SECRET

3. There is little doubt that both Israel and Egypt have violated the ceasefire and the associated standstill agreement (about the military activity in 50km zones on either side of the Suez Canal). The Americans have taken reports from the Israelis and Egyptians seriously and are in touch with the Russians about alleged violations. But they refused to let these allegations distract them from their efforts to promote the opening of talks under Dr. Jarring's auspices.

4. On 23 August, Dr. Jarring announced the start of talks under his auspices in New York at official level. He said he hoped that they would later be raised to Foreign Minister level. He cannot expect the talks to go smoothly. The parties will start from positions on peace, withdrawal and boundaries which are far apart. But we must hope that all concerned will see that their best interest lies in persevering with the dialogue which has now begun.

5. Dr. Jarring has said he would welcome further guidance from the four powers and talks are continuing both at Permanent Representative and at Deputy level in New York. We hope the Deputies will soon be able to produce the memorandum on points of agreement and disagreement among the four which they were instructed to prepare in the spring.

6. I expect to see Mr. Shaw, Mr. Niss and Mr. Atallah (Foreign Minister of Jordan) in New York and to have talks there about the Middle East with a number of other Foreign Ministers, including Mr. Rogers and Mr. Gromyko.

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SECREn
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1893 19 JUNE 1970

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NUMBER 1893 OF 19 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO PARIS MOSCOW CAIRO AMMAN BEIRUT TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM FOLLOWING IS TEXT:
THE UAR (JORDAN) AND ISRAEL ADVISE ME THAT THEY AGREE:
(A) THAT HAVING ACCEPTED AND INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CARRY OUT RESOLUTION 242 IN ALL ITS PARTS, THEY WILL DESIGNATE REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSSIONS TO BE HELD UNDER MY AUSPICES, ACCORDING TO SUCH PROCEDURE AND AT SUCH PLACES AND TIMES AS I MAY RECOMMEND, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT AS APPROPRIATE EACH SIDE'S PREFERENCE AS TO METHOD OF PROCEDURE AND PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
(B) THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE AFOREMENTIONED DISCUSSIONS IS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE BETWEEN THEM BASED ON (1) MUTUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY THE UAR (JORDAN) AND ISRAEL OF EACH OTHER'S SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, AND (2) ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE 1967 CONFLICT, BOTH IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 242.
(C) THAT, TO FACILITATE MY TASK OF PROMOTING AGREEMENT AS SET FORTH IN RESOLUTION 242, THE PARTIES WILL STRICTLY OBSERVE, EFFECTIVE JULY 1 AT LEAST UNTIL OCTOBER 1, THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

F.C.O PASS IMMEDIATE TO PARIS MOSCOW CAIRO AMMAN BEIRUT AND TEL AVIV.

MR. FREEMAN

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET


MIDDLE EAST

Conflict between Israel and the Arab States

Speaking Notes

Two important developments during the past ten days.

The Russians have proposed new language on peace (for ultimate incorporation into four power guidance for Dr. Jarring).

1. The Americans have proposed a new basis for the resumption of Dr. Jarring's mission. This would require prior commitments by the parties to (a) indicate their willingness to carry out Security Council Resolution 242 and to make specific commitments on peace and withdrawal, (b) designate representatives to hold discussions under Dr. Jarring's auspices, and (c) observe a ceasefire from 1 July at least until 1 October. For the Israelis, acceptance of these commitments would entail abandoning their acceptance of the Resolution only "as a basis for negotiation" and their refusal to give a public commitment about withdrawal.

2. The Americans have made it clear to the Israelis that decisions about the supply of additional aircraft will depend on developments.

3. Besides approaching the Israelis, the Egyptians and the Jordanians, the Americans have given details of their /proposals/
proposals to the Russians, the French, the Secretary-General, Dr. Jarring and ourselves. The Israelis have reacted badly. They particularly dislike the proposal for a limited ceasefire and the link established between the supply of additional aircraft and the development of events. We have no authoritative Egyptian reaction so far. The Jordanians have expressed doubt about the willingness of the fedayeen to acquiesce in the proposals. The French have expressed alarm about what they consider to be an American attempt to by-pass the four power talks. We have no news yet of Soviet reactions.

4. We are sceptical about the prospects for the American initiative. But it marks an important stage in the commitment of US influence to working for a settlement. We are doing our best to give it a fair wind with the parties. When the Americans announce their proposals in public (as they plan to do before the end of the week), we shall say that we welcome their decision to make a new effort to bring about peace in the Middle East.

5. I expect to see Mr. Eban when he visits London unofficially in ten days' time (17th).

Near Eastern Department

(For Rogers is giving his press conference tomorrow at about 3.45 pm our time.)
CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET

MIDDAY PAST

28 May, 1970

Speaking Notes (Defensive)

Situation in the Area

The high level of hostilities has continued both on the UNR/Israel and the Lebanon/Israel fronts. On the Canal, the uneasy stand-off arrangement between the Russians and the Israelis has been maintained. HM Ambassador to Moscow yesterday expressed to the Russians our concern at the seriousness of the present situation. I have not yet had a report of the Soviet reaction. I also took the opportunity of Mr. Eban's passage through London to have a very full review of the present situation with him. During the course of this I reaffirmed our determination to help to ensure Israel's survival.

2. On the Lebanese front, the situation is still unsettled after the terrorist attack on an Israeli school bus on 22 May. After the incident, I issued a personal statement condemning the attack and expressing our sympathy with all those who had suffered.

This statement was conveyed to the Israel Prime Minister and raised by Lord Caradon at the United Nations.Israel has formally notified the United Nations of its condemnation of the incident and the Lebanese have done the same in connection with the subsequent shelling of Lebanese villages by the Israelis during which 20 people lost their lives. Neither side seems likely at present to call for a further meeting of the Security Council.

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The Israelis have greatly reinforced their defensive patrols on the border. There is as yet no sign that they propose to undertake in the near future a major reprisal attack of the kind foreshadowed by the Deputy Prime Minister in his speech on 22 May.

