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SECRET**THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT***Printed for the Cabinet. March 1963***C.C. (63)****Copy No. 46****16th Conclusions****CABINET****CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at Admiralty House, S.W. 1, on Thursday, 14th March, 1963, at 10.30 a.m.****Present:**

The Right Hon. HAROLD MACMILLAN, M.P., Prime Minister	
The Right Hon. R. A. BUTLER, M.P., First Secretary of State	The Right Hon. THE EARL OF HOME, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Items 1-5)
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT HALSHAM, Q.C., Lord President of the Council and Minister for Science	The Right Hon. LORD DILHORNE, Lord Chancellor
The Right Hon. REGINALD MAUDLING, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer	The Right Hon. HENRY BROOKE, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department
The Right Hon. DUNCAN SANDYS, M.P., Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Secretary of State for the Colonies (Items 1-4)	The Right Hon. IAIN MACLEOD, M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
The Right Hon. EDWARD HEATH, M.P., Lord Privy Seal (Items 1-7)	The Right Hon. ERNEST MARPLES, M.P., Minister of Transport
The Right Hon. CHRISTOPHER SOAMES, M.P., Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Items 1-7)	The Right Hon. FREDERICK ERROLL, M.P., President of the Board of Trade
The Right Hon. JOHN BOYD-CARPENTER, M.P., Chief Secretary to the Treasury and Paymaster General	The Right Hon. MICHAEL NOBLE, M.P., Secretary of State for Scotland (Items 1-7)
The Right Hon. J. ENOCH POWELL, M.P., Minister of Health	The Right Hon. Sir EDWARD BOYLE, M.P., Minister of Education
The Right Hon. Sir KEITH JOSEPH, M.P., Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs (Items 5-8)	The Right Hon. WILLIAM DEEDES, M.P., Minister without Portfolio

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. LORD CARRINGTON, First Lord of the Admiralty (Items 3-4)	The Right Hon. JULIAN AMERY, M.P., Minister of Aviation (Item 4)
Sir JOHN HOESON, Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General (Item 3)	The Right Hon. MARTIN REDMAYNE, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury

Secretariat:

Sir BURKE TREND
Mr. A. L. M. CARY
Mr. J. H. WADDELL

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C.C. 16 (63)

Parliament

1. The Cabinet were informed of the business to be taken in the House of Commons in the following week.

Foreign Affairs

Syria

(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (61) 55th
Conclusions,
Minute 1)

2. The Foreign Secretary said that the recent revolution in Syria closely resembled the *coup d'état* in Iraq in February. The new Government in Damascus appeared to be in effective control of the country; and we had therefore extended formal recognition to it. Since some of its members were believed to support Egyptian policies, the position of Saudi Arabia might become increasingly precarious.

The Yemen

(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (63) 14th
Conclusions,
Minute 2)

The Foreign Secretary informed the Cabinet that the Royalist forces appeared to have abandoned the south-eastern part of the Yemen and were making little headway in the north. The representative of the President of the United States, Mr. Bunker, who had recently discussed the situation with the Government of Saudi Arabia, had ascertained that the latter might be prepared to abstain from further intervention in the Yemen if the Egyptian Government would agree to bring hostilities to an end and thereafter to withdraw their troops over a period of time. There was no action which we ourselves could usefully take in these circumstances; but, since it must remain our objective to eliminate Egyptian influence from the Yemen, we should continue to support the United States initiative.

The Cabinet—

(1) Took note of these statements by the Foreign Secretary.

Somalia

(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (60) 34th
Conclusions,
Minute 5)

The Foreign Secretary said that the Government of Somalia had been offended by our refusal to sanction, at this stage, the secession of the Somalis in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and were considering whether they should break off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. It was for consideration whether, in these circumstances, we should seek to promote discussions between the parties concerned or whether, at the appropriate moment, we should invoke the assistance of the United Nations.

The Commonwealth Secretary said that, during his recent visit to Kenya, he had arranged that the Northern Frontier District should constitute a separate and additional Region within the Colony. This, however, was only an interim measure, designed to hold the situation until the forthcoming elections in Kenya had taken place. There was some hope that the new Government of Kenya which would take office as a result of the elections would realise that, if they sought to retain the Northern Frontier District against the will of its Somali inhabitants, they would incur heavy expenditure in policing the territory and subsidising its administrative services. It was not impossible, therefore, that they would eventually agree to allow the Somalis to secede.

In discussion, it was suggested that, even if no useful action as regards the Northern Frontier District could be taken until after the elections in Kenya, we should seek to devise some means of dissuading the Government of Somalia from breaking off diplomatic relations in the interval, possibly by assuring them that we should be ready to take part, at the appropriate moment, in the process of further consultation which they were known to have in mind.

The Cabinet—

(2) Invited the Foreign Secretary, in consultation with the Commonwealth Secretary, to consider whether any further steps might be taken to prevent a breach of diplomatic relations with the Government of Somalia.

