Sir. N. L. L. Hansen’s dispatch to Tunis 1/6 of the enclosed report are very interesting. The general argument being that the maintenance of British prestige in the Near and Middle East depends upon a satisfactory solution being found in Palestine. Failing such a solution it is argued that advances from the Italians, whose store is high, in the Arab world after the conquest of Abyssinia, would be welcomed for adjustment purposes.

A copy has gone to Palestine.
A.R. Thomas 20/1.

I agree with Mr. Thomas’ summary. This is an extraordinarily interesting country. It should be noted that Mr. Attiyah’s investigations were carried out in the latter summer; and do not take account of the developments of the last two or three months.

Sir H. L. L. Hansen says that the Arab Federation is a dream. But the report shows, in the plan that...
there is the least need for it in a
guestion of weighty issues -
what the Federation might do if
it were possible to create it, or
against what will certainly happen
if we don't try and create it.
The first alternative would then
be a question of faith in the
immediate post-war years, but it
is the aim of Attlee's report to show that it is now becoming
imperative, and that at the
current moment the interests of
imperialism are moving in the
same direction as the objectives of
old war-time policy.

C.S. Bevan
20/4/37

We will need restating.
5/1/January
21/1

Kirs-Bloch's
29/1

Sir A. Leverton seems to think that
with our large prestige and resources,
we cannot afford to risk
the hostility towards us which he believes
will arise in Egypt if we make
softly by a pro-Jewish policy in
Palestine. What one would like to see
is an authoritative appreciation of the dangers and disadvantages of both
interests of adopting an approach to
life of conciliation by the House of Lords
and advise on 24th March

I have thought of a collaborative
with Russia, could perhaps very
helpful material, which might also be
read by the Cabinet when the case
to brief, etc. etc.

Caldwell
26.3

Mr. would be sent to Russia, secret,
H. O. Cowell (draft)

21/1/37

Very interesting - it is now
being re-examined.

H. O. Cowell in favour of
them a highly significant
problem. We have in
these papers an alarming
appreciation of the dangers
which threaten if we neglect
take a decision which
does not certify the Middle
what are the
and Jewish 'peace' is a very
the latest very real.

For the moment, we
what views will Nye
Commission will present
but this
will be brought up
when we are considering
in their
report?  27/1/87
8th 28/1/87
\
\
3. F.O. 28.10/38 (the printed copy of the Attorney's reply)

Ex h. 3 to the same as end a 1

P 국회. By 31 March alone

O. C. R. Wilson

2.9

Mr. Williams

Brought up.

R.J. 2.77. 3/6

B.V. to another motion

Mr. Davies, brought up v. x opposes? continue. 3/5.

A further result

O. C. R. Wilson 1.4.32 ch.

Mr. Davies, 3/5

AG

R.T.
Dear Sir,

Not very cheerful reading.

But protest will have been

incumbent day the recent

strike against the Arab

High Commissioner etc.

26.10.37

We leave a very long way
to go and a very uphill
job. I am quite sure
that both you will with
leave to be imposed by
us or that the mandate
will have to continue, or
that we have to leave
Palestine altogether. These
are in any three alternatives.
We shall meet it
increasingly not diminishing
resistance for some time
to come. Ultimately I
think it will be decided
one or another is the

Will Britain or her solici
be de facto leader of
the Eastern Mediterranean
Cultural Territories?

26.10.37

Preliminary 27.10
above
S. R.O. — E.6790/14/65 — 17.11.47.

(The copy of a draft from 1943, 1251 of 5/6,
causing note by the agent on
Palestinian Migration Affairs)

Mr. Attiyah's general analysis of the situation is familiar from previous
papers on this file; the report is
of interest, however, since it was
written (instead of predecessor) after
the dissolution of the Higher
Committee etc. In effect Mr. Attiyah's
view now is that the situation
cannot be explained in terms of "a
mythological agitator", and that, as
the result of government's recent action
against the Arabs, enhanced prestige
in one sense (power based on fear)
is more than balanced by depreciated
prestige in the other sense (loyalty
based on agreement of aims).

His comment on the recent
innovation of Arabic broadcasts from
the U.K. is also of interest. I take
it that what he means is that
unless 'propaganda' i.e. broadcasting
is broadcast (which I understand
is against H.M.G.),
we can only promote news; e.g.
news will not be palatable, and therefore the pro-British effect small. No doubt this point has been considered, but the Middle Eastern reaction is of interest.

Cary has gone to Jerusalem. I sent Y.

J.O. (handwritten)
18.11.37
This is written entirely from the Arab point of view, with anti-Semitic spirit.

? as proposed.
3.11.37

I rather suspect that Mr. Altizad is of Syrian origin. He is clearly in sympathy with the pan-Arab movement, and is a representative of the Damascus region, and on this he is his advice on the Palestinian question the ultimate aim of the Palestinian movement. I am not surprised.

? part b

H.G. (handwritten)
19.11.37

30th 22.-11.37

(As copy of Cairo copy 232 of 8/11. sent by Mr. Bingham on Palestinian Enquiry Affairs)

A point of the minutes to (5).

Put by

T. D. Bemrose
15.12.37

WSC
17.12.37

silence.
BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO,
5th November, 1937.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note by Samuel Bey Attiyah on conditions in Palestine and Syria as seen by him during his recent holiday in Syria.

