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ER1091/101

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM JERUSALEM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE
AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Walmsley
No. 48
23rd April, 1953

D. 8.49 p.m. 23rd April, 1953
R. 10.18 p.m. 23rd April, 1953

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 48 of 23rd April,
Repeated for information to:

Amman
Tel Aviv
Washington [Priority]
Paris [Priority]
U. K. Del. New York [Priority]
B. M. E. O. [Priority]

My telegram No. 46. ER 1091/101

Following mostly [sic] from Vigier.

On the Mixed Armistice Commission meeting yesterday, the Israelis declared that henceforth they considered the M.A.C. machinery useless. Please see Amman telegram No. 205, paragraph 2. The chairman's attitude, Vigier agreed, was due to conflict of evidence in which the United Nations observers' views contradicted Israelis'. Shortly afterwards the firing began.

2. The M.A.C. met today under Riley's chairmanship, Vigier and Ridder also present. The Israelis violently opposed investigation of yesterday's incident and only agreed to consult the Israeli Chief of Staff when their refusal, Vigier says, began to look odd. The Israelis said the flare-up was due to tension caused by the crimes of the infiltrators. Only high level talks could clear the situation. Jordan had not replied to their memorandum (enclosed in our letter of 2nd April). The M.A.C. machinery had become inefficient. R.... defended the machinery but expressed dislike of the majority vote. Conclusion, the Israelis will consult as above and R.... will press Jordan to agree to high level talks on infiltration.

3. R....'s report to New York contained nothing new of substance.

4. Vigier again expressed the hope that Jordan, in her own interests, would agree to such talks.

5. Vigier would not openly commit himself on responsibility for opening the motion. He left little doubt, however, that he considers Israel almost certainly responsible. He considers this part of the campaign prepared for Dulles' visit, as the Israel Press and radio build-up has for days been such as to bear unfortunate interpretation.



17. [sic]

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P

CONFIDENTIAL

Jerusalem telegram No. 48 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

7 [sic]. United Nations arranged the cease-fire for 1230 today G. M. T., both sides undertaking not to retaliate if the other broke the truce. Since then there have been occasional shots from the Israel side only. Casualties to noon on the Arab side, 4 police or military dead, 4 civilians dead and 9 wounded.

Foreign Office pass to Tel Aviv as my telegram No. 21 and Priority to Washington, Paris, U. K. Del. New York and B. M. E. O. as my telegrams 4, 4, 4 and 7 respectively.

[Repeated to Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, U. K. Del. New York and B. M. E. O.]

ADVANCE COPIES

The Prime Minister
Sir W. Strang
Private Secretary
Sir J. Bowker
Head of Eastern Department
Head of News Department

DDD

E
 EASTERN DEPARTMENT
ISRAEL

E 21091/102

FROM *Amman*
Mr Furlong

No. *216*
 Dated *23.4.53*
 Received in Registry— *24.4.53*

Israel outbreak of aggression
King Hussein & Jordan. King Hussein has stated that if aggression continues it will not be possible to prevent retaliation. Hoped that immediate & effective action be taken to stop aggression. Mr. & French representatives similarly informed.

Last Paper

(MINUTES)

References
ER 1091/100

Submitted with -/93, -/94, -/95, -/96, -/97, -/100, -/101, -/103, -/104, on the Israel-Jordan ^(Fly E) ~~front~~ ^{front} in Jerusalem. also ER 1092/2 and -/3, of which -/2 gives details ^(Fly A) ~~(main complaints)~~ ^(main complaints) -/96 and -/101 ^(Fly B) (Jerusalem) give most objective account, and unofficial UN views that Israeli appear to have started the trouble. Passage marked 'X' in -/101 and attributed to Israeli seems to imply that they adopted counter-measures.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

In this tel. and -/100 ^{Fly C} ~~Amman~~ ^{Amman} refer the attitude of the Jordan Govt., the main contents of their Note, and their invocation of the Tripartite Declaration and Anglo-Jordan Treaty. -/99 ^(Fly D) recounts the Israeli Ambassador's remarks to the Minister of State on 22/4 about incidents in which Jordan was alleged to be the guilty party.

(Action completed) *1/2/53* (Index) *1/2/53*

Next Paper

At a meeting this morning in

See J. Pankov's room it was decided to draft a tel. to Tel-Aviv asking for removal of Local Commander's Agreement and more restraint in the M.A.C., and to Amman (copy) patience and high-level talks.

Israelis made representations to us on the 9th and 19th April about one or two incidents. The incidents in Jerusalem seem to have started on the 18th April with the shooting of a Jewish woman, and to have built up until the general explosion of the 22nd April.

The M.A.C. seem to be doing their task well in arranging cease-fires and encouraging constructive efforts to reduce the tension.

Draft tel. to Amman and Tel-Aviv submitted.

H. P. Wilson
24/4

See submission on E

405
27/4

CONFIDENTIAL

21091/102

FROM ADMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Furlonge

No. 206

23rd April, 1953

D. 2.40 p.m. 23rd April, 1953

R. 3.51 p.m. 23rd April, 1953

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 206 of 23rd April

Repeated for information to Jerusalem

Paris

Tel Aviv

New York (U.K. Del.)

Washington

B.M.E.O.

My immediately preceding telegram.

King Hussein spoke to me on this matter when he received the diplomatic corps this morning and expressed the view that, while hitherto the Jordan Government had acted with all possible restraint, it would not be possible to prevent retaliation if Israeli aggression continued. I pointed out Jordan case had in the past been greatly strengthened by the patience and discipline which they had shown and urged that this should continue.

2. Jordan Prime Minister summoned my United States colleague and myself after our audiences and, in the presence of Minister of Defence, spoke strongly on the same lines as Jordan note summarized in my telegram under reference adding the same points as King Hussein had made. He said that speaking in the name of the Jordan Government he called on the three signatories of the tripartite statement to take immediate and effective action to stop Israeli aggression once and for all. Fact that Jerusalem was the scene of the latest aggression made it infinitely more serious than any previous ones and would have repercussions throughout the Arab and Christian worlds. Turning to me, he said that he appealed to Her Majesty's Government in their additional capacity as allies of Jordan to ensure that this aggression ceased and was not repeated. Should it not cease within a day or two, Jordan Government would feel compelled to call on Her Majesty's Government under terms of the treaty to consult with them on defence measure.



/3.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Amman telegram No. 206 to Foreign Office

-2-

3. My United States colleague and I spoke on the lines of last sentence of paragraph 1 above and Prime Minister said that the Jordan Government's intention was to take no provocative action. Indeed, their desire was to arrive at an eventual settlement with Israel and they had hoped to discuss how this could be done with Mr. Dulles during his forthcoming visit, but this aggression and any repetition of it would render the chances of reaching any kind of settlement far more remote.

4. Prime Minister had intended that my French colleague should be present at this meeting, but as he was delayed he was, I understand, summoned and spoken to on similar lines a little later.

Foreign Office pass Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, New York (U.K. Del.) and B.M.E.O. as my telegrams 32, 7, 2, 5 and 62 respectively.

[Repeated to Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, New York (U.K. Del.) and B.M.E.O.]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Prime Minister
Sir W. Strang
Private Secretary
Sir J. Bowker
Head Eastern Department

bbbb

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ER 1091/03

FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir F. Evans
No. 115
23rd April, 1953

D. 3.56 p.m. 23rd April, 1953

R. 5.42 p.m. 23rd April, 1953

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 115 of 23rd April
Repeated for information to

Washington
B.M.E.O.
and Saving to

New York (U.K. Del.)
Amman
Paris

Jerusalem telegrams Nos. 18 and 19: Jerusalem Situation.

Israel version is in my immediately following telegram. I understand Israelis have asked General Riley to preside over an emergency meeting of Mixed Armistice Commission to discuss last night's incident and border situation generally.

2. Deputy Director General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs this morning said that Israeli Government had lost all confidence in General de Ridder whose handling of Israel/Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission was rendering it totally ineffective.

Foreign Office pass to Washington, New York (U.K. Del.) and B.M.E.O. as my telegrams Nos. 9, 5 and 23 and Saving to Paris as my Saving telegram No. 13.

[Repeated to Washington, New York (U.K. Del.), B.M.E.O. and Saving to Paris].

PPPP



CONFIDENTIAL

FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

2109/105

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir F. Evans
No. 118
April 24, 1953.

D. 10.00 p.m. April 24, 1953.
R. 12.25 a.m. April 25, 1953.

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 118 of April 24.

Repeated for information to Jerusalem Amman
B.M.E.O. U.K. Del. New York
Washington
and Saving to Paris

Amman telegram No. 205 to Foreign Office: Jerusalem Situation.

In my opinion all information available to myself and Furlonge is, ipso facto, in some degree suspect and no conclusion could wisely be drawn in advance of the verdict of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation (please see Chancery letter 103018/TWO/053 of March 6).

2. For what it is worth, the following is my speculation on what may have happened. As a result of the recent incident when, according to the Israelis, Arab Legion sentry fired into Israeli Jerusalem, (e.g. page two of my letter to Ross of April 21) the Israelis established posts covering the Legion sentries and planned to return the fire on the next provocation, either at the Arab post nearest the incident with the result that chain reaction inevitably developed, or possibly all along the line.

3. I think the Israel delegate's opposition to investigation (paragraph 2 of Jerusalem telegram No. 48 to Foreign Office) was in accordance with his existing instruction (consequent upon de Ridder's refusal on the previous afternoon to vote on the Wadi Fukin incident, about which the Israelis have been particularly bitter) to place no confidence in the M.A.C. under de Ridder's chairmanship. When the delegate referred to the Israel Chief of Staff, the instructions were reversed and the investigation accepted.

4. I am doubtful of Furlonge's explanation that the incident is part of deliberate campaign preparatory to Dulles's visit, as I fail to see how this could redound to Israel's advantage. Undoubtedly

APR 25 1953
/Israel

*3/21/53
to be
revised*

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CONFIDENTIAL

el Aviv telegram No. 118 to Foreign Office

-2-

Israel official and public opinion have recently been much alarmed by border incidents such as those referred to in my letter of April 14 and April 24. Whether or not these are "minor" and have been "unjustifiably high-lighted" inevitably depends on point of view. There have been violent criticisms in the Left and Right Wing opposition Press of the Israel Government's failure to protect its citizens, and of the ineffectiveness of diplomatic action and complaints to the M.A.C. The Right Wing Herut has advocated spontaneous action and there has been talk of revival of the I.Z.L. and Stern Gang. This background is, I suggest, possible explanation of the existing tension and of interpretation hazarded in paragraph 2 above.

5. I am dubious about the value of further minatory démarche by the Western Governments (unless of course the United Nations investigation reveals clear-cut responsibility) at any rate to Israel, for fear these would diminish the authority of the present generally responsible Government who, under internal pressure, might be tempted to turn a blind eye to irregular retaliation which they would claim was beyond their control.

6. I suggest a more fruitful course would be stern advice by the United Nations to both sides in whatever terms are justified in the considered opinion of the United Nations. Peace Supervisory Organisation, combined with pressure from the Western Governments to accept such advice. Proposal in last sentence of Amman telegram No. 205 and paragraph 4 of Jerusalem telegram No. 48 seem suitable ingredients.

Foreign Office pass priority to Jerusalem, B.M.E.O., U.K. Del. New York and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 26, 25, 7 and 11 and Saving to Paris as my telegram No. 15.

[Repeated to Jerusalem, B.M.E.O., U.K. Del. New York, Washington and Saving to Paris]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Prime Minister
Sir W. Strang
Private Secretary
Sir J. Bowker
Head of Eastern Department

LLL.

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163

R1091/105

(A)

Enter

E

ISRAEL-JORDAN INCIDENTS

The only new development shown in Sir Francis Evans' telegram No. 118 is that it looks from paragraph 3 as if the Israelis have now accepted investigation of the latest Jerusalem incident by the Mixed Armistice Commission. Nevertheless, we would still think that the Israelis were at fault in opposing the Mixed Armistice Commission's procedure at the outset of the incident. Moreover, they have been increasingly inclined to criticise the Armistice machinery as being ineffective.


Sir Francis Evans, in paragraph 5, deprecates "a further minatory démarche by the Western Governments." Our draft instructions are not minatory. I think therefore that all that is required as a result of Sir Francis Evans's latest telegram is the addition of a final paragraph to the following effect.