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SECRET**THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT***Printed for the Cabinet. April 1963***C.C. (63)****Copy No. 44****25th Conclusions****CABINET*****CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room,
House of Commons, S.W. 1, on Thursday, 11th April, 1963, at 10.30 a.m.*****Present:**

The Right Hon. HAROLD MACMILLAN, M.P., Prime Minister	
The Right Hon. R. A. BUTLER, M.P., First Secretary of State	The Right Hon. THE EARL OF HOME, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT HAILSHAM, Q.C., Lord President of the Council and Minister for Science	The Right Hon. LORD DELHORNE, Lord Chancellor
The Right Hon. REGINALD MAUDLING, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer	The Right Hon. HENRY BROOKE, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department
The Right Hon. DUNCAN SANDYS, M.P., Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Secretary of State for the Colonies (Items 1-2)	The Right Hon. IAIN MACLEOD, M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
The Right Hon. PETER THORNEYCROFT, M.P., Minister of Defence	The Right Hon. JOHN HARE, M.P., Minister of Labour
The Right Hon. EDWARD HEATH, M.P., Lord Privy Seal	The Right Hon. ERNEST MARPLES, M.P., Minister of Transport
The Right Hon. CHRISTOPHER SOAMES, M.P., Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food	The Right Hon. FREDERICK ERROLL, M.P., President of the Board of Trade
The Right Hon. JOHN BOYD-CARPENTER, M.P., Chief Secretary to the Treasury and Paymaster-General	The Right Hon. MICHAEL NOBLE, M.P., Secretary of State for Scotland
The Right Hon. J. ENOCH POWELL, M.P., Minister of Health	The Right Hon. Sir EDWARD BOYLE, M.P., Minister of Education
The Right Hon. Sir KEITH JOSEPH, M.P., Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs	The Right Hon. WILLIAM DEEDES, M.P., Minister without Portfolio

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. RICHARD WOOD, M.P., Minister of Power (Items 3-4)	Sir JOHN HOBSON, Q.C., M.P., Attorney- General (Item 4)
The Right Hon. MARTIN REDMAYNE, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury	

Secretariat:

**Sir BURKE TREND
Mr. A. L. M. CARY
Mr. J. H. WADDELL**

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C.C. 25 (63)

Foreign
Affairs
Malaysia
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (62) 53rd
Conclusions,
Minute 2)

1. *The Foreign Secretary* said that there were some signs of an easing of tension in South-East Asia. A recent meeting between Malayan and Philippine representatives had contributed to an improvement in relations between the two countries; and in a subsequent message President Sukarno of Indonesia had expressed to the Prime Minister of Malaya his readiness to enter into personal discussions with him.

Laos
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (63) 23rd
Conclusions,
Minute 5)

The Foreign Secretary informed the Cabinet that, in the absence of energetic action by Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister of Laos, there was an increasing risk that fighting would break out between forces controlled by the two wings of the Neutralist Government. Some of the Government's troops in the Plain of Jars had seceded to the Pathet Lao; and General Phoumi might take the opportunity to reopen hostilities against those who were under the control of Prince Souvannouvong. It might help to stabilise the situation if an outpost of the International Control Commission were established in the Plain of Jars; and, after consultation with the United States Government, he had invited the Soviet Foreign Minister, as co-chairman of the Geneva Conference on Laos, to co-operate in bringing pressure on the Commission for this purpose.

Japan
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (62) 65th
Conclusions,
Minute 3)

The Foreign Secretary said that he had been given a very friendly reception during his recent visit to Japan. The Japanese Government had been pleased to be accepted as members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and had shown themselves eager to have the sponsorship of the United Kingdom Government for entry into other international organisations. Japan should be able to contribute a significant degree of aid to under-developed countries; and there was likely to be scope for increasing trade between Japan and the United Kingdom.

Europe
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (63) 8th
Conclusions)

The Foreign Secretary said that there were indications that the French Government might not oppose arrangements which had been suggested by Dr. Schroeder, the West German Foreign Minister, for permanent machinery to enable contact to be maintained between ourselves and the countries of the European Economic Community. This machinery would supplement, and not replace, Western European Union.

The Cabinet—

Took note of these statements by the Foreign Secretary.

Iraq
Export of
Arms
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (63) 23rd
Conclusions,
Minute 5)

2. *The Chief Secretary, Treasury*, said that, in the light of the Cabinet's previous discussion, the Committee on Strategic Exports had come to the conclusion that it would be appropriate to accede to the requests made by the Iraqi Government for the provision of facilities for the training of officers and for the supply of tanks, aircraft and ammunition.

In discussion it was agreed in principle that the Iraqi requests should, so far as practicable, be met and that preparations should be made for this purpose. But, in view of the announcement that day that the Governments of Egypt, Iraq and Syria proposed to establish a Federal State, it would be expedient to defer action to give effect to this decision until the significance of this new development could be assessed.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Agreed that preparations should be put in hand to meet the requests made by the Government of Iraq for the provision of training facilities and military equipment.

