
some relief to those, - home and  
away, - who feel <sup>in their blood</sup> passionately that  
we ought to do something, and  
are not to be persuaded that  
convinced that much of the time the  
best answer is to let the Egyptians  
do it for us.

26  
27/6

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

on by  
6571/102773

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- 1. Sir J. Bagin.
- 2. Eulin room for.



(10311/14/53)

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED

Office of the United Kingdom  
Trade Commissioner,

KHARTOUM.

J E. 10551 23.

1st August, 1953.

INDEXED

Dear Roger.

The big political question mark here at the moment is the Khatmi-N.U.P. situation, i.e. whether or not Sayid Ali has really finally decided that the only way to attempt to stop S.A.R. is to tell his followers to vote for the N.U.P. and the N.U.P. alone. The situation is not at the moment clear but Kenrick will be reporting to you by this bag on the latest position (after 3 years as D.C. in Omdurman he knows the Khatmi there well and as at the moment he shows a disposition to report to you direct I am happy to let him deal with this aspect of our work).

2. You should know however that this news following the reports published here about anti-British and anti-administration propaganda organised in Egypt during the "Liberation" celebrations and the defection to Egypt of Yacoub Osman and Ahmed Yusuf Hashim has resulted in a fit of jitters among the administrators, some of whom have urged me to try to get Her Majesty's Government to "do something" to counter the Egyptian tide. What particularly sticks in their gullets is that Neguib and Sallah should be able to make their lying propaganda statements without any counterblast in similar terms from members of H.M. Government in similar positions. What they are really after in their hearts is good quotable stuff to be broadcast to the Sudan and published in the local papers in which the British Prime Minister assures the Sudanese that come what may the Egyptian imperialists and colonisers will be kept out of the Sudan, or the Secretary of State declares himself ready for rivers of blood if necessary to prevent the Egyptians encroaching on our rights in the Canal Zone. They seem particularly enamoured of the idea of engineered Parliamentary questions and answers.

3. I have explained why such statements would be rather difficult to make and to do the administrators justice most of them appear to appreciate this (though the cynical remark about kowtowing to the Egyptians and sacrificing the Sudan for the sake of a defence agreement is usually heard). But are H.M. Government at the moment prepared to take a strong line with Egypt about the Sudan? Are they for example prepared to represent to Neguib that many of his speeches and statements and those of his lieutenants on the Sudan are grossly out of keeping with the spirit and the letter of the February Agreement; and publicise the fact that they are doing so?

*Yours very truly*  
*Derek Riches*  
 (D.M.H. Riches)

R. Allen, Esq., C.M.G.,  
 African Department,  
 Foreign Office,  
 S.W.1.

B371/162773 41698

OS 1055/24)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.E.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

August 19, 1953.

You wrote to us on July 31 (10211/14/53) about the means by which we might prevent a visit to the Sudan by General Neguib. We agree with you that it would be a dangerous thing: it would also of course be a flagrant breach of the spirit of the agreement and of the prescribed neutral atmosphere for the Egyptian President to make what inevitably becomes an election-cring tour of the Sudan.

2. While not wishing to be too optimistic, we hope that the likelihood of the visit has receded into the background since the less than joyful passage of Major Salim. If the Egyptians do not drop the idea themselves, we should hope that the Umma will with their now-found courage whip up enough public clamour to make it impossible. However, we ought to assume the worst case and consent on your suggestions about the action we might wish to take:

(1) Representations.

(a) By Her Majesty's Government. You will have noticed from my letter of August 17, to Konrath (OS 1055/53) that the possibility of a visit to the Sudan by Neguib was in our minds in drafting our "grand remonstrance". We cannot put much faith in representations alone, but the publicity and the implied threat in the text of said manifesto might have some effect.

(b) By the Governor General. We agree with you that it would be dangerous to carry an objection based on public order to its logical conclusion.

(c) The Electoral Commission. We do not think the Electoral Commission would be likely to take this on. However, Josef Jenny is scattering a few discreet seeds in Ben's mind.

(2) General Neguib Crisis. Without looking any further into this, we can say that Neguib is fairly excretable in the eyes of his colleagues. His great asset is his "public relations" value which he would be busy exploiting during a triumphal tour of the Sudan.

(3) A general situation. As you say we have none who, like Neguib, meet the specifications of the local market. Luce agrees that we can gain more by virtuous abstention from competition.

4. We therefore seem to have reached the same conclusions as you.

5. I am copying this letter to Konrath and Luke.

(R. T. D. Ledward)

D. H. H. Rights, Esq.,  
Office of the United Kingdom,  
Trade Commissioner,  
Khartoum.

R371/102773

91698



*Enter quickly*  
*Wm/s/r*

(10311/14/53)

Office of the United Kingdom  
Trade Commissioner,

SECRET

INDEXED

**J E 1055 /24**

KHARTOUM.

31st July, 1953.

*Dear Roger,*

There have been a number of reports that General Neguib intends to visit the Sudan before the elections, September being suggested as a likely month and his itinerary as including some of the provincial centres (though not the South) in addition to the Three Towns. I am told that even the Umma delegation to the "Liberation" celebrations were so carried away by their reception in Cairo and by the normal traditions of reciprocal hospitality as to invite the General to visit the Sudan.

2. If the visit comes off it may have a serious influence on the elections, especially if properly timed. I have repeatedly reported the popularity enjoyed by the General among persons of all classes and political leanings in this country and the publicity associated with the recent junketings and bellicosities in Cairo has, if anything, increased this. He would undoubtedly have a tremendous reception were he to come to the Sudan and he and his entourage could do a lot of damage in a very short time both to British prestige and to the independence cause. Such being the case we have been thinking in good time of what could be done to prevent or counter the effect of the visit. The possibilities that have occurred to us are:-

1. To stop the visit by representations from -
  - (a) H.M. Government
  - (b) The Governor General
  - (c) The Electoral Commission.
2. To stop the visit by provoking a crisis in the Canal Zone or otherwise making it necessary for Neguib to stay in Egypt till after the elections.
3. If the visit comes off to attempt to neutralise its effect by producing a counter attraction in the shape of a visit to the Sudan of a colourful personality of our own.

3. The best course would undoubtedly be to put the onus on Sen by getting the Electoral Commission to ask Neguib not to come as his visit would be a factor likely to affect the neutrality of the elections. I think it improbable however that the Commission would agree to do this. As regards representations by H.M. Government and the Governor General they could be made on the grounds of incompatibility with the letter and spirit of the February Agreement and threat to public order respectively. The former is not on present

/form

R. Allen, Esq., C.M.G.,  
African Department,  
Foreign Office,  
S.W.1.

FO 371/1027-73

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only



form likely to shake the Egyptians while the latter is manifestly far-fetched and if carried to its logical conclusion of refusing entry to the Sudan to Neguib both politically bad and likely itself to provoke demonstration and possibly disorders in the Three Towns.

4. The feasibility of suggestion No. 2 is not for me to judge.

5. As regards 3. we just cannot produce a figure to measure up to Neguib, though the visit of Lord Mountbatten at the end of October would be something as a counter-puff.

6. All in all, 1 (c) and 1 (a) or a combination of both seem to be the most promising lines. In representing that the visit would be contrary to the spirit of the Agreement we might threaten that if it did nevertheless materialise we should then consider ourselves free to send any propaganda stars of our own to the country.

I am sending copies of this letter to Duke in Cairo and Kenrick at the Governor General's Office.

*Denis Riches*  
 (D.M.H. Riches)

FO 371/102773

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Hankey

No. 1161

August 7, 1953

D. 6.21 p.m. August 7, 1953

R. 7.40 p.m. August 7, 1953

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

JE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1161 of August 7  
Repeated for information to Khartoum (for Governor General  
and U.K. Trade Commissioner)  
INDEXED

Your telegram No. 1415: Sudan.  
Many thanks.

JE 1055/27

I was unable to get Col. Nasser, Salah Salem and Minister for Foreign Affairs together at a suitable juncture last night, but I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs and Salah Salem. Latter was most concerned at my remonstrances and obviously did not want to lose propaganda stick to beat us. We will have a separate go at Nasser shortly.

2. Meanwhile, although nothing precise was said, it looks as if Salah Salem's projected visit to Sudan could not be very imminent, as he said in another connexion that he had several engagements here next week.

Foreign Office please pass priority to Khartoum as my telegram No. 270.  
[Repeated to Khartoum].

QQQ





20371/102773

91698

JE. 1055/26

SECRET

INDEXED

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL

DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Howe  
No. 496  
August 7, 1953

D. 5.35 p.m. August 7, 1953  
R. 6.55 p.m. August 7, 1953

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 496 of August 7  
Repeated for information to Cairo.

Your telegram No. 722.

Salen's visit.

I could not prevent a Minister of one of Co-Domini Governments from paying a visit to this country, unless I were satisfied that such a visit were liable to provoke a breach of public order. If on above grounds I were to prevent Salah Salem from disembarking here and send him back, the result would probably be to stimulate protest and demonstrations by the pro-Egyptian parties here.

2. I agree it would be foolish to expect Salah Salem to exercise any moderation if it were suggested to him that that was a condition on which we would not object to his visit.

3. We can urge Umma to try to counteract his activities, but I doubt whether they could be brought to protest openly to prevent his visit on the grounds that it was a breach of the Umma - Neguib agreement. I will test their reactions on this point.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo as my telegram No. 265.

[Repeated to Cairo].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Sir W. Strang  
Private Secretary  
Sir J. Bowker  
Head of African Department





Reference:-

FO 371/102773

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J.



FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Hankey

D. 6.50 p.m. August 5, 1953

No. 1149.

R. 8.26 p.m. August 5, 1953

August 5, 1953

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1149 of August 5

Repeated for information to Khartoum

and Saving to Paris

B.M.E.O.

Washington

A

Commenting on a report published in Al Ahram of August 4 to the effect that Britain had annexed parts of the Southern Sudan to Uganda, General Neguib stated that this was not the only violation of the Sudan's integrity by the British. About 50 years ago they had leased a considerable area of Bahrel Gazal province to Belgium and they had also had certain regions annexed to Eritrea, the French colonies and to Uganda. Neguib described this action as robbery.

2. Asked for their views "Sudanese leaders", unnamed, now in Egypt, stated that they would not allow this transgression to pass unchallenged and that, as soon as a national government had been formed, steps would be taken to annul any such illegal disposal of Sudanese territory.

B

Foreign Office please pass Khartoum as my telegram No. 269 and to Paris and Washington as my Saving telegrams Nos. 320 and 266 respectively.

[Repeated to Khartoum and Saving to Paris and Washington].

K K K K

Reference:-

FO 371/1027-73

RECORD OFFICE

51628

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Telegraphic Address  
"HAKIMAM"

*Enter*

GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
KHARTOUM.

*ask M/S k check*

*KA 15/7*

06/07.8.1.

7th July, 1953.

**JE 1051 | 592.**

**SECRET**

*Dear Allen,*

I enclose a copy of a translation of an Arabic record of the meeting between the Prime Minister and Sayed Abdel Rahman, written by Ibrahim Ahmad after the meeting. The translation is also Ibrahim Ahmad's and I have not altered his wording.

If there are any important inaccuracies in this version of the discussion, would you please let me know.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Riches.

*Yours sincerely*  
*FDZ*

F. L. MOSE.

11th July, 1953, C. O.,  
London Office,  
London, S.W.1.

Record of talks between Sir Winston Churchill and Sir Lord Duff Asson, 1st Earl of Home, 1943, at the 1st Empire Hotel.

Order of the day at the first dinner meeting and the following in relation to the subject.

The record started by thanking Sir Winston for his attitude towards the Anglo-Egyptian agreement about the Sudan thereby returning the Sudan their freedom taken away at the battle of Aden in which he took part.

He then mentioned the day and then added that he felt that the attitude of the world towards the British had changed since his visit to Cairo last year.

The record stated that his attitude was the same as when he was in London last year and all that had taken place since then. The British, who were always demanding the sovereignty over the Sudan as appeared in the White Paper agreement, had admitted that the sovereignty of the Sudan was for the Sudanese. The record believed that this was again for the Sudanese but it did not mean that we would accept anything other than independence for the Sudan. He also said that this should not alter our relations with British who were the first to admit that the sovereignty of the Sudan was for the Sudanese.

1. I do not believe that the Egyptians have given up the idea of the unity of the Nile valley and all that they are after is that they want to get rid of the British Government. It will not be difficult for them to conquer by force the Independent Sudan.

2. When the Sudan reaches its independence, the friendship between the British and the Sudanese will help us to retain our independence through co-operation and agreement.

3. The friendship continues with the type of statement given by Lord Duff about our discussions with the Egyptians over the Sudan Canal.

4. All that was said by Lord Duff when asked by a journalist was that we, as seekers of freedom, do not fear it for Egypt. This does not mean that we will get involved in the Egyptian dispute with you.

5. We do not interfere with the freedom and independence of any part, in the same way the Americans in this country do not interfere with our independence, and our forces stationed in Egypt do not interfere with the independence of Egypt. We will offer the Egyptians all reasonable assistance for the maintenance of the military base and we never intend to interfere with their freedom but if the Egyptians try to do us any harm, we will hit hard but whatever will be the outcome of our negotiations with Egypt, I wish to announce that the British Government will carry through the Anglo-Egyptian agreement leading to the independence of the Sudan.

- C. A. R. Thank you for this promise.
- G. L. C. The friendship you have referred to is also affected by what appears in the Umma papers against the British.
- G. L. C. The Umma papers do not ignore the good deeds of the British but we have a strong opposition encouraged by the Egyptians and Egyptian press and even in this country the Prime Minister has to keep an eye on the opposition in anything said or written. It was not possible for us or Sayed Abdik to check everything written in our papers and some of the editorial staff are still young but in any event I have informed Mr. Selwyn Lloyd in this connection that we intend to open a new page. Moreover the practical co-operation of the Umma Party with the Government in critical times is the real proof of friendship.
- G. L. C. I am very keen on the independence of the Sudan and I understand that the Egyptians, in spite of their agreement with you to keep neutral, are working for the unity of the Nile Valley and are paying their agents and trying to buy new supplies. All this should be stopped. On the other hand we are anxious and will do our best to see the elections take place on the fixed date in a free and neutral atmosphere.
- G. L. C. It is true that the Egyptians have broken their agreement with us but the Sudan Government also is holding the U. N. P.
- G. L. C. This should not be seen. What we hope for the Sudan is independence but I should like to warn you again that it will be difficult for the Independent Sudan to stand in the face of an Egyptian invasion. I believe that if the Egyptians do not succeed in bringing about the Unity of the Nile Valley by means of propaganda, they will resort to force. The desert between Egypt and the Sudan was in the past a strong barrier in the face of any invading army but, deserts do not hinder an army equipped with aeroplanes. Another important point that I must mention with deep regret is that the bravery of the Sudanese is no longer a valuable asset in the face of a well equipped modern army. Do not think that you can defeat the present Egyptian army as you have done with the predecessors near El Ghaid in the last century. The Egyptians will try to buy modern arms and will get German officers to train their army. You must therefore seriously consider ways and means of defending your independence.
- G. L. C. I fully appreciate the importance of this point and I do not doubt that with your co-operation we will be able to defend our independence. When I met Mr. Maclean last year I asked his views as to the relations that should exist between Great Britain and the Sudan and his usual view was that he would not enter into any sort of treaty that the Sudanese would object to.

S. S.  
I agree that it should be left to the independent Sudan to decide on the type of relations with us and all that I am afraid is that the Sudan will be able to maintain its independence. This relation could be a treaty to be agreed upon or the membership of the Commonwealth which will give more benefits to the Sudan and from which the Sudan can withdraw at any time if it is in his interest to do so.

S. R.  
I have no doubt that the mutual friendship now existing will result in good relations between us in the future.

S. S.  
You can discuss with Mr. Evelyn Lloyd any further details or any hole you think we can do and if you wish to see me a second time I am ready to fix a date.

S. R.  
Thank you very much.

The Lord then expressed his appreciation of the progress brought about by the British in the Sudan in the last 50 years and their effort in preparing the Sudanese to take over the affairs of their country.

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SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO KHARTOUM

Cypher/OTP.

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

No. 688

D. 3.10 a.m. July 7, 1953.

July 6, 1953.

SECRET.

Addressed to Khartoum telegram No. 688 of July 6.  
Repeated for information to Khartoum (U.K. T.C.).  
Cairo.

Your telegrams Nos. 451, 452, 457 and 459 [of June 24 and 28: the Sudan: Umma Party].

As you will have seen in the record, it was made clear to the Mahdi at both his meetings with the Minister of State that the three conditions mentioned were essential pre-requisites of close collaboration, and that the first condition was a public statement by the Umma on their breach with Egypt. Nothing that the Minister of State or the Prime Minister said could be interpreted as offering unconditional support.

2. Nevertheless, if the Umma were in fact to withhold all cooperation with the Egyptians and to fight Egyptian propaganda openly and launch an all-out electoral campaign against the N.U.P., it might be that we should regard this as satisfactory. It all depends on the circumstances, and on this we should like your advice.

3. On the other hand, if the Umma Party really succeed in persuading the Egyptians to call off their improper activities, a new situation would be created. However, in these circumstances also there might be possibilities of collaboration with the Umma.

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SECRET

J

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Howe  
No. 457  
June 27, 1953

D. 3.50 p.m. June 27, 1953  
R. 5.45 p.m. June 27, 1953

PRIORITY  
SECRET

E1055/10

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 457 of June 27  
Repeated for information to Cairo.

My telegram No. 451.

J E 1055 / 19

Neguib's letter has now been received by Umma. It says that as his previous letter has been misunderstood by Umma he has cancelled it. He asks Umma to wait until the return to Khartoum of Abdullah el Fadil who will clear up the points of misunderstanding.

2. As Abdullah el Fadil's return has been further delayed the Umma are sending Abdullah Khalil to Cairo on June 29. He and Abdullah el Fadil will again demand positive assurances from the Egyptians that their propaganda, bribery etc. will stop. Umma Party will then consider their future attitude towards Egypt in the light of the reply brought back by Abdullah Khalil. If adequate assurances are given by the Egyptians the Umma will certainly give them an opportunity to show whether they intend to implement them effectively.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo priority as my telegram No. 241.

[Repeated to Cairo].

K K K K

Ref 371/10277

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**J** E 1055/16.

INDEXED

SUDAN: THE UMMA PARTY

CONFIDENTIAL

Flags A & B  
JE 1055/9 & 10  
JE 1055/11 & 12  
Flags C & D

Mr. Luce has reported and commented on two meetings with the Mahdi and Umma leaders since their return to Khartoum; one on June 24 (G.G. Khartoum Nos.451 and 452) and another on June 28 (G.G. Khartoum Nos.457 and 459).

2. S.A.R. has tried all the usual evasions in the attempt to establish that Her Majesty's Government have committed themselves to support him and his party, whilst leaving them free of any commitment whatsoever - i.e. free to turn again should it seem expedient to do so.