2. I would invite attention to his remarks regarding the Arab trend towards Italy owing to British Zionist policy, his views regarding the genuineness of the anti-Zionist rebellion in Palestine and the attitude of the British press in imagining that this revolt is the work of a few political agitators, and finally to his version of the remarks made by Naji al Suedi, brother of the present Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his opening speech at the Muqadim Conference.

3. With reference to the recent arrangements made regarding British broadcasting from Palestine, it will be noted that Samuel Bey Attiyah thinks that the good results of this enterprise will largely depend on a question of fact, namely Great Britain’s policy in Palestine.

4. A copy of this despatch has been forwarded to the Officer Administering the Government of Palestine, Jerusalem.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,

Sir,
Your most obedient, humble Servant.

AMBASSADOR.

The Right Honorable
Anthony Eden, M.C., V.P.,
M.P., M.P., M.P.
The following notes on conditions prevailing in the "GRAND LIBAN" and "SYRIA" States may be of interest to those interested in the Near East.

The "GRAND LIBAN" continues to very badly suffer:
(a) Financially owing to the fall in the franc, and to the exploitation of its chief resources by French capital.
(b) Politically by the forced and unnatural amalgamation of purely Mohammadan districts under Maronite influence. This discontent on the part of the Mohammadan section of the population will undoubtedly reveal itself in case of any general crisis in which the Near East is implicated.

A constitution has been created for the "GRAND LIBAN" providing for a Parliament to include 68 members (for a population under one million); there was a strong opposition to the present Government, and a bloody struggle between the two parties was expected to take place on the occasion of the elections. However the High Commissioner, on his return from France, warned both parties that the French Government was too busy in more important issues, and did not desire any troubles in Lebanon - and an agreement, based on a proportional division of Parliamentary seats, was concluded. The elections took place peacefully on the 24th but the strife will be resumed on meeting of Parliament.

In the "SYRIA" State, there is more cohesion owing to the crushing majority of Mohammadans. The Druses of Hauran mountain however, refuse to have a Mohammadan Governor appointed by the Damascus authorities and insist on the recognition of an autonomy for the mountain, and for a Druse Governor, of the Mountain itself, to be appointed.

The difference threatened to take serious dimensions,
the Druses being reported to be secretly helped and moved by French policy in order to keep the country divided, and to create a strong opposition, in the East.

It was a current rumour in Damascus that France, (and with her Great Britain) did not defend the Syrian cause in the Alexandrette case, as they could and should have done. They attribute this to the anxiety of these two powers not to lose Turkish friendship in case of a war with Italy.

The friendliness shown now in Syria to France is only superficial; and the moment the last French soldier leaves Syria, the Syrian attitude will depend on their own interests and worldly events.

Since the return of Air Sheikh Arsalah, himself, and friends, have been spreading a propaganda to the effect that it is to the interest of Mohammedans and Druses to throw in their lot with the Italians in the event of war.

They affirm that Italy's intentions towards them is very friendly, and consist only in assisting them to get rid of the British and French influence, to help them financially and Militarily, to organize themselves into an Arab confederation (to become in future an Arab Empire) - Italy and Germany would undertake to respect and guarantee their independence; and as such they would play a role in the Near East's politics as a third factor in the Rome-Berlin policy.

This propaganda is credited owing to the readiness of the population to believe it; and because they find Italy's policy directed against the British whom they look upon, now, as the enemy of Arabs and Islam due to the British Zion policy.

It should be remembered that Syrians, Lebanese, and Palestinians have always formed one race and one country.
and any oppression which they believe is befalling one
section of them, is felt by the others - These feelings of
wrong having been done to themselves, and to their brethren
in Palestine make them only too ready to believe and catch
on such Italian propaganda.

It is a great pity that Great Britain who held the
unique occasion to emerge from the Great War as the champion
and supporter of Arabs and Islam, should be now looked upon
as their enemy - Every good wisher of the British Government
hopes that they might realize the mistake of their Zionist
policy before it is too late - The Anti-Zionist rebellion
in Palestine is genuine, and not the work of a few political
agitators, headed by the Mufti, as the British Press wrongly
represents the case - The whole Mohammedan Arab world registers
the Zionist policy, and the agitation in Palestine will never
die down. The present extreme repressive measures renders
Great Britain more unpopular and will not help in remediying
the situation. The Jews themselves should realize that if,
left to themselves in a world's crisis, their lot would be
an unenviable one: surrounded as they will be by Arab independent and armed states.

The congress held at "Belougrad" (Syria) last August,
to discuss the Palestinian question, was fairly representative.
Influential leaders who have interests at present with Great
Britain and France, naturally did not attend but the congress
had the good will of everybody. The opening speech of the
Iranian leader - Naji El Saud - was significant. In communicat-
ing it to the Press the strong expressions he actually used
were modified to appear mild. He actually said that "when
the British Staff, in case of a war, sit down to count their
friends, they would certainly not find Mesopotamia included
in their list; also the rest of Arab states - as long as
Great Britain persists in her Zionist policy".

Mr. Oliver (a British Missionary who is accused of
being a Secret British agent) was refused admission to
attend the conference.
The speech, on the subject of Palestine, by Wasef Pasha Ghali, proves also that Egypt could not indefinitely remain indifferent to what is going on.

I read that Great Britain has arranged to use a British broadcasting station for the purpose of counteracting the effects of Italian - Arabic propaganda - the credibility and good results would greatly depend on Great Britain's Islamic policy as represented in their treatment of Palestine.

The Sudan Agency,
Cairo, 20-10-39.
Sir,
Ramleh, September 9, 1937.