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- (2) Invited the Foreign Secretary to give further consideration to the desirability of giving effect to the arrangements to be put in hand under Conclusion (1) above, in the light of the new situation created by the announcement that Iraq would be linked with Egypt and Syria in a Federal State.

Export of
Large Diameter
Steel Pipe
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (63) 23rd
Conclusions,
Minute 5)

3. The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the President of the Board of Trade (C. (63) 60) about the export of large diameter steel pipe from the United Kingdom to the Soviet bloc.

The Foreign Secretary said that on 21st November, 1962, the North Atlantic Council had decided to invite member countries to stop delivery of large diameter pipe to the Soviet bloc under existing contracts and to prevent new contracts for such deliveries "to the extent possible". We had made clear to the Council during the discussion preceding this decision that we had no means of preventing such exports by United Kingdom firms. We had, however, agreed not to veto the Council's decision, provided that it was clearly understood that in the case of the United Kingdom the words "to the extent possible" would mean "not at all".

In pursuance of the Council's decision the Federal Government of Germany had recently placed an embargo on further exports of steel pipe by German firms to the Soviet bloc. If a United Kingdom firm now secured an order for steel pipe from the Soviet Union, there would be strong resentment in the Federal Republic. There would also be repercussions on our relations with the Government of the United States, who maintained that the early completion of the oil pipeline connecting the Soviet Union with her satellites in Europe would have serious strategic consequences for the West. He had thought it necessary, however, in discussion with Dr. Schröder, the Federal German Foreign Minister, to make it clear to him that, if the Government were to seek to frustrate any order for steel pipe which any United Kingdom firm might succeed in obtaining from the Soviet Union, they might fail to secure the endorsement of Parliament.

The President of the Board of Trade said that the Soviet Union had approached the South Durham Steel and Iron Company earlier in the present month. It was likely that the firm would wish to send a representative to Moscow in the near future to discuss the terms of a possible contract. He had made it clear to the firm that there would be no objection on the Government's part to their proceeding with these negotiations; and they might succeed in obtaining an order. It had been suggested that the United States might be prepared to place orders of their own with the South Durham Company, which would have the effect of pre-empting the firm's capacity to manufacture steel pipe of the size in question; but there was as yet no concrete evidence to suggest that any orders of this kind would in fact be placed.

In discussion there was general agreement that it would be undesirable, both on economic and on political grounds, to seek to obstruct the negotiations in prospect between the South Durham Company and the Soviet Government or to prevent the fulfilment of any contract that might be negotiated as a result. It would be right, however, to give some public explanation of the Government's policy in this matter, including some account of the discussions in the North Atlantic Council and of the specific reservation which we had placed on the Council's ultimate decision, even though this would place the German Foreign Minister in a position of some difficulty in view of his own public assertion that the Council's

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SECRET**THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT***Printed for the Cabinet. April 1963***C.C. (63)
26th Conclusions****Copy No. 47****CABINET****CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at Admiralty House, S.W. 1,
on Thursday, 25th April, 1963, at 10.30 a.m.****Present:**

The Right Hon. HAROLD MACMILLAN, M.P., Prime Minister	
The Right Hon. R. A. BUTLER, M.P., First Secretary of State	The Right Hon. THE EARL OF HOME, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT HALSHAM, Q.C., Lord President of the Council and Minister for Science	The Right Hon. LORD DILHORNE, Lord Chancellor
The Right Hon. REGINALD MAUDLING, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer	The Right Hon. HENRY BROOKE, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department (<i>Items 1-2</i>)
The Right Hon. DUNCAN SANDYS, M.P., Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Secretary of State for the Colonies	The Right Hon. IAIN MACLEOD, M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
The Right Hon. PETER THORNEYCROFT, M.P., Minister of Defence	The Right Hon. EDWARD HEATH, M.P., Lord Privy Seal (<i>Items 3-7</i>)
The Right Hon. ERNEST MARPLES, M.P., Minister of Transport	The Right Hon. CHRISTOPHER SOAMES, M.P., Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (<i>Items 1-6</i>)
The Right Hon. JOHN BOYD-CARPENTER, M.P., Chief Secretary to the Treasury and Paymaster General	The Right Hon. J. ENOCH POWELL, M.P., Minister of Health (<i>Items 2-7</i>)
The Right Hon. Sir EDWARD BOYLE, M.P., Minister of Education (<i>Items</i> <i>1-6</i>)	The Right Hon. Sir KEITH JOSEPH, M.P., Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs
The Right Hon. WILLIAM DEEDES, M.P., Minister without Portfolio	

The following were also present:

Mr. ALAN GREEN, M.P., Minister of State, Board of Trade (<i>Item 6</i>)	The Right Hon. MARTIN REDMAYNE, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury
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Secretariat:

Sir BURKE TREND
Mr. A. L. M. CARY
Miss J. J. NUNN

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C.C. 26 (63)

Parliament

1. The Cabinet were informed of the business to be taken in the House of Commons in the following week.

**Report of the
Radcliffe
Tribunal
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (62) 68th
Conclusions,
Minute 2)**

2. The Cabinet had before them a Note by the Prime Minister (C. (63) 67), to which was appended a proof copy of a White Paper, to be published that day, containing the Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Vassal Case and Related Matters.