"Your telegram No. 118 just received. From paragraph 3 it would appear that the Israelis have now accepted investigation by the M.A.C. If so, you should adapt your representations accordingly. The fact remains that the Israelis opposed investigation at the outset and have been increasingly inclined to criticize the Armistice machinery as ineffective."

Paragraph 6 of Sir Francis Evans' telegram suggests stern advice to both sides by the United Nations.

/ This

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This might be useful, and I think we should ask Sir Gladwyn Jebb for his comments, particularly as regards possible procedure.

R. J. Sawyer

25th April, 1953.

Erw. Straub

I have sent a minute to the P.M.

W.S.
274

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R 1091/107

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FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Furlonge
No. 212
April 25, 1953

D. 1.53 p.m. April 25, 1953

R. 3.23 p.m. April 25, 1953

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 212 of April 25
Repeated for information to

Jerusalem	Tel Aviv	B.M.E.O.
New York (U.K. Del.)	Washington	
and Saving to	Paris	

Tel Aviv telegram No. 118.

EX 1091/105

Glubb states that after thorough investigation he is one hundred per cent convinced that firing on April 22 was started by the Israelis in the manner indicated in paragraph 1(a) of my telegram No. 205 and not (repeat not) by anyone in the Jordan side. Given the strict discipline of the Legion, and the fact that there has seldom or never been ~~efficiency~~ ^{efficiency} in Jerusalem, I do not consider that this view can be regarded as "suspect".

2. I understand that the Israeli members of M.A.C., while now authorised to agree in principle to an investigation, are still arguing as to how it should be carried out. If this is true the Israelis would seemingly have successfully obstructed the only procedure which could legally establish responsibility.

3. Glubb expresses serious concern at the trend of Israel press and radio propoganda in regard to frontier incidents during the last two or three months and remarked that day after day "Jerusalem Post" and other Israel newspapers have published reports of incidents, which are not only grossly exaggerated but bear little relation to Israeli complaints to M.A.C. My United States colleague and I have gained much the same impression, though we have not studied the Israel press so closely. If it is correct, it is not surprising

/that

27 APR 1953

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Amman telegram No. 212 to Foreign Office

-2-

that this campaign, which bears all the marks of official inspiration, should have created violent public opinion referred to in paragraph 4 of telegram under reference. There seems in fact danger that the officials may become prisoners of their own propaganda.

4. "Explanation" attributed to me in paragraph 4 of telegram under reference is not mine but Vigier's, please see paragraph 5 of Jerusalem telegram No. 48. *OR 1001/101*

Foreign Office pass to Tel Aviv, B.M.E.O., New York (U.K. Del.), Washington and Saving to Paris as my telegrams Nos. 33, 65, 6, 8 and 5 respectively.

[Repeated to Tel Aviv, B.M.E.O., New York (U.K. Del.), Washington and Saving to Paris].

ADVANCE COPIES

Prime Minister

Sir W. Strang

Private Secretary

Sir J. Bowker

Head of Eastern Department

Head of News Department

Resident Clerk

PPPP

CONFIDENTIAL

2001/108

FROM JERUSALEM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Walmsley
No. 49
April 25, 1953

D. 3.39 p.m. April 25, 1953
R. 5.05 p.m. April 25, 1953

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

My telegram No. 48. *EX 109101*

Israelis have agreed to investigation. Informal meeting yesterday discussed the methods to be used, without conclusive result. Jews have so far refused to let their casualties (six, lightly wounded) be interviewed by United Nations Observers. My informant, De Ridder, is now thinking investigation prejudiced from the start because Riley, at the meeting of M.A.C. on 23rd, stated that in his view nobody would ever be able to prove who started. De Ridder is wholly convinced of Israel guilt. [grp. undec. ? Nevertheless] United Nations Observers noted the burst of firing twelve minutes before the time at which the Jews say they suffered first casualties from the Arab firing: details by bag. The Israeli delegate at the meeting on 22nd stated only about half an hour before the firing began that he could take no responsibility for what might now happen. Israel behaviour has throughout been such as to arouse suspicion.

2. De Ridder says that Riley is backing him well in respect of Israel heavy propaganda campaign which has resorted to almost pure invention. Great play is made with report that he ruled that firing by civilians across line was not forbidden by Armistice Agreement. For practical purposes this report is wholly false. De Ridder also explained why he and Observers cannot agree with much of the evidence brought by Israel to support emergency meetings on infiltrators. Details by bag. In recent case, for instance, Israel dog which "followed track" to frontier was found to have been laid on scent from clothing of murdered man.

27 APR 1953

13.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Jerusalem telegram No. 49 to Foreign Office

-2-

3. De Ridder considers M.A.C. machinery has outlived its usefulness and can hardly function much longer. Armistice, he thinks, cannot be long preserved except by a body having greater powers of enforcement.

4. De Ridder has heard nothing from Riley of latter's departure but told me he heard an American General had been appointed to replace Riley.

5. Total Arab dead now ten.

Foreign Office pass Priority to Tel Aviv and routine to Washington, Paris, New York (U.K. Del.) and B.M.E.O. as my telegrams Nos. 22, 5, 5, 5, and 18 respectively.

[Repeated to Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, New York (U.K. Del.) and B.M.E.O.].

PPPP

	E EASTERN DEPARTMENT	E R 1091/109
<p style="text-align: center;">1953</p> <p>FROM Sir F. Evans, Tel Aviv.</p> <p>No. 121 Dated 25.4.53. Received in Registry— 27.4.53.</p>	<p>ISRAEL</p> <p>Jordan Frontier</p> <p>Border situation remains. Each side has reinforced arms in Tlem area. Suggestion for meeting in Tlem between Gen. Riley & Heads of British, U.S & French missions in Amman & Tel Aviv</p>	
<p>Last Paper</p>	<p>(Minutes)</p> <p>Submitted with -/105, -/106, -/107, /108.</p>	
<p>References</p> <p>ER 1091/105.</p>	<p>Sir F. Evans' suggestion merits support, especially as Gen. Riley will be retiring, and such meetings would go some way to show the Israelis and Arabs that everyone is tired of their fight-on.</p>	
<p>(Print)</p>	<p>The Prime Minister has asked for further background material, and proposed action with a draft tel. is included in a draft memo. attached to the P. 196. letter.</p>	
<p>(How disposed of)</p>	<p>In any approach to the Secretary-General that may eventually be made it might be best to not avoid specific and official reference to the Tripartite Declaration, which is an Agreement not registered with the UN.</p>	
<p>(Action completed)</p> <p>2/2/53</p>	<p>(Index)</p> <p>2/2/53</p>	<p>H. N. Pullar 28/4</p>
<p>Next Paper</p>		

01. 10. 50
I am not sure that we can approve
Gen F. Evans' suggestion without further
consideration of the pros & cons. H.M.
Ambassador at Buenos Aires just voiced
his misgivings in tel. no. 217 of April 27.
I shall submit a considered minute
as soon as possible. Meanwhile the
attached memorandum could go
to the P.M. in response to his request
for more information.

Admiral Cross
28/4

R. J. P. [unclear]
28/4

See -1130/- for
further action on memorandum.

[unclear]
7/5

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FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

ER 1091/109

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Evans

No. 121

D:5.00 p.m. April 25, 1953

April 25, 1953

R:6.54 p.m. April 25, 1953

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 121 of April 25

Repeated for information to : Amman Jerusalem
Washington U.K.DEL. New York
British Middle East Office

and saving to : Paris

My telegram No. 118 : ~~ER 1091/105~~ Jordan Frontier.

Border situation is undoubtedly serious. Each side appears to have reinforced arms in the Jerusalem area and if there were further clashes between regular forces, the situation might be hard to control.

2. I believe that most [grp undec ? hopeful] remedy for the whole problem is overhauling and substantial strengthening of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization. This, however, will take time.

3. Meanwhile I would like to make the following suggestions for your consideration. That an early meeting should be arranged in Jerusalem between General Riley and the Heads of the British, United States and French Missions in both Amman and Tel Aviv. The object of this meeting would be :-

(a) to discuss the border situation generally

(b) to consider what advice and proposals General Riley could most usefully address to each side and how the British, United States and French Governments could most effectively bring pressure to bear on the Jordan and Israeli Governments to implement these proposals.

(c) to consider (if General Riley were willing) whether changes are desirable in the work of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization.

/ s. The

27
MAY 1953

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CONFIDENTIAL

Tel Aviv telegram No. 121 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

4. The holding of such a meeting, which could not and I think should not (repeat not) be kept secret, might, I suggest, help to ease the present tension by :-

(a) showing the concern of the Western Powers (thus reinforcing validity of Tripartite Declaration), and

(b) providing a novel approach to the problem.

It would also afford a valuable opportunity for the Heads of Missions in Amman and Tel Aviv to exchange views and to gain access to General Riley's opinions and experience. General Riley has, after all, been dealing with the problem longer than anyone else in the area and, especially in view of today's reports from New York of his early resignation, a full discussion with him would be most useful. He is also in the best position to know the true facts of the situation.

5. The meeting could be no more than an exchange of views and would not, of course, diminish General Riley's sole responsibility to the United Nations. [~~grp-undec~~] *Interest of the* British, United States and French Governments would [~~grp-undec~~] *denier* from tripartite declaration. *(amended 28/4)*

Foreign Office pass priority to Jerusalem, B.M.E.O., Washington and United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegrams 27, 26, 12 and 8 respectively and saving to Paris as my saving telegram 16.

[Repeated to Jerusalem, B.M.E.O., Washington, U.K.DEL. New York and saving to Paris].

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R1001/113

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP.

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Furlonge

No: 216

April 27, 1953.

D: 3.00 p.m. April 27, 1953.

R: 4.16 p.m. April 27, 1953.

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 216 of April 27

Repeated for information to: Tel Aviv. Jerusalem.
Washington. B.M.E.O. U.K.Del. New York.
and Saving to: Paris.

Reference your telegram No: 226. E

I spoke as instructed to the Jordan Prime Minister this morning. He thanked me and said that the situation in Jerusalem had now happily calmed down. The Jordan Government desired to maintain tranquility along the border and to control infiltration, but inherent difficulties of the latter problem made it impossible to eliminate completely.

2. He himself had always been in favour of a meeting between high-ranking officers of the two sides, and had given instructions to this effect before he went on leave last February. Unfortunately during his absence these orders had been changed and Azmi Nashashibi had been delegated to attend the meeting, which had consequently been similar in nature to an ordinary M.A.C. meeting and had led to no useful result. He had now told Glubb that he should agree to the meeting of high-ranking officers.

3. The Prime Minister stated that he had not personally seen the Israeli memorandum of suggestions for combatting infiltration but he would like the Israeli Government to know that Jordan Government would show themselves cooperative in this matter. He himself would from now on be immersed in preparations for accession ceremonies, and any action in the matter would fall to the new government which would take office on the 5th of May. He believed however that this government would follow a similar policy.

4. The Prime Minister added that he did not believe that, in view of existence of Anglo-Jordan treaty and tripartite statement, Israelis had any intention of trying to occupy any part of Jordan. He thought their acts of aggression were designed to.....

28 APR 1953
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A

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CONFIDENTIAL

Amman telegram No: 216 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

designed to intimidate the Jordan Government so that they might be more ready to accept Israeli terms for a peace settlement. He thought it essential that the Jordan case should be known as widely as possible and had therefore, on this occasion, informed all Arab Governments of the facts of the Jerusalem incident. If any future incidents took place all the Moslem Governments would be informed as well.

5. The Prime Minister's attitude was studiously conciliatory but he made it clear that he was in process of laying down his burden, and that he regarded it as the responsibility of the new government to proceed with the matter.

Foreign Office pass Tel Aviv, Washington, B.M.E.O. and U.K.Del. New York as my telegrams Nos: 34, 9, 64 and 7, and Saving to Paris as my saving telegram No: 6.

[Repeated to Tel Aviv, Washington, B.M.E.O.,
New York and Saving to Paris].

JJJJJ

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FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Furlonge

No. 217

April 27, 1953.

D: Untimed April 27, 1953.

R: 5.06 p.m. April 27, 1953.

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 217 of April 27,
Repeated for information to Tel Aviv Washington B.M.E.O.
Jerusalem UKDEL. New York
and Saving to Paris.

Tel Aviv telegram No. 121 and my immediately preceding telegram.