Flag D

3. Judging from the report of the second meeting, Mr. Luce seems to have shaken them out of their belief that they can get away with this; but we can expect them to take the line that the Sudan Government are withholding what Her Majesty's Government promised unconditionally. When we say that this is not the case, S.A.R. will no doubt pretend to believe that the Sudan Government have persuaded Her Majesty's Government to withdraw their promise.

Flag C

4. It is noteworthy that Abdullahi El Fadil has been in Cairo since May 23 and is still there: no doubt one idea behind this was to keep the lines open - to reassure the Egyptians that S.A.R.'s prolonged stay in this country did not mean that the Umma had committed themselves to co-operation with Her Majesty's Government.

JE 1051/561  
Flag E

5. It seems unlikely, from these telegrams, that the assurances to be demanded by the Umma in Cairo will be the open support by Egypt of the Independence cause and a disavowal of the National Unionist Party (as Abdulla Khalil said when he was here). It is more probable that they will again be something vaguer, and that the Egyptians will give a more tactful reply this time. It

SENT TO DEPT.  
13/7

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is possible that the Egyptians will think it worth while ~~to~~ going quietly for a month or so. In short, things will most likely continue as they are unless the Egyptians make a false move or the Umma are again seized with panic about their election prospects.

6. Apart from a reluctance to commit themselves irrevocably, I imagine that the Umma leaders are still concerned to avoid doing anything which would give the Egyptians the excuse to denounce the Anglo Egyptian Agreement. They probably suspect that we are trying to provoke such a denunciation in order to free ourselves from our obligations to the Sudanese under the agreement (their argument against saying anything about Southern D.C.'s is illustrative of this).

JE 1055/9  
Flag A

7. As to co-operation with the S.R.P., the situation looks a little more hopeful after this later meeting; but besides disputes about constituencies, the monarchy v republic issue is likely to be a serious obstacle. As long as it appears that S.A.R. still has the ambition of becoming king, many potential supporters of the independence movement are likely to stay away from it.

JE 1055/12  
Flag D

JE 1051/577G  
Flag F

Flag C

8. We can only now await the outcome of Abdullah Khalil's visit to Cairo; but in the meantime we should give Mr. Luce the means to deny that Her Majesty's Government have offered unconditional support to either S.A.R. or the Umma Party. (A draft telegram is attached)

Flag C

9. Perhaps the Minister of State will wish to discuss all this with Sir Robert Howe before he returns to Khartoum next Sunday.


*Roger Allen*

June 30, 1953.

*S. W. Strong*

*J. I. ... 35.6*

371/102773



I think that a meeting would be the best way of dealing with this. (The Minister of State discussed it with Lord Salisbury today.)

Minister of State

W. Stanger  
30/6

Now see record of meeting with Sir R. Howe, a redraft of it.

Pa. 4/7.

371/102773

91698 3 copies PC

1944  
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SECRET

RECORD OF MEETING WITH THE  
GOVERNOR GENERAL OF THE SUDAN

---

Present: The Minister of State,  
Sir Robert Howe,  
Mr. R. Allen.

Co-operation with the Umma

The Minister of State said that the Umma representatives were now in Cairo discussing the Egyptian attitude towards the Sudan with the Egyptian Government. It was uncertain whether the Egyptians would be able to satisfy the Umma representatives. Meanwhile, the Mahdi had indicated in Khartoum that it might be difficult for the Umma to denounce their Agreement with Egypt, but had suggested that they might in fact withhold co-operation with Egypt and fight a strong electoral campaign against the N.U.P. He asked the Governor General's views on this.

2. The Governor General said that he thought it would in fact be difficult for the Umma to repudiate their Agreement with Egypt, and he was inclined to think that a refusal by the Umma to co-operate in practice with the Egyptians might suffice for our purposes.

3. The Minister of State also thought that there might be a point where non-co-operation by the Umma with the Egyptians and the pro-Egyptian parties in the Sudan would satisfy us. He would like the Governor General's advice on this after he returned to the Sudan. Our object should be to ensure that there was no Umma/N.U.P. Coalition after the Elections. If there were, an Umma majority in the new Parliament and as a result the Sudanese Government asked for independence before the three years were up, we should probably have to make it plain that Her

Majesty's

Majesty's Government would not resist such a demand, but of course Sudanisation could not be ~~contemplated~~<sup>completed</sup> within a shorter period.

4. It was agreed that the Governor General should report on the attitude of the Umma after his return, and that meanwhile, he would do his best to ensure that the Umma and the S.R.P. came to a working arrangement in the constituencies.

Evidence about Egyptian bribery and propaganda in the Sudan

5. The Minister of State inquired whether the intelligence services of the Sudan Government were succeeding in collecting evidence about this.

6. The Governor General said that they were trying to do so, but he did not know how successful they had been. It was agreed that the Governor General would look into this on his return.

Future of British Officials of the Sudan Government

7. The Minister of State said that he had some doubts about the desirability of our circularising the members of the Sudan Service in order to obtain details of their qualifications for re-employment. He did not wish to give the impression that Her Majesty's Government were expecting them to leave their posts in the Sudan in the near future. On the contrary, we should try to avoid a general exodus.

8. Mr. Allen said that he had just written a letter to Mr. Luce setting out our doubts on this subject and asking for advice. We thought that it might be easier if any circular were sent out by the Staff Association in the Sudan, rather than

by/

Reference:-

57698

FO 371/102773

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by the Sudan Government. It was agreed that the Governor General would advise us about this after his return.

July 4, 1953.

Re 371/102773

SECRET

J

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Howe  
No. 459  
June 28, 1953

D. 5.25 p.m. June 28, 1953  
R. 7.05 p.m. June 28, 1953

PRIORITY  
SECRET

12055/12

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 459 of June 28  
Repeated for information to Cairo.

My telegram No. 457.

Luce had a further discussion this morning with the Mahdi, Siddik el Mahdi, Abdulla Khalil and Ibrahim Ahmed. They said that the Umma Executive has come to a definite decision to state publicly that the Egyptians have broken their agreement [grp. undec.], to launch an all-out press and propaganda attack on Egypt and to cooperate openly with the British if the Egyptians either refuse to give assurances demanded by Umma or, having given them, fail to carry them out fully within about a month. If assurances are given and strictly observed the situation in the Umma view will be satisfactory to both the pro-Independence Sudanese and the British.

2. Regarding cooperation amongst the pro-Independence parties the Umma now show some willingness to try to come to an understanding with S.R.P. which will put an end to the present bitter conflict between them in a number of constituencies. In return, Umma asks for a further assurance that British administrators will remain neutral as between Umma and S.R.P. This can be given, but we are not optimistic about the result of discussions between Umma and S.R.P., because the former will claim majority support in some constituencies which is not admitted by S.R.P.

3. It was agreed at discussions that further developments must await result of Abdulla Khalil's visit to Cairo. But it will be seen from the above that some progress has been made from the position reported in my telegram No. 451.

4. We must warn you, however, that the Mahdi is showing clear signs of believing that Her Majesty's Government have /promised ...

30 JUN 1953

DE 1155/9



FO 371/102773


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y

SECRET

Khartoum telegram No. 459 to Foreign Office

2.

promised him personal and material assistance regardless of the outcome of Umma - Egyptian issue.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo priority as my telegram No. 242.

[Repeated to Cairo].

K K K K

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102773

J

SECRET

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Howe

D. 8.55 p.m. June 24, 1953

No. 451

June 24, 1953

R. 10. 18 p.m. June 24, 1953

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

J E 1053/9

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 451 of June 24  
Repeated for information to Cairo

My telegram No. 446. JE 1055/7

Abdullahi El Fadil's return to Khartoum has been delayed until June 25 and Neguib's latest letter has therefore not yet been seen by the Umma.

2. Luce had a long talk with the Mahdi this morning, with Siddik El Mahdi and Abdullah Khalil also present. The conditions mentioned by the Minister of State in his talk with the Mahdi on May 27 were discussed at length.

(a) Denunciation of the Umma agreement with Egypt. *green*

The Mahdi's version of this point is "non-cooperation with Egypt" and he pointed out that already there is no cooperation between the Umma and Egypt. Moreover, the Umma have now decided to launch an all-out electoral campaign against the N.U.P. and their Egyptian supporters. The Mahdi at first denied that the Minister of State had mentioned denunciation of the Umma agreement, but when asked to read out the Arab record of the talks of May 27 and the word denunciation was found to have been used on more than one occasion, he asserted that in subsequent talks the Minister of State had changed this to non-cooperation with Egypt. This assertion is not supported by your telegram No. 666. Siddik El Mahdi then made it quite clear that the Umma could not denounce their agreement. He contended that there is nothing in the agreement which conflicts with British interests or with the cause of Sudanese independence (there is some truth in this) and said that the denunciation would do great harm to the Umma Party. They would openly fight Egyptian propoganda and this action would make the Umma attitude towards Egypt clear to all the Sudanese. The Mahdi supported Siddik in this and Abdullah Khalil remained silent. *JE*

25 JUN 1953

/(b)

SECRET

Khartoum telegram No. 451 to Foreign Office

-2-

(b) Cooperation among the supporters of independence.

The Mahdi said that the S.R.P. was primarily a creation of the Sudan Government, that it now consists mainly of only a few Nazirs and that the Sudan Government has only to tell, or if necessary, order them to cooperate with the Umma and they will do so.

(c) Assurance to Southerners that the British administrators in the South would be able to remain for some time to come.

The Mahdi said he considered that this is a matter for Parliament to consider when it is formed, and that nothing should be said before then. Siddik said that the Umma delegation which toured the South found that the desire for prolongation of British administrators' service is by no means universal among the Southerners and that the Umma do not consider this to be a point of great importance. Moreover, the Egyptians would regard any assurance on this subject as a breach of the February agreement.

Continued in my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo immediate as my telegram No. 237.

[Repeated to Cairo].

- ADVANCE COPIES
- Prime Minister
- Minister of State
- Sir W. Strang
- Private Secretary
- Sir J. Bowker
- Head of African Department

PPPP

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE  
(Office of Governor General)

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

No. 436  
June 17, 1953

D: 12 Noon June 17, 1953  
R: 1.41 p.m. June 17, 1953

PRIORITY  
CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED  
E. 1055 / 6.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 436 of June 17,  
Repeated for information to Cairo.

Abdullah Khalil has reported that Neguib has delivered to Abd**el**bahi el-Fadil, who is still in Cairo, a letter addressed to the President of the Umma Party in which he withdraws his last letter of May 22 and expresses the wish to seek new means of satisfying the Umma on points at issue between them.

2. Abdullah Khalil himself is not prepared to pay attention to any further Egyptian approach of this sort and hopes that the letter will not influence other misinformed leaders. We must, however, expect it to strengthen the influence of the section of Umma opinion which would like to give Neguib one more chance.

3. Please inform Governor General.

Foreign Office please pass Cairo Priority as my telegram No. 232.

[Repeated to Cairo].

17 JUN 1953

Start

CONFIDENTIAL

J/E 1055/8

The Prime Minister received S.A.R. on June 10. I was present.

The Prime Minister told S.A.R. that we did not think much of friends who were ashamed to admit their friendship for us. If we were to co-operate to secure Sudanese independence against Egyptian designs, we should expect his newspapers at least to avoid a hostile attitude; Sayed Siddiq's recent statement supporting Egypt was particularly unfortunate, and he wondered how S.A.R. and his supporters could complain of Egyptian bad faith and, in the same breath, say that they supported Egypt in breaking her treaty with us.

The Prime Minister went on to say that he understood that the agreement between the Umma and General Neguib had been based on Neguib's solemn assurance that the Egyptian Government would refrain from propaganda in the Sudan in favour of unity. It was clear that, since the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February, the Egyptians had in fact been carrying on an unbridled propaganda campaign in favour of unity, and they were subsidising the National Unity Party on a very large scale. The Prime Minister said that it would be a monstrous thing if we were to give the Sudan its independence and, after all we had done, the Egyptians were then to filch it away. We had no intention of allowing that to happen.

S.A.R. said that he intended to take steps on his return to Khartoum to see that anti-British propaganda by the Umma Party organs was damped down.



June 16, 1953.

African Department (to enter)

Copies to:-

- Sir W. Strang
- Lord Reading
- Mr. Nutting

copy

EL SUDAN EL GEDID (Non-Party - Pro-Independence) (28/6/53).

El Sudan el Gedid scores a most important journalistic triumph. Summary of discussions between Sir Winston Churchill and S.A.R. - Has Churchill offered the throne to S.A.R.? Great Britain expresses her determination to protect Sudan's independence.

According to the paper's representative in foreign diplomatic circles (!) the following account is a resume of the discussion that took place in London recently between the British Prime Minister the Rt. Honourable Sir Winston Churchill and El Seyed Sir AbdelRahman el Mahdi, Patron of the Umma Party:-

During his interview with S.A.R. Sir Winston Churchill looked happy and cheerful. He was accompanied by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd; and El Seyed Ibrahim Ahmed interpreted for S.A.R.

The conversation was lucid and frank; and Sir Winston Churchill declared that Great Britain was all out for an early general election and the setting up of self-government as a preliminary step towards self-determination.

Great Britain, he said, has no ambition other than that the Sudan maintains the bonds of friendship which the British have been promoting for the past 50 years or so, and establish diplomatic relations with Britain accordingly.

S.A.R. said in reply that the independent Sudan would certainly show gratitude to all who did it service. It will never let down any ally who helps it ~~to~~ win its liberty. The Sudan will see to it that good relationship exists between it and the rest of the world, carrying on with progress in all fields of human endeavour and joining the Arab League.

The Sudan would not be satisfied with anything less than full independence.

Sir Winston then said that it was up to the Sudanese to choose the form of government they liked although he believed that monarchism would be best suited to the Orient; and S.A.R. replied that monarchism was a dying concern particularly in the East and that it had outlived its usefulness. It would not therefore be advisable for the Sudan to start its independent career with a rapidly diminishing political system.

Already long-established monarchisms have disappeared and it was believed that republicanism would be most suitable for the Sudan.

"This is all very well" remarked Sir Winston, "but in view of my vast experience of the East and my active participation in the 'River War' and indeed my knowledge of the Mahdi's record and that of his family I am of the opinion that monarchism is better for the Sudan than Republicanism".

/S.A.R said



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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Howe

No. 387

May 25, 1953

PRIORITY  
CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED. 5.32 p.m. May 25, 1953

R. 7.08 p.m. May 25, 1953

J E 6035 / 4.

291X  
J E 1643 / 3

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 387 of May 25

Repeated for information to Cairo

My telegram No. 218 to Cairo.

A copy of Neguib's letter to the Umma party referred to in paragraph 2 of that telegram has now been given confidentially to Luce. The main points are as follows.

1. The mutual interests of Sudan and Egypt require a common policy for the division of the Nile waters to the benefit of the two countries, a common economic policy and a common defence policy to prevent any outside interference in the above two interests.

2. If the Sudan becomes independent the two countries will have an agreed foreign policy which will safeguard the above three interests.

3. If the Sudan becomes united with Egypt each country will deal with its internal affairs without interference from others, but a joint Sudanese-Egyptian body will be set up to deal with matters of common interest.

4. The difference between independence and unity is therefore very slight.

5. The real menace to a satisfactory arrangement between an independent Sudan and Egypt is British influence which is used to poison the atmosphere and to foster suspicions between the Sudanese and the Egyptians. The greatest danger from the British is their raising the bogey of Egyptian propaganda in the Sudan.

/6. The





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CONFIDENTIAL

Khartoum telegram No. 387 to Foreign Office

-2-

- 6. The chief weapons of British influence are their holds on administration and executive authority, their economic strangle hold, Christian missions and the United Kingdom Trade Commissioner's office.
  - 7. Egypt is maintaining the policy of neutrality towards all Sudanese parties and no money is being sent to the Sudan for political purposes. Egypt's one aim is to help the Sudanese to get rid of British colonization.
  - 8. Egypt has been cut off from the Sudan for fifty years and it is only natural that the two peoples should now fill this gap by visiting each other.
  - 9. A final appeal to maintain solidarity for the common purpose of getting rid of the British.
- Foreign Office pass priority to Cairo as my telegram No. 220.
- [Repeated to Cairo].

PPPP

[371/102773

INDEXED  
JE. 1055/28  
9/6/48

1/14/48  
Submission V  
Ed. Tel. 14 06 10 Cairo  
with JE 1054/606

THE SUDAN: VISIT OF MAJOR SALEM

JE 1051/606

Flag A.

In his telegram number 494, the Governor General suggests that we should try to get the Egyptians to lay off such propaganda stunts as a visit by Salem would be, <sup>we</sup> adding that it might also help stave-off a visit by Neguib, of which there has been some talk, — September being the suggested date.

2. The Governor General argues that the visit would be inconsistent with the Anglo/Egyptian Agreement, because its purpose would be to intervene in the political situation. We should have great difficulty in sustaining this argument since the Egyptians would naturally not admit that this was the purpose of the visit. We cannot argue that ministerial visits as such are inconsistent with the Agreement, since the Minister of State has made a visit since it was signed.

3. On the other hand, Egyptian behaviour over the Sudan in the last week or two has been particularly objectionable. They have not only been awkward about the appointment of Mr. Riches as alternate member of the Commission, but have made very provocative statements on this subject and on the subject of the Sudan generally (see especially Cairo telegram number 1120 at JE 1051/604).

Governor General's

Flag B

On the specific issue of Riches, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs has refused to agree explicitly that the Egyptian Government does not claim a right to veto even when we have offered to suggest another name. (The present position is that Sir Laurence Grafftey-Smith is flying to Khartoum on August 6 to take part in a Commission meeting).

Flag D

4. We therefore have very good reason to make some demonstration of our disapproval of this kind of

behaviour/

behaviour. We cannot hope to reach an amicable arrangement simply by asking the Egyptians to agree to abstain from propaganda visits by Egyptian Ministers. What we <sup>might</sup> ~~can~~ do is instruct Mr. Hankey to inform the Egyptian Government that we ~~would~~ regard such visits as inconsistent with the spirit of the Agreement; to say that for our part we have no intention of engaging in such propaganda stunts; and that unless the plan for the visit is withdrawn, we must consider what further steps to take.

5. The possible further steps would be: -

- (a) for the Governor General to refuse to allow Salem to <sup>the Sudan.</sup> ~~enter~~ This would be very drastic, but is worth considering. The arguments against it — which seem to be decisive — are that it would provoke a major crisis and probably spoil any chances of the defence discussions succeeding, and that we would get little support in the Sudan (we should be accused of "provoking" the Egyptians).
- (b) <sup>for us to</sup> ~~we should~~ riposte in the Egyptian style by publicly denouncing the behaviour of the Egyptian Government, <sup>We could</sup> saying that their action in refusing to issue the decree appointing Mr. Riches, and this projected visit by Major Salem, ~~are~~ demonstrations of their unwillingness to keep to the terms of the Agreement, and that they have been informed that this ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> our view. Paradoxically, this course, though seemingly ineffective might bring us dividends in the Sudan. If, at the same time we could persuade the Umma to object to the visit and to refuse to have anything to do with Salem, it would help us a great deal.