The Prime Minister said that the Report, as originally submitted, included certain passages which, for reasons of security, had been either omitted or amended in the version prepared for publication. These changes, however, were few in number and did not affect either the substance or the conclusions of the Report.

In discussion it was agreed that the Report would probably provoke a considerable amount of public discussion but that the Government should refrain from indicating their attitude to the issues which it raised until the forthcoming Parliamentary debate on security. It might become necessary to consider how far the journalists who had been imprisoned for refusing to disclose their sources of information to the Tribunal should be granted any facilities for expressing their views on the Tribunal's Report.

The Cabinet—

Took note, with approval, of C. (63) 67.

**Foreign
Affairs
Laos
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (63) 25th
Conclusions,
Minute 1)**

3. *The Foreign Secretary* said that, although we had some hope of securing Soviet co-operation in establishing the International Control Commission in the Plain of Jars, there seemed little prospect that the Soviet Government would agree that the Commission's authority should be extended over the whole of Laos. The Geneva agreement was now in jeopardy; and a partition of the country might become unavoidable. In that event the northern area would probably fall under Sino-Soviet influence; and the United States might feel obliged to intervene in the south and to take additional measures to support Thailand. It might become necessary to consider how far we ourselves should support action of this kind.

The Cabinet—

(1) Took note of the statement by the Foreign Secretary.

**United Arab
Republic
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (63) 25th
Conclusions,
Minute 2)**

The Foreign Secretary said that the implications of the recent union of Egypt, Syria and Iraq in a Federal State were not yet clear. The effect on Jordan might be serious, particularly if a new movement developed to overthrow the existing régime and the Government of Israel felt obliged, as a result, to intervene.

It would be necessary to keep the position of the Iraq Petroleum Company under close review and possibly to reconsider the projected sale of arms to Iraq in response to the recent request by the Iraqi Government. A decision on the latter issue should in any event be deferred until we had ascertained the reactions of the Government of Iran, who would probably oppose any measures likely to strengthen the new Federal State.

In discussion it was suggested that we should not be unduly influenced by Iranian susceptibilities. Provided that we could obtain satisfactory assurances from the Iraqi Government that they had no

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aggressive designs against Kuwait, it would be in our interest to adopt a reasonably helpful attitude towards their request, despite their endorsement of the Federal State.

The Cabinet—

- (2) Agreed to defer a decision on the recent request by the Government of Iraq for supplies of arms.
- (3) Agreed that, without prejudice to Conclusion (2) above, the normal supply to Iraq of spare parts and maintenance items for military equipment should continue.

**Military Aid
to India**

4. *The Commonwealth Secretary* said that the United States Government appeared to be divided on the desirability of providing additional military aid to the Government of India as an insurance against renewed aggression by Communist China. It would be desirable to keep some prospect of additional aid before the Indian Government in order to encourage them to reach agreement with the Government of Pakistan on Kashmir, but this should stop short of the proposal, which had some support in the United States Administration, for the provision of combat squadrons of aircraft to defend Indian cities against air attack.

In discussion it was generally agreed that a clear distinction should be maintained between the supply of military equipment and advice to the Indian Government and active participation by British forces in the defence of India. The latter could involve the United Kingdom in war with Communist China; and no commitment in this respect should be undertaken, or discussed with the Government of India, without full consideration by the Cabinet. If the Indian Government wished to engage other countries in the defence of India, they should be prepared to become members of the appropriate regional organisation for collective security and to accept the obligations which membership would entail.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Agreed that, pending further consideration of the issues involved, United Kingdom military aid to India should not extend to active participation by United Kingdom forces in the defence of Indian cities against air attack.
- (2) Invited the Foreign Secretary and the Commonwealth Secretary to represent to the United States Government the objections to such participation.
- (3) Invited the Minister of Defence to reconsider, in the light of Conclusion (1) above, a proposal that a squadron of Javelin aircraft should take part in an air defence exercise in India.

**United Kingdom Fishery
Limits
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (63) 25th
Conclusions,
Minute 4)**

5. *The Lord Privy Seal* informed the Cabinet that the new Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Pearson, had asked us to defer action to give effect to the Cabinet's recent decision to extend United Kingdom fishery limits until he had had an opportunity to discuss the issues involved during his visit to the United Kingdom in the following week. If we acceded to this request, we should give the countries concerned very little time in which to consider their position before 15th May, when our formal notice of termination of the Treaties involved must be given.