While both sides appear to have lost confidence in M.A.C. procedure, I am doubtful whether the latter can be effectively strengthened in the absence of any enforcement [of the] organisation. It is absence of this which has brought it into disrepute, at least in Jordan. Riley's departure may help, particularly if a successor proves more forceful.

2. It is difficult to forecast how the situation will develop until it is known:

- (a) What line Riley's successor takes:
- (b) What the attitude of new Jordan Government is:
- (c) Whether any effective result follows from Jordan-Israel military talks on infiltration, particularly a revival of local Commanders' agreements:
- (d) Whether Israel is calling off or at least modifying their propaganda campaign.

3. I should therefore regard the suggestion in Tel Aviv's telegram under reference as premature even if it were not open to objections on other grounds.

4. I would propose to discuss the border situation in general with new Jordan Prime Minister as soon as he is in the saddle.

Foreign Office pass Tel Aviv, Washington, UKDEL. New York, B.M.E.O. as my telegrams Nos. 35, 10, 8 and 65 and Paris as my Saving telegram No. 7.

[Repeated to Tel Aviv, Washington, UKDEL. New York, B.M.E.O. and Saving to Paris].

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From Hussein to

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICES AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Furlonge

No. 206

23rd April, 1953

D. 2.40 p.m. 23rd April, 1953

R. 3.51 p.m. 23rd April, 1953

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 206 of 23rd April

Repeated for information to Jerusalem

Tel Aviv

Washington

Paris

New York (U.K. Del.)

B.M.S.O.

My immediately preceding telegram. ✓

King Hussein spoke to me on this matter when he received the diplomatic corps this morning and expressed the view that, while hitherto the Jordan Government had acted with all possible restraint, it would not be possible to prevent retaliation if Israeli aggression continued. I pointed out Jordan case had in the past been greatly strengthened by the patience and discipline which they had shown and urged that this should continue.

2. Jordan Prime Minister summoned my United States colleague and myself after our audiences and, in the presence of Minister of Defence, spoke strongly on the same lines as Jordan note summarized in my telegram under reference adding the same points as King Hussein had made. He said that speaking in the name of the Jordan Government he called on the three signatories of the tripartite statement to take immediate and effective action to stop Israeli aggression once and for all. Fact that Jerusalem was the scene of the latest aggression made it infinitely more serious than any previous ones and would have repercussions throughout the Arab and Christian worlds. Turning to me, he said that he appealed to Her Majesty's Government in their additional capacity as allies of Jordan to ensure that this aggression ceased and was not repeated. Should it not cease within a day or two, Jordan Government would feel compelled to call on Her Majesty's Government under terms of the treaty to consult with them on defence measure.

13.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Amman telegram No. 206 to Foreign Office

-2-

3. My United States colleague and I spoke on the lines of last sentence of paragraph 1 above and Prime Minister said that the Jordan Government's intention was to take no provocative action. Indeed, their desire was to arrive at an eventual settlement with Israel and they had hoped to discuss how this could be done with Mr. Dulles during his forthcoming visit, but this aggression and any repetition of it would render the chances of reaching any kind of settlement far more remote.

4. Prime Minister had intended that my French colleague should be present at this meeting, but as he was delayed he was, I understand, summoned and spoken to on similar lines a little later.

Foreign Office pass Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, New York (U.K. Del.) and B.M.E.O. as my telegrams 32, 7, 2, 5 and 62 respectively.

[Repeated to Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, New York (U.K. Del.) and B.M.E.O.]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Prime Minister
Sir W. Strang
Private Secretary
Sir J. Bowker
Head Eastern Department

bbbbb

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ER 1091/115 (A)

SIR WILLIAM STRANG

Relayed JDF

I attach a draft minute on the Israel-Jordan Border which I understand you wish to send to the Prime Minister.

I also attach three draft telegrams to Tel Aviv, Amman and Washington.

H. J. B. ...

24th April, 1953.

Sent to Prime Minister

W.S. 24/4

24/4/53

Registry No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft. *[Signature]*
Minute.

This infiltration implies considerable loss on the Israelis and creates great nervous tension.

ISRAEL-JORDAN BORDER INCIDENTS

Since hostilities ended in April 1949 a state of tension has existed along the entire border. The length of the armistice line and the difficult terrain render control and policing very difficult. It is not clearly demarcated, and it divides villages from their lands or wells. Of the many people who illegally cross the line it is not surprising that most are Arab refugees who are separated from their property. Some of them go to rob or murder.

2. Since King Abdullah's assassination relations between Israel and Jordan have deteriorated, and the co-operation between the forces of both sides required to control infiltration does not exist. The Israelis' reaction is to shoot to kill, and to seek to deter marauders by organising reprisal raids.

3. The responsibility for investigating complaints of violation of the armistice frontiers lies with the United Nations. The General Armistice Agreement provides for a Mixed Armistice Commission (M.A.C.) composed of two representatives from each side under the chairmanship of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation. It is the only impartial body able to ascertain the facts and assess the conflicting claims of Israelis and Jordanians. Its effectiveness depends on the goodwill of both sides. It has no power to enforce its decisions.

4. The main influence which has prevented frontier incidents from developing into major clashes is the known interest of the U.K.,

/America

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

America and France in preserving the tranquillity of the area. These three Powers issued in May 1950 a declaration affirming their opposition to the use or threat of force between any of the states in the area. The U.K. has moreover a defensive Alliance with Jordan under the Anglo-Jordan Treaty.

5. This Treaty was invoked by Jordan when the Israelis attacked the two villages of Falama and Rantis in February. The Mixed Armistice Commission found the Israelis at fault, and H.M.G. and the U.S. Government made representations to the Israel Government strongly deprecating any resort to organised reprisals. The Jordan Government were at the same time urged to take all possible measures to control infiltration from Jordan.

6. Since then the Israelis have complained to us of alleged Jordanian breaches of the Armistice Agreement and of Egyptian interference *with five Israel fishing boats.*

7. The latest event is an outbreak of shooting in Jerusalem, with casualties on both sides. Reports are still coming in. Both Jordanians and Israelis accuse the other of firing first. The best impartial comment we have so far received is from H.M. Consul-General in Jerusalem. He reports that the preliminary view of U.N. officials is that the Israelis are almost certainly responsible and that they opened fire without provocation.

8. The Jordan Government have delivered a note to H.M. Ambassador calling on H.M.G. as their partner in the Anglo-Jordan Treaty and a signatory to the Tripartite Declaration to take action to stop these aggressive acts.

/Similar

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Similar representations have been made to the American and French representatives in Amman. Paralleled representations may be expected from the Israel Government.

9. The two draft telegrams attached contain the Department's views on what should be said to the Israel and Jordan Governments.

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL
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No. 226

April 26, 1953.

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

D. 2.24 a.m. April 26, 1953.

Addressed to Amman telegram No. 226 of April 26.

Repeated for information to Tel Aviv (Immediate)

Jerusalem	B.M.E.O.
Washington	U.K. Del. New York
Paris	Ankara

Your telegrams Nos. 205 and 206 [of April 23: Jerusalem Incident].

I approve the line you have taken.

2. Please inform Jordan Prime Minister that I am glad that his Government intend to refrain from provocative action and want to reach an eventual settlement with Israel. I agree that Jordan Government appear to have exercised commendable restraint, in view of indications which we have received that Israelis were primarily responsible.

3. In view of effect on world opinion (to which Jordan Prime Minister alluded) it is desirable that incident should be properly investigated by the responsible United Nations authorities. I trust that the Jordanians will see the advantage of this, in their own interest, and will afford the Mixed Armistice Commission all possible cooperation. Looking beyond the present incident, I strongly urge the Jordan Government to return a prompt and positive reply to the latest United Nations proposals for high-level discussions on the whole border problem, and to make a constructive reply to the Israel memorandum.

4. In making this communication you should say that Her Majesty's Government's attitude is based on the Tripartite Declaration and the Anglo-Jordan Treaty, by which they stand.

5. You should inform the Jordanian Government in confidence of the general line of the instructions contained in my telegram No. 164 to Tel Aviv.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

Cypher/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

No. 164

April 26, 1953

D. 2.40 p.m. April 26, 1953

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Tel Aviv telegram No. 164 of April 26

Repeated for information to

Amman	Jerusalem	Washington	Paris
New York (U.K. Del.)	B.M.E.O.	Ankara	

Your telegrams Nos. 115 and 116 [of April 23: Jerusalem incident].

I am concerned at the Israel Government's uncooperative attitude towards the United Nations authorities and at the lack of restraint over their armed forces. The Truce Supervision Organisation and the Mixed Armistice Commission are the competent bodies to investigate breaches of the armistice. They can only work effectively if they have the support of both sides. It is surely in the Israel Government's interest that the Mixed Armistice Commission should be given full facilities for investigating if, as the Israelis allege, Arabs were the first to open fire. Failure to cooperate with United Nations authorities will cast doubt on validity of their claims.

2. Please speak to Israel Government on these lines. You may add that I am urging the Jordan Government, as I have done in the past, to enter into high level discussions about the border problem and to make a prompt and positive response to latest Israel proposals. (See my telegram No. 226 to Amman). I hope that on their side Israelis would agree to a revival of the Local Commanders' agreement. I trust that the Israelis will contribute to success of such talks by doing their best to cooperate with United Nations officials and by moderating tone of their publicity.

3. Your telegram No. 118 [of April 24] just received. From paragraph 3 it appears that the Israelis have now accepted investigation by the Mixed Armistice Commission. If this is confirmed you should adapt your representations accordingly.

PPPP

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SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

Cypher/OTP

ER109/115.

P R I S E C

No. 163

April 26, 1953.

D.1.33 a.m. April 26, 1953.

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Please convey the following urgent and personal message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Ben Gurion.

[Begins].

These clashes in Jerusalem are most regrettable. Many great things affecting the Middle East and the relations between Israel and the Arab States hang in the balance at the present time. As one who has been a Zionist since the Balfour Declaration, I feel you will not mind my putting this point direct to you.

[Ends].

[Copies sent to Prime Minister]

B B B

Minutes.

17 E

CONFIDENTIAL

2004/119

ISRAEL-JORDAN INCIDENTS IN JERUSALEM.

Press Guidance.

News Department want as soon as possible guidance on Her Majesty's Government's attitude towards the outbreak of firing in Jerusalem, as the fact that H.M. Ambassadors in Tel Aviv and Amman both made representations is likely to become known very quickly. It is, moreover, already known that the Jordan Government have sent us a note.

3. I see no objection to our making known in general terms the gist of our representations, and there is in fact some advantage in their gaining wider currency. We should not, however, say openly that we have reason to believe that the Israel Government was primarily responsible for the outbreak of firing, since the only impartial opinions we have received on this question, and on which we base our view, were communicated to us in confidence by United Nations officials. If pressed, however, News Department might intimate this, off the record and not for attribution, if correspondents are so perplexed by the welter of conflicting claims that they are unable to take a line.

5. The following is the general guidance suggested:-

" Her Majesty's Government greatly deplore the recent outbreak of firing between Israel and Jordan posts in Jerusalem. H.M. Ambassadors in Tel Aviv and Amman have been instructed to reiterate to both governments that in Her Majesty's Government's view the tension along the Arab border, of which the Jerusalem outbreak is only one symptom, can only be relieved by the fullest co-operation between security forces of both sides and they have urged that meetings should take place between senior officials of both sides to make the necessary arrangements.

The competent body to investigate breaches of the Armistice and to assist both sides in achieving co-operation over the policing of the frontier is the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, working through its Mixed Armistice Commission. These bodies must have the fullest support and co-operation from both sides if they are to work effectively, and

/Her

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.


Her Majesty's Government earnestly hope that this will be given. In particular, they trust that the Israel Government will afford the United Nations authorities fullest facilities for investigating the recent incidents. "

G.H. Baker.
 (G.H. Baker).
 April 28, 1953.

Mr. Ross agrees. We shall speak on these lines but only when asked. We have not yet been asked.

J. Drinkell
 28/4
 News Dept.

Mr. Pullar (this might be p.w. relevant papers).
 28/4



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C O N F I D E N T I A L

21091/125 E

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

- TO: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN CANADA
U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN AUSTRALIA
U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN NEW ZEALAND
U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN SOUTH AFRICA
U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN INDIA
U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN PAKISTAN
U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN CEYLON

(Dated 28th April, 1953)

Y.No. 96 SAVING CONFIDENTIAL

My telegram Y.No. 25.

ISRAEL-JORDAN TENSION

Representations referred to in above telegram were made to Israel and Jordan Governments in February; the United States Government made similar approach.