The Search for a Settlement

3. The four power talks are continuing in New York. There is no sign of any real progress. Attention is now turning towards the possibility of an early resumption of Dr. Jarring's mission. The Americans, the French and ourselves all believe that the time may soon come when we should work for this. However, both the Americans and the Russians wish to see whether their bilateral contacts which are expected to resume in the next few days in Washington will lead to any progress before committing themselves. I believe that this is the right course.

Security Council Resolution on Israel/Lebanon Incidents

4. This was a difficult meeting of the Council. The Israeli armoured attack which provoked it was on a much larger scale than anything previously done by the Israelis against Lebanon. The Arabs were trying hard to get a resolution which either called for or implied sanctions against Israel. Unfortunately, an attempt by the Finnish representative to put forward a neutral resolution urging the need for progress towards a settlement was opposed and effectively frustrated by the Israelis on distinctly weak grounds. In the event, the Arabs seemed to be assured of enough support for a most unbalanced text. It was at this stage that Lord Caradon asked for and I gave authority to work for amendments...
to the Arab text to bring it into line with resolutions for which we have voted in the past in similar circumstances, for example after the Israel attack on Karame in Jordan in March 1968. Lord Caradon was surprisingly successful. It was on this basis that he voted in favour of it, making it plain in his explanation of vote that we condemned the escalating violence as we had condemned all acts of violence on both sides in the past. Nor could we disregard death and destruction on either side.

Near Eastern Department
SECRET

CABINET

30 April, 1970.

MIDDLE EAST

Soviet-manned Flights in the UAR (Defensive)

On 29 April, the Israel Government issued an official statement which said: "for the first time Soviet pilots are flying operational missions from military installations under their control in Egypt".

2. Although we know that Russian pilots have been carrying out training and reconnaissance flights from bases in the UAR for about two years, we do not believe that they have so far flown any flights over Israel or the occupied territories or any flights intended to intercept Israeli aircraft elsewhere. We do not know what the Israel Government meant by "operational missions".

Four Power Talks

Since 2 April, the deputies of the representatives of the four powers in New York have met twice a week to prepare a memorandum on the areas of agreement and disagreement between the four. Progress has been slow. The deputies have however now begun to identify areas of agreement, but it will probably still be some weeks before they complete their work.

Near Eastern Department

SECRET
Speaking Notes

Soviet Arms Supplies to the UAR

The delivery of the Soviet SA-3 surface-to-air missile system to the UAR, with Soviet personnel to man it, has now been confirmed. This system has not previously been deployed outside the Soviet bloc. The Soviet decision to send these missiles to the UAR was probably taken at about the time of President Nasser's visit to Moscow in January. This visit was prompted by the Israeli deep penetration air attacks against the UAR which began in early January. The Russians seem to have tried to find a way of defending the UAR against attacks of this kind, without giving them equipment which would enable them to undertake retaliatory attacks against Israel. But the increased Soviet commitment to the defence of the UAR contains obvious dangers, not least that the Russians will eventually be dragged deeper still into participating in the UAR's defence.

US Arms Supplies to Israel

2. On 23 March, the US Secretary of State announced that President Nixon had decided not to meet Israel's requests for more Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft for the time being. The Americans believe that Israel has adequate air superiority over her Arab neighbours at present and they assess that the Soviet missile deliveries to the UAR have not affected this so far. They will however keep the situation under review. Meanwhile,
they have agreed to give Israel economic assistance in the form of an expanded programme under Public Law 480 for the purchase of surplus food, under favourable credit arrangements, and also credits to help cover the balance due on past military contracts. The total extent of this economic assistance which will amount to about $100 m. is much less than the $1,000 m. for which Israel is believed to have asked. The Israeli authorities are evidently disappointed at the President's decision, but their reaction has been restrained.

Four Power Talks [F/L]
3. In the four power talks in New York there have been signs of a change in the Soviet attitude towards the American proposal that the deputies of the four powers should produce an interim progress report recording the extent of their agreement and disagreement up to now. There is therefore some hope that the deputies may be able in the next few days to start drafting their report. We have welcomed the proposal, which the Americans have explained to us was designed to enable both ourselves and the French to inject our own ideas into the four power discussions.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office
PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS

MIDDLE EAST

Speaking Note

Two requests for a special Debate on the Middle East were made in the House on 26 February, one of them by the Leader of the Opposition. He asked the Leader of the House whether it would be possible to arrange such a Debate before the Easter recess.

I do not think that we should proceed to these requests. In a special Debate, we should almost certainly be pressed to make statements on the supply of British and French military equipment to Libya, on the supply of American military aircraft to Israel (about which we can expect President Nixon to make a decision shortly) and on the progress of the four power talks. None of these subjects are subjects on which we shall wish to make detailed statements in public between now and the Easter recess.

Background

The department has prepared a brief for the Leader of the House which takes the same line. Copy is attached.
SPECIAL DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Brief for the Leader of the House

Background

The request for a special debate on the Middle East first arose during the debate on the President of the Board of Trade's statement on the Swissair Disaster on 26 February. The request was revived by the Leader of the Opposition after the Leader of the House's statement on the Business of the House on 26 February.

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary made a statement on aircraft safety on 2 March and there is at present nothing to add to what Mr. Stewart said on that occasion. On H.M.G.'s policy on the Middle East generally, Mr. Stewart answered several questions on 26 February, covering the four-power talks, the U.S. proposals and the threat to Lebanon.

3. If a special debate were to take place, Ministers would no doubt be pressed to make statements on the supply of British and French military equipment to Libya, the supply of American military aircraft to Israel and the progress of the four-power talks. The present time is not a good one for any detailed public statement on any of these subjects.

