

F0371/102762

41638

J

AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

J

F 1052/30

1953

EGYPT AND SUDAN

FROM

Sir R Stevenson
Cairo

No. 221

Dated 4th Feb

Received in Registry 5th Feb

Secret.

Withdrawal of British Troops
Comments on advisability
of H.M.G. making an official
statement.

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

References.

JF 1051/23
/21

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Major Saleh Salem's recent threatening
speech at Tanta has made it all the less
likely that the statement suggested by Sir
R. Stevenson could be made at the present
moment without being interpreted in Egypt,
and in certain circles in this country, as a
surrender to threats.

R. Parsons
6/2.

We can go no further over this until
we know whether the Prime Minister has
approved the Cabinet conclusions on the
basis of defence negotiations.

Even if full authority can be given to
proceed with defence talks, it is doubtful
whether a statement could be made until
those talks actually begin.

Much will depend on the reception
of the Sudan agreement in this country. If, as
seems possible, it gets a bad reception, then
the chances of making a statement look dim.

/I can not

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

6/5/53
✓

WR.
26.6.53

Next Paper.

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I can not help thinking that nothing we could do or say would remove Egyptian suspicions so long as the Egyptian Govt feel it to be to their advantage to put us on the defensive. Their "suspicions of our bad faith" are more than a conviction; they are a principle of policy.

RTD (edwen)

6/2

Now see also Cairo file, 248-2269.

Now see Mr Allen's later submission on this subject.

RP
19/2.

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

Sir R. Howe
No. 98

8th February, 1953

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

D. 8.45 p.m. 8th February, 1953
R. 10.58 p.m. 8th February, 1953

E 1031/36

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 98 of
8th February.

Repeated for information to: Cairo
Washington

Cairo telegrams numbers 243 and 245.

During the last three months, in spite of great provocation, officials and organs of the Sudan Government have displayed great restraint.

2. Speeches of Egyptian leaders, the offensive Southern tour of Major Salem, the daily vituperation against the Sudan Government on Egyptian Press and State broadcast programmes have been, in the main, unanswered.

3. The Nazi policy of repeating pledges often enough, has been ably followed by Egypt and it is beyond reason to expect us to make no answers.

4. If Egypt is prepared to moderate this propaganda we shall certainly be delighted and will follow their lead.

Foreign Office pass to Cairo and Washington as my telegrams numbers 71 and 58 respectively.

[Repeated to Cairo and Washington].

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371/102762

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CONFIDENTIAL
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 243
7th February, 1953

D. 7.07 p.m. 7th February, 1953
R. 7.57 p.m. 7th February, 1953

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

JE1051/171
E1052/33

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 243 of
7th February

Repeated for information to Khartoum B.M.E.O.
Washington
and Saving to Paris

My telegram No. 231.

When I saw General Neguib on 6th February I spoke to him in strong terms about the deplorable effect which Major Salem's speech was bound to have. General Neguib readily agreed and said that he had repeatedly urged the members of his Military Committee to be circumspect in their public utterances. As his appeals went unheeded, he would have to consider issuing instructions. He would speak seriously to Major Salem on his return to Cairo.

2. It may be that the violence of Major Salem's language is to some extent due to the reported reference by the Minister of State to Colonel Nasr's statement. (Please see my telegram No. 242). It is also possible that as suggested in journalist circles here, that the H.M.C. are encouraged to these excesses by indications of fuller American support for Egyptian demands (see Khartoum telegram No. 84 to you). The main reason, however, is probably Egyptian suspicions of our intentions and their continuing fear that negotiations may still fail though efforts to launch the Liberation Group makes some damage inevitable in present circumstances.

JE1051/168

3. General Neguib's own speech today was moderate - please see my telegram No. 244.

4. I also had a chance yesterday during a short break in our meeting on the Sudan to speak privately to Major Salem myself. My main point apart from questioning the desirability /of any ...



CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 243 to Foreign Office

2.

of any violent public statements, was that his speech did not refer at all to the Egyptian Government's policy to negotiate a friendly settlement with Her Majesty's Government but merely expatiated on the measures which Government would take to force us out of the Canal Zone. Major Salem vehemently denied this and accused the journalists of extracting from a very long speech any passages which could be given a sensational twist. He assured me that he had emphasised the desire of Egypt to negotiate a friendly settlement but that this had been omitted from the published extracts. I accepted this but again deprecated the habit of making inflammatory speeches. Major Salem gave me the impression of being somewhat subdued and I think it likely that General Neguib did in fact give him a piece of his mind.

Foreign Office please pass to Khartoum (Priority) and to Washington and Saving to Paris as my telegrams Nos. 93, 92 and Saving 70 respectively.

[Repeated to Khartoum, Washington and Saving to Paris].

K K K K

371/102762

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 242
7th February, 1953.

D. 5.25 p.m. 7th February, 1953.
R. 6.25 p.m. 7th February, 1953.

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

E 1052/32 *J E 1051/171*

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 242 of 7th February.
Repeated for information to:

Washington
B.M.E.O.
Khartoum

and Saving to: Paris.

My telegram No. 231.

In reply to journalists' question Colonel Abdel Nasr yesterday declared that Major Salem's speech at Tanta was an "eloquent reply" to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's statement of 4th February in the House of Commons referring to Colonel Nasr's declaration to the "New York Herald Tribune".

2. Apparently also (as Colonel Nasr told my Officer Commanding) the version which reached the Egyptians was misquoted suggesting that the Minister of State had spoken not of "responsible Egyptians" but of "irresponsible Egyptians". I have not yet seen the text of this statement myself.

Foreign Office pass to Khartoum (priority) Washington and Saving to Paris as my telegrams Nos. 92, 90 and 69 Saving respectively.

[Repeated to Khartoum and Washington and Saving to Paris].

ADVANCE COPIES

Sir W. Strang
Private Secretary
Sir J. Bowker
Head of African Department
Head of News Department
Resident Clerk

CCC



371/102762

9/638

9/2

Registry No. 1052/32

TOP SECRET
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
~~RESTRICTED~~
OPEN

RP 9/2

EMERGENCY
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
~~ROUTINE~~
with without priority
~~DEFERRED~~

(Date) - 8 FEB 1953 19
Despatched 1-58 P.M.

Draft.

Cairo

OUTFILE

[Security classification] Ex-Clas
-if any

Addressed to Cairo

Telegram.

No. 266

telegram No. 266 (date) 9/2

(Date) Feb 9

repeated for information Saving to Washington, BMEO, Fayid, Khartoum, Paris.

Repeat to:—
(Saving) Washington. 385 SAU
BMEO, Fayid. 103 SAU
Khartoum. 6 SAU
Paris. 297 SAU

Your telegram No 242 [of 7th February; Minister of State's statement on BMEO, Fayid. Egypt.]

Minister of State's statement was made in reply to Mr WYATT's question (my telegram No 112 and your telegram No 111 refer) which had been deferred until 4th February.

RECEIVED IN C.B.
10 FEB 1953
SENT TO Dept.

2. Following is text finally actually used;
Begins

Certain public statements have recently been made by a number of Egyptians in authority about the renewal of guerrilla warfare in the Canal Zone, if our troops are not withdrawn. While it is the declared policy of the Egyptian Government to secure the withdrawal of British troops by negotiation, in view of the nature of these statements Her Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo, upon my right hon. Friend's instructions, has taken them up with the Egyptian Government with a view to impressing upon General Neguib

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FO 371/102762

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and his colleagues that if our two Governments are to negotiate a general settlement, negotiations can only take place in an atmosphere of self-restraint.

I believe that it should be possible to reach a settlement acceptable to both sides as a result of rational discussion of the problems involved. My right hon. Friend has received the assurance of the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs that it is the Egyptian Government's intention to reach a settlement by negotiation. Neither the threat of force nor the use of force will do anything but hinder the achievement of the aims of both countries.

Ends

RL 9/2

*Noted to
African Dept.
Middle East Secretariat*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

ALL PAPERS: "We Shall Tell Imperialists To Quit. If They Were to Refuse, We Should Resort to Struggle In All Fields Even to the Extent of Our Blood Being Shed." SALAH SALEM.

Tantah, the third city in Egypt, was yesterday the scene of a historic reception given to Major Salah Salem, as the representative of the great Military Movement. Premier Lewa Mohamed Naguib was represented by Colonel Salah Hetata.

The city was gaily enflagged and at noon Colonel Hetata as General Naguib's delegate, accompanied by Major Salah Salem arrived at the station where, amidst scenes of unprecedented enthusiasm, they were officially welcomed by the Mudir, high officials and notables.

Imposing Parade.

The liberation parade marched through the main streets of the city. It consisted of detachments of mounted and foot auxiliary police, sports groups and boy scouts. A Company of Sudanese troops and the Greek Boy Scouts were enthusiastically cheered.

The delegate of Premier General Mohamed Naguib and Major Salem then went to the Engineers' Club where arrangements had been made for Major Salem to deliver his speech from the balcony of the Club overlooking a square where a huge crowd had assembled.

Colonel Hetata introduced the speaker to the audience describing him as "the hero of the Sudan agreement".

Major Salem's Speech.

Addressing the huge crowd, Major Salem said that he was not going to deliver a formal speech but was merely going to tell them the aims of the Liberation Movement and what had already been achieved by it.

He stressed the fact that the country had long been afflicted with what had wrongly been called democracy. The whole world, he said, was under the impression that a democratic system existed in Egypt because all the aspects of this system were in existence, including parliament and elections which gave the impression that the country's affairs were being controlled by the peoples' representatives.

