AFTER SEVERAL WEEKS OF RUMOURS IN CAIRO ABOUT THE IMMINENT TRANSFER OF THE HEAD OF THE US INTERESTS SECTION HERE, TODAY'S NHRAH AND GUNHURJA (THE FIRST QUOTING ITS OWN WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT) REPORT THAT ACCORDING TO STATE DEPARTMENT SOURCES BERGUS IS TO BE REPLACED BY NICHOLAS STERNER, EGYPTIAN DESK OFFICER IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

THE PRESS QUOTING AGENCY REPORTS ALSO STATES THAT DURING THE MEETING ON 29 SEPTEMBER BETWEEN MR. ROGERS AND MR. MAHMUD RIAD THE FORMER ASKED FOR A RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH EGYPT. MR. RIAD IS SAID TO HAVE HAD NO REPLY.
HEAD OF US INTERESTS SECTION

1. The AA was told by his Turkish colleague at the end of last week that not only was Mr Bergus due to leave within the next few days, but that the reason was that he had paid an unauthorised call on President Sadat and that the Egyptians had subsequently asked for his removal. This is pretty malicious stuff.

2. Muhammad Riad, when I saw him on Saturday, mentioned with a laugh his earlier references to YE and to me about "orchestration" of Egyptian foreign policy and said that what had happened in the last few weeks and the forthcoming government re-shuffle would, he hoped, show those who doubted the reality of this that they had been wrong. He recalled the rumours that had been pedalled so actively within the diplomatic corps concerning Mr Mahmoud Riad's impending resignation and said that he would be carrying on. He also, in the same breath, said something nice about Mr Bergus and this gave me the opportunity to mention that the rumours circulating seemed to concern his position rather than Mr Riad's. Muhammad Riad indicated that he had heard similar rumours and begged me to believe that, whatever the truth of them, the Egyptians had done nothing to speed Mr Bergus' departure. Indeed, they regarded him as a man whom they trusted and with whom they could do business and they fully realised that any change might be for the worse. Only a day or two back, Mr Bergus had called on him on a matter connected with China and Muhammad Riad had then reiterated to him his confidence in which the Egyptian Government had in him and the personal esteem felt for him.

3. While I of course realise that I was treading on very delicate ground, I thought in view of the report from the AA that it was worth getting this firm re-affirmation from the Egyptians that they wanted Bergus to stay on. If he is being removed, I suspect it is due to Mr Sisco rather than anyone else.

A B Urwick
20 September 1971

CONFIDENTIAL
Nothing to be written in this margin
Mr. Pergus told me today that he had informed Mr. Mohammed Riad that as a result of the U.A.R. agreeing to accept further additions to the U.S. Mission in Cairo he was intending to open the Kennedy Library. Mr. Mohammed Riad indicated that he thought, subject to higher approval, that this would be a very welcome move.