Line to Take

4. As I told the House last week, it would be very difficult to find time for a special debate before Easter.

5. Ministers have made the Government's policy on the Middle East clear to the House on numerous occasions. My right honourable Friend, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary,

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my right honourable Friend the President of the Board of Trade and I myself have all made statements in the past few days on the problem of aircraft safety, which I think occasioned the first suggestion that there should be a special debate. My right honourable Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary also answered several questions on 26 February about the Middle East in general, including the four-power talks. Another question on this subject has been put down to my right honourable Friend the Prime Minister on 17 March. In these circumstances, I do not think a special debate is necessary.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, S.W.1.
1 March, 1970.
CABINET

5 March, 1970

OVERSEAS AFFAIRS

MIDDLE EAST

Speaking Notes [defensive]

Visits to London of Mr. Allon and Mr. Eban

Mr. Allon, the Deputy Prime Minister of Israel, visited London privately from 23 February to 27 February. Several Ministers, including myself, attended at a dinner party given by the Israeli Ambassador on 26 February.

2. Mr. Eban, the Foreign Minister of Israel, visited London privately on 27 February and 28 February. He had just paid official visits to the Federal German Republic, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. He has now returned to Israel.

3. I had quite a long conversation with Mr. Eban on 27 February. He had nothing very new to say. His main points were that the Soviet Government clearly did not want a peaceful settlement; that the Israelis were mistaken in believing that they could force Israel down; and that Israel had the present military situation under control. He also repeated the point that Israel regarded Arab willingness to engage in direct negotiations as a token of Arab readiness to make peace.

Four power talks and situation in the region [defensive]

4. There have been no important changes. In the four power talks the Americans have continued to press the Russians to move towards their own positions on commitments to peace and the procedure...
procedure by which a settlement should be negotiated. The Russians have continued to press for an immediate start on drafting the terms of guidance for Dr. Jarring.

5. In the area, the Israelis have shown concern about an increase in the number of incidents on the boundary between Israel and the Lebanon. But there have been no incidents to catch the headlines, here or elsewhere.
CABINET

5 March, 1970

OVERSEA AFFAIRS

MIDDLE EAST: AIR SAFETY

Background Note

The Secretary of State made a statement to the House on 2 March (copy attached). The emergency meeting summoned by the President of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) began in Paris on 3 March. Its outcome is not yet known.

2. On 3 March, the British Airline Pilots Association (BAPA) announced that it would press for an immediate ban on all flights to the Middle East and at the Conference of the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations (IFALPA) which is due to begin in London on 11 March.
gave to the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) on 4th December. Since the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965 there has been no formal defence treaty between Britain and Singapore; but the Singapore Government made it clear at that time that they regarded the previous defence arrangements with Britain as continuing in force.—[Vol. 793, c. 2564.]

Mr. Biggs-Davison: Will the hon. Gentleman say a little more about the position regarding Singapore, to which this agreement presumably applies? Would he explain to what extent agreement would be required for renegotiation?

Mr. Luard: It has already been explained that we are hoping to renegotiate new arrangements which will replace the Anglo-Malaysia Defence Agreement. In the context of the discussion of the new arrangements, we will certainly be considering the position of Singapore and entering into consultation about it with the Singapore Government.

Mr. Braine: Until those new arrangements have been negotiated, can the hon. Gentleman tell the House what is the legal position of British Service men in Singapore if there is no defence treaty? How do they stand legally in connection with criminal jurisdiction?

Mr. Luard: I should require notice as to the exact legal position, but there has in recent years been no change in that. The special position of Singapore arises from the fact that Singapore withdrew from Malaysia at an earlier stage. This is not affected by our decision to withdraw.

Mr. John Lee: If a further agreement is negotiated, will it be on the basis that any services we render will be on a market-price basis?

Mr. Luard: I am not quite clear what services my hon. Friend is thinking of, but, normally speaking, if they are economic services they will be on a market-price basis.

CIVIL AIRLINERS (SECURITY)

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Michael Stewart): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I should like to make a statement on the security of aircraft.

Immediately after the disaster on the 21st February, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office spokesmen expressed deep regret at the disaster. I should like to repeat this here and to express the sincere sympathy of Her Majesty's Government with the Swiss Government and with the relatives of the victims of the tragedy. On 23rd February, our Ambassador in Israel conveyed to Mrs. Meir our very deep regret.

The cause of this disaster has still not been established with certainty. Her Majesty's Government do, however, strongly condemn the increasing violence directed against civil aircraft in recent years. There is widespread and justifiable concern, and we must hope that all nations will now resolve to find a solution to this problem.

My right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade has already informed the House on 25th February of the action we are taking domestically and internationally. We shall be sending representatives to the meeting in Paris tomorrow of European civil aviation administrations which will discuss with other European Governments and with the airlines what further practical steps should be taken to minimise the risk of any further loss of life.

This is, however, only a first step, because the problem is worldwide. We have welcomed and fully support the initiative taken by the Swiss Government for the convening of a special conference under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organisation to discuss aviation security. I.C.A.O. is the appropriate Specialised Agency of the United Nations, and we regard it as the proper forum for the groundwork on this subject.

We are taking a leading part in the proceedings of I.C.A.O., which has already produced the Tokyo convention on civil aviation on board aircraft. Our ratification of this convention was among the 12 which brought it into force.
Mr. Stewart: I am sorry that I cannot give a definite answer, but I hope, as soon as possible.

Mr. John Mendelson: In the discussions between the 13 Governments which are the main providers of air services, and in the United Nations, will my right hon. Friend insist that action must be taken against those Governments who allow on their soil those terrorist groups to prepare their murderous assaults, and that joint action must be taken against them immediately and not a long time after such an incident occurs?

Mr. Stewart: I agree that it is right to take action against Governments who behave in that manner. What we have to decide—and it is not easy—is what effective action can be taken. That is the purpose of the international discussions.

Mr. Doughty: Will the Foreign Secretary see that the quickest possible steps are taken to provide security at airports and that, if necessary, legislation is passed here even allowing passengers who may be under suspicion to be searched before boarding aircraft?

Mr. Stewart: That is, perhaps, a matter more for my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade.

Sir Dingle Foot: Is it not a fact that the placing of bombs on aircraft has been strongly and publicly condemned in Cairo by the Government of the United Arab Republic?

