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KENCE SL

1. AFTER SEVERAL WEEKS OF RUMOURS IN CAIRO ABOUT THE IMPENDING TRANSFER OF THE HEAD OF THE US INTERESTS SECTION HERE, TODAY'S AHRAM AND GUMHURIA ( THE FIRST QUOTING ITS OWN WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT) REPORT THAT ACCORDING TO STATE DEPARTMENT SOURCES BERGUS IS TO BE REPLACED BY MICHAEL STERNER, EGYPTIAN DESK OFFICER IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

2. THE PRESS QUOTING AGENCY REPORTS ALSO STATES THAT DURING THE MEETING ON 29 SEPTEMBER BETWEEN MR ROGERS AND MR MAHMUD RIAD THE FORMER ASKED FOR A RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH EGYPT. MR RIAD IS SAID TO HAVE MADE NO REPLY.

BEAUMONT

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*Minutes* 3/3 (14)

H/E

HEAD OF US INTERESTS SECTION

1. The AA was told by his Turkish colleague at the end of last week that not only was Mr Bergus due to leave within the next few days, but that the reason was that he had paid an unauthorised call on President Sadat and that the Egyptians had subsequently asked for his removal. This is pretty malicious stuff.

2. Muhammad Riad, when I saw him on Saturday, mentioned with a laugh his earlier references to YE and to me about "orchestration" of Egyptian foreign policy and said that what had happened in the last few weeks and the forthcoming government re-shuffle would, he hoped, show those who doubted the reality of this that they had been wrong. He recalled the rumours that had been pedalled so actively within the diplomatic corps concerning Mr Mahmoud Riad's impending resignation and said that he would be carrying on. He also, in the same breath, said something nice about Mr Bergus and this gave me the opportunity to mention that the rumours now circulating seemed to concern his position rather than Mr Riad's. Muhammad Riad indicated that he had heard similar rumours and begged me to believe that, whatever the truth of them, the Egyptians had done nothing to speed Mr Bergus' departure. Indeed, they regarded him as a man whom they trusted and with whom they could do business and they fully realised that any change might be for the worse. Only a day or two back, Mr Bergus had called on him on a matter connected with China and Muhammad Riad had then reiterated to him the confidence which the Egyptian Government had in him and the personal esteem felt for him.

3. While I of course realise that I was treading on very delicate ground, I thought in view of the report from the AA that it was worth getting this firm re-affirmation from the Egyptians that they wanted Bergus to stay on. If he is being removed, I suspect it is due to Mr Sisco rather than anyone else.

A B Urwick

A B Urwick

20 September 1971

Copy to:
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/ The Turkish

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*Minutes*

The Turkish Ambassador has no truck with this story under the version: Mahmud Riad has won his victory over Bergus. I said I did not think that Mahmud Riad wanted to get rid of Bergus & if someone had let anyone down it was really the State Dept with its slowness which had let down Bergus, Haikal & Sadat & "shown Mahmud Riad to be right" – or apparently so. Interestingly enough the Turkish Ambassador gave me my own version back as his version on 19th Sept. after speaking by telephone to Mahmud Riad.

R. 21/IX

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3/3 (13)

Counsellor 24/8
Head of Chancery NLG 24/8
C.A. / MED 25/8

Mr. Bergus told me today that he had informed Mr. Mohammed Riad that as a result of the U.A.R. agreeing to accept further additions to the U.S. Mission in Cairo he was intending to open the Kennedy Library. Mr. Mohammed Riad indicated that he thought, subject to higher approval, that this would be a very welcome move.

/ VIII

23 August 1971

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LOY NR 285/26

3/3 (12)

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 927 OF 28 JULY, INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW PARIS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN BEIRUT TEL AVIV AND INFO SAVING ROME AND BRUSSELS.

(11) MY TEL NO 924: US/UAR RELATIONS.

1. PLEASE AMEND '' INSTRUCTIONS'' IN PARA 2 SENTENCE 2 TO READ '' INDICATIONS''.

2. ERROR REGRETTED.

FCO PASS SAVING INFO ROME AND BRUSSELS.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 924 OF 27 JULY, INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW PARIS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN BEIRUT TEL AVIV AND SAVING INFO ROME BRUSSELS.