23 August 1971
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>097</td>
<td>25.7.</td>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>FCO TEL 924: US/UAR RELATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. PLEASE ADD &quot;INSTRUCTIONS&quot; 2 PARAG 8 SENTENCE 2 TO READ &quot;INSTRUCTIONS.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. ERROR REGRETTED.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FCO PASSES SAVING INFO ROME AND BRUSSELS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>URMICK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed "Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records" leaflet.
1. WHEN I SAW RUAHLAD RIAD (CHEF DE CABINET OF THE UAR FOREIGN MINISTER) ON 26 JULY HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD NOT SEEN BERGUS (HEAD OF US INTERESTS SECTION) SINCE HE AND HIS MINISTER HAD GOT BACK FROM EASTERN EUROPE. HE ASKED ME TO TELL BERGUS THAT HE (RIAD) WAS ANXIOUS TO PUT BEHIND ANY UNPLEASANTNESS THAT HAD BEEN CAUSED BY THE INCIDENT OF THE BERGUS PAPER AND TO GET BACK ONTO THE BASIS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY EXISTED BETWEEN THEM.
2. RIAD SOUGHT TO JUSTIFY THE WAY THE EGYPTIANS HAD HANDLED THE BERGUS PAPER BY SAYING THAT, UNTIL MR. ROGERS HAD BROACHED THE SUBJECT WITH THE FRENCH IN PARIS AND IT HAD GOTTEN BACK THROUGH FRENCH CHANNELS TO THE US MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THEY HAD NOT MADE ANY OFFICIAL REFERENCE TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE DOCUMENT. RIAD MENTIONED THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD HAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON THAT IN FACT THE BERGUS PAPER WAS THE WORK NEITHER OF BERGUS HIMSELF NOR OF THE US STATE DEPARTMENT BUT OF SOME OTHER (UNSPECIFIED) PART OF THE US GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT AT ONE POINT THE EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN AFRAID THAT BERGUS WOULD LOSE HIS JOB AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT AND THAT THEY REALIZED THAT THIS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT BE TO EGYPT'S ADVANTAGE. RIAD ALSO REFERRED TO THE DANGER OF CONDUCTING COMPLICATED DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS OTHER THAN THROUGH THE ESTABLISHED CHANNELS AND REITERATED THAT ALL MAJOR DECISIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY IN EGYPT WERE TAKEN BY PRESIDENT SAADAT AND THAT ANY APPEARING DIFFERENCES IN POLICY WERE A MATTER OF ORCHESTRATION BY THE PRESIDENT (AN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO BERGUS' USE OF THE HAikal CHANNEL). I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THAT BERGUS MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN AT LIBERTY TO CHOOSE WHICH CHANNEL HE USED, BUT THAT I WOULD CERTAINLY PASS ON THIS OLIVE BRANCH TO BERGUS WHICH I FELT SURE HE WOULD WELCOME. I ALSO MADE THE PERSONAL SUGGESTION THAT, IF THE INTENTION WAS INDEED TO LET BYGONES BE BYGONES, IT WOULD BE BEST TO AVOID RAGING OVER THE PAST ONCE AGAIN AS THERE WAS ALWAYS A DANGER THAT THIS MIGHT LEAD TO FURTHER MUTUAL RECRIMINATION.
3. I saw Bergus this morning and he told me that he had been awaiting an opportunity to go to the Foreign Ministry and had indeed just been provided with a good excuse to do so, as he had been instructed to discuss a matter concerning the Law of the Sea. He would therefore see Muhammad Riad as soon as possible. He commented that in fact Mr. Rogers had not even been aware of the existence of the Bergus paper at the time he saw the French. Bergus also said that he had really had no choice in the matter of using Haikal as a channel to the President. For example Haikal had summoned Bergus to his office on 15 May and it was only when he got there that Haikal revealed to him that they were going off to see the President forthwith. President Sadat had in any case made it quite clear that he preferred this matter to be handled through Haikal and indeed Haikal had asked Bergus to see him again later today. It was really a question of the UAR government sorting out among themselves how they wished to handle their external relations. Bergus also told me that he had been encouraged by President Sadat's speeches over the weekend and felt that the negotiations for an interim arrangement were still very much on.

4. I think the fact that Muhammad Riad (who was undoubtedly speaking with the concurrence of his Minister) should have gone out of his way to reopen the UAR Ministry of Foreign Affairs' line to the Americans in this way is also itself encouraging.

5. Riad incidentally told me that Gorbal (Head of the UAR Interests Section in Washington) had been instructed to remain in Washington until Sisco returned from Israel and that he would then be returning to Cairo to report.

FCO pass info saving to Rome and Brussels.

Urick
I asked Mr. Mohammed Riad what the Egyptian view of the “interim solution” of the Arab-Israeli conflict was in the light of the recent Soviet-Egyptian conflict. He repeated as he had said in the earlier part of the conversation that it had not in any way changed as a result of the treaty and the U.S. side felt itself at complete liberty to work with the United States Government and other Governments towards a solution based on Resolution 242 and through Jarring and the Four Powers. This applied too in theory to the interim solution which so far as he was concerned rested entirely on the document which they had given to the U.S. Representative and myself on 20 May containing Mr. Meir’s “working notes.” He went on to say that on 22 May he had received a visit from Mr. Fergus, who was “very distressed” and said he wished to communicate to the Minister for any hard language he might have used on 20 May. Mr. Mohammed Riad had then arranged for Mr. Fergus to see Mr. Meir on the same day and they had had a forty-minute conversation in which they discussed the internal views which had been expressed by Mr. Meir and Mr. Riad had assured him that he had spoken and continued to speak with the full authority of the President and the U.A.R. Government.

Mr. Mohammed Riad then continued that on 23 May (Monday) he received a further visit from Mr. Fergus who on this occasion handed over to him a paper which he said represented the personal views of the U.A.R. Government. There had been no reply to Washington concerning the Israeli views brought back by Mr. Sisco from Tel Aviv on 19 May. Mr. Fergus had insisted that these were lengthy personal views and had not got the blessing of Washington – but, asked Mr. Mohammed Riad, “me and all professionals and know that that means.” He said that he had passed the paper on to the Minister and to President Sadat. They were of course study it, but he had made no commitment to reply to it.

I asked Mohammed Riad what the paper contained and he said that he could not tell me but it was conceived in vague terms and on the question of “linkage” with Resolution 242. Very vague indeed, while on the question of Egyptian troops crossing the Canal it had been stipulated that Israel and the U.A.R. should agree on the types and numbers of military personnel and matériel which the Egyptian might have on the other side. This might have on the U.A.R. Mr. Fergus did not mention this paper in his talks with me on 29 May. Nor did Mr. Mohammed Riad show any knowledge of Mr. Fergus’s continued discussions with Mr. Nasser though clearly I was in a position to probe this.
CONFIDENTIAL AND EMBASSY

EFFECT OF COMMUNICATION WITH U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ON 20 May 1971.