He asked whether it was true that the country really enjoyed the benefits of a sound constitutional government and replied in the negative, stating that on the contrary, there was an absolute king who considered the people as his slaves of whom he could dispose according to his whims and caprices.

Parties as Instruments.

He added that the absolute king had actually ruled the country using Ministries as his own tools, the parties bowing their heads to his oppression in exchange for grave irregularities being committed by them with perfect impunity.

Such Cabinets, he continued, called themselves peoples' Governments and asserted that they were the true representatives of the people.

How Parliaments Were Formed.

As for parliaments, he said, that all Egyptians are aware how they were formed, only those paying certain amounts of money, becoming eligible for nomination as candidates.

He went on to say that, once a Government was installed its supporters main objective was to secure the greatest possible benefit, by transacting shady deals, by favouritism, nepotism and corruption at the expense of the people of this country.

February 5, 1953

- 6 -

Morning - 625

(CONTD)The Army's Movement.

Suddenly, he said, the great Army's Movement took place and succeeded in achieving its immediate aims.

"We believe in the peoples' right to govern itself under a sound democratic system. We thought that, under the circumstances bygone should be considered bygone and a new page should be turned over in the history of modern Egypt. We thought that an opportunity should be afforded to Egypt's 27 parties to purify themselves so that they might take active part in the government of the country.

"We set at liberty all internees even the members of the ex-king's suite in the ardent hope that the past with all its evils might be forgotten.

"With regard to the political parties, we observed that their programmes were almost identical all aiming at the realisation of Egypt's independence, unity of the Nile Valley and the promotion of the country from the economic, social and cultural points of view. Why then such a large number of parties when none of them had a definite programme of its own?

"It was quite clear that the parties did not try to ensure the country's well-being but merely aimed at securing the advantages of power at any price."

The Liberation Organisation:

After touching upon the events of the 1919 rebellion he spoke of the birth of the Liberation Organisation.

He added that parties believing that they had been left to resume their misguided tactics, began to make use of their old methods and it became quite clear that some drastic step had to be taken. It was deemed necessary, he said, that the whole nation should be united so that Egyptians might act as one man and on January 23, Premier General Mohamed Naguib proclaimed the creation of the Liberation Organisation.

"This Organization will not only undertake the execution of internal development schemes but will also take active part in ensuring the evacuation of imperialistic forces from the whole Valley of the Nile".

"We shall ask imperialists to quit. If they do so, they will spare themselves unnecessary difficulties and win our friendship. But if they refuse, we shall resort to drastic action as already repeated by Premier General Mohamed Naguib. In this case our clear policy will be to resort to struggle in all fields, even if this struggle leads to our blood being shed.

"Naturally, if we were forced to have recourse to such drastic action, imperialists would not be in a position to have a Ministry dismissed and replaced by another because they would have to face all Egyptians united under a single banner, having a sole aim: the evacuation of all foreign troops."

"They occupy the Canal Zone on the plea that the base is indispensable to their forces in the event of war. This belief may have been the result of previous governments having afforded them every possible aid during World War II. This aid certainly contributed in a large measure to their victory and to the loss of Egypt's rights. This farce shall never be repeated. Not a single Egyptian will in any way help them, although during World War II over 300,000 Egyptians worked in their camps and bases, thus freeing 10 divisions for active service. They shall not use our means of communications or our ports even if we have to blow up railway lines and roads and destroy rolling stock.

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February 5, 1953.

- 7 -

Morning - 625.

CONT'D.

"We repeat that we shall not allow this comedy to be again acted as it took place during their rout at Alamein but we, ourselves shall use all forces at our disposal to harass them everywhere even if we have to use sticks as weapons and stones as missiles. They will not beat us unless they march on the dead bodies of 20 million Egyptian heroes.

"We shall ally ourselves against them with the devil himself and shall stand by those who aim at defeating and humiliating them; such humiliation will, by God's will, be their lot in the near future."

"Fortunately, we are military men who understand their language and are aware of their arguments for the maintenance of their forces in the Canal zone. But we also know how to render it impossible for them to remain in the base and how to make it quite useless. This would never have been possible under the old regime with the political parties whose sole aim was to secure power."

Referring to the Sudan question, he spoke at great length upon the recent developments which culminated in the agreement with the Sudan parties which thwarted the manoeuvres of the British officials of the Sudan Government.

He said that the British had persistently striven to rouse the people of the Sudan against Egypt and had actually succeeded in sowing the seeds of discord between a section of the Sudanese people and their Egyptian brethren.

He pointed out that while the British tried to create the false impression that Egypt denied to impose her imperialistic domination over the Sudan, they worked to separate the north of the Sudan from the southern provinces.

Concluding, he said: "We earnestly hope the British may take the course dictated by reason."

"It seems, however, that they will not listen to the voice of reason, in which case we are quite ready for the struggle and are sure of its result which is complete victory for our cause."

ALL PAPERS
Summary.

AL-AHRAM : Persecution Of The Inhabitants Of The South Of The Sudan.

Khartoum, 4. "Al-Ahram" special service.

It is understood that the Egyptian Government will invite some of the tribal chiefs and sultans of the Southern regions of the Sudan, following the telegram sent by Sayed Abdullah Adam, the Supreme Chief of the Dinka tribes, to Premier Lema Mohamed Naguib, exhorting him to stop the campaign of terrorism and persecution launched by the British officials of the Sudan Government against the inhabitants of the Southern regions of the Sudan.

Sudanese Lawyers To Leave For South.

Sayed Abdullah Adam also wired to the Sudan National Unionist Party inviting Sudanese lawyers to leave for the South with a view to investigating conditions there.

Sayed Mohamed Nureddin, Vice-President of the Party, declared that as such a matter was of a national character, he would discuss it with the other parties.

Meanwhile, he said, Sudanese lawyers were quite ready for the journey to the South.

Sudanisation.

The Sudanese members of the Civil Service have submitted a note to the Civil Secretary asking early steps to be taken for the Sudanisation of high posts in the provinces and districts.

AL-AHRAM - Page 6.
Summary.

f0371/102762

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No. 347

21st February, 1953

D: 6.25 p.m. 21st February, 1953

R: 7.05 p.m. 21st February, 1953

CONFIDENTIAL

E 1052/56

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 347 of 21st February.

Repeated for information to Washington

B.M.E.O.

Ankara

and Saving to: Paris

My telegram No. 341. Defence Negotiations.

My United States colleague told me this morning that Dr. Ahmed Hussein (formerly Minister of Social Affairs) was being appointed Egyptian Ambassador in Washington. United States Ambassador had had a long conversation with him the day before yesterday and had urged him to talk very seriously to the Military Committee on the subject of "evacuation". He should tell responsible members of the Committee that it was vitally necessary for them to realise that they were doing their own cause no good by trumpeting about complete evacuation and about facing Britain with irreducible demands. It was even sillier to talk about a renewal of guerilla warfare. He (Mr. Caffery) could assure them that any such move by the Egyptian Army would provoke the most violent and effective reaction by the British troops and that, in so doing, they would have the full support of the United States.

2. Mr. Caffery went on to tell me that Ahmed Hussein, whose appointment he welcomed in Washington, could be trusted to speak very clearly on these lines to the Military Committee and, in particular, to embroider on the ruthlessness of our military reaction in the event of renewed guerilla warfare.

Foreign Office please pass Washington, Ankara and Paris telegrams 128, 14 and saving 92 respectively.

Repeated to Washington and Ankara and Saving to Paris]

23 FEB 1953
G-6 G-6
MEMORANDUM

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 349
21st February, 1953

E 1052/57
D: 4.39 p.m. 21st February, 1953
R: 5.10 p.m. 21st February, 1953

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 349 of 21st
February.

Repeated for information Saving to Paris

Washington

B.M.E.O.

Having repeatedly asserted during the past three days that evacuation negotiations would begin today, press 21st announces that General Neguib will hand over the Egyptian note on evacuation to me at our meeting this morning. My visit to the Canal Zone yesterday is naturally linked with evacuation plans.

2. On the other hand, Akhbar Al Yom reports that today's meeting will be concerned with the various statements on the Sudan agreement and not with evacuation.

3. Colonel Abdel Nasr, in a statement to Akhbar Al Yom said that firstly, no agreement had yet been reached on evacuation, secondly, no date had been fixed for evacuation talks, and thirdly, the situation demanded the unity of the nation and continued readiness for action. The lessons of past experience must not be forgotten. Egypt must be prepared for the worst eventualities -if the best happened nothing would have been lost.

4. Other papers reiterated that Egypt will accept nothing less than complete and unconditional evacuation.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Paris and Washington as my telegrams 93 and 59.

[Repeated Saving to Paris and Washington]

Fe 371/102762

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CONFIDENTIAL
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No. 354A
21st February, 1953

D: 8.40 p.m. 21st February, 1953
R: 9.08 p.m. 21st February, 1953

CONFIDENTIAL

E 1052/55

INDEXED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 354 A of 21st February.

Repeated for information to Washington

B.M.E.O.
and Saving to Paris

My telegram No. 341.

General Neguib and Egyptian Foreign Minister emphasised in conversation with me the desirability of opening talks about the Canal Zone as soon as possible. I replied that I had no instructions on the subject but that I could assure them that the matter was under urgent consideration in London. I went on to advise very strongly, and as a friend of Egypt, that the Egyptian Government should refrain from presenting us with any notes on the subject or otherwise forcing the issue. To do so would be to defeat Egypt's own ends.

Foreign Office please pass Washington and Paris as my telegrams 133 and saving 94 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and Saving to Paris]

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1953 FEB 1953
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P371/102762

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 325
18th February, 1953

D. 12.33 p.m. 18th February, 1953
R. 1.13 p.m. 18th February, 1953

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 325 of
18th February

Repeated for information to Washington
B.M.E.O.