2. Since then there has been a further series of incidents on the Israel-Egyptian and Israel-Jordan frontiers and in Jerusalem.

3. On 8th, 9th and 19th April Israel Government called attention of United Kingdom, United States, French and Turkish Governments to incidents on the two frontiers which, they claimed, were clearly intended for sabotage and intimidation, and asked the four Governments to use their good offices with the Jordan and Egyptian Governments.

4. On 22nd April firing started in Jerusalem; Jordan Government sent a note to United Kingdom, United States and French Governments recording facts of outbreak and alleging that these proved that incident was yet another act of deliberate and planned aggression by Israel. Note to United Kingdom Government called upon United Kingdom as partner in the Anglo-Jordan Treaty of Alliance to take action to stop aggression.

5. King Hussein and the Jordan Prime Minister followed the note up with oral messages to United Kingdom, United States and French Ambassadors in Amman. In name of Jordan Government Prime Minister repeated following points:-

(a) He called on three signatories of tripartite statement (see my telegrams Y.Nos. 139 and 140 of 23rd May 1950) to take immediate and effective action to stop Israeli aggression once and for all.

(b) Fact that Jerusalem was scene of latest aggression made it infinitely more serious than any previous ones and would have repercussions throughout Arab and Christian world.

(c) Should it not cease within day or two, Jordan Government would feel compelled to call on United Kingdom Government under terms of Anglo-Jordan Treaty to consult with them on defence measures.

Prime Minister added that Jordan Government did not intend to take any provocative action and that their desire was to reach a final settlement with Israel.

/6. United

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- 2 -

6. United Kingdom Ambassador in Tel Aviv has been asked to inform Israel Government of importance which United Kingdom Government attach to full Israeli co-operation with the Mixed Armistice Commission and of their concern at the unco-operative attitude which Israel Government have recently shown and at the lack of restraint over their armed forces.

7. United Kingdom Ambassador in Amman has told Jordan Government in confidence of approach made to Israel Government, adding following points:-

(a) United Kingdom Government are glad that Jordan Government intend to refrain from provocative action and want to reach an eventual settlement with Israel.

(b) United Kingdom Government trust that Jordanians will co-operate fully with Mixed Armistice Commission.

(c) United Kingdom Government's attitude is based on Tripartite Declaration and on Anglo-Jordan Treaty by which they stand.

8. United Kingdom Government have informed United States and French Governments of above exchanges and have expressed the hope that they will instruct their representatives in Tel Aviv and Amman to speak to both parties on similar lines.

(To Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington and Pretoria only)

9. Please inform Commonwealth Governments. Copies sent to four High Commissioners in London.

(To New Delhi, Karachi and Colombo only)

10. You may at your discretion inform Commonwealth Governments on same basis as in my Y. No. 25.

Copy to:-

D.I

Foreign Office Mr. Pullar
H.M. Ambassador for U.K. in Dublin
U.K. High Commissioner in Salisbury
U.K. Embassy, Washington - Mr. R.H. Belcher
U.K. Delegation to the
U.N., New York - Mr. M.E. Allen

Copies sent to High Commissioners for Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa in London, omitting paragraphs 9 and 10

WESTERN & U.N. DEPT.
WES. 75/101/1

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Jen

4/28/53/90

PRIME MINISTER

You asked for a further Note on the Israel-Jordan Frontier Dispute and the United Nations part in it in the light of Tel Aviv telegram No. 121 of April 25.

I attach a Note on the armistice machinery and on General de Ridder.

We are considering further Sir Francis Evans's suggestion in his telegram No. 121 of a meeting between General Miles and the Heads of the British, American and French diplomatic representatives at Amman and Tel Aviv in the light of comments since received from Amman.

April 29, 1953.

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ISRAEL-JORDAN FRONTIER DISPUTE

The Truce Supervision Organisation is a United Nations body composed of American, French and Belgian officers set up under Count Bernadotte in 1948 to supervise the truces arranged at that time. The functions of this Organisation have been extended to cover the supervision of the working of all four Armistice Agreements (with Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria). The head of the Organisation is the United Nations Chief of Staff. He reports direct to the Security Council.

2. Each of the four Armistice Agreements provides for a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of two members of each of the parties concerned (except in the Israel-Egyptian Armistice Agreement, where there are three each) under the Chairmanship of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation or his nominated deputy. The function of the Mixed Armistice Commission is to supervise the execution of the provisions of the Agreement and to deal with complaints brought to its notice by either of the parties. The United Nations chairman has the casting vote.

3. The United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation is Lieutenant-General Riley, formerly of the U.S. Marines, now a full-time employee of the United Nations. He worked with Count Bernadotte and has a great deal of experience in this field. He has been declared persona non grata by some of the Arab states and has handed in his resignation, to take effect on May 15, (his contract was due to expire in January 1954.) He is able but inclined to be pro-Israel.

4. General de Ridder is General Riley's deputy on the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission. He is a Belgian disliked by the Israelis for his allegedly pro-Arab attitude.

5. The Mixed Armistice Commission has no machinery or powers to enforce its recommendations or decisions. Having observers

/on

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on the spot, it is nevertheless the only neutral body which can ascertain and assess the facts of any incidents. Its effectiveness therefore depends on the co-operation it receives from the parties to the Armistice Agreement. It meets as required in any agreed locality to conduct its investigations. The findings of the Mixed Armistice Commission are not made known automatically to outside persons or countries so that it is necessary to make a specific request to find out what decision has been reached in any particular case.

6. The policy of Her Majesty's Government has been to give full support to the Truce Supervision Organisation and to call upon both Israel and Jordan to co-operate with it to the fullest extent. This is reflected in the representations made by Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Tel Aviv and Amman on April 26 and April 27.

April 29, 1953.

E
7/10/53
2100+(12)

CONFIDENTIAL
FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Furlonge
No. 230
April 30, 1953

D: 12.14 p.m. April 30, 1953
R: 1.50 p.m. April 30, 1953

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 230 of April 30.
Repeated for information to Tel Aviv.

Tel Aviv telegram No. 130: *ER 1091 103* Press Guidance on Jordan-Israel Border Situation.

Jordan internal political situation is particularly delicate at present. Intensive discussions on the new government are in process and there is some danger that Fawzi Mulki, who is generally believed to be King Hussein's choice for Prime Minister, maybe forced by his lack of parliamentary support to rely on the Extremists.

2. It would, therefore, be most unfortunate if anything were said at this juncture which could be misrepresented as indicating that Her Majesty's Government were trying to induce the Jordan Government to engage in "direct negotiation" with Israel, even if only on the Border Situation. Storm, similar to that caused in Jordan last December by our open support of the United Nations resolution, might ensue and might adversely affect the composition of the new government.

- DISTRIBUTED TO:
Eastern Department
Middle East Secretariat
News Department
Information Policy Department
Regional Advisers

G G G G

APR 30 1953
MEXICO

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21091/29

BRITISH EMBASSY, E

TEL AVIV.

26th April, 1953.

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 88
(1033/123/53)

Sir,

The regrettable events in Jerusalem last week have again demonstrated the dangerous situation on the Jordan-Israel border. The cause of this is the continued lack of a peace settlement between the two countries. Our present hope is that if and when our plans succeed for new arrangements with the Arab States, and particularly Egypt, for the defence of the Middle East, the Arab States will be more ready to make peace with Israel. Certainly I see no other hope for an early settlement.

17/12/53
10/12/53

2. Mr. Furlonge in his letter 1075/27/53 of the 26th March to Sir James Bowker counselled that the only politically practical solution was to force Israel to cede enough fertile territory to Jordan for the resettlement of a "high proportion" of the 450,000 refugees now in Jordan and of those in the Gaza Strip and the Lebanon. Sir Thomas Rapp in his letter 10752/64/53 of the 23rd March was equally pessimistic about an accommodation between Israel and the Arab States, until we and the United States were ready to take positive and decisive action to impose on Israel a settlement which would be acceptable to the Arabs: presumably he has in mind some such cession of territory as Mr. Furlonge has proposed. I do not myself think practical a solution along these lines, which would require the emigration of a large number of Israelis (whither it is hard to imagine). Short of the most drastic threats by the United States Government, which I much doubt any United States administration would utter, still less execute, I believe the Israelis would resist such a partition by force. However, I do not propose in this despatch to examine the ways in which a peace settlement between Israel and the Arab States might be brought about, and have touched on the subject only to explain that in my view we would be unwise to count on one in the near future, and should be prepared for the Israel-Jordan border to remain unsettled for a long time to come.

3. Yet I do not believe we can safely allow the present tension on the border to persist. Apart from the danger that clashes, such as last week occurred between the regular armed forces of the two countries, might develop into a general resumption of hostilities, the bitterness and publicity which at present attend every incident connected with the border troubles are likely to make our negotiations with the Arab States more difficult.

4. As usual in disputes of this kind, both sides are convinced that they are wholly in the right, at any rate morally. The Jordanians maintain that infiltration, which is the essence of the border problem, is principally due to

/ the

The Right Honourable
Sir Winston S. Churchill, K.G., O.M., C.H.,
Etc., etc., etc.,
Foreign Office.

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- 2 -

the understandable persistence of the unfortunate Arab refugees in returning to their former homes in Israel to harvest their crops, collect their belongings, or visit their relatives. They agree that on occasion the less laudable motives of robbery or vendetta play a part, but argue that this is only a minor one. They say that their own authorities do everything they can to control infiltration but that the Israelis are uncooperative. They believe, if, as I do not doubt, one may credit General Glubb with fairly representing their view, that the Israelis magnify the problem of infiltration to strengthen their protests against the delivery of arms to the Arabs, and that they plan at an auspicious moment to invade Jordan on the pretext that the latter is unable to maintain order on its side of the frontier. The occasional retaliatory raids, such as at Falama and Rantis last February, and incidents such as the shooting in Jerusalem last week, are in the Jordan view a consistent campaign to this end, which they believe is in itself only a step towards the ultimate Jewish purpose of dominating by force the whole Middle East.

5. The Israelis, on the other hand, ^{52106.161} complain that the seriousness of the infiltration problem is not realised in London and Washington. They produce figures such as those enclosed in my letter to Mr. Ross 1033/56/53 of the 12th February to show the continuous and substantial losses they suffer, and they point out that the strain imposed on border settlements by the constant threat of robbery and murder is intolerable. They seek to throw the blame on the Jordanians by pointing out, somewhat disingenuously, that infiltration is only a one way problem since no Israelis infiltrate into Jordan: more convincingly they maintain that it is the Jordanians and not themselves who perpetuate the present situation by refusing to discuss a peace settlement. This intransigence they believe can be directly traced to the influence of those Palestinian Arabs such as Nashashibi and Anwar Nuseibi who wield authority at Amman and have a personal interest in preventing a peace settlement which would finally frustrate their hopes of winning back at any rate a large part of Western Palestine. The Israelis point out that no government can be expected indefinitely to remain passive in the face of attacks on the lives and property of its citizens, that if it does it will not long remain in power and that it will in any event be incapable of preventing the development of independent action by extremists among its own citizens. They complain that their appeals to the Western Powers to use the means which, in the Israelis' view, are at their disposal to persuade the Arab States to make peace are unavailing, that the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission as at present constituted under the chairmanship of General de Ridder is ineffective, and that when they resort to the methods of limited reprisals which all experience of frontier problems (e.g. our own on the north-west frontier of India) has shown to be the only effective method, they are accused of barbarity and aggressive intentions.

/ 6.

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- 3 -

6. I am not one of those who believe that problems of this kind can be interpreted in terms of black and white, and that one side or other to the dispute can be judged wholly guilty or innocent. If it is possible to make a generalisation, I would say that the Jordanians because of their persistent refusal, in common with other Arab States, to discuss peace terms with Israel are the more responsible for the continued existence of the problem, though even on this point an Arab sympathiser could well argue that the United Nations are to blame for having created the State of Israel at all. On the other hand, the Israelis are probably more responsible for the particular crises to which international attention is drawn from time to time. This is explicable since, so long as the frontier troubles are confined to infiltration into Israel by refugees or robbers from Jordan there is no "problem" except for the Israelis, and international attention is drawn to the scene only when the Israelis indulge in organised counter action.