WITH reference to Sir Miles Lampson’s despatch, No. 1383 of the
17th December last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a
further note on Near Eastern affairs by Edward Attiyah.\(^1\)

2. In section 2 of his note Edward Attiyah expressed the opinion that the
Syrian National party in the Lebanon, in spite of accusations often levelled
against it, is not inspired by Italy but would be an admirable instrument for Italy
to use in an emergency owing to its Fascist character.

3. He thinks that Italian propaganda has not made much progress in
Palestine, but that Italian aid might be solicited by the Arabs in their struggle
against the British Zionist policy (see section 5).

4. It is obvious that the Arabs, as indicated in section 6, would prefer the
continuance of the mandate over an undivided Palestine, with restricted immi-
gration of Jews, to partition, which Edward Attiyah considers is unacceptable to
the Arabs. It might, however, become acceptable if cloaked by some such scheme
as that which Nuri Pasha has put forward (see my despatch No. 1067 of to-day’s
date).

5. With regard to section 7 Nuri Pasha has also drawn attention to the
fact that the more developed Palestine Arabs objects to being put under the more
primitive Transjordan administration (see my despatch No. 1067 of to-day’s date).

6. With reference to the last paragraph of section 10, I have no information
of this alleged corruption of Osman Moharrem by Mr. Gibson.

7. It is satisfactory to note that the Sudanese enjoyed being entertained
more in England than in Egypt. I would draw attention to the recommendations
in section 15 that frequent opportunity should be given to the Sudanese of visiting
and forming contact with England.

I have, &c.

D. V. KELLY.

Enclosure.

Notes on the Near East by the Intelligence Officer, Khartum, July-August 1937.


It is still expected that the French Senate will shortly ratify the Syrian and
Lebanese treaties with France, although the present French Government does not
seem to like them as much as the Blum Ministry did. It is now quite clear that
the Christians of the Lebanon are very mistrustful of the Moslem Arabs of Syria
proper, and are likely to remain so for a long time to come. They have no real
sympathy with the Arab movement, which they regard as being largely Islamic
in character and therefore prejudicial to the Christian minorities in the Near
East. Consequently, they believe that autonomy based on a perpetual alliance
with France is the most satisfactory solution for their national problem, being
their only guarantee against declining into the position of an oppressed minority
among a Moslem population still largely backward and fanatical. Even those
Christians who a few years ago tried to believe in the possibility of union with
the Moslems in an Arab National Movement have now come to this conclusion.
The problem is further complicated by the fact that while the Christians in the
Lebanon are solidly against the incorporation of their country in the Syrian
State (where they would be a minority), the Moslem minority in the Lebanon is
equally opposed to continued separation from Syria. Religious differences in
Syria continue to dominate the political situation.

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\(^1\) Extract only printed.
2. The Syrian National Party.

An exception to this general thesis is the attitude of the Syrian National party, a youth movement formed a little over a year ago by a highly sophisticated Syrian Christian, Antoun Saadi. It is still of little importance, but bears sufficient resemblance to similar recent movements in Europe to be viewed as capable of startling development. The principles and organisation of this party are very much on Fascist lines, and indeed when the party became known to the Government it was believed that its inspiration and funds were Italian. This, however, has not been proved, nor, in my belief, is it true—so far. The movement, I believe, sprang up as a spontaneous local effort, though clearly the ideological inspiration came from Central Europe. Italian help and possibly control might come into it at any moment, particularly in a crisis. It would be an admirable instrument for Italy to use in an emergency.


At present, however, the party (which numbers between 15,000 and 25,000 members, chiefly young men, recruited from all classes) is fanatically anti-foreigner in its assertion of Syrian nationalism. Its particular objectives are Syrian national unity, embracing Christians and Moslems, and independence of foreign control. It appears to have achieved a large measure of success among the youth of the country (both Christians and Moslems) since its foundation. Such a form of idealism is easy to inculcate in young people, but it remains to be seen whether this idealism will achieve any lasting success against existing religious divisions, if the party does not obtain power in the near future. This seems very improbable at the moment, although the present internal condition of Syria favours the growth of such a movement. Acute economic distress aggravated by the fall of the franc, the openly scandalous corruption of the French Administration, the confusion in public opinion caused by internal sectarian strife; these seem to present an admirable conjunction of circumstances for the success of a Fascist movement. It is clear that the Government regards the growth of this party with some alarm, for it has several times imprisoned its "Leader" and rounded up all the principal organisers. As long as the Syrian Government is under the protection of France, however, it is difficult to imagine how a party could seize power, unless some other foreign State were to support it at the critical moment (compare Spain). Incidentally, the frontiers of the Syrian nation, as conceived by this party, are the Taurus Mountains on the north and the Suez Canal on the south; that is to say, it includes Palestine, where the party, I believe, has a branch.

The Syrian National party is not well viewed in other Arab countries (apart from Palestine), because of its emphasis on Syrian nationalism against pan-Arabism, its advocacy of the isolation, and, so to speak, self-sufficiency of the Syrian national problem.

4. The French Administration.

On only one point there is unanimity in Syria—the unsatisfactory character of the French Administration. This is no mere matter of emotional hostility to a foreign régime, for the Maronites (the Christian majority in the Lebanon), who for centuries had been so pro-French that their only nationalist aspiration before the war was a French occupation of Syria, are now the first to want to get rid of French rule, which they openly denounce as scandalous. They are still, however, desirous of having the protection of France in the form of an alliance; though there are some who make no secret of a strong wish to substitute the British for the French as an ally or mandatory Power.