In conversation with the Egyptian Foreign Minister this morning I stressed the fact that, as you had already made clear to the Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires, General Neguib's broadcast had already made the defence negotiations far more difficult. In this connexion I referred to a recent statement by the Minister of National Guidance, which has received wide publicity, suggesting that there would be no great difficulties in the defence negotiations in view of the fact that Britain had repeatedly declared her readiness to evacuate the Canal Zone. I said that statements of this kind made it impossibly difficult for Her Majesty's Government and I despaired of success if the present campaign in the Egyptian Press and the loquaciousness of responsible Egyptian Ministers continued.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington as my telegram No. 118.

[Repeated to Washington].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary
Sir W. Strang
Sir J. Bowker
Head of African Department
Head of News Department



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SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL

DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 331
18th February, 1953

D. 7.13 p.m. 18th February, 1953
R. 7.30 p.m. 18th February, 1953

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

E 1052/50

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 331 of
18th February

Repeated for information to Washington

JE B.M.E.O./46
1052/50

My telegram No. 298: Defence Negotiations.

I understand from the United States Embassy that the Military Committee have been busy drafting a note retracing the history of the Canal Zone dispute and asking for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of British forces.

2. I repeated to Foreign Minister this morning what you had said to the Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires on the effect of the controversy over the Sudan Agreement on the opening of defence negotiations. I will now take an early opportunity of telling him that, in my view, the moment is singularly ill-timed for any such initiative in view of the present temper of the House of Commons, and also that he would be well advised to ensure at least that, if the Egyptian Government wish to open defence negotiations forthwith, their request to do so should be couched in terms which would not give offence to Her Majesty's Government and to the British public; otherwise I cannot be responsible for the consequences.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington as my telegram No. 119.

[Repeated to Washington].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Sir W. Strang
Private Secretary
Sir J. Bowker

Head of African Department
Head of News Department
Resident Clerk



K K K K

SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

J

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No. 335

19th February, 1953.

D. 11.52 a.m. 19th February, 1953.

R. 1.34 p.m. 19th February, 1953.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

JE 1052/51
JE 1052/50

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 335 of 19th February.
Repeated for information to Washington and B.M.E.O.

My telegram No. 331 and your telegram No. [grp. undec. 7345].

United States Ambassador saw Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and his Counsellor has seen a member of the Military Committee.

2. The upshot was that the Egyptians have stated that:-
 - (a) They will not make any public statements at all at this moment;
 - (b) They will not present any note to me in the immediate future;
 - (c) They will consult the United States Embassy before taking any major step over this question.

3. The Egyptians are clearly much impressed by the difficulties you have had in the House of Commons and by the fact that they have been risking the loss of their major objective by overplaying their hand. The general effect has thus been to sober them up for the moment, though one cannot be sure how long this will last.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington as my telegram No. 121.

[Repeated to Washington]

LLL.

B371/102762
82

AFRICAN
9638

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Parliamentary Question

* 71 Mr. H. Hynd: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, what is the present status of the territory known as the Canal Zone in Egypt.

Occington

ANSWERED 18 FEB 1953
ATTACHED.

18 FEB 1953

EWSA/53

The answer to this question is quite straightforward. The "Canal Zone" is part of Egypt. Under the 1936 Treaty, which we regard as still in force, H.M.G. have the right to station certain forces in this part of Egypt, and have the use of certain facilities there. The existence of these rights does not, however, affect the status of the territory.

2. It is difficult to see the purpose of this question. Maybe that Mr. Hynd is intending to ask a supplementary about the withdrawal of British forces in Egypt. In any case he will not have the opportunity since the Parliamentary Office states that there is no chance of this question being reached on Wednesday. There would, therefore, seem to be no object in giving an extensive brief on possible supplementaries; this can be done later if Mr. Hynd has the question deferred.

3. A draft reply is submitted.

RCM Young

(R.C. Mackworth-Young)
16th February, 1953.

R.T.S. (Edmund)
7/2

Roger Allen
17/2

R.G. Bowler
17/2

* Now see supplementary reply.

I spoke to Harry Hynd & am not much the wiser as a result about his object. I think he merely wants to get the legal position on record, & will probably raise something to do with withdrawal of our troops. If the Qn. is deferred, I will attach the Pd on this which was answered recently. (11th Feb)
J. Conville

* I agree - but!
think by stating
he probably means
under which
regime - & to what
the answer wd be
the 1936 treaty
regime - what

If it is left on,
we might add
my Ms.
amendment if
Dpt. sees no
objection to
Egypt.

Rov.

Feb. 18.

bill (140)

FO 371/102762

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1	2	3	4	5	6

**SUEZ CANAL ZONE
(STATUS)**

82. Mr. H. Hynd asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the present status of the territory known as the Canal Zone in Egypt.

Mr. Nutting : The territory in question is part of Egypt. Under the 1936 Treaty Her Majesty's Government have the right to station certain forces there. The existence of these rights does not, however, affect the status of the territory.

RECEIVED IN U.S.
20 FEB 1953
SENT TO DEPT.
21/3

18 FEB 1953

DRAFT REPLY TO
PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION
NO. 77
of
WEDNESDAY
18th FEBRUARY, 1953
by
MR. EMRYS HUGHES

The territory in question is part of
Egypt. Under the 1936 Treaty
Itma has the right to
station certain forces there.
The existence of these
rights does not, however, affect
the status of the territory.

Note for Supplementaries

R - Feb. 18.

If asked whether the 1936 Treaty is still
regarded as valid by Her Majesty's Government,
the answer is "Yes". Her Majesty's Forces are
in the Canal Zone in accordance with the terms
of that Treaty.

371/102762

91638

J

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No. 341

19th February 1953

D. 9.30 a.m. 20th February 1953

R. 10.35 a.m. 20th February 1953

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

E 1052/52

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 341 of 19th

February

Repeated for information to Washington B.M.E.O.
and Saving to Paris

Your telegram No. 345. *JV* *JE*

I spoke to Egyptian Foreign Minister as directed this evening. He gave me an assurance that the Egyptian Government had no intention of presenting us with the kind of note forecast in the Press, still less would they think of publishing it. He added that he had reassured Mr. Caffery on this point this morning (see my telegram No. 335).

2. His own idea was that we should sit down as soon as possible and exchange views. He admitted that the Egyptian Government regarded the principle of withdrawal as having already been accepted by Her Majesty's Government and referred to the negotiations with Neguib el Hilaly last spring. He considered that in these circumstances it would rapidly become a matter of technical sub-committees, but before that happened he thought there was a good deal to be said for the negotiators on both sides to visit the Canal Zone and see the extent of the problem for themselves.

3. He emphasized the fact that Egypt was ready now to start exchanging views and he asked me to assure you that delay would be very risky. The longer the gap between the conclusion of the Sudan negotiations and the beginning of those regarding the Canal Zone the greater chance there was of something being said or done to upset the present favourable atmosphere. He begged you to consider the possibility of a very early announcement of the date of the beginning of the negotiations.

4. I said that....

CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 341 to Foreign Office

-2-

1. I said that as he knew, the present temper of the House of Commons was such that it would be very difficult for you to open negotiations on the Canal Zone immediately. He agreed with this but said that nevertheless he hoped that you would be able to make every effort in this direction. I again called attention to the light hearted way in which responsible members of the present régime spoke of the coming negotiations, as if it were a matter merely of fixing up technical details. I told him that I had no illusions whatever about the matter and that the negotiations would in all probability be long and difficult. He made no comment.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 125 and Saving No. 90 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and Saving to Paris]

QQQ

20371/102762

91638

M
R Stevenson
Cairo

Evacuation of troops in the Suez Canal.
Minister of Foreign Affairs has given an assurance that the Egyptian Government has no intention of presenting a note. He considers that views should be exchanged as soon as possible.

341
ed 19th Feb

received in
istry
20th Feb
Confidential

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

References.

In this telegram the Egyptian Foreign Minister is reported as having said that his Government regarded ~~referred to~~ the principle of withdrawal of British troops as having already been accepted by Her Majesty's Government, and referred to the negotiations with Hilaly last Spring.

See Flag A and subsequent pp

2. At that time, we had agreed the following text with the Egyptians, subject to agreement on a formula dealing with the question of sovereignty in the Sudan.

(Print.)

"Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Royal Egyptian Government have decided to enter into negotiations in order to settle the differences between the two countries on the basis of the withdrawal of British Forces and the study of the necessary defence measures to be taken as a result.

(How disposed of.)

Egypt dist

The conversations between the two Governments will cover the ways and means of giving effect to these arrangements, and include the questions of the defence of the Canal Zone and the arming of Egyptian Forces, in order that Egypt may fulfil her determined + intention to ensure the defence of this area".

+ The Egyptians wished to substitute the word "defend" for "to ensure the defence of".

3. There would therefore appear to be some justification in the Egyptian contention that Her Majesty's Government had already accepted the principle of withdrawal.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

CRS 26
1/2

WRP
26.4.53

4. The possibility that Her Majesty's Government might make a statement about withdrawal on lines somewhat similar to that provisionally agreed with Hilaly was the subject of a recent statement, Submission (JE 1192/23).

Next Paper.

Rome Rome

21/2

1/2 the Neguib

Jordan
17/2

PO 371/102762

91638

If the Neguib Administration were to ask us to agree to a similar formula at the outset of defence negotiations, we should have to consider it; but we would not be committed to accept it just because we had agreed to do it under other, unfulfilled, hypotheses with the Hilaly régime. We should be much better started on negotiations if, as is suggested here, we simply agreed to survey the extent of the problem.