Mr. Borgus informed me that within a few hours of his conversation with Mr. Haikal (in the course of which he was told that the President and Yehuda had seen matters out and that he should henceforth work through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), he received a further message from Mr. Haikal to President Sadat's behalf. This was to the effect that President Sadat was thinking of sending a high level emissary to Washington, but before doing so would like to exchange a further message with President Nixon, sending it by the hand of Mr. Borgus who should return to Washington for this purpose. Mr. Borgus said that he was in any case intending to return for some leave to Washington on 8 June and he would seek the agreement of the State Department to his carrying a message and to his interrupting his leave if necessary to bring it up. On 20 May he telephoned Mr. Haikal to say that this was agreed and Mr. Haikal said that he would like to see him. At the ensuing meeting Mr. Haikal said that he would arrange for Mr. Borgus to be received by President Sadat on 7 or 9 June. In the meantime Mr. Haikal had continued, he had a message from President Nixon in connection with the recently signed Soviet-Egyptian agreement which the President would like transmitting to Washington. It was:

(1) President Sadat remained committed to all that he had said in the recent talks with Secretary Rogers.

(2) His proposals for an interim settlement remained valid.

(3) He would continue to welcome United States help in assisting the two parties in reaching an interim agreement.

(4) The Soviet-Egyptian treaty was not an alliance (pact) and placed no restrictions on the continuance of the U.S.-U.A.R. dialogue. It had been the least that the President could do to reassure the factions of Egyptian good faith after the arrest of many people with whom they had worked in the past years, even though this arrest was for internal reasons.

CONFIDENTIAL AND EMBASSY
I saw Mr. Bergus on the evening of 30 January. He said that he had delivered the message from Secretary of State Rogers to Mahmoud Riad on 27 January. This message was fairly energetic and pointed out that in the American view neither Israel nor the U.A.R. were strong enough militarily to impose its will on the other and that therefore a political solution and a continuation of the ceasefire seemed by far the wisest course. Mr. Rogers reiterated once again that the U.S. Government adhered to its paper of 20 October 1969 in respect of the U.A.R.'s frontiers and asked that this paper did not seem to be so far from the standpoint recently adopted by the U.A.R. Government.

2. The U.A.R. reply to this paper had made the two points that it was true that the Israelis were unable to impose their will on the U.A.R.; they had failed to do so in 1967 and would certainly fail again. Moreover, the U.A.R. was not seeking to impose its will on Israel but the will of the United Nations as embodied in Resolution 242 and other resolutions. The reply went over familiar ground as to why in the absence of any forward move in the Jarring talks the U.A.R. could not accept a prolongation of the ceasefire.

3. Mr. Bergus said that he thought that it was as a result of this message that Mahmoud Riad and President Sadat decided to send the former on his journey to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, possibly with a view to bringing the heads of these two States into play by persuading them to write letters to President Nixon in the same vein as that from King Hassan of Morocco.

4. Mr. Bergus said that he had had some difficulty in pointing out to the State Department that failure to prolong the ceasefire did not mean that the Egyptians wished the Jarring talks to be broken off and was perfectly compatible with a peaceful settlement, but that this was now beginning to sink in. He thought that in pursuit of the prolongation of the ceasefire President Nixon might
authorize the United States delegation to the
United Nations to participate in some declaration
and in the reactivation to some extent of the Four
Power talks, at the same time keeping the Israelis
happy by further largesse.

5. Yesterday evening, 31 January, Mr. Derges
told me that he had delivered yet another message
from Mr. Rogers to Mahmoud Riad. In Mahmoud Riad's
absence he had been authorised to give it to
Mohammed Riad. He did not tell me what this
message contained.

1 February 1971.
Senator Muskie

Mr. Pergus told me that Senator Muskie's visit had been a huge success. He had met well with President Sadat and with Begin. His meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs had not been so easy, as he (Muskie) had insisted before going to the meeting that it would be easy for him to convince the Egyptians to open Sharm al-Shaikh to the Israelis, or at least to let them occupy it, and he had received a very dusty answer. Likewise, his press conference had not been a great success. The trouble, Mr. Pergus said, was that he was pretty ignorant not only of Middle Eastern affairs but of the world outside the United States in general and therefore not terribly sure of his facts. The press had picked up some of his rather expansive sayings in Israel, such as that he could well understand the Israeli feeling that they did not want a non-Israeli presence on top of the Golan Heights, and had tried to pin him down to a specific definition whether this meant he was in favour of Israeli supremacy, or not. He fought off these and other questions somewhat clumsily and the Egyptian press representatives just sat back and enjoyed the sight of him being baited by the American and other foreign press men.

2. Mr. Pergus said he had briefed Senator Muskie but had not accompanied him on his official visits in view of the fact that he was a principal figure of the Opposition, though he had been with him on the visit to Begin.

22 January 1971