6. In the meantime, the Acting Secretary of State has directed that we should seek Mr. Hankey's views. The Department

therefore/

371/102773

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therefore recommend that the above considerations should be borne in mind when we have Mr. Hankey's comments.

7. A draft telegram is attached, on the lines agreed at Lord Salisbury's meeting.

*R.D. Sedman*

August 4, 1953.

*We need bear these suggestions in mind. The first thing is to get Mr. Hankey's comment.*

*V.G. [unclear]  
4/8*

*[unclear]*

*tel. sent.  
4/8*

FO 371/102773

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(JE 1055/21)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

SECRET

July 29, 1953.

OUTSIDE

In conversation with Allen, Luce has mentioned a discussion with Sayed Ali el Mirghani in which the latter brought up the subject of the article in the newspaper "Sudan el Gadi" where it was alleged that the Prime Minister had pressed Sayed Abdul Rahman el Mahdi to make himself King of the Sudan. Luce thought that this story and other similar rumours which were current in the Sudan were having a harmful effect on the cause of independence, and that it would be useful if some means could be devised of countering them.

It is not possible of course for Her Majesty's Government to put out official denials of rumours current in the Sudan, but I think that something might be done in the following way. When you see Sayed Ali, you could refer to his conversation with Luce and assure him that the question of the form of government in an independent Sudan was not discussed at all between SAR and the Prime Minister. The subject did come up at a meeting between SAR and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: on this occasion, the Minister of State repeated what was said to SAR by Mr. Eden a year ago - that it was for the Sudanese to decide, if they chose independence, what the form of their Government would be, and said that the Sudanese Parliament, when it was elected, would be able to give some indication of their views.

If this leaked into the local press (and it might be well to arrange that it should) SAR could not complain, since it is an accurate statement of what took place between him and the Minister of State, and since he has not claimed himself that the subject was discussed between him and the Prime Minister.

I leave it to you to judge whether it would be helpful for you to take this step.

WILLIAM STRANG.



J

317

himself to this publicly in a statement to a Khartoum newspaper.

4. Mr. Luce thought it would be useful for Her Majesty's Government to counteract the rumours of which Sayed Ali complained, and the attached draft letter from Sir William Strang to Sir Robert Howe suggests a means of doing so which has been discussed with Mr. Luce.

*Flags B+C* (Our records of S.A.R.'s conversations with the P.M. and the Minister of State are at JE 1055/8 and JE 1051/5749; S.A.R.'s record of the conversation with the P.M. is at JE 1055/19).

*Flag D*

*Roger Allen*  
July 22, 1953.

It may be that S.A.R. read more into the Minister of State's personal remarks during his interview with him than was warranted. But the fact remains that neither <sup>of the</sup> records of the interview with the Prime Minister mentions the subject of the Monarchy, and I agree that action on the lines proposed would be useful.

*A. F. Zoubeir*

July 24, 1953.

*Sir W. Strang*  
*Minister of State*

*As you were present at these interviews, you will know best how to handle this.*

*W. Strang*

*I agree with this & other*  
*hr 24/7*

FO. 371/102773

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- 3 -

them through the provision of working capital.  
(Riches letters to Allen 10311/10/53 of 18th May and 1st June).

When invitations were being distributed for the celebrations of the 23rd an Egyptian toured parts of Equatoria touting for acceptances with promises of money. He is also reported to have tried to get a Police Sergeant Major to go to Cairo with promises that his pay would be doubled if he did so.

An Army Officer has been put into the Office of the Egyptian Economic Expert in Khartoum. His functions are not yet known but the Chief Staff Officer Egyptian Troops is the main channel for Egyptian Government activity, so this appointment is significant.

The local "Sudan El Gedid" paper, previously notorious for it's independent line has since the middle of the month made a volte face and declared for union with Egypt. This coincides with the return from Cairo of the Editor Ahmed Yousif Hashim and the supposition is that he has been bought.

Governor-General's Office,  
Khartoum.  
29th July, 1953.



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*Enb*

Telegraphic Address  
"HAKIMAM"

**JE 1055/25**

GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
KHARTOUM.

GG/97.8.1/3.

28th July, 1953.

**INDEXED**

SECRET.

*Dear Allen*

I forward to you a further periodical resume of Egyptian propaganda. The Umma know all about this but there is still a section of the party unwilling to go too far in open attack on the Egyptians.

2. There seems to be a good deal of local opinion very critical of the lack of reaction from the United Kingdom to the Egyptian attacks published in press and radio, where they concern Britain or show an attitude over Sudanese affairs contrary to the undertaking in the Agreement to preserve "a free and neutral atmosphere".

3. It is a fact that since about the middle of the month the Umma press has published a series of articles criticising in moderate tones the N.U.P. and Egyptian policies:-

- July 12th - "Salah Salem's good offices".
- July 14th - "What we hold against the N.U.P.".
- July 21st - "We are fed up with these manoeuvres".
- July 26th - "What do the Unionists want now".
- July 27th - "Unblemished independence".
- July 28th - Comment by Abdulla Bey Khalil on Salah Salem's statement at Alexandria on the 9th.

The Umma have also begun to issue a pamphlet called "Independence Movement Letters". No. 1 was headlined "We claim full independence for the Sudan". It appeared in English and Arabic from the Tamaddon Press and No. 2 is appearing shortly.

4. I am sending copies of this letter and the enclosure to Duke at Cairo and Bill Davies in London and will pass copies to riches here.

*Yours sincerely*  
*J. W. Kenrick*  
J. W. KENRICK.

Ref 371/102773 91648

SECRET.

THIRD NOTE ON EGYPTIAN PROPAGANDA IN  
THE SUDAN SINCE THE AGREEMENT  
OF FEBRUARY, 1953.

This third note covers the period since 20th April, 1953 (when the last note was written) until the end of July 1953. It should be read with the knowledge that the Umma Party, during this period, have protested to the Egyptian leaders against their campaign in the Sudan, and have received assurances that Egypt intended to remain neutral and would not try to influence the Sudanese in their choice of political party or future status.

It can not be said that there has been any abatement in Egyptian propaganda, nor was this to be expected.

2. Methods used in Egypt.

(1) Public statements by politicians, in particular Major Salah Salim, whose utterances seem to be beyond the control of the Regime have continued to claim that Egypt's aim is to clear British influence out of the Sudan and that Britain is determined to prevent this by sabotaging the February Agreement.

An example of recent date was his statement at Alexandria on July 9th. A typical quotation follows:- "All that concerns us is that there should be a free Sudan or, in other words, a Sudan over which there is no foreign British influence. Should we (Egypt or the Sudan) unite and this influence exist it would be useless. The Sudanese people would not be able to develop and would continue to be humiliated, poor and weak. They will be a burden on us and we shall be a burden on them. It is not a question of being connected or separated, as was said in the past. All we want is to help them to remove the nightmare of Imperialism. Once this is done they will realise where their interests lie and they will certainly realise that their interests lie with us".

The rest of his statement was devoted to showing that fantastic agricultural prospects existed in the Sudan, were not being developed 'by the British' but would be developed by the Egyptians if the two countries united.

(2) Cairo Radio continued to broadcast lies and malicious rumours specifically directed at the Sudan through it's "Sudan Corner" programme directed by Tewfik Ahmed el Bakri (Cairo Chancery letter No. 1686/9/539 to the African Department dated 20th June 1953).

(3) The Middle East News Agency continued to collect news items from their Khartoum Agents which, inaccurately conceived or maliciously altered, then appear in the Egyptian Press and are later quoted in the local vernacular press. Many examples can be seen in the Akhar Sa'a. Issue No. 14 of 15th April, 1953 of El Tahrir is a flagrant example. The Anram of July

14th carried the news "England buys the Mandi's cotton for  $\frac{1}{2}$  million pounds more than the prevailing prices". No attempt of course is ever made to check facts in the appropriate official quarters.

(4) The propaganda approach by inviting Sudanese to Cairo as guests of the Government continued and reached a crescendo for the celebrations of July 23rd. On May 10th Chief Jambo and two Southern Sudanese ex-Egyptian Majors were met at the airport in Cairo by General Neguib himself and a number of Ministers. They were accommodated in special hotels, allotted special cars, feted, and encouraged to record anti-British and anti-Sudan Government statements which were recorded for broadcast from "Sudan Corner" and given wide publicity in the Egyptian Press. A case came to light in Bahr-el-Ghazal Province showing that young Southern boys had been enticed to Cairo, given money and clothes there, taught to hate the British and then returned to their Southern Province to sow dissension.

Recently there were over 100 boys from Omdurman non-Government schools touring Cairo and Alexandria at the expense of the Egyptian Government.

For the celebrations of July 23rd large numbers of invitations were sent out to practically all the tribal leaders and a number of Government Officials, without reference to the Sudan Government (Governor-General's telegram No. 243 of 1st July to Cairo). They were entertained at the public expense, and an opportunity was taken at a reception for the International Press, to use statements by a N.U.P. Sudanese Doctor serving in the South and some disgruntled Southerners, to discredit Britain and the British element of the Sudan Administration (Cairo telegram No. 1097 to the Foreign Office).

### 3. Methods used in the Sudan.

(1) There were no glaring examples of tours by prominent Egyptians of Ministerial level during the period under review.

(2) The existing Egyptian agencies were however active. The Egyptian Irrigation Department for example carried out a purge in Malakal of all staff suspected of being sympathetic to the Sudan Administration. Egyptian Irrigation Department Officials also toured the South with the N.U.P. electioneering delegation. On the 23rd July the E.I.D. in Malakal organised festivities which included an unauthorised procession, which shouted "Long live Unity of the Nile Valley" outside the Governor's Office, and a play, to which the public had been invited, which symbolised the Unity of Egypt and the Sudan.

In Duedin the two Egyptian Ramadan preachers departed from their religious briefs to praise Neguib and to attack the British and the Americans.

A so-called Egyptian Agricultural Company arrived on May 10th and toured the Blue Nile Province. This is a dangerous move designed to penetrate the Nile Pump agricultural schemes by gaining control of

R 371/102773

9/648

White J  
C. J.

TOP SECRET

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Howe

No. 478

July 15, 1953

D: 11.00 a.m. July 15, 1953

R: 1.16 p.m. July 15, 1953

PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

INDEXED

JE 1055/18

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 478 of July 15.  
Repeated for information to Cairo.

My telegrams Nos. 470 and 472. <sup>JE 1055/15</sup>

In conversations with Luce on July 12 and myself today, the Mahdi discussed the present political situation and, in particular, Umma relations with the British.

2. He said that as regards Umma relations with Egypt we must now wait for a month to see if Egypt carries out her latest promises. If she does not, the Umma will take action described in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 472 and the way will be clear for open cooperation with the British.

3. The Mahdi agreed that if Egypt does carry out her promises, the situation will have changed, but he emphasized strongly that cooperation by Umma and the British will still be essential to the cause of independence. The Egyptians have set up a strong propaganda organisation in the Sudan and this will be able to continue to function and must continue to be fought, and this requires funds. The Mahdi pointed out that he had spent large sums of his own money in the past years in support of Umma and independence, but he is now in financial difficulties and cannot afford to help them adequately. If Her Majesty's Government mean what they say about supporting the cause of independence, this is the time to prove it by giving him practical assistance.

4. As regards cooperation between the pro-independence parties, the Mahdi said that it would be a mistake to have any close agreement between the Umma and S.R.P. as this would drive Khatmia away from the latter party, but he thought it might be possible to reach some understanding which would reduce the conflict between the two parties.

/ 5. Regarding assurances ...



FO 371/102773

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TOP SECRETKhartoum telegram No. 478 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

5. Regarding assurances to the Southerners, the Mahdi said that recent Umma delegation to the South had found that only a section of the Southerners are anxious that British Administrators should remain beyond the three year period. However, if the Southerners when they come to parliament show a strong wish for this and if they are cooperating in the cause of independence, he thought Umma would support them.

6. Siddik el Mahdi will arrive in London on July 23 in connexion with cotton sales but will also certainly want to discuss matters mentioned in paragraph 3 above. Luce will arrive on July 21 and will bring my views on the subject.

7. Salah Salem's visit to Khartoum has been cancelled.

Foreign Office pass priority to Cairo as my telegram No. 252.

[Repeated to Cairo].

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African Department  
News Department

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SECRET

INDEXED

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Howe

No. 472

D. 4.30 p.m. July 9, 1953

July 9, 1953

R. 6.59 p.m. July 9, 1953

SECRET

JE

Your telegram No. 688.

You will now have seen my telegram No. 470. - JE1055/13

2. The present situation is that Egypt has given the assurances requested by Umma and the latter will wait about three weeks to observe the practical results. If these are not satisfactory to Umma, they have assured us that without further ado they will declare publicly that Egypt has broken her agreement with them, and launch an all-out campaign against the Egyptians and the N.U.P. In my view, we could regard these conditions as satisfactory.

3. If the Egyptian assurances are carried to the satisfaction of Umma, a new situation, as you say in your telegram under reference, will be created and we shall then have to consider what form of collaboration with Umma will be possible and appropriate. I can only repeat that, in spite of your clear statement to the Mahdi in London, he is unlikely to agree that personal assistance to him will have become inappropriate.

4. The danger is that Egypt will now play down her propaganda and bribery sufficiently to avoid a break with Umma, but leave herself free to start again nearer the elections, when any strong Umma reaction would have less time to take effect.

5. Salah Salem's visit may also be an important factor. Should he succeed in patching the unity of the Sudanese parties, however artificial and temporary, any question of close cooperation with Umma would, I consider, have to be abandoned.

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R371/102773

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SECRET

FROM KHAIROUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

J

Cypher/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Howe  
No. 470  
July 7, 1953

D. 4.20 p.m. July 7, 1953  
R. 6.02 p.m. July 7, 1953

PRIORITY  
SECRET

JE 1055/13

INDEXED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 470 of July 7.  
Repeated for information to Cairo.

On returning from Cairo, Abdulla Khalil reports that he found Neguib, Salah Salem and other Egyptians in a more amenable and subdued mood than hitherto. Salah Salem admitted that Egypt had been helping the N.U.F. but assured Abdulla Khalil that this would now all cease and that the Umma would very soon have clear proof of this.

2. Abdulla Khalil replied that he was glad to hear this, but emphasized that the Umma would require positive evidence of Egyptian good intentions. If this was not forthcoming in the very near future, the Umma would take other action without further reference to Egypt.

3. The Umma now intend to wait about three weeks to judge the effect of the Egyptian assurances.

4. Abdulla Khalil ascribes this apparent change in the Egyptian attitude to three factors:

- (a) The firm line taken by the Umma delegation to Cairo in April,
- (b) A growing awareness that many N.U.F. leaders are self-seekers of little worth, who have given the Egyptians such false information about the situation in the Sudan,
- (c) Nervousness about the future of the present régime in Egypt (opposition from the Wafd and the universities was particularly mentioned by Neguib).

5. Neguib said that he would favour real independence for the Sudan with treaty relations to safeguard the mutual interest

/of the



SECRETKhartoum telegram No. 470 to Foreign Office

-2-

of the two countries, but he could not possibly say this publicly now as it would strengthen the hands of his enemies too greatly.

6. Salah Salem is reported to be flying to Khartoum on July 11, with the main object of trying to bring Sayed Ali Mirghani and The Mahdi closer together and to revive unity between the Sudanese parties.

Foreign Office pass to Cairo as my telegram No. 247.

[Repeated to Cairo].

0-0-0-





Office of the United Kingdom  
Trade Commissioner,  
P.O. Box 801,  
Khartoum.

R 22/5

11th May, 1953.

J E 1055/5

Dear Roger.

I have found a rather more pessimistic atmosphere on my return to Khartoum. There is a feeling that pro-unity propaganda financed by the Egyptians is "making headway" though no one is willing to commit himself to what this means in concrete terms. But a general increase in the strength of the N.U.P. in the country proportionately increases the importance of the south to all parties, and it seems that the recent activities of Ahmed-es-Sayid on behalf of the N.U.P. in the south have been more successful than observers, including the Umma, had expected. It is this as much as anything else that has happened recently that has induced the Umma's present feeling of apprehension.

2. The general attitude of the Umma Party remains the problem. They talk of having laid down the law to Neguib and of being willing to break it if he refuses to give them the guarantees they want, and Sayid Abdur Rahman himself has suggested full co-operation with H.K.G. But they - or at least the majority of the leaders who matter - remain curiously reluctant to abandon the hope that Neguib does perhaps represent a new type of honest Egyptian with whom durable agreements can be made. While in the background is the constant fear that what Egypt has recently given Egypt can also take away: she can denounce her agreement to waive her insistence on sovereignty and to grant self-government and self-determination to the Sudanese, and engineer a boycott of the elections by the N.U.P.

3. The Umma leaders have said in confidence that this time they will not be deceived and that if within a month or so there are not obvious indications that the Egyptians are sincerely willing to carry out an agreement to abstain from propaganda they will break with Egypt. But on present indications when that time comes I fear that there will inevitably be a move in favour of giving Egypt another chance. Meanwhile, presumably as a concomitant of the continuing negotiations with Neguib the Umma press ostentatiously maintains a balance as between Egypt and Britain. Attacks on Egyptian propaganda are accompanied by warnings that Britain (and specifically my office) should not try and emulate Egypt in this respect, while a recent article professed to find pro-commonwealth propaganda just as active and objectionable as the pro-unity variety. Sayid Seddik has himself carefully explained to me how he rebutted Neguib's charge that he was pro-British!

I am sending a copy of this letter to Cairo.

Yours truly  
Derek Riches  
(D.M.H. Riches)

Allen Esq., C.E.G.  
African Department,  
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

F. 10371/102773

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

P R I S E C

Sir R. Howe

D. 7.14 p.m. May 6, 1953

No. 340

R. 9.07 p.m. May 6, 1953

May 6, 1953

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

J E 1055/2

Following personal for Prime Minister

I saw Sayed Abdul Rahman El Mahdi yesterday and the Secretary-General of U.M.M.A. party today who gave me a full account of their party delegation's visit to Neguib to complain of Egyptian propoganda and bribery. The delegates had taken a strong line with Neguib who pleaded not guilty and put the blame on his subordinates. The delegates had pressed Neguib to make a statement to the effect that he would prefer an independent Sudan to unity of the Nile valley brought about by improper means. A reply had been received from Neguib but was not considered satisfactory and a further approach is being made to Cairo.

2. S.A.R. said that he would use all his resources to combat Egyptian activities here and hoped he would be supported by us and by Her Majesty's Government. They would wait a little to see if the Egyptians would mend their ways. If they did not Abdullah Khalil said the party would denounce the agreement with the Egyptians, boycott elections, and take steps to see that the elections could not be carried out. They would prefer to go back to the situation before the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement and put off self-determination for years under our protection.