I think we might support the idea that both negotiators should go to the Canal zone, as long as this was not made an occasion for specifying.

RTD Edward
23/2

All this has to some extent been undertaken by words.

The abortive discussions with Hilali do not commit us to anything now, any more than do the Devin-Sidky talks. But the formula of last summer may come in useful again in briefing our rep. regarding the opening of talks.

No doubt the Sgt. "technicians" (save the mark!) should visit the Canal zone.

RA. 24/2

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

D. 11.12 a.m. 17th February, 1953.
R. 12.20 p.m. 17th February, 1953.

No. 314

17th February, 1953.

E1052/H* INDEXED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 314 of 17th February,
Repeated for information Saving to:

Paris
Washington
B.M.E.O.

Press of 17th reports that Sir John Harding is flying to Fayid on 17th to discuss the Canal Zone problem with Sir Brian Robertson and myself.

2. According to Al Ahram's special correspondent in London, it is believed that Great Britain will not make an Egyptian settlement with Israel a condition of evacuation, as certain Labour M.P.s. have demanded.

Foreign Office please pass to Paris and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 83 and 46 Saving.

[Repeated Saving to Paris and Washington].

DISTRIBUTED TO

African Department
Eastern Department
Middle East Secretariat

CCC

17 FEB 1953
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91638

SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No. 298

12th February, 1953.

D. 10.32 a.m. 14th February, 1953.

R. 11.08 a.m. 14th February, 1953.

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

INDEX

JE 1032/46

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 298 of 14th February.
Repeated for information to Washington and B.M.E.O.

By telegram 294. Defence Negotiations.

Not only has General Neguib now formally raised the question of starting defence talks but the Egyptian press has generally urged early opening of these discussions at the same time as it welcomed, in cordial terms, the achievement of agreement on the Sudan.

2. If we do not take this opportunity offered by the greatly improved atmosphere resulting from the good reception of the Sudan Agreement, both here and in the United Kingdom, to announce our intentions in regard to our forces in the Canal Zone on the lines suggested in my telegram 140, I fear that the opportunity will not be repeated. We should get something in to forestall in the next two weeks, any impatience in the Egyptian press or any tendency on the part of Egyptian personalities to revert to bluster and threats. If we are to avoid giving the impression of yielding to pressure we should regain the initiative now, as suggested in my telegram No. 22 (paragraph 2). The present détente will probably not last long and it seems to me vital that we should not miss this opportunity.

3. I do not think that a statement now of our intentions for the future of the Canal Zone would be regarded as in any way confusing that issue with that of the future of the Sudan.

4. Moreover our declared attitude has long been that we were ready to discuss the future of the Canal Zone as soon as the Egyptians, for their part, were willing to do so, and we cannot now go back from that position without destroying the confidence which we have begun to restore in the Egyptians by the conclusion of the Sudan Agreement. On the other hand, to take the initiative and announce our intentions in the course of the next few days would,

18 FEB 1953


/I

No 371 102762

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SECRET

Cairo telegram No. 298 to Foreign Office

-2-

I believe, give us as good a tactical position for the subsequent negotiations as Neguib gained by his acceptance at the outset of self-government and self-determination for the Sudan.

Foreign Office please pass Washington as my telegram 109.

[Repeated to Washington]

ADVANCE COPIES:

- Sir W. Strang
- Private Secretary
- Sir J. Bowker
- Head of African Department
- Head of News Department

LLL.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No. 315

D. 11.12 a.m. 17th February, 1953

17th February, 1953

R. 12.38 p.m. 17th February, 1953

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 315 of
17th February.

Repeated for information to: Paris

Washington

B.M.E.O.

My telegram No. 288

Press reports that following the declarations made by General Neguib and the Minister for Foreign Affairs the Egyptian Government is preparing a Note demanding the evacuation of British forces.

2. The directing Council of the Revolution (H.M.C.) met on the 14th and 15th and 16th to draw up this Note whose presentation is said to be imminent.

3. General Neguib, Colonel General Abdel Nasr and Major Salem are selected by the press as Egypt's team for the evacuation negotiations.

Foreign Office please pass to Paris and Washington as my Saving telegrams Nos. 84 and 47 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Paris and Washington].

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9838
Registry

No. TE1052 47

~~TOP SECRET~~
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~~SECRET~~

CYPHER

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without
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(Date) 18.2.53 19

Despatched 6.25 P.M.

Draft.

CAIRO

[Security classification] CONFIDENTIAL
-if any

Addressed to CAIRO

Telegram.

No. 345
(Date) Feb 18

telegram No. 345 (date) 18 Feb

repeated for information to PARIS, WASHINGTON, BMEQ ~~BAHIG~~
and Saving to Paris

Repeat to: PARIS 380 Washington 725
BMEQ FAYID 287

Your telegram No. 315 [of 17th February].

I very much hope that the Egyptian

Government will not repeat not put in a note demanding the evacuation of British forces. If, as seems likely, such a demand were couched in terms which we should have to reject, the prospect of any negotiations on the subject would be seriously jeopardised.

2. I am disturbed at the tendency by Egyptian spokesmen (for example, by Major Salem and yesterday by the Minister of National Guidance) to suggest that, since the principle of evacuation has been accepted by us, negotiations will be short and easy. This, ^{is} to say the least, misleading, since I have no illusions that the terms and conditions upon which we should be prepared to withdraw our forces will be readily acceptable to the Egyptian Government.

3. You should do what you can to discourage this tendency on the part of responsible Egyptians. In particular you should try to ensure that, if any note is presented, it is confined to a request for the opening of negotiations and does not merely demand evacuation.

PRINTED IN THIS MARGIN.

RECEIVED IN R.R.
19 FEB 1953

~~Excluded~~
~~Cyphers~~
Cypher.

Distribution:—
F.O. & Whitehall

Roger Allen
18/2

Copies to: 43
18/2

W.S.
18/2

BZ

371/102762

91638

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371

J

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 288
13th February, 1953

D. 11.12 a.m. 13th February, 1953
R. 11.56 a.m. 13th February, 1953

PRIORITY

E 1052/42 INDEXED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 288 of
13th February.

Repeated for information Saving to: Paris
Washington
B.M.E.O.
Khartoum

At a press conference after the signing of the Sudan Agreement on the 12th, Neguib is reported to have replied to questions as follows:-

The Sudan settlement would pave the way to the solution of the evacuation question. He had asked me to discuss the withdrawal of British troops and believed that Britain would agree, that she accepted evacuation and that it only remained to fix the period.

2. Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi is reported to have told reporters that the Sudan Agreement was a step forward in the right direction and that it was hoped that it would be followed by similarly successful steps. Asked when he expected talks on evacuation of Suez Canal to begin, the Minister said "as soon as possible, we do not reckon our time in years now but in minutes and seconds".

H H H



6371/2762

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J

AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

J E 1052/43

FROM

Sir R. Stevenson

Cairo

unclassified.

No. 289

Dated 13th Feb

Received in Registry - 14th Feb.

General Neguib has stated that the Sudan agreement is regarded as an encouraging step in progress of Anglo Egyptian relations. He hopes to visit the Sudan shortly and also the U.K.

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

References.

E 1052/42

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

E & S desk

(Action completed.)

EBS 19/2

(Index.)

W.F. 26.6.53

Next Paper.

Please see first sentence of paragraph 3. We do not yet know whether General Neguib really means this or whether his remarks were made in the flush of enthusiasm at the Sudan agreement. But I suppose there would be no objection and that there is still time to make any necessary arrangements?

R. Parsons
14/2.

Protocol Dept.

Yes. An Egyptian Special Mission headed by a Gen. Nabil has already been appointed but the composition can always be altered. But do we take Neguib's remark seriously? I should scarcely have brought so.

[Signature]

6.371/102762

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We do not take Neguib's remarks seriously yet and the difference of opinion between HM6 and the Egyptian Govt about the Sudan and the Commonwealth has reduced the chances that he will come. But Protocol Department minute is helpful, in case the suggestion is suddenly sprung on us.

RP
18/2

F0371/102962

4/638

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No.289

13th February, 1953.

D.6.11 p.m. 13th February, 1953.
R.7.11 p.m. 13th February, 1953.

PRIORITY

JE 1052 / 43

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.289 of 13th February
Repeated for information Saving to Paris

My telegram No.288.

JE 1052 B.M.E.O.
42

Washington
Khartoum

Replying to further questions, Neguib said that he regarded the Sudan Agreement as an encouraging step in the development of Anglo-Egyptian relations, which would improve until all the ills of the past had been wiped out.

2. He said that he would go to the Sudan at the first opportunity. He would also visit the South, though he would not "take off his clothes" like Major Salem.

3. He would welcome a visit from Mr. Eden and, answering another question, said that he hoped to attend Her Majesty the Queen's Coronation. He also hoped to visit the United States when Egypt's internal problems had been resolved.

4. He expressed his gratitude for the help of my United States colleague during the negotiations.

5. At a press conference following Neguib's, Major Salem is reported to have explained that the Sudan Agreement was based wholly on the Egyptian note of 2nd November 1952 and the Khartoum Agreement of 10th January 1953.

6. Major Salem said that important features of the Agreement were the control of the Governor-General's powers by a special commission, the freedom of the Sudanese to choose their own future and no separate mention of the south.

7. Egypt had insisted that Sudanese commercial transactions considered by Britain or Egypt to bear directly on foreign policy should be considered as "external affairs". This was to obviate a possible Sudan-Israel trade agreement.