In Palestine, on the other hand, the religious rift between Moslems and Christians has on the surface been completely bridged by their sincerely united opposition to the Zionist menace. I say "on the surface," because beneath it, the Christians of Palestine, no less than their co-religionists in Syria, mistrust the Moslems, have little sympathy for the cause of an all-Arab union, and fear to become a minority in an independent Arab State. But, and it is a considerable "but," they are absolutely at one with the Moslems in their resistance to Zionism. Against the Jews they are Arabs, and their fear of Zionism, and
opposition to it, are (with a few exceptions) every whit as determined and sincere as that of the Moslems. The answer is that they are against Zionism, but not against the British mandate or some other form of ultimate British control that would guarantee them the necessary protection in an Arab Palestine. This is true of the majority of Palestinian Christians. A small element, however, embittered by British policy in Palestine to the point of hatred, and seduced by crude Italian propaganda, displays to-day, open leanings towards the Duce. It is significant that the individuals who show these pro-Italian sympathies are mostly Roman Catholics. Generally speaking, however, Italian propaganda has not achieved any appreciable success in convincing the Arabs either of the sincerity of the Italian championship of the cause of Islam, or of the superiority of Italian to British colonial administration; but this does not preclude the possibility, in a suitable emergency, of Italian aid being accepted or even solicited by the Arabs in their struggle against British Zionist policy.

6. Reactions to Partition.

The first reaction of the Arabs to the partition scheme recommended by the commission was one of intense disappointment and hostility. Not only did they in general feel bitterly opposed to the principle of partition, but they were genuinely aghast at the manner in which it was proposed to divide up the country, and at the share allotted to them.

For the Arabs there are two ways of looking at the Palestine problem. The first is to envisage it as it stands to-day, recognising, that is to say, certain accomplished facts, and to be prepared to accept a solution on this basis. The second is to go on looking at the problem as it arose twenty years ago, to go on denying the very basis on which it arose as having been unjust and invalid; and therefore to refuse to compromise on the basis of the fait accompli.

The spontaneous emotional approach of the Arabs is, naturally enough, the second of the two, and the logic of the case they present is very simple, and, to them, conclusive. It is very difficult, perhaps impossible, for them to recognise a fact which they have combatted from its very inception, which has been accomplished against their will, and which finally demands of them the sacrifice of nearly one-half of their country. The emotional resistance to the situation is really formidable and, one can safely say, unanimous. For expropriation of home and native soil is a challenge to the most primitive and elementary instincts, and will therefore move not only the politically conscious population of the towns, but even the most backward elements of the rural population, who could not be moved on a more sophisticated and complex issue. Indeed, it seems to me that the partition scheme will, because of this, encounter more general opposition than the alternative arrangement (though by no means a solution) which has existed till now, and whereby the Jews had access to the whole of Palestine and could acquire land anywhere in it by purchase from individual Arabs. The danger to the Arabs of ultimate Jewish domination over the whole country, inherent in this arrangement, was of a more abstract and less tangible nature than the immediate loss of soil manifest in the partition scheme, though this loss is limited to one part of the country and leaves the Arabs sovereign and secure in the other part. Moreover, there is something final—an irrevocable surrender—in the partition scheme, from which the Arabs shrink violently. From many conversations I had with Arabs in Palestine and Syria, I gathered that they would definitely prefer the continuance of the mandate over an undivided Palestine, with a restricted immigration of Jews (the temporary solution proposed by the commission), in spite of the independence that partition would give them.

So much for the principle of partition, against which all the Arabs feel so strongly—I say "feel," for there is an element which, subordinating emotion to rational consideration, is willing to accept the partition of Palestine as the only possible solution, although uncompromisingly rejecting the boundaries of the particular scheme recommended by the commission. From all that I saw and heard, I am convinced that the Arabs will resist to the utmost this scheme, which seems to them, not without cause, to give the Jews practically all that is worth having in Palestine; the fertile plains, water supplies and ports of the north. Jaffa, the one port allotted to the Arabs (apart from Gaza, which is of very
secondary importance), is to be doubly enclosed within the Jewish area and the corridor leading to Jerusalem; and Haifa, it is argued, though theoretically retained under the mandate, will almost certainly become Jewish.

7. Union with Transjordan.

Nor does the prospect of union with Transjordan under the Emir Abdullah seem to the Palestine Arabs sufficiently attractive to outweigh the disadvantages of the rest of the scheme. The sophisticated Arab leaders (particularly the Mufti) regard the Emir as a backward bedouin unfit to reign over their country; and they fail to see why the Arab world should be required to go on providing thrones for the House of Hashem. They were, moreover, greatly alarmed lest the Emir should succumb to this imperial bait and promote intrigues in favour of the partition scheme, a fear which at one moment seemed only too well-grounded. The Emir clearly was not averse from a partition scheme that promised him the throne of a respectable-sized kingdom, and the Nashashibi party in Jerusalem, in order to spite their enemy the Mufti, showed themselves for a moment disposed to approve partition and support the Emir's cause. Fear, however, of the rising tide of national sentiment against the scheme caused them to recant immediately, and they joined the tide.