Mr. Stewart: Yes, Sir. That is so.

Mr. Lablack: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that it is not Governments of these countries who may be responsible? If it proves that the perpetrators of outrages such as the Swissair disaster are citizens of a certain country which refuses to take firm measures against the organisations which employ the perpetrators of these outrages, will the right hon. Gentleman introduce a motion in I.C.A.O. calling for a complete boycott of air services to those countries? Furthermore, can he explain why it is taking so long for the resolution of the Swiss Government to be considered by I.C.A.O.?

Mr. Stewart: I do not think that there has been unnecessary delay about this. To get effective measures would be a very
Mr. STEWART: It is a difficult and complicated matter, although I hope that it will not be delayed unduly for that reason.

In reply to the earlier part of the hon. Member's question, I would mention, as I did in my statement, that the cause of the Swissair disaster has not yet been established with certainty. I would not want to go into too many hypothetical speculations at this stage.

Mr. SHAWELL: My right hon. Friend will appreciate that the civilian air pilots are very much concerned in this matter. Can he say whether, at the meeting which, I understand, is to be held in Paris tomorrow, the international pilots' association will be represented?

Mr. STEWART: I think so, but I cannot be certain. It is a discussion between both Governments and airlines.

Mr. BIGGS-DAVISON: Have the Government yet done anything at all to try to secure the arrest of Francis Bohenan, who was responsible for the hijacking of a British aircraft and the kidnapping therefrom of President Tshombe, who has since died in illegal captivity?

Mr. STEWART: The hon. Member should put that Question on the Order Paper.

Mr. BIGGS-DAVISON: I have.

Mr. RANKIN: Despite what my right hon. Friend has told us, is he aware that at the weekend a British Airline Pilots' Association officer was able to move about a prohibited area of London Airport uninterrupted and not even challenged, and, during that period, could have planted as many bombs as he wanted on British aircraft which were parked in that prohibited part of the airport?

Mr. STEWART: Yes, I have seen the statement, but this is a matter for my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade.

Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The point of order has been dealt with by the Chair and by the Foreign Secretary. Mr. Grossman.

NURSING SERVICES (INQUIRY)

The Secretary of State for Social Services (Mr. Richard Crossman): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a statement on further Government measures to ensure that the nursing services are equipped to meet the demands of the present and the future.

I am glad that agreement has been reached in the Whitley Council on higher pay for all nurses in the National Health Service. But I have never considered that pay was the only problem in nursing and, as a matter of urgency, I am now

RHODESIA

Mr. Faulds: On a point of order. Before the Foreign Secretary leaves the Chamber—I am sorry not to have given you notice of this, Mr. Speaker, but I think that you will appreciate the point of it as I proceed—may I say that I do not think that I am the only Member to find it rather unsatisfactory that on an important and fundamental issue like the question of Rhodesia the Foreign Secretary should seek to smuggle in his statement on it with other Questions in general. Is it not possible for you to refuse permission to Ministers to do that in such cases?

Mr. Speaker: It is possible for a Minister to answer Questions in the way he wishes to, either during Question Time or afterwards. I do not think that the Foreign Secretary has smuggled anything in.

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Michael Stewart): Further to that point of order, I must protest against the phrase "smuggle in". I should like to make it clear that if this is what the House wants, I am quite prepared to make statements till I am blue in the face, but that would take up a good deal of time, and I was trying to provide information to the House on a number of subjects.

Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order, Order. The point of order has been dealt with by the Chair and by the Foreign Secretary. Mr. Crossman.

NURSING SERVICES (INQUIRY)

The Secretary of State for Social Services (Mr. Richard Crossman): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a statement on further Government measures to ensure that the nursing services are equipped to meet the demands of the present and the future.

I am glad that agreement has been reached in the Whitley Council on higher pay for all nurses in the National Health Service. But I have never considered that pay was the only problem in nursing and, as a matter of urgency, I am now
CABINET
19 February, 1970.

MIDDLE EAST
ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE

Speaking Notes
Situation in the Area (Defensive)

The situation has continued to get worse. The Israeli air raid which led to 70 civilian deaths at a factory near Cairo on 12 February has caused deep resentment in the Arab world. This raid confirmed the Arabs in their view that they should not accept a simple return to the ceasefire unless the Israelis were prepared to give some assurances on withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. They will certainly not do so in response to public offers by Israel. The Arabs are also coming increasingly to talk of retaliatory raids against Israel. This may seem unrealistic: but if the Israeli raids are continued, or intensified, there is a very real risk of reckless action by the Arabs.

2. Meanwhile the UN Secretary General is very worried about the situation and is consulting both General Bull, of the UN Truce Supervisory Organisation, and Dr. Jarring. Dr. Jarring still seems to believe, however, that there is no point in his resuming his consultations in the area without fresh and more detailed guidance from the four powers.

Arms Supplies (Defensive)

3. We have no further indications about the intentions of either the Americans or the Russians to supply new equipment to the Israelis or Arabs. The Russians have not, however, given a favourable response to the Prime Minister's proposal for

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an agreement on arms limitation to the area. This idea has, however, been sharply criticised by the Arabs on the ground that it was designed to perpetuate Israeli military superiority.

Four Power Talks (Defensive)

1. The present climate is most unpropitious for any progress in the search for a settlement. The four powers are meeting today and are likely to discuss French and American drafts of an appeal for a cease-fire. We prefer the French draft and Lord Caradon is discussing this with the Americans and French. However, the Russians are likely to refuse to agree to any appeal. The four will also discuss the question of commitments to peace. With French support, the Russians will probably press the Americans to agree to start work on drafting the new guidance for Dr. Jarring. The Americans will probably continue to resist this.

5. I shall continue to keep a close watch on the situation, in consultation with our allies and with the governments in the area, and to see whether there is anything useful we can do to help prevent its further deterioration. I shall of course consult my colleagues as necessary if any change in our present policy seems to be indicated.