3. S.A.R. said that Egyptians had suggested that the money came from Sayed Ali Mirghani. S.A.R. did not think this a possible answer, but he did accuse his rival of openly supporting the Egyptian aims and using his position as a religious leader for political purposes. The Administration should withdraw their support from S.A.M. and British officials should throw their weight behind the U.M.M.A. party wherever possible.

Please see my immediately following telegram.

[Copies sent to the Prime Minister].

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

P R I S E C

Sir R. Howe  
No. 341  
May 6, 1953.

D. 6.53 p.m. May 6, 1953.  
R. 8.25 p.m. May 6, 1953.

PRIORITY  
CONFIDENTIAL

Personal for Prime Minister.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Abdulla Khalil's ideas on future action by the Umma party if the Egyptians fail to mend their ways, should not be taken necessarily to represent the views of the party as a whole. He is not in the innermost counsels of the Party and is less close to Sayed Abdul Rahman El Mahdi than some of its other leaders.

2. Sayed Abdul Rahman El Mahdi's accusations against Sayed Ali Mirghani are a familiar gambit. In fact there is no more evidence now than in the past, that he is supporting Egypt and his views on the future of the Sudan are as enigmatical as ever. His guiding principle continues to be fear and hatred of Sayed Abdul Rahman El Mahdi and Mahdist ambitions.

3. In my opinion we must be very cautious about giving our obvious support to Sayed Abdul Rahman El Mahdi and Umma before they decide to come out into the open over their attitude to Egypt. As long as they try to maintain a façade of friendliness with Egypt they will disown us when any activities of ours embarrass them with the Egyptians. But an open break with Egypt would put new life into the pro-independence elements in the country and would open the door to firmer and more effective support from us.

[Copies sent to the Prime Minister].

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*Euler*  
Governor General's Office,

GG/97.8.1.

KHARTOUM.

20th April, 1953.

*Pr... might... exchange... 10.3/4*

PERSONAL & SECRET.

Dear *Allen,* *E1055/1*

With reference to our telegram No. 297 I enclose a note on the methods of propaganda used by the Egyptians since the February Agreement.

2. It makes no mention of money because we have so far not been able to obtain positive proof of its use, but the circumstantial evidence is so strong, and it is so much a matter of common knowledge, that there can be no doubt whatever that large sums of Egyptian money are being used in support of the N.U.P.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Creswell in Cairo.

Yours *sim only*  
*[Signature]*

(W. H. Luce)

R. Allen, Esq., CMG.,  
The Foreign Office,  
LONDON. S. W. 1.

R0371/102773

91698

20/4/53

NOTE ON METHODS OF PROPAGANDA USED BY THE EGYPTIANS  
SINCE THE FEBRUARY, 1953, AGREEMENT.

It is considered useful to divide this subject into two parts. A. methods used in Egypt and B. methods used in the Sudan.

A. METHODS USED IN EGYPT.

1. There are a number of instances of speeches made by General Neguib, Major Salah Salim and others in which Britain has been publicly accused of working to sabotage the Agreement. For example see Cairo's clear telegrams to the Foreign Office No. 581, 617 and 618. More recently Major Salah Salim is reported to have accused Britain in a lecture to the Journalists' Club in Alexandria of aiming to dismember the Nile valley and of impoverishing it by lowering the standard of agriculture and by wasting its mineral wealth. He informed his audience that Egypt intended to expose in a Red Book the scandalous policy followed by Britain since the signing of the Agreement.

2. Cairo radio.

A powerful new radio transmission has been instituted as close as possible to the Oudurman wavelengths on the 29 and 43 metre bands.

3. Middle East News Agency.

A Dr. Husni Khalifa of M. E. N. A. has been provided with Egyptian funds, and has just been given an hour each day on the Cairo to Khartoum trunk telephone in order to collect information from agents in the Sudan.

4. Invitations to Prominent Sudanese.

Merchants and tribal leaders in considerable numbers are being invited (often personally by General Neguib) to visit Egypt at Egyptian expense ostensibly to attend agricultural and horse shows. A party went in the middle of March, and there is another party up there now. In addition Ahlia (i.e. - non-government) school teachers have been invited to Egypt to attend cultural lectures, in order to contaminate another supremely important sphere and get at the young. The Sudan Football Association has recently been approached to exchange team visits, the Egyptian players to come to the Sudan first.

B. METHODS USED IN THE SUDAN.

1. Visits and Tours of prominent Egyptians.

Examples:

The tours of Salah Salim, Dr. Salah el Din, and Sh. Bakhouri. No opportunities are lost to make mischievous speeches or statements at press interviews.

2. Representative Offices in the Sudan.

(a) The offices of the Inspector-General of the Egyptian Irrigation Department, the Economic Expert and the Inspector of Egyptian Education are agencies for propaganda services. Since the establishment of the military regime however the headquarters of the Egyptian Sudan has become the most important

(b) Branches of new Egyptian Organisations are being opened, for example: the Misr Bank, which has wide commercial interests, and the Red Crescent Organisation. The latter is distributing largesse to the poor in Omdurman.

3. Egyptian Army Activity.

Examples:

- (a) The attendance of Egyptian officers at Congress Club and N. U. P. meetings and celebrations.
- (b) The interference in politics of senior officers, who are used as a channel to the Sudanese parties for the delivery of messages, instructions, and probably money.
- (c) After the official celebrations parade on February 14th the Egyptian Army encouraged crowds of demonstrators shouting "Long live Neguib" and "Unity of the Nile", and carried them in their military trucks through the streets of Khartoum, from the Secretariat, where the parade took place, back to their barracks.
- (d) The provision by the Army to the cinemas of the main towns of the "Liberation film".
- (e) The opening by the Egyptian Army of a Public Affairs Office in Khartoum.
- (f) The incident of the presentation to General Neguib of an S. D. F. Badge (See Morris' letter to Ledward dated 16.4.53).
- (g) The disregard of Air Navigation Regulations by Egyptian Air Force, low flying, etc.

4. The Egyptian Club.

The Club has a prominent site in Khartoum and for some time has allowed lectures with anti-British tinge to be given to which the public are invited. More recently it has entertained tribal leaders, etc. going through to Egypt (see A.4. above) and has shown them films of Neguib being idolised by the Cairo mob.

5. Various other Propaganda devices.

These are well planned and widespread.

Examples:

- (a) The holding of an Egyptian art exhibition last month, and the intention to hold some form of industrial exhibition shortly.
- (b) The provision of liberation flags in large quantity after the signing of the agreement, for free distribution and sale in the shops. These flags were flown down from Cairo by military aircraft.
- (c) The provision of a small Unity lapel badge for distribution.
- (d) It is reported that radio recording apparatus is to be sent to the Sudan to record statements by pro-Egyptian Sudanese for transmission from Cairo Radio.
- (e) There is an increase in visits by Egyptian students, scouts, schoolgirls, etc.
- (f) ~~The~~ subtle move to catch the ambitious has been the appointment of Sudanese to the post of Governor, Aswan, as Deputy to Director of the Azhar, and to the Under-Secretaryship for Sudanese Affairs. The S. D. F. is attacked by the offer of appointments and promotion in the Egyptian Army to S. D. F. officers if they leave the Force, and some retired S. D. F. officers have been so treated.
- (g) The sending to the Sudan for distribution ~~taxies~~ through the Egyptian Army of portraits of General Neguib.

- (h) There have been attempts to seduce Sudan Government radio staff and members of the Sudan Journalists' Association.
- (i) The despatch to the Sudan of Egyptian Islamic preachers was a move in the religious sphere.
- (j) Rumours are fostered that an Egyptian University will be built in Khartoum at Egyptian expense, and a large secondary school is now being built with Egyptian money in Omdurman.
- (k) In the economic field there is also activity. For example the Egyptians try to make available when possible certain commodities at cheap prices. A recent example was soap. They are also sedulously fostering a rumour that they are going to buy Sayed Abdol Rahman's cotton crop. It will be appreciated that all private cotton growers are extremely anxious about the prospects of selling their recent crop.

From the above it can be seen that Egyptian methods of propaganda cover a wide field. Whereas some are open, or even clumsy, others are skilfully designed to have long range effect in a country as immature as is the Sudan. It is true that the Egyptians sometimes overreach themselves, but they suffer from no inhibitions, and an error of shooting by one piece is soon forgotten in the general barrage from the remainder of the artillery.

Governor-General's Office,  
Khartoum.  
20th April, 1953.

GG/97.8.1.

53

R 371/102773

91698

Luce  
Charbonnet  
Mr Allen  
9/97.8.1  
20<sup>th</sup> April  
d in  
1<sup>st</sup> May

Sudan  
Note on methods of propaganda  
used by the Egyptians since  
February 1965.

Copied Mr Hussein, Cairo.

References

2081/500.

102773

(Print)

(How disposed of)

MINUTES

This information is useful because;  
(a) we may have to use it to counter attack  
if the Egyptians carry out their threat of  
exposing our Sudan policy in a Red Book,  
(b) some of these devices might be adopted  
by us.

R. Parsons  
4/5.

i.p.d. (Mr Barclay) for observations please.

1. I have taken copies of the enclosure.
2. I wish I could be encouraging and make some useful suggestions for following the example of Egypt. Except for one or two comparatively minor measures we cannot compete with the Egyptians who are prepared to concentrate everything they have got in winning over the Sudan. If they had been clever they would have done all these things long ago. They have every advantage in being a neighbouring country with a common bond (at any rate as far as the chief political centres in the Sudan are concerned) of a common language and religion. The following are my detailed observations on the enclosure to this letter.
  - A.
    1. If our Ministers were prepared to make speeches about the Sudan they would receive just as much publicity as those of the Egyptian military junta. If Egypt publishes the threatened Red Book, we will do our best to discredit it, but it will be widely read and believed because it will be interestingly scurrilous.

2. Cairo Radio. I have no doubt that this will be one of the best heard stations in the Sudan and therefore one of the most widely listened to. The best counter is an improvement in Radio Qaduman. We are shortly to discuss the possibilities with the Sudan Public Relations Officer. The B.B.C. Arabic service and Sharq el Adna have  
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/been

(Action completed)

(Index)

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WR.  
30.4.53



been asked to pay particular attention to the Sudan in their programmes.

3. The Middle East News Agency. This is a comparatively new project which, I suspect, has been set up largely as a rival to the Arab News Agency. The latter are going to establish an office as soon as possible in Khartoum (where they already have a correspondent). I have asked those concerned to investigate the possibilities of sabotaging the M.E.N.A. which has now started operating (so far not very effectively) all over the Middle East from a base in Cairo.

4. Invitations to the Sudanese. We cannot compete here with the Egyptians who can offer Arabic speaking Moslem Sudanese any amount of palatable fare comparatively close at hand. We have of course an official Sudanese Delegation coming to the Coronation and I understand that the Sudanese Government are themselves sending at their own expense a party of about 30 Sudanese to the Coronation as well. This Department is arranging a month's tour in the United Kingdom for three parties of four Sudanese journalists or others of similar status who are in a position to influence public opinion during the course of this year.

B.

1. I do not imagine that one of our Ministers would wish to stump the Sudan making speeches. He would in any case be under the disadvantage of not speaking in Arabic which is essentially an oratorical language. I think, however, that some time before the Sudanese elections it might be a very good plan to have a ministerial statement here which would be publicised in the Sudan and which would clearly state the themes which we wish put over to the Sudanese.

2. The establishment of our Trade Commissioner's Office in Khartoum may do something to offset the effect of the many Egyptian offices in the Sudan. The British office is already being severely criticised in the Egyptian and Sudanese press (including worst of all a Sudanese pro-independence paper) and we should take opportunities of calling the attention of the Sudanese to the activities of the Egyptian offices.

3. Army Activity. I do not think that the British Army is in a position to conduct similar propaganda. It looks to me as if it would now suit us best from the propaganda point of view for the forces of both Britain and Egypt to withdraw from the Sudan.

4. Egyptian Club. I do not think that anything similar in the way of an Anglo-Sudanese Society would work. It is just possible that we might get something like the old Brotherhood of Freedom going in the Sudan and we are putting this suggestion to Mr. Riches. We cannot compete over (a), (b) and (c). As regards (d) the best thing would be for pro-independence Sudanese to broadcast as much as possible on Radio Omduman. I should have thought that the move in (f) of appointing Sudanese to senior Egyptian posts might be undermined by suggesting that such Sudanese might well lose their nationality later.

To sum up, the Egyptians have a positive aim in view, the winning over of the Sudan to unity with Egypt and are concentrating everything on this. We on the other hand only wish to see the Sudanese independent. We are pretty certain that this will be their choice if they are left free to decide. We can only go on doing our best to expose the emptiness of Egyptian promises and to extol the advantages of independence.

*C.F.H. Burdley*  
(C.F.H. Burdley)  
May 7, 1953.

Minutes.

I think Mr Barclay's last para sums things up very well. What we have to say to the Sudanese is quite different in kind, and simply does not lend itself to the use of the same techniques - even if we had the money and the permission.

I am however worried because in the Foreign Office there is no such corpus of personal experience of the Sudan to draw on as we can draw on for all "foreign" countries, and I am quite convinced that much time is bound to elapse before i) Mr Dearden is in a position to assess the possibilities of frame recommendations ii) new devices can be put forth that will have an effect on Sudanese opinion before the elections.

Mr Evans (PRO, Khartoum) whom I am seeing soon may have some ideas; but if not I am thinking of trying to get together a small advisory group of people in London who do know the Sudan - ex-Sudan Govt people: Mr Arthur Fitchell perhaps - one or two men who have lived & worked (eg. missionaries) outside Khartoum. What African Dept think & whom

F371/162773

9/680

Minutes.

What they support?

African Dept

Alex

If we have trouble in Egypt, the situation may so develop that we shall authorise the Governor-General to take physical action to stop Egyptian activities. We must at present, however, provide for a situation in which this is not happening.

2. Our object is to persuade the Sudanese that independence is best for them; that they can be independent; that we will support them in getting their independence; and, subsequently, if they need it. The corollary of this is that we want to make the Sudanese pro-independence elements see that they must now be primarily responsible for asking for what they want; we can only back them up. It follows we do not want to get in front of them rather than behind. At the moment they are concentrating on attacking Egyptian activities in the Sudan. They will not succeed in stopping them, and they are pretty sure of this themselves, but for the time being we would probably do more harm than good by too rapid an expansion of our activities; we might lay ourselves open to the accusation that, for all our talk of independence, we were obviously seeking to extend our hold rather than to withdraw. In pursuit of their present tactics, the Umas Party might take up the same cry.

3. We hope this is a temporary situation, and that the Umas will soon come out into the open against the Egyptians; but at the moment the best thing seems to let the Information Office work itself in with the job of projecting Britain. This need not stop us planning for an extension of activities later. The difficulty I see about having a special commission of ex-Sudan Government people is that whilst they would be valuable for supplying information, I am not convinced that their advice on the kind of propaganda approach required would be sound. They themselves would have no doubts about this, and would expect their advice to be taken. We might therefore spend more time shooting down suggestions based on a picture of the Sudan as it no longer exists than in getting anything useful out of them. The Sudan political service have been excellent administrators, but on the whole poor politicians. (This is a sweeping generalisation of course: but Arthur Gaitskell, for example, was never altogether popular with the political service on account of his determination to push ahead, and stay abreast of, the Sudanese effendiya). My frank opinion is that Mr. Dearden's experience of the birth-pangs of prematurely-delivered Arab states in Libya and Jordan will be

x  
i.e. publicly  
Say.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

/more

End

SP

the Sudan

Minutes.

more relevant to his task than a lifetime's service in the Sudanese districts. It is unhappily a fact that very few of the ex-Sudan Government people who went to Libya were able to adapt themselves to changed conditions there and I think their advice on propoganda would suffer from similar mental inhibitions. We can, of course, always get advice on specific questions from a variety of authoritative sources - the Sudan Agency or Sir James Robertson, for example.

W. Morris.

(W. Morris)  
May 14, 1953.

A free discussion was held on May 14 with Mr. Evans, PRO Khartoum, at which Mr. Morris & Mr. Barclay were present. A number of useful suggestions emerged & will be pursued in other papers.

Alexander  
10/5

May  
24/5

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J.



FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Hankey  
No. 1149.  
August 5, 1953

D. 6.50 p.m. August 5, 1953  
R. 8.26 p.m. August 5, 1953

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1149 of August 5  
Repeated for information to Khartoum  
and Saving to Paris B.M.E.O.  
Washington

A

Commenting on a report published in Al Ahram of August 4 to the effect that Britain had annexed parts of the Southern Sudan to Uganda, General Neguib stated that this was not the only violation of the Sudan's integrity by the British. About 50 years ago they had leased a considerable area of Bahrel Gazal province to Belgium and they had also had certain regions annexed to Eritrea, the French colonies and to Uganda. Neguib described this action as robbery.

2. Asked for their views "Sudanese leaders", unnamed, now in Egypt, stated that they would not allow this transgression to pass unchallenged and that, as soon as a national government had been formed, steps would be taken to annul any such illegal disposal of Sudanese territory. B

Foreign Office please pass Khartoum as my telegram No. 269 and to Paris and Washington as my Saving telegrams Nos. 320 and 266 respectively.

[Repeated to Khartoum and Saving to Paris and Washington].

K K K K

F0321/102773

91698

J

AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

EGYPT AND SUDAN

J E 1055/22  
~~1081~~

FROM

Mr Hankey,  
Cairo.

No. 1148.

Dated 5 August.

Received in  
Registry— 6th August.

Commenting on report published in "Al Akhbar" of 4th August, that Brittain had annexed part of the Sudan to Uganda, Neguib said that this was not the first instance. He named several other alleged "Robberies".

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

References.

I do not think we need follow up these accusations. It is a typical piece of Egyptian journalism and its only importance is that General Neguib should have taken it up in this way. The instances referred to must be frontier rectifications during the course of demarcation of the Sudan's frontiers with other territories: the Lado enclave was eventually returned by the Belgians to the Sudan. If a Sudanese "national Government" is to begin its international career by refusing to recognise international agreements on the frontiers of the Sudan, it will be away to a flying start.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft) Clancy Brubaker,  
Addis Ababa from  
I.P.O.  
Compt Paris Aug 7.

2. I suggest that in publicity we should ignore the details of this speech as far as possible and if necessary point out that the boundaries of the Sudan have almost all been delimited during the past fifty years; ~~and~~ that during the course of <sup>their</sup> delimitation that certain small areas which were claimed by the Sudan may have been put outside ~~the~~ <sup>new</sup> boundaries; and vice versa. General Neguib's statement is, however, another example of the apparent Egyptian determination to make as much bad blood as possible over the Sudan, in spite of their Agreement with us.

W. Morris.

(W. Morris)  
August 6, 1953.

News Dept (a/s)

I agree

L.D. Wray  
12/8

Rm

7/6/53

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Can 11/8

WR  
3-12-53

Next Paper.