8. Prospects of Agreement.

In conclusion, I would say that the partition scheme as it stands will be determinedly resisted by the Arabs, and that any attempt to impose it on them by force of arms would create a very serious situation in the Near East, a situation which in the event of a European war would cause England considerable embarrassment. Iraq (with ambitions of heading ultimately an Arab federation) has shown itself greatly interested; and even the Egyptian Government, which till now has maintained an attitude of extreme moderation because of Nahas Pasha's desire for friendly co-operation with England, would be driven to intervene by the pressure of public opinion and the desire to preserve its prestige in the Mahometan world, if physical force had to be employed against the Arabs of Palestine.

There is just a possibility, on the other hand, that if the terms of the scheme are considerably modified, the Arabs might in the end accept it, or at least allow it to be carried out, as the least objectionable solution of their problem.


I should like here to say a few words about British prestige in the Near East. In Syria and Palestine it seemed to me to have somewhat recovered from the blow administered to it by the Italian conquest of Abyssinia. To this recovery no doubt the rearmament programme has contributed powerfully. But the recovery is by no means complete. The old impression of invulnerability has gone, and while there are many who believe that England can still hold her own in the Mediterranean, there are just as many who question her ability to do so. So much for England's international prestige. As for her "internal" prestige with the Arab Nationalists, there is very little of that left. Confidence in her probity, respect for her word, have vanished completely, while fear of her striking power is almost totally absent, since it is believed that in present circumstances she dare not strike. The leniency displayed by the Palestine Government during the disturbances, and what the Arabs claim as victories against British troops in the engagements that took place, have engendered in them a conspicuous attitude of defiant boldness.

In this connexion I may mention what a Syrian friend who was in Iraq this summer said to me. He was telling me about the purchase of twenty military aeroplanes by the Iraqi Government from Italy a few weeks ago, and how when two of them were damaged on arrival, the Italian Government promptly offered to have them repaired at its own expense. I asked him whether this purchase of military equipment from Italy was not contrary to the spirit of the treaty with England. "The Iraqians," he answered, "don't care a bit about England any more. They are neither afraid of her, nor amicably disposed towards her, and they treat with open contempt the Englishmen who are still in Iraq."
No. 1802.
(181/12/56)

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a note on Near Eastern affairs written at Khartoum by Mr. A.S. Attiyah, the Sudan Government Intelligence Officer, after a visit he paid to Egypt, Palestine and Syria during last summer.

2. Mr. Attiyah was educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, from which he graduated to Brasenose College, Oxford.

3. Mr. Attiyah's report dwells first on the weakening of Great Britain's position in the Eastern Mediterranean owing to the general native interpretations of Italy's successful Abyssinian adventure and to Spanish developments. However, he believes that the majority of thinking people in these parts view with apprehension the possibility of a British eclipse, and would still be prepared to support Great Britain in any conflict between her and the Fascist powers, provided a solution of the Palestine problem could be found acceptable to the Arabs.

The failure to find such a solution must, he thinks, involve a recrudescence of armed hostility on a larger scale involving other Arab lands.

4. He then suggests that, in addition to the settlement of the Palestinian question in a manner acceptable to the Arabs, Great Britain and France, in order to make more secure Arab co-operation, might sponsor the creation of some sort

The Right Honorable
Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
et al., etc., etc., etc.,
of Arab Federation under their aegis. This, I may record, is an old dream which seems no more practicable now than seventeen years ago.

5. I need not dwell on Mr. Attiyah's picture of Egypt after the signature of the treaty. It is on the whole an accurate one, but it has already been presented to you in frequent reports from Mr. Kelly and myself.

6. The statement regarding the persecution of the Copts must be taken with a grain of salt. Many Muslims, on the contrary, are complaining that, owing to Hakim's position, Copts are at present being favoured at the expense of Muslims. This is indeed almost an obsession with the Prince Regent, who never fails to allude to it in his conversations with me.

7. With reference to the suggestion that Ahmad Sahib was excluded by Abbas from the dinner given by the ex-shahive to the latter at Cario, it is possible that the exclusion was only due to the fact that Abbas affiliated has not been on good terms with the Sahih family generally. I draw this inference from certain information given me here by one of the ex-shahive's intimates.

8. Mr. Attiyah's impressions regarding Egyptian intentions towards the Sudan are reassuring. He thinks that the Egyptians will lay stress on Egyptian-Sudanese fraternity rather than on a more active Egyptian share in the condominium.

9. With regard to the more important part of Mr. Attiyah's note, namely that dealing with the Palestine question, I have, on several occasions during the present year, touched on its dangers to our position generally in the Near East. There appears to be a consensus of opinion among competent observers that the Arabs will not acquiesce peacefully in any solution of the question which does not
assure a continuance of Arab predominance in Palestine. If His Majesty's Government are unable to admit such a solution, then it would seem advisable to be prepared beforehand for the consequences. If, after the Royal Commission's report, His Majesty's Government feel compelled to adopt a solution unacceptable to the Arabs, it is generally anticipated that there will be a recurrence of trouble either in the near future or later when the Arabs have recovered from the strain of last summer's struggle, and that the reactions in neighbouring Arab countries will be wider and stronger than during the conflict now suspended by a sort of truce.

10. It will be remembered that only an amelioration of Anglo-Egyptian relations through the negotiations for, and subsequent conclusion of, an Anglo-Egyptian treaty, together with an easing of the Anglo-Italian tension through our unavoidable acquiescence in the Italian victory in Abyssinia, enabled us to withdraw troops from Egypt in order to provide essential reinforcements for Palestine. The events of this year seem to show that we have not enough forces available to deal with serious trouble in more than one quarter at the same time. No doubt any such limitation will be present to the minds of His Majesty's Government in determining their future policy in the Near East.