18. He concluded



London Committee

Cairo telegram No.289 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

8. He concluded by saying that British acceptance of Sudanese demands would no doubt pave the way for a settlement of other outstanding questions, particularly that of evacuation. If Britain withdrew, a page of true cordiality and solid friendship would be opened in Anglo-Egyptian relations. Egypt was always ready to forget the past.

Foreign Office please pass Paris and Washington as my saving telegrams Nos.81 and 44.

[Repeated Saving to Paris and Washington].

B B B

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(No. 1043/45/53G)


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BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

13th February, 1953.



Dear Roger,

I presume that you have seen the B.D.C.C's paper, DCC(52)-49 of the 5th September, 1952, entitled "Measures to be taken in Egypt to frustrate an ultimatum".

2. The fact that I am writing about this paper does not mean that we expect trouble but we recently reconsidered it on the principle that it is best to prepare for any eventuality. After 6 months further experience of the régime we have a number of comments which I think worth passing on to you.

3. We never had much hope that it would be possible to secure "the withdrawal of the Egyptian ultimatum or at least its non-implementation". We are now certain that it would be impossible. Suicidal tendencies are too far developed and we have no doubt whatever that the régime would take up the challenge of our "counter ultimatum". I fear, therefore, that our action would not only fail to attain its objective, but would also irrevocably prejudice the attainment of our "long-term aim" as defined in paragraph 6 of the papers.

4. In the circumstances envisaged, our only hope, however faint, would still be to try to convince the Egyptians that a policy of violence simply would not pay and that the new régime would itself inevitably be one of the victims of such a policy. But the virtual certainty that they would not be deterred even if convinced makes one point particularly clear. This is that there should be no bluffing of any kind whatever. Bluff would undoubtedly be called and very speedily. We ought, therefore, to be entirely ready to put the measures of Group II of the B.D.C.C. paper into effect very closely after those of Group I. I am not myself sure that the most effective retort to an ultimatum would not be immediate imposition of most of the sanctions listed under Group II.

5. So far as we know the B.D.C.C. paper has received the general approval of the Chiefs of Staff, but has not been submitted to Ministers. We do not suggest that it should be. But we believe that Ministerial approval for this paper should certainly be obtained if at any time the defence negotiations look like breaking down. We have had ample warning in the speeches of Neguib, General Abdel Nasr and Salah Salem of what we might expect at once if negotiations did break down. I repeat that we are not expecting a breakdown and are merely, we hope, erring on the side of caution.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter to Hugh Stephenson.

James

Charles Dule

R. Allen, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

*It will be
in copy to
the Comms
by Friday
1/2*

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(JE 1052/540)

23rd February, 1953.

TOP SECRET

Thank you for your letter No. 1043/45/530 about the British Defence Co-ordination Committee's Paper on the measures to be taken to frustrate an ultimatum by the Egyptian Government.

2. I entirely agree with the comment in paragraph 3 of your letter that it would be impossible to secure the withdrawal of any formal Egyptian ultimatum once it had been issued. The hope is that we might make the Egyptians think twice if there were indications that they were about to turn nasty.


3. The B.D.C.C. Paper has not yet been submitted to Ministers, but it will be kept in readiness and submitted at once if the situation should deteriorate so far as to make the danger of trouble imminent.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to Hugh Stephenson in Fayid.

(R. Allen)

C. B. Duke, Esq., C.I.E., O.B.E.,

Cairo.



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D(53) 2nd Meeting: Defence Committee
11 Feb. 1953.

2. THE SITUATION IN THE CANAL ZONE

TOP SECRET
1) Sir J. Boyle
2) Africa Dept.
3) Entes

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he feared that, when General Neguib had concluded an agreement on the Sudan, he would do his utmost to be rid of all British forces in Egypt, so that he would then be free to exert pressure upon the Sudan by bribery and other means to seek unity with Egypt. He thought it necessary that we should have some positive plans to defeat military action by the Egyptians against our forces in the Canal Zone and some means by which we could negotiate from strength a further agreement with Egypt about the base. He suggested that we might insist that the cost of removal from the Canal Zone should be charged against Egypt's sterling balances. If this point were maintained, Egypt would be more ready to conclude an agreement which did not entail this financial burden. He thought also that the least sign of military activity, whether by the Egyptian Army or by guerilla forces against us, would be sufficient justification for rounding up and disarming that part of the Egyptian Army which was located in the Sinai Peninsula. This would be an effective card in negotiations, and would carry with it far fewer disagreeable responsibilities and commitments than the occupation of Cairo and Alexandria, which would inevitably lead to action against mobs and bloodshed among civilians.

JE1052

44

In discussion the following points were made:-

(a) THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said that he would wish to reserve his position on the blocking of Egypt's sterling balances, since that would affect the trade relationships between Egypt and this country. There would, however, be no further release of sterling balance for Egypt this year, as Egypt had received all that was allowed under the terms of the agreement.

(b) THE CHIEFS OF STAFF confirmed that it would be a practical military operation to cause the surrender of that part of the Egyptian Army which was in the Sinai Peninsula, either by direct action or by stopping supplies. If the main Egyptian Army launched an attack upon our forces in the Canal Zone - which seemed very unlikely - there would be no great difficulty in defeating it.

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
(c) The plans which existed allowed for a rescue operation to be carried out in Cairo and Alexandria in case of further attacks against British and friendly nationals in these two cities. If it became necessary to occupy these places permanently there would be a need for further reinforcements.

(d) The object of negotiations with Egypt would be to arrive at an agreement by which the base would be retained in the Canal Zone and would continue to serve as the maintenance base for all British forces in the Middle East. It was hoped that the agreement would allow for the retention of 5,000 British Service personnel to look after the base, but, although these men would have their personal arms, they would not be organised in combat units.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would like the Chiefs of Staff to prepare for him a short note showing the plans which existed for positive action in the Canal Zone in the face of provocation. He hoped that the Minister of Defence would be able to explain these to the Cabinet at a meeting later that day, when he might also refer to a suggestion previously made by him that we should give a military guarantee to the Sudan against external attack.

The Committee:-

- (1) Instructed the Chiefs of Staff to prepare a note giving the outline of existing plans for action in the Canal Zone in the event of further provocation.
- (2) Invited the Minister of Defence to be ready to explain the position to the Cabinet later that day.



Parliamentary Question

* 95 Mr. Wyatt: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, what reply he has made to the requests from the Egyptian Government for the immediate withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone.
[Deferred from Monday 26th January]

Adm

E 1052/31 4 FEB 1953

REC 4 FEB 1953
ATTACHED.

I do not think that the Department need suggest any alteration in the answer agreed when this question was originally put down for 21st January, (attached.)

R. Parsons
2/2.

Mr. Killick

EGYPT

British Troops, Canal Zone

16. Mr. Wyatt asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what reply he has made to the request from the Egyptian Government for the immediate withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: Certain public statements have recently been made by a number of Egyptians in authority about the renewal of guerrilla warfare in the Canal Zone, if our troops are not withdrawn. While it is the declared policy of the Egyptian Government to secure the withdrawal of British troops by negotiation, in view of the nature of these statements Her Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo, upon my right hon. Friend's instructions, has taken them up with the Egyptian Government with a view to impressing upon General Neguib and his colleagues that if our two Governments are to negotiate a general settlement, negotiations can only take place in an atmosphere of self-restraint.

I believe that it should be possible to reach a settlement acceptable to both sides as a result of rational discussion of the problems involved. My right hon. Friend has received the assurance of the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs that it is the Egyptian Government's intention to reach a settlement by negotiation. Neither the threat of force nor the use of force will do anything but hinder the achievement of the aims of both countries.

Mr. Wyatt: Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman say whether, in the general negotiations now proceeding in Cairo, the obstacles with regard to the three years' agreement on the Southern Sudan have been overcome or whether any fresh obstacles have arisen?

Mr. Lloyd: That is a rather different question from the one on the Order Paper. There is a later Question with regard to negotiations on the Sudan.

83 JAN 1953
1829/30

P-331/162762

AFRICAN.

9/1638

Parliamentary Question

La 53
* 21

Adm

Mr. Wyatt: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, what reply he has made to the requests from the Egyptian Government for the immediate withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone.

21 JAN 1955

It is suggested that the Secretary of State might use this question to inform the House of Commons of Her Majesty's Government's reactions to the menacing statements made over the past few weeks by Egyptians in high authority. At the same time, it seems advisable to avoid any statement which might increase tension at this juncture, and the draft answer is therefore intended to be firm without being in any way alarmist.

Flag A -

2. Sir R. Stevenson has approved the suggested draft with one amendment, which has been incorporated. He has also suggested that the Secretary of State might make a specific appeal to the press, both British and Egyptian, to be restrained. Department do not recommend that this suggestion be accepted; Neguib has had a good run in the British press, which would be justified in resenting official strictures.

Ryan Allen

19th January, 1953.

R. J. Bowler

19/1

The opening sentences attach perhaps too much importance to these outbreaks. If we have had no request from the Egyptian Govt. as such to withdraw immediately we shd. surely say so, adding that the public demands for withdrawal have not been from an official character. R. J. Jan. 20.



P 371/102762

91638

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

No. 112

18th January, 1953

D. 3.10 p.m. 18th January, 1953

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 112 of 18th January
Repeated for information to Washington Beirut

Memin Fayid
Mr. Wyatt, Labour Member for Aston, has put down the following question for 21st January:

"To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what reply he has made to the requests from the Egyptian Government for the immediate withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone".