This case will be dealt with in <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>next</sup> ~~next~~ <sup>issue</sup> ~~issue~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>news</sup> ~~news~~ <sup>dept</sup> ~~dept~~

6371/102778

91698

JE. 1035/26

J

SECRET

INDEXED

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Howe  
No. 496  
August 7, 1953

D. 5.35 p.m. August 7, 1953  
R. 6.55 p.m. August 7, 1953

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

JE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 496 of August 7  
Repeated for information to Cairo.

Your telegram No. 722.

Salen's visit.

I could not prevent a Minister of one of Co-Domini Governments from paying a visit to this country, unless I were satisfied that such a visit were liable to provoke a breach of public order. If on above grounds I were to prevent Salah Salen from disembarking here and send him back, the result would probably be to stimulate protest and demonstrations by the pro-Egyptian parties here.

2. I agree it would be foolish to expect Salah Salen to exercise any moderation if it were suggested to him that that was a condition on which we would not object to his visit.

3. We can urge Umma to try to counteract his activities, but I doubt whether they could be brought to protest openly to prevent his visit on the grounds that it was a breach of the Umma - Neguib agreement. I will test their reactions on this point.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo as my telegram No. 265.

[Repeated to Cairo].

ADVANCE COPIES:

- Sir W. Strang
- Private Secretary
- Sir J. Bowker
- Head of African Department
- Head of News Department
- Resident Clerk



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FO 371/102773

21628

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Hankey

No. 1161

August 7, 1953

D. 6.21 p.m. August 7, 1953

R. 7.40 p.m. August 7, 1953

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

JE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1161 of August 7  
Repeated for information to Khartoum (for Governor General  
and U.K. Trade Commissioner)

INDEXED

Your telegram No. 1415: Sudan.

Many thanks.

JE 1056/27

I was unable to get Col. Nasser, Salah Salem and Minister for Foreign Affairs together at a suitable juncture last night, but I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs and Salah Salem. Latter was most concerned at my remonstrances and obviously did not want to lose propaganda stick to beat us. We will have a separate go at Nasser shortly.

2. Meanwhile, although nothing precise was said, it looks as if Salah Salem's projected visit to Sudan could not be very imminent, as he said in another connexion that he had several engagements here next week.

Foreign Office please pass priority to Khartoum as my telegram No. 270.

[Repeated to Khartoum].

QQQ





6371/102773

91698

INDEXED  
J E. 1055/28

Phu. Chis  
Submission P  
Ed. bel. 14 06 to Cairo  
Ltr. JE 1051/606

THE SUDAN: VISIT OF MAJOR SALEM

JE 1051/606

Flag A.

In his telegram number 494, the Governor General suggests that we should try to get the Egyptians to lay off such propaganda stunts as a visit by Salem would be, <sup>we</sup> adding that it might also help stave off a visit by Neguib, of which there has been some talk, — September being the suggested date.

2. The Governor General argues that the visit would be inconsistent with the Anglo/Egyptian Agreement, because its purpose would be to intervene in the political situation. We should have great difficulty in sustaining this argument since the Egyptians would naturally not admit that this was the purpose of the visit. We cannot argue that ministerial visits as such are inconsistent with the Agreement, since the Minister of State has made a visit since it was signed.

Governor General's

Flag B

Flag D.

3. On the other hand, Egyptian behaviour over the Sudan in the last week or two has been particularly objectionable. They have not only been awkward about the appointment of Mr. Riches as alternate member of the Commission, but have made very provocative statements on this subject and on the subject of the Sudan generally (see especially Cairo telegram number 1120 at JE 1051/604). On the specific issue of Riches, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs has refused to agree explicitly that the Egyptian Government does not claim a right to veto even when we have offered to suggest another name. (The present position is that Sir Laurence Grafftey-Smith is flying to Khartoum on August 6 to take part in a Commission meeting).

4. We therefore have very good reason to make some demonstration of our disapproval of this kind of

behaviour/

behaviour. We cannot hope to reach an amicable arrangement simply by asking the Egyptians to agree to abstain from propaganda visits by Egyptian Ministers. What we ~~can~~<sup>might</sup> do is instruct Mr. Hankey to inform the Egyptian Government that we ~~would~~ regard such visits as inconsistent with the spirit of the Agreement; to say that for our part we have no intention of engaging in such propaganda stunts; and that unless the plan for the visit is withdrawn, we must consider what further steps to take.

5. The possible further steps would be: -

- (a) for the Governor General to refuse to allow Salem to ~~enter~~<sup>the Sudan</sup>. This would be very drastic, but is worth considering. The arguments against it - which seem to be decisive - are that it would provoke a major crisis and probably spoil any chances of the defence discussions succeeding, and that we would get little support in the Sudan (we should be accused of "provoking" the Egyptians).
- (b) ~~We~~<sup>for us to</sup> ~~should~~ riposte in the Egyptian style by publicly denouncing the behaviour of the Egyptian Government, *We could* saying that their action in refusing to issue the decree appointing Mr. Richea, and this projected visit by Major Salem, ~~are~~ demonstrations of their unwillingness to keep to the terms of the Agreement, and that they have been informed that this ~~is~~ our view. Paradoxically, this course, though seemingly ineffective might bring us dividends in the Sudan. If ~~at~~ the same time we could persuade the Umma to object to the visit and to refuse to have anything to do with Salem, it would help us a great deal.

6. In the meantime, the Acting Secretary of State has directed that we should seek Mr. Hankey's views. The Department therefore/

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therefore recommend that the above considerations should be borne in mind when we have Mr. Hankey's comments.

7. A draft telegram is attached, on the lines agreed at Lord Salisbury's meeting.

*R.D. Sedman*

August 4, 1953.

*We may bear these suggestions in mind. The first thing is get Mr. Hankey's comment.*

*W. J. ...*  
4/8

~~*...*~~

*tel. sent.*  
*4/8*

FO 371/102773

91698

SECRET

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Cypher/OTP

Sir R. Howe  
No. 470  
July 7, 1953

D. 4.20 p.m. July 7, 1953  
R. 6.02 p.m. July 7, 1953  
**INDEXED**

PRIORITY  
SECRET

**JE 1055/13**

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 470 of July 7.  
Repeated for information to Cairo.

On returning from Cairo, Abdulla Khalil reports that he found Neguib, Salah Salem and other Egyptians in a more amenable and subdued mood than hitherto. Salah Salem admitted that Egypt had been helping the N.U.P. but assured Abdulla Khalil that this would now all cease and that the Umma would very soon have clear proof of this.

2. Abdulla Khalil replied that he was glad to hear this, but emphasized that the Umma would require positive evidence of Egyptian good intentions. If this was not forthcoming in the very near future, the Umma would take other action without further reference to Egypt.

3. The Umma now intend to wait about three weeks to judge the effect of the Egyptian assurances.

4. Abdulla Khalil ascribes this apparent change in the Egyptian attitude to three factors:

(a) The firm line taken by the Umma delegation to Cairo in April,

(b) A growing awareness that many N.U.P. leaders are self-seekers of little worth, who have given the Egyptians much false information about the situation in the Sudan,

(c) Nervousness about the future of the present régime in Egypt (opposition from the Wafd and the universities was particularly mentioned by Neguib).

5. Neguib said that he would favour real independence for the Sudan with treaty relations to safeguard the mutual interest

/of the



FO 371/1027-73 9/698


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SECRET

Khartoum telegram No. 470 to Foreign Office

-2-

of the two countries, but he could not possibly say this publicly now as it would strengthen the hands of his enemies too greatly.

6. Salah Salem is reported to be flying to Khartoum on July 11, with the main object of trying to bring Sayed Ali Mirghani and The Mahdi closer together and to revive unity between the Sudanese parties.

Foreign Office pass to Cairo as my telegram No. 247.

[Repeated to Cairo].

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*Enter*

Telegraphic Address  
"HAKIMAN"

GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
KHARTOUM.

*OK M/S k check*

*KA 15/7*

60/97.6.1.

7th July, 1953.

**J E 1051 592.**

SECRET

*Dear Allen,*

I enclose a copy of a translation of an Arabic record of the meeting between the Prime Minister and Sayed Abdel Rahman, written by Ibrahim Ahmed after the meeting. The translation is also Ibrahim Ahmed's and I have not altered his wording.

If there are any important inaccuracies in this version of the discussion, would you please let us know.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Riches.

*Yours sincerely*

*W. H. Duce*

W. H. DUCE.

D. Allen, Esq., C. C.,  
Foreign Office,  
London, W. 1.

Record of the meeting between Sir Martin Churchill and  
Mr. Nuri al-Said on 17th June, 1943, at  
No. 1, Grosvenor Street.

Order of the meeting was first during the meeting and the  
following is a translation from the meeting.

The speech started by thanking Sir Martin for his  
attitude towards the Anglo-Egyptian agreement about the  
Sudan thereby returning the Sudan their freedom taken away  
at the battle of Verdun in which he took part.

The speaker thanked Sir Martin and then said that he  
felt that the attitude of the Sudan towards the British had  
changed since his visit to Cairo last year.

The speaker recalled that his attitude was the same as  
when he was in the Sudan last year and all that had taken place  
was that the British, who were always demanding the  
sovereignty over the Sudan as appeared in the 1914-1915  
agreement, had admitted that the sovereignty of the Sudan  
was for the Sudanese. The speaker believed that this was  
a gain for the Sudanese but it did not mean that we would  
accept anything other than independence for the Sudan.  
The speaker also said that this should not alter our relations  
with British who were the first to admit that the sovereignty  
of the Sudan was for the Sudanese.

Q. ... I do not believe that the Egyptians have given up  
the idea of the unity of the Nile valley and all  
that they are after is that they want to get rid of  
the British first and then it will not be difficult  
for them to conquer by force the independent Sudan.

A. ... When the Sudan reaches its independence, the friend-  
ship between the British and the Sudanese will help  
us to obtain our independence through co-operation  
and agreement.

Q. ... How long will this friendship continue with the type  
of statement given by Nuri al-Said about our dis-  
agreement with the Egyptians over the Suez Canal.

A. ... All that was said by Nuri al-Said when asked by a  
journalist was that we, as seekers of freedom, do  
not deny it for Egypt. This does not mean that we  
will not be involved in the Egyptian dispute with you.

Q. ... How do you interfere with the freedom and independ-  
ence of Egypt, in the same way the Americans in this  
country do not interfere with our independence, and  
our friends stationed in England do not interfere  
with the independence of relations. We will offer  
the Egyptians all reasonable solutions for the  
unintentional of the military base and we never intend  
to interfere with their freedom but if the Egyptians  
try to do us any harm, we will hit hard but whatever  
will be the outcome of our negotiations with Egypt,  
I wish to assure you that the British Government  
will carry through the Anglo-Egyptian agreement  
leading to the independence of the Sudan.

- S.A.R. Thank you for this broadcast.
- S.A.C. The friendship you have referred to is also affected by what appears in the Umm papers against the British.
- S.A.R. The Umm papers do not ignore the good deeds of the British but we have a strong opposition encouraged by the Egyptians and Egyptian press and even in this country the Prime Minister has to keep an eye on the opposition in anything said or written. It was not possible for me or Sayed Siddik to check everything written in our papers and even if the editorial staff are still young but in any event I have informed Mr. Selwyn Lloyd in this connection that we intend to open a new page. Moreover the practical co-operation of the Umm Party with the Government in critical times is the real proof of friendship.
- S.A.C. I am very keen on the independence of the Sudan and I understand that the Egyptians, in spite of their agreement with you to keep neutral, are working for the unity of the Nile Valley and are paying their agents and trying to buy new supporters. All this should be stopped. We, on the other hand are anxious and will do our best to see the elections take place on the fixed date in a free and neutral atmosphere.
- S.A.R. It is true that the Egyptians have broken their agreement with us but the Sudan Government also is holding the U.M.P. ?
- S.A.C. This should not happen. What we hope for the Sudan is independence but I should like to warn you again that it will be difficult for the independent Sudan to stand in the face of an Egyptian invasion. I believe that if the Egyptians do not succeed in bringing about the Unity of the Nile Valley by means of propaganda, they will resort to force. The desert between Egypt and the Sudan was in the past a strong barrier in the face of any invading army but, deserts do not hinder an army equipped with aeroplanes. Another important point that I must mention with deep regret is that the bravery of the Sudanese is no longer a valuable asset in the face of a well equipped modern army. Do not think that you can defeat the present Egyptian army as you have done with their predecessors near El Foid in the last century. The Egyptians will try to buy modern arms and will get German officers to train their army. You must therefore seriously consider ways and means of defending your independence.
- S.A.R. I fully appreciate the importance of this point and I do not doubt that with your co-operation we will be able to defend our independence. When I met Mr. Abo El Kheir last year I asked his views as to the relations that should exist between Great Britain and the Sudan and his real wish was that he would enter no sort of treaty that the Sudanese would sign.



A. C.

I agree that it should be left to the independent Sudan to decide on the type of relations with us and all that matters is that the Sudan will be able to maintain its independence. This relation could be a treaty to be agreed upon or the membership of the Commonwealth which will give us no benefits to the Sudan and from which the Sudan can withdraw at any time if it is in his interest to do so.

A. R.

I have no doubt that the mutual friendship now existing will result in good relations between us in the future.

A. C.

You can discuss with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd any further details or any help you think we can do and if you wish to see me a second time I am ready to fix a date.

A. R.

Thank you very much.

The Sudan has expressed his appreciation of the progress brought about by the British in the Sudan in the last 50 years and their effort in preparing the Sudanese to take over the affairs of their Country.

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J JE1055/15

J

SECRET

INDEXED

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
WHITTHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Howe

No. 472

D. 4.30 p.m. July 9, 1953

July 9, 1953

R. 6.59 p.m. July 9, 1953

SECRET

JE

Your telegram No. 688.

You will now have seen my telegram No. 470. - JE1055/13

2. The present situation is that Egypt has given the assurances requested by Umma and the latter will wait about three weeks to observe the practical results. If these are not satisfactory to Umma, they have assured us that without further ado they will declare publicly that Egypt has broken her agreement with them, and launch an all-out campaign against the Egyptians and the N.U.P. In my view, we could regard these conditions as satisfactory.

3. If the Egyptian assurances are carried to the satisfaction of Umma, a new situation, as you say in your telegram under reference, will be created and we shall then have to consider what form of collaboration with Umma will be possible and appropriate. I can only repeat that, in spite of your clear statement to the Mahdi in London, he is unlikely to agree that personal assistance to him will have become inappropriate.

4. The danger is that Egypt will now play down her propaganda and bribery sufficiently to avoid a break with Umma, but leave herself free to start again nearer the elections, when any strong Umma reaction would have less time to take effect.

5. Salah Salem's visit may also be an important factor. Should he succeed in patching the unity of the Sudanese parties, however artificial and temporary, any question of close cooperation with Umma would, I consider, have to be abandoned.

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*White J*  
*Open*

TOP SECRET

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Howe

No. 478

July 15, 1953

D: 11.00 a.m. July 15, 1953

R: 1.16 p.m. July 15, 1953

PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

INDEXED

**JE 1055/18**

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 478 of July 15.  
Repeated for information to Cairo.

My telegrams Nos. 470 and 472.

JE 1055/15

JE 1055/13

In conversations with Luce on July 12 and myself today, the Mahdi discussed the present political situation and, in particular, Umma relations with the British.

2. He said that as regards Umma relations with Egypt we must now wait for a month to see if Egypt carries out her latest promises. If she does not, the Umma will take action described in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 472 and the way will be clear for open cooperation with the British.

3. The Mahdi agreed that if Egypt does carry out her promises, the situation will have changed, but he emphasized strongly that cooperation by Umma and the British will still be essential to the cause of independence. The Egyptians have set up a strong propaganda organisation in the Sudan and this will be able to continue to function and must continue to be fought, and this requires funds. The Mahdi pointed out that he had spent large sums of his own money in the past years in support of Umma and independence, but he is now in financial difficulties and cannot afford to help them adequately. If Her Majesty's Government mean what they say about supporting the cause of independence, this is the time to prove it by giving him practical assistance.

4. As regards cooperation between the pro-independence parties, the Mahdi said that it would be a mistake to have any close agreement between the Umma and S.R.P. as this would drive Khatmia away from the latter party, but he thought it might be possible to reach some understanding which would reduce the conflict between the two parties.

/ 5. Regarding assurances ...



Reference:-

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TOP SECRET

Khartoum telegram No. 478 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

5. Regarding assurances to the Southerners, the Mahdi said that recent Umma delegation to the South had found that only a section of the Southerners are anxious that British Administrators should remain beyond the three year period. However, if the Southerners when they come to parliament show a strong wish for this and if they are cooperating in the cause of independence, he thought Umma would support them.

6. Siddik el Mahdi will arrive in London on July 23 in connexion with cotton sales but will also certainly want to discuss matters mentioned in paragraph 3 above. Luce will arrive on July 21 and will bring my views on the subject.

7. Salah Salem's visit to Khartoum has been cancelled.

Foreign Office pass priority to Cairo as my telegram No. 252.

[Repeated to Cairo].

DISTRIBUTED TO:

African Department  
News Department

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J.

ALLIANCE  
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CONFIDENTIAL

THE SUDAN: SAR'S MONARCHICAL  
AMBITIONS

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In conversation with Mr. Allen, Mr. Luce has reported that when he met SAM before leaving Khartoum, the latter spent the whole time talking Sudanese politics - for the first time in Mr. Luce's experience. What seemed to have stirred him into this unusual departure was a newspaper article (and rumours circulating around the same theme) alleging that the Prime Minister had told SAR that he was in favour of a Mahdist monarchy in the Sudan. Sayed Ali professed not to believe the stories himself, but said that they would be taken by his followers as evidence that they were right in believing that Her Majesty's Government were on the side of the Mahdists and against the Khatmia.

2. Sayed Ali told Mr. Luce that he favoured a republic and independence. He said all the Sudanese wanted independence - when they talked about unity, they meant some kind of arrangement with Egypt, but not a Sudan ruled by Egypt. He thought that if it were clear that the Mahdi family had abandoned their monarchical pretensions, it would influence his followers in favour of the independence side. Mr. Luce thinks this is true, though it is unlikely that Sayed Ali himself will come out into the open.

3. The present position seems to be that the Umma Executive has decided in favour of a statement favouring a republic, but that the question is to be submitted to a general party meeting. Siddik has committed

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himself to this publicly in a statement to a Khartoum newspaper.

4. Mr. Luce thought it would be useful for Her Majesty's Government to counteract the rumours of which Sayed Ali complained, and the attached draft letter from Sir William Strang to Sir Robert Howe suggests a means of doing so which has been discussed with Mr. Luce.

Flags  
B+C  
Flag D  
(Our records of S.A.R.'s conversations with the P.M. and the Minister of State are at JE 1055/8 and JE 1054/5149; S.A.R.'s record of the conversation with the P.M. is at JE 1055/19).  
Roger Allen  
July 22, 1953.