11. Even supposing, however, that Arab exhaustion were to preclude an immediate resumption of the armed struggle, an unsettled Palestine would still remain a permanent factor of disturbance in Arab lands and even in Egypt. This factor will always be weighing in the scales against co-operation with us among numerous elements who otherwise would, as Mr. Attiyah points out, be only too anxious to
10. It would not be safe to rely much on local factors tending to pre-occupy Arab states with their own local nationalities and thus to dispose them to co-operate with the Arabs of Palestine. Factors such as the establishment of the new régime in Iraq by coup d'état and the traditional isolation of Egypt may operate for a time against co-operation with the Palestinian Arabs, but in the long run the Muslim states of the Near East cannot remain indifferent to an Arab eclipse in Palestine.

12. Here I would invite attention to the Reuters' telegram of December 12th from Jerusalem according to which the Arab leaders in Jerusalem propose to summon a Congress representative of all Arab countries in the Near and Middle East to meet in Cairo and that Amin Bey Abdul Hadi is understood to be leaving for Cairo to discuss the project with his colleagues. I have telegraphed to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Palestine to ask if he can confirm this, but have at present not received his reply.

14. The Prince Regent asked the Oriental Secretary on December 10th whether he had any other information on the subject, and, on receiving a negative answer, said that he too had none. He added that, though a couple of days ago...
ago he had had a long conversation with Nasser on many
different subjects, including that of the treaty with
Saudi-Arabia, the Prime Minister had made no mention
of any idea of such a Congress here. His Royal Highness
concluded, therefore, that the Egyptian Government had
had no previous knowledge of the project.

15. I need hardly dwell on the inconvenience of such
a Congress in Cairo. But we must remember that Nasser, in
addition to a certain vanity which is pushing him to seek
a prominent role in this Arab drama, cannot afford to be
too unsympathetic to appeals of Egypt’s Muslim neighbours.
Egyptians, proud of their recent independence and their
prominent economic and cultural role in the Near East,
have long been proclaiming the necessity of Egypt’s playing
a more active part in co-operation with Arab lands. Admin-
istrative measures even have been contemplated for this pur-
pose, e.g. formation of an Oriental section in the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs for organisation of propaganda in the
East. Even a well-disposed Egyptian Government would find
it difficult to evade playing a part in a struggle so
intensely interesting to the Arab and Muslim world. Their
opponents, always on the look-out for pretences to promote
their partisan aims, would be quick to seize on what they
would no doubt qualify as subservience to the British and
betrayal of Muslim interests. The Government would prob-
ably find it difficult not to make some sort of gesture
in favour of the Arabs with a view to silencing the clamour
of their opponents.

16. The situation indicated above, while disquieting to
As from the point of view of our relations with the Arab
States and Egypt, becomes even more disturbing in view of
the powerful assistance which it is affording to Italy in her propaganda and penetration in Arabian lands and even Egypt.

17. His Majesty's Government are fully informed of the propaganda, deliberately hostile to us, conducted by Italy in all these lands. The dangerous possibility of Italy establishing herself in South Arabia through the training and controlling of South Arabian aviators has forced the subject of correspondence with His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah (see correspondence ending with your despatch No. 1152 of December 4th, 1935). Equally notorious is the Italian penetration of the Yemen through her agents disguised in civil functions (e.g., doctors) - through her intrigues in view of the succession of the old and sick Imam - through her provision of arms and financial facilities - through the reality of the menace she presents to the Yemen since the establishment of her East African empire. It is possible that the Imam's death is not so near as is repeatedly predicted, but his eventual disappearance is likely to afford an opportunity for much friction in troubled waters caused by rivalries among the Imam's sons and certain tribal elements. Italy will, no doubt, make the most of any opportunities afforded her by any internal confusion in the Yemen.

16. It is obvious that all this Italian effort will be greatly facilitated by the continuance and development of Arab hostility to Great Britain owing to an unsettled situation in Palestine. The Arabs are aware of the Italian danger to themselves but despair is a bad counsellor and, if the choice were to appear to them to lie between the Zionist absorption in Palestine, with its menace to the
Arab world generally, and of co-operation with Italy against Great Britain and France, who, after all, are in the position of standing in the way of Arab aspirations, it is greatly to be feared that the second alternative might appear to them the least fatal.

19. It is not within my province to express opinions regarding the internal problem of Palestine, and it is only on the external reactions to that problem that I am venturing to dwell. Whatever may be the necessities of the Palestinian issue, I would earnestly urge that, anyhow, it be not examined in isolation from our whole position in the Near East, and that we consider carefully whether we have the means of maintaining our position in the Near East against an Italian thrust facilitated by Arab co-operation, based on despair of us and an apprehensive respect of Italian power as demonstrated by the conquest of Abyssinia.

So I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine, His Majesty's Ambassador at Baghdad, and His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,

Sir,

your most obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) J. (Redacted)

(Lord (Redacted)
SECRET.

APPENDIX TO S.O.I.S. No. 54 (see para. 847)

NOTE BY THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER DATED 31st
OCTOBER, 1936, ON IMPRESSIONS AND INFORMATION
GATHERED DURING HIS VISITS TO EGYPT, SYRIA
AND PALESTINE IN SUMMER OF 1936.