In discussion it was suggested that, since Mr. Pearson was probably concerned to ensure that discussion of future fishery limits should be the subject of an international conference, he might be content with an assurance that the immediate effect of our proposed

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SECRET**THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT***Printed for the Cabinet. May 1963***C.C. (63)
35th Conclusions****Copy No. 47****CABINET****CONCLUSIONS** of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at Admiralty House, S.W. 1,
on Tuesday, 28th May, 1963, at 11.30 a.m.**Present:**

The Right Hon. HAROLD MACMILLAN, M.P., Prime Minister	
The Right Hon. R. A. BUTLER, M.P., First Secretary of State	The Right Hon. VISCOUNT HAILSHAM, Q.C., Lord President of the Council and Minister for Science
The Right Hon. LORD DILHORNE, Lord Chancellor	The Right Hon. HENRY BROOKE, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department
The Right Hon. DUNCAN SANDYS, M.P., Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Secretary of State for the Colonies (Items 1-5)	The Right Hon. IAIN MACLEOD, M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
The Right Hon. ERNEST MARPLES, M.P., Minister of Transport	The Right Hon. CHRISTOPHER SOAMES, M.P., Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Items 1-5)
The Right Hon. FREDERICK ERROLL, M.P., President of the Board of Trade	The Right Hon. JOHN BOYD-CARPENTER, M.P., Chief Secretary to the Treasury and Paymaster General
The Right Hon. MICHAEL NOBLE, M.P., Secretary of State for Scotland	The Right Hon. J. ENOCH POWELL, M.P., Minister of Health
The Right Hon. Sir EDWARD BOYLE, M.P., Minister of Education	

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. JULIAN AMERY, M.P., Minister of Aviation (Item 4)	The Right Hon. HUGH FRASER, M.P., Secretary of State for Air (Item 4)
The Right Hon. THE EARL OF DUNDEE, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Items 1-5)	The Right Hon. MARTIN REDMAYNE, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury

Admiral of the Fleet The Right Hon.
THE EARL MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA,
Chief of the Defence Staff (Item 4)

Secretariat:

Sir BURKE TREND
Mr. A. L. M. CARY
Miss J. J. NUNN

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C.C. 35 (63)

Parliament

1. The Cabinet were informed of the business to be taken in the House of Commons in the following week.

Foreign Affairs**Iraq**

(Previous Reference :
C.C. (63) 28th
Conclusions,
Minute 2)

2. *The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs* said that the fact that the Government of Iraq had found it necessary to imprison a number of supporters of President Nasser and to execute certain adherents of the previous President of Iraq, General Kassem, tended to show that they had not yet established themselves firmly in power. Their position might be further weakened if a breakdown of the current negotiations with the Kurdish minority were to lead to further hostilities. On the other hand, our recent agreement to supply Iraq with military equipment had been warmly welcomed by the Government of Iraq and would increase our influence in Iraqi affairs.

Conference of African Heads of State

(Previous Reference :
C.C. (63) 34th
Conclusions,
Minute 2)

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs said that, during the Conference of African Heads of State which had taken place at Addis Ababa in the previous week, the President of Ghana, Dr. Nkrumah, and the Prime Minister of Uganda, Mr. Obote, had expressed markedly anti-Western views, particularly on the question of the independence of Southern Rhodesia. On the other hand, the resolution on this subject which the Conference had finally adopted had been more moderate than had at first seemed likely; in effect, it was confined to urging the United Kingdom Government not to grant independence to the Colony under a Constitution which would leave the government in the hands of a minority of the inhabitants.

Indonesia

(Previous Reference :
C.C. (63) 34th
Conclusions,
Minute 2)

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs said that the United States Government had now sent two envoys to Tokyo to discuss with the President of Indonesia, President Sukarno, the regulation recently issued by the Indonesian Government expropriating United States and United Kingdom oil interests in Indonesia. They appeared to believe that President Sukarno could be persuaded to agree to arrangements which would allow the oil companies to continue their operations; and there was some risk that they might be disposed to accept a settlement whereby 60 per cent of the realised prices of the output of oil would accrue to the Indonesian Government and only 40 per cent to the oil companies. There was also reason to believe that the Indonesian Government would seek to conclude a separate agreement with the United States Government, which would leave them free thereafter to proceed with the expropriation of the United Kingdom interests. The United States Government had therefore been asked to ensure that we should be represented at any discussions with the Indonesian authorities.

The Cabinet—

Took note of these statements by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

Expenses of Members of Parliament

(Previous Reference :
C.C. (61) 5th
Conclusions,
Minute 7)

3. *The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster* said that, if discussions now in progress with the Opposition resulted in agreement, it was proposed to table a Resolution providing for the payment of the railway fares of wives of Members of the House of Commons on a limited number of journeys between a Member's home, his constituency, and London.

In discussion it was suggested that, if the proposed concession included journeys between a Member's home and London, it should

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SUBJECT:

**India and Pakistan
Military Aid to India**

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C.C. 31 (63)

India and
Pakistan
Military Aid
to India
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (63) 30th
Conclusions)

The Cabinet resumed their discussion of the memorandum by the Commonwealth Secretary (C. (63) 82) on military aid for India. They had before them a draft message from the Prime Minister to the President of the United States, which indicated that any further military aid which the United Kingdom might be able to provide to India would have to be limited and emphasised the serious political objections to the proposal that United States and United Kingdom fighter squadrons should participate in the defence of Indian cities against air attack.