Near Eastern Department

CONFIDENTIAL
... as requested, I attach notes for the Secretary of State to use in Cabinet tomorrow. As you will see they deal with:

(a) the realities of the three-cornered dance of Government to Mr. Reagan's meetings of 21 January and 2 February;

(b) relations between the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republics;

(c) recent military initiatives in the Middle East;

and

(d) the four-power talks in New York.

\[ 
\text{(Y. P. Trim)} \\
11 February, 1979. \\
\]

Yours, Mr. Williams
12 February, 1970

MIDDLE EAST

Speeches \& Notes (Defensive)

The situation of the three Eastern Forces of Government to Mr. Kosygin's messages of 21 January and 2 February. (Defensive)

The Prime Minister's reply to Mr. Kosygin's message of 2 February was delivered by H.I.I. Ambassador in Moscow to Mr. Kosygin himself on 6 February. The interview was short. Mr. Kosygin expressed regret that the Prime Minister's message did not allude to recent Israeli military activity or to the occupation by Israel of Arab territory.

2. President Pompidou's reply was delivered to Mr. Kosygin by the French Ambassador on the same day. I sketched the terms of President Nixon's reply last week. President Pompidou's reply recalled the fact that the French had earlier said that violations of the ceasefire could lead to uncontrolled escalation: emphasised the importance attached by the French Government to the early resumption of Dr. Jarring's mission: noted with interest that the Soviet representative in the four-power talks had supported French views about how to make progress in New York: and said that the French saw a link between the two key questions of withdrawal and peace: and suggested that the time had come for the four to invite the United Nations to put an end to their military operations and obey the ceasefire resolutions of June 1967.
Relations between the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic

3. We are now certain that President Nasser paid a secret visit to Moscow from 22 January to 26 January. We think it probable that he sought substantial new Soviet military aid for the United Arab Republic and a further Soviet effort to get the West to persuade Israel to abandon her present policy of bombing military targets well inside Egypt. We do not know what military equipment he may have asked for. It was clearly no coincidence that Mr. Kosygin's messages to the three Western Heads of Government were delivered shortly after President Nasser's departure from Moscow.

Recent Military Incidents in the Middle East (Defensive)

4. Naval frogmen from the United Arab Republic attacked Israeli naval vessels at Eilat on the night of 4 February, sinking a naval auxiliary and damaging a tank landing craft (the largest ship in the Israeli Navy). On 6 February, the Israelis sank a U.A.R. minesweeper in the Gulf of Suez. On 8 February, the Israelis renewed their attacks on military targets near Cairo.

The Four Power Talks in New York (Defensive)

5. The four power talks resumed on 2 December. The four are holding their eleventh meeting since the resumption today. Lord Caradon will be present. He will speak about the importance of commitments to peace in a settlement, emphasise the importance of re-establishing effective cease-fire arrangements in the region and draw attention to the harmful effects of the supply of more, and more sophisticated, military equipment to the parties.
As requested, I attach notes for the Secretary of State to use in Cabinet tomorrow. These concentrate on the message from Mr. Kosygin which was delivered to the Prime Minister on 2 February.

(J.P. Tripp)
4 February, 1970.

c.c. Mr. Williams
CABINET
5 February, 1970.

MIDDLE EAST

On 2 February, the Soviet Ambassador gave the Prime Minister a message from Mr. Kosygin about the situation in the Middle East and the present state of the international effort to help bring about a peaceful settlement (copy attached).

2. The Soviet Ambassadors in Washington and Paris delivered comparable (but not absolutely identical) messages for President Nixon and President Pompidou on 31 January and 2 February respectively. President Nixon's reply was conveyed to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington on 4 February. It set out the American analysis of why the situation had deteriorated in recent months; reaffirmed the desire of the US for a ceasefire; said that the US had begun discussions last week (before the delivery of Mr. Kosygin's message) with both the Israelis and the Egyptians about measures to restore the ceasefire; and reiterated the desire of the US to work for peace. We do not know when or in what terms President Pompidou intends to reply. We think that the three messages were intended to make clear that the Soviet Union still wanted a peaceful settlement; that it was nevertheless not prepared to pay any price (or to ask the Egyptians to pay any price) for achieving a settlement; and that it might feel obliged to provide the Egyptians with additional,
and perhaps more sophisticated, military equipment if Israeli attacks on targets in the UAR were to continue. The messages may also have been intended to help establish a platform from which the Soviet Union could blame others if the situation in the region continued to deteriorate or if the four power talks were to face breakdown.

3. I think it important that a reply to Mr. Kosygin's message should be sent today if possible. The reply which we have drafted emphasises the importance of working towards an effective ceasefire in the Middle East. It goes on to draw attention to the vital importance of the provisions of Security Council Resolution No.242 which can be the only basis for a settlement in the Middle East. This covers the two essential principles of Israeli withdrawal on the one hand and commitments to peace on the other. Finally, our proposed reply notes with concern the reference in the message from Kosygin about putting at the disposal of Arab States the means of promoting an escalation of violence in the Middle East. It refers to the repeated requests by H.M.G. that there should be a general agreement on the limitation of arms supplies in the Middle East and asks the Soviet Union whether they would be prepared to join in working for such an agreement.

4. The American reply to the Russian note was handed to the Russians yesterday afternoon.
Advice for the Prime Minister

Mr. de Courcy Ireland has asked us to provide you with draft Notes for Supplemants to accompany draft advice to the Prime Minister on answering a Parliamentary Question about his talks with President Nixon.

Yarnold

cc.
American Department
Mr. de Courcy Ireland.
NOTES FOR SUPPLIMENTARIES

Middle East

Israel's right to exist

1. There can be no question about our recognition both of Israel's existence and of her right to exist.

Arms Supply: Leaving Israel defenceless

2. As my rt. hon. Friend, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, said in reply to my hon. Friend the member for Newark on 13 October, in the absence of agreement on a general limitation on arms supplies to the Middle East it is not our intention to see any country in the Middle East so disadvantaged as to tempt an aggressor.