2. I propose to reply as follows:-

"I assume that the honourable Gentleman is referring to the public statements made in recent weeks by a number of Egyptians in authority about the renewal of guerilla warfare in the Canal Zone, if our troops are not withdrawn. These statements must be regarded as expressions of opinion and not formal requests. Nevertheless Her Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo, upon my instructions, has taken them up with the Egyptian Government with a view to impressing upon General Neguib and his colleagues that if our two Governments are to negotiate a general settlement, negotiations must be preceded by a policy of self-restraint.

I believe that it should be possible to reach a settlement acceptable to both sides as a result of rational discussion of the problems involved. Neither the threat of force nor the use of force will do anything but hinder the achievement of the aims of both countries."

3. Please comment.

K K K K

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Notes for Supplementaries No. 16

There can be no withdrawal before negotiations.
 I am sure that the House will not wish me to go
 into details of the terms upon which we should be
 ready to negotiate, but I can assure them that
 there will be no question of our being forced
 out by threats.

*The fact that ^{it is necessary to have} ~~the~~ so many
 troops in the Canal Zone is surely not
 the fault of this country.*





- ② S.S.S.
- ③ Sir W. ...
- ④ Sir J. ...
- ⑤ Officer ...

J 15 1052/24

21st January, 1953

INDEXED

Hon. Mr. Eden

No reply required.
S.S.S. saw Mr. Crossman
today. F. 26/1

I wonder whether you could do me a great favour and permit the enclosed letter to be sent by diplomatic bag to our Embassy in Cairo. The fact is that there is a severe military censorship, and a glance at its contents will show why I do not want this letter to be read by one of the junta! The Ambassador and his staff and, in particular, the Oriental Secretary, could not have been more helpful to me, and I should like to thank them. I also promised to compare notes with them.

Most of the information I gained has been outdated by the coup, but there are one or two interesting points which I should like to mention to the Oriental Secretary. I was very lucky in the days I picked for being in Cairo, and in the amount of time I was able to spend with seven of the nine officers in the inner circle.

I may have been sold a pup, but I don't think so. These men convinced me that they really want to be loyal allies of the West once the "British occupation" is ended. Of course it's a gamble to trust them, but it's an even greater gamble, in my view, to lose what may be the last opportunity by over-scrupulous negotiations on what, at best, can only be safeguards for the Southern Sudan of three years' duration.

What disturbed me was the discovery of the gap which seems to exist between the views of London and the views of our Embassy in Cairo. I certainly didn't appreciate, before I went to Cairo, what the Neguib regime is like, how tense the situation is, and how great its potentialities for good and bad. I tried to point this out in last week's "New Statesman" in a sharply critical article. If there were a chance that my personal impressions would make you more sympathetic to what one can call the Cairo position, I would ask you to spare me half an hour. But maybe you would think it a waste of time.

Yours sincerely,

Dick Crossman

Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.

R.H.S. Crossman

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J.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP.

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevensen
No: 294
12th February, 1953.

D: 10.50 a.m. 12th February, 1953.
R: 11.21 a.m. 12th February, 1953.

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

1052/40

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 294 of
12th February

Repeated for information to: Khartoum.
Washington.

JE 1051/111

JE

My telegram No: 256 and your telegram No: 279.

At the time of the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan this morning, General Neguib and the Egyptian Foreign Minister both said, with some emphasis, that they are now ready to discuss the question of the withdrawal of troops from the Canal Zone and that they hoped we would open these discussions as soon as possible.

2. I spoke on the lines of the last two sentences of your telegram under reference.

Foreign Office please pass Khartoum (immediate) and Washington as my telegrams Nos: 112 and 108.

[Repeated to Khartoum and Washington].

ADVANCE COPIES:
Sir W. Strang.
Private Secretary.
Sir J. Bowker.
Head of African Dept..
Head of News Dept..

JJJJJ

FEB 1953

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JE 1052 37

African Dept.

TOP SECRET

BRIEF FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION WITH
MR. DULLES

EGYPT: DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS

United States and United Kingdom representatives agreed upon a plan for comprehensive negotiations with the Egyptian Government in discussions held in London between December 31st and January 7th. Subject to the views of the Prime Minister, H.M.G. have approved the conclusions of the talks and we hope that the United States Administration will approve them also in all their details.

~~FLAG A~~

2. The Secretary of State may only have time to refer to the papers agreed with the United States and say that he hopes that Mr. Dulles will be able to take an early opportunity of reading these, if he has not already done so, and approving them. The Secretary of State will recall that there are four elements in the so-called "package" proposal, namely, withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone, Egyptian participation in M.E.D.O., supply of arms to Egypt, and economic assistance to Egypt; the important point is that all these parts are inter-related. We hope to start talks with the Egyptians on defence as soon as possible after agreement on the Sudan, if this can be reached.

Arms and Equipment for Egypt.

3. The only outstanding difference between our two Governments is over the question of military equipment. The U.S. Government have decided to sell the Egyptian Government \$11 m. worth of equipment, some of it to be delivered within 45 days, some after one year and the remainder after two years. Our military experts consider that this equipment has been chosen by the Egyptians with an eye to what they would need in the event of their attempting to dislodge our forces from the Canal Zone by force. There is very little in the list which could be described as defensive, and even the list of equipment

/for

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for delivery within 45 days contains 400 machine guns and 70 armed cars. In any case we regret that the Americans should offer equipment to the Egyptians at this stage, although they have agreed to make no communication to the Egyptian Government until there has been further discussion with us about its timing in relation to the Sudan negotiations and the state of tension between ourselves and Egypt. Sir R. Makins has been instructed to put our views to the State Department.

4. We obviously shall not persuade the Americans to send nothing to Egypt. Our own authorities are anxious to supply certain kinds of non-lethal equipment to Egypt at once, and there are other things to the supply of which the Egyptians have been pressing us to agree in principle. It is therefore suggested that the Secretary of State might speak to Mr. Dulles on the following lines:

It seems to us sheer madness to offer at this stage to release to the Egyptians large quantities of arms of the most lethal and offensive type, as suggested in the list recently referred to us. We presume that the aim of the Americans is to make the Egyptians in general more amenable to an association with the Western Powers and in particular more reasonable in their negotiations with us on defence. We believe, however, that such an offer would have exactly the contrary effect and would convince the Egyptians that they could always rely on American support in their negotiations with us.

There is, however, a certain amount of non-lethal equipment which the Egyptians have on order from us, and this we might be prepared to release once the Sudan negotiations are concluded. Secondly, the Egyptians have asked us to agree in principle to the release of other equipment, mostly anti-aircraft equipment, within

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the next six months; this we might be prepared to do at the appropriate moment after we have opened defence negotiations in concert with the Americans.

Could not the Americans do likewise? That is to say, could they not cut out of their list for the time being all lethal equipment and confine themselves to non-lethal equipment which would be primarily used for training purposes by the Egyptians. Later on, if things go well they might agree to release limited supplies of other equipment, but things like machine guns should be kept until the last.

In this way they would not only avoid the risk that the weapons they supplied might be used to kill British troops, but also the Egyptians might be brought to a more realistic frame of mind.

Roger Allen

2nd February, 1953.

*I discussed this with
Mr. Allen and agree with
the brief.*

Col. Sir W. Strong

*R. J. [unclear]
2/2*

TO. SECRET

EGYPT AND SUDAN

Brief for the Secretary of State's meeting with Mr. Dulles

The Secretary of State is familiar with the present state of our negotiations with Egypt. The main points he will wish to stress are:-

- (i) that our sole interest in the Sudan is to see it launched into self-government, which is to be followed by self-determination, in conditions which will be acceptable to all sections of the Sudanese population, and which give fair assurance that the stability of the country will be preserved;
- (ii) that the difficulties in the negotiations would not have arisen if the Egyptians had not refused to fall in with our original suggestion last September that we should proceed with elections first;
- (iii) that we have been ready all along to let our differences stand over for discussion with the Sudanese Parliament and Government;
- (iv) that the main difficulties are practical only, i.e.
 - (a) on the South: to find a solution which the Egyptians will accept, and which at the same time makes it possible ^{to persuade} ~~for~~ the two and a half millions living in the South Sudan to co-operate in the new Constitution;
 - (b) on Sudanisation: to avoid ^{the} collapse of the administration which might result from the abrupt withdrawal of the British administrators who have built up the country in the past fifty years. But on this again we are ready to let the wishes of the Sudanese prevail.

/2. Sir Roger

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2. Sir Roger Makins has recently telegraphed to say that the U.S. Government will find it hard to understand why we should get involved in a major clash with the Egyptians over the South and Sudanisation. The Secretary of State ^{may} ~~wish~~ therefore wish to stress that we are doing our utmost to avoid any clash.

Roger Allen

3rd February, 1953.

H. G. ...
3/2

Enter.

SECRET

Private Secretary Distribution

JE 1052/37 G

Copy No. 29

MEETINGS WITH MR. DULLES AND MR. STASSEN

Meeting in the Foreign Office at 5 p.m. on 4th February, 1953

Present:

Mr. Eden.
 Lord Alexander.
 Mr. Selwyn Lloyd.
 Sir W. Strang.
 Sir. P. Dixon.
 Sir J. Bowker.
 Mr. C. A. E. Shuckburgh.
 Mr. A. D. M. Ross.
 Mr. R. H. Allen.

Mr. Dulles.
 Mr. Stassen.
 Mr. Julius Holmes.
 Mr. Lincoln Gordon.
 Mr. Douglas MacArthur, Jr.
 Mr. J. Penfield.
 Mr. R. L. O'Connor.
 Mr. R. E. Matteson.