7. Hitherto it has been the policy of Her Majesty's Government to keep the problem within bounds by extending periodic advice and warnings to the Jordanian and, more frequently, Israel Governments. I doubt if this policy can much longer be trusted to succeed and fear that though it may keep the lid on a little longer, there will be constant danger of an explosion which might involve Her Majesty's Government in embarrassing action under the Tripartite Declaration.

8. The best hope of improvement lies, I consider, in the re-organisation and strengthening of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation. This was originally designed to supervise the conduct of an armistice which, it was generally hoped at the time, would rapidly be succeeded by a peace treaty. As events have developed the organisation has for five years been the only instrument with any powers to keep tranquil a border between two hostile powers along which conditions have steadily deteriorated. In this ungrateful task it has been more successful than might have been expected, and the merit and devotion of the majority of its members probably deserve more recognition than is generally accorded them. However, if, as I believe, we have to reckon with an indefinite prolongation of the present undetermined condition of the frontier, the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation must be made more effective, and its staff increased both in quantity and, with the exception of one or two of its members, in quality.

9. As Mr. Furlonge has pointed out (and responsible Israelis have frequently made the same observation to me), the problem of infiltration could be very greatly reduced by effective cooperation between the local commanders on either side of the frontier. From time to time arrangements for such cooperation have been made and have temporarily been effective. Always for some reason they have broken down with the result that the situation has sharply deteriorated. An example was the local commanders' agreement which the Jordanians maintained that the Israelis denounced at the

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- 4 -

beginning of this year, and which the Israelis argued lapsed when the Jordanians disregarded it in the case of some Israeli drivers whom they kept in detention in defiance of the agreement. If the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation disposed of sufficient competent officers to supervise closely the working of such agreements, and to intervene promptly whenever they broke down, the situation could be considerably improved. Also if there were more officers available to investigate complaints, the Mixed Armistice Commission would not fall into the disrepute which it at present enjoys, at any rate in Israel, because of the inevitable delays in its functioning. The present system whereby a single casting vote is given or withheld by the United Nations chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission places an undue burden both of responsibility and odium on that individual. It would surely be better to enlarge the Commission to include more United Nations members who would not necessarily all vote in the same sense.

10. General Riley's resignation should provide a suitable opportunity for a full examination of the structure, scope and working of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation. It would also be valuable to press that the proceedings of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation should be made available to the three governments who signed the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 (Eastern Department's letter ER 1073 of the 23rd March refers).

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Paris, Cairo, Ankara, Amman, Damascus and Beirut and to the United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations in New York, the Head of the British Middle East Office and to the Acting British Consul-General in Jerusalem.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

F. B. Evans

<p>1953</p>	<p>E EASTERN DEPARTMENT</p>	<p>E 21091/130</p>
<p>FROM Sir F. Evans Tel Aviv to Mr Ross No. 1033/124/63 Dated 28.4.53. Received in Registry— 1.12.53</p>	<p>Item received + Israel - Jordan Border Situation. Views strengthening of U.N. Truce Supervision Org. and timing warning + Israel Gov. M</p>	
<p>Last Paper</p>	<p>(MINUTES)</p>	
<p>References ER 1091/105 107 109</p>	<p>This is an interesting letter. Sir F. Evans's comments views in paras 1 and 2 were very weighty. I think we should defer consideration of the suggestion at the end of para 2 until we see what we do in the UNTSO matter.</p>	
<p>(Print)</p>	<p>2. In paragraphs 4 + 5 Sir F. Evans expands the reasons which led him to put forward his suggestion in Tel Aviv Tel. No. 121 (ER 1091/109 - Flag A.) In his minute in that jacket Mr. Ross undertakes to submit a memorandum minute on the subject. I have reviewed Mr. Pullar's version and submit it herewith (see minutes inside). JWS:ale 1/5</p>	
<p>(How disposed of)</p>	<p>In my opinion all these suggestions are misconceived. The King's interest lies</p>	
<p>(Action completed)</p>	<p>(Index)</p>	<p>39451</p>
<p>Next Paper</p>	<p>39451</p>	

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lies in reducing tension on the frontiers and in encouraging Israel & Jordan to take measures to prevent incidents. To this end we remonstrate with the parties according to the degree of blame which attaches to either of them and we urge them to collaborate with the U.N. machinery & with each other. It is convenient for us to have the UN machinery to point to in this way and of course it is our interest that the machinery should be as efficient as possible. To hold consultations with it on the spot, more or less in full view of the parties, ~~and~~ would, however, only involve us more deeply and make it more difficult for us to maintain (as we do at present) that the U.N. and not we and our co-signatories to the Tripartite Declaration are responsible for the execution of the Armistice Agreements. The fact that the U.N. machinery has no powers of enforcement makes such a course of action even less attractive,

Since

Minutes.

since we should become involved
to no purpose. If there is to be any
improvement in the UN machinery
this should be brought about by
discreet action in the U.N.

Secretariat. It is there that there
should be consultations with General
Riley. Even so, in the absence
of the right & the power to enforce
its decisions the UN machinery
can be no more than a facade
and the only real deterrent to
violent action remains the fear
of doing something of which the U.S.
& the U.S. Govt will strongly disapprove
& show their disapproval. This means
resolute representations (not necessar-
ily in public) by the U.S. Govt
and no doubt the French Govt to
the parties according to the degree
of their responsibility.

/Have

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

Have authorized the dispatch of telegrams to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem & Amman asking for views on the American suggestion that the Israel-Jordan M.A.C. should be broken down into three. Here again think we are likely to find more drawbacks than advantages.

Admiral
4/5

I agree with Mr. Ross.

It seems to me that the directions in which we can most hopefully look for an improvement in the border situation are:

(1) high level talks between Jordanians and Israelis and the re-establishment of co-ordinated control: and

(2) a review of the United Nations machinery.

(2), as Mr. Ross points out, should properly be undertaken in the United Nations Secretariat and could be stimulated by our own, the American and the French Delegations. The latest suggestion for breaking down the Israel/Jordan M.A.C. into three should also be discussed in the United Nations Secretariat, in the light of the views of our local representatives.

I think we should put our views to Paris and Washington.

R. J. S.
May 6, 1953

See submission & tel. in LR 109/142

7/5

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Cancelled by ER 1091/11 + 2

P.

CONFIDENTIAL

Israel-Jordan Border

Situation

Three suggestions have been made for improving the tense situation which exists:

Flag E (a) the United Nations should give stern advice to both sides in whatever ~~cases~~ the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) considers justified; this should be coupled with pressure on both sides from the western governments to accept such advice (Sir Francis Evans telegram No. 118 - ER1091/105).

Flag A (b) an early meeting in Jerusalem between the United Nations Chief of Staff (General Riley), and the British, American and French diplomatic representatives from both Tel Aviv and Amman (Sir Francis Evans telegram No. 121 - ER1091/109) (It should be remembered that General Riley's resignation takes effect on May 15).

Flag G (c) the present Mixed Armistice Commission (M.A.C.) should be replaced by three separate M.A.C.'s, one each for the northern, southern, and Jerusalem sectors of the Israel-Jordan border (Washington telegram No. 919 - ER1091/117). The State Department ask for our views on this.

2. The third suggestion can be considered separately from the other two, and a minute with draft telegram is being submitted separately.

*ER 1091/108
Flag C*

3. The situation which has led Sir Francis Evans to make the first two suggestions is briefly as follows. The situation along the Israel-Jordan border has deteriorated, causing frequent crises of high tension which result in serious armed clashes: the most notable of these in recent months have been the Falama and Rantis incidents at the end of January, and the outbreak of shooting in Jerusalem of April 22. The UNTSO and the MAC have been unable to stop such incidents, and so far unable to bring Israelis and Jordanians together in high-level talks to work out a system of collaboration over the control of the border. In consequence both Israel and Jordan have declared that they are losing confidence in the United Nations machinery. General Riley's deputy, General de Ridder, has also expressed the opinion that MAC machinery has outlived its usefulness and can hardly function much longer; in his view the armistice cannot be long preserved except by a body having greater powers of enforcement.

4. Sir Francis Evans's first suggestion (paragraph 1(a) above) is largely overtaken by his second, and he has not elaborated it or reverted to it. The issue of such a statement by the United Nations is a matter for them to decide, and the Secretary-General might feel it necessary to have the backing of the Security Council before he did anything. This suggestion is covered in the action proposed in paragraph 11 below.

5. Sir Francis Evans's second suggestion: its objects and the advantages which he sees in it are set out in full in his telegram No. 121 Flag A. In a letter of April 28,

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(ER 1091/30 : Flag 9) he has explained the purpose ^{he} had in mind, namely: that we should strengthen the authority and efficiency of the UNTSO, that we should intervene directly with the Israel and Jordan governments as little as possible, and that when we do intervene it should be in support of the recommendations of the UNTSO.

6. The department share Sir Francis Evans's view of the object which we want to achieve, for the following reasons. The United Nations is in Her Majesty's Government's view the proper organization for settling Arab-Israel disputes. The United Nations has formed the UNTSO to supervise the execution of the various armistice agreements, and United Nations officials preside over each Mixed Armistice Commission. These Commissions are an integral part of the armistice agreements signed by each country, and cannot be allowed to lapse without grave risk of imperilling the armistices themselves.

7. Her Majesty's Government has consistently supported this United Nations machinery, and repeatedly urged both Israel and Jordan to give it their fullest co-operation. The UNTSO has however no power to enforce its decisions or recommendations; in this respect it is similar to any other United Nations Agency, and it is difficult to see how it, or any other United Nations body, can be given powers of enforcement. In the absence of full co-operation from Israel and Jordan, the United Nations machinery has been kept going largely by the support given to it by the signatories of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 (United Kingdom, United States of America, and France), and the pressure which those powers - the United Kingdom in the van - have exercised on Israel and Jordan. As the prestige and the effectiveness of the UNTSO wane, the amount of pressure and the number of occasions on which we have to apply it increase. This is unwelcome to us, for it embarrasses our relations with Israel, and especially with Jordan with whom we have a defensive Alliance. Moreover, unless the MAC's are able properly to investigate breaches of the armistice on the spot and allocate responsibility for them, our representations to either side either lose their force, or expose us to the reproach of partiality for giving greater credence to the claims of one side against the other.

8. There is no doubt that Sir Francis Evans's suggestion in paragraph 1(b) above would advance our aim of strengthening the local United Nations machinery. The proposed meeting would, if the United Nations officials concerned agreed to it, show the continuing and increasing concern of the Tripartite Powers at the deterioration in Israel-Jordan relations; and it would be a public testimony to their support of the local United Nations Chief of Staff. Sir Francis Evans's suggestion may not however be the only, or the best way of achieving our object. Her Majesty's Ambassador at Amman considers it premature, and would prefer to wait until it is known

ER1091/114
Flag B

(a) what line General Riley's successor takes

(b) what the attitude of the new Jordan government is

/(c)

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- (c) whether any progress results from Israel-Jordan high-level talks
- (d) whether Israel ceases or modifies her propaganda campaign.

ER1091/120
Flag D

Mr. Furlonge reports that his United States colleague also deprecates the suggestion for the reasons given in (a), (b) and (c) above, and fears that the diplomatic representatives of the Tripartite Powers in Tel Aviv and Amman may well express divergent views in a meeting with General Riley.

9. In the Department's view there are no grounds for thinking that the situation is likely to improve with the mere lapse of time. There does not seem much weight in the objections listed in the preceding paragraph:

- (a) General Riley's successor will require a considerable time before he can take a definite line on the issues at stake;
- (b) the attitude of the new Jordan Government is very unlikely to differ much from that of the previous government: in any case the Jordan Government's attitude is only half the problem;
- (c) the success of the proposed high-level talks, and even the prospect of their being arranged, will be impaired by incidents such as the Jerusalem firing;
- (d) Israel will be forced back more and more on her own initiative in proportion as she considers the United Nations machinery ineffective;
- (e) while the views of the British, American and French representatives in Tel Aviv and Amman may not be in entire harmony, they will be much closer than those of the Israel and Jordan representatives with whom General Riley usually has to deal, and the Tripartite Representatives will at least be inspired by a common purpose.

10. The department do not therefore consider that Sir Francis Evans's suggestion should be dropped for the reasons which Mr. Furlonge opposes to it. We think it might be a possible means of going some way to achieving the objects set out in paragraphs 5-7 above.