Participation in the four power talks

3. We are taking part in the four power meetings in New York because we believe that the four can help bring about an early resumption of contacts between Dr. Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary General and the parties to the dispute.
VERBATIM SERVICE 275/69 THURSDAY 30 OCTOBER 1969

MIDDLE EAST: MR. STEWART.

THE FOLLOWING IS SUBSTANCE OF MR. STEWART’S REMARKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST DURING HIS SPEECH OPENING THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY THURSDAY (THESE EXTRACTS COVER THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS GENERALLY, ARMS POLICY, AND RELATIONS WITH LIBYA):

I WANT NOW TO TRY TO SET OUT HER MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT’S VIEW OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEM.

FIRST, THERE IS AN IMPERATIVE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

IF ANY OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION IMAGINE THAT THEY HAVE ANYTHING TO GAIN BY MERELY PROLONGING THE PRESENT SITUATION, I BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE DISASTROUSLY MISTAKEN, BECAUSE AS LONG AS THE PRESENT SITUATION CONTINUES THERE WILL BE A STEADY HARDENING OF OPINION BOTH IN ISRAEL AND IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES, WHICH WILL MAKE AN ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT MORE DIFFICULT. WE SEE THIS ALREADY IN CERTAIN EVENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN THE ARAB WORLD. I DO NOT THINK THAT ANYONE IN THIS COUNTRY CAN HAVE ANYTHING BUT A FEELING OF GREAT SYMPATHY FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE LEBANON AT THIS TIME. WE HAVE LONG HAD FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THAT COUNTRY. ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE WHOLE MIDDLE EASTERN AREA, CULTURAL AND MATERIAL, HAS BEEN OF GREAT BENEFIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST, AND WE MUST HOPE THAT THE LEBANESE, TOGETHER WITH THEIR ARAB NEIGHBOURS – FOR THIS IS AN ARAB AFFAIR – WILL SOON BE ABLE TO RESTORE THEIR COUNTRY TO ITS USUAL PEACE AND PROSPERITY.

BUT WHAT IS HAPPENING THERE AND WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN SOME OTHER PARTS OF THE ARAB WORLD ILLUSTRATES THAT UNLESS THERE IS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE OPINIONS WILL HARDEN TO THE POINT WHERE SUCH A SETTLEMENT WILL NEVER BE POSSIBLE. I THINK THAT IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL SHOULD GIVE PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THIS ASPECT OF THE SITUATION. I SHALL SEEK IN WHATEVER WAY I HAVE TO SAY NOT TO BE A PARTISAN OF EITHER ISRAEL OR THE ARAB STATES, BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT THE OVERWHELMING INTEREST OF THIS COUNTRY, NOT ONLY MORAL BUT MATERIAL, IS AN AGREED SETTLEMENT. THIS MATTERS FAR MORE TO US, AND TO HUMANITY, THAN AN ATTEMPT TO SECURE SOME PRECISE ADVANTAGE ON THIS POINT OR THAT FOR ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER.

WHAT ARE THE MECHANICS BY WHICH ONE COULD REACH SUCH A SETTLEMENT? I BELIEVE THAT THE BASIS MUST BE THE RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN NINETEENSIXTHESEVEN. EVER SINCE THEN THE TASK HAS BEEN TO TRY TO TURN IT INTO A PRACTICAL TIMETABLE OF ACTIONS...
TO BE PERFORMED BY ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED, AT THE END OF WHICH THE WHOLE RESOLUTION, AND NOT JUST THOSE BITS WHICH PLEASE ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER, WOULD BE CARRIED OUT.

WE HAD HOPED THAT DR. JARRING'S MEDIATION WOULD BRING THAT ABOUT, BUT SO FAR HE HAS NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL. IN CONSEQUENCE, HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO TAKE PART IN THE FOUR-POWER DISCUSSIONS, THE OBJECT OF WHICH IS TO TRY TO CREATE BY COMMON COUNCIL SUCH A BODY OF GUIDANCE AND PROPOSALS FOR DR. JARRING AS WOULD ENABLE HIM TO TURN HIS MISSION INTO A REALITY.

FOR A TIME THE FOUR-POWER TALKS HAVE BEEN IN RECESS WHILE TWO POWERS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, HAVE TALKED TOGETHER. I BELIEVE I AM RIGHT IN SAYING THAT THEY HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS BUT NOT YET THAT DEGREE OF PROGRESS WHICH WILL PRODUCE A SETTLEMENT. I THINK THAT IT IS RIGHT THEREFORE TO TRY TO DRAFT EFFECTIVE GUIDANCE TO DR. JARRING.

AS TO WHAT THAT GUIDANCE SHOULD BE IT SEEMS TO ME THAT AN ESSENTIAL ITEM IN THE CONTENT OF A SETTLEMENT, AN ESSENTIAL ITEM IN ANY PROPOSALS THAT DR. JARRING OR ANYONE ELSE CAN PUT TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED, IS THAT THERE MUST BE, AS THE RESOLUTION ITSELF SAYS, A JUST AND LASTING PEACE WITH ALL THAT IMPLIES - AND IT IMPLIES THAT GUIDANCE SHOULD BE A CLEAR RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST.

DOTS DOTS DOTS AFTER THE INFORMAL, OR SEMI-INFORMAL, MEETING IN NEW YORK TO WHICH I REFERRED, A SHORT STATEMENT WAS ISSUED, ONE OF THE POINTS - AND TO THIS ALL FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS COMMITTED THEMSELVES - WAS A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST AS A STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST ALONG WITH HER NEIGHBORS. IT IS THE MEASURE OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN TRAGEDY THAT ONE SHOULD REGARD A STATEMENT LIKE THAT AS BEING OF SIGNIFICANCE. ONE MIGHT HAVE THOUGHT THAT IT COULD BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED, BUT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES AS THEY ARE, TO HAVE HAD THAT CLEARLY ACCEPTED BY ALL FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS WAS, I BELIEVE, A SIGNIFICANT STEP, AND CERTAINLY NEITHER HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT NOR ANY OF THE OTHERS OF THE FOUR POWERS WOULD DEPART FROM THE PROPOSITION THAT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN A SETTLEMENT IS THE UNDOUBTED RECOGNITION NOT ONLY OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST BUT OF HER RIGHT TO BE AT PEACE WITH ALL THAT FOLLOWS FROM BEING AT PEACE, THE USE OF THE INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS, AND ANYTHING ELSE.