The Commonwealth Secretary said that, since the Cabinet's discussion on the previous day, he had been informed that the United States Government intended to discuss with the Indian Minister of Defence Production, Mr. Krishnamachari, who was at present in Washington and would shortly visit London, a programme of military aid comprising a number of successive instalments over several years. They would not seek to make the provision of such aid explicitly dependent on a resolution of the differences between the Governments of India and Pakistan about Kashmir; but they would emphasise the importance of achieving a settlement of this dispute. The assistance which they contemplated appeared to take the form of supplies of various types of equipment and the provision of training facilities for Indian personnel; as regards the provision of combat aircraft, they would merely offer to consider the possibility of participating in training exercises in India.

This indication of the scale on which the United States would be prepared to provide military assistance to India would make it difficult for us to adopt the negative attitude suggested in the draft message to President Kennedy; and, while there would be no harm in re-emphasising to the United States Government the political objections to any proposal that fighter aircraft should participate in the active defence of Indian cities, we should now seek to match the United States offer of assistance in other respects as nearly as our resources would allow.

In discussion the following main points were made:

(a) In the light of the generous assistance which we were already providing to India in relation to her programmes of social and economic development, we could not afford to make more than a very modest contribution to her rearmament, at least so long as the Indian Government, by refusing to reach a settlement with the Government of Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir, made it impossible to plan the defence of the sub-continent on a rational basis.

(b) This consideration was the more important in that the United States Government were already recommending the Federal German Government, against our advice, to sell aircraft to Pakistan. This might precipitate further requests for military aid from India; and we must avoid becoming involved in a process of competitive rearmament by India and Pakistan.

(c) We should not neglect the opportunity afforded by any further assistance which we might give to the Indian Government to press them to remove their present discrimination against British shipping.

(d) It was perhaps unlikely that the United States Government would be persuaded finally to abandon the proposal that United States and United Kingdom aircraft squadrons should participate in the air defence of Indian cities. They were the more likely to adhere to it in that it represented a form of assistance to India which they could undertake to provide without seeking prior Congressional approval. Moreover, they would tend to discount the political risks involved, in the light of current indications that the Indian Government themselves might eventually reject this offer on the grounds that it would be inconsistent with their policy of non-alignment.

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(e) Nevertheless, so long as this project remained under discussion, it would constitute a potentially dangerous moral commitment on our part; and we should continue to emphasise our objections to it as forcibly as possible.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that we should suggest to the United States Government that they should adopt a cautious attitude at this stage to the Indian request for military assistance and, in particular, should avoid any undertaking extending over a substantial period of time. In addition, we should continue to urge them to refrain from any commitment as regards active participation by United States and United Kingdom forces in the air defence of Indian cities, pending further examination of the implications of this course.

The Cabinet—

Took note that the Prime Minister would arrange for the United States Government to be informed, on the lines indicated in their discussion, of the United Kingdom views on the scale and nature of further military assistance to India.

Cabinet Office, S.W. 1.
16th May, 1963.

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SECRET**THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT***Printed for the Cabinet. July 1963***C.C. (63)
46th Conclusions****Copy No. 43****CABINET*****CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet, held in the Prime Minister's Room,
House of Commons, S.W. 1, on Thursday, 11th July, 1963, at 5 p.m.*****Present:****The Right Hon. HAROLD MACMILLAN, M.P., Prime Minister****The Right Hon. THE EARL OF HOME,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs****The Right Hon. REGINALD MAUDLING,
M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer****The Right Hon. IAIN MACLEOD, M.P.,
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster****The Right Hon. JOHN HARE, M.P.,
Minister of Labour****The Right Hon. CHRISTOPHER SOAMES,
M.P., Minister of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food****The Right Hon. JOHN BOYD-CARPENTER,
M.P., Chief Secretary to the Treasury
and Paymaster General****The Right Hon. J. ENOCH POWELL, M.P.,
Minister of Health****The Right Hon. VISCOUNT HAILSHAM,
Q.C., Lord President of the Council
and Minister of Science****The Right Hon. HENRY BROOKE, M.P.,
Secretary of State for the Home
Department****The Right Hon. PETER THORNEYCROFT,
M.P., Minister of Defence****The Right Hon. ERNEST MARPLES, M.P.,
Minister of Transport****The Right Hon. FREDERICK ERROLL,
M.P., President of the Board of Trade****The Right Hon. MICHAEL NOBLE, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Scotland****The Right Hon. Sir EDWARD BOYLE,
M.P., Minister of Education****The Right Hon. Sir KEITH JOSEPH, M.P.,
Minister of Housing and Local
Government and Minister for Welsh
Affairs****The following were also present:****The Right Hon. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.,
Minister of Aviation (Items 1-2)****THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, Minister of
State, Commonwealth Relations Office****The Right Hon. MARTIN REDMAYNE,
M.P., Parliamentary Secretary,
Treasury****Secretariat:****Sir BURKE TREND
Mr. A. L. M. CARY
Mr. P. A. WILKINSON****SECRET**

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(c) The fact that the interests of the High Commission Territories might suffer if we adopted a more restrictive policy in relation to the export of arms was an additional argument for avoiding, if possible, any significant change in the present arrangements.