It may be that S.A.R. read more into the Minister of State's personal remarks during his interview with him than was warranted. But the fact remains that neither <sup>of the</sup> records of the interview with the Prime Minister mentions the subject of the Monarchy, and I agree that action on the lines proposed would be useful.

L. J. Sowerby

July 24, 1953.

Sir W. Strang  
Minister of State

As you were present at these interviews, you will know best how to handle this.

W. Strang

I agree with this

24/7  
a/c  
24/7

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*Emb*

Telegraphic Address  
"HAKIMAH"

**JE 1055/25**

GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
KHARTOUM.

GG/97.8.1/3.

28th July, 1953.

**INDEXED**

SECRET.

*Dear Allen*

I forward to you a further periodical resume of Egyptian propaganda. The Umma know all about this but there is still a section of the party unwilling to go too far in open attack on the Egyptians.

2. There seems to be a good deal of local opinion very critical of the lack of reaction from the United Kingdom to the Egyptian attacks published in press and radio, where they concern Britain or show an attitude over Sudanese affairs contrary to the undertaking in the Agreement to preserve "a free and neutral atmosphere".

3. It is a fact that since about the middle of the month the Umma press has published a series of articles criticising in moderate tones the N.U.P. and Egyptian policies:-

- July 12th - "Salah Salem's good offices".
- July 14th - "What we hold against the N.U.P.".
- July 21st - "We are fed up with these manoeuvres".
- July 26th - "What do the Unionists want now".
- July 27th - "Unblemished independence".
- July 28th - Comment by Abdulla Bey Khalil on Salah Salem's statement at Alexandria on the 9th.

The Umma have also begun to issue a pamphlet called "Independence Movement Letters". No. 1 was headlined "We claim full independence for the Sudan". It appeared in English and Arabic from the Tamaddon Press and No. 2 is appearing shortly.

4. I am sending copies of this letter and the enclosure to Duke at Cairo and Bill Davies in London and will pass copies to Riches here.

*Yours sincerely*  
*J. W. Kenrick*  
J. W. KENRICK.

THIRD NOTE ON EGYPTIAN PROPAGANDA IN  
THE SUDAN SINCE THE AGREEMENT  
OF FEBRUARY, 1953.

This third note covers the period since 20th April, 1953 (when the last note was written) until the end of July 1953. It should be read with the knowledge that the Umma Party, during this period, have protested to the Egyptian leaders against their campaign in the Sudan, and have received assurances that Egypt intended to remain neutral and would not try to influence the Sudanese in their choice of political party or future status.

It can not be said that there has been any abatement in Egyptian propaganda, nor was this to be expected.

2. Methods used in Egypt.

(1) Public statements by politicians, in particular Major Salah Salim, whose utterances seem to be beyond the control of the Regime have continued to claim that Egypt's aim is to clear British influence out of the Sudan and that Britain is determined to prevent this by sabotaging the February Agreement.

An example of recent date was his statement at Alexandria on July 9th. A typical quotation follows:- "All that concerns us is that there should be a free Sudan or, in other words, a Sudan over which there is no foreign British influence. Should we (Egypt or the Sudan) unite and this influence exist it would be useless. The Sudanese people would not be able to develop and would continue to be humiliated, poor and weak. They will be a burden on us and we shall be a burden on them. It is not a question of being connected or separated, as was said in the past. All we want is to help them to remove the nightmare of Imperialism. Once this is done they will realise where their interests lie and they will certainly realise that their interests lie with us".

The rest of his statement was devoted to showing that fantastic agricultural prospects existed in the Sudan, were not being developed 'by the British' but would be developed by the Egyptians if the two countries united.

(2) Cairo Radio continued to broadcast lies and malicious rumours specifically directed at the Sudan through it's "Sudan Corner" programme directed by Tewfik Ahmed el Bakri (Cairo Chancery letter No. 1686/9/539 to the African Department dated 20th June 1953).

(3) The Middle East News Agency continued to collect news items from their Khartoum Agents which, inaccurately conceived or maliciously altered, then appear in the Egyptian Press and are later quoted in the local vernacular press. Many examples can be seen in the Akhar Sa'a. Issue No. 14 of 15th April, 1953 of El Tahrir is a flagrant example. The Anran of July



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14th carried the news "England buys the Mahdi's cotton for  $\frac{1}{2}$  million pounds more than the prevailing prices". No attempt of course is ever made to check facts in the appropriate official quarters.

(4) The propaganda approach by inviting Sudanese to Cairo as guests of the Government continued and reached a crescendo for the celebrations of July 23rd. On May 10th Chief Jambo and two Southern Sudanese ex-Egyptian Majors were met at the airport in Cairo by General Neguib himself and a number of Ministers. They were accommodated in special hotels, allotted special cars, feted, and encouraged to record anti-British and anti-Sudan Government statements which were recorded for broadcast from "Sudan Corner" and given wide publicity in the Egyptian Press. A case came to light in Bahr-el-Ghazal Province showing that young Southern boys had been enticed to Cairo, given money and clothes there, taught to hate the British and then returned to their Southern Province to sow dissension.

Recently there were over 100 boys from Omdurman non-Government schools touring Cairo and Alexandria at the expense of the Egyptian Government.

For the celebrations of July 23rd large numbers of invitations were sent out to practically all the tribal leaders and a number of Government Officials, without reference to the Sudan Government (Governor-General's telegram No. 243 of 1st July to Cairo). They were entertained at the public expense, and an opportunity was taken at a reception for the International Press, to use statements by a N.U.P. Sudanese Doctor serving in the South and some disgruntled Southerners, to discredit Britain and the British element of the Sudan Administration (Cairo telegram No. 1097 to the Foreign Office).

### 3. Methods used in the Sudan.

(1) There were no glaring examples of tours by prominent Egyptians of Ministerial level during the period under review.

(2) The existing Egyptian agencies were however active. The Egyptian Irrigation Department for example carried out a purge in Malakal of all staff suspected of being sympathetic to the Sudan Administration. Egyptian Irrigation Department Officials also toured the South with the N.U.P. electioneering delegation. On the 23rd July the E.I.D. in Malakal organised festivities which included an unauthorised procession, which shouted "Long live Unity of the Nile Valley" outside the Governor's Office, and a play, to which the public had been invited, which symbolised the Unity of Egypt and the Sudan.

In Daeim the two Egyptian Ramadan preachers departed from their religious briefs to praise Neguib and to attack the British and the Americans.

A so-called Egyptian Agricultural Company arrived on May 10th and toured the Blue Nile Province. This is a dangerous move designed to penetrate the Nile Pump agricultural schemes by gaining control of

FO. 371/102773

- 3 -

them through the provision of working capital.  
(Riches letters to Allen 10311/10/53 of 18th May and 1st June).

When invitations were being distributed for the celebrations of the 23rd an Egyptian toured parts of Equatoria touting for acceptances with promises of money. He is also reported to have tried to get a Police Sergeant Major to go to Cairo with promises that his pay would be doubled if he did so.

An Army Officer has been put into the Office of the Egyptian Economic Expert in Khartoum. His functions are not yet known but the Chief Staff Officer Egyptian Troops is the main channel for Egyptian Government activity, so this appointment is significant.

The local "Sudan El Gedid" paper, previously notorious for its independent line has since the middle of the month made a volte face and declared for union with Egypt. This coincides with the return from Cairo of the Editor Ahmed Yousif Hashim and the supposition is that he has been bought.

Governor-General's Office,  
Khartoum.  
29th July, 1953.

FO 371/102773

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(JE 1055/21)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

SECRET

July 29, 1953.

OUTFILE

In conversation with Allen, Luce has mentioned a discussion with Sayed Ali el Mirghani in which the latter brought up the subject of the article in the newspaper "Sudan el Gadid" where it was alleged that the Prime Minister had pressed Sayed Abdul Rahman el Mahdi to make himself King of the Sudan. Luce thought that this story and other similar rumours which were current in the Sudan were having a harmful effect on the cause of independence, and that it would be useful if some means could be devised of countering them.

It is not possible of course for Her Majesty's Government to put out official denials of rumours current in the Sudan, but I think that something might be done in the following way. When you see Sayed Ali, you could refer to his conversation with Luce and assure him that the question of the form of government in an independent Sudan was not discussed at all between SAR and the Prime Minister. The subject did come up at a meeting between SAR and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: on this occasion, the Minister of State repeated what was said to SAR by Mr. Eden a year ago - that it was for the Sudanese to decide, if they chose independence, what the form of their Government would be, and said that the Sudanese Parliament, when it was elected, would be able to give some indication of their views.

If this leaked into the local press (and it might be well to arrange that it should) SAR could not complain, since it is an accurate statement of what took place between him and the Minister of State, and since he has not claimed himself that the subject was discussed between him and the Prime Minister.

I leave it to you to judge whether it would be helpful for you to take this step.

WILLIAM STRANG.

f371/102778



91648

Enter quickly  
Wm/s/r

(10311/14/53)

Office of the United Kingdom  
Trade Commissioner,

SECRET

INDEXED

J E 1055 /24

KHARTOUM.

31st July, 1953.

Dear Roger,

There have been a number of reports that General Neguib intends to visit the Sudan before the elections, September being suggested as a likely month and his itinerary as including some of the provincial centres (though not the South) in addition to the Three Towns. I am told that even the Umma delegation to the "Liberation" celebrations were so carried away by their reception in Cairo and by the normal traditions of reciprocal hospitality as to invite the General to visit the Sudan.

2. If the visit comes off it may have a serious influence on the elections, especially if properly timed. I have repeatedly reported the popularity enjoyed by the General among persons of all classes and political leanings in this country and the publicity associated with the recent junketings and bellicosities in Cairo has, if anything, increased this. He would undoubtedly have a tremendous reception were he to come to the Sudan and he and his entourage could do a lot of damage in a very short time both to British prestige and to the independence cause. Such being the case we have been thinking in good time of what could be done to prevent or counter the effect of the visit. The possibilities that have occurred to us are:-

1. To stop the visit by representations from -
  - (a) H.M. Government
  - (b) The Governor General
  - (c) The Electoral Commission.
2. To stop the visit by provoking a crisis in the Canal Zone or otherwise making it necessary for Neguib to stay in Egypt till after the elections.
3. If the visit comes off to attempt to neutralise its effect by producing a counter attraction in the shape of a visit to the Sudan of a colourful personality of our own.

3. The best course would undoubtedly be to put the onus on Sen by getting the Electoral Commission to ask Neguib not to come as his visit would be a factor likely to affect the neutrality of the elections. I think it improbable however that the Commission would agree to do this. As regards representations by H.M. Government and the Governor General they could be made on the grounds of incompatibility with the letter and spirit of the February Agreement and threat to public order respectively. The former is not on present

/form

R. Allen, Esq., C.M.G.,  
African Department,  
Foreign Office,  
S.W.1.

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371/102773

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only



form likely to shake the Egyptians while the latter is manifestly far-fetched and if carried to its logical conclusion of refusing entry to the Sudan to Neguib both politically bad and likely itself to provoke demonstration and possibly disorders in the Three Towns.

4. The feasibility of suggestion No. 2 is not for me to judge.

5. As regards 3. we just cannot produce a figure to measure up to Neguib, though the visit of Lord Mountbatten at the end of October would be something as a counter-puff.

6. All in all, 1 (c) and 1 (a) or a combination of both seem to be the most promising lines. In representing that the visit would be contrary to the spirit of the Agreement we might threaten that if it did nevertheless materialise we should then consider ourselves free to send any propaganda stars of our own to the country.

I am sending copies of this letter to Duke in Cairo and Kenrick at the Governor General's Office.

*Denis Riches*  
*Denis Riches*  
(D. M. H. Riches)

10371/102773

(JR 1055/24)

91698

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

August 19, 1953.

You wrote to us on July 31 (10341/44/53) about the means by which we might prevent a visit to the Sudan by General Reguib. We agree with you that it would be a dangerous thing: it would also of course be a flagrant breach of the spirit of the agreement and of the prescribed neutral atmosphere for the Egyptian President to make what inevitably becomes an election-coring tour of the Sudan.

2. Whilst wishing to be too optimistic, we hope that the likelihood of the visit has receded into the background since the let us not say painful passage of Major Salim. If the Egyptians do not drop the idea themselves, we should hope that the Umma will with their now-found courage whip up enough public clamour to make it impossible. However, we ought to assume the worst case and consent on your suggestions about the action we might wish to take:

(1) Representations.

(a) By Her Majesty's Government. You will have noticed from my letter of August 11, to Kenrick (JR 1055/35) that the possibility of a visit to the Sudan by Reguib was in our minds in drafting our "grand remonstrance". We cannot put much faith in representations alone, but the publicity and the implied threat in the text of aide memoire might have some effect.

(b) By the Governor General. We agree with you that it would be dangerous to carry an objection based on public order to its logical conclusion.

(c) The Electoral Commission. We do not think the Electoral Commission would be likely to take this on. However, José Fenoy is scattering a few discreet seeds in Ken's mind.

(2) General Reguib's visit. Without looking any further into this, we can say that Reguib is fairly exorbitant in the eyes of his colleagues. His great asset is his "public relations" value which he would be busy exploiting during a triumphal tour of the Sudan.

(3) A general challenge. As you say we have none who, like Reguib, meet the specifications of the local market. Luce agrees that we can gain more by virtuous abstention from competition.

4. We therefore seem to have reached the same conclusion as you.

5. I am copying this letter to Kenrick and Luke.

(R. T. D. Leducart)

D. H. H. Nichol, Esq.,  
Office of the United Kingdom,  
Trade Commissioner,  
Khartoum.

FO 371/102773

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19/3  
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1. See J. Bugh.
2. Enter now for.



(10311/14/53)

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED

Office of the United Kingdom  
Trade Commissioner,

J E. 10551 23.

KHARTOUM.

1st August, 1953.

INDEXED

Dear Roger.

The big political question mark here at the moment is the Khatmi-N.U.P. situation, i.e. whether or not Sayid Ali has really finally decided that the only way to attempt to stop S.A.R. is to tell his followers to vote for the N.U.P. and the N.U.P. alone. The situation is not at the moment clear but Kenrick will be reporting to you by this bag on the latest position (after 3 years as D.C. in Omdurman he knows the Khatmi there well and as at the moment he shows a disposition to report to you direct I am happy to let him deal with this aspect of our work).

2. You should know however that this news following the reports published here about anti-British and anti-administration propaganda organised in Egypt during the "Liberation" celebrations and the defection to Egypt of Yacoub Osman and Ahmed Yusuf Hashim has resulted in a fit of jitters among the administrators, some of whom have urged me to try to get Her Majesty's Government to "do something" to counter the Egyptian tide. What particularly sticks in their gullets is that Neguib and Sallah should be able to make their lying propaganda statements without any counterblast in similar terms from members of H.M. Government in similar positions. What they are really after in their hearts is good quotable stuff to be broadcast to the Sudan and published in the local papers in which the British Prime Minister assures the Sudanese that come what may the Egyptian imperialists and colonisers will be kept out of the Sudan, or the Secretary of State declares himself ready for rivers of blood if necessary to prevent the Egyptians encroaching on our rights in the Canal Zone. They seem particularly enamoured of the idea of engineered Parliamentary Questions and answers.

3. I have explained why such statements would be rather difficult to make and to do the administrators justice most of them appear to appreciate this (though the cynical remark about kowtowing to the Egyptians and sacrificing the Sudan for the sake of a defence agreement is usually heard). But are H.M. Government at the moment prepared to take a strong line with Egypt about the Sudan? Are they for example prepared to represent to Neguib that many of his speeches and statements and those of his lieutenants on the Sudan are grossly out of keeping with the spirit and the letter of the February Agreement; and publicise the fact that they are doing so?

Yours very truly  
 Derek Riches  
 (D.M.H. Riches)

91698

371/102773

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Registry

No. JE 1055/23

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft.

Mr. Riches  
Chatham  
from  
Mr. Leonard.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION.
18 AUG 1953
SENT TO TYPE
DEPARTMENT

Personal

Aug: 9 1953

I think your letter of 1<sup>st</sup> August (10321/14/53) is partially answered in my letter of Aug. 13<sup>th</sup> to Kenwick, and its enclosure. That should provide some evidence that we are prepared to think of using ~~to~~ harsh words. I think that where we (meaning by those words "we" yourself, and ourselves in this department) part company with the administrators is that we are only prepared to recommend the use of them when we think that there is something to be achieved by it, and not merely to relieve our feelings. It is only natural that




that they should or therefore  
conclude that we can't have  
the right sort of feelings.

However, feelings at ~~home~~  
~~and abroad~~ are factors to be  
taken into account; and it was a  
one consideration in our mind that  
in drafting our aide-memoire  
that one of the incidental things  
~~and~~ it might <sup>achieve</sup> ~~be~~ is to give  
some relief to those, - home and  
away, - who feel <sup>in their blood</sup> passionately that  
we ought to do something, and  
are not to be persuaded that  
convinced that much of the time the  
best answer is to let the Egyptians  
do it for us.

26  
27/6

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.



(JP 1055/23)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

August 19, 1953.

PERSONAL

I think your letter of August 1 (10311/14/53) is partially answered in my letter of August 13 to Kenrick, and its enclosure. That should provide some evidence that we are prepared to think of using harsh words. I think that where we (meaning by "we" yourself, and ourselves in this Department) part company with the administrators is that we are only prepared to recommend the use of them when we think that there is something to be achieved by it, and not merely to relieve our feelings. It is only natural that they should therefore conclude that we can't have the right sort of feelings.

2. However, feelings are factors to be taken into account; and it was a consideration in our mind in drafting our side-memoire that one of the things it might achieve is to give some relief to those, - home and away, - who feel in their blood that we ought to do something, and are not to be convinced that much of the time the best answer is to let the Egyptians do it for us.

(R.T.D. Ledward)

D.M.H. Riches, Esq.,  
Khartoum.

91698  
R 371/102773

J E 1055 (1055)

INDEXED

SUDAN: THE UMMA PARTY

CONFIDENTIAL

Flags A & B  
JE 1055/9 & 10  
JE 1055/11 & 12  
Flags C & D

Mr. Luce has reported and commented on two meetings with the Mahdi and Umma leaders since their return to Khartoum; one on June 24 (G.G. Khartoum Nos.451 and 452) and another on June 28 (G.G. Khartoum Nos.457 and 459).

Flag D

2. S.A.R. has tried all the usual evasions in the attempt to establish that Her Majesty's Government have committed themselves to support him and his party, whilst leaving them free of any commitment whatsoever - i.e. free to turn again should it seem expedient to do so.

3. Judging from the report of the second meeting, Mr. Luce seems to have shaken them out of their belief that they can get away with this; but we can expect them to take the line that the Sudan Government are withholding what Her Majesty's Government promised unconditionally. When we say that this is not the case, S.A.R. will no doubt pretend to believe that the Sudan Government have persuaded Her Majesty's Government to withdraw their promise.