DOTS DOTS DOTS

MR. M. STEWART: I HAVE SAID BEFORE THAT THE FACT THAT THE ARAB COUNTRIES ARE NOT PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN DIRECT TALKS WITH ISRAEL IS SOMETHING THAT IS EXTREMELY HARD FOR PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY TO UNDERSTAND. DOTS DOTS DOTS

MR. M. STEWART: BECAUSE THIS METHOD OF DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS IS NOT AVAILABLE NOW, I DO NOT THINK THAT EITHER WE OR ISRAEL MIGHT TO SAY THEREFORE THAT WE WILL NOT ATTEMPT ANY OTHER METHOD. I THINK THAT WE HAVE TO TRY TO REMEMBER THAT THIS PROBLEM CANNOT BE DEALT WITH IN THE DIMENSION OF REASON ALONE. BEHIND THIS LIE DEEP SUSPICIONS AND HATRED ON BOTH SIDES WHICH IN TIME WE HAVE TO RESOLVE. DOTS DOTS DOTS

I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE A GREAT ADVANCE IF THE ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD SAY, "WE WILL NEGOTIATE DIRECT WITH ISRAEL", BUT I SAY ALSO THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE MISTAKEN IF SHE SAID THAT BECAUSE THEY WILL NOT DO THAT SHE WILL NOT MAKE ANY MOVE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT, THAT IS NOT THE SPIRIT IN WHICH THE ANSWER CAN
I have stressed strongly that one part of any useful guidance to
Dr. Jarring must be the doctrine of a just and lasting peace.
Another part must be secure and recognised borders between Israel
and her neighbours. Third - and this will be more welcomed on one side
than on the other - there must be no doubt at all about the
withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories of her neighbours.

It is on this point that the Arab countries have professed profound
misgivings as to Israeli intentions. It is to this point that
Israeli policy must be directed. Is it possible to marry together
somehow the insistent and legitimate demand by Israel for a just
and lasting peace and security, and the insistent and legitimate
demand by the Arab countries for withdrawal? It ought not to be
impossible. The other element that there must be in such guidance
is a real move forward to relieve the distress of the refugees.

I do not think that it would be possible to devise a package
that would meet all those requirements without some willingness on
the part of all the parties concerned to be content with less than
one hundred per cent of what they want, and I believe that fully all
know that. The question they have to ask themselves is whether,
although a settlement might not give them one hundred per cent of
what they would really like, is not there within reach a settlement
that is infinitely better for them all than the continuation of
what is going on now?

It seems to me that this is particularly Britain's concern. We,
whose interest, not through any special virtue of our own but as
a plain matter of fact, as the common interest of mankind and an agreed workable and lasting settlement
have to try in the Four Power talks to get enough agreement here
to provide Dr. Jarring with solid and useful propositions that he
can put to both parties. We must hope that the parties
concerned will realise how much they have to gain from immediate
settlement, and the ultimate disaster that hangs over them all if
they lose the opportunity.

Arms Policy

Having spoken of the Middle East, I ought to refer to the matter
of British arms policy in this area. Here I must remind the house
of the principles that I set out governing the policy when I spoke
in the debate on seventeenth June. First, it is not the practice of
this Majesty's Government to reveal the details of particular arms
transactions. We have stuck firmly to that, and I think that we
are right to do so. Second, immediately after the war of nineteen
sixty-seven in the Middle East we adopted the policy of not selling
arms anywhere in the Middle East. We would have persisted in that
policy if all the other powers had done the same. Failing that, we
have now had to say that we must judge any particular request on its
merits, and by 'on its merits' I mean two things. First, we do not
want a situation to arise in the Middle East in which any one nation
is so confident of its military superiority that it may be tempted to
pick and violent military action. Second, in deciding to say
'some' or 'no' to any particular request we have to consider -
probably the main thing - is what will be
the effect of our answer, whether 'yes' or 'no' on the prospects
of a peaceful settlement?

It would not be right to disclose our decision in each particular
case. I must ask the house to believe that when we come to take these
decisions we take very much into account what will be the effect on the
prospect of a settlement or whether we say yes or no to any
PARTICULAR REQUEST.

HAVING MENTIONED THE SUBJECT OF ARMS, IT IS NATURAL FOR ME NOW TO REFER TO RELATIONS BETWEEN HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN LIBYA.

MR. CHRISTOPHER MAYHEW (WOOLWICH, EAST): COULD NOT MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND TRY TO PERSUADE THE FOUR POWERS TO GO A LITTLE FURTHER THAN SIMPLY TO LAY DOWN A TIMETABLE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE RESOLUTION, AS HE SUGGESTED? COULD THEY NOT ALSO AGREE TO CUT OFF ARMS SUPPLIES TO ANY COUNTRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHETHER ISRAEL OR AN ARAB COUNTRY WHICH DOES NOT CONFORM WITH THE FOUR POWER PROPOSALS FOR PEACE?

MR. STEWART: THE HONOURABLE MEMBER WILL REALISE THAT WE SHALL HAVE TO GET AGREED FOUR POWER PROPOSALS FIRST BEFORE WE CAN TALK IN THESE TERMS. I DO NOT RULE OUT WHAT HE HAS SAID AND I WOULD HOPE THAT IF THE FOUR POWERS CAN AGREE ON THIS MAIN BASIS OF A SETTLEMENT WE CAN ALSO AGREE ON A POLICY OF MUTUAL RESTRRAINT IN ARMS SUPPLIES.