(d) The United Kingdom had a substantial financial interest in the supply of arms to South Africa. For aircraft alone current orders amounted to £26 million, while orders worth £1½ million were currently under negotiation and further orders, worth £47 million, were in prospect.

(e) The adoption of a moderate resolution on the lines proposed would still leave us in difficulty in the case of certain types of arms supplies, since equipment such as tanks, armoured cars and helicopters could be used both for external defence and for the enforcement of apartheid. Moreover, even if it were agreed to prohibit the export of further weapons of this sort, we could hardly refuse to permit the sale of ammunition and spares for weapons and vehicles which we had already supplied to the South African Government.

(f) A more discriminatory resolution, particularly one in mandatory terms, would be deeply resented by the South African Government and might endanger the Simonstown Agreement, which was of considerable strategic importance to the United Kingdom. This risk, however, must be weighed against the damage which might be caused to our relations with other Commonwealth countries, in some of which other important defence interests were at stake, if the United Kingdom were thought to be facilitating the supply to South Africa of arms which could be used for repressive purposes.

The Cabinet—

Authorised the Foreign Secretary, in the light of their discussion, to instruct the United Kingdom delegation at the United Nations to join the United States delegation in seeking to promote a resolution on the lines of paragraph 5 of C. (63) 115.

Egypt
Nubian
Monuments
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (61) 61st
Conclusions,
Minute 4)

3. The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Minister of Education (C. (63) 119) on the preservation of the Nubian monuments which were liable to be submerged as a result of the construction of the High Dam across the Nile.

The Minister of Education said that the cost of the new scheme for saving these monuments which had been adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) would be \$36 million. The Government of the United Arab Republic would be prepared to place contracts for the work as soon as a sum of \$32 million had been pledged by countries prepared to participate. The United States Government had agreed to contribute one-third of the total cost; and contributions from other countries already amounted to over \$19 million, leaving a deficit of only \$750,000 to be made good. If we did not contribute to the project, the United Kingdom would be the only country with a major archaeological reputation to abstain from participation. He therefore proposed that we should agree to subscribe \$250,000.

In discussion the following points were made:

(a) At a time when the Egyptian Government were failing to honour the agreed arrangements for compensating British subjects whose assets in Egypt had been expropriated and, in addition, were suspected of using poison gas in the Yemen public opinion in this country would be liable to criticise any contribution by the Government to a project of the kind proposed.

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C.C. 46 (63)

(b) On the other hand the current policies of the Egyptian Government were irrelevant to a scheme which was designed to preserve in perpetuity monuments which were of historical interest and international concern. Although it seemed unlikely that the Soviet Government would contribute to the project, our own reputation as a civilised country required us to respond to the appeal.

(c) It was understood that the United States Government had arranged to discharge their contribution by drawing on blocked currency balances in Egypt. It was for consideration whether we should adopt a similar course and should take the opportunity so afforded to arrange for a corresponding payment to be made to United Kingdom citizens whose assets in Egypt were at present blocked.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Agreed in principle that the United Kingdom should contribute the sum of \$250,000 to the project which had now been adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation for the preservation of the Nubian monuments.
- (2) Invited the Minister of Education, in consultation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Foreign Secretary, to give further consideration to the possibility that this contribution might be paid in such a way as to enable the Government to arrange for a corresponding payment to United Kingdom citizens whose assets in Egypt were blocked.

Shipbuilding
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (63) 32nd
Conclusions,
Minute 8)

Replacement
for the
Queen Mary

4. The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (C. (63) 122) about a proposed replacement of the *Queen Mary*.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the proposal now put forward by the Cunard Company for the construction of a Q.4 was even less attractive than the earlier proposal for a Q.3 (which Parliament had endorsed only with considerable reluctance), particularly in so far as it involved a larger proportionate contribution from the Government at more favourable rates of interest. Moreover, the Company intended that the Q.4, unlike the Q.3, should be used for winter cruising. This would be bound to stimulate demands from other companies for Exchequer assistance in support of any of their own ships which might be put to a similar use. The Economic Policy Committee had therefore reached the unanimous conclusion that, despite the political criticism which might be evoked by a decision which would be represented as a virtual withdrawal from the express trans-Atlantic liner service, the Company's proposal should be rejected. In announcing this decision, however, the Government should also undertake to increase the amount of Exchequer credit to be made available for shipbuilding under the new credit scheme.