11. The department accordingly recommend the following course of action: we should instruct Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington and Paris to inform the United States and French Government's that:

- (a) we are concerned at the lack of success of the UNTSO in ensuring the smooth working of the Armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan;
- (b) in the absence of enforcement machinery, we should like to see the UNTSO's prestige and effectiveness strengthened in any way possible, in order that it may better discharge its function and help to prevent the situation envisaged in the Tripartite Declaration from arising;

/(c)

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- (c) the suggestions in paragraph 1(a) and (b) above have been made with this end in view;
- (d) we should be grateful for their views on these suggestions, and for any others which they may have;
- (e) if any of these suggestions find general support, we should instruct our delegations to the United Nations to discuss them with the Secretariat as a matter of urgency.

J. Baker
1/5

re-date
cancelled by ER 1091/102
Dr. Furlong
Pr.

CONFIDENTIAL

ISRAEL-JORDAN BORDER RELATIONS

ER 1091/105
Flg F.

ER 1091/109
Flg A.

In his telegram No. 118, Sir Francis Evans suggested that stern advice by the United Nations to both sides, combined with pressure from the western governments to accept such advice, might be the most fruitful course to pursue. Sir Francis Evans brought this idea up and expanded it in his telegram No. 121. In this telegram he proposes that an early meeting should be arranged in Jerusalem between General Riley and the Heads of the British, United States and French Missions in both Amman and Tel Aviv. The object of the meeting would be:-

- (a) To discuss the border situation.
- (b) To ascertain what proposals General Riley could address to each side and how the tripartite governments could bring pressure to bear on Israel and Jordan to implement those proposals.
- (c) To consider, with General Riley's consent, whether the Truce Supervision Organisation should be modified or its work changed.

2. The advantages which would accrue from this meeting in Sir Francis Evans' opinion would be:-

- (a) To show the importance the western powers attach to the problem.
- (b) To provide a new approach to the problem.
- (c) To provide an opportunity for exchange of views between the Heads of Missions and General Riley.

Sir Francis Evans emphasises that the meeting could be no more than an exchange of views and would not diminish General Riley's sole responsibility to the United Nations.

ER 1091/117
Flg B

3. Mr. Furlonge, in his telegram No. 217, has put forward the following objections to this suggested course of action:-

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- (a) It is not known what line General Riley's successor will take.
- (b) It is not yet known what the attitude of the new Jordan Government will be.
- (c) It is not yet known what result will emerge from the Jordan-Israel talks on infiltration.
- (d) It remains to be seen whether Israel will modify her propaganda campaign.

In short Mr. Furlonge considers the suggestion as premature if it is not open to objections on ~~the~~ grounds.

4. General de Ridder is reported in Jerusalem telegram No. 49 to have said that the Mixed Armistice Commission had outgrown its usefulness. Mr. Furlonge thinks that both sides have lost confidence in it. On the other hand, it has been, and remains, our policy to support the Truce Supervision Organisation and the Mixed Armistice Commission to the fullest possible extent since they provide the proper and qualified machinery for supervising the execution of the terms of the Armistice Agreement. There is no other body to do this. There is also no other organisation which can attempt to provide an objective view of the conflicting claims put forward by both sides. Without the Mixed Armistice Commission there would be no cushion between the two signatories of the Armistice Agreement and, in any case, the Mixed Armistice Commission is an integral part of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and presumably could only be removed by the consent of the parties to that Agreement. It would, therefore, appear that unless the two parties wish to remove the one objective organisation and the one body which cushions off each side from the other, the Mixed Armistice Commission must remain in being. If this is so, and even if it were not so, it seems to be in the
/interests

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interests of the Western Powers that it should continue to exist and that it should be made more effective if possible by support, not only from the two protagonists, but by complete backing from the Tripartite Powers. Even although Israel and Jordan may have lost confidence in the Mixed Armistice Commission for the moment, this is no reason to suppose that confidence cannot be regained. The lack of confidence on both sides, apart from the dislike of either side of not winning as much support for its claim as it might like, seems to derive to a considerable extent from antagonism to personalities. The Arabs cannot stand General Riley and the Israelis cannot stand General de Ridder. It is probable, therefore, that on the whole they have both done a pretty good job and Jerusalem reports Monsieur Vigier as saying that General de Ridder was correct in some of his more unpopular decisions vis-à-vis the Israelis.

5. There is little doubt that a meeting of the kind suggested by Sir Francis Evans, attended with suitable publicity, would mark the importance attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission by the Tripartite Powers (who form 3/5ths of the permanent members of the Security Council) and would enhance the position of the Mixed Armistice Commission in the eyes of all those countries interested in the problem. It is evident from Sir Francis Evans' remarks that he considers the meetings would be only consultative and that it would be to the advantage of the Tripartite Powers, on whom, in the last resort, the peace of the area depends, to talk over with General Riley proposals for the future based upon the experience and knowledge which he has acquired over the past five years. It is quite clear that there would be little point in holding such a meeting with General Riley's successor until the latter had had time to assimilate local conditions and make up his own views. In this case, since General Riley's resignation takes effect

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on May 15 the meeting will have to be held as soon as possible.

6. Mr. Furlonge evidently takes the view that it would be a waste of time to have the meeting in order to talk to a man who is retiring and before the attitude of the new Jordan Government is known. This, however, seems to miss the point of Sir Francis Evans' suggestion which is that the Tripartite Powers should talk the matter over with General Riley for their own advantage, and that the talks would concern only the two parties engaged in the conversation. It is to be hoped that the new Jordan Government will not take a line which would render the working of the Mixed Armistice Commission null and void. The Tripartite Powers would not be called upon to take any action of enforcement but merely to see in what way they could assist the Mixed Armistice Commission if the situation became difficult. There seems to be no particular reason to wait for the results of the Israel-Jordan talks, if and when they take place, or for modification of Israel's propaganda campaign. It is probably less important to hold such a meeting at times of comparative calm when the attention of all concerned in these matters can be turned to other fields, than at times of stress when decisions and lines of action have to be agreed.

7. I suggest that provided a decision to hold a meeting can be obtained within one week, it would be advantageous to us to hold it and would not appear to involve Her Majesty's Government in any problem of enforcing a decision or of stepping into the fore more than has been the case in every incident to date.

8. Since the above was written, Mr. Furlonge in his telegram No. 226 of April 29 has enforced his objections to the idea of holding a meeting and has obtained the support of the United States Embassy in Amman. It is not
/known

ER 1091/120
Flay D

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known whether Sir Francis Evans has obtained similar support in Tel Aviv for his suggestion. It may be noted in connexion with this telegram that in the course of general conversation ^{in the Foreign Office} with an official of the United States Embassy it was agreed "on working level" that there was something in Sir Francis Evans' idea. The American official concurred.

9. There is one objection which Mr. Furlonge has not yet put forward but which possibly may be in his mind. That is that the views of the representatives of the Tripartite Powers in Tel Aviv and in Amman might prove irreconcilable quite apart from any difference of opinion with General Riley. Sir Francis Evans has come to the point where he is prepared to believe that the evidence and information supplied to himself and to Mr. Furlonge in Amman is prima facie suspect. Mr. Furlonge is not prepared to agree with this point of view. However, Jerusalem have informed us that the United Nations officials look askance at the evidence produced by both sides. It is indeed possible that the meeting might not be successful if Mr. Furlonge and the United States Ambassador in Amman both think it will not be. This could be overcome by holding two meetings, if General Riley were to consent, the first with the Tripartite Representatives in Israel and the second with Tripartite Representatives in Jordan.

10. One of the subjects which might be discussed is the proposal put forward by the State Department, on which our views have been requested, in Washington telegram No. 919, that there should be three separate Mixed Armistice Commissions, one for ^{the} Northern, one for Jerusalem and one for the Southern sector of Israel. The idea is to try to remove some of the burden from the present Mixed Armistice Commission. However, since it is apparent that both Mr. Furlonge and his United States colleague are opposed to the idea ^{of a meeting now}, it is improbable that ^a the meeting of the Jordan representatives of the

/Tripartite

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CONFIDENTIAL

British Embassy,

Tel Aviv.

1033/124/53

28th April, 1953.

My dear Archie,

In my telegram No. 118 I urged the wisdom of waiting for the verdict of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation on the responsibility for last week's affray in Jerusalem, before deciding what representations we should make, and to whom. I am quite prepared to agree that the information which Geoffrey Furlonge receives from the Arab Legion about incidents of this kind is more likely to be correct than the version which we get here from the Israelis. However, although it is reasonable that more reliance should be placed on reports sifted by the British officers of the Legion, I think you will agree that there is some possibility that even these officers, ~~and~~ they are not I imagine on the spot when incidents occur, may be prejudiced in favour of the Arab case. My point therefore was not that Geoffrey Furlonge's version was wrong but that it should not be taken unsupported as a basis for decision.

2. Now several days after the event I am satisfied that the Israelis were the more to blame. Whether or not they fired the first shot will presumably be hard to prove, but I have no doubt that consequent on the rooftop murder on the 18th April of an Israeli woman in the New City, (not an isolated instance of irresponsible shooting from the Old City) they made preparations to reply in force the next time there was any shooting from the Arab side. If the occasion had not come when it did it would have come later. I do not, however, think it likely that the Israelis decided to launch an unprovoked fusillade at a given time. From our point of view this attitude of the Israel Government towards border incidents is foolish in their own interest, dangerous to the stability of the area, and damaging to our own relations with the Arab States. I therefore think that there is a good case, if the verdict of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation endorses my suspicions, for myself and my French and American colleagues again warning the Israel Government that we most strongly disapprove of their methods. I would propose to point out that there is a limited fund of goodwill towards Israel in the United Kingdom which the Israel Government are in danger of exhausting.

3. However, I do not believe that by itself this negative approach, however strongly made and however justified, will have more than a temporary effect, since the Israel Government are determined not to adopt a purely passive role in the face of infiltration, and I fear that unless we can at the same time contrive some new approach to the problem we shall again be faced with a similar incident in a few months time.

4. The Israel Government are undoubtedly gravely perturbed at the effect of the persistent activities of marauders from Jordan on their settlements near the border (and in so elongated a country a large proportion of it is within range of the border) and on their plans to induce more people to settle on

/the

A. D. M. ROSS, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

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- 2 -

the land. They are also extremely sensitive to the accusations of the right and left wing oppositions that they are incapable of protecting the lives and properties of their citizens - and voices have begun to be raised among their own supporters. There is a good deal in what Furlonge said in his telegram No.212 to the Foreign Office about the Israel government playing up to the border situation, though since I am unaware of the details of their complaints to the Mixed Armistice Commission I cannot comment on the alleged disparity between these and the versions which appear in the press. Certainly the authorities do nothing to damp down press publicity. I think the explanation is partly that since there would in any case be violent publicity in the opposition press, the government feels bound in self-defence to encourage its own supporters to play the same tune. I also have some fear that if we cannot find any way of diminishing infiltration, the Israel authorities may quietly encourage retaliatory action by groups of settlers whom they will claim they are unable to control.

5. For these reasons I believe that our wisest course is to strengthen the authority and efficiency of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation, to intervene directly with the two governments as little as possible, and when we do intervene to do so in support of recommendations of the UNTSO. It was with this idea in mind that I put forward the suggestion in my telegram No.121 for a meeting between General Riley and the representatives in Amman and Tel Aviv of the powers signatory to the tripartite declaration.

I am sending copies of this letter to Rapp, Furlonge and Walmsley.

Yours ever,

Frank Brown

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British Embassy,

AMMAN.

April 28th, 1953.

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CONFIDENTIAL

1031/80/53

21001/31

Dear Archie,

With reference to the correspondence at present resting with Tel Aviv telegram No.126 of April 28th about the recent Jerusalem incident, I enclose a copy of an Arab Legion Memorandum which clearly sets forth the Jordan view on the whole question, particularly as regards the artificial Israeli propaganda build-up since the beginning of this year.

2. You will have seen from my telegram No.216 of April 27th that the Jordan Prime Minister's reaction to your reply to his representations was surprisingly mild. It is, in fact, evident that, after the first furious outburst of indignation at the shooting in Jerusalem public opinion has rather tended to shrug its shoulders and merely chalk up the matter as one more Israeli aggression, before turning its attention to the more immediately interesting topic of King Hussein's forthcoming accession. If, as seems probable, the MAC produce no clear cut decision about responsibility, the matter will presumably pass into comparative oblivion.