Flag C

4. It is noteworthy that Abdullahi El Fadil has been in Cairo since May 23 and is still there: no doubt one idea behind this was to keep the lines open - to reassure the Egyptians that S.A.R.'s prolonged stay in this country did not mean that the Umma had committed themselves to co-operation with Her Majesty's Government.

JE 1051/561  
Flag E

5. It seems unlikely, from these telegrams, that the assurances to be demanded by the Umma in Cairo will be the open support by Egypt of the Independence cause and a disavowal of the National Unionist Party (as Abdulla Khalil said when he was here). It is more probable that they will again be something vaguer, and that the Egyptians will give a more tactful reply this time. It

/is

SENT TO DEPT.  
13/7

6321/102773

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is possible that the Egyptians will think it worth while <sup>to</sup> ~~go~~ quietly for a month or so. In short, things will most likely continue as they are unless the Egyptians make a false move or the Umma are again seized with panic about their election prospects.

6. Apart from a reluctance to commit themselves irrevocably, I imagine that the Umma leaders are still concerned to avoid doing anything which would give the Egyptians the excuse to denounce the Anglo Egyptian Agreement. They probably suspect that we are trying to provoke such a denunciation in order to free ourselves from our obligations to the Sudanese under the agreement (their argument against saying anything about Southern D.C.'s is illustrative of this).

JE 1055/9  
Flag A

7. As to co-operation with the S.R.P., the situation looks a little more hopeful after this later meeting; but besides disputes about constituencies, the monarchy v republic issue is likely to be a serious obstacle. As long as it appears that S.A.R. still has the ambition of becoming king, many potential supporters of the independence movement are likely to stay away from it.

JE 1055/12  
Flag D

JE 1051/577  
Flag F

8. We can only now await the outcome of Abdullah Khalil's visit to Cairo; but in the meantime we should give Mr. Luce the means to deny that Her Majesty's Government have offered unconditional support to either S.A.R. or the Umma Party. (A draft telegram is attached)

Flag C

Flag C

9. Perhaps the Minister of State will wish to discuss all this with Sir Robert Howe before he returns to Khartoum next Sunday.

*Roger Allen*

June 30, 1953.

*Sir W. Stanger*

*J. I. M. ... 30.6*

371/102773



91698

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I think that a meeting would be the best way of dealing with this. (The Minister of State discussed it with Lord Salisbury today.)

Minister of State

W. Stanger  
30/6

Now see record of meeting with Sir R. Howe, a redraft of tel.

Da. 4/7.

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J

RET

RECORD OF MEETING WITH THE  
GOVERNOR GENERAL OF THE SUDAN

---

Present: The Minister of State,  
Sir Robert Howe,  
Mr. R. Allen.

Co-operation with the Umma

The Minister of State said that the Umma representatives were now in Cairo discussing the Egyptian attitude towards the Sudan with the Egyptian Government. It was uncertain whether the Egyptians would be able to satisfy the Umma representatives. Meanwhile, the Mahdi had indicated in Khartoum that it might be difficult for the Umma to denounce their Agreement with Egypt, but had suggested that they might in fact withhold co-operation with Egypt and fight a strong electoral campaign against the N.U.P. He asked the Governor General's views on this.

2. The Governor General said that he thought it would in fact be difficult for the Umma to repudiate their Agreement with Egypt, and he was inclined to think that a refusal by the Umma to co-operate in practice with the Egyptians might suffice for our purposes.

3. The Minister of State also thought that there might be a point where non-co-operation by the Umma with the Egyptians and the pro-Egyptian parties in the Sudan would satisfy us. He would like the Governor General's advice on this after he returned to the Sudan. Our object should be to ensure that there was no Umma/N.U.P. Coalition after the Elections. If there were, an Umma majority in the new Parliament and as a result the Sudanese Government asked for independence before the three years were up, we should probably have to make it plain that Her

Majesty's



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Majesty's Government would not resist such a demand, but of course Sudanisation could not be ~~contemplated~~ <sup>completed</sup> within a shorter period.

4. It was agreed that the Governor General should report on the attitude of the Umma after his return, and that meanwhile, he would do his best to ensure that the Umma and the S.R.P. came to a working arrangement in the constituencies.

Evidence about Egyptian bribery and propaganda in the Sudan

5. The Minister of State inquired whether the intelligence services of the Sudan Government were succeeding in collecting evidence about this.

6. The Governor General said that they were trying to do so, but he did not know how successful they had been. It was agreed that the Governor General would look into this on his return.

Future of British Officials of the Sudan Government

7. The Minister of State said that he had some doubts about the desirability of our circularising the members of the Sudan Service in order to obtain details of their qualifications for re-employment. He did not wish to give the impression that Her Majesty's Government were expecting them to leave their posts in the Sudan in the near future. On the contrary, we should try to avoid a general exodus.

8. Mr. Allen said that he had just written a letter to Mr. Luce setting out our doubts on this subject and asking for advice. We thought that it might be easier if any circular were sent out by the Staff Association in the Sudan, rather than

by/

Reference:-

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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by the Sudan Government. It was agreed that the Governor General would advise us about this after his return.

July 4, 1953.



SECRET

P0371/102773

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FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

J

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Howe  
No. 459  
June 28, 1953

D. 5.25 p.m. June 28, 1953  
R. 7.05 p.m. June 28, 1953

PRIORITY  
SECRET

1E 1055/12

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 459 of June 28  
Repeated for information to Cairo.

My telegram No. 457.

Luce had a further discussion this morning with the Mahdi, Siddik el Mahdi, Abdulla Khalil and Ibrahim Ahmed. They said that the Umma Executive has come to a definite decision to state publicly that the Egyptians have broken their agreement [grp. undec.], to launch an all-out press and propaganda attack on Egypt and to cooperate openly with the British if the Egyptians either refuse to give assurances demanded by Umma or, having given them, fail to carry them out fully within about a month. If assurances are given and strictly observed the situation in the Umma view will be satisfactory to both the pro-Independence Sudanese and the British.

2. Regarding cooperation amongst the pro-Independence parties the Umma now show some willingness to try to come to an understanding with S.R.P. which will put an end to the present bitter conflict between them in a number of constituencies. In return, Umma asks for a further assurance that British administrators will remain neutral as between Umma and S.R.P. This can be given, but we are not optimistic about the result of discussions between Umma and S.R.P., because the former will claim majority support in some constituencies which is not admitted by S.R.P.

3. It was agreed at discussions that further developments must await result of Abdulla Khalil's visit to Cairo. But it will be seen from the above that some progress has been made from the position reported in my telegram No. 451.

4. We must warn you, however, that the Mahdi is showing clear signs of believing that Her Majesty's Government have promised ...

20 JUN 1953

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SECRET

Khartoum telegram No. 159 to Foreign Office

2.

promised him personal and material assistance regardless of the outcome of Umma - Egyptian issue.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo priority as my telegram No. 242.

[Repeated to Cairo].

K K K K

SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO KHARTOUM

Cypher/OTP.

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

No. 688

D. 3.10 a.m. July 7, 1953.

July 6, 1953.

SECRET.

Addressed to Khartoum telegram No. 688 of July 6.


Repeated for information to Khartoum (U.K. T.C.).  
Cairo.

Your telegrams Nos. 451, 452, 457 and 459 [of June 24 and 28: the Sudan: Umma Party].

As you will have seen in the record, it was made clear to the Mahdi at both his meetings with the Minister of State that the three conditions mentioned were essential pre-requisites of close collaboration, and that the first condition was a public statement by the Umma on their breach with Egypt. Nothing that the Minister of State or the Prime Minister said could be interpreted as offering unconditional support.

2. Nevertheless, if the Umma were in fact to withhold all cooperation with the Egyptians and to fight Egyptian propaganda openly and launch an all-out electoral campaign against the N.U.P., it might be that we should regard this as satisfactory. It all depends on the circumstances, and on this we should like your advice.

3. On the other hand, if the Umma Party really succeed in persuading the Egyptians to call off their improper activities, a new situation would be created. However, in these circumstances also there might be possibilities of collaboration with the Umma.



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FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Howe  
No. 457  
June 27, 1953

D. 3.50 p.m. June 27, 1953  
R. 5.45 p.m. June 27, 1953

PRIORITY  
SECRET

E 1055/10

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 457 of June 27  
Repeated for information to Cairo.

My telegram No. 451. — J.E 1055/19

Neguib's letter has now been received by Umma. It says that as his previous letter has been misunderstood by Umma he has cancelled it. He asks Umma to wait until the return to Khartoum of Abdullah el Fadil who will clear up the points of misunderstanding.

2. As Abdullah el Fadil's return has been further delayed the Umma are sending Abdullah Khalil to Cairo on June 29. He and Abdullah el Fadil will again demand positive assurances from the Egyptians that their propaganda, bribery etc. will stop. Umma Party will then consider their future attitude towards Egypt in the light of the reply brought back by Abdullah Khalil. If adequate assurances are given by the Egyptians the Umma will certainly give them an opportunity to show whether they intend to implement them effectively.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo priority as my telegram No. 241.

[Repeated to Cairo].

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CONFIDENTIAL

J/E 1055/8

The Prime Minister received S.A.R. on June 10. I was present.

The Prime Minister told S.A.R. that we did not think much of friends who were ashamed to admit their friendship for us. If we were to co-operate to secure Sudanese independence against Egyptian designs, we should expect his newspapers at least to avoid a hostile attitude; Sayed Siddiq's recent statement supporting Egypt was particularly unfortunate, and he wondered how S.A.R. and his supporters could complain of Egyptian bad faith and, in the same breath, say that they supported Egypt in breaking her treaty with us.

The Prime Minister went on to say that he understood that the agreement between the Umma and General Neguib had been based on Neguib's solemn assurance that the Egyptian Government would refrain from propaganda in the Sudan in favour of unity. It was clear that, since the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February, the Egyptians had in fact been carrying on an unbridled propaganda campaign in favour of unity, and they were subsidising the National Unity Party on a very large scale. The Prime Minister said that it would be a monstrous thing if we were to give the Sudan its independence and, after all we had done, the Egyptians were then to filch it away. We had no intention of allowing that to happen.

S.A.R. said that he intended to take steps on his return to Khartoum to see that anti-British propaganda by the Umma Party organs was damped down.

June 16, 1953.

African Department (to enter)

Copies to:-

Sir W. Strang  
Lord Reading  
Mr. Nutting

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE  
(Office of Governor General)

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

No. 436  
June 17, 1953

D: 12 Noon      June 17, 1953  
R: 1.41 p.m.    June 17, 1953

PRIORITY  
CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED  
E. 1055 / 6.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 436 of June 17,  
Repeated for information to Cairo.

Abdullah Khalil has reported that Neguib has delivered to Abdabahi el-Fadil, who is still in Cairo, a letter addressed to the President of the Umma Party in which he withdraws his last letter of May 22 and expresses the wish to seek new means of satisfying the Umma on points at issue between them.

2. Abdullah Khalil himself is not prepared to pay attention to any further Egyptian approach of this sort and hopes that the letter will not influence other misinformed leaders. We must, however, expect it to strengthen the influence of the section of Umma opinion which would like to give Neguib one more chance.

3. Please inform Governor General.

Foreign Office please pass Cairo Priority as my telegram No. 232.

[Repeated to Cairo].

17 JUN 1953

6371/102773

91698

SECRET

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Howe

D. 8.55 p.m. June 24, 1953

No. 451

June 24, 1953

R. 10. 18 p.m. June 24, 1953

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

**J** JE 1053/9

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 451 of June 24  
Repeated for information to Cairo

My telegram No. 446.

JE 1055/7

Abdullahi El Fadil's return to Khartoum has been delayed until June 25 and Neguib's latest letter has therefore not yet been seen by the Umma.

2. Luce had a long talk with the Mahdi this morning, with Siddik El Mahdi and Abdullah Khalil also present. The conditions mentioned by the Minister of State in his talk with the Mahdi on May 27 were discussed at length.

(a) Denunciation of the Umma agreement with Egypt.

green

The Mahdi's version of this point is "non-cooperation with Egypt" and he pointed out that already there is no cooperation between the Umma and Egypt. Moreover, the Umma have now decided to launch an all-out electoral campaign against the N.U.P. and their Egyptian supporters. The Mahdi at first denied that the Minister of State had mentioned denunciation of the Umma agreement, but when asked to read out the Arab record of the talks of May 27 and the word denunciation was found to have been used on more than one occasion, he asserted that in subsequent talks the Minister of State had changed this to non-cooperation with Egypt. This assertion is not supported by your telegram No. 666. Siddik El Mahdi then made it quite clear that the Umma could not denounce their agreement. He contended that there is nothing in the agreement which conflicts with British interests or with the cause of Sudanese independence (there is some truth in this) and said that the denunciation would do great harm to the Umma Party. They would openly fight Egyptian propaganda and this action would make the Umma attitude towards Egypt clear to all the Sudanese. The Mahdi supported Siddik in this and Abdullah Khalil remained silent.

JE

25 JUN 1953

/(b)

FO 371 / 102773

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SECRET

Khartoum telegram No. 451 to Foreign Office

-2-

(b) Cooperation among the supporters of independence.

The Mahdi said that the S.R.P. was primarily a creation of the Sudan Government, that it now consists mainly of only a few Nazirs and that the Sudan Government has only to tell, or if necessary, order them to cooperate with the Umma and they will do so.

(c) Assurance to Southerners that the British administrators in the South would be able to remain for some time to come.

The Mahdi said he considered that this is a matter for Parliament to consider when it is formed, and that nothing should be said before then. Siddik said that the Umma delegation which toured the South found that the desire for prolongation of British administrators' service is by no means universal among the Southerners and that the Umma do not consider this to be a point of great importance. Moreover, the Egyptians would regard any assurance on this subject as a breach of the February agreement.

Continued in my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo immediate as my telegram No. 237.

[Repeated to Cairo].

ADVANCE COPIES

- Prime Minister
- Minister of State
- Sir W. Strang
- Private Secretary
- Sir J. Bowker
- Head of African Department

PPPP



6 371 / 102773 91698  
copy

EL SUDAN EL GEDID (Non-Party - Pro-Independence) (28/6/53).

El Sudan el Gedid scores a most important journalistic triumph. Summary of discussions between Sir Winston Churchill and S.A.R. - Has Churchill offered the throne to S.A.R.? Great Britain expresses her determination to protect Sudan's independence.

According to the paper's representative in foreign diplomatic circles (!) the following account is a resume of the discussion that took place in London recently between the British Prime Minister the Rt. Honourable Sir Winston Churchill and El Sayed Sir AbdelRahman el Mahdi, Patron of the Umma Party:-

During his interview with S.A.R. Sir Winston Churchill looked happy and cheerful. He was accompanied by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd; and El Sayed Ibrahim Ahmed interpreted for S.A.R.

The conversation was lucid and frank; and Sir Winston Churchill declared that Great Britain was all out for an early general election and the setting up of self-government as a preliminary step towards self-determination.

Great Britain, he said, has no ambition other than that the Sudan maintains the bonds of friendship which the British have been promoting for the past 50 years or so, and establish diplomatic relations with Britain accordingly.

S.A.R. said in reply that the independent Sudan would certainly show gratitude to all who did it service. It will never let down any ally who helps it ~~to~~ win its liberty. The Sudan will see to it that good relationship exists between it and the rest of the world, carrying on with progress in all fields of human endeavour and joining the Arab League.

The Sudan would not be satisfied with anything less than full independence.

Sir Winston then said that it was up to the Sudanese to choose the form of government they liked although he believed that monarchism would be best suited to the Orient; and S.A.R. replied that monarchism was a dying concern particularly in the East and that it had outlived its usefulness. It would not therefore be advisable for the Sudan to start its independent career with a rapidly diminishing political system.

Already long-established monarchisms have disappeared and it was believed that republicanism would be most suitable for the Sudan.

"This is all very well" remarked Sir Winston, "but in view of my vast experience of the East and my active participation in the 'River War' and indeed my knowledge of the Mahdi's record and that of his family I am of the opinion that monarchism is better for the Sudan than Republicanism".

/S.A.R said



17 P 371/102773

91648

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

P R I S E C

Sir R. Howe

D. 7.14 p.m. May 6, 1953

No. 340

R. 9.07 p.m. May 6, 1953

May 6, 1953

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

J E 1055/2

Following personal for Prime Minister

I saw Sayed Abdul Rahman El Mahdi yesterday and the Secretary-General of U.M.M.A. party today who gave me a full account of their party delegation's visit to Neguib to complain of Egyptian propaganda and bribery. The delegates had taken a strong line with Neguib who pleaded not guilty and put the blame on his subordinates. The delegates had pressed Neguib to make a statement to the effect that he would prefer an independent Sudan to unity of the Nile valley brought about by improper means. A reply had been received from Neguib but was not considered satisfactory and a further approach is being made to Cairo.

2. S.A.R. said that he would use all his resources to combat Egyptian activities here and hoped he would be supported by us and by Her Majesty's Government. They would wait a little to see if the Egyptians would mend their ways. If they did not Abdullah Khalil said the party would denounce the agreement with the Egyptians, boycott elections, and take steps to see that the elections could not be carried out. They would prefer to go back to the situation before the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement and put off self-determination for years under our protection.

3. S.A.R. said that Egyptians had suggested that the money came from Sayed Ali Mirghani. S.A.R. did not think this a possible answer, but he did accuse his rival of openly supporting the Egyptian aims and using his position as a religious leader for political purposes. The Administration should withdraw their support from S.A.M. and British officials should throw their weight behind the U.M.M.A. party wherever possible.

Please see my immediately following telegram.

[Copies sent to the Prime Minister].

K K K K

10371/102773

9/6/98

Wade

A

1005/2

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

P R I S E C

Sir R. Howe  
No. 341  
May 6, 1953.

D. 6.53 p.m. May 6, 1953.  
R. 8.25 p.m. May 6, 1953.

PRIORITY  
CONFIDENTIAL

Personal for Prime Minister.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Abdulla Khalil's ideas on future action by the Umma party if the Egyptians fail to mend their ways, should not be taken necessarily to represent the views of the party as a whole. He is not in the innermost counsels of the Party and is less close to Sayed Abdul Rahman El Mahdi than some of its other leaders.

2. Sayed Abdul Rahman El Mahdi's accusations against Sayed Ali Mirghani are a familiar gambit. In fact there is no more evidence now than in the past, that he is supporting Egypt and his views on the future of the Sudan are as enigmatical as ever. His guiding principle continues to be fear and hatred of Sayed Abdul Rahman El Mahdi and Mahdist ambitions.

3. In my opinion we must be very cautious about giving our obvious support to Sayed Abdul Rahman El Mahdi and Umma before they decide to come out into the open over their attitude to Egypt. As long as they try to maintain a façade of friendliness with Egypt they will disown us when any activities of ours embarrass them with the Egyptians. But an open break with Egypt would put new life into the pro-independence elements in the country and would open the door to firmer and more effective support from us.