Sudan

The Secretary of State said that the Cabinet had yesterday approved an offer to General Neguib which went 95 per cent. of the way to meet him. On the position of safeguards for the South we were prepared either to make the whole matter *ad referendum* to the Sudanese Parliament, or to make the exercise by the Governor-General of his special responsibility for the South subject to the advice of his commission. On Sudanisation we were prepared to accept the Egyptian terms subject to the establishment of an international commission to supervise the whole process of self-determination including Sudanisation. He hoped that, on this basis, Mr. Dulles might feel able to instruct the United States Ambassador in Cairo to tell General Neguib that the United States Government thought this a reasonable offer which the Egyptians ought to accept. We were extremely anxious to reach an agreement and should spare no effort to this end.

Mr. Dulles wondered whether it would be possible to combine an instruction in these terms to Mr. Caffery with a solution of the difference between us on supplying arms to Egypt. He had it in mind that Mr. Caffery might say that he took it for granted that the Egyptians would accept this offer by the British Government and

that it was on that understanding that the United States would be prepared to sell equipment to the Egyptians. If, of course, the offer were not accepted, then the matter of equipment would have to be reconsidered.

The Secretary of State pointed out that some of the equipment which the United States Government proposed to sell to Egypt could very easily be used against British troops in Egypt in the event of trouble. If Mr. Dulles's plan were followed it would be desirable to go through the list of equipment with this in mind. Mr. Dulles said that it might be possible to take the line that, if the Sudan agreement went through, the United States Government would in fact allow the Egyptians to purchase some of the non-lethal equipment, but that a delay should be imposed on the provision of equipment to which the British Chiefs of Staff raised objection. In any case he doubted whether any of the equipment could in fact be delivered within forty-five days.

It was agreed that the list of equipment should be reconsidered in the light of this discussion, and that meanwhile the State Department might suggest to Mr. Caffery that he should support the British offer to General Neguib.

Egypt

Mr. Dulles enquired the British view on the stability of the Neguib régime. *The Secretary of State* said that there were doubts about its stability. For example, the Sudanese were anxious to reach an agreement with Egypt because they thought that the present régime might not last.

Mr. Dulles said that it was because of such doubts that the United States Government wished to allow the Egyptian Government to purchase equipment.

The Minister of Defence doubted whether the present was the moment to offer the carrot to the donkey.

The Secretary of State thought that we might allow the Egyptians to have equip-

ment for training purposes, but that other equipment should not be made available until the defence negotiations were under way.

Mr. Dulles said that it was the policy of the new Administration to take a more favourable attitude towards the Arabs than their predecessors. For this reason the President was unwilling to go back upon an agreement with an Arab State which the previous Administration had made. He believed that the previous Administration had in fact signed an agreement which made Egypt eligible to purchase arms, and it was therefore open to her to make cash purchases in the United States. Nevertheless, some administrative delays might be possible.

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Brief for conversation with French ministers.

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12/15/38

EGYPT AND M.E.D.O.

Anglo-Egyptian negotiations

The Secretary of State may wish to tell the French Ministers the stage reached in the Sudan negotiations. Since French Equatorial Africa has a long frontier with the Sudan, the French Government have a close interest. He may wish to say that ~~in the event of~~ ^{after} the conclusion of an agreement with Egypt over the Sudan, we intend to enter into defence negotiations, ~~with a minimum of delay.~~ The French Embassy have been told ^{very little about} ~~in very broad outlines the upshot of~~ our discussions with the United States Government from December 31st to January 7th, ^{though they are aware that Egypt was discussed.} In the absence of approval of the basis of negotiation with Egypt by the Prime Minister or by the new United States administration, it is difficult to go much further.

M.E.D.O.

2. It may be unnecessary to say more about the Middle East Defence Organization than that everything now seems to depend upon the progress of our negotiations with Egypt. The outcome of these negotiations will undoubtedly have a considerable influence upon the shape which this regional organization eventually assumes.

Suez Canal

3. The British and French Embassies at Washington presented a joint Note to the State Department on January 29th regarding the freedom of transit through the Canal. The Secretary of State may wish to record his pleasure at this example of Franco-British co-operation, and to express the hope that it

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may lead to concrete results. The first reaction of the State Department was that there should be no objection in principle to the United States Government joining in a secret exchange of views on a tripartite basis, as we had suggested.

Arms Supply

4. It might be thought proper to add a word of appreciation to the French on their co-operation over the embargo on arms to Egypt which has been in force since Anglo-Egyptian relations deteriorated in the Autumn of 1951. We are not relaxing our embargo yet, and will not fail to give the French Government and the North Atlantic Council due warning when we feel the time is right for a change in policy.

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 184
29th January 1953

D. 9.45 a.m. 30th January 1953
R. 10.30 a.m. 30th January 1953

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 184 of 29th
January

Repeated for information to Washington B.M.E.O.
Ankara

and Saving to Paris

I called on the Egyptian Foreign Minister this evening and in the course of conversation about other matters said that I had a growing impression that certain elements in the present régime, particularly the High Military Committee and perhaps certain other people in the Government, had the idea that they had got Britain on the run and that they only had to exercise a little more pressure, perhaps by stirring up trouble in the Sudan and in the Canal Zone to obtain their national aspirations in full. I did not need to tell him with his experience what a profound psychological mistake this was. The Wafd had made it 18 months ago after interpreting wrongly, our withdrawal from Abadan. The British were, as he knew, the wrong kind of people on whom to use these tactics and anyone who did so would inevitably defeat his own end. Her Majesty's Government were, as he had himself found, sincerely anxious to reach an agreement, but as he had also doubtless found there was in England a strong trend of opinion which maintained that Great Britain had been kicked about quite enough by these small Middle Eastern countries and did not view with any particular favour an agreement which could be interpreted as giving way to Egypt.

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2. Foreign Minister said that his own anxiety to reach an agreement made him share my impressions and apprehensions to some extent, but he could assure me solemnly that this kind of idea, though prevalent with some people, would not affect the policy of the Egyptian Government so long as he and General Neguib, were members of it. He described the Military Committee as being in a state of "high emotionalism". The success which they /had had seemed



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Cairo telegram No. 184 to Foreign Office

-2-

had had seemed to have gone to their heads. They were talking far too much, and particularly to journalists. He thought that the best answer was that we should continue quietly to negotiate. He himself suffered from a multitude of difficulties caused by the violent loquaciousness of these young officers, but he had come to the conclusion that there was nothing he could do about it except to ensure that it was not translated into actual policy. I said that this was all very well but General Neguib himself was inclined to violent language on occasions. This did not help at all. Foreign Minister agreed but said that the Egyptians were a Mediterranean people who lived largely on their emotions, and words did not have the same significance as they did in northern countries. In order to keep the spirit of the movement alive he had occasionally to use some "pepper" in his public pronouncements. We should not take this too seriously.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Ankara and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 68, 12 and Saving No. 60.

[Repeated to Washington and Ankara and Saving to Paris]

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Registry
No. 1052/22

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
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Draft.
despatch
Paris

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He is O'Brien
Harvey
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Cairo 29
Khalid Fayid 29
Winton 135

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Date:

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M. Redwood
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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
29th January, 1953.

Sir,

During the course of my conversation with the French Ambassador today, His Excellency asked me about progress in the Sudan.

2. I explained the difficulties we were encountering on the Egyptian side. M. Massigli asked me whether we were concerned about the American attitude. From all the telegrams the French Ambassador had been sending from Cairo, it appeared that the Americans were giving support to the Egyptians rather than to ourselves. He also referred to a member of the American staff at Cairo, now back in Washington, who seemed completely "sold out" on Neguib. He was emphasising the need for America to support Moslem powers everywhere. If this was really to be American policy, results would be disastrous. I gathered that the officer concerned was McClintock.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to... Cairo, Winton & Khalid Fayid.

Copy
20/1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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enter

MEASURES TO MAINTAIN OUR POSITION IN EGYPT

I think this is rather an important paper by the Chiefs of Staff, which may be of some help to the Secretary of State in any discussions that he may have on Egypt with the Prime Minister.

2. The Chiefs of Staff are considering what action would have to be taken by the Commanders-in-Chief Middle East, for which Ministerial authority would have to be sought here, if it became apparent that no agreement between ourselves and Egypt was possible and the Egyptians were consequently preparing for guerilla warfare or terrorist attacks on our forces in the Canal Zone.

The action they contemplate would really have two objects: first, to frighten the Egyptians off guerilla activities, and secondly, to consolidate our own position if the Egyptians nevertheless proceeded to extremes. We could, and probably should, reinforce the action designed to achieve the first object by diplomatic action, e.g. by instructing H.M. Ambassador to warn the Egyptians plainly that we were not going to be evicted by force from the Canal Zone, that we should hold the members of the Egyptian Government personally responsible for any damage or loss of British lives, and that we should take whatever action might in our view be necessary to maintain our position.

3. The Chiefs of Staff have not suggested any order of priority for the measures which they have enumerated and no doubt it would depend on circumstances which actions we took first. They have, however, divided their measures into those under the heading of "immediate action" and those under the heading of "action if the military situation further deteriorates". Some of the measures which they suggest are fairly drastic - for example, (g) (control of the white oil supply to Cairo and restriction on movement of oil by road, rail and barge);

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(j) (preparatory steps to institute Military Government, including the setting up of courts to try terrorists); (m) (institution of Military Government in the Canal Zone where necessary); and (n) (stop all oil supplies from the Canal Zone to Cairo). The Chiefs of Staff realise that if we were obliged to take these steps, it would probably mean that Egyptian hostility had reached such a pitch that we should be obliged also to occupy Cairo and Alexandria.