1. There have been three predominant topics of
interest in the Near East this summer:
   (a) the Italo-Abyssinian affair and its termination,
   (b) the Palestine troubles, and
   (c) the treaties between England and Egypt and
       between France and Syria.

   The treaties are the only bright spot in an otherwise
   very gloomy picture.

2. I am sorry to state that as a result of the Italo-
   Abyssinian business British prestige has suffered an
   extremely severe set-back in the Near East. Italy's
   bold and successful adventure is regarded everywhere
   as a serious reverse for the British Empire; for the
   League aspect of the matter is considered to be nothing
   more than an elaborate piece of window-dressing designed
   to conceal an essentially imperialist duel between
   Britain and Italy - and for the first time the Arab
   and Islamic world has seen the British Empire successfully
   challenged over a big issue in and around the Mediterranean
   basin. The Spanish civil war, coming immediately on top
   of the Italian victory in Abyssinia, and implying (as it
   seems to most observers to imply) another Fascist triumph
   to the detriment of British and French Democracy, has
   unfortunately enhanced the newly created impression of
   England’s vulnerability, so that many people in Egypt,
   Palestine and Syria are wondering whether really England’s
   supremacy in the Mediterranean Basin and the East is
   not approaching its end. Everywhere one comes across
   feelings of insecurity and fear - chiefly experienced
   by intelligent and thinking persons, for in spite of
   all the clashes that have occurred since the War between
   Near East nationalism and British policy, there are
   /now
few thinking individuals in that part of the world who
do not still believe that British ascendancy is the ultimate
preserver of order and stability in the East, and who (pro-
vided Great Britain is willing to satisfy some of their
deepest aspirations) would not dread the prospect of its
being seriously challenged.
5. In order, however, that the Moslem peoples of the
Near East should give their support to England in any
conflict that might break out between her and the Fascist
powers, one imperative condition must be fulfilled —
merely the solution (if a solution can be found at this
stage) of the Palestine problem in a manner acceptable
to the Arabs. For Palestine has definitely become the
focus of Arab-Moslem feeling all over the Near East —
the U.S. treatment of her problem will react profoundly
on Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Arabia and even Egypt.
4. The Arabs of Palestine, supported by their co-
religionists in all the neighbouring Arab states, are
now determined to fight to the death against the policy
embodied in the Balfour declarations. They have made
up their minds that they will not allow their country
to become a national home for the Jews, absorbing more
and more Jewish immigrants, and coming more and more under
Jewish political control. The strike they carried out,
and the determined self-sacrificing desperation that was
behind it, and that one saw in every Arab one spoke to
in Palestine this summer is a fairly clear indication of
this back-to-the-wall resolve.

The cessation of the strike is nothing more than an
armistice. The country for the time being was tired.
20,000 troops had arrived in Palestine, and the orange
export season was at hand. If the strike was allowed to
rein this season the country would have been financially
wrecked to a disastrous degree. Moreover the Royal

/Council
posed to offer a chance which the leaders on the advice of the Arab King decided to take. Should, however, the British Government refuse to modify their policy — in other words should they decide to uphold the policy of the Balfour declaration, it is practically certain that the trouble will break out again — probably on a larger scale, involving the active co-operation of the Arabs in Iraq, Transjordan, etc.

In order, however, to gain the goodwill of the Arabs of the Near East to an extent that would make Britain's position among them really secure in the near too improbable event of another European war, a more comprehensive and constructive policy than the mere pacification of Palestine is required. The Arabs cling ardently to their dream of an Arab State, or, at least, a Federation of Arab States. They bitterly remember that England promised to help them achieve this ideal during the War, and accuse her of having betrayed them at the conclusion of it. It is certain that if another War breaks out, while the Arabs are still feeling as they are today, they will refuse to believe any more promises and while harbouring no love for Italy or Germany, will pursue a purely opportunist line and seize the occasion to realise their long cherished ambitions in whatever way they can do so. Today there is not a single Arab in Palestine who has any love for Italy. Yet it is an open secret that the Palestine revolt has been helped by Italy with money and arms.

In view of all this one wonders whether it would not be possible for Britain and France, acting jointly (since it is the two of them that control the destinies of the Arabs — and since moreover it is more than likely that they will find themselves once again fighting a common battle in the event of another war) to sponsor the creation of some sort of an Arab State Federation under
4.

Their aim is. France has now signed a treaty with Syria—England has a treaty with Iraq. Palestine is, of course, the chief difficulty, but if that was overcome, even perhaps without the co-operation of France, Britain might be able to do something along those lines.

THE TREATY:

7. As was to be expected the Treaty has on the whole been well received in Egypt. The opposition to it among some of the minority groups (one can scarcely call them parties) is of a largely factional nature—although there are a number of individual politicians and journalists in the ranks of the minority who are imbued with the constitutional necessity of opposing an opposition immediately in the interests of democratic government, and was not unnaturally seen in the Treaty the first legitimate target for their criticism.

8. The Sudan part of the Treaty is regarded as being rather vague, and there is considerable confusion of thought as to how it will be implemented e.g. number of troops to be returned, number of Egyptians to be employed in administrative posts in the Sudan, the exact functions of the Senior Egyptian Officer, etc., etc.