US/UAR RELATIONS.

1. WHEN I SAW MUHAMMAD RIAD ( CHEF DE CABINET OF THE UAR FOREIGN MINISTER) ON 26 JULY HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD NOT SEEN BERGUS ( HEAD OF US INTERESTS SECTION) SINCE HE AND HIS MINISTER HAD GOT BACK FROM EASTERN EUROPE. HE ASKED ME TO TELL BERGUS THAT HE ( RIAD) WAS ANXIOUS TO PUT BEHIND THEM ANY UNPLEASANTNESS THAT HAD BEEN CAUSED BY THE INCIDENT OF THE BERGUS PAPER AND TO GET BACK ONTO THE BASIS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY EXISTED BETWEEN THEM.

3/3 (11)

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2. RIAD SOUGHT TO JUSTIFY THE WAY THE EGYPTIANS HAD HANDLED THE BERGUS PAPER BY SAYING THAT , UNTIL MR. ROGERS HAD BROACHED THE SUBJECT WITH THE FRENCH IN PARIS AND IT HAD GOT BACK THROUGH FRENCH CHANNELS TO THE UAR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS , THEY HAD NOT MADE ANY OFFICIAL REFERENCE TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE DOCUMENT. RIAD MENTIONED TO ME IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD HAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON THAT IN FACT THE BERGUS PAPER WAS THE WORK NEITHER OF BERGUS HIMSELF NOR OF THE US STATE DEPARTMENT BUT OF SOME OTHER ( UNSPECIFIED ) PART OF THE US GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT AT ONE POINT THE EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN AFRAID THAT BERGUS WOULD LOSE HIS JOB AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT AND THAT THEY HAD REALISED THAT THIS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT BE TO EGYPT'S ADVANTAGE. RIAD ALSO REFERRED TO THE DANGER OF CONDUCTING COMPLICATED DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS OTHER THAN THROUGH THE ESTABLISHED CHANNELS AND REITERATED THAT ALL MAJOR DECISIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY IN EGYPT WERE TAKEN BY PRESIDENT SADAT AND THAT ANY APPARENT DIFFERENCES IN POLICY WERE A MATTER OF ORCHESTRATION BY THE PRESIDENT ( AN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO BERGUS' USE OF THE HAIKAL CHANNEL). I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THAT BERGUS MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN AT LIBERTY TO CHOOSE WHICH CHANNEL HE USED, BUT THAT I WOULD CERTAINLY PASS ON THIS OLIVE BRANCH TO BERGUS WHICH I FELT SURE HE WOULD WELCOME. I ALSO MADE THE PERSONAL SUGGESTION THAT, IF THE INTENTION WAS INDEED TO LET BYGONES BE BYGONES, IT WOULD BE BEST TO AVOID RAKING OVER THE PAST ONCE AGAIN AS THERE WAS ALWAYS A DANGER THAT THIS MIGHT LEAD TO FURTHER MUTUAL RECRIMINATION.

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3. I SAW BERGUS THIS MORNING AND HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD BEEN AWAITING AN OPPORTUNITY TO GO TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND HAD INFACT JUST BEEN PROVIDED WITH A GOOD EXCUSE TO DO SO, AS HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TODISCUSS A MATTER CONCERNING THE LAW OF THE SEA. HE WOULD THEREFORE SEE MUHAMMAD RIAD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE COMMENTED THAT IN FACT MR. ROGERS HAD NOT EVEN BEEN AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE BERGUS PAPER AT THE TIME HE SAW THE FRENCH. BERGUS ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD REALLY HAD NO CHOICE IN THE MATTER OF USING HAIKAL AS A CHANNEL TO THE PRESIDENT. FOR EXAMPLE HAIKAL HAD SUMMONED BERGUS TO HIS OFFICE ON 15 MAY AND IT WAS ONLY WHEN HE GOT THERE THAT HAIKAL REVEALED TO HIM THAT THEY WERE GOING OFF TO SEE THE PRESIDENT FORTHWITH. PRESIDENT SADAT HAED IN ANY CASE MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT HE PREFERRED THIS MATTER TO BE HANDLED THROUGH HAIKAL AND INDEED HAIKAL HAD ASKED BERGUS TO SEE HIM AGAIN LATER TODAY. IT WAS REALLY A QUESTION OF THE UAR GOVERNMENT SORTING OUT AMONG THEMSELVES HOW THEY WISHED TO HANDLE THEIR EXTERNAL RELATIONS. BERGUS ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY PRESIDENT SADAT'S SPEECHES OVER THE WEEKEND AND FELT THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT WERE STILL VERY MUCH ON.