3. The new Jordan Government's attitude will, of course, largely depend on its composition, but I should expect it to be all out to show itself patriotic, so that we should I think be unwise to expect an equally mild reaction if the Israelis try it on again. It may be possible to secure the "high-level meeting" and other discussions on infiltration, but I think the most we can hope for is a revival of the Local Commanders' Agreement and a consequent increase in cooperation, at least temporarily.

4. I am copying this letter to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Paris, Tel Aviv, UKDEL (New York), Jerusalem and the British Middle East Office in Fayid.

*Yours ever,
G. W. Furlonge*

(G.W.Furlonge)

A.D.M. Ross, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
London S.W.1.

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ISRAEL AND JORDAN

28th April.,
1953

SECRET

RESUME

Ever since the beginning of 1953, the Israeli Government seems to have adopted a new policy towards Jordan. Infiltration into Israel is now a problem four years old. During this period, the statistics of infiltrators and of stolen property have maintained a remarkably steady average. The last three months of 1952, however, were a remarkably quiet period.

In January, 1953, the Israeli Government turned on the propaganda. The surprised inhabitants of Jordan were told that the situation was suddenly critical, that the frontier was soaked in blood and that tension was mounting rapidly.

Statistics revealed no increase in incidents and the frontier seemed rather quieter than usual. Those familiar with Jewish tactics in the past concluded (not that the situation was critical) but that the Jews were about to commit some outrage.

There followed a few days later the Jewish attacks on the villages of Rantis and Falama. These operations were not very successful. The attacking parties were carrying large quantities of explosives, evidently intended to blow down the houses of the villagers. In both cases, the Jews failed to lay their charges, and on the contrary were obliged to retire rather hastily, leaving considerable quantities of ammunition and equipment, and in one case a dead Jewish soldier.

It was impossible to deny that units of the Israel Army had deliberately crossed the border line and attacked Jordan villages. Both the U.S. and British Governments handed strongly worded notes to Israel. The whole plan had been a fiasco.

THE NEW METHOD OF TERRORISM

The Jews were greatly embittered by this failure. They took immense trouble in their press and broadcast to deny that they had received a rebuke, sometimes claiming that Israel and Jordan had received identical notes from America and Britain, sometimes that it was Jordan who had been rebuked.

After a short interval during which Israel propaganda was devoted to explaining away the Falama affair, it embarked once more on a campaign of more and more hysterical vituperation. This propaganda build-up was carried out in the press, on the radio and in the form of diplomatic approaches to the Western Powers.

In all the four years of uneasy peace since 1948, no propaganda campaign of anything resembling this violence has occurred. The Jews have in the past been extremely clever in this direction. Their statements have usually been 80% true, with a small piece of untruth or exaggeration added, and a twist given to the comments, calculated to show Jordan in an unfavourable light.

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- 2 -

WILD PROPAGANDA

But in the last three months, Jewish propaganda has almost entirely parted company with truth. The majority of their statements in the press about marauding and raiding appear to be completely fictitious. In the great majority of cases, no corresponding complaints are laid before the Mixed Armistice Commission.

An "Israel Army Spokesman" makes frequent releases to the press, stating that ten, fifteen, or twenty "Arab marauders" have been killed in the previous week. The most stringent police enquiries in Jordan fail to reveal any men reported missing, or perhaps one or two where the Jews reported 18 or 20.

A caravan of smugglers caught by the Jews near Gaza (and themselves all natives of Gaza) are reported as "para-military raiders" from Jordan. Yet the Jews knew perfectly well that they were smugglers, because they seized the pack animals laden with rice and sugar.

Two incidents occurred of patrols on either side exchanging shots across the border, neither side having crossed. Yet both incidents were reported as "A force of para-military raiders from Jordan" invading Israel, and it was stated that after prolonged battles with the Israel Army, the "marauders" fled back to Jordan.

In some cases, an exchange of shots across the border appears to be reported again and again for a week, without reference to any previous report, conveying the impression that new battles are occurring every day. In reality, even with all this wild fire talk, there were no serious incidents on the border during March.

PROPAGANDA MESMERISM

One of the most dangerous aspects of this unrestrained propaganda campaign is the effect which it appears to be producing on the Israelis themselves. The Jews complain that the inhabitants of their frontier villages cannot sleep at night. This is scarcely to be wondered at, if they read the Jewish press, which daily describes the most terrible and bloody (but purely fictitious) battles.

In this connection, an interesting letter from the Jewish "Jerusalem Post" is attached at Appendix A. It appears that an Israeli Judge stated in court that infiltration was not as serious as the public had been led to believe.

THE JERUSALEM SHOOTINGS

At 5 p.m. on Wednesday April 22nd Jewish snipers suddenly opened fire all along the line in the city of Jerusalem. This action was an absolute and complete surprise. It had always been believed that Israel - nervous at the possibility of U.N.O. pressure for the internationalization of Jerusalem - would not create incidents in the city.

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All or nearly all the firing was done by snipers with rifles, from high buildings which overlooked the crowded streets of the Arab city. At 5 p.m. crowds of people were thronging the streets. Nevertheless the fire was carefully aimed, chiefly at Arab Legion soldiers, many of whom were in the streets.

The streets in the Jewish city were entirely deserted within a few minutes of the first shot. On the Jordan side, the crowds, taken completely by surprise, naturally took much longer to take cover, thereby offering good targets for a longer time.

When dark came, the Jewish city was almost completely blacked out. Jewish police loud-speaker vans could be heard in the streets saying in Hebrew: "Everybody keep under cover. We are teaching the Arabs a lesson".

The Arab Legion posts replied to the Jewish fire for a few minutes, but after that, there was nothing to shoot at on the Jewish side. The Israel snipers continued to shoot until dark.

The Israel army opened up again at 5 a.m. on Thursday April 23rd., and continued firing whenever a target presented itself until 8 a.m. when firing petered out. The Arab Legion did not fire at all on Thursday.

The M.A.C. met under the presidency of General Riley at 11 a.m. on Thursday, and spent three-and-a-half hours arguing whether or not to hold an enquiry. The Jordan delegation demanded a full enquiry, the Israelis refused one. General Riley (weak as ever) said he supposed that there ought to be an enquiry, but doubted if it would be possible to prove who was guilty.

General Riley has spent nearly four years in Jerusalem, always avoiding saying anything clear. The Arab Governments accuse General Riley of being pro-Jewish. I doubt if they are right. But he always produces the same type of solution - "It is not clear who has been at fault, but anyhow let us all be friendly from now onwards".

This system may make it difficult for either side to denounce General Riley, and the example of Count Bernadotte is enough to impose caution on every U.N.O. representative in Palestine. Such appeasement, however, is extremely injurious, if we allow the possibility that one side or the other may be intentionally aggressive. A deliberate aggressor can always count on General Riley concluding the incident by a carefully balanced statement, allotting a small and exactly equal amount of criticism to both sides, saying that no conclusive proof of guilt can be found, and inviting all parties to live happily ever after.

WHAT WAS THE IDEA?

As already stated, the Jordan authorities were taken completely by surprise by the Jewish killings in Jerusalem. They had always "appreciated" that the Jews would not stage a military operation in the streets of the City.

The only apparent explanation is that Rantis and Falama had convinced the Jews that attacking frontier villages was no longer effective. This was firstly because the rising efficiency of the National Guard had made such operations increasingly difficult. The second was that village resistance resulted in Jewish dead being left in Jordan, together with abandoned Jewish equipment, providing damning evidence as to the identity of the aggressor. The third was that Britain and America seemed to have turned rather nasty about it.

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- 4 -

These considerations did not modify the psychological outlook of the Jews. In their view, terrorism, and force are the best instruments of policy. They have used terrorism for the past ten years in Palestine, and they attribute the British withdrawal from Palestine, and the creation of the State of Israel to Jewish employment of terror and murder. The question that faced them after Falama was not therefore whether or not to continue terrorist tactics, but whether a more efficient form of terrorism could be devised.

Shooting across the border at least would leave no tell-tale Jewish dead in Jordan territory. But to shoot across the border in country districts was unlikely to produce sufficiently dense crowds to cause adequate casualties. The crowded streets of Jerusalem alone offered a suitable terrain for a new Deir Yassin.

WHO FIRED FIRST?

From the Jewish point of view, however, the great advantage of a revenge - massacre by shooting across the border was that bullets leave no tracks. Moreover it was inevitable that the Arab Legion would reply, and thus the question of who fired first could be made the subject of an endless wrangle. The reasons for claiming that the Jews fired first are as follows:

- (1) The shooting began simultaneously over the whole length of the City. Some of the posts which fired were out of ear-shot of others. Thus it is obvious that simultaneous opening of fire along so long a front must have been carefully arranged beforehand. Either this plot was hatched by Arab Legion Headquarters or by Israel Army headquarters.
- (2) There have been odd shots in Jerusalem before, but these have never resulted in a simultaneous outbreak of shooting within a few seconds. The city is so large and sprawling, that a casual shot or two in one area is not heard in many other parts, and if heard, it is not possible half a mile away to tell which side the shot came from. There can be no question therefore of an accidental or spontaneous outburst of firing.
- (3) There can therefore be NO doubt whatever that the Jews had carefully arranged the plan before hand. The only justification which might be claimed for the Jews is that a solitary Arab somewhere fired the first shot. The Jews had prepared a careful plan to open fire all along the line and they gave orders to put this plan into execution. This theory meets with the following difficulties.
- (4) Nobody has yet produced any evidence about this mythical Arab. There are no arms in the hands of civilian Arabs in Jerusalem (unless they be concealed in their houses). Any Jordanian in Jerusalem who owned a weapon, would certainly not shoot it at the Jewish City in daylight. He would know perfectly well that he would be immediately caught by the police and get several weeks in prison.

A civilian Jordanian can therefore be excluded. The only alternative would be a man of the Arab Legion. The Arab Legion are no longer scattered in small posts, but in one or two garrisons each with officers. For the Arab Legion to open fire and deny it, would presuppose a plot involving a considerable number of officers and men. The Arab Legion is sufficiently disciplined to make such a plot impossible.

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- 5 -

- (5) If an Arab did fire first, his shot was indistinguishable from the rest of the shooting. Now if an Arab had fired, and the Jews in retaliation, had ordered their troops to fire back all along the line, the original shot would have to have been reported back to a senior Jewish commander.

In view of the fact that the Jews opened fire simultaneously all over the city, the order must have been given at least by a battalion commander, but more probably by a brigade commander. If a front line Jewish post saw or heard an Arab fire a shot, it would have had to report back to its platoon or company commander. The latter would have to tell the battalion commander, and he would in all probability refer to the brigade commander. To open fire indiscriminately on crowds of civilians all over Jerusalem is obviously not a decision that could be left to a junior officer. Moreover the civil police and the civil population cleared the streets in a few minutes when firing began, a fact which suggests that the civil police had also been warned.

Now there had not been a serious incident of this nature in Jerusalem for years, and if the Jews did not know it was going to happen, it is extremely unlikely that all these officers would have been sitting in their offices with their ears to the telephone at 5 p.m. in the evening.

If therefore the Arabs fired first, and the Jews then ordered their troops to fire in retaliation all along the line, the process could not have failed to take at the least ten minutes, and more probably 20 minutes to half an hour.

If, on the other hand, the post opposite where the Arab shot was fired, had replied immediately in retaliation, then the remaining Jewish posts would have come into action one after another.

Either then there would have been a shot or shots fired by Arabs, followed by an interval of ten to thirty minutes, and then simultaneous Jewish fire all along the line. Or else, one Jewish post would have fired first and the others opened up gradually one after another.

Neither of these things happened. Fire was opened simultaneously by Jewish posts all along the line. Nobody had heard any previous shots.

- (6) The Jews held a rehearsal on 14th April, sounded alarms and cleared the streets of civilians. The same process was carried out on Wednesday April 22nd, a fact which makes April 14th look very like a rehearsal.
- (7) Between 4.30 p.m. and 5 p.m. on April 22nd, Arab Legion look-out posts observed Jewish reinforcements creeping up to several of their front line posts. Something like a total of two company's of infantry were observed re-inforcing the Jewish front posts, in the half hour before the firing began.
- (8) Jewish reinforcements continued to reach their front line positions until midnight. Throughout the whole incident, the Arab Legion did not bring up any reinforcements to Jerusalem city.
- (9) When firing began, the streets of the Jewish city were cleared in a very remarkably short time (as per the previous rehearsal). Police loud speaker vans were on the streets in record time, calling on all civilians to take cover.