9. The post of Inspector General of Egyptian Irrigation is likely to go to Abd el Qawi Bey Ahmed, who from our point of view (as well as from the Egyptian) would be an excellent choice. I saw Abd el Qawi Bey himself, and he told me privately that he was hoping to get the appointment, the only consideration militating against him being the fact that he was not a Wadist. As however the Wad is somewhat young in first class men of the type of Abd el Qawi Bey, Mubas will have to recruit a few servants from outside the Wadi ranks, and Abd el Qawi Bey may well be one of them.

10. The minority Groups as well as patriotic individual observers view the future with considerable misgivings.
They rightly hold that the next few years will be a
decisive period in Egypt's history. The responsibility
for what happens in Egypt can no longer be laid on the
British Government. It is now exclusively held by the
Egyptians themselves, and everything depends on how the
presidential period is going to conduct itself. The
reasons are none too good, but one of course must make
allowances for the
initial period. Everywhere one hears of disquieting signs —
and often one hears tales from intelligent and disillusioned
Egyptians. In the first place the Gypsies are being
persecuted, and this in spite of the prominent part they
have played in the past, and of the fact that they have
two Ministers in the Cabinet, one of whom, Makram el-Ahmed,
is known to dominate Nahas. Nahas himself is not
fanatical, but there is still a good deal of fanaticism among
his followers, and Nahas is too careful of his position and
popularity to take any risks on behalf of his co-religionists.

Again private influence, nepotism and corruption
are extremely rife, and that old evil the unjust distribution
of irrigation water in the Provinces is becoming very
acute — Every Deputy who owns agricultural land uses his
influence over the local irrigation authorities to obtain
preferential treatment, and sometimes the Deputy's wishes
are confirmed by an order from the Minister.

11. It is, of course, only human that the seed reaching
the land of milk and honey after so many years in the
wilderness, should desire to enjoy some personal refreshment
on their arrival. One must not forget that even in
enlightened European democracies (the few that remain of
these) party followers have to be rewarded on the attainment
of office by their party; or that in France for
instance, the private influence of the deputy is often
undoubtedly exerted for personal ends. The British are
too often inclined to judge conditions in the East by the
admittedly
admittedly worse standards of public life in England. Their perspective would be more correct and their outlook more tolerant if they adopted America or France as a standard of comparison. A much more serious danger is the existence of the new student organizations.

16. Wearing colored shirts, these bodies of unruly young men have now definite: learned the Fascist secret of imposing an impetus in impecunio by means of organized terrorism. I heard during my stay in Cairo that several opponents of the Treaty had been threatened by the Blue Shirts (Fascists) with physical violence if they aired their views too freely; while Makram, I was told, was believed to be in danger of being assassinated by the Green Shirts, who held him responsible for the treaty of which they did not approve.

15. The split in the Land itself (Nahas and Makram versus Makram and Nakrash) is more acute than it ever has been. Abd el Qaid Bey told me that when Nahas, Makram and Makram were at Carlsbad this summer after the signing of the treaty, the ex-Khedive sent a message to Nahas inviting the three of them to dinner—Nahas' answer was that he and Makram would be pleased to dine with Effendi, but that Makram need not be with them, and in spite of the Khedive's expectations, the venerable leader insisted on ruling out the President of the Chamber of Deputies.

It is quite likely that this split will one day come to a head, at which event both factions will probably try to establish a dictatorship with the help of the Blue Shirts. Makram and Nakrash will not come into the open yet, as they realize that the magic of Nahas' name with the masses would be too much for them at the present stage—but if the people become dissatisfied through maladministration, and Nahas begins to lose in office the halo which he developed in opposition under the blows of Iskand's policemen, then those two masters of secret organization and the political
political plot (it is Sukashi actually who controls the party machinery of the Wafd) might decide to strike at their leader.

14. The chief trouble with Egypt is that its political and civil life is still controlled by that old clique of politicians who were either brought up in the traditions of the pre-war Turkish School or received their training in the demagogic days of the nationalist movement. A new generation of public-spirited civil servants is beginning to appear, but it is still small, and it will be some time before it displaces the older clique. The most outstanding personality of this new generation is Anis Osman, the new Under-Secretary for Finance, who before long will be in the Cabinet.

THE EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE TO THE SUDAN UNDER THE NEW REGIME.

15. For some time to come, at least, the official Egyptian attitude to the Sudan will, I believe, be correct. Nahas means to behave himself and create a good impression; and it is unlikely that the implementation of the Treaty will cause us any trouble. The Egyptians will now concentrate on developing ties with the Sudan - visits, financial help to schools, possibly (though not very likely) economic projects, etc. Occasionally, of course, we may have embarrassing incidents, out-bursts of nationalism, etc. which are very likely to occur on the proposed visit to us this winter of 100 Egyptian students.

There will be at the beginning, that is to say, a good deal of formalisation, repeated emphasis on the ties that bind the two countries together etc. As, however, the Sudanese themselves would not welcome any suggestion that the treaty has given Egypt new rights in the Sudan, and as the Egyptians are anxious not to appear to their darker esteem to be claiming any sort of right over them, they will, I think, exercise caution and restraint. The Egyptians
Egyptians have been made to realise (by the "Page" articles, by Sheikh Ahmed Osman el Qmil's conversations in Egypt, etc) that any over-insistence by them on their share in the Condominium would stress their character as rulers in Sudanese eyes; and that the Sudanese would resent their appearance in this rôle. Hence the stress, from their side, will be not so much on their active share in the Condominium as on the protection of the Condominium.

And personally, I believe that any excess of interest they show in the Sudan during the next few years as a result of the Treaty will gradually decrease as the novelty of the new régime wears off.