4. I THINK THE FACT THAT MUHAMMAD RIAD ( WHO WAS UNDOUBTEDLY SPEAKING WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF HIS MINISTER) SHOULD HAVE GONE OUT OF HIS WAY TO REOPEN THE UAR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS' LINE TO THE AMERICANS IN THIS WAY IS ALSO ITSELF ENCOURAGING.

5. RIAD INCIDENTALLY TOLD ME THAT GORBAL ( HEAD OF THE UAR INTERESTS SECTION IN WASHINGTON) HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REMAIN IN WASHINGTON UNTIL SISCO RETURNED FROM ISRAEL AND THAT HE WOULD THEN BE RETURNING TO CAIRO TO REPORT.

FCO PASS INFO SAVING TO ROME AND BRUSSELS.

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9

RECORD OF CONVERSATION WITH CHEF DE CABINET OF THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 30 May 1971.

I asked Mr Mohammed Riad what the Egyptian view of the "interim solution" of the Arab-Israel conflict was in the light of the recent Soviet-Egyptian treaty. He repeated, as he had said in the earlier part of the conversation that it had not in any way changed as a result of the Treaty and the U.A.R. side felt itself at complete liberty to work with the United States Government and other governments towards a solution based on Resolution 242 and through Jarring and the Four Powers. This applied too in theory to the interim solution which so far as the U.A.R. side was concerned rested with the document which they had given to the U.S Representative and myself on 20 May containing Mr Mahmud Riad's "speaking notes." He went on to say however that on 22 May he had received a visit from Mr Bergus, who was "very distressed" and said he wished to apologise to the Minister for any hard language he might have used on 20 May. Mr Mohammed Riad had then arranged for Mr. Bergus to see Mr. Mahmud Riad on the same day and they had had a forty-minute conversation in which apologies were offered by Bergus and Mahmud Riad had assured him that he had spoken and continued to speak with the full authority of the President and the U.A.R. Government.

2. Mr. Mohammed Riad then continued that on 23 May (Sunday) he received a further visit from Mr Bergus, who on this occasion handed over to him a paper which he said represented his own personal views on how the U.A.R. Government might have replied to Washington concerning the Israelis views brought back by Mr Sisco from Tel Aviv on May. Mr Bergus had insisted that these were purely personal views and had not got the blessing of Washington - but, added Mr Mohammed Riad, "we are all professionals and know what that means !" He said that he had passed the paper on to the Minister and to President Sadat They would of course study it, but he had made no commitment to reply to it.

3. I asked Mohammed Riad what the paper contained and he said that he could not tell me but it was conceived in vague terms and on the question of "linkage" with Resolution 242 was very vague indeed, while on the question of Egyptian troops crossing the Canal it had merely stipulated that Israel and the U.A.R. should agree on the types and numbers of military personnel and materiel which the Egyptians might have on the East Bank. (N.B. Mr Bergus did not mention this paper in his talk with me on 29 May. Nor did Mr Mohammed Riad show any knowledge of Mr. Bergus's continued discussions with Mr. Haikal, though clearly I was not in a position to probe this.)

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8

RECORD OF CONVERSATION WITH U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ON 29 May 1971.

Mr Bergus informed me that within a few hours of his conversation with Mr. Haikal (in the course of which he was told that the President and Mahmud Riad had sorted matters out and that he should henceforth work through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), he received a further message from Mr. Haikal on President Sadat's behalf. This was to the effect that President Sadat was thinking of sending a high level emissary to Washington, but before doing so would like to exchange a further message with President Nixon, sending it by the hand of Mr. Bergus who should return to Washington for this purpose. Mr. Bergus said that he was in any case intending to return for some leave to Washington on 8 June and he would seek the agreement of the State Department to his carrying a message and to his interrupting his leave if necessary to bring a reply. On 29 May he telephoned Mr. Haikal to say that this was agreed and Mr. Haikal said that he would like to see him. At the ensuing meeting Mr Haikal said that he would arrange for Mr. Bergus to be received by President Sadat on 2 or 3 June. In the meantime Mr Haikal had continued, he had a message from President Sadat in connection with the recently signed Soviet-Egyptian agreement which the President would like transmitting to Washington. It was:

(i) President Sadat remained committed to all that he had said in the recent talks with Secretary Rogers.