[Copies sent to the Prime Minister].

CCCCC

371/102773

9/698



E. L. J.

CONFIDENTIAL

Office of the United Kingdom  
Trade Commissioner,  
P.O. Box 801,  
Khartoum.

Re 22/5

11th May, 1953.

J E 1055/5

Dear Roger.

I have found a rather more pessimistic atmosphere on my return to Khartoum. There is a feeling that pro-unity propaganda financed by the Egyptians is "making headway" though no one is willing to commit himself to what this means in concrete terms. But a general increase in the strength of the N.U.P. in the country proportionately increases the importance of the south to all parties, and it seems that the recent activities of Ahmed-es-Sayid on behalf of the N.U.P. in the south have been more successful than observers, including the Umma, had expected. It is this as much as anything else that has happened recently that has induced the Umma's present feeling of apprehension.

2. The general attitude of the Umma Party remains the problem. They talk of having laid down the law to Neguib and of being willing to break if he refuses to give them the guarantees they want, and Sayid Abdur Rahman himself has suggested full co-operation with H.M.G. But they - or at least the majority of the leaders who matter - remain curiously reluctant to abandon the hope that Neguib does perhaps represent a new type of honest Egyptian with whom durable agreements can be made. While in the background is the constant fear that what Egypt has recently given Egypt can also take away: she can denounce her agreement to waive her insistence on sovereignty and to grant self-government and self-determination to the Sudanese, and engineer a boycott of the elections by the N.U.P.

3. The Umma leaders have said in confidence that this time they will not be deceived and that if within a month or so there are not obvious indications that the Egyptians are sincerely willing to carry out an agreement to abstain from propaganda they will break with Egypt. But on present indications when that time comes I fear that there will inevitably be a move in favour of giving Egypt another chance. Meanwhile, presumably as a concomitant of the continuing negotiations with Neguib the Umma press ostentatiously maintains a balance as between Egypt and Britain. Attacks on Egyptian propaganda are accompanied by warnings that Britain (and specifically my office) should not try and emulate Egypt in this respect, while a recent article professed to find pro-commonwealth propaganda just as active and objectionable as the pro-unity variety. Sayid Seddik has himself carefully explained to me how he rebutted Neguib's charge that he was pro-British!

I am sending a copy of this letter to Cairo.

Yours truly  
Derek Richards  
(D.M.H. Riches)

6371/102773

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J

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Howe  
No. 387  
May 25, 1953

INDEXED. 5.32 p.m. May 25, 1953

R. 7.08 p.m. May 25, 1953

PRIORITY  
CONFIDENTIAL

J = 1035/4  
J = 1643/3

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 387 of May 25  
Repeated for information to Cairo

My telegram No. 218 to Cairo.

A copy of Neguib's letter to the Umma party referred to in paragraph 2 of that telegram has now been given confidentially to Luce. The main points are as follows.

1. The mutual interests of Sudan and Egypt require a common policy for the division of the Nile waters to the benefit of the two countries, a common economic policy and a common defence policy to prevent any outside interference in the above two interests.

2. If the Sudan becomes independent the two countries will have an agreed foreign policy which will safeguard the above three interests.

3. If the Sudan becomes united with Egypt each country will deal with its internal affairs without interference from others, but a joint Sudanese-Egyptian body will be set up to deal with matters of common interest.

4. The difference between independence and unity is therefore very slight.

5. The real menace to a satisfactory arrangement between an independent Sudan and Egypt is British influence which is used to poison the atmosphere and to foster suspicions between the Sudanese and the Egyptians. The greatest danger from the British is their raising the bogey of Egyptian propaganda in the Sudan.

/6. The

20 MAY 1953  
Khartoum

FO 371 / 102-773

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CONFIDENTIALKhartoum telegram No. 387 to Foreign Office

-2-

6. The chief weapons of British influence are their holds on administration and executive authority, their economic strangle hold, Christian missions and the United Kingdom Trade Commissioner's office.

7. Egypt is maintaining the policy of neutrality towards all Sudanese parties and no money is being sent to the Sudan for political purposes. Egypt's one aim is to help the Sudanese to get rid of British colonization.

8. Egypt has been out off from the Sudan for fifty years and it is only natural that the two peoples should now fill this gap by visiting each other.

9. A final appeal to maintain solidarity for the common purpose of getting rid of the British.

Foreign Office pass priority to Cairo as my telegram No. 220.

[Repeated to Cairo].

PPPP

1953

3371/102773

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FROM

Mr Luce  
Khartoum  
to Mr Allen

No. 99/97.8.1

Dated 20<sup>th</sup> April

Received in Registry— 1<sup>st</sup> May

Sudan

Note on methods of propaganda used by the Egyptians since February 1963.

Copied Mr Russell, Cairo.

References

SP 2051/520.

102773

(Print)

(How disposed of)

MINUTES

This information is useful because;  
(a) we may have to use it to counter attack if the Egyptians carry out their threat of exposing our Sudan policy in a Red Book,  
(b) some of these devices might be adopted by us.

R. Parsons  
4/5.

I.P.D. (Mr Barclay) for observations please.

1. I have taken copies of the enclosure.
2. I wish I could be encouraging and make some useful suggestions for following the example of Egypt. Except for one or two comparatively minor measures we cannot compete with the Egyptians who are prepared to concentrate everything they have got in winning over the Sudan. If they had been clever they would have done all these things long ago. They have every advantage in being a neighbouring country with a common bond (at any rate as far as the chief political centres in the Sudan are concerned) of a common language and religion. The following are my detailed observations on the enclosure to this letter.

A.

1. If our Ministers were prepared to make speeches about the Sudan they would receive just as much publicity as those of the Egyptian military junta. If Egypt publishes the threatened Red Book, we will do our best to discredit it, but it will be widely read and believed because it will be interestingly scurrilous.

2. Cairo Radio. I have no doubt that this will be one of the best heard stations in the Sudan and therefore one of the most widely listened to. The best counter is an improvement in Radio Omdurman. We are shortly to discuss the possibilities with the Sudan Public Relations Officer. The B.B.C. Arabic service and Sharq el Adna have M1915 43677

/been

(Action completed)

(Index)

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WR.  
30.4.53



been asked to pay particular attention to the Sudan in their programmes.

3. The Middle East News Agency. This is a comparatively new project which, I suspect, has been set up largely as a rival to the Arab News Agency. The latter are going to establish an office as soon as possible in Khartoum (where they already have a correspondent I have asked those concerned to investigate the possibilities of sabotaging the M.E.N.A. which has now started operating (so far not very effectively) all over the Middle East from a base in Cairo.

4. Invitations to the Sudanese. We cannot compete here with the Egyptians who can offer Arabic speaking Moslem Sudanese any amount of palatable fare comparatively close at hand. We have of course an official Sudanese Delegation coming to the Coronation and I understand that the Sudanese Government are themselves sending at their own expense a party of about 30 Sudanese to the Coronation as well. This Department is arranging a month's tour in the United Kingdom for three parties of four Sudanese journalists or others of similar status who are in a position to influence public opinion during the course of this year.

B.

1. I do not imagine that one of our Ministers would wish to stump the Sudan making speeches. He would in any case be under the disadvantage of not speaking in Arabic which is essentially an oratorical language. I think, however, that some time before the Sudanese elections it might be a very good plan to have a ministerial statement here which would be publicised in the Sudan and which would clearly state the themes which we wish put over to the Sudanese.

2. The establishment of our Trade Commissioner's Office in Khartoum may do something to offset the effect of the many Egyptian offices in the Sudan. The British office is already being severely criticised in the Egyptian and Sudanese press (including worst of all a Sudanese pro-independence paper) and we should take opportunities of calling the attention of the Sudanese to the activities of the Egyptian offices.

3. Army Activity. I do not think that the British Army is in a position to conduct similar propaganda. It looks to me as if it would now suit us best from the propaganda point of view for the forces of both Britain and Egypt to withdraw *from the Sudan.*

4. Egyptian Club. I do not think that anything similar in the way of an Anglo-Sudanese Society would work. It is just possible that we might get something like the old Brotherhood of Freedom going in the Sudan and we are putting this suggestion to Mr. Riches. We cannot compete over (a), (b) and (c). As regards (d) the best thing would be for pro-independence Sudanese to broadcast as much as possible on Radio Omdurman. I should have thought that the move in (f) of appointing Sudanese to senior Egyptian posts might be undermined by suggesting that such Sudanese might well lose their nationality later.

To sum up, the Egyptians have a positive aim in view, the winning over of the Sudan to unity with Egypt and are concentrating everything on this. We on the other hand only wish to see the Sudanese independent. We are pretty certain that this will be their choice if they are left free to decide. We can only go on doing our best to expose the emptiness of Egyptian promises and to extol the advantages of independence.

*C.F.R. Barclay*

(C.F.R. Barclay)  
May 7, 1953.

*no reply*

9

I think Mr Barclay's last para sums things up very well. What we have to say to the Sudanese is quite different in kind, and simply does not lend itself to the use of the same techniques - even if we had the money and the permission.

I am however worried because in the Foreign Office there is no such corpus of personal experience of the Sudan to draw on as we can draw on for all "foreign" countries, and I am quite convinced that much time is bound to elapse before i) Mr. Dearden is in a position to assess the possibilities - frame recommendations  
ii) new devices can be put forth that will have an effect on Sudanese opinion before the elections.

Mr Evans (PRO, Khartoum) whom I am seeing soon may have some ideas, but if not I am thinking of trying to get together a small advisory group of people in London who do know the Sudan - ex Sudan Govt people: Mr Arthur Fairbairn perhaps; one or two men who have lived & worked (eg. missionaries) outside Khartoum. What W. African Dept think & whom

would they support?

African Dept

Allen

If we have trouble in Egypt, the situation may so develop that we shall authorise the Governor-General to take physical action to stop Egyptian activities. We must at present, however, provide for a situation in which this is not happening.

2. Our object is to persuade the Sudanese that independence is best for them; that they can be independent; that we will support them in getting their independence; and, subsequently, if they need it. The corollary of this is that we want to make the Sudanese pro-independence elements see that they must now be primarily responsible for asking for what they want; we can only back them up. It follows we do not want to get in front of them rather than behind. At the moment they are concentrating on attacking Egyptian activities in the Sudan. They will not succeed in stopping them, and they are pretty sure of this themselves, but for the time being we would probably do more harm than good by too rapid an expansion of our activities; we might lay ourselves open to the accusation that, for all our talk of independence, we were obviously seeking to extend our hold rather than to withdraw. In pursuit of their present tactics, the Umma Party might take up the same cry.

x  
i.e. publicly  
say.

3. We hope this is a temporary situation, and that the Umma will soon come out into the open against the Egyptians; but at the moment the best thing seems to let the Information Office work itself in with the job of projecting Britain. This need not stop us planning for an extension of activities later. The difficulty I see about having a special commission of ex-Sudan Government people is that whilst they would be valuable for supplying information, I am not convinced that their advice on the kind of propaganda approach required would be sound. They themselves would have no doubts about this, and would expect their advice to be taken. We might therefore spend more time shooting down suggestions based on a picture of the Sudan as it no longer exists than in getting anything useful out of them. The Sudan political service have been excellent administrators, but on the whole poor politicians. (This is a sweeping generalisation of course: but Arthur Gaitskell, for example, was never altogether popular with the political service on account of his determination to push ahead, and stay abreast of, the Sudanese effendiya). My frank opinion is that Mr. Dearden's experience of the birth-pangs of prematurely-delivered Arab states in Libya and Jordan will be

/more

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End

9P

the Sudan

Minutes

more relevant to his task than a lifetime's service in the Sudanese districts. It is unhappily a fact that very few of the ex-Sudan Government people who went to Libya were able to adapt themselves to changed conditions there and I think their advice on propaganda would suffer from similar mental inhibitions. We can, of course, always get advice on specific questions from a variety of authoritative sources - the Sudan Agency or Sir James Robertson, for example.

W. Morris

(W. Morris)  
May 14, 1953.

A free discussion was held on May 14 with Mr. Evans, PRO Khartoum, at which Mr. Morris & Mr. Barclay were present. A number of useful suggestions emerged & will be processed in <sup>I.P.D.'s</sup> other papers.

Renalohu  
15/5

May 24/5

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Euler J  
Governor General's Office,

GG/97.8.1.

KHARTOUM.

20th April, 1953.

*8 pages of ...  
might ...  
exchange ...  
10-3/4*

PERSONAL & SECRET.

Dear *Allen,* *E1055/1*

With reference to our telegram No. 297 I enclose a note on the methods of propaganda used by the Egyptians since the February Agreement.

2. It makes no mention of money because we have so far not been able to obtain positive proof of its use, but the circumstantial evidence is so strong, and it is so much a matter of common knowledge, that there can be no doubt whatever that large sums of Egyptian money are being used in support of the N. U. P.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Creswell in Cairo.

Yours *sin only*  
*[Signature]*  
(H. H. Luce)

R. Allen, Esq., C.M.G.,  
The Foreign Office,  
LONDON. S. W. 1.

**NOTE ON METHODS OF PROPAGANDA USED BY THE EGYPTIANS  
SINCE THE FEBRUARY, 1955, AGREEMENT.**

It is considered useful to divide this subject into two parts. A. methods used in Egypt and B. methods used in the Sudan.

**A. METHODS USED IN EGYPT.**

1. There are a number of instances of speeches made by General Neguib, Major Salah Salim and others in which Britain has been publicly accused of working to sabotage the Agreement. For example see Cairo's clear telegrams to the Foreign Office No. 581, 617 and 618. More recently Major Salah Salim is reported to have accused Britain in a lecture to the Journalists' Club in Alexandria of aiming to dismember the Nile valley and of impoverishing it by lowering the standard of agriculture and by wasting its mineral wealth. He informed his audience that Egypt intended to expose in a Red Book the scandalous policy followed by Britain since the signing of the Agreement.

**2. Cairo radio.**

A powerful new radio transmission has been instituted as close as possible to the Cadurman wavelengths on the 29 and 43 metre bands.

**3. Middle East News Agency.**

A Dr. Husni Khalifa of M. E. N. A. has been provided with Egyptian funds, and has just been given an hour each day on the Cairo to Khartoum trunk telephone in order to collect information from agents in the Sudan.

**4. Invitations to Prominent Sudanese.**

Merchants and tribal leaders in considerable numbers are being invited (often personally by General Neguib) to visit Egypt at Egyptian expense ostensibly to attend agricultural and horse shows. A party went in the middle of March, and there is another party up there now. In addition Ahlia (i.e. - non-government) school teachers have been invited to Egypt to attend cultural lectures, in order to contaminate another supremely important sphere and get at the young. The Sudan Football Association has recently been approached to exchange team visits, the Egyptian players to come to the Sudan first.

**B. METHODS USED IN THE SUDAN.**

**1. Visits and Tours of prominent Egyptians.**

Examples:

The tours of Salah Salim, Dr. Salah el Din, and Sh. Bakhouri. No opportunities are lost to make mischievous speeches or statements at press interviews.

**2. Representative Offices in the Sudan.**

(a) The offices of the Inspector-General of the Egyptian Irrigation Department, the Economic Expert and the Inspector of Egyptian Education are agencies for propaganda services. Since the establishment of the military regime however the headquarters of the Egyptian Troops in the Sudan has become the most important agency.

(b) Branches of new Egyptian Organisations are being opened, for example: the Misr Bank, which has wide commercial interests, and the Red Crescent Organisation. The latter is distributing largesse to the poor in Omdurman.

### 3. Egyptian Army Activity.

#### Examples:

- (a) The attendance of Egyptian officers at Congress Club and N. U. P. meetings and celebrations.
- (b) The interference in politics of senior officers, who are used as a channel to the Sudanese parties for the delivery of messages, instructions, and probably money.
- (c) After the official celebrations parade on February 14th the Egyptian Army encouraged crowds of demonstrators shouting "Long live Neguib" and "Unity of the Nile", and carried them in their military trucks through the streets of Khartoum, from the Secretariat, where the parade took place, back to their barracks.
- (d) The provision by the Army to the cinemas of the main towns of the "Liberation film".
- (e) The opening by the Egyptian Army of a Public Affairs Office in Khartoum.
- (f) The incident of the presentation to General Neguib of an S. D. F. Badge (See Morris' letter to Ledward dated 16.4.53).
- (g) The disregard of Air Navigation Regulations by Egyptian Air Force, low flying, etc.

### 4. The Egyptian Club.

The Club has a prominent site in Khartoum and for some time has allowed lectures with anti-British tinge to be given to which the public are invited. More recently it has entertained tribal leaders, etc. going through to Egypt (see A.4. above) and has shown them films of Neguib being idolised by the Cairo mob.

### 5. Various other Propaganda devices.

These are well planned and widespread.

#### Examples:

- (a) The holding of an Egyptian art exhibition last month, and the intention to hold some form of industrial exhibition shortly.
- (b) The provision of liberation flags in large quantity after the signing of the agreement, for free distribution and sale in the shops. These flags were flown down from Cairo by military aircraft.
- (c) The provision of a small Unity lapel badge for distribution.
- (d) It is reported that radio recording apparatus is to be sent to the Sudan to record statements by pro-Egyptian Sudanese for transmission from Cairo Radio.
- (e) There is an increase in visits by Egyptian students, scouts, schoolgirls, etc.
- (f) ~~The~~ The subtle move to catch the ambitious has been the appointment of Sudanese to the post of Governor, Aswan, as Deputy to Director of the Azhar, and to the Under-Secretaryship for Sudanese Affairs. The S. D. F. is attacked by the offer of appointments and promotion in the Egyptian Army to S. D. F. officers if they leave the Force, and some retired S. D. F. officers have been so treated.
- (g) The sending to the Sudan for distribution ~~taxing~~ through the Egyptian Army of portraits of General Neguib.

- (h) There have been attempts to seduce Sudan Government radio staff and members of the Sudan Journalists' Association.
- (i) The despatch to the Sudan of Egyptian Islamic preachers was a move in the religious sphere.
- (j) Rumours are fostered that an Egyptian Islamic will be built in Khartoum at Egyptian University large secondary school is now being built with Egyptian money in Omdurman.
- (k) In the economic field there is also activity. For example the Egyptians try to make available when possible certain commodities at cheap prices. A recent example was soap. They are also sedulously fostering a rumour that they are going to buy Sayed Abdel Rahman's cotton crop. It will be appreciated that all private cotton growers are extremely anxious about the prospects of selling their recent crop.

From the above it can be seen that Egyptian methods of propaganda cover a wide field. Whereas some are open, or even clumsy, others are skilfully designed to have long range effect in a country as immature as is the Sudan. It is true that the Egyptians sometimes overreach themselves, but they suffer from no inhibitions, and an error of shooting by one piece is soon forgotten in the general barrage from the remainder of the artillery.

Governor-General's Office,  
Khartoum,  
20th April, 1953.

GG/97.8.1.