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- 6 -

- (10) A police loud-speaker van is alleged to have been heard saying in Hebrew "Keep under cover, We are going to teach the Arabs a lesson".
- (11) At night, the Jewish city was blacked out and the street lighting was dimmed very low. There was no movement whatever in the city. The fact that complete black out conditions could be introduced in 1½ hours (firing began at 5 p.m.), if the Jews were surprised by an Arab attack, speaks highly for Jewish Civil Defence Training. (The black out was also rehearsed on April 14th).
- (12) On Thursday morning April 23rd., the Jewish snipers re-opened fire at 5 a.m. and fired till 8 a.m. Firing by the Jews was resumed in the afternoon. The Arab Legion did not fire at all on Thursday, and did not reply to the Jewish snipers.
- (13) The Jews admit four wounded as their casualties. Jordan had:

KILLED	1 officer cadet
	4 soldiers
	5 civilians

Total	10
Wounded	1 soldier
	<u>11</u> civilians
Total	12

We certainly must be remarkably inefficient if the whole incident was premeditated by Jordan.

The Arab Legion casualties were all unarmed soldiers strolling in the streets. NO Arab Legion soldier was injured in his post or trench. If we had begun it, would we not at least have got our soldiers under cover first?

(14) When General Riley called the M.A.C. to an immediate emergency meeting, the Jordan delegation immediately asked for a full U.N.O. enquiry. The Israeli delegation alleged that the Jordanians fired first, but refused an enquiry.

(15) After the Mixed Armistice Commission, General Riley said to a British officer of the Arab Legion that he knew it was all a Jewish racket, but it was not his job to say so, and anyhow he could not produce legal proof if challenged.

(16) As a result of U.N.O. pressure, the Jews have eventually very unwillingly consented to an enquiry, in principle. They stipulate, however,

- (a) That the enquiry will not take place for a week, when of course it is essential to carry it out when the incident is still fresh, if we are to ascertain the truth.

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- 7 -

- (b) That the proceedings are to be limited to finding out who fired the first shot. Presumably they will produce a dozen Jews who swear that an Arab fired at them first.
- (c) That the enquiries are to be held only within the walls of the Mixed Armistice Commission room. The U.N.O. investigators are not allowed to go out into the city and cross-question soldiers and civilians. They will therefore only meet the "witnesses" whom the Israeli Government care to produce for them.

It is evident from all this that the Israeli Government are determined not to allow any real enquiry to take place.

(17) It is remarkable that, although the Jews complain that the Arabs fired first, the Israeli delegation have not lodged any complaint about the incident before the Mixed Armistice Commission. The only complaint on the record over the whole incident was put in by Jordan.

Presumably if the Jews had lodged a complaint, they could not simultaneously have refused an enquiry.

SUMMARY

This Jerusalem massacre is just one more incident in a long list which includes the murder of Lord Moyne, the massacres at Deir Yassin, Fuwaima and many other places, the murder of Bernadotte, the attacks on Rantis and Falama and many more. This is the way Jewish psychology works, and they will continue to perpetrate such crimes until they are convinced that they do not pay.

It is curious that the Jews do not realize that they are not terrorizing the Arabs. They are merely increasing their hatred, hastening Arab unity, and rearmament, fanning fanaticism and making peace more and more remote.

There is no use hoping that the Jews will give up terrorist methods unless the Western Powers can show more determination and give the Jews a diplomatic fright. For Israel cannot survive without the support of the Western Powers, and could not defy them if they really meant business.

28th April., 1953.

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APPENDIX 'A'

LETTERS

INFILTRATORS

To the Editor of the POST

Sir, - Some time ago the Press reported that a watchman who had killed an infiltrator was sentenced to seven and a half years' imprisonment, and now comes the report that the sentence has been set aside by the Supreme Court.

While comments on a case which is still sub judice are inadmissible, it is generally accepted that the obiter dicta of the judge which have no bearing on the case may be made the subject of comment. Thus, in the margin of the judgment, the Judge observed that the public at large seemed to have formed a dangerous opinion on infiltrators. That is to say that, in the opinion of the Judge, infiltration is less dangerous than is generally believed.

This is, I think, a startling statement. According to figures published up to the end of February, infiltrators perpetrated some 16,000 criminal acts: they committed about 300 murders, wounded 230 persons (these figures do not include Security Forces casualties), and caused material damage amounting to IL.1.2m.

The question is therefore: How many Jews must be murdered and injured, and how much damage must be caused, before public opinion on this issue becomes reasonable and ceases to be harmful?

Yours etc

AVRAHAM SHARON

Jerusalem April 4th.

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2091/136

British Consulate-General,
Jerusalem

27th April, 1953

CONFIDENTIAL

1062/89/53

My dear Baker,

In my telegram No. 49 of 25th April, I said I would send by bag further details on two points mentioned to me by General de Ridder on the 24th April.

2. As regards the timing of the first burst of shooting in Jerusalem on the 22nd, a certain U.S. officer in the Observer Corps was just leaving the U.S. Consul's house in the New City when he heard a burst of firing. He looked at his watch, which said 4.50 (Jordan time). Eyre, of the B.M.E.O., who was unaware of this piece of information, has told me that when he himself was at the Damascus Gate on that day he found himself under fire, looked at his watch and found it said 4.50 (within a minute or two either way). The U. N. observer drove straight to the Mandelbaum Gate, which is about seven minutes drive away, and crossed the lines under fire directed from the Israel side. Thus, it is unquestionable that the Jews were firing before 5.0 p.m. (Jordan time, equals 6.0 p.m. Israel time). At the meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission under Riley on the 23rd April Riley said, as already reported, that he did not think anyone would ever be able to prove who started firing, and in order to show how difficult it was to get agreement on times he asked everyone present to look at their watches: naturally, there were discrepancies of a few minutes all round the table. Riley then said (or it was said, and he accepted) that the firing began about 6.0 p.m. (Israel time, equals 5.0 p.m. Jordan time). This time having been thus "established" the Israel representative looked at his watch and said: "Yes we had our first casualty at 6.2".

3. If the first Israel casualty had been earlier it seems safe to assume that an earlier time would have been named. But by the evidence both of a U.N. observer and of Eyre, of which the Israel delegate was ignorant, firing had been going on for some time before then. Against this it can be argued that the first Israel casualty did not necessarily represent the first Arab shot. If this were so however, and assuming that the first shot came from the Arab side, the deduction would be that the Jews, in retaliation for one or a few Arab shots which missed, launched a reprisal whose scale may be judged from the relative casualties: ten Arab deaths and eight wounded (six being hospital cases) against the reported six lightly wounded Jewish casualties. Furthermore, at least two of the Arabs, to my personal knowledge, were shot at a point about 500 yards from the nearest Jewish front-line post. The Damascus Gate itself, which was under fire for a considerable time, is over 300 yards from the same point. Traffic on the main road north from the Gate, which runs past our office, more or less parallel to the armistice line, was paralysed for a time, and casualties were inflicted on pedestrians using it. The reprisal (if such it were) could thus hardly be represented as one limited to no-man's-land or the immediately adjoining section, i.e., the area in which the Jews have complained of Arab "aggression" in the past.

4. As regards the Israel propaganda campaign against General de Ridder, the quality of this may be judged by the allegation
/that

G. H. Baker, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office

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that (e.g., Jerusalem Post 24th April)

"last week he ruled that shots fired across the border by civilians do not constitute an infringement of the Armistice Agreement. In practice this means that it is enough for an Arab soldier to shed his uniform and identity card at home in order to make it internationally acceptable for him to cross the border and attack or ambush peaceful citizens in their homes during the night."

General de Ridder informed me that the "ruling" to which this presumably refers was one made in respect of a particular case of shots by one Arab at another (probably a relative) just across the border. What he ruled was that this incident was not a violation of Article III(2) of the Armistice Agreement, which forbids warlike action by "military or para-military forces against the military or para-military forces of the other Party or against civilians..."

5. Article III(3) of the Armistice Agreement however says:

"No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by one of the Parties to this Agreement against the other Party."

This article, beside being relevant to the incident of 22nd - 23rd April, seems clearly enough to cover the case of civilians firing across the border (unless it is a case of a private feud).

6. As regards Israel complaints that General de Ridder disregards Israeli evidence, the truth is that much of this evidence deserves to be disregarded. The scent "followed" by an Israel dog to the frontier in one case was described in my telegram No. 49 of 25th April. As regards the Wadi Fukin incident, the Israelis at first demanded that account be taken of an analysis of bloodstains found on the Israel side of the line: having had time to perform the analysis they then withdrew their demand. U.N. observers who visited the scene do not agree that the evidence shows that the bodies were dragged across the line. As regards the Israel allegation that one of the men was killed some hours after he first became unconscious, de Ridder agrees that this was so. He pointed out however that he himself, during the war, once remained unconscious for over eleven hours after his skull was cracked, that the wounded Israeli may have remained unconscious in the same way on the "battlefield" and been shot from some distance by the Arabs when he roused himself. Such an explanation seems quite serious enough, but it is not the one on which the Israelis based their complaint. De Ridder, having refused to vote for the Israel complaint in this matter, then refused to vote for the Jordan complaint that the Israel patrol had violated Jordan territory.

7. As regards the strengthening of the Truce Supervision machinery, recommended by Sir Francis Evans in his telegram No. 121, and endorsed by General de Ridder (my telegram No. 49), there is perhaps one point which is worth making. The great majority of the United Nations personnel here have acquired a suspicion of the Jews, both in respect of truth-telling and in respect of their attitude towards the Truce Supervision machinery, General de Ridder is the best-known example. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the United Nations staff are not also ready to suspect Arab evidence. De Ridder said to me on the 25th, what he has many times said before, that both sides are apt to produce false evidence but that the Jews do so more consistently, more deliberately and much

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more skilfully than the Arabs. It would not be a difficult though a lengthy task to compile a list of the major instances of which this suspicion of Jewish good faith is based. Furthermore, apart from individual distortions and instances of doubtful faith, the incidents which during the past year or so have raised a challenge to the Truce Supervision Organisation itself have been initiated by Jewish action. The Lake Huleh dispute, the barrel, the Mount Scopus hut, the Arab college, perhaps the ammunition-running to Mount Scopus, are instances that come to mind. There may be countervailing instances, but none, so far as I am aware, in respect of Jordan who after all is the Arab state most concerned. Finally, on what might be called a semi-personal level, the Israelis have managed to create the impression that they are hostile to the members of the organisation. The most striking example of this occurred during the barrel dispute last summer and was reported at the time. So far as physical danger is concerned, the observers are no doubt prepared to, and do, come under fire on the frontiers, but the instances which have come to my notice are ones where Jews and not Arabs have been concerned. For instance, de Ridder's assistant, Commandant Ceelen, was fired at (or, at least, bullets struck very close) in the Damascus Gate on the 22nd April: he was carrying a white flag and his uniform is quite different from that of the Arabs. Other United Nations officers, not carrying a white flag, also came under fire. On the same day, an hour or two earlier, Jews (apparently in No-man's-land) had fired at a white-painted United Nations jeep near Latrun.

8. Nobody, perhaps, disputes that the Israelis feel sincere indignation at much that has happened, and the murders near the frontier - if they are indeed the work of infiltrators - are highly distressing. On the other hand, the experience here of the United Nations (and I think of a generation of British administrators before them) has been that the sincerity of the indignation felt by the Jews is not necessarily related to the accuracy of their facts or the justice of their argument.

9. In these circumstances, whatever strengthening of the Truce Supervision Organisation may be undertaken, and however wholesale a change may be made in its personnel, no permanent improvement in relations between the United Nations staff and the Israelis can be expected unless there is also a change in the attitude of Israel.

10. Finally I should record de Ridder's private view that there is much which might be done on the Jordan side to deter infiltrators, always provided that the authorities are physically able to do it. His particular fear is that the village headmen and the National Guards cannot be brought to take drastic action against infiltrators. He considers that much is however already being done. Certainly the impression which I have received from the Governor of Jerusalem (Jordan) is that considerable efforts are being made. The police have a regular information service and lay ambushes. He personally sentences a number of infiltrators to prison terms: the sentences he described to me were from one to six months. On the other hand he was highly tickled when I asked whether some sacks of Israel gelignite, confiscated from infiltrators by the police, had been returned to their place of origin.

11. I am copying this to Amman, Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, U.K. Delegation New York, and B.M.E.O. (Fayid).

Yours in
Robert Walmsley
(A. R. Walmsley)