(ii) His proposals for an interim settlement remained valid.

(iii) He would continue to welcome United States help in assisting the two parties in reaching an interim agreement.

(iv) The Soviet-Egyptian treaty was not an alliance (pact) and placed no restrictions on the continuance of the U.S.-U.A.R. dialogue. It had been the least that the President could do to reassure the Russians of Egyptian good faith after the arrest of many people with whom they had worked in the past years, even though this arrest was for internal reasons.

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I saw Mr. Bergus on the evening of 30 January. He said that he had delivered the message from Secretary of State Rogers to Mahmud Riad on 27 January. This message was fairly energetic and pointed out that in the American view neither Israel nor the U.A.R. were strong enough militarily to impose its will on the other and that therefore a political solution and a continuation of the cease-fire seemed by far the wisest course. Mr. Rogers reiterated once again that the U.S. Government adhered to its paper of 29 October 1969 in respect of the U.A.R.'s frontiers and added that this paper did not seem to be so far from the standpoint recently adopted by the U.A.R. Government.

2 The U.A.R. reply to this paper had made the two points that it was true that the Israelis were unable to impose their will on the U.A.R.: they had failed to do so in 1967 and would certainly fail again. Moreover, the U.A.R. was not seeking to impose its will on Israel but the will of the United Nations as embodied in Resolution 242 and other Resolutions. The reply went over familiar ground as to why in the absence of any forward move in the Jarring talks the U.A.R. could not accept a prolongation of the ceasefire.

3. Mr. Bergus said that he thought that it ~~was~~ may well have been ~~possibly~~ as a result of this message that Mahmud Riad and President Sadat decided to send the former on his journey to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, possibly with a view to bringing the heads of these two States into play by persuading them to write letters to President Nixon in the same vein as that from King Hassan of Morocco.

4. Mr. Bergus said that he had had some difficulty in pointing out to the State Department that failure to prolong the ceasefire did not mean that the Egyptians wished the Jarring talks to be broken off and was perfectly compatible with a peaceful settlement, but that this was now beginning to sink in. He thought that in pursuit of the prolongation of the ceasefire President Nixon might

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authorise the United States delegation to the United Nations to participate in some declaration and in the reactivation to some extent of the Four Power talks, at the same time keeping the Israelis happy by further largesse.

5. Yesterday evening, 31 January, Mr. Bergus told me that he had delivered yet another message from Mr Rogers to Mahmud Riad. In Mahmud Riad's absence he had been authorised to give it to Mohammed Riad. He did not tell me what this message contained.

1 February 1971.

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3

Senator Muskie

Mr Bergus told me that Senator Muskie's visit had been a fair success. He had got on well with President Sadat and with Haikal. His meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs had not been so easy, as he (Muskie) had insisted before going to the meeting that it would be easy for him to convince the Egyptians to cede Sharm al Shaikh to the Israelis, or at least to let them occupy it, and he had received a very dusty answer. Likewise, his press conference had not been a great success. The trouble, Mr. Bergus said was that he was pretty ignorant not only of Middle Eastern affairs but of the world outside the United States in general and therefore not terribly sure of his facts. The press had picked up some of his rather expansive sayings in Israel, such as that he could well understand the Israelis feeling that they did not want a non-Israeli presence on top of the Golan Heights, and had tried to pin him down to a specific definition whether this means he was in favour of Israel annexing Golan. He fought off these and other questions somewhat clumsily and the Egyptian press representatives just sat back and enjoyed the sight of him being baited by the American and other foreign press men.

2. Mr. Bergus said he had briefed Senator Muskie but had not accompanied him on his official visits in view of the fact that he was a principal figure of the Opposition, though he had been with him on the visit to Haikal.

22 January 1971

cc D.L.S.
Out Lee
P.S.
Mlk
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