MR. JEREMY THORPE (DEVON, NORTH): ARE WE TO DEDUCE FROM THAT THAT NO INITIATIVE HAS BEEN TAKEN TO GET FOUR POWER AGREEMENT? IF I AM WRONG AND AN INITIATIVE HAS BEEN TAKEN, CAN WE KNOW WHO IS NOT PREPARED TO AGREE?

MR. STEWART: THE POSITION IS THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WAR WE TOOK THE UNILATERAL DECISION THAT WE WOULD NOT SUPPLY THEM, WE WOULD HAVE MAINTAINED THAT POSITION IF OUR EXAMPLE HAD BEEN FOLLOWED. SINCE THEN I HAVE HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH, FOR EXAMPLE, MY COLLEAGUE MR. GROMYKO FROM WHICH IT APPEARS THAT IF WE COULD GET A SETTLEMENT ON THE MAIN ISSUES IN DISPUTE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IT MIGHT ALSO BE POSSIBLE TO GET AGREEMENT ON ARMS. FRANKLY, I THINK THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO GET A COMMON ARMS POLICY AMONG THE FOUR UNLESS WE COULD ALSO GET A COMMON POLICY ABOUT THE MAIN ISSUE. IF WE COULD GET A COMMON POLICY ON THE MAIN ISSUE, I WOULD NOT BE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCE OF AGREEMENT ON ARMS SUPPLIES IN GENERAL.

LIBYA, ABOUT TO REFER TO RELATIONS BETWEEN HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN LIBYA, HONOURABLE MEMBERS WILL HAVE SEEN REPORTS THAT THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF OUR MILITARY INSTALLATIONS FROM LIBYA. YESTERDAY OUR AMBASSADOR WAS HANDING A NOTE ASKING FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO BRING ABOUT EARLY EVACUATION OF OUR FORCES FROM LIBYAN TERRITORY, AS THE HOUSE KNOWS, THESE FORCES ARE IN LIBYA UNDER THE NINETEENFIFTYTHREE TREATY OF ALLIANCE. THEY CONSIST OF A ROYAL AIR FORCE STATION AT EL ADEM AND A SMALL GARRISON AT TURIN.

I MUST TELL THE HOUSE THAT BEFORE WE RECEIVED THE LIBYAN NOTE I HAD, OF COURSE, ALREADY BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO THIS MATTER. I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS REQUEST FROM THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT COMES SERIOUSLY AS A SURPRISE TO ANYONE. I ACCEPT THAT THE WAY IN WHICH IT HAS MADE THE REQUEST, BY A TENDEREDLY WORDED NOTE ASKING US TO NEGOTIATE WITH IT ABOUT THE MATTER, IS A REASONABLE APPROACH. AS I HAVE SAID, I HAD THIS IN MIND BEFORE WE RECEIVED THE REQUEST. I CALLED OUR AMBASSADOR, MR. DONALD MACLEAN, FROM LIBYA AND HAD CONSULTATIONS WITH HIM ON THIS SUBJECT LAST WEEK.

OUR FRIENDSHIP WITH LIBYA HAS BEEN OF LONG STANDING, BUT IT IS CLEAR NOW THAT WE HAVE TO THINK OUT A DIFFERENT BASIS FROM THAT WHICH EXISTED FROM THE NINETEENFIFTYTHREE TREATY. THAT WE SHALL NOW BE ENGAGED IN DOING AND WE SHALL BE STUDYING THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT'S COMMUNICATIONS IN THE GENERAL FRAME OF MIND THAT WE BELIEVE THAT THERE CAN BE FOUND A BASIS FOR A FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THIS COUNTRY AND LIBYA, BUT IT WILL HAVE TO BE ON A BASIS DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH EXISTED BETWEEN THIS COUNTRY AND THE FORMER LIBYAN GOVERNMENT.
To Mr. Bishop (Remark): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he is aware of the growing concern regarding the deteriorating situation in the Middle East and especially in Libya, and whether Her Majesty's Government will reconsider its policy of supplying arms and equipment to those countries whose threats constitute a danger to the peace and stability of the Middle East.

12 October, 1992.
DEBATE ON THE CONSOLIDATED FUND:
27 JANUARY, 1970

Situation in the Middle East

The situation in the region is a matter for great concern. Recent events have shown that, in the absence of a political settlement, the situation is bound to become more serious.

2. There is therefore an urgent need for a political settlement. The Security Council Resolution of November 1967 provides the only basis for such a settlement.

3. We are playing a full part in the international effort to help bring about a settlement. The four power talks resumed on 2 December with a new sense of urgency and meetings have taken place regularly since then. The four have agreed that their aim is to prepare fresh guidance for Dr. Jarring, which would enable him, in collaboration with the parties, to make progress in his mission.

4. Both the Arabs and Israel are criticised for their attitudes towards the dispute, both by each other and by other countries. It is our earnest wish to help bring about progress towards a settlement. We believe a settlement would be in the interests of both Israel and the Arab states and in the interests of the whole international Community. We therefore hope that the parties will co-operate with the international effort to help bring about a settlement. We also hope that they will not take any action which would close the door to a settlement in the future.

/5.
5. The House will not expect me to go into detail about the action which we have taken or which we may take in the four power talks. Everything we do is governed by our desire to bring about rapid progress towards a settlement.
SECRET
CABINET
3 September 1970
Middle East
Conflict between Israel and the Arab States

Speaking Notes

On 23 July, President Assad announced the UAR's acceptance of the American proposals of 19 June (copy attached). The Jordanians shortly followed suit. The Israeli Government had difficulty in reaching agreement and their acceptance of the proposals on 5 August caused the resignation of six Cohal (right-wing) Cabinet Ministers. The parties would not have accepted the American proposals unless both super-powers had been ready to apply a good deal of pressure.

2. The three month ceasefire came into force on 7 August under arrangements made by the Americans. We gave our permission for two U2s to be based at Akrotiri in Cyprus for the duration of the ceasefire. The Americans are using these to help the Israelis survey Egyptian activities on the West Bank of the Canal. The Israelis, the Egyptians, the Cypriots and the Russians all know about these arrangements. So far, none of these has complained to us about them.