4. The Chiefs of Staff have prepared this paper in consultation with the Foreign Office. They are not proposing to put it to Ministers at present, and will not do so unless the situation in Egypt deteriorates. Nevertheless they thought it right that the Secretary of State should see it now. The paper sketches in outline the very unpleasant consequences, from our point of view, of a break with Egypt. Its purpose of course is not to dwell on the horrors (the Chiefs of Staff have, for instance, omitted any reference to the probability that we might have to declare partial mobilisation in this country in order to call up the necessary administrative staff to carry on Military Government in the Canal Zone, let alone of course in Egypt itself); but the nature of the measures themselves indicates plainly enough the sort of situation with which they think - probably rightly - we should be faced. It is largely on this account that it seems necessary to reach a defence agreement with Egypt.

Roger Allen

28th January, 1953.

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The consequences of a break
with Egypt have been present
in our minds for some time
but I agree that it is
useful that they should
be summarized by the Chiefs
of Staff at this juncture.

R. J. [unclear]
28/1

Sir W. Keary

W. Keary
28/1

Will this not be
circulated to the
Cabinet or at least
to Defa Cln?

~~W. Keary~~

I have suggested to Gen
Brayden that this might
be done, though the COS had
said (last para) that they did not think
it necessary to submit it formally. I explained
the S/S reasons for wanting this report brought to Ministers' attention. C/S/S/2.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Sir W. Stanger 27/1
Sir J. Boyler 27/1
Africa Dept 28/1

WJ 27/1

26th January, 1953

J61052 39

Dear Shuckburgh,

The Minister of Defence thinks that the Foreign Secretary may like to see the enclosed copy of a minute he has received from General Brownjohn setting out the views of the Chiefs of Staff on the situation which might arise from a breakdown of negotiations with Egypt.

Yours sincerely,



C.A.E. Shuckburgh, Esq., C.M.G.

Sept 24
for 27

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TOP SECRET

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MINISTER

MEASURES TO MAINTAIN OUR POSITION IN EGYPT

The Chiefs of Staff have been considering the situation which might arise from a breakdown of negotiations with Egypt.

2. It is possible that the Egyptians might present Her Majesty's Government with demands amounting to an ultimatum. A rejection of such demands would probably result in the Egyptian Government taking forcible action through terrorists, backed by Egyptian armed forces, with the object of driving us from the Canal Zone.

3. We assume that H.M.G. would, at an appropriate moment, give a warning to the Egyptian Government, reiterating previous statements that :-

(a) we should immediately intervene in the Delta if British lives were endangered;

(b) we should take any action we considered essential to the security of our position in the Canal Zone.

4. If the Egyptians disregarded the warning and persisted in their actions, we would then have to be ready to take the necessary military action.

5. H.M. Ministers have already delegated authority to the British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Middle East, to take certain measures in the event of a sudden and serious emergency which does not allow time for prior reference to London. These measures are purely defensive; they are designed for the protection of the Canal Zone rather than as a means of exerting pressure on the Egyptians.

6. The Chiefs of Staff consider that, in the event of a breakdown and in the face of threats of renewed terrorism, it would be essential to take measures to gain and maintain the initiative. These measures should :-

(a) be a strong deterrent to the Egyptians, so as to bring home to them our ability to maintain our position and to retaliate;

(b) be capable of prompt and effective execution, if necessary in the face of the resistance of the Egyptian armed forces;

(c) not prejudice any further large-scale action which we might have to take - e.g., RODEO;

(d) avoid unnecessary damage to the interests of other nations.

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7. At Annex we have set out first, the measures for which authority has been delegated to the British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Middle East, subject to reference to London, if the emergency permits; and secondly, those measures for which Ministerial approval would be required, if the situation deteriorates. We have sub-divided the latter into those measures necessary for immediate action and those for action if the military situation further deteriorated.

8. The Chiefs of Staff wish to draw attention to the fact that the establishment of Military Government within the Canal Zone involves grave political, economic and administrative problems and the provision of a civil administrative staff from the United Kingdom if the local Egyptian authorities are withdrawn. Feeding the population would be a serious problem.

Conclusion

The Chiefs of Staff do not think that at this stage it is necessary to submit this paper formally to the Defence Committee. They feel, however, that you should be aware of the measures which it will be necessary to take in the event of a breakdown with the Egyptians, and that you may wish to send a copy of this minute to the Foreign Secretary.

21st January 1953

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ANNEX

MEASURES FOR WHICH AUTHORITY HAS BEEN DELEGATED TO THE BRITISH DEFENCE CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE, MIDDLE EAST, SUBJECT TO REFERENCE TO LONDON, IF THE EMERGENCY PERMITS.

- (a) Restrict movement into, out of and within the Canal Zone and screen all traffic for security purposes.
- (b) Arrest, detain or expel from the Canal Zone terrorists or other persons known to be plotting against U.K. interests.
- (c) Move land forces for RODEO BERNARD to the Erskine line, alert RODEO FLAIL and fly reconnaissance as required over restricted areas of the Delta.
- (d) Take such action as may be necessary to work W.D. cargo in the Canal ports and keep the Suez Canal open to shipping of all nations.
- (e) Control and route all flying over the Canal Zone.

MEASURES FOR WHICH MINISTERIAL APPROVAL WOULD BE REQUIRED, IF THE SITUATION DETERIORATES.

Immediate Action

- (f) Seal off within the Canal Zone all positions occupied by Egyptian Armed Forces and stop all traffic between the Delta and Sinai, particularly supplies to the Egyptian Forces in Sinai. Arrangements should be made with the U.N.W.R.A.P.N.E.+ administrator for the feeding of the Arab refugees in Gaza.
- (g) Establish control of the white oil supply to Cairo, involving the restriction of movement of oil by road, rail and barge, and the control of piped oil, accompanied by a statement to the Egyptian authorities that such control has been established.
- (h) Establish effective control of the Sweetwater Canal within the Canal Zone, and requisition barges in order to exert pressure on the Egyptian Government by interrupting one of their vital lines of communication.
- (j) Take preparatory steps to institute Military Government where necessary, particularly the setting up of courts to try terrorists. While detailed steps depend on the type of control which circumstances require, they might include :-

+ United Nations Works and Relief Administration, Palestine and Near East.

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(i) Calling forward additional administrative personnel.

(ii) Issuing warning proclamations.

Action if the Military Situation further deteriorates

- (k) Disarm and expel from the Canal Zone all members of the Egyptian Armed Forces.
- (l) Expel, disarm or take such lesser action as circumstance require, against non-co-operative or hostile Egyptian Police or Government Officials in the Canal Zone.
- (m) Institute Military Government in the Canal Zone where necessary and as far as possible.
- (n) Stop all oil supplies from the Canal Zone to Cairo.
- (o) Occupy El Abbassa.

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SAVING TELEGRAM

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En Clair by bag.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir Ralph Stevenson
No. 33 Saving

4th February, 1953

FO & WH

ADVANCE COPY

E1052/35

Repeated Saving to:- Paris No. 67,
W' ton No. 32,
Memin (Fayid) No. 60.

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 33 Saving of 4th February, repeated for information Saving to Paris, W' ton and Memin (Fayid).

Press 31st reports that in an interview with the French News Agency on the 30th, Col. Abdel Nasr said that friendship with Britain could only be established once British troops had left Egypt.

2. Al Misri commented that evacuation might lead to friendship and the forgetting of broken promises.
3. Al Zaman said that Britain must understand that the Egyptian people want agreement and friendship, but that this can only come about after complete acceptance of the demands of the Nile Valley. It would be better for the British to evacuate as friends, rather than as foes.
4. Both comments are more gracious than we have done to expect, particularly from al Misri.



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JE 1052/30

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

INDEXED

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No. 221

4th February, 1953.

D. 6.24 p.m. 4th February, 1953

R. 8.3 p.m. 4th February, 1953

PRIORITY

SECRET

JE.1052/23

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 221 of 4th February
Repeated for information to Washington and B.M.E.O.

Your telegram No. 199: Defence Negotiations.

JE.1052/21

Certainly a statement on the lines suggested in my telegram No. 140 might if made last week have been interpreted in some quarters as a surrender to threats, and it could clearly not be made immediately after some disturbing statement on the Egyptian side. But if it is properly timed I do not think there is much risk of the Egyptian Government exploiting it in this way though they would probably represent it as a triumph for their policy (and I do not think that this would really be to our disadvantage).

2. It is also true that if the statement were not translated into fact within a reasonable period of time Egyptian suspicions would probably revive. On the other hand time is not on our side and any serious incident or general deterioration in relations would make it more difficult still, or even impossible, to make the statement and I see no prospect of a satisfactory solution without it. The danger of incidents is likely to increase as time goes on and I still think that the sooner such a statement can be made the better - before anything happens to make it more difficult still to do so. If we can successfully conclude the Sudan negotiations the statement should be made immediately afterwards.

3. I agree that a lesser statement would serve no useful purpose. It might well in fact do harm. But I do not see any real advantage in "keeping the Egyptians guessing". One of the main causes of our present difficulties is that the Egyptians doubt our good faith and do not believe that we really intend to withdraw at all, and the longer we leave them with that suspicion the deeper it gets and the more bitter they become.

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Cairo telegram No. 221 to Foreign Office

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The present Government are no more prepared than previous governments to make the principle of evacuation subject to terms. Apart from their efforts in the internal field the main difference between them and their predecessors lies in their (probably) more practical and realistic approach once evacuation has become an established fact in spite of their greater impatience over big issues.

4. I will comment separately on your paragraph 3 and the M.E.D.O. question.

Foreign Office please pass Washington as my telegram No. 86.

[Repeated to Washington].

DISTRIBUTED TO:

African Department
Middle East Secretariat
Western Organisation Department

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