In discussion there was general agreement with this view.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Agreed that the Cunard Company should be informed that their new proposal for the construction of a ship (Q.4) to replace the *Queen Mary* was unacceptable to the Government.
- (2) Invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in consultation with the Minister of Transport, to arrange that the announcement of the decision under Conclusion (1) above should be accompanied, if possible, by a statement that the Government proposed to increase the amount of Exchequer credit to be made available for shipbuilding under the new credit scheme.

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CONFIDENTIAL**THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT***Printed for the Cabinet. July 1963***C. (63) 119**
9th July, 1963Copy No. **59****CABINET****NUBIAN MONUMENTS****MEMORANDUM BY THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION**

In March 1960, in response to pleas by the Governments of the U.A.R. and the Sudan, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) launched an international appeal for funds to save the monuments of Nubia which will be submerged by 1964 as a result of the construction of the High Dam. The United Kingdom's contribution to two of the main aims has consisted of Treasury grants, up to a maximum of £45,000, to the Egypt Exploration Society for British participation in the work of rapidly investigating unexplored archaeological sites in Nubia and of transferring temples which can be moved to safe sites.

2. A third aim has been to preserve some monuments *in situ*. The most famous are the temples of Abu Simbel, and much publicity has surrounded the efforts to save them. The first proposal adopted was an Italian scheme, estimated to cost \$70 million, to raise the temples whole above the eventual level of the Nile. The project was planned in two stages—the first being the lifting operation and the second restoring the landscape. The Cabinet considered at its meeting on 9th November, 1961, (C.C. (61) 61st Conclusions) whether the United Kingdom should contribute to the cost of this scheme and came provisionally to the conclusion that a contribution would not then be justified. (At that time there was no indication that either the USSR or the United States intended to subscribe.)

3. The Italian scheme remained the most favoured until the 12th General Conference of UNESCO in December of last year. By the autumn of 1962 it had become clear that the money, even for the first stage, would not be found from voluntary contributions. The conference therefore had before it a proposal to finance the first stage of the scheme from loan and make the repayments a charge on UNESCO's general budget over a period of 15 years. The total cost, including interest, would have been some \$42 million. This compulsory plan was defeated by a decisive majority of votes.

4. The conference agreed, however, that the appeal fund should be continued, and the Executive Committee of the Campaign, together with the Government of the U.A.R., have been considering alternative proposals. It has now been formally decided to adopt a Swedish scheme, estimated to cost up to \$36 million (\$32 million plus \$4 million for contingencies) to cut the monuments into sections and lift them piece by piece to be reassembled in a new and higher position. A major factor in the decision was the known willingness of the United States Government, now confirmed, to contribute a third of the cost (\$12 million) from blocked funds in Egypt. More than \$19 million have already been pledged from other sources, including \$11½ million from the U.A.R. Among the other major contributors are Germany, approximately \$1,845,000; Italy, \$1,800,000; France, \$1,000,000; Netherlands, \$533,000; Spain, \$270,000; Japan, \$1,000,000.* The amount remaining to be found towards the basic sum of \$32 million (at which point the U.A.R.

* Several of these countries—in particular the United States, Germany and Italy—have also contributed substantial sums for other monuments under the campaign. The United States contributed \$5 million alone for preserving the temples at Philae.

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Government will be willing to sign contracts) is about \$3 million. The chief reason advanced by my predecessor for not contributing to this part of the campaign at an earlier stage was that if large sums of extra money could be found for UNESCO they should be devoted to the urgent educational needs of Africa. I fully agreed with this argument and have continued to act upon it. Nevertheless there are new factors in the present situation which make it necessary for us to look afresh at the case for a United Kingdom contribution.

5. It has been represented to me again, by the Director-General of UNESCO, that if we do not contribute to the appeal we shall be the only country with a major interest in archaeology, and particularly an outstanding reputation in the field of Egyptology, to remain out of the picture. Apart from this argument, which counted with some of my colleagues when the matter was last discussed, the situation is now different from what it was in 1961 in that the sum of money still to be found is now marginal compared with the total cost, so that even a comparatively modest contribution by the United Kingdom would have an appreciable effect in helping to fill the gap. If Her Majesty's Government still decline to contribute we shall be very much isolated, and are likely to arouse suspicions with the United Arab Republic that our attitude is basically one of hostility. Moreover, we shall encounter severe criticism in this country not least in Parliament where members of all parties have been pressing me on this matter. I think these arguments carry weight, and that there is now a strong case for a United Kingdom contribution.

6. In 1960 the Foreign Secretary, who favoured a United Kingdom contribution for political reasons, recommended a sum of £50,000. If a United Kingdom contribution was to be effective as an example to other countries, and earn credit with the member States of UNESCO, I should be inclined to favour a somewhat larger sum (which could be pledged now but need not be paid until the next financial year). I recommend that we should subscribe \$250,000 (just under £90,000).

E. C. G. B.

Ministry of Education, W. I,
8th July